

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THE NATIONAL REVIEW.

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MARCH TO AUGUST,

1898.

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CONTENTS OF VOL. XXXI.

AUTHOR.		PAGE
Abell, H. F.	Is Cricket Degenerating?	700
A Colonial Chronicle		145, 302, 449, 602, 757, 914
Ashley, Right Hon. Evelyn	Mr. Gladstone	536
Atkins, T.	The Army as a Career	233
Baldry, A. L.	An Artist of Many Methods	96
Blake, J. Y. F.	Second Thoughts on Rhodesia	118
Bullen, F. T.	A Reminiscence of Manila	856
Bulwer, Sir Edward, K.C.B.	The British Army	39
Colomb, Vice-Admiral P. H.	First Impressions of the War	523
" " "	Second Impressions of the War	835
Dawson, W. H.	German Elections	886
Deane, Rev. Anthony	The "Religious" Novel	244
De Viti de Marco, The Marquis	Recent Insurrections in Italy	902
Correspondence	The Sugar Crash and After. By Sir Charles Walpole	162
"	Indian Currency. By William Fowler	472
"	A Remonstrance. By An Afrikander	626
"	Irish Land Acts. By Dr. Anthony Traill	776
Episodes of the Month		1, 165, 325, 477, 629, 781
Edwardes, Miss Betham-	A Publicist's View of France	422
Elliott, Robert H.	India in Deep Waters	721
Foreman, John	The Coming Partition of China	87
Gibbs, Hon. Herbert C.	The Indian Crisis, and a Remedy.	53
Hale, Colonel Lonsdale	The Unreadiness of the Volunteers	683
Hampson, J. N.	Great Britain *v.* France and Russia	502
Henson, Rev. H. H.	Mr. Kensit—and After	694
Holland, Hon. Lionel R., M.P.	Old-Age Pensions	868
Huguenot	The Truth about Dreyfus	541
Lawson, W. R.	Russia's Sinews of War	218
Low, A. Maurice	American Affairs	105, 253, 403, 565, 710
Maccoll, D. S.	Among the International Artists.	559
Maguire, T. Miller	Surprise in War	361
Markoff, Dr. A. V.	The Policy of Russia	206

603350

AUTHOR.		PAGE
Maryland	Married Women in American Society	896
Maxse, Admiral	Face to Face in West Africa	29
Maxse, L. J.	The Military Terror in France	745
" "	M. Cavaignac's Vindication of Captain Dreyfus	814
Michie, A.	Our Future Policy in China	654
Moore, Professor W. Harrison	Constitution Making in Australia	269
Morison, Theodore	A Descendant of the Prophets	578
Phillipps, L. March	The Chartered Company	374
Reeves, Hon. W. Pember	Two Foreign Critics of Australasia	587
Richardson, C. Morgan	Plunder by Death Duties	432
Shadwell, Arthur	Should Inebriates be Imprisoned?	280
" "	Journalism as a Profession	845
Sorrows of a Scribbler	. . . . .	63
Statham, H. H.	Street Music	734
Stutfield, G. H.	Handicaps	386
Stutfield, H. E. M.	The Higher Rascality	75
Traill, Dr. Anthony	The Irish Land Acts at Work	130
Vambéry, Professor	Great Britain and Her Rivals in Asia	191
Vane, Lady	The Autocrat of the Sickroom	418
White, Arnold	The Russian Bogey	802
Whitmore, C. A., M.P.	Our Defeat and some Morals	263
Williams, Charles	The Advance on the Soudan	351
Wilson, H. W.	Front Bench Invertebrates	292
" "	The Truth about the Maine	671

G.W.R. MECHANICS' INSTITUTION. NEW SWINDON.

THE NATIONAL REVIEW.

No. 181.—MARCH, 1898.

EPISODES OF THE MONTH.

THE PRIZE ESSAY.

We desire to remind our readers of the prize of £50 (half contributed by the Navy League, and the other half by THE NATIONAL REVIEW) for a typewritten essay or story of not more than 10,000 words, giving a forecast of the probable effects upon the United Kingdom of an indecisive war against two first-class Powers, it being borne in mind that ocean cables would probably be cut before war was declared and that the price of bread would rise to at least 1s. per loaf. Manuscripts must be sent to the Navy League, at 13, Victoria Street, London, S.W., not later than March 31st (1898), signed with a motto, and accompanied by a sealed envelope, with corresponding inscription, containing name and address of the writer, to be opened only when the prize is awarded. No questions will be answered by the League or ourselves relating to this announcement. The copyright of the successful essay will belong to the Executive of the League, who reserve to themselves the right of publication in such form as they shall think fit. Its first public appearance will be in THE NATIONAL REVIEW.

OPENING OF PARLIAMENT.

Parliament was opened with the customary formalities on the 9th of February amid feverish public interest, though not perhaps of the usual kind. Ordinarily popular attention is concerned with the legislative pro-

posals of the Queen's Speech and the order of precedence accorded them. But this year so completely is the national mind diverted from "the minor problems," as Mr. Chamberlain has courageously termed domestic politics, and so correspondingly absorbed is it with "the major problems" that the contents of the Speech from the Throne, though not less copious and far-reaching than its predecessors, attracted but a mild flicker of interest save in its references to external and Imperial affairs. Her Majesty announced the conclusion of the dreary negotiations, which have been dragging on ever since the short sharp war between Greece and Turkey, by the signature of a treaty leaving "the territorial relation" of the two Powers "practically unchanged." As to Crete "the difficulty of arriving at an unanimous agreement" has "unduly protracted the deliberations of the Powers," and "hope" of results is all that is entertained. The recent accession of British troops to the Egyptian Army in the Soudan was attributed to the rumoured intention of the Khalifa to advance, and the welcome and relevant announcement was made that "a treaty of commerce and friendship has been concluded with the Emperor of Abysinnia." There followed a lengthy reference to the "severe depression" of the West Indies, caused by "a heavy fall in the price of sugar, which is mainly attributable to the reduction in the cost of production and the great increase in its extent during recent years . . . . . artificially stimulated by the system of bounties . . . maintained in many European States. There are signs of a growing opinion in those States that this system is injurious to the general interests of their population; and communications are now in progress between my Government and the Governments principally concerned, with a view to a conference on the subject, which I trust may result in the abolition of the bounties." All the world knows that the one thing needful in order to abolish "the artificial stimulus" to the ruin of the West Indies, *i.e.*, the foreign bounties, is for Great Britain to threaten an artificial restriction in the shape of a countervailing duty equivalent to the bounty. Only in that way can the "growing opinion" abroad against bounties—upon which so much reliance is placed within ten years of a former disappointment—be made effective. That her Majesty's Ministers should fail to recognize this obvious fact, or, recognizing it, should fail to act upon it, is distinctly discouraging to an immense number of her Majesty's subjects in all parts of the Empire. A countervailing duty by killing bounties would restore Free Trade between our sugar-producing colonies and the Mother Country. Free Trade conditions can be no less sound when they suit the interests of a colony than when they suit the interests of the Mother Country.

It is evident from the Speech that our statesmen prefer the quasi-Protectionist system of "doles to the distressed," which will be vigorously and rightly overhauled in the House of Commons. At the end of the REVIEW will be found a short but most graphic letter from Sir Charles Walpole (late Chief Justice of the Bahamas) depicting the catastrophe approaching in the West Indies if we cannot make up our minds to defend them against their enemies.

"BILL STICKING." The Imperial section of the Queen's Speech comprised also a couple of paragraphs giving a most succinct account of the risings on the Indian frontier, and paying a warm tribute to the fortitude and gallantry of the troops engaged in quelling them. There were also "anxious" references to the returning plague in Western India, while thankfulness was expressed at the disappearance of the famine which "may now be said to be at an end, excepting within a small tract in Madras," but we fear the dogged optimism of the India Office betrays itself in the assertion, "that there is reason to anticipate a prosperous year, both for agriculture and commerce, throughout my Indian dominions." The coming increase of the army was foreshadowed in the recognition that, though the estimates "have been framed with the utmost desire for economy," "the duty of providing for the defence of the Empire involves an expenditure which is beyond former precedent," owing to "the enormous armaments which are now maintained by other nations." The recital of the principal Bills to be introduced by the Government contained no surprise to the newspaper public, as they had already been accurately anticipated. A critic might, perhaps, be disposed to regret that the bitter experience of former years has not saved the Cabinet from loading up the Speech with far more projects of legislation than the Session can accommodate. Every Government commits the same blunder, which as an Opposition it protested against. We can all recall Mr. Balfour's and Mr. Chamberlain's indignant indictment of their predecessors for "plastering the hoardings" with Bills there was no time to pass, and inferentially no intention to pass, and "a Bill-sticking Government" became a byword. Now, however, the public are threatened with an immense array of Ministerial measures, and, although the saving clause "if time permits," is inserted a short and *bonâ fide* list would have been preferable. In the forefront we have as the staples of the Session: (1) Irish Local Government; (2) Army Reform; (3) Prisoner's Evidence Bill—which we trust will be rejected; (4) Amendment of Scotch Private Bill Procedure; (5) Creation of Municipalities in London; (6) Amendment of the Vaccination Laws. Then in the background we have: (*a*) Church

Reform; (*b*) The Establishment of a London University; (*c*) Prison Reform; (*d*) Secondary Education; (*e*) Mercantile Marine Fund Reform; (*f*) Company Law Reform; (*g*) Agricultural Holdings Reform; (*h*) Adulteration of Drugs and Food. It is alleged that supporters of a Bill are soothed by hearing it mentioned in the Queen's Speech, in which case they must be as simple as Mr. Verdant Green. One would have thought that the promoter of a Bill would far sooner learn that it had been passed without having been "mentioned" than "mentioned" without any prospect of passing.

Philosophy.

The interest of the Debate on the Address, in reply to the Speech from the Throne, centred—in the House of Lords—round Lord Salisbury's statement, which had been awaited with undisguised impatience. His colleagues, Mr. Balfour, Mr. Chamberlain, and notably Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, had all employed language on platforms which implied that vital British interests in the Far East were menaced by other nations, who sought to establish spheres of influence or privileged provinces in China, from which outsiders would be excluded. Great Britain formulated in reply the policy of "open doors" and "equality of opportunity," which had been expounded with much felicity by Mr. Balfour, and with some bluntness by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. This claim for "freedom of foreign trade" received the emphatic endorsement of Opposition speakers, such as Lord Kimberley, Mr. Asquith, and Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, as our pages testified last month. Moreover, although we have the *minimum* of confidence in the cablegrams of *The Times'* New York correspondent, because he is unable to recognize anything in the Western Hemisphere beyond New York, there are independent grounds for believing that British policy in China has American approval. These and other circumstances combined to create an "atmosphere" in which a more theatrical statesman would have revelled. But Lord Salisbury was in his most philosophical mood, and steadily declined to respond to the fighting temper that had been aroused, and was serenely indifferent to the suggestion that he had "climbed down" to Russia, the evidence for which, it must be confessed, was exceedingly flimsy, viz., the publication in a newspaper of an alleged agreement between China and Great Britain in the middle of negotiations. This smart piece of journalism was immediately responsible for the breakdown of the negotiations by putting other Powers on the war-path, and the culprit has been severely blamed for his "unpatriotic" conduct. But it should be remembered that

the Chinese were determined that knowledge of the negotiations should get abroad, so that Russia and Great Britain might be played off against one another—as at Constantinople in former days. What we are pointing out, in passing, is the simplicity which treats premature disclosures as final terms between the parties, and taunts one or other with diplomatic humiliation merely because the final terms, when disclosed, do not correspond with the early suggestion. The Chinese Government is a past-master in the art of procrastination, and people will be well advised to suspend their judgment until progress is reported from headquarters. The general lines of our policy have been laid down, and generally approved. We may rely on their being adhered to.

A SIGNIFICANT SENTIMENT.

Lord Salisbury refused to gratify the curiosity of Lord Kimberley, who leads the attenuated Radical Peerage, "to tell him everything that has gone on in China," but he admitted that Sir Michael Hicks-Beach's famous reference to "war" had been provoked by suggestions that "our treaty rights in China might be set aside and that the comparative freedom of traffic which we have achieved by the treaty of Tientsin might be destroyed by the action of other European Powers. I think it quite right that a protest should be made against the mere entertainment of such an idea though I do not for an instant suggest that any European Power really entertained it." And to relieve public anxiety Lord Salisbury added a sentence that puts our China policy in a nut-shell and comprises the doctrine of the open door and the equality of opportunity for all nations, "not only have we not surrendered one iota of the treaty rights, but we have no intention of surrendering them, and though I will not make use of those high-sounding words which grate on the noble earl's nerves, I will say that their is no effort which this country will not make rather than allow those rights to be destroyed." The speaker significantly added: "I venture to hope, knowing the soundness of the judgment of the statesmen by whom Europe is governed, that no such intention will ever be entertained." So far there had been no "desperate diplomatic battle in favour of the treaty of Tientsin," and Lord Salisbury attributed the "strained excitement" that had arisen over this question "to extraordinary confusion of thought" which he cleared up in the following satisfactory sentences:—"There are some persons in this country who imagine that by the treaty of Tientsin we have acquired the right to force China to take a loan, and also the right to force them to take with it any conditions we may think fit to impose. We did not make the proposal to China, it was China

that proposed to us that we should guarantee the loan. The proposal was received, I observe, with the greatest enthusiasm in this country, an enthusiasm to which there was no echo in my own mind, for I felt the greatest hesitation about the proposal, not because I was in doubt whether it was worth our while to make a small contribution to the necessities of China, but because I rather dreaded entering upon the path of finding money for a Government that might want money. China is not the only Government in the world that might want money, and I should be sorry if we encouraged demands which, of course, we might not be able to deal with, and by which we might be embarrassed." Eventually the British Government decided to make an advance "on very favourable terms" in return for certain concessions in China "directed to the object of increasing and freeing the trade with China, and none of them contained anything injurious to China herself," but "as the negotiations are not concluded, it would not be right for me to go through the proposals."

THE LEGEND OF TA-LIEN-WAN.

Lord Salisbury proceeded to investigate "the legend of Ta-lien-wan," about which there was an extraordinary outburst of perfectly honest but, perhaps, superfluous excitement in the early days of February. Men were prepared to lay down their lives for Ta-lien-wan though they had never heard of it before, and, in nine cases out of ten, had not the smallest conception of its whereabouts. "What happened in respect to Ta-lien-wan was this, it was mentioned with other treaty ports by Sir Claude MacDonald, with our approval, to the Chinese Council somewhere about January 16th, and the Chinese Council the next day informed us that it would embarrass them very much, for reasons which it was not necessary to enter into very closely, and for their own personal comfort and well-being they desired that we should not insist on this proposal. The next day, that is the 17th I think, I replied that this particular proposal was not essential, though we had thought it advantageous, and I suggested as a compromise that the opening of Ta-lien-wan as a treaty port should be put off until the time when the railway might have reached that port, because it is obvious to anybody who knows anything of that country that the country behind Ta-lien-wan is practically worthless in itself, and that no trade could arise there until the railway reaches the port. A few days afterwards, Sir Claude MacDonald reported to me that that compromise had been accepted as a condition of the loan, and from that day to this I have heard nothing more of Ta-lien-wan. So all the extraordinary legends that came over the wire as to the condition having been withdrawn, as far as I know, as far as the information which has

reached me goes, are absolutely without foundation." Lord Salisbury added: "But I am bound to say that I do not feel very much interested, and for this reason, that we have received, spontaneously, from the Russian Government the written assurance that any port which they might obtain leave to employ for the outlet of their commerce would be a free port, free to the commerce of this country. Now, a free port is much better than a treaty port. So having ascertained that Ta-lien-wan was to be a free port, it interested us very little indeed to know whether it was to be a treaty port or not. I may say that similar assurances have been made to us by the German Government with respect to the territory they have recently occupied; indeed, the German Government went further, and were more flattering to us, for their Ambassador informed me they had come to the conclusion that our manner of dealing with such things, at all events in the Colonies, is better than theirs, and that in this instance, at any rate, they intended to imitate our methods." It appears to us on a calm review of the position as disclosed by authentic facts that Great Britain has adopted a Policy which commends itself to the common-sense, not only of this, but of other nations having independent interests in China. Moreover, several valuable steps have already been taken in pursuance of that policy, as is clearly shown by Lord Salisbury's speech, and if any faith, whatsoever, may be placed in rumour, these steps are not solitary.

WISDOM FROM WASHINGTON.

By the side of Lord Salisbury's declaration of policy we desire to place a striking extract from a speech delivered in the Senate of the United States on January 11th, by Senator Teller, the mover of the famous Teller resolution which was recently carried in the Senate by a large majority, and was accompanied by the usual outcry from newspapers whose dogmatism on American affairs is only surpassed by their ignorance thereof. Mr. Teller, who is one of the most respected and influential men in the public life of the Republic, is the leader of the Silver Republicans. We are not allowed to appreciate him in this country because he is not appreciated in New York, which is the great distorting medium between the American and British people; but it would be hard to name any man whose opinion has more weight with public opinion in the United States in its largest sense. On the Chinese question Senator Teller said: "I am not afflicted with Anglomania or Anglophobia. I want no entangling alliances, and yet I would have the same kind of entangling alliances about the country over there (China) that we had with Mr. Canning about South America. I would say to Great Britain, and I would say it in a way she would understand, 'We will join you in a protest, and if it comes to the worst we will join you in any efforts you may

make to maintain the autonomy of China, of Persia, Afghanistan, and Beluchistan, all now threatened by the great Russian Bear, and Germany and France combined.' I should see to it not in the interest of trade alone, but in the interest of the human race, and in the interest of my own American people, that those great Powers do not dismember that country, and are not allowed to go into it, with the result that it, with its great population and activities, should become competitors with us and competitors with our own Christian brethren throughout the world. . . . . I would say to France, to Germany, and to Russia, and I would say it if England were in the combine, which, thank God, she is not, 'Hands off! let the autonomy of that great country remain as it has been for more than four thousand years.'" These, in our judgment, are the most sagacious words that have been spoken on the Chinese question since it was first broached some weeks ago. Senator Teller realises the peril to civilisation involved in "the opening up" of these yellow myriads. The "light heart" with which Europe contemplates the prospect recall's Olivier's *cœur leger* when France plunged into the *débacle* of 1870. This wise reminder from Washington is needed.

Tunis.

Lord Salisbury dealt in easy discursive terms with the thousand and one other questions, any one of which is liable at the most inopportune moment to blossom into "a crisis" and to acquire the dignity of "head lines." Though speeches make a convenient text we cannot deluge our readers with extracts, and can only hope that some percentage of the topics treated in the Premier's annual Parliamentary survey may abstain from becoming acute during the coming month. The references to Tunis and Madagascar, however, are, in themselves, sufficiently serious to require notice, while recent events have given them a painful interest. It is notorious that Lord Salisbury has been angrily accused, not merely by "Tory jingoes," but by the pundits of the last Cabinet, of "knuckling down" to France all over the world, and the phrase "graceful concession," originally coined by the leading Conservative paper *The Standard*, has been eagerly adopted by the Opposition to describe our policy. Siam, Tunis, and Madagascar are the stock instances given of "the frittering away of valuable British interests," special stress being laid upon the two latter to illustrate this "feebleness." Now, we believe, Lord Salisbury's sustained endeavour to cultivate the goodwill of France is not merely wise, but popular, and that if it involves an occasional concession on our part *le jeu vaut bien la chandelle*, provided France is willing in her turn to make corresponding concessions to us, and to show her

appreciation of the spirit in which she has been met. So far, however, there has not been a scintilla of evidence indicating concession or appreciation on her part. *Without* our "surrender" in Tunis and Madagascar France would hardly be "nastier" than she is. Are they slight or worthless? The French have always attached the same importance to their work in Tunis that we attach to ours in Egypt. Indeed, the cases are curiously on all fours, both countries being "integral parts of the Turkish Empire" into which the "usurpers" entered to restore order, and with definite pledges to retire when their mission had been accomplished. The undertakings of both nations were *bona fide*, but subsequent experience has shown them to have been rash. The French have found their occupation of Tunis as irretrievable as we find our occupation of Egypt, and it has been a cardinal object of French diplomacy to obtain our recognition of their right to remain where they are, which many Englishmen would have withheld except in return for a reciprocal recognition of our status in Egypt. Lord Salisbury has been severely attacked for deciding otherwise and granting France a free hand in Tunis in return for a paltry reduction of duties on cotton goods, which the French are already seeking to repudiate.* The French are notoriously jubilant over their "diplomatic victory" in Tunis. We do not grudge it them, provided it is not regarded as conferring upon them a sort of divine right to "graceful concessions."

THE "CASE OF MADAGASCAR."

When national passion is aroused it is almost as hard to be just as for a camel to go through the eye of a needle. When, however, Lord Salisbury told the story of Madagascar in the House of Lords no national passion had been excited, and it would be difficult to conceive a more dispassionate recital of a distinct international misdemeanour on the part of France, not merely affecting ourselves, but also other nations who had treaties with the Hova Government that were annulled when it was overthrown :—

"The case of Madagascar was this. The French Government had invaded Madagascar. They did that when the noble lord was in office in the Ministry of

* Lord Salisbury did not enter upon the political side of the Tunisian question, and defended his "bargain" thus:—"The case of Tunis is this. There was a Tunis treaty—that was a very good treaty—but it depended for its life on the life of the Regency of Tunis, and that was about as bad a life as any political life I have known. The noble earl stated accurately the rule of international law. I think it has received a general concurrence that when a Government has disappeared the treaties it has made disappears with it, and therefore we thought it was a very good bargain which exchanged a Tunis treaty that was precarious for a French treaty which is stable. The French treaty will last, and the French treaty has the additional advantage of giving for a certain number of years a great advantage to our staple industry and commerce. I can see, therefore, the bargain is a good one."

Mr. Gladstone. Mr. Gladstone did not take any step to prevent the invasion and conquest of Madagascar. I do not blame him, but that is the exact distribution of responsibility between us. Then two years ago the French Government resolved that they would enforce the protectorate which had existed ever since the invasion of the island, and which they had set up. They announced that they were going to reinforce and strengthen their protectorate. The French Minister made that statement in the most clear and manifest terms, and the armies of France invaded the island avowedly with the intention of maintaining the protectorate. If they had carried out the intention of maintaining the protectorate our treaties would have been safe. If we had desired to prevent the French from invading the protectorate the time for us to interfere was when that expedition was about to start. When that expedition was about to start the noble earl himself was in office. He did not raise any objection, and I am not surprised that he did not raise any objection, because the French Minister announced in the very clearest terms that it was to reinforce and strengthen the protectorate that the expedition was made. When the French Government were in possession and absolute masters of what they would do, they suddenly announced that they would change the protectorate into an annexation, and with it all our treaties had fallen. I do not for a moment blame the noble earl for the course taken, but if there is a responsibility in the matter it is the responsibility of having allowed the French to invade the island. The real truth is, I think, we have some grounds for discontent at the treatment which we have received in this matter at the hands of the French Government. We have protested against it very strongly, and we conceive that the adverse tariff now being inflicted on us is a tariff which the French Government, according to the ordinary rules of international comity, are not entitled to enforce. I do not know whether the noble lord blames me for not having gone a step farther. I do not think he does. But I do not in the least conceal my impression of the interpretation which the French Government has put upon their rights or the manner in which they have set aside their clear pledges as to what the expedition was to have done."

West Africa.

In the middle of February the British public found themselves plunged into a fresh crisis, though its advent was hardly a surprise to any serious student of current affairs. It is none the less disagreeable, and at the time of writing it has become acute and threatens to jeopardize our relations with our nearest neighbour. It is unnecessary for us to discuss it in detail, as the position is fully explained in an article farther on in this number. The main point is that France and Great Britain have assumed positions in West Africa from which one of them will be compelled to recede, and both nations are fully aware that a "graceful concession" is the only pacific solution of the difficulty, though both seem equally averse to making it. France, it is said, is resolute, and refuses to budge an inch, or even to arbitrate. She has convinced herself that in colonial matters her part is to take and ours to give. The relations are under no circumstances to be reversed. The general British feeling, on the one hand, is that the resources of concession to France have been exhausted and wasted, that there is nothing to show for "Tunis" or "Madagascar," but, on the contrary, that every surrender is accepted by France as an incentive to fresh aggression, that instead of becoming more friendly

she steadily becomes more hostile. There is consequently a not unreasonable but practically unanimous desire in this country that the Government should adopt a firmer policy on the present occasion. France has for some years been endeavouring to elbow Great Britain out of West Africa, and, when we compare the present map with that of a few years ago, the success of French "pushfulness," or "land-grabbing," is undeniable. France appears to claim the right to complete the chain of territory which she has been drawing round our West Coast Colonies. She would then, by means of the tariffs she imposes wherever she goes, be able to block their access to the interior, and so kill their trade. She seems to rest her claim on the novel ground that she has made such "sacrifices" in forging three-fourths of the chain that Great Britain cannot in decency refuse to let her complete it. The British, while admiring the initiative and dash displayed by the French in founding a Greater France in West Africa, while recognizing that the *Hinterland* of two of their Colonies is irretrievably lost with fatal results to their trade, deny that they are constrained to acquiesce in the ruin of the remainder. If any claim to "compensation for sacrifices" is to be heard it should be that of Great Britain, for the "sacrifices" sustained by her Colonies. We will not trouble the reader here with any geographical details, as they are explained elsewhere, except to ask him to bear in mind a place called Boussa on the Niger, now in unlawful occupation of the French, in defiance of the protest of the British Government. If the French are permitted to retain Boussa, Great Britain may be regarded as having "climbed down." The immediate danger arises from the fact that since the French declared they would disregard conventions, agreements, or prior treaties, and only recognize "effective occupation," we have been compelled to despatch armed forces to effect occupation of our remaining *Hinterland*. The French have also pushed forward, and, in some places, the rival bodies are within a stone's throw of one another. A heady lieutenant might precipitate a catastrophe.

THE RUSSIAN BOGEY.

Russia is far from being the most formidable Power in Europe, but she passes as such, which is more to her purpose. Indeed, the other nations are tumbling over one another for her favours, and there is probably not one who would not break all present engagements in order to secure a lasting Russian alliance. The official and Chauvinist Press of Moscow and St. Petersburg shrewdly trade on the ignorant terror of Europe, and paint fancy pictures of Russia's strength and resources. Lately, one of these organs, the *Novoe Vremya*, declared that "Russian foreign policy is amply sufficient to safe-

guard the interests of the Russian Empire in every part of the world where they may come into conflict with those of Great Britain." A Russian correspondent of *The Daily Chronicle* supplies a valuable corrective to this bluster. "Such words recall the absurd acclamations which greeted the Crimean War, and we remember that before the war with Turkey in 1877 it was generally foretold that the campaign would only be a short and triumphant promenade. Yet it lasted a full year, ruined our finance, and the rouble fell from 348 centimes to 218, and in all these twenty years has never risen higher than 270 again." We learn further that the intelligent section of Russian society declines to enter the fool's paradise of the Jingo Press, and that not less anxious questions are being asked in St. Petersburg than in other places:—

"Are we really prepared for a European war? Could we hold our own against even such a Power as the Japan of to-day? The answers are not reassuring, and well-meaning people, who regard politics from the point of view of national development and prosperity, have every reason to be uneasy. Could we feel assured beforehand of victory in a war with Japan? Without considering the further question of combinations with European Powers or a general war, we are compelled to own that the Japanese would have a good off-chance of defeating us, paradoxical as such a statement must seem. Russia, so powerful a nation, with a population of 130,000,000, and an army of 1,000,000 in peace and 2,500,000 on a war-footing! Yes, we know all that, and all the same we should be running a great risk in a war even with Japan alone."

The correspondent in support of this view points out that the Russian army like the Russian population is concentrated in the west, the south, and the central provinces of European Russia, and that in the whole of Siberia with an area of 4,833,500 square miles there are less than 7,000,000 inhabitants and about 40,000 troops. After reviewing the relative power of Russia and Japan and indicating the immense strategic advantages possessed by the latter, the writer adds:—

"The Russian Government would have still further difficulties in organizing a campaign for the annexation of Korea. All the military stores, the commissariat, and the army itself would have to be sent from Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kiev, and Odessa, and the transport over a distance of between 2,000 and 3,000 miles at least would involve unheard-of-expense. In the first place, the Trans-Siberian Railway is not finished yet, and about 1,000 miles would have to be traversed on foot. Even if the railway were finished, the transport of an army of 250,000 men would require at least three months of incredible labour, and at the end we should reach a country without fortresses, without towns, almost without inhabitants, and without any practicable roads. . . . Speaking generally, these enormous distances, the want of population, the beggary of the peasant, and the universal ignorance, which the Government does its utmost to maintain, make of Russia a semi-barbarous nation, not nearly so powerful as it appears at first sight. It would want two generations to populate the Far East provinces by a rational system of colonization.

For these and other reasons this candid correspondent is of opinion that a war in the Far East between Russia and any serious

opponent would not be quite the "picnic" which the former's newspapers contemplate.

THE ZOLA TRIAL.

While the British have been exciting themselves about West Africa, the French have been convulsed by the trial of M. Zola, technically for "defaming" a tribunal, but really for having made himself the mouthpiece of the view—which appears to be generally held throughout the civilized world—that the trial of Captain Dreyfus as a spy was irregular, and should be reviewed. His own trial has been, at least, as irregular as that against which he protested, for Court, mob, and military have combined to promote the prosecution, to browbeat his witnesses, and to overawe the jury. M. Zola himself was guilty of making violent and wholesale charges which he must have been conscious that he could not prove, even if granted a fair trial, and his passionate and positive asseverations of Captain Dreyfus' innocence, though intensely dramatic, did not assist his cause, and are at this stage irrelevant. The conviction of the famous novelist was a foregone conclusion to all who had watched the case, and he has been vindictively sentenced to the maximum punishment of twelve months imprisonment, and to a fine of 3,000 francs (£120). The chief impression made by the trial upon a foreign observer is admirably described by *The Times*. "M. Zola has been tried as he desired, he has been condemned as he must have known for a long time that he would be, and he has failed to make the trial, as he hoped, an opportunity for practical revision of the Dreyfus judgment by a French Court of law. But in a far larger sense he has succeeded, and that with a completeness that may well console him for what he will have to suffer in person, in pocket, and in popularity. He has procured revision of the Dreyfus case, not indeed in the sense of repairing the wrong done to an individual, but in the far more important sense of exposing the perils that assail the foundation of society in France. He has been served by M. Labori with extraordinary ability, ingenuity, perseverance, and eloquence. It has been a rare intellectual treat for educated men everywhere to watch the splendid fight made by M. Zola's counsel against the heaviest odds. His patient dexterity has converted a hostile Judge and a crowd of military obscurantists, into unwilling accessories to M. Zola's design. Out of calculated admissions, obstinate reticence, and judicial obstruction he has extracted the materials for a damaging indictment of the existing *régime*. The question of the innocence or guilt of Dreyfus stands very much where it did. If the great combination against which M. Zola has been struggling are con-

tent with the gratification of vindictive feelings against the prisoner of the Ile du Diable, that satisfaction is theirs. But M. Labori's conduct of the trial has made it clear beyond the reach of controversy that Dreyfus, innocent or guilty, was illegally tried and illegally condemned." What the ultimate consequences of this portentous trial may be no man can foretell; but a disturbed France has not infrequently sought relief from internal anxiety by external adventure, and a growing number of her people believe that a sea war would be cheap.

THE WOLCOTT NEGOTIATIONS.

Senator Wolcott has given the United States Senate an account of his recent embassy to Europe, which should be read *in extenso*.* It was a brilliant, dignified, and temperate speech worthy of the conspicuous services he has rendered to the cause of sound money, and of his own high reputation as an orator. He traces the origin of his famous negotiations—which brought bimetallism into the storm centre of practical politics last year—to the unequivocal pledge given by his Party (Republican) at the St. Louis Convention in 1896 to "promote" the "free coinage of silver by international agreement." Three months prior to the adoption of this policy, the present British House of Commons had exhaustively debated the currency question (17th March, 1896) and had unanimously passed the following resolution, "That this House is of opinion that the instability of the relative value of gold and silver, since the action of the Latin union in 1873, has proved injurious to the best interests of this country, and urges upon the Government the advisability of doing all in their power to secure by international agreement a stable monetary par of exchange between gold and silver." The speeches of British Ministers (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach and Mr. Balfour) in interpreting this motion were not less significant than the motion itself, for they pledged the British Government to maintain the gold standard in the United Kingdom, but to do all else that was possible to promote the restoration of bimetallism abroad.† Sir Michael Hicks-Beach also specified Great Britian's chief contribution to the settlement:—"If it be possible for other nations to join in a bimetallic agreement which seemed good to themselves, I have little doubt but that the Indian Government would be prepared to assist by reopening

* *See The Bimetallist* for February 15th. Horace Marshall & Son, 125, Fleet Street, London. Price, 3d.

† Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, Chancellor of the Exchequer, said: "We cannot, therefore, alter the gold standard of the United Kingdom; but with that reservation we are prepared, in the words of the resolution, to do all in our power to secure, by international agreement, a stable monetary par of exchange between gold and silver."

the Indian mints to the free coinage of silver, and that we might endeavour by other minor means to promote the increase of silver in coinage and thus aid in an international agreement on this great question." While Mr. Balfour not only restated his bimetallic convictions with enthusiasm, but expatiated on the magnitude of this same British contribution. Mr. Wolcott, to make assurance doubly sure, paid an informal visit to Europe after the Republican victory of 1896, in the course of which he sounded the leading statesmen of Europe and realized how favourable were the prospects of International Bimetallism. Sir Michael Hicks-Beach renewed his pledge. In consequence of Senator Wolcott's report to President McKinley, a Special Commission, consisting of himself, Mr. Adlai Stevenson, and General C. J. Paine, was created for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with other nations. The American Commissioners commenced their labours in Paris, with the result that a preliminary understanding was reached, whereby the great Republics undertook to reopen their mints (which were closed in 1873) to silver at the old ratio of 15½ to 1. They then (July) approached England, whose Premier, Lord Salisbury, had officially told the American Ambassador in May, while the negotiations were proceeding in Paris, "that the English Government still adhered to the policy outlined in the speeches of its Ministers in the House of Commons." Nor have they ever withdrawn from that position, but temporarily all calculations have been upset by the amazing desire of the Indian Government to "borrow trouble." The trouble has come swiftly as may be gathered from Mr. Herbert Gibbs' article. We also deal with it in the opening pages of "A Colonial Chronicle."

A Noble Peroration.

We much wish we could go point by point through Mr. Wolcott's really splendid speech, but we must confine ourselves to one short extract of great practical importance and the noble peroration. "It is my sincere conviction that an international bimetallic agreement is still feasible, by the terms of which certain countries will join us and open their mints to the unlimited coinage of silver, and others will contribute to the plan an enlarged use of that metal as money; and I say this the more freely because I shall give way upon the Commission to somebody more fitted for such negotiations and better able to give them his constant time. This result cannot be brought about without the expenditure of both time and patience, and the persons entrusted with the duty of negotiation must have back of them the hearty support of the President and of Congress. It may also be necessary, in my opinion, to make concessions in the ratio, bringing it somewhere in the neighbourhood of 20 to 1, more nearly approximating the ratios recognized by Russia, Austria, and

India. There are many countries unvisited where there is a strong bimetallic sentiment, and which would, undoubtedly, co-operate in some fair plan." The peroration was as follows:—

"International bimetallism is not a myth—a chimera. The people of Europe are, even as we are, struggling to keep their heads above water, and seeking blindly for that which may make for prosperity and for progress. The evils of falling prices and dearer gold bring poverty and disaster to them as to us. It is said that the influence of money grows year after year. So also does the influence of those great masses who toil from dawn till dark upon soil which God made rich and the unwise laws of man make profitless.

With useless endeavour
For ever, for ever,
Is Sisyphus rolling
His stone up the mountain!

And every year of added burdens and lessened prices swells the ranks of those who refuse longer to believe that over-production, cheaper transportation, and labour-saving inventions can account for the steady decline in values since the mints were closed, nearly a quarter of a century ago. Dollar wheat is dollar wheat the world over; but it does not tell the same story in France and Germany, where drought and flood have left only starvation in their wake, that it does here, where the misfortunes of the Old World have brought prosperity to the New.

"Much of the recent legislation in Europe, looking to the increase of gold holdings and the depreciation of silver, finds its origin in the exigencies of a situation where readiness for war is the paramount necessity. There is hardly a statesman in Europe who believes the last word has yet been said upon the question of the remonetisation of silver, and hardly one who would not welcome an effort to settle the question internationally. Only a few days ago, just before Christmas, in a debate in the French Chamber, M. Meline again declared from the Tribune that the French Government was at one with the United States on the question of bimetallism!

"In the face of such a declaration it is as cowardly to abandon hope as it is false to talk about failure. International bimetallism is to the gold monometallist a stumbling-block, and to the silver monometallist foolishness; but it is nevertheless a splendid possibility. Its accomplishment would be the greatest blessing that could befall our people, and to achieve it we might well afford to sink for the time the hostilities of party, and the bickerings of faction.

A Historic Debate.

There has been a pointed and pregnant discussion (February 11th) on Home Rule in which the House of Commons disposed of that once prolific topic between afternoon tea and dinner. The incident in itself is sufficiently remarkable to deserve some notice, even at a time when the mere mention of the words "Home Rule" suffices to quench an appreciable amount of human sympathy, particularly in the Radical breast. Mr. John Redmond, the leader of the Parnellite section of the Irish Nationalists, having heard such allegations of slackness against the British Opposition resolved to test their enthusiasm in the cause over which he broods. With this object, and with the further purpose of exploring the position of the Dillonite Nationalists, Mr. Redmond moved a craftily-constructed amendment to the Address in a cruelly incisive speech, which had similar effects to those produced by a highly explosive shell. The amendment, which

was eventually rejected by 233 to 65, ran thus :—"Humbly to represent to your Majesty that the satisfaction of the demands of the Irish people for national self-government is the most urgent of all subjects of domestic policy, and that those demands can only be met by the concession of an independent Parliament and Executive responsible thereto for all matters distinctively Irish." Mr. Redmond desired, in the first place, to dispose of the delusion animating the Unionist party, viz., that local self-government would be accepted by Ireland as a substitute for Home Rule. He welcomed the smaller measure, but had determined to meet it with a clear and precise definition of the Nationalist position :—

"They said that the demand for Irish legislative independence did not rest alone upon grievances ; it did not rest alone on the admitted failure of England to govern Ireland successfully. No doubt a system of government which had resulted in depopulation and industrial paralysis, in famine and insurrection, in coercion and financial oppression stood self-condemned before the world. But Nationalists did not base their demand primarily on grievances. If the English government of Ireland had been as wise as it had been foolish, if it had been as sympathetic as it had been heartless, if it had been as successful as it had admittedly been disastrous, still the demand for national freedom would be just as strong as it was to-day. That demand had its foundations not merely in grievance, but in those ineradicable differences of race and of history which must keep Ireland for all time a separate and distinct country, and in that spirit of nationality which he, at any rate, believed to be absolutely indestructible."

Mr. Redmond did not stop to consider the equal rights of the Northern nationality of Ireland to select their form of government, "if the spirit of nationality" is "indestructible." He proceeded to break into menaces which cannot fail to clear away a good deal of current cant for which Mr. Gladstone is responsible :—

"This year Irishmen at home, and in every quarter of the globe where they had found refuge from English misgovernment, would be celebrating the centenary of the insurrection of 1798 ; and their hearts would be filled with a feeling of honour and veneration for the memory of the men who, a hundred years ago, died fighting against English rule in Ireland. This was an additional reason why he had raised this question ; indeed, it would be little short of a national disgrace to Ireland if at the beginning of this year no voice was raised in the English Parliament to tell Englishmen to their faces the plain truth on this matter—that Irishmen to-day hated English rule, and that they would never desist until they had succeeded in wresting their country from its grasp. The celebration of '98 meant that the detestation of foreign interference by the Government in purely Irish affairs was just as strong in the hearts of the masses of the Irish people to-day as it was in the breasts of their forefathers when, a hundred years ago, they gave their lives in a gallant effort to end it. It meant, further, that the spirit of rebellion against that foreign interference in the government of purely Irish affairs was alive in Ireland to-day just as it was a hundred years ago. It meant, also, that with the great bulk of the Irish people at this moment the question even of armed insurrection against a system of government which England insisted on maintaining was a mere question of expediency and the chance of success. It seemed to him, after all the nonsense that had been talked in recent times about the union of hearts, that some voice should be heard telling Englishmen to their faces the naked truth in this matter. He did not wish to be misunderstood. England had Ireland at her shores in the position of an enemy, and rightly so."

THE "VITAL CHANGE."

After reviewing the last ten years Mr. Redmond declared that the rejection of the two Gladstonian Home Rule Bills (1886 and 1893), which were avowedly compromises, threw the Irish back upon their original claim, which is, "to the full measure of national rights," *i.e.*, the repeal of the Act of Union.

"Personally he had never believed that the Imperial Parliament was capable, even if it were willing, to govern Ireland well. At the same time he was anxious and willing that the experiment should be tried. To the Government and the Unionist Party he said that if the Local Government Bill was conceived in a spirit as liberal as their pledges, if it conferred on Ireland the same rights and privileges which had been conferred on England, Scotland, and Wales, then he would be among its heartiest supporters and would be delighted at its enactment."

But, far from weakening the demand for Home Rule, the extension of local government would intensify it, and render it irresistible, for "England would learn speedily the utter folly of those who pretended to believe that Irishmen were unfit to govern themselves." The speaker confessed to having a further object in view viz., "to endeavour to elicit, if he could, in the friendliest possible spirit, from the Liberal Party some expression of their present views on this matter"—Home Rule. Mr. Redmond then indicated, in a series of scathing sentences, the "vital change" which, he believed, had penetrated the present Opposition since Mr. Gladstone retired into private life:—

"The alliance which was entered into between Irish Nationalists and the Liberal Party in 1886 was based upon the clear and distinct pledge and condition that Home Rule should be put as the first item in the programme of the latter, and that, in the memorable words of Mr. Gladstone himself, 'it should block the way.' That condition, in his view, was violated when, on the accession of Lord Rosebery to power, Home Rule suffered from what was described by the right hon. member for Montrose as the 'temporary suspension of the prosecution of Home Rule,' and when in place of the prosecution of Home Rule there was taken up the Newcastle programme. Most sensible people to-day admitted that the substitution of disestablishment and local veto and other contentious matters was, on the part of the Liberal Party, even apart from Irish considerations, a huge blunder. But where did they stand now? Was it seriously asked or expected that Irish Nationalists should help the Liberal Party back into power and then should put trust in the devotion to Home Rule of the right hon. gentleman the leader of the Opposition, who, since the resignation of Lord Rosebery, has never said one single syllable upon the subject? The National Liberal Federation had promulgated a programme which, from beginning to end, made no mention whatever of Ireland, not a whisper even about Home Rule. It was perfectly evident from this, as well as from the comments of Radical organs, that the trend of Liberal public opinion in England was in the direction, first, of a diminution of the magnitude of the Home Rule Question down to some scheme of general devolution called Home Rule all round, and, in the second place, in the direction of the postponement even of this modified form of Home Rule until the question of the House of Lords, electoral reform, and other questions of that sort had been first dealt with. Any sane

man must acknowledge that the placing of the reform of the House of Lords before Home Rule meant the postponement, the abandonment, of any serious consideration of the Irish national question for our time."

Mr. Redmond's amendment was briefly seconded by Mr. O'Kelly, who bluntly declared that "Ireland is a nation; and when the proper opportunity came she must enforce her demands for liberty by force, just as that liberty was taken from them by force."

THE DILLON "CRUX."

Sir William Harcourt, the leader of the Opposition, after a few preliminary passes, stated:—"Then I come to his (Mr. Redmond's) fundamental proposition, and that is that the demand can be satisfied only by the concession of an independent Parliament for all affairs distinctively Irish. What he asks me to do, then, is to condemn, to repudiate, all the principles of Home Rule on which the English party, on these benches at least, and with the consent of the leaders of the Irish party, on two successive occasions, in 1886 and 1893, have founded a measure of Home Rule, and that was the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament." Sir William Harcourt added:—"Then, I say, in answer to the friendly question of the hon. and learned gentleman, I think he asks us too much when he asks us to recant and alter all we have said and done on this question of Home Rule; and when he asks us to support a resolution which declares for an independent Parliament. What is meant by an independent Parliament? The seconder of the resolution left no doubt as to what is meant by the independent Parliament of a nation which is prepared to employ force for its purposes." The leader of the Opposition concluded by saying that he, at any rate, should vote against Mr. Redmond's amendment. Mr. Dillon followed with a severe condemnation of the amendment, which, however, he declared, amid much laughter, that he would support, as it was "a crux prepared for his benefit." He affirmed that the Nationalists "still stood on Mr. Parnell's platform, and were still willing to accept Mr. Gladstone's policy as a full compensation for their national demand, and to stand loyally by that settlement," but they would take nothing less, and they would not submit to a postponement. "Now, while he had not the slightest intention of doing what appeared to him to be a purely mischievous and exceedingly stupid thing to do, he was prepared to state what was the position of the Irish party in this matter if to do that would ease the anxiety of the hon. member for Waterford (Mr. Redmond). That position was, that neither at the polls where they could control Irish votes—and he thought they could turn the election in about 30 constituencies, perhaps more—nor at a general election could any body of men desiring

to get into power or to form a Ministry expect the support of the Irish Nationalist Party except on the condition that Home Rule for Ireland, and at least as extensive Home Rule as was satisfactory to the Irish people, occupied the foremost place in their programme."

MR. BALFOUR'S RAPIER.

The Parliamentary situation produced by these memorable declarations gave Mr. Balfour an opportunity of doing the utmost justice to his great debating talents. By common consent his speech was as perfect in form and taste as it was killing in effect. He opened in his happiest vein :—

"I almost feel there is a certain impropriety in my venturing to intervene in the little domestic discussion which we have listened to with such interest. If I may change the metaphor, I rather feel I have been a spectator of a little bit of comedy, and that in a rash moment I spoil the general harmony of the scene by myself coming forward and making some observations on the stage. But I suppose I cannot leave this matter, however little it may directly concern gentlemen on this side, altogether without some observations. Let me say, by way of preface, that I do not quite understand the relation of the speeches that have been made to-night with the votes that are going to be given. I understand that the hon. gentleman who moved the amendment and the hon. member for East Mayo (Mr. Dillon) do not agree in their views, but are going to vote in the same lobby. I understand the right hon. gentleman the leader of the Opposition and the hon. member for East Mayo do agree in their views, but are going to vote in different lobbies. These are mysteries of Parliamentary statecraft it is not easy to fathom, and I do not attempt to afford a solution of the singular problem presented for our consideration."

Mr. Balfour met Mr. Redmond's attack with a spirited vindication of the Unionist policy :—

"The hon. gentleman said that the Irish people would not regard a measure of local government for Ireland, however broad its basis, as any substitute for Home Rule. In one sense of the word I entirely agree with that statement. We do not propose this as a step towards Home Rule. We do not bring it forward as a compromise between our views and the views of hon. gentlemen opposite. We mean to bring it forward on its own merits as an integral part of our policy—as a policy which we should pursue with equal zeal and desire to bring to a successful consummation even if the Home Rule Party were wiped out of existence altogether. Our desire is to extend to Ireland those local liberties, that local control, that England and Scotland already possess, and we desire that for reasons altogether outside the Home Rule controversy and all the embittered debates which have taken place on that subject. But if the hon. member asks us to go forward and say that we have given up all hope that at any time we may reconcile every section of the Irish people to us I should have thought it was not a hard lot—namely, that of bearing their full share—even more than their full share (cries of "Taxation" and "Coercion")—in the general government of the Empire ; if we are asked whether we have given up that hope, then I say we have not given it up."

The authors of the new Local Government Bill may not live to see the day. "I am aware that long centuries of misunderstandings, and worse than misunderstandings, leave scars not easily to be

obliterated, but I live in the undying faith and hope that the time will come either now or later when the inhabitants of these two islands will be as closely joined as the inhabitants of any other nation in the world. (Loud Irish cries of 'Never, never.') The hon. member (Mr. MacNeill) neither desires nor hopes it; I both desire it and hope it. And which is the more patriotic, the more generous, the best fitted to serve the real interests of Ireland? I, indeed, entertain no doubt, though it is only the verdict of history that will ultimately decide it." After emphasizing the importance of Sir William Harcourt's categorical adherence to the Home Rule Bill of 1893, Mr. Balfour declared if we were ever compelled to choose between "independent" and "dependent" Home Rule, "you had better make a good job of it at once and give them independence. All study of past and contemporary history which I have been able to give to those Constitutions in which there are subordinate Parliaments or double systems of representation under one nominal head convinces me that they are absolutely unworkable, that they lead, not to the friendship, but to the enmity of nations, and that they are a clumsy contrivance for perpetuating difficulties, which everyone must admit our relations with Ireland have been very fruitful of." The speaker proceeded to draw the moral from the divergent views expressed by British and Irish allies as to the precise position of Home Rule in the Party programme. The former desire to solve many intricate political problems before taking up Home Rule, while the latter won't allow any programme to be mentioned except Home Rule.

THE COERCION OF ENGLAND.

Mr. Balfour's searching criticism led to the following interchange of views, which graphically depicts the present plight of the Home Rule Party:—

Mr. BALFOUR.—But that the member for East Mayo (Mr. Dillon), who I always thought was hand in glove with right hon. gentlemen opposite, and who certainly commands no inconsiderable section of the right hon. gentleman's (Sir William Harcourt) followers, and who has always expressed his firm belief in the union of hearts, should now come forward publicly in this House and say that he is determined, so far as his influence goes in English constituencies, to compel the Party opposite—the English Home Rule Party—to adopt a course of action of which they disapprove and of which their English supporters disapprove, is a truly amazing state of things.

Mr. DILLON.—That is not exactly what I said. What I did say was that, so far as I had any influence, I would put pressure on candidates to adhere to the policy of Mr. Gladstone on the Irish Question.

Mr. BALFOUR.—I do not think that there should be any dispute between us. I understood the hon. gentleman's statement to be that he commanded thirty seats in England.

Mr. DILLON.—I said I thought we could influence close on thirty seats.

Mr. BALFOUR.—The hon. gentleman can influence thirty seats, and can determine who shall come in in thirty English seats. In those English seats, and I presume elsewhere, as far as his influence exists, he is determined that what he calls the policy of Mr. Gladstone in 1886 and 1893—that of putting Home Rule in the front of everything else—is the policy that must be pursued. Well, sir, that is perfectly legitimate and perfectly honest and straightforward. But is that the policy of the English section of the Party of which the hon. member is a member?

Mr. FLAVIN.—It will have to be their policy. (Loud Ministerial cheers and laughter.)

Mr. BALFOUR.—I think that is possible; I think that what the hon. gentleman has said is not only possible, but even probable. In these circumstances how wise and prudent is the reticence of the right hon. gentleman! When it gets known through the length and breadth of the land that the Irish supporters of the Party opposite are going to coerce their English allies, when it is known that their deliberate intention is to make them swallow this draught, with or without jam, then I think the wisdom and prudence of the right hon. gentlemen will become manifest to all men. They know perfectly well that there is nothing that will be so resented on this side of St. George's Channel as the kind of threat which the hon. gentleman the member for East Mayo has used in polite but unmistakeable language, and which the hon. gentleman near him has dotted and crossed with all the emphasis of a Parliamentary interruption.

"THE PARTING OF THE WAYS."

Anyone who depreciates the significance of this Home Rule debate should turn up an article in *The Westminster Gazette*, the evening mouthpiece of the Opposition in London, entitled "The Parting of the Ways" (Feb. 14th). This spirited Radical paper has long been restive under the Irish yoke, the Temperance yoke, and the various other yokes to which its Party is subjected. Indeed, its attitude gives some point to an observation recently made to the present writer by one of the wits of the Opposition: "Our Party hates all its opinions, and would shed them if it could, and turn Tory." *The Westminster Gazette* thus summarizes the relations of the British and Irish "allies":—

"It is a parting of the ways for Irishmen not less than for Liberals. The Irishmen have now to make their choice upon a fundamental point in their policy. Either they are seeking Home Rule with the consent of Great Britain or they

are seeking it without the consent of Great Britain. In the second case they can only achieve their object by revolution, or by making the Government of Great Britain impossible, or by taking advantage of her necessities in some crisis of her fate. If that is the object, we have no observation to offer except that the idea of an alliance with any English party necessarily falls to the ground. The Liberal policy has been constitutional Home Rule to be obtained with the consent of Great Britain. If that and nothing more is the object of Irish Home Rulers in the House of Commons, then co-operation with the Liberal Party is natural and right, but it carries with it certain obvious consequences. One of these is that Irishmen in this position cannot ride both horses at once. They cannot be Constitutionalists in England if they are Separatists in Ireland. They cannot reasonably rely on British support when they want it if they hold themselves free to offend British sentiment when it suits them. If Mr. Davitt thinks it necessary to go to America and agitate against an Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty, he cannot, as a reasonable man, expect British Liberals, who were deeply concerned in that cause, to feel cordial about entrusting him with the government of Ireland."

That Mr. Dillon's sophistical speech did not mitigate the soreness caused by his uncompromising vote is clear from this further passage:—

"But what does the vote mean? Mr. Dillon must have known that in voting as he did he placed the whole Liberal Party, or, if that does not concern him, at least some of the staunchest and best friends of the Irish cause, in a most painful position. Yet his party, as we understand, were unanimous in deciding to vote with Mr. Redmond in spite of this manifest consequence, and in spite of the obvious fact that they were arming the Unionists with a most formidable weapon. Mr. Dillon, we may be pretty sure, would not have done this except for the most cogent reason. This reason can only be that the extremists in Ireland are so formidable that no Irish party dare risk their displeasure by voting against them. This year, as everyone knows, is the centenary of the '98 rebellion, and before it is over we are to witness demonstrations of advanced Nationalism. If Mr. Dillon cannot stand firm against the extremists and confine himself in Ireland to the constitutional Home Rule on which any alliance with a British party depends, then we are very much afraid that the rift of last Friday will become a gulf before the end of the year. He cannot expect to get Home Rule with the consent of England, if he lets the Home Rule movement slip back into the hands of the extremists in Ireland."

The anger of the Radicals is natural, and arises from the fact that they have gratuitously placed themselves between the devil and the deep sea. They may scold their Irish taskmasters, but they cannot carry on without the Irish vote. Nor can they convert "the predominant partner" to Home Rule. They have fallen on evil times and Sisyphus would have no cause to envy their lot.

AN ACCEPTABLE UNIVERSITY.

We have only space to refer to one other of the countless debates on domestic affairs that have already occurred in the House of Commons. It likewise concerned Ireland, and its chief feature was a really memorable utterance from Mr. Balfour. Mr. Dillon had moved an amendment to the Address calling attention to the grievance under which the Irish Catholics labour, owing to the want of an acceptable university, and demanding immediate remedial legislation. Mr. Dillon made an eloquent and convincing speech "not only on

behalf of the united Catholics of Ireland, but on behalf of the intelligent, liberal, and broad-minded among the Protestants." Colonel Saunderson, fresh from his mischievous stumping tour in South Africa,indulged in the usual fire and brimstone denunciations of the proposal, and consigned the Government to "everlasting destruction" if they adopted it. Mr. Balfour pointed out that to oppose the creation of a Catholic University because it is "denominational," is unreasoning, considering that the Irish Educational System is saturated with "denominationalism"; moreover, the Irish bishops no longer stipulate for a strictly denominational institution, "they no longer ask that the college or university, which I, for one, desire to see established, shall be fenced round by any technical limitations which shall prevent men of any religion or men of no religion from getting the full advantages of every endowment, of every scholarship, of every Fellowship, if Fellowships there are to be—in fact, to obtain the full advantages of all the money voted to that institution by the liberality of Parliament. Of course, it stands to reason, it is of the essence of the case, that the college or university should be founded upon such lines as will make it, as I have said before, Roman Catholic in the sense that Trinity College is Protestant. That you must do, or you fail in your policy. But while that is clear on the one side, it is also equally clear on the other that, when you have established that general atmosphere of Roman Catholicism which corresponds to the general atmosphere of Protestantism of Belfast College and of Trinity College, every single endowment is to be open to men of all creeds alike, and the best man may go in and win as he can now at Trinity College or at Belfast." Mr. Balfour used powerful arguments in support of his plea. In the first place, the cause of higher education in Ireland is crippled. No Government can, in decency, come to the House of Commons for money in the interest of the Protestant minority "while the claims and wishes of the Roman Catholic majority in Ireland receive no consideration at all." And "it fills me with dismay to find that this House and this country is prepared to acquiesce tamely in a condition of things which practically and substantially deprives two-thirds of the population of Ireland of the higher education advantages which it is in our power to give." Mr. Balfour concluded his plea with a fine appeal to his followers to follow him on this question.

MR. MORLEY'S APPEAL.

Mr. Balfour's sagacious support of an Irish Catholic University received distinguished approval throughout the two days' debate. Indeed, one may fairly say that men endorse the Balfour view in proportion as they are intelligent and educated, and *vice versa*

This is very far from saying that it will forthwith be realized, for a great mass of stern, unbending stupidity has to be converted or overridden, as is apparent from the deferential, apologetic, and gingerly speeches delivered by those "in touch with public opinion." Nevertheless, the utterances of Mr. Balfour, Mr. Morley, Mr. Courtney, and the support accorded to the proposal by Mr. Lecky and Mr. Carson, the two members for Dublin University —*i.e.*, Trinity College, Dublin,—cannot fail to impress upon the "agitators" that they have embarked upon a cause worthy of all possible zeal, and one that cannot sustain permanent discomfiture. Political prophecy is proverbially a hazardous occupation, but if any future event is certain that event is the State endowment of such a university in Ireland as the Catholics feel they can utilize. All who ought to carry most weight, and whose influence must ultimately tell, are in favour of it. As Mr. John Morley pointed out—in a speech deserving the highest praise, considering that "all his life he has abhorred clericalism in all forms," that he sits for a Scotch Calvinistic constituency, and is largely amenable to "the Nonconformist conscience"—within the last twelve years there have been three Chief Secretaries for Ireland, all of whom approached this question from entirely different political points of view, and with "the utmost difference of theological and antitheological prepossession." But all agree "that this proposal, in the interests of social expediency, in the higher interests of Ireland, whether Unionist or Home Rule, is not only justified but requisite." Among those favourable to this policy Mr. Morley quoted Sir Michael Hicks-Beach and Lord Spencer, "who entirely approves the proposal we are now considering." Mr. Morley made an appeal to the bigots of his Party not dissimilar to that made by Mr. Balfour to Unionists.

AYES AND NOES.

Mr. Dillon did not press his amendment calling for an Irish Catholic University to a division, so it is difficult to estimate the cleavage of opinion in the House of Commons on this question, but an analysis of the debate reveals a remarkable preponderance in numbers which is still greater in names :—

SPEAKERS.

FOR.	AGAINST.
Mr. John Dillon	Mr. Grant Lawson
Mr. Harrington	Colonel Saunderson
Mr. R. B. Haldane	Mr. R. W. Wallace
Mr. T. M. Healy	Mr. Perks
Mr. W. E. H. Lecky	Mr. W. Johnston
Mr. A. J. Balfour	Mr. Rentoul
Mr. Leonard Courtney	Mr. Lloyd George
Mr. John Morley	
Mr. E. F. V. Knox	
Lord Edmund Talbot	
Serjeant Semphill	
Mr. Alfred Lyttelton	
Mr. Clancy	
Mr. Carson	

IRISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT.

On Monday, February 1st, Mr. Gerald Balfour, in a speech much praised for its lucidity, introduced his promised Local Government Bill for Ireland. By some it may be felt that a measure of which the author says that he hopes it may "work through failure to success," and which is brought in rather in fulfilment of hasty pledges on English and Scotch hustings in the throes of the fight against Home Rule than to meet any real need or effective demand in Ireland, is unlikely to evoke much enthusiasm among Unionists generally. The fact that the measure will place in disloyal hands a large amount of patronage now in loyal hands,* and that the Bill therefore met with a friendly reception from all sections of Nationalists, does not tend to recommend a measure that will place the management of local affairs in Ireland in the hands, roughly speaking, of the same electors as return the Irish members to the House. This hazardous step has, however, now become inevitable, and it is the clear duty of the Unionist Party so to handle it that it may do as little harm and as much good as possible. The practical working of the measure during the first year of the experiment must largely depend on the power and constitution of the central Local Government Board, under whose guidance the popular local bodies will be placed, and by whom the rules and regulations, to be promulgated, nominally, by the Lord Lieutenant in Council, will in reality be drawn. We understand that the ultimate attitude of the Irish Unionists and their friends in both Houses towards the measure will largely depend on the way in which the pending vacancy in the Irish Local Government Board will be filled. It has already been announced that the appointment of a commissioner with thorough practical knowledge and experience of the business hitherto managed by Irish Grand Juries is considered essential. With this business the I.L.G.B. has hitherto had practically nothing to do. To say, as Mr. Gerald Balfour did, that the share the Irish country gentry would have in the management of County affairs in the future depended entirely on themselves was hardly fair. It leaves out of consideration that clerical influence and the smouldering conspiracies against the British connexion and against payment of rent create in most parts of Ireland a situation entirely different from that which existed in most parts of Great Britain when the present system was introduced. Col. Saunderson very justly pointed out that the position of the gentry on the Local Boards would depend not on themselves, but on the good sense of the electors. The financial provisions of the measure are very important and very complicated. No adequate estimate of their effect can be formed except from the

* See the Nationalist declarations noted in these pages.

Bill, which is not yet in print. We understand that grave doubts are entertained whether these provisions will afford to resident and improving landowners the protection from excessive local taxation promised by Mr. Arthur Balfour.

THE WORKS DEPARTMENT.

The Works Department of the London County Council is again before the public, this time with an advertisement from Lord Welby; and in a few days the electors will have an opportunity to pronounce upon it. The Department has now been running for five years: in the course of this period it has constructed several hundred works, both engineering and architectural, and of very diverse kinds, roads sewers, bridges, stations, asylums, and the total up to the 30th September last (omitting the imperfect accounts since supplied of imperfect works, which give rise only to conjecture, though conjectures on the whole very unfavourable to the Department, and omitting also jobbing works) is officially reported as showing the following result. Works which if put into the hands of contractors were estimated to cost £630,822 have been executed by the Department at an actual cost of £655,307 or £24,485 more than would have been paid to contractors. So far, then, there is a clear money loss to the ratepayers of over £24,000. But the case does not stop here. The £630,822 which would have been paid to contractors would not have been by them wholly spent upon their works, part would have remained in their pockets as profit. It was, we know, from the trading prospectus, the middleman's profit that was to be saved. Put this profit at 6 per cent. or £36,000, add it to the £24,000 actual loss, and we find that the Works Department has spent upon the works £60,000 more than contractors would have done. Now, supposing an inquisitive elector to ask how has this £60,000 been expended, the only answer is that it has been misspent. Misspent in extravagant outlay on actual works in Belvedere Road; misspent in defective management; misspent in unskilful purchases of material; above all, misspent in wages to workmen for idling. But is there, then, really nothing to be set on the other side? May we not suppose that the workman's position has been raised, or that the Council has received better work than would have been the case with contractors? Alas! neither of these hopes is possible; and it must be confessed that the Council has expended its valuable time in carrying on and wrangling over this trade, with no conceivable advantage to the public, but only with actual loss to the ratepayers, and risk of still greater loss. And the gravest risk has not yet been realized, viz., that the estimating officers of the Council should make easy estimates in order to avoid friction with

the Works Department. If ever that day comes—and surely human nature bids us expect that it may come—then good-bye to the one check now held over the Works Department; the works will show as done within the estimates; and, however gross the extravagance, no one will be able to prove it, scarcely even to suspect it.

Its Mainspring.

What then is or was the reason for the existence of this unfortunate Department? Rather a curious one. The business—that of a complex and risky trade—was not started on business principles. If the institution of the Works Department provided gratification to the megalomaniacal ambition of the Progressive Party for a swelling retinue of workmen, not without votes, and for a brilliant career as the model employer, it was at bottom the product of Trade-Unionism—the new, Socialistic Trade-Unionism, the sworn enemy of capitalists in general, and contractors in particular. The idea was that, on the works, Trade-Unionism should be in full swing, with its rules and regulations, its "shop-stewards," and the rest of it; and that the workmen should be under no contractor, with a pocket-interest to exact a fair day's work for a fair day's wage: but should have for employers, if not Trade-Unionists, a public body pledged to Trade-Unionism, and well-leavened with Trade-Unionists—an easy-going master, asking but little, and paying freely from the rates. And this idea was handsomely realized under the Works Committee, the Department was a Trade-Union run concern. The works were patrolled by Trade-Unionist members of the Committee; the proceedings of the Committee were inspired by the same members; and the policy of the Council largely shaped by close attention to the Labour-Bench within and the Labour-vote outside. For example: It was promulgated that at the close of any strike in the trade, the Works Department would pay whatever rate of wages might be the result of the strike, with the natural consequence that the men on the Council's works do not strike, but contribute to those who do, and thus the whole weight of the Council is cast on the side of the strikers. Or, again, as to wages, a serious attempt was made to bind the Council to pay, and to require to be paid on all its works, whatever rate the Trade-Unions might chose to fix, and was only frustrated, after a struggle, by the imposition of a qualification that the rate should not only be fixed by the Union, but be in practice obtained in the trade. The Works Committee—amateurs playing at experts—has now been abolished, but the Works Department still survives, and the electors, if they think they really like this sort of thing, can continue it.

FACE TO FACE IN WEST AFRICA.

Our dispute with France upon the West African Question has reached the crisis which has long been foreseen by those who have watched its development. It was bound to come in presence of the attitude which the French Government has persistently assumed, and which has dismayed the friends and delighted the enemies of France. That attitude has been one of an uncompromising refusal to abate her pretensions to raid at liberty in territories declared by official proclamation, by international agreement, as well as by native treaties, to be under a British Protectorate. The truth is, and it is melancholy to have to say so, France has behaved to us in West Africa as if she were some barbarous Oriental Power that had had no experience in international comity. We have not resisted by arms because we always imagined that a civilized Government in Paris exercised a controlling power, and would repudiate the outrages to which we have been subjected.

We did not think it possible that European France would have identified herself with the trespasses and misdoings of an African France. Our officials in West Africa have merely protested and retreated as the African French invaded and occupied their territory. The complaints and grievances have been referred to the Home Government. We have in our turn, sent them on with more or less strong despatches to the French Government, or let us say, to Monsieur Hanotaux. He has, during most of the time that this question has gathered, been a Foreign Minister far more powerful than the Foreign Minister of an Autocrat. We cannot believe he has allowed himself to become the puppet of an African Chauvinist Party, and must therefore hold him responsible for having allowed a situation to develop which may possibly produce a war between England and France. If Monsieur Hanotaux had acted differently a friendly settlement would have been

arrived at long ago. We do not know what influence has misled Monsieur Hanotaux. No man estimates the Paris Daily Press at its proper value better than Monsieur Hanotaux, and its Anglophobism would not affect him in the least; but it is almost astonishing that a man of his capacity and good intentions should not have taken the trouble to master the West African case.

In international questions—unless they are menacing and immediate—there is no public. If there had been an alert British Public upon the West African dispute, things could never have arrived at their present pass. The occupation of Nikki and Boussa after the French Government had obtained a pledge from us not to send troops into the disputed territory, both these places being within it, would have caused as great a flare-up as a nocturnal surprise of Gibraltar. There is, however, no watchful public. We must console ourselves with the knowledge that when the country is appealed to, there is an ample amount of common-sense to support a Minister who has acted wisely and firmly.

Firmness is required at the present juncture more than any other quality. The Government has an overwhelming case on its side, and only firmness is required to support it. It will be found by all those who examine the narrative of events that in the whole course of British diplomacy there never has been a case more solidly founded than ours. The Government has acted throughout with the greatest forbearance. Indeed, our forbearance has been probably mistaken for weakness. Concessions have led the French Government to suppose that we can be squeezed to any extent. Our meekness may have encouraged them to carry out the principle of what they call Effective Occupation. This delightful phrase was specially invented for West African use. It sounds more diplomatic than the word it stands for—seizure. It parries in itself obvious objections by suggesting previous "unoccupation." Curiously enough, before the French commenced their conquests in West Africa, at a time when they anticipated British and German extension, they brought forward a resolution through their delegate at the Berlin Conference that occupation, except within the allotted sphere of influence, should constitute no claim to ownership, and the Congress adopted it.

What are the principles upon which the West African Question might have been settled? Apparently there are only three.

1. The Hinterland theory, which gives prior claim on the backland of the colony occupying the sea-coast.

2. The Anglo-French agreement of 1890, which debars us from going north of a line between Say on the Niger and Barua on Lake Chad, and which it was also understood at the time, by

both the French* and ourselves, debarred the French from invasions to the South of the line.

3. Prior treaties with native chiefs, acknowledging our Protectorate.

How does the French Government treat these three principles which we have urged and submitted. It is just as well the truth should be spoken. Its treatment of them is both contemptuous and insulting.

The French Government does not condescend even to consider the validity of the Hinterland doctrine except so far as it can be claimed for the benefit of a French colony. They have obtained our fullest recognition of it for all their sea-coast colonies. This does not satisfy them—their object has been and is to cut off the Hinterland of our colonies. They have accomplished this in the cases of Sierra Leone and Gambia. One wonders how any British Ministry can ever have signed the agreement which ruined these two colonies. They are now enveloped by French territory and hostile tariffs, for it must be steadily remembered that while our practice is to throw ports or territory we acquire open to the trade of the world, the French erect a wall of tariffs. A glance at the map will show how lamentable the position of Gambia is: it is confined to the banks of the river and hemmed in by French territory. This melancholy result is entirely our own fault. Had we yielded to the solicitation of native chiefs some twenty years ago, we might have extended the benefit of our influence and sphere over the whole of the Upper Niger. But the Little England School prevailed in those days. In 1865 a Committee of the House of Commons Wiseacres came unanimously to the resolution "that all further extension of territory or assumption of Government, or new treaty offering any protection to native tribes would be inexpedient."

We make no claim whatsoever to redress or alleviation in regard to these two colonies. We accept the fruits of our folly. Since Gambia is thus blocked in and paralysed we are not at all sure it might not be a useful pawn to exchange for an equivalent. The present West African Question stands, however, upon its own merits.

The second argument we use, based on the Anglo-French agree-

* The *Temps* published a map at the time showing as "English possessions" everything to the south of the Barua line and stated that Say was the southern limit of the French zone of influence. The *Débats* wrote at the time. "We have obtained all the Upper Niger and the great bend of the river down to Say. *To the south of this point and of the parallel which passes through it* are territories which appear relatively rich and populous, *these will not be ours.*" The *République Française* said: "*The line from Say to Lake Chad places the kingdom of Borgu, Sokoto, and Bornu within the English sphere.*"

ment of 1890, which created a frontier between the British and French, known as the Say-Barua line, is treated in precisely the same manner as the first. The tale seems almost derived from an Opera-Bouffe. The frontier is good for the French as against our incursions, but it is not good as against theirs! They contend with solemnity that the *Say-Barua line was intended to restrict the English from going north, but not to restrict the French from coming south.* This argument is, of course, absurd. What was the intention of the Say-Barua line? It would have been quite sufficient to designate the Sokoto empire as within the British sphere. Say was selected as the westernmost point because its meridian almost corresponded with the eastern boundary of Dahomey and overlapped the now disputed territory; and it must be remembered that Lord Salisbury, in explaining the effect of the agreement in the House of Lords, dwelt especially on the fact that while France had undoubtedly gained great advantages by the agreement, the Niger Company had also gained great advantages, inasmuch as it had secured Bornu, which lay south of the Say-Barua line. Since then, and before the French invasion, Great Britain has made treaties with the chiefs or kings of Boussa, Kiama, and Nikki, as well as with other potentates who claimed dominion in Borgu.

This brings us to the third argument. What position does France take up on the subject of prior treaties? The Opera-Bouffe continues. Treaties the British have made with native chiefs are invalid, and may be superseded by French treaties that become valid. Captain Lugard, for instance, preceded the French at Nikki and made a treaty with the chief. A fortnight afterwards the French arrived and superseded his with one of their own which has become a sacred document.

The occupation of Nikki and Boussa was indefensible upon another ground which has been alluded to. In the first place, France, amid all her claims, had never, until recently, advanced one for Boussa or for any place on the navigable Niger. A French officer's zeal once led him to occupy Bajibo, a place on the Niger below Boussa. Our Government protested, and the French party was withdrawn. The contention of the French, when Boussa was admitted to be within our sphere, was that Boussa did not carry dominion over the Borgu country. Her policy was rather to set up Nikki as a rival to Boussa. It should be explained that Boussa had been freely open to the occupation of the Niger troops, and it was only postponed at the suggestion of the King, who had received a subsidy for several years from the Niger Company, which was on the best terms with its agents. He feared difficulties arising on account of possible relations with women if the troops were

quartered in Boussa; and for this reason Liaba, a little farther down the river, was selected as a military station. When Sir George Goldie undertook his campaign to Bida on the eastern bank of the Niger, the French Government, fearing the Frontier Question, which was then under the consideration of Commissioners might become compromised, made a request that, pending discussion, the Niger troops should not be advanced into the disputed territory. The pledge was given. The obvious and honourable understanding, of course, was that neither of the parties in dispute were to send their troops in. We imagined we were dealing with a European France, but African France immediately poured her troops in and took possession of the territory in dispute! In Europe this would have been tantamount to a declaration of war. When Sir George Goldie had concluded his successful campaign, he found himself in command of a splendid body of black troops. The French had seized Boussa—it would have been a mere skirmish to eject them. He refrained from doing so because he felt assured the occupation would have been immediately disavowed, as had been done in the case of Bajibo. To the astonishment of all those who followed the West Indian Question, the French Government decided to approve this raid. Boussa is still occupied by French troops. The peaceable settlement of our dispute with France depends entirely upon whether Boussa is evacuated or not. This evacuation is the very least we can demand. After this we can recommence negotiations. The whole crux of the situation depends upon Boussa. Collisions, of course, may be dangerous, but they do not constitute the greatest danger. Even the worm turns at last, and, although we have been abject enough hitherto, I think it may be said that we turn at Boussa, and demand the withdrawal of the French garrison.

The French are not generally supposed to be deficient in reasoning power. It may be well asked, "What reasons have they advanced for resisting the obviously justifiable British claims for redress?" Surely they must have something to say! The *Temps*, which is the instructed organ of the French Foreign Office, gave us an explanation. The *Temps*, like nearly every French newspaper, is strongly Anglophobist, but its articles on most subjects are above the level, and are, at least, serious. It is extremely well informed upon African affairs. What, then, has this intellectual exponent of French policy in West Africa to say? The reason given is that France is *obliged* "to provide her establishments in the Sudan and Dahomey with an outlet on the navigable part of the Niger." Hence the occupation of Boussa "is rendered imperative by the heavy sacrifices which France has made during the past fifteen years." This, and nothing more! As regards the latter

argument, although I am not disposed to run too closely the analogy between the conduct of nations and individuals, it is very much the same as if a man, having stolen his neighbour's property, claimed to keep it on the ground of having made heavy sacrifices to secure it. Moreover, "the navigable part of the Niger" was, as far back as the Berlin Conference of 1884, publicly recognized as belonging exclusively to Great Britain. In consequence of this, the principle of international regulation which was adopted for the Congo river was expressly rejected for the Niger. The administration of the Act of Navigation was by general consent confided to Great Britain.*

The list of our grievances against France is so complete and apparently so hopeless of the prospect of a pacific settlement that it hardly needed the additional aggravation of a reported invasion of Sokoto† on the left bank of the Niger, and of the French reoccupation of Wa and Borea or Beria. The kingdom of Sokoto has been, by treaty with France, declared under a British Protectorate. Wa is in the back country of our Gold Coast colony, and is now become occupied apparently by both French and British troops. A French military post consisting of a subaltern officer and thirty native soldiers, has been established at Wa to confront the British. The British and French flags are therefore now flying over the same town. At Borea, which is occupied by a British force, the officer was summoned to haul down the British flag. The demand was naturally refused, and the French force encamped outside the town.

The gravity of the situation consists in this—that France continues to occupy the disputed territory, and we are compelled to distribute forces so as to checkmate her. Effective occupation can only be met by a similar proceeding on our part. European France, or, in other words, the French Cabinet, has apparently no control over African France. The French Press, absorbed in the Zola trial, and ignorant of the guilt of its Government, remains pacific, we are told, and unable to discern any cause for alarm. At the time this is written, one newspaper expresses its satisfaction at the continued occupation of the Lagos Hinterland. We are informed that the French expeditions are all part of a plan originally conceived and carried out by Governor Ballot, who appre-

* *The Times* deserves a compliment for the admirable articles on the Colonies which appear in its columns from time to time. They are full of information, moderate in tone, and sagacious in counsel. See articles on "West Africa," February 7th and 18th.

† I sincerely trust we shall not allow ourselves to be diverted from the question of Boussa by the reported invasion of Sokoto. The question, moreover, is not whether an advance is being made upon the city of Sokoto, but whether an invasion taken place of any portion of the country of Sokoto.

hended that the French colony of Dahomey might become s aled up in the rear in the same way that the French have sealed up Gambia and Sierra Leone. The Governor was determined to extend the Dahomey Hinterland right up to the Niger at Say. This was done. We have always recognized the claim of the French Colonies to their Hinterland; but the Governor's ambitions grew. He proceeded to enlarge it to the west by appropriating the Hinterland of Lagos. Lieutenant Bretonnet was despatched northward, and having reached Ilo, on the Niger, at mid-distance between Say and Boussa, this buccaneer descended the river and occupied Gomba, Lafogo, and Boussa. His report about the occupation of Boussa, according to a correspondent of *The Daily Mail*, was that the "Sultan" of Boussa invited him to occupy the town, as a rival was supported by the English forces. Bretonnet, with 150 tirailleurs, attacked and overthrew the rival's forces. He then occupied Boussa.

What is to be done? Negotiation has, so far, entirely failed. The French idea of negotiation, as has been shown, is to claim everything and to yield nothing. Commission after Commission has met and palavered in vain. A Commission met in 1892, and again in 1894. French claims each time became more and more extravagant. As an illustration of this it may be mentioned that at one time (1892 Conference) it had been agreed that the extension of Dahomey northward should be limited to the 8th parallel of latitude. France, however, withdrew the consent she had given. In 1896 the French Government proposal was that the Dahomey Hinterland was to run north as far as the Niger and that Lagos was to have its Hinterland cut off in the 8th parallel, along which the French frontier was to be established. The plain English of this proposal was that a French Protectorate was to be substituted over the Borgu country instead of the British one, which had been declared and notified to the French Government on January 1st, 1895. There was an effrontery in this proposal that seemed to extinguish all hope of a friendly settlement. Our strong desire to come to an agreement induced us, however, to consider a proposal to trace a frontier, starting from the north-east corner of Dahomey, deflecting from the Meridian to the eastward, and running up to Ilo on the Niger. Such a line would almost pass through Nikki. The frontier might have been so arranged as to place Nikki within the French sphere. This is probably a concession which might still be made. The British Commissioners then proposed to discuss a frontier based upon concluded treaties with native chiefs.

This, however, led to nothing. It is convenient to the French to ignore prior treaties. The 1896 Commission therefore brought its

sittings to a close without having accomplished anything. Again, a Commission was summoned to negotiate this winter. It has been negotiating since November, and has arrived at a deadlock. France, in the meantime, has continued her advance and annexed the territory in dispute. Either the French Cabinet believes we can be insulted with impunity or it wishes to provoke a war.

We have protested and expostulated in vain, and the Prime Minister, at the Guildhall Banquet of last year, gave a distinct warning that the relations of the two countries were becoming jeopardized.

"While we wish," he said, "to behave in a neighbourly manner, and to show due consideration to the feelings and claims of others, yet we are obliged to say that while we have shown that consideration in past transactions, there is a limit to the exercise of that particular set of qualities, and that we cannot allow our plain rights to be overridden."

This passage gave umbrage even to the better class of Frenchmen, who, knowing nothing of the West African Question, declared it to be a "note of brutality," which showed that Great Britain "only recognized the argument of force." The application of this to the West African Question is rather ludicrous. The sole reliance of France has been in the "argument of force." Great Britain has been left to monopolize the moral argument.

If I have pointed out the danger there is of a situation in which war may be on us unexpectedly, a war which neither nation desires, and yet which neither nation can avoid, it is not the least in the spirit of Jingoism or menace. It is the trick of our Little Englanders, led by Sir William Harcourt, to pretend that there are "rash and reckless men" in the Unionist Party who "want to fight everybody and take everything." My belief is there are no such men, but there are men who, although prepared to make every sacrifice, nay, even the surrender of obvious rights, in order to avoid the hideous calamity of a war between ourselves and France, still think that there is a point at which we should cease to surrender, and that—more than this—the prospect of peace will be greatly improved if we intimate the point when it is reached. In my opinion the evacuation of Boussa should be the condition of resuming negotiation. I have made no reference to the reported invasion of Sokoto because I cannot believe in it. Such an outrage would exceed all others. The men I speak of, and in whose Party I enroll myself, agree with Lord Salisbury in the oft-quoted words used at the Guildhall, and do not agree with Sir William Harcourt.

To give an account of the humiliating affronts we have received at the hands of the French Government, to explain the resentment it has aroused, and to echo Lord Salisbury's declaration that "we

cannot submit to have our plain rights overridden," is neither Jingoism nor menace.

In the meantime the French remain untroubled. The *Débats* coolly says: "One is amazed at seeing from what trifling incidents all the present pother has arisen." It is not the least surprising that the French remain tranquil. They have nothing to resent; they have committed their raids at our expense, and are in possession of the spoils. The despoiler who has carried off his booty is generally tranquil. It is the denuded victim who complains. This tranquillity constitutes the danger. The French people are kept in ignorance of what their officials have done. It is invariably explained to the ordinary French newspaper reader that every Anglo-French difficulty is merely a case of British greed. Is it too much to hope that, even at this eleventh hour, some Frenchmen of authority and independence will examine the history of the course which has been pursued towards England by official France, and that through their intervention some reparation and a friendly settlement may be arrived at? Nothing would rejoice us more. I am quite convinced of this, that if England had behaved towards France in the way France has behaved towards England in West Africa, the French people would never have submitted as tamely as we have done; and, moreover, that an English Party would have been formed in this country strong enough to insist on reparation and a friendly settlement.

No sane Englishman desires war with France; we have shown in every way our desire to avoid it, but if France continues her provocation we shall be obliged to accept her challenge. Speaking personally, I can only regard the prospect of a war with France with the utmost abhorrence. I have always regarded her as my second country. My hope has always been for an Anglo-French *entente*. I was one of the few Englishmen who protested against the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. If my hope of an *entente* has vanished it is because I have come to the conclusion that France—judged by the conduct of her Government and the language of her newspapers—is inspired by a fixed enmity to England.

We have found determined hostility upon the question of Egypt, the Upper Nile (over the Anglo-Congo agreement), Newfoundland, Siam, Madagascar, and West Africa. We have vainly endeavoured to propitiate her by concessions. Each concession has been accepted as a sign of weakness and forgotten. We gave way at Madagascar, Tunis, Siam, and upon innumerable occasions in West Africa. We remained silent when France violated all her engagements concerning the evacuation of Tunis. It was friendly and considerate on our part to do this, but our forbearance stands in striking contrast with the campaign she perpetually wages against us in Egypt, where our position is precisely analogous to hers in

Tunis,* except that we have not yet declared a Protectorate in the former country. She has also disregarded all her undertakings to us at Madagascar, and ruined our connection with that island. She tore up our Anglo-Congo agreement, and substituted a treaty of her own. She refuses to settle the Newfoundland dispute, and pays extravagant bounties to French fishermen to cross the Atlantic and maintain some trivial rights—trivial to France, but most vexatious to the people of Newfoundland.

If I have drawn up these accusations, they are intended less as accusations than as an explanation of a situation the creation of which we profoundly deplore.

The French people want war as little as we do. It is melancholy to think they may be blundered into it by incompetent statesmen. If only there were such a thing in France as public opinion (apart from press opinion)—if the ill-informed French people could know the real situation! but the daily newspapers of Paris monopolize all the channels of information and pervert the reading public. There is no chance of getting a word heard in British justification. The hopeless thing is that we may be drifting into a war which each nation would make strenuous efforts to avoid. It may be avoided if the French Government is given to understand that the limit of surrender has been reached. If it is not understood *Perfide Albion* will seem more perfidious than ever.†

FREDK. A. MAXSE.

* The following words were read by M. Jules Ferry, then Prime Minister of France, to the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, in May, 1881:—

"La République Française a répudié solennellement en commencant cette expédition toute projet d'annexation, toute idée de conquête: elle renouvelle à cette heure, où le dénouement est proche, les mêmes déclarations."

It was provided also by the Treaty of Bardo that the occupation of Tunis "shall cease when the French and Tunisian authorities shall have recognized by common consent that the local Administration is capable of guaranteeing the maintenance of order."

Monsieur Barthélemy St. Hilaire assured our Ambassador, Lord Lyons, that "the French Government had certainly no intention of annexing Biserta or any other part of Tunis."

† Nothing can be more satisfactory than the peroration of Mr. Chamberlain's speech in the House of Commons on February 24th. He said the Government and the country were "united in the determination that while they will exhibit a most conciliatory disposition in dealing with disputed matters, and be ready even to make concessions of what they think to be their rights in order to secure the friendship of a great nation with which they desire to remain in cordial amity; on the other hand, they will not allow the important interests of this country to be sacrificed."

THE BRITISH ARMY.

THE whole winter has been occupied with an important discussion on the question of Army Reform, and I am desirous of offering a few observations on the subject of short service, and the organization accompanying it. As I wish to speak as impartially as possible, I must premise what I am going to say by stating that, though I was engaged in helping to carry out the organization, I was not mixed up in any way in its original inception.

When I first went to the War Office in June, 1873, I found both the short service and the localization organization established. I confess that I was rather prejudiced than otherwise against the changes which had taken place, not on account of the principles involved, but on account of the sympathy I felt for regiments, which were likely to lose their separate indentity by being linked with other regiments. At the same time, I considered that it had been ratified by Parliament, that three millions of money had been voted for the purpose of carrying it out, and that, for that reason, if for no other, those who had to carry it out ought to do so loyally, whether they approved it or not. I soon found, however, what a valuable organization it would be, when fully developed, for the purpose of war, as well as for the maintenance of our responsibilities in ordinary times. Valuable in the case of war, because, on the mobilization of the Reserves, the country would have at home seventy battalions effective at war strength ready for any operation required; and valuable in ordinary times, because the battalions in India and the Colonies would be automatically supplied with fully trained soldiers.

I am not going to enter into many details of figures. Several very able letters have been published, the object of some of which has been to make out that the whole system as introduced by Lord Cardwell has been a failure; while the object on the other side has been to show that there has been no failure, but that, on the contrary, if the organization had been properly worked the army would have been in even a better condition than that in which it now is. I merely wish to tell the simple story as it presents itself to me, and to point out what, in my opinion, is required to remedy

real or apparent defects, and place the system on a sounder basis.

Previous to 1872 there was no regular Infantry organization in the country. The Infantry consisted of a number of regiments all independent one of the other, and with no base or locality to fall back upon. It is true that the regimental organization was in itself perfect, but, except in the cases of the four-battalion and two-battalion regiments—of which twenty-seven existed—there was no elasticity or expansive power. If a single battalion regiment was wanted at any time for service, it had to be filled up at haphazard by volunteers from other regiments with which it had no connection, the efficiency of which was thereby impaired.

After adopting the short-service system, Lord Cardwell no doubt felt the necessity of reorganizing the Infantry regiments. He was supported by Members on both sides of the House, though opposed by a large military as well as civil element. The question was unluckily mixed up with the abolition of purchase, with which it had really nothing to do; but that measure had created such a bitter feeling among those who were opposed to it that anything in the way of Military Reform proposed by Lord Cardwell was regarded with distrust.

He first began by reducing the number of battalions abroad to what he considered ought to be the normal number required in India and the Colonies. This number he found to be seventy There were at his disposal two regiments of four battalions each, twenty-five regiments of two battalions each, and eighty-three regiments of one battalion each. By joining together in pairs the eighty-three last-named regiments, he found that he could have seventy battalions abroad and seventy in support at home with one over. There is no doubt that, if an army were being formed *de novo*, an organization of four battalions to every regiment would be a better and a more elastic organization than that of two battalions; but the problem was not the formation of an army *de novo*, but how to bring the forces that existed into one organization. Lord Cardwell desired to weld into a homogeneous whole the regular and the auxiliary forces of the United Kingdom. Now, the organization of the auxiliary forces was a County organization, and Lord Cardwell found that, by adopting the double battalion system in all cases except that of the Rifle Brigade and the Sixtieth Regiment, he could bring the Regulars as near as possible into a County organization. There were two alternative plans by which this system could be attained. First, eighty-two of the eighty-three regiments might be linked and brigaded by pairs; or, secondly, half of these regiments might be disbanded and second battalions added to the other half. It was generally understood that the Military Authorities at the time chose the first alternative,

and I think it must be admitted that under the circumstances it was a wise choice.

The scheme ultimately formulated by the Organization Committee was based on the essential idea of territorial districts, each to contain two line battalions, two Militia Infantry battalions, and a certain *quota* of Volunteers, formed into an administrative brigade, the whole to rest on the brigade depôt or centre.

Lord Cardwell was succeeded by Mr. Gathorne Hardy, afterwards Lord Cranbrook, who, though he was urged to alter the arrangements, resolutely refused to do so without further enquiry. It was by his order that the Militia Committee, which was presided over by the present Lord Derby, and which numbered among its members many of the most prominent and influential Militia Colonels of that time, was assembled. This Committee, which was unanimous in its report, went a step further, and recommended that the brigade organization should be converted into a regimental organization. When the present Lord Derby succeeded Lord Cranbrook as Secretary of State, he assembled another Committee on the organization of the army. It was presided over by the late Lord Airey, and recommended among other things that the terms of service with the colours should be lengthened, but in 1880, before any decision was arrived at on the reports of the above-named Committees, another change of Government took place, and Mr. Childers came in as Secretary of State for War. He adopted most of the changes recommended by the Militia Committee, as well as some of those recommended by Lord Airey's Committee, including the extension of service with the colours. This was the real commencement of localization. The line and Militia uniforms were assimilated, the Militia officers were put under the Army Act all the year round, and the Militia battalions became virtually line battalions in a disembodied state. During the next ten years our responsibilities abroad increased without a proportionate increase of our resources at home to meet them. The difficulty of finding drafts grew so serious that Mr. Stanhope, who was then Secretary of State for War, determined to assemble a Committee in 1891 to consider the matter. This was the origin of the Wantage Committee. The report of that Committee distinctly showed the causes of the failure, and suggested the alterations necessary in order to meet the difficulties; but until last year nothing was done towards securing one of the most important objects brought to notice in the report—namely, the adjustment of the balance of battalions abroad and at home as well as that of men.*

* I cannot do better than quote here that part of the report which dealt with the organization:

ORGANIZATION.

9. "The efficient maintenance of our establishments for the military defence of our possessions at home and abroad must always, under a system of voluntary enlistment, be a matter of difficulty.

"This difficulty is considerably increased by a want of complete appreciation on the part of the public—and, in some cases, on the part of officers of the army*—of the subjects and intentions of the existing organization of the various military forces of the Empire. This organization, under which the armed forces of the Crown have been governed since 1872, is based on a memorandum issued in that year by the Commander-in-Chief, carrying out proposals made by the then Secretary of State for War. But it has been shown by the evidence that this organization has not been completely maintained. The failures which have arisen are due mainly to this, but largely also to the fact that the existing inducements to enter the army have failed to supply the ranks with soldiers of sufficient age to provide the requisite drafts for India and abroad, and at the same time to keep the battalions on home service up to the proper standard of efficiency.

"The necessary condition in a voluntarily-enlisted army, of seeking in the open market, and the face of enormous civil competition, for recruits sufficient to provide for an army of 104,000 men abroad, and for a nearly equal force at home, is the problem which has to be solved. If it cannot be solved with voluntary enlistment, conscription is the only alternative."

10. "The whole weight of the evidence has fully sustained the conviction that the question of long service, in the common acceptation of the term, as opposed to short service, is not now open to argument. Even if short service has not been deliberately adopted by the nation, or if the repeated failures under long service to obtain even the smaller number of recruits which it required, could be ignored, the absolute necessity, under the conditions of modern warfare, for such a system as will permit of the rapid expansion for war, and reinforcement of an army in the field by an efficient Reserve, is universally admitted. This can best be provided by a short-service system. What the Committee conceive to constitute an efficient Reserve will be hereafter stated. The present difficulties are not attributable to short service as such, but to the failure of successive Governments to carry out the principles accepted in 1872, upon which the short-service organization adopted in that year was based."

11. "The complete application of the territorial system (which to a considerable extent has always existed in this country) is also an integral part of the organization now in force. The evidence as to the value of the territorial connection is overwhelming. Commanding and regimental officers have been unanimous in stating that their territorial recruits are their best men; and it has been precisely in the case of those regiments which have the closest connection with their districts that these witnesses have expressed the strongest opinion in favour of the system. Not less important is their evidence that it is in these districts that their own men, on transfer to the Reserve, find it easiest to obtain employment. Another great advantage of the system lies in the intimate connection it fosters between the line, the Militia, and the Volunteers, from which much advantage results to recruiting, more especially from the encouragement which Militia commanding officers give to the enlistment of their men

* With reference to this point, the Committee desire to record their concurrence in the opinion expressed by the General commanding the forces in Ireland (see his evidence, Question 4373), that the organization of the army ought to be made a subject in all examinations for promotion. They are also of opinion that steps should be taken to place within the reach of the officers of the army the reports of all Committees on important military questions, by making a distribution of them to headquarters of corps and to garrison libraries.

into battalions of the line. No less than 13,535 men during 1891 thus passed from the Militia into the line."

12. "The fact that England has at one and the same time to maintain an army in India which may be considered as permanently on active service, adequate garrisons in her Colonies, and an army at home, which has to fulfil the dual purpose of home service (including the provision of a force for small wars), and of feeding the army abroad, lies at the root of the difficulties with which we have to contend."

13. "The further circumstance that the Indian army is ever increasing contributes largely to augment these difficulties. The home army, with the present establishment, consequently tends to become more and more a depôt for the army abroad, and less an efficient army for purposes of home service, and for the sending out of expeditionary battalions in case of need. Moreover, the necessity of yielding to the immediate pressure of the increasing demands for India and the army abroad, without receiving any compensating augmentation of the cadres at home, has forced the authorities to depart in practice from those principles of the organization of 1872 which provided that a certain force at home should be kept in a fit condition for active service, and that home battalions should not be regarded merely as recruiting agencies for battalions serving abroad."

14. "At the same time it cannot be doubted that there are great advantages in keeping the army in India closely united with the army at home. If treated as distinct armies they would have a tendency to diverge in different directions and to deteriorate in different ways, from absence of the correcting influences derived in the one case from home service, and in the other from foreign active service."

15. "The advantages of the system of regimental training for men destined for India over the alternative, and far more expensive, system of depôts can hardly be over-estimated. The recruits acquire more interest in their profession, and better teaching in the higher spirit and discipline of a soldier's life. When a recruit enlists he wants to enter the army and not a military school, and there can be no doubt that the variety and excitement of regimental life compare favourably, in his estimation, with the routine of life at the depôt."

16. "Still more is this the case when young soldiers, destined for India, have the advantage of going to Aldershot, or other camps of instruction, where (more especially during late years) men have been made to take part in the most interesting branch of a soldier's duty, viz., field operations on a comparatively large scale with Cavalry and Artillery."

17. "The system now in operation, though by no means fully adequate as hitherto carried out, has been so far successful that the efficiency and excellence of our army in India is testified to by undisputed evidence. The organization, therefore, has accomplished its object so far as India is concerned, though, in consequence of its not having been completely maintained, at the cost of great strain to the army at home and serious sacrifice of its efficiency."

18. "This excellence of the army in India is in great measure due to the zeal and energy of the officers and non-commissioned officers of the home battalions, and to their efforts to send out the best possible material to India, even at the expense of their own battalions. The high quality of the drafts sent abroad should be taken into consideration in passing judgment upon the system responsible for the condition of the home battalions. When these battalions are condemned as being largely composed of growing lads, it must be borne in mind that this is to a certain extent the anticipated result of the system, which was, nevertheless, after much consideration, and in spite of these drawbacks, adopted as that best suited to our requirements—namely, a double-battalion system, under which the home battalion undertakes the training and supply of drafts for the battalion abroad. The Committee have no hesitation in stating their belief that the double-battalion system is not only the most economical,

but also the best machinery which can, at present, be devised for furnishing the foreign drafts and effecting the reliefs. They are confirmed in this view by the evidence of His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, of the General commanding the forces in Ireland, of the Adjutant-General, and of the General commanding the Aldershot Division, who all expressed strong opinions in its favour."

19. "To provide drafts of trained men of suitable age for service in India is admitted to be a condition of primary importance, to which the efficiency of the home battalions must, to a certain extent, give way ; but it by no means follows that the home battalions need be depleted and reduced to the extent that many have hitherto been, and it is with a view to obviating this evil, as well as maintaining both the quality and quantity necessary for the efficiency of the Indian drafts, that the recommendations contained in this report have been made."

The question of the supply of men must be dealt with whatever organization be adopted. The opponents of the present organization, as I understand, say that under their proposal, viz., the partial return to long service, the number of recruits required would be considerably diminished, though they admit that it would be at the expense of the Reserve. Before sacrificing, however, the Reserve it should be clearly shown that the short-service system has failed, and that the recruits required are not to be got under it. This cannot be proved until the short-service system has been properly worked in accordance with the principles of 1872, which has never yet been done.

There was fairly unanimous testimony before the Wantage Committee from the most experienced officers in favour of the maintenance of short service. Lord Wolseley would rather not have any man longer than nine years with the colours. Sir Redvers Buller thought that twenty-seven years of age should be the limit; and Sir Evelyn Wood, though wishing to keep a proportion of old soldiers, was not in favour of long-service men. Almost all the witnesses admitted the necessity of a Reserve, and a Reserve cannot be created except by means of short service. The point, therefore, is how to adapt the short-service system to the requirements of our service abroad and to the maintenance of efficient battalions at home, for all purposes required.

Efficiency of Battalions Abroad and at Home.

The evidence given before the Wantage Committee as to the efficiency of the battalions abroad was distinct. The Adjutant-General, at that time Sir Redvers Buller; the present Commander-in-Chief, Lord Wolseley; the Duke of Connaught, who had been Commander-in-Chief in Bombay; and officers commanding battalions in India, all agreed that the battalions in that country were in a most effective condition. The late frontier war has fully confirmed this. Whatever criticism may have been made,

there has been universal acknowledgment of the merits of the men. This has been confirmed by Sir W. Lockhart, the Commander-in-Chief, as well as by private letters from other officers.

So far as the foreign battalions are concerned, therefore, it must be admitted that the short-service system has not been a failure.

With regard to the battalions at home, the evidence certainly went to show that, owing to the youth of the recruits, no battalion was fit to be sent on active service, and that in the case of some battalions, owing to the large abnormal drafts supplied to their twin battalions, they were like squeezed lemons after the drafts had been despatched. It did not seem, however, to be generally recognized that the organization scheme never intended that the home battalions should be fit to take the field on active service while on a peace footing. The intention was that, should they be required for war, they should be brought up to war strength by means of the Reserves. The inequalities in the drafts demanded have since been rectified to a great extent I believe, and, as a rule, normal drafts are only sent from each battalion. Assuming, therefore, for the moment, that a regular supply of recruits can be furnished to each regiment, the only point to consider is whether the nucleus on which the Reserve is to be grafted is sufficiently strong in each battalion as only to call for a due proportion of Reserve men to bring it up to war strength on mobilization.

During the late controversy in *The Times* there was a difference of opinion on this point. Sir Arthur Haliburton contended that on mobilization the effective strength of the average battalion would be 476 N.C.O.'s and men, and that consequently only 591 Reserve men would be required to be added to each battalion to bring it up to war strength. Mr. Arnold Forster, on the other hand, put the number that would be required at an average of from 650 to 750, and even "over 800." His numbers were, it appears, based on a wrong assumption, because he assumed that, on mobilization, it would be necessary to deduct, in addition to the men under twenty, all men in their last year of colour service or time-expired men as well as the drafts actually told off for foreign service. But in the event of mobilization these men would not be deducted, as in that case men becoming due for the Reserve or discharge would be retained with the colours both in the home and foreign battalions, and no drafts would therefore be sent from the home to the foreign battalion to replace them. Should there be any drafts on passage at the time of mobilization, the men, relieved by these drafts, would, on arrival, be retained with the home battalions.

Sir Arthur Haliburton's figures seem to be, therefore, rather cor-

roborated than otherwise by those of Mr. Arnold Forster. At all events, if this mistake of Mr. Forster's is rectified, the numbers in both cases are closely assimilated. It is for the military authorities to say whether this strength meets all requirements. It is really a question of establishment, for the greater the strength of the battalion the larger will be the proportion to form the nucleus on which to graft the Reserve.

Remedies.

Since 1891 our responsibilities abroad have been further increased, and on the 1st of January, 1897, there were 76½ battalions and 82,594 of all ranks abroad as against 64½ battalions and 54,371 of all ranks at home, or an excess of twelve battalions and 28,223 of all ranks in the Infantry abroad over the numbers at home. It is obvious that with this discrepancy it is almost impossible to support the battalions abroad from the battalions and depôts at home and to maintain at the same time the force at home efficient for the purposes required.

Independently of the question of obtaining the necessary number of recruits, the three chief remedies recommended by the Wantage Committee seem to be the remedies applicable, to a great extent, to the present condition of things. They were :—

1st. That the equality between the numbers of line battalions serving at home and abroad respectively upon which the organization of 1872 was based should be restored.

2nd. That the general establishment of Infantry at home liable to furnish drafts should be maintained at a strength of five times the amount of the drafts required for abroad.

3rd. That, so far as is consistent with the requirements of other military considerations, there should be an uniform establishment for battalions on home service and an uniform establishment for battalions abroad, and that one battalion of a regiment should return home in the same season in which the other battalion embarks for foreign service.

The settlement of what ought to be, in ordinary times, the normal number of battalions kept abroad for the purpose of meeting our responsibilities does not rest with the military, but with the Government, who, after consultation with their military advisers, fix the number they consider to be necessary. Should it become necessary to increase that number *permanently* then, in order to carry out the organization of 1872, extra battalions must be raised at home in proportion to the number required. When the increase of battalions abroad is only needed for *temporary* employment and is not required *permanently*, that is a contingency which would have to be met in another way. Lord Lansdowne foreshadowed, in his speech at Edinburgh, a plan of having more

regiments of four battalions each than we have now. There is no doubt (and I do not think that the statement can be gainsaid) that for a temporary emergency it would be much easier to provide for the strain of keeping three battalions abroad by means of one battalion and a depôt of eight companies at home, than it would be to provide for two battalions of a regiment abroad by means of a six-company depot alone. At present there are only two regiments, the K.R.R. Corps and the Rifle Brigade, of four battalions each, but if, in developing the organization, six or eight more regiments could be enlarged to four battalions each, the country would have at its disposal eight or ten battalions which could be sent abroad for temporary purposes, without dislocating the machinery to any great extent.

The second of the above-named measures recommended by the Wantage Committee has, I believe, been already carried out as far as possible, and establishments have been raised in accordance with this principle.

The third measure recommended, viz., the uniformity of the establishments at home as well as the uniformity of the establishments abroad, is a measure which could only be carried out by degrees, according as the regimental drafts were brought down to their normal strength. This, I believe, has been accomplished to a great extent now, but its permanency, as well as the relief in all cases of battalions abroad by battalions of the same regiment from home, must depend upon the maintenance of the equality between the number of line battalions serving at home and abroad respectively.

Supply of Recruits.

The supply of recruits depends upon the regulations adopted for getting them and upon the terms and conditions offered them.

There are certain broad principles to be observed in trying to obtain recruits for a voluntary army. In the first place, it has been sufficiently shown that the chief supply must come from young men, that is to say, from growing and immature youths. They have been taken as such from time immemorial, and have turned out the very best soldiers. There was abundant evidence given before the Wantage Committee in their favour. They are more pliable, more full of go, and more easily handled and taught than older men, and, besides, they more readily adapt themselves to the laws of discipline necessary for armed bodies. No one, I think, will deny that the discipline of home life, which was a marked feature in the early years of this century, has been diminished to a considerable extent, and that, therefore, from a National point of view, it is a benefit to the country that its youth should have an opportunity of being trained to habits of discipline and self-control.

Lord Lansdowne stated, in his speech at Edinburgh, that during the last twenty years about 600,000 recruits had been raised for the army, or an average of 30,000 per annum. As, during that time, there were only eight years when the strength did not come up to the establishment, there must have been constant checks put on recruiting to prevent the supply exceeding the demand. If this was the case, then it is evident that more men could have been enlisted if required. It is a curious fact that the supply has always increased with the demand. In the five years from 1883 to 1887 there was a great demand for recruits, owing to the demobilization of the Reserves called up in 1882, which had not been made supernumerary to, but had been included in the ordinary establishments, and owing, also, to the raising of the establishments afterwards. That demand was met by a greater supply, those years having produced an abnormal number of recruits, the numbers enlisted being:—In 1883, 33,096; in 1884, 35,653; in 1885, 39,971; in 1886, 39,469; in 1887, 31,225.

Again, in the years 1891, 1892, and 1893 there was another great demand for recruits, owing to an abnormal number of men passing to the Reserve, and to the fact that the establishments were again raised, with the result that in 1891, 35,003 recruits were raised; in 1892, 41,659; and in 1893, 35,195.

In every other year out of the twenty the strength exceeded the establishment at the end of the year. I am quite aware that it will be said that recourse was had to "specials," but "specials" are taken at all times, because it is well known that, with growing lads, no hard and fast lines can include all the eligible recruits, and that by fixing hard and fast rules as to standard, a great many of the very best men are often obliged to be refused. The term "special" is a term of reproach, and the sooner it is abolished the better. After fixing the minimum height, and any technical qualification required for each branch of the service, it would be well to leave all the rest to the judgment of the officer commanding the regimental district, and the medical officer. They are experienced and honourable men, and, if they agree, the country may rely upon it that very few mistakes would be made. It would be easy to get ample testimony showing the rapid manner in which young recruits develop under good treatment, and under the excellent system now adopted for their training in the service. The cry always seems to be for the ready-made article. It must be remembered that the ready-made article is not to be got. The raw material must be taken as it offers itself, and be manufactured.

In countries where conscription is the law the broad principle acted upon is, that no man must escape the service who is likely to make an efficient soldier. In a voluntary army the rule, when recruits are wanted, should be that no willing man, within the

prescribed ages, ought to be refused who is likely to become an efficient soldier.

Terms and Conditions of Service.

With regard to the terms and conditions of service, no doubt these should be such as not only to attract recruits, but also such as to make them contented while serving, and to induce them to pass from the colours at the end of their time in a contented frame of mind. The interest of the man and the interest of the State should be made identical. If the State requires a long-service army, then the terms must be shaped accordingly, but if, as under the Cardwellian system, the object is a Reserve, then the terms should be such as to keep as few privates as possible with the colours longer than the period required. At first Lord Cardwell had evidently intended to make it obligatory on all privates to pass into the Reserve on completion of their colour service. Lord Cranbrook, anticipating that some good substantial advantage ought to be provided for men going into the Reserve, very wisely instituted the deferred pay, which is really a deferred gratuity to help the man on passing into the Reserve. It was subsequently considered desirable that good men should be allowed to continue in the service if they found that it was more congenial to them than civil life. It was therefore made optional for these men to remain if they wished. There is no compulsion used whatever. The choice rests entirely with the man, assuming him to be a good man, but having made his choice he has to abide by it. Deferred pay is, as has been said, the keystone by means of which short service can be combined with free and elastic conditions. Either the passage to the Reserve must be obligatory, or, if optional, it must be combined with such terms as will be substantially advantageous to all who pass to the Reserve under the terms of the contract.

That the terms and conditions between the man, while serving with the colours, and the State shall be as free and elastic as possible is a condition which is absolutely necessary in a voluntary army. While in an army raised by conscription it is not wise to have too many voluntary clauses, so in an army raised by voluntary enlistment it is not wise to have too many compulsory clauses. It is better to make the terms such as will induce the man to stay as long as the State requires him, and to go into the Reserve at the time most suitable to the interests of the State. The interests of the State and that of the man will thus be identical.

The principle that the able-bodied and fully trained soldier is deserving of a higher wage than the immature recruit is a very valuable principle to work upon. It gives something for a young man to look forward to, and we may fairly anticipate that it will have some effect in reducing the large waste resulting from desertion

and purchase in the early years of service. It should be remembered that it is as important an object to retain as it is to procure recruits. The more the waste in the army is reduced, the less the number of recruits required.

It is generally admitted that the terms offered in the market should be as simple and as clear as possible, and not in any way framed in words which might be misinterpreted. For this reason it would be better that a weekly wage, clear of all stoppages, except such as arise from the man's own fault, should be offered. When any increase is given, it should take the form of an increase in the weekly wage. By this means the terms will be open to no doubts, and will be plain to the simplest understanding. The prospects, independent of the prizes on promotion, which the man will then have before him will be:—

1. A short period of immaturity with a lower rate of pay.
2. An increased wage on becoming an able-bodied soldier.
3. A liability of foreign service for a limited period only.
4. A choice of remaining with the colours on completion of his colour service or of going into the Reserve with a substantial gratuity to help him, and the promise of assistance as far as it is possible and as far as his own conduct, while in the service, will help him.

I have now given the course of the history of Lord Cardwell's scheme. I have written it for the civilian reader. I have endeavoured to show where it was never carried out, and the measures necessary for its completion. I have also endeavoured to show that if the country will freely take recruits at the age when they are most willing to come, and if the terms and conditions of service are such as to attract and retain, not only those who wish to make the army a career, but also those who wish to remain only a limited time, and after that to pass into the Reserve and back again into civil life, it may fairly be expected that the supply will increase with the demand.

One more word, and that is with reference to the Reserves, and Deferred Pay.

Reservists.

There seems to be a revival of the old distrust about the Reserves coming up when wanted. It is the same distrust which was shown previous to the mobilizations of 1878 and 1882. In those years, nevertheless, the Reserve men all responded to their summons, except an infinitesimal percentage, and in the words of an old officer who was by no means friendly to the Reserve, "fell in the next morning as if they had never left the colours." Those years are now forgotten, but, by recalling these facts to recollection, public confidence ought surely to be reassured, and to be satisfied that what happened then will happen again.

Deferred Pay.

I have alluded to deferred pay in the course of this article. It is a point which I consider involves a vital principle. It is a vital principle as affecting the working of short service with free and elastic conditions, as well as affecting the comfort and contentment of the Reserve man, the backbone, in emergency, of the army.

The system enables the country to meet the wishes of the *bonâ-fide* soldier, whose inclinations lead him to remain in the service and, at the same time, to contribute to the contentment of the valuable Reserve man who wishes to return to civil life. At present every good man is allowed, with the consent of his commanding officer, to extend his service, and subsequently to re-engage. There is, so far, a freedom of contract in favour of the man under that head. On the other hand, it is urged that, on the completion of colour service, the temptation of deferred pay is so great as to induce the large majority of privates to join the Reserve, or, as commanding officers say, to practically drive them from the colours. It is further urged that men, when they have once joined the Reserve, cannot rejoin the colours, owing to their being obliged to refund the deferred pay. In the first place, is it clear that men who really feel the service more congenial to them than civil life are prevented from extending? By the last annual return there were on the 1st January, 1897, close upon 9,000 privates serving on an extended engagement. The second complaint opens a question independent of deferred pay, and that is whether it is for the interest of the public service that men who, of their own free will, have joined the Reserve should have the power indiscriminately of coming back whenever it suits them, whether their services are required or not. It must be remembered that all men on returning to the colours reduce *pro tanto*, the strength of the Reserve, and hence the fighting power of the country. It is vain to say that the numbers can be limited. If the door is once opened to all men because they cannot get employment, no limit, in justice, can be fixed.

The evidence before the Wantage Committee distinctly showed that the system of deferred pay was popular, and much appreciated among Reserve men as well as by the privates serving with the colours. In fact, regimental officers, though averse to deferred pay because it induced men to leave the colours, admitted that it was popular. Of the 34,000 men in the Reserve who were asked whether the deferred pay had been of any benefit to them, 93 to 94 per cent. stated that it had been, and 6 to 7 per cent. that it had not been so. Are the interests of this large majority of men to be ignored because a few men, who would not take advantage of the permission to remain, want to come back again? If the necessity of a Reserve is admitted, then surely the inducement to enter the Re-

serve, coupled with the permission to extend, with no loss of their deferred pay, but, on the contrary, with a considerable addition to it when they leave the colours, is a legitimate inducement. As to the argument in favour of giving permission to men to return to the colours after they have joined the Reserve, quite independent of the interests of the public service, it cuts at the root of the existence of a Reserve. From a recruiting point of view, moreover, the abolition, or even the diminution, of deferred pay appears to be a short-sighted policy. The amount of it is now well known among the men, and, taken as it is every year among the civil population, is one of the best advertisements for the army. Lord Cranbrook, when introducing it on March 2nd, 1876, laid stress upon this fact as one of its probable advantages. He said:

"By the course he proposed to adopt our soldiers would return to their villages with a whole year's pay in their pockets, and this would be the means of inducing others to enlist."

I have limited myself to the subject of the Infantry of the line. I have not touched on the other branches of the Army. I have not even touched on the Militia, in which certain improvements are desirable, seeing that it is a disembodied part of the line. I have limited myself to the consideration of the system inaugurated in 1872, and to what appears to me to be the main question affecting it, which the country will have to decide upon, and that is, whether it will adhere to the short-service system with all its advantages, or go back to the long-service system with all its drawbacks?

Let only the present organization of the Infantry be developed on the original principles laid down by Lord Cardwell, there are plenty of able officers in the army, from the Commander-in-Chief downwards, who can be thoroughly relied upon to complete the higher organization. The statement of Lord Wolseley, as to the readiness of two army corps, should be accepted by the public as eminently satisfactory, and, given the increase necessary to complete the present organization, we shall have further results equally satisfactory.

In that case, the country will have reason to congratulate itself hereafter that it was not induced to go back, but that, in fully developing the short-service system initiated in 1870, it will have made its voluntary army a complete success as a fighting machine whenever an emergency arises requiring its services.

E. G. Bulwer.

THE INDIAN CRISIS AND A REMEDY.

WAR, Plague, Famine! One, alone, of these is a sufficient curse, but India suffers from them all.

The Government of India has a hard task; and, though we may criticize the way in which they deal with these evils, we can hardly hold them responsible for "the act of God and the King's enemies." But the list of India's troubles is not restricted to these cases, as all those know who have followed Indian business and Indian finance; for, in addition to the evils I have enumerated, a small body of worthy gentlemen, who are known collectively as the Government of India, are taking lessons in monetary science at the expense of the commercial, financial, and agricultural interests which they are supposed to protect.

The feeling that the actions of the Government have aroused, among all except the official classes, is faithfully reflected by every section of the Anglo-Indian Press, and, to quote the London *Times*, "forms very grave reading."

"The present situation is intolerable," writes *The Pioneer*.

"The recurrent starving of the country up to gold point," says the Calcutta *Englishman*, "and then letting loose a few lakhs of telegraphic transfers is simply prolonging the agony."

"How acute was that agony," says the London *Times* of 14th February, "may be judged from the statement that in Calcutta loans were being negotiated as high as 14 per cent. interest, while in Bombay, according to *The Times of India*, not even 24 per cent. would bring out an advance upon the most solid of all security—namely, gold bars." No doubt, as the English *Times* points out, the vernacular Press will take the matter up; and, of course, the first thing that they will do will be to point out to the natives that the Government have surreptitiously increased their taxation by giving a high artificial value to the rupee, in which their taxes are paid, and that, by the same act, they have lowered the rupee price of the silver ornaments or hoards in which the natives invest their savings.

To understand the native feeling on this subject, we may

imagine what would occur in a free country like this if, owing to some emergency, the Government felt it their duty to follow the precedent of the Plantagenet and Tudor kings, and clip or reduce the value of all sovereigns to the extent of say 30 or 40 per cent., and thus to reduce the savings of the natives of this country by that amount; and if we assume that our people had no voice in the Government, I think we may further assume that they would take measures to obtain one.

Sir Michael Hicks-Beach spoke of our responsibility to "that vast population that cannot speak for itself"; the view, however, of some Indian gentlemen (not Anglo-Indian officials) is, that when this "vast population" gets to understand what has been done it will "speak for itself."

War, plague, and famine are evils severe enough certainly, but they are temporary in their character, and if the country were unhampered by uncertain and empirical legislation it would soon pick up its strength with the help of its commerce and agriculture. But this is precisely what India is not allowed to do, for the Government have taken this opportunity to throttle the Industry of India with an artificially contracted currency. We, in England, are never tired of boasting that our wise and sound currency laws have given us a free and automatic system of metallic currency; but in June '93 we took away that very system from India. We despise the forced currency devices of the South American Republics; we prove theoretically, and events prove practically, that they will almost certainly lead to Bankruptcy. Yet we have kept India on a forced currency for the last four and a half years; and we have shown ourselves apt pupils of South American financiers by raising loans in London to pay current expenses in order to keep up the exchange. In short, we, who think ourselves the financial and monetary oracles of the world, have jumbled up the practice of the Plantagenet kings with the shifty devices of bankrupt South American States, and therefrom we have produced a currency system for India.

Quite true, say the Government of India, in their despatch of 16th September last, but you must remember that our system of currency is not really a system at all, it is a transition step to a gold basis which is on the eve of accomplishment.

We then ask, what sort of a gold standard are you about to adopt? and what further steps do you propose to take towards obtaining it? What is this plan that, after an incubation of four and a half years, is about to be hatched? Is it a gold basis such as we have in England, with silver as limited legal tender? Is it a gold basis such as they have in France and the United States, with a mass

of over-valued silver as unlimited legal tender, and a mass of gold to keep that silver at par? Or is it the gold basis of one of the various currency schemes that have been put before the public during the last few years? To these questions we receive no reply, because the Indian Government neither know what sort of gold basis they are trying to obtain nor do they know what steps they should take to obtain it.

Is this business?

What the Indian Government really thought was, that if they could force the rupee up to 1s. 4d. or over, and if they agreed to receive gold for rupees at that rate, gold would flow into India, and that they would thus get a gold standard. Or if they did not think so, why did they add to the law which closed the mints a decree making sovereigns and gold receivable by the Government at 1s. 4d. the rupee?

They forgot that the net was spread in the sight of all, and that no one would exchange his gold for rupees at 1s. 4d. unless he had good reason to suppose that he would get 1s. 4d. back. It was obvious to everyone except the Indian Government that, as rupees could be substituted for gold at 1s. 4d. to any extent, rupees could not possibly go above 1s. 4d., so that there was no possibility of making a gain in exchange by shipping gold to change for rupees; on the other hand, as it was clear that the rupee exchange had been "rigged" by the Government to a point about 60 per cent. above its metallic value, it was clear that it might fall heavily at any moment, and that the shipper might get his gold back at a much lower rate. Consequently, though the exchange has been at 1s. 4d., and enormously high rates of interest are being paid in India, no gold goes to the treasury; for, to the intense surprise of the Indian Government, their invitation to capitalists to take a heavy risk in exchange, with a chance, if they had very good luck, of getting out without loss, has not proved an attractive proposition.

Indeed, far from sending gold to the Treasury, everyone in India remits all that can be spared when exchange approaches 1s. 4d., as that is the highest rate they can ever obtain, and as, if they wait longer, exchange may fall; and though the Indian banks are bound to supply their regular customers with money, they charge very high rates for doing so, and keep as little capital in India as they possibly can.

Perhaps the Government thought that the millions of gold that are supposed by some to exist in India would pour into the Treasury as prophesied by certain writers; but during the last few weeks natives have been borrowing rupees on bar gold at the rate of 2 per cent. per month rather than exchange it at the Treasury for the precarious and artificial 1s. 4d. rupee; their point of view being that

gold may rise greatly as measured in their money, viz., in rupees, and that it cannot fall below the equivalent of 1s. 4d. per rupee, so they prefer to borrow rupees at exorbitant rates rather than part with their gold. I have said that the Indian Government has been taking lessons from South America, but this perhaps is hardly fair—on South America, for no American financier in his maddest moments ever concocted so certain a device for keeping money out of the country. In South America they have debased paper currencies certainly, but these go up as well as down, and though the foreign capitalist runs a risk in exchange, he has as good a chance of profit as of loss from that cause; but the Indian Government's new game, where the lucky players get their stakes back and the unlucky ones lose, is not likely to be generally popular.

The Indian Government have just passed another law whereby they hope to obtain gold in London, but as we have not seen the text it is useless to discuss it. One thing, however, is certain, that however many laws are passed no gold standard can be introduced into India unless the rupee is made freely convertible into gold. Before, therefore, any private gold goes to India the Government must accumulate, by loan or otherwise, a gold reserve to maintain the rupee at par. As there are about £140,000,000 sterling in rupees taken at 1s. 4d., and as the silver value of the rupee is about 10d., a very large fund will be required; and if we take the analogy of France and the United States, and other countries where there is also a large mass of over-valued silver in circulation, and if we take into account the different coinage value of the silver in those countries, it would appear as if about £50,000,000 sterling would be required.*

This would seem a heavy price to pay for the luxury of a gold standard, especially when there are many who think that it would be a great evil in itself. But apart from that, a gold standard in India would mean a great drain of gold from existing stocks of gold in Europe; and, to say nothing of causing panics over here, it would tend to raise the value of gold as compared with all produce.

In addition to the Government's demand for gold, gold from private sources would also go into India (when and if the rupee had been made freely convertible) to relieve the existing monetary stringency; and further, an indefinite demand for gold would spring

* Some people think that no more than £15,000,000 would be required, at first at all events, and they point to Java as a similar case, but Java differs from India, in that its silver money is unlimited legal tender at the Bank of Holland, so that to make the cases at all parallel we should have to make Indian rupees unlimited legal tender at the Bank of England.

up in India for hoarding, when the natives realized that gold was stable, as measured in rupees, and that silver was in India a mere fluctuating commodity, like copper. Thus an enormous and increasing quantity of gold would be required for India. Gold would be appreciated, and gold prices everywhere would tend to fall heavily. The effect in India would be that the difficulty that she already experiences of meeting her gold obligations in England would be increased, and she would have to find more goods and produce to pay the £18,000,000 per annum that she owes us, to say nothing of the interest on the new loan of £50,000,000 which we have supposed that she would raise. As this annual gold debt is the source of all the trouble it seems rather curious that the only relief that the Government of India can suggest, should be one that would increase that burden.

What then is the remedy? A remedy has been proposed—by France and the United States—and has been rejected.

India required a par of exchange with both gold-using and silver-using countries; and that was offered them. India has been crying out for years for a high exchange; that, too, was offered them. These things, however, were all refused because, as stated in the despatch of 16th September, the Indian Government was on the eve of securing a gold standard.

This despatch of 16th September was a truly remarkable document. In it the Government referred to the objection that the rupee would, under a gold standard, continue to remain at a value above its metallic value; but "this is an objection which has not made itself felt in other countries, including France and the United States, in which an analogous system has been in operation for many years. It is not likely that the objection will make itself seriously felt in India when the gold standard has been effectively introduced."

The Government therefore think that because France, with £160,000,000 of gold and no external debt, can keep her silver at par, India can do so with no gold and a large external debt. It is when a nation has to remit money that an unsound currency breaks down; and India, a poor country, with a permanent foreign indebtedness of £18,000,000 a year, which she must pay, is in a very different position to a rich country like France, whose foreign indebtedness is entirely voluntary, and can be stopped at any moment, and whose exchange is always in her favour.

France and the United States may be supposed to know something of their own business, but when they try to arrange concerted action for removing the evils from which they are suffering, India tells them that their present system causes them no inconvenience, and,

in fact, is so satisfactory that she means to adopt it herself. The United States must have been truly pleased at so unexpected a testimonial, from a part of the British Empire, to the wisdom of Messrs. Sherman and Bland.

The whole despatch is full of amusement to the student of money, but I have not time to discuss it at length; suffice it to say, that the Government confuse rupee prices with silver prices, and found an argument on that confusion; forgetting that they have already forced the rupee to 60 per cent. above its real value, and that the artificial value of the rupee has placed the Indian producer at a great disadvantage as compared with his silver-using competitors, and that the tea producers and others are loud in their complaints.

However, the Home Government think the despatch so weighty and convincing that they have dropped all further negotiations and have made no attempt to reconcile the views of India with those of France and the United States. Others think that it is almost criminal to allow the gentlemen who wrote the despatch to continue their absurd currency experiments on the people of India.

We have no right to place the interests of 300,000,000 of people in the hands of men who know so little of practical matters that they think the United States currency position satisfactory, and who know so little of monetary science that they think France and India are comparable. And least of all have our Government any right to shelter themselves behind the opinions of their own nominees.

Let us now consider whether any remedy is possible for the present intolerable condition of affairs in India, which is at once feasible, sound, and capable of immediate application.

It has been proposed to open the English mints to silver; and it has been proposed that India should make an agreement with France and the United States; but whatever the merits of these plans may be, they must be dismissed as incapable of immediate application in the present state of public opinion.

On the other hand, a gold standard for India is, as we have seen, impracticable and undesirable.

It has been suggested that the Government should cease its borrowings in England, and should sell its Council bills freely as occasion requires. This, no doubt, is a sound policy as far as it goes, and, in my opinion, should be at once adopted; but if nothing more be done, the injury to the natives in the matter of silver savings would still remain; the disadvantage to the Indian producer, as compared with his silver-using competitors, would still remain; and the false basis of an artificial rupee would also remain.

What, therefore, I would propose, is that India should return as soon as possible to her old automatic metallic standard and re-open the mints to silver. She would then, at least, have a par of exchange with one set of nations, viz., those that use silver; she would, at least, be free from monetary stringency caused by artificial contraction of the currency; and, above all, she would be free from further Government experiments in unsound money.

I believe that there would be a considerable demand for silver for currency purposes for India directly the mints were opened, and that silver would rise considerably; for there are practically no stocks of silver on the market, and even a small demand would raise it a good deal. We can also see by the existing monetary stringency that even when the rupee is at 1s. 4d. a good deal more money is required, so if it fell, more money still would be required, and there would be a greatly increased demand for silver for coinage. If the fall should put the Government in temporary difficulties they could raise a loan to tide over the time during which taxation was being adjusted, and an exhaustive enquiry was being held by competent people; for nothing can persuade either economists or men of business that better means of taxation cannot be found than that of giving a false value to the money of the people.

The above proposal would, I know, meet with great support from all those who hold that the only sound basis for Government finance is an automatic metallic currency; but the objection to it is, as I have indicated, that the rupee might fall from its present value to such an extent as to disorganize Government finance, and that the consequent increased taxation might cause discontent. This is a perfectly valid objection; but I may remark in passing that it can be urged with almost equal force against the conditions that at present exist.

It is an objection, however, and should be met; and could be met, to a great extent at least, by adopting the proposal suggested by the six monometallic members of the Gold and Silver Commission of 1888, and by Mr. Goschen. This proposal was that England should gradually withdraw the half-sovereign, and should issue in its place 10s. notes based on silver. To this proposal there is, as Mr. Goschen said, no economic objection, but it was withdrawn because it met with no general support except in Lancashire. If, however, it could be shown that by adopting it England would render material assistance to India, and would make at the same time a large profit for herself, no serious person could oppose it.

There are about £22,000,000 sterling in the form of half-sovereigns, and if these were withdrawn, and the gold put on the

market, the "strain" upon gold would be *pro tanto* diminished and if 10s. silver notes were substituted we should obtain that which all desire—an increased use of silver for domestic or internal purposes. This would necessitate no real change in our currency laws, for the 40s. legal tender limit of our silver coins would be also applied to the new 10s. notes.

Nor need there be any fear that these notes would become dirty, for they could be renewed whenever they were presented at the bank or at Government offices; and the cost of doing this would be absolutely inappreciable as compared with the profit that the Government would make. In the first place, the half-sovereign is, as we all know, a very expensive coin to maintain, and the saving under this head would go far to cover the cost of the issue and renewal of the notes; and in the next place, just as the Government now buy silver at the market price and issue it in the form of coin at 66d. an ounce, so they would enormously increase this profit by buying silver at the market price and issuing it in the form of notes at 66d. an ounce. Supposing, for instance, that they issued notes to the extent of £22,000,000 (the value of the present half-sovereigns), and that they bought that silver at an average price of 33d. an ounce, they would make a gross profit of £11,000,000, out of which they might well spare enough to keep the new notes clean!* There may be different opinions as to the price at which England could buy silver, but this at least is clear, that so far as English buying raised the price of silver the Indian Government would be benefited, and the mass of Indian silver would be increased in value; while so far as England's purchases did not raise the price of silver, her profit would be increased.

Now, as to the effect of such an operation on the price of silver and, consequently, on the metallic value of the rupee. The annual production of silver at its market value is estimated at £18,489,444.† The annual production of gold is increasing rapidly, and is estimated at £51,706,188†; and the extraordinary demands of Russia

* I may here point out that this is a very different proposal to that made by the French and American Envoys, for they suggested that England should withdraw her half-sovereigns and issue 10s. notes contemporaneously with the opening of the French and United States mints at a ratio that would make the price of silver 60·84d. an ounce, so that England would only have made a small (and, as some think, an uncertain) profit by the transaction. I suggest that England should do this when silver is as low as it is ever likely to be. I say that silver is about at its lowest price, because at any lower figure a great demand would spring up for silver forks and spoons and other articles that are now made in electroplate. Taking into account the value of the metal when this class of goods is worn out, it would actually pay better to buy silver than electroplate if silver were at from 1s 9d. to 1s. 10d. an ounce; so if we add 3(d.) an ounce for the natural preference for silver over electroplate, it would appear that silver could hardly fall below 24d. or 25d.

† *New York Commercial and Financial Chronicle.*

and other countries for gold currencies are nearly satisfied. Thus a fresh demand by England and India, even for a moderate annual amount, would almost certainly raise the price of silver to 37¾d. an ounce, and this would give a value of 1s. 2d. to the rupee, at which value, I am assured, the Government of India could carry on perfectly well.

There would be no occasion for England to purchase silver at over 37¾d., and the effect of such a limit would be that England's purchases, and her support of the market, would be spread over some years, and at the end of that time, for the reasons I have just given, we might reasonably hope that the price of silver would be maintained by the ordinary demand and by the increased supply of gold. It might also happen that if the British Empire of their own motion contributed practically all that France and the United States desired, these two nations would also of their own motion take steps to promote the use of silver and maintain its price. Germany and other nations might also withdraw their smaller gold pieces and increase the internal use of silver.

To recapitulate: the present proposal is—

1. That the Indian Government should cease at once to borrow in England for the purpose of raising exchange.
2. That the Secretary of State should sell Council drafts freely, as occasion required.
3. That England should at once begin to withdraw her half-sovereigns and to issue 10s. silver notes in substitution. The British Government should have entire discretion as to the time and price at which the purchases of silver for the note issue should be made, in order to avoid any possibility of their being "cornered" by speculators; the only exception being that there should be a maximum limit of 37¾d. per ounce for these purchases.
4. The Indian Government should reopen the mints to silver, leaving the date of doing so to be settled in agreement with the Home Government.

To recapitulate the advantages of this plan:—

1. An automatic metallic currency for India.
2. A par of exchange between India and silver-using countries.
3. Restored value to the savings of the Indian natives.
4. A large pecuniary gain to England.

To these may be added the following negative advantages:—

1. No dependence on Foreign co-operation.
2. No trouble about ratios.
3. No change in the principles of England's currency laws.
4. No increase in the demand for gold.

5. No monetary stringency in India due to an artificially contracted currency.

6. No further experiments on the basis of false money.

It is certain that no scheme of dealing with Indian monetary affairs can be free from objection, for no perfect system of currency has ever yet been devised; but I can, at least, claim for the above plan that it consists simply of a combination of old, sound, and intelligible proposals, and that it is neither ingenious nor original.

HERBERT C. GIBBS.

THE SORROWS OF SCRIBBLERS.

(Being the Confessions of a Magazine Contributor.)

"And here in recent times were found three skeletons; the first being the bones of a man, the second those of a woman, and the third those of a cousin."

I remember weeping tears of rage—tears, also, I need hardly add, of extreme youth—when the work of genius that ended with the above lines was returned "with thanks." I am now a wiser, if a sadder scribbler.

It is said, in common parlance, to be better to "sweep a crossing" than to take to the thorny paths of literature. Certainly, from the nature of the advice so plentifully bestowed upon the young aspirant to literary honours, one is led to infer that such is the case. The reason for so much cold water being thrown is not, however, entirely the contemptible one that everyone is desirous to keep his or her profession as "close" as possible. It is rather that there is such an enormous army of people who think they can write, and such an amount of entreaty sent up to all who are supposed to be anywhere near the literary swim, "to tell" less fortunate outsiders "how to get their magazine articles accepted"; as though there were a royal road, indeed, to the heart of an editor! Editors, though a long-suffering and much-abused race, are not quite such fools as the said outsiders would seem to think, and are quite alive to the value of a good thing when they get it. Though they may well be tempted to cry with the preacher, "of the making of many books there is no end, and much reading (of crabbed MSS.) is a weariness to the flesh"; yet they are scarcely inspired, in their final selection, by as much private and personal malice as people think. "The many fail, the one succeeds;" and where so many try, the proportion of those who succeed seems even smaller. One manuscript accepted in twenty is the average; at least so an editor of wide experience lately asserted (an editor writing *his* confessions that time!). And *such* manuscripts as some of the rejected are! One always marvels how it is that after a prolonged dose of them, the editor does not altogether lose his critical faculty. No wonder if his heart become somewhat hardened in the direction of embryo authorship. The fact is, that

to the ignorant the profession of writing seems to possess two great advantages. Firstly, it requires, so to speak, no "plant"; and, secondly, almost everyone thinks he can do it. The more entirely ignorant he is, the less is he troubled with doubts on the subject. And even when not ignorant, how full of hope and confidence is the budding author! (Perhaps that is why he is so much more interesting to meet before he has budded.) Whatever the ranks of the Published may be—and few educated people in these days have not perpetrated a volume of some kind or other, the ranks of the Great Unpublished are still larger. Perhaps they console themselves with visions of "a fairer, other world than ours," like William Blake, the poet-painter, who used to say wistfully to the publishers, on the return of his MSS., "Well, they are published elsewhere, and beautifully bound!"

But, although I thus kindly plead for the editors, I who write have been in my time afflicted by them. I have, indeed, gone through the Slough of Despond like the rest, and have come out at the other side of it—a far more philosophical individual than when I entered it. If in my callow days I used to weep when a cherished article was returned, now a similar incident affects me not at all—I severely restamp it, redirect it, clean it up (if necessary), get its front and back pages retypewritten (if necessary), and send it remorsely again on its travels; for, sad to relate, it *does* still happen that I am occasionally rejected. But, then, I no longer regard rejection as a personal insult. Perhaps the explanation of this may be that in my callow days I was conceited; and nothing reduces the conceit of a person—of average intellect at least—like trying seriously to write himself. After many attempts, and untold returned MSS., the average writer finds gradually his or her proper level, and looks upon life generally in a chastened spirit.

I have always been a hardened magazine beggar. To return to my youth, I embarked—as a blackened and torn MS. of my youth reminds me,—after perpetrating the literary gem that heads this paper, on a lengthy novel with a somewhat original plot, viz., the captain of a big passenger-ship, in the middle of the Pacific Ocean, falls in love with a young lady-passenger; she refuses him; the captain thereupon steers his ship straight for a desert island, where he severely keeps his crew and passengers till the said young lady shall relent; the crew, half-starved, go on their knees to the obdurate damsel; she consents. Tableau! This, also, I considered a great work of genius, and could not comprehend the moral obliquity of the editor who returned it. To this story, however, has, year by year, alas! been added a brilliant series of stories and articles which have never seen the light; fifty at least in number, they get dustier year by year, in a desk devoted to

superannuated and unappreciated talent. I am still very much open to offers for them. I am not particular. If even a patent "safe cure" medicine tout should offer me 10s. 6d. for the best of them, I "wouldn't 'aggle with him." While on the subject of patent medicines, I may say that I have my doubts whether two at least of my "short stories"—two with tragic and deeply-touching endings—have not been utilized to this end—that of advertisement for a patent "cure." Though long ago paid for, I could never trace them; and I now never open a quack medicine pamphlet without dreading to find—in the novelette that, like the jam in the powder, accompanies these publications—my own cherished offspring, with the end—the pathetic death-bed scene, Cynthia dying to slow music—altered like this:—

"Cynthia did not die, reader. Be reassured; she recovered. It was Prince's Prime Pills for Pampered People (or Gammer Goose's Groats, or Mother Shipton's Salts) that cured her. *One box did it.*"

What Mr. Frith felt when a well-known soap firm bought his Academy picture, "The New Frock," and re-christened it "So Clean," will be nothing to what I shall feel then!

Curiously enough, an author has a more tender corner of his heart for his failures than for his successes; also, he always imagines them to be his best productions. They, like the poor, are always with him; they are, from long habit, the children of his brain that he regards with the deepest affection; for he can always refresh his memory by re-reading them and conning their beauties, which "age cannot wither, nor custom stale," even though the rags of their corporeal tenement scarcely hold together. They are never quite beyond hope; and there is more joy in the heart of an author over the manuscript that repents and is accepted—(the prodigal son, so to speak)—at, say its twentieth visit, than over the acceptance of the new and freshly typewritten sheets whose pristine whiteness has never yet been marred by weeks of contact with dusty office pigeon-holes!

In looking over such antiquated documents—which have something of the sadness of old love-letters—I am struck with their colossal neatness. How often had I burned the midnight oil over them, hopelessly entangled in a labyrinthine sentence of my own weaving! The very first are tied up with blue ribbons; some of them were, I think, in the struggle for perfection, copied over at least a dozen times in my clearest hand, and typewritten after that! Then they begin to grow more careless, the sheets of paper become irregular, and there are actually corrections! Lying near them I find another neatly-docketed bundle: "Editorial Letters." These turn out to be not, as one would think, full of well-deserved praise, but actually and solely letters of rejection!

Evidently, at an early period of authorship, one may be proud even of these! Yes, I have been familiar with every form of refusal, from the chilling printed form to the polite personal note from the editor—specimens of this, I need hardly say, are rare. Rare, also, is another kind of note from an editor, who, not content with rejecting you, writes you a private and kindly worded homily (generally from the country) on your very reprehensible theories; this, however, I prefer to the printed form, as it is surely better to be lectured than not to be noticed at all! But, perhaps the most obliging editor of my experience was that of a well-known "monthly," who once offered to send on my story, free of charge, to any other magazine I liked to name! Such kindness I felt more cutting than any rebuff. And this considerate and thoughtful editor went on to observe that every MS. sent in to him must be carefully furnished with name and address, as lately, within the space of *one week*, the firm had received three separate and distinct novels, labelled severally: "Hester Trelawney," "Hubert Trelawney," and "Herbert Trelawney," and these had got hopelessly mixed before being returned to their authors! Either—and this I should be sorry to think of him—the considerate editor lied,—or the crowd of literary aspirants must indeed baffle conception! But there is no doubt that it was all terribly crushing.

And, now that I am on the subject of Editors, let me warn the budding author to eschew, like the plague, the editors of his own personal acquaintance. Editors as husbands, I may add, are especially trying. Alas! the old proverb holds good here as elsewhere: "A prophet has no honour in his own country." As a man is no hero to his valet, neither is a literary lady a heroine or a shining light to her husband. We have never been in a position to say whether the same theory holds good of wives also. Probably not; for, of old, there was the shining example of "the good Kadijah" for all other ladies to take pattern by. Ladies, however, being notoriously inconsequent, it is always easier for them to believe in a person when there is no one else to do so, and we do not know that the good Kadijah continued to put her trust in Mahomet so heartily after he had once attained to fame. Apart, however, from editorial husbands, whose only standard of their wives' genius would appear to be calculated on their emoluments from other editors, editorial friends and acquaintances are also, as we said, inadvisable; and there is room for sad reflection in the thought that as your acquaintance with editors, and the Press generally, widens, so does your field for possible articles become more limited. Further, as far as possible, avoid all *personal* dealings with editors and publishers. Should you be shabby, they may (for after all they were once men) think less of you; should

you be in evident want of money, they will cut your price down; should you be nervous, they will paralyse you; and, beyond all else, their one and very reasonable desire will be to get rid of you as soon as possible, and on the easiest terms. No, always send everything by post; it is by far your best chance. Though manuscripts, like curses, come home often to roost, so quickly—especially should they happen to be poetry—as to be a tribute to the postal service, still the post is your best friend. But do not, under the sting of frequent rejection, put your faith in "correspondence columns," or send up your MSS. for the "literary criticism" that so many papers offer nowadays. In return you will get something like this:—

CISSIE. Dear little girl, don't be downhearted. Your poems, though not as yet quite equal to the best magazines, are a veritable *cri de cœur*, especially that beginning with the lines:—

"Dainty Mabel, sweetest fairy,
Treading earth like vision airy."

You have the poet's ear. Do not, however, think of print for quite twenty years to come; you will need all that time, with the Muse's help, to "mould the secret gold." Meantime, possess your soul in patience.

ATALANTA. You show much promise, my young friend. The story of the scene-painter's mad dog, who bit the *prima donna* as she was being smothered as Desdemona, is very realistic and original; yet, it seems almost too improbable for Othello suddenly, by her wild shriek, to discover that he is her long-lost husband, and to murder her forthwith in his surprise. No, my child, if, as you say, you have sent the story to twenty magazines and fifteen periodicals unsuccessfully, do not be discouraged, but wait another ten years before publishing anything. As you tell me that you are only forty now, at fifty you will still have the world before you, and meanwhile you will have mellowed and ripened.

JONATHAN. As your story was not up to magazine form we have strained a point in your favour, and, in order to give you the pleasure of seeing yourself in print, have inserted the whole of it in our weekly issue, as a letter to the Editor.

(We do not pay for letters.—ED.)

After this kind of thing you are pretty much where you were before, except for time, trouble, paper, and postage. Alas, even if a first article is ever printed and paid for, it has often cost by that time the whole, and more, of the money it earns! And this brings us to the question of the pay usually accorded by magazines and periodicals. In this connection I may state that my first successful MS., accepted after about twenty sendings and ten recopyings, was kept, by the "family magazine" that accepted it, for three years before it was published; and my remuneration, delayed till then (for the almost invariable rule with magazines is not to pay until the thing appears in print), proved to be at the lordly rate of 5s. a double column—£1 in all. As by the time it appeared I had forgotten all about it, the £1 came as a pleasant surprise; but I can safely say it hardly paid expenses! The different magazines, of

course, vary largely in their scale of payment; but they one and all have a different scale for authors "with names" and authors "without names." This in a way is fair, for the well-known and popular author can afford to name his own price, whereas the *scriptor ignotus* has to "take what he can get." Thus a magazine or high-class review, while it pays Rudyard Kipling £12 per page, will pay the unknown contributor no more than 10s. per page. However irritating it may be to know that another contributor to your magazine is getting some twenty times as much pay as yourself, yet you may be quite sure that the said contributor is getting no more than his "market value," which he has probably, at some period of his life, had to haggle for. But, as a rule, it is safe to say that periodicals as a whole do not pay so well as papers, and that journalism is a better staff than magazine-hack-writing. If literature, as a living, may be compared to sweeping a crossing, then periodical-writing may be likened to a crossing in a suburb where few men come and go, and journalism to that of a busy street in the City. Journalism offers, at any rate, daily bread; while magazines often keep their contributors waiting so long for insertion and payment that anyone who did it for a living would have to have something else to go upon. There may be, perhaps, some twenty or thirty people in England who make £200 a year by magazine-writing; their names are well known to the public, and are a safe "draw"; while outside these is the large army of magazine contributors whose earnings average, say, from £20 to £50 a year; hardly enough, indeed, to keep body and soul together.

The following is an account of the various sums paid, and the kind of contributions accepted, by the current journals. We may not, perhaps, be quite "up to date" as to all of them, but here, such as it is, is the information gleaned from personal experience during fifteen years' magazine-writing. It is a list which may prove useful to the young aspirant. I myself invariably send it by return of post in answer to those well-known and pathetic appeals as to "how to get my article into a magazine."

Argosy: Accepts articles that are pleasantly discursive, frivolous, and not too long. 10s. 6d. a page.

Atalanta: for girls; semi-artistic, and not *too* improving. About 15s. a page.

Bow-Bells: About £1 10s. for a story of ten pages.

Cassell's: £1 a page (of two columns).

Chambers's Journal: For short "facty" papers.

Cornhill: Pays better than any within my experience. £1 1s. per page (small pages of big type, not double-columned), and counts half pages.

English Illustrated: A kodak-paper, or an article accompanied with sketches, has the best chance here. Very alive and very modern. £1 1s. 0d. a page.

Family Herald: About £3 10s. for 8,000 words. Stories must be written in a popular style—with plenty of love.

Gentleman's: Pays by the story, and not the page.

Girls' Own Paper: "Facty," practical, and very improving.

Good Words: Articles generally not to exceed four pages. £1 per page.

Household Words: Not easy to get into. 5s. a column.

Leisure Hour: Religious and exclusive. 8s. a page.

Macmillan's: £1 1s. a page, double-columned (and counts half pages). High literary standard.

Monthly Packet: Exclusive, very churchy, and slightly priggish, though improving. Conveys the idea of a feminine touch.

Nineteenth Century: You must either have something new to say or, if you have not, you must have a handle to your name. £1 1s. or more a page.

Quiver: Same pay as Cassell's. Stories must be moral, and of the "religious sensational" type.

Strand: Quite impossible without "cheek," or a kodak.

Sunday-at-Home: Goody-goody, with sermons.

Temple Bar: Anecdotic. £5 for a short article.

Windsor: Modern, goes in largely for illustrations and facts.

Woman-at-Home: Extremely personal.

This list, of course, is not complete. Indeed, I have had to "weed" the original MS. carefully, for I find that several of the magazines on my list are now extinct (indeed, it is a mortifying reflection that the mortality among magazines to which I have contributed has been unusually severe and sudden). I have also had to omit several magazines to which my marginal notes were "pay-nothing-devils," "very hard up," and the like. For the old-fashioned "essay articles" *Cornhill* and *Macmillan's* offer still the best field. Elsewhere there is little chance now (unless you happen to have a "name") for that kind of article. Nearly all the recently started magazines go in entirely for "facty" articles and personalities; in fact, the general tendency of the modern periodical is to be a sort of monthly *édition de luxe* of *Tit-Bits*. Nothing appeals to the intelligence, style is at a discount; and the literary part of it can be got through in ten minutes. The "Queen's English" is disregarded in these days; and it is better for you to attend to your facts and personalities than to your grammar.

Most of the magazines have, as I said, a "sliding scale," *i.e.*, all the sums above quoted are capable of enlargement to geniuses

and rising authors; but beware of asking too much before you are quite sure of your "market value"; you may "o'ershoot your mark." It has but seldom been my lot to come across a magazine that paid nothing; in fact, only once, and that was a more or less "charitable publication"; though I have met with one or two editors who tried to escape payment. I would also say, however, "beware of the magazine that welcomes your article with too many rapturous encomiums." It is not, however, the prices given by magazines that we must solely study when writing for their pages; it is a far more important thing to study their literary style. I will try to illustrate this fact further. Let us suppose that such a usual thing as a wedding in a country church is to be described: first we will imagine ourselves to be writing with a view to the "ladies'" pages in the society papers:—

"Do you know, dear, I really had to make up my mind to leave delightful London for a day, and go down to see the function at Slocumbe-cum-Pogis. The sweet little country village had decked itself out in its gayest, the church with its delicately modulated scheme of colour looked charming, and the dear bride herself quite too sweet for words; just a little tearful, but exquisite in pale-tinted ivory satin with *revers* of brocade, altogether too trottie! and lace that was a joy for ever," &c., &c.

Or to the page called "The W-r-s- of A-t-lyc-s" in a certain evening journal:—

"Quite a conscious joy was obtainable by those who are contented to find enjoyment in the infinitely simple, on Monday at the little village of Slocumbe-cum-Pogis. How entirely sad soever a wedding may be to the reflective mind—yet to those who listen with awakened ear to the sounds of summer, to whom the scent of the quickset hedge is grateful, whose eye can feed on the dim rustle, the old English point, the passionate brocades, and the iridescent and opalescent kaleidoscopic light of a church filled with Hymen's votaries—all these things make for gladness, and that sweet melancholy which is the *raison d'être* of the cultured," &c., &c.

The charm of this kind of writing is that everything is put exactly as you would *not* naturally put it either in speaking or writing, to say nothing of there being no apparent reason why it should not go on for ever.

Or in the style called "D-ly T-l-graphese":—

"The light from the chancel window shone on sculptured knight and marble clerestory no less than on the bright heads of the charming and youthful couple; and the impassioned and earnest words of the sacerdotal dignitary, spoken with feeling, were succeeded by the mellow strains of the organ," &c., &c.

Or in the pseudo-smart, "crisp," would-be-intimate style affected by certain so-called "society" journals:—

"The dear Duchess of C——, with her handsome girl, graced the ceremony and beamed on all as sweetly as ever. The bride looked extremely well; it is a pity that, though amiable and pleasant, she lacks distinction. Her mother, the Countess of B——, was evidently deeply touched; she often carried her embroidered handkerchief to her eyes; and—there, I felt quite sorry for her."

The "cloven foot" rather shows in these last words, which recall Dan Leno as Mrs. Aladdin.

Or in the style of some of the penny weeklies:—

"The day was a ripper, and the sun came down as hot as hot could be. The bride's 'get up' was the envy of all the ladies, and the attendant sylphs were as pretty as pinks in picture hats and waving draperies. The bridegroom looked, as usual, a trifle nervous, and the music was a bit 'off colour,'" &c., &c.

Or, finally, in the style of the church magazine, which is apt occasionally to be rather slipshod in its style, and oblivious to such minor things as rules of grammar:—

"The dim religious light of the sacred building seemed to be in true harmony with the hearts of those partaking in the solemn service. The fair bride bore her part admirably, and yet showed great feeling, winning the hearts of all around, and truly this was one of the sweetest sights," &c., &c.

We might continue such examples *ad libitum*, but these will suffice to show what we mean. It will be seen that a careful study of some or all of these styles is required to make even the moderately successful magazine contributor. Further, it will be well to note that when writing for a religious magazine, though one may be slipshod as one likes, one must guard against being too pagan in sentiment; that when writing for the family or household magazine, it will be as well to be most strictly proper; and that when sending to the "up-to-date" and go-ahead publication, it is better to be quite the reverse. Family magazines are very particular. I do not bear them any grudge, for one of them was the first to extend me a helping hand; but once I remember writing a most innocent story destined for its pages, and on receiving the proof, I found that the words "curse" and "loathe" had been carefully altered to "abuse" and "hate"; also that any mention of "legs" was expunged, and even that the arrival of babies was objected to!—curious, this, for a "family magazine"! For the *F-m-ly H-r-ld*, you must be addicted to adjectives, mild love-making, and, above all, the severely moral. When writing for the *Q-v-r*, be sure you do not omit to bring in a duke or at least a baronet, who shall refuse the attentions of the wealthy heiress and bestow himself on the unassuming governess; without some variation of this popular theme no story in the *Q-v-r* would be complete. Again, for some magazines you must be careful not to poke fun at a curate; one or two periodicals, also, *C-ss-ll's*, for instance, studiously avoid any mention of a theatre. Editors of magazines are usually men of honour, and keep to their bond; only once was I very badly treated by one, and he, I am sorry to say, was editor of a "church" magazine. This was how it happened. My article had been accepted, even with enthusiasm, and the pay agreed on. I waited two, three years—nothing happened. The

magazine had changed hands, and the new editor returned me my paper, adding insult to injury by informing me that he was sure that I would not like "to injure the magazine by its insertion"! The paper was subsequently published elsewhere, but I still rankle against that editor, who, indeed, went so far as to admit, but only when the matter was further pressed, that he was legally liable for the money.

Editors (to continue the all-pervading topic) differ much in kind. One may be a "purist" in language, and will alter every sentence in every article sent in—not always to its advantage; another, again, may not interfere with it at all. Some editors, also, have a way of cutting out inches of the printed proof to suit their convenience, these excisions being generally made with little or no regard to what is left out, or even to the sense of the context. Magazines and periodicals sometimes print in a footnote the information that, even when stamps are enclosed, they "do not return rejected MSS."; but, personally, I have never had a rejected MS., however bad, *not* returned; so I think that they only say this to discourage the crowd of possible applicants. Of course, I have never tried the plan of sending without stamps; but I have heard that, even in that case, one often gets MSS. back again; such is the courtesy of a maligned race of men! But do not be too easily discouraged. The transcendental merit of an article or story is not always recognized at first, and I have myself sent a story three times in succession (at appreciable intervals) to the same magazine, getting accepted, like the "importunate widow," at last. It's a long lane that has no turning! And magazine-editors must continually recognize, in other publications, contributions which they know they have previously "declined with thanks."

To be, above all, original, to be "alive," to continually "break new ground," these are the aims ever struggled for by the militant modern magazine. The modern "Christmas Number," so entirely "French," and with no particle of the old "holly-and-mistletoe" spirit about it, is a proof of this. One periodical lately even started the novel idea of publishing, for a change, "the worst story that had been sent" to it! Certainly, the rejected stories and articles would often, as in this case, prove the most amusing! But, for the novice, the line of demarcation between the merits of accepted and rejected MSS. is not always easy to see; he only knows that for years and years he has tried and failed, and then, all at once, to his surprise, the Rubicon is passed! And well for him, very often, that it is not passed too soon! For, how ashamed some poets and authors must have felt in later years of their "juvenilia"! It is not often, surely, that the reflective veteran writer would of his own free will print his baby effusions; and surely poor Mr

Ruskin, could he yet feel deeply, would not relish all the contents of Mr. Collingwood's bulky two volumes of "Poems."

There is, as a rule, no regular "staff" on a magazine; but, on the contrary, "a fair field and no favour." Articles from the unknown contributor are often rejected on account of their abnormal length; sometimes because they happen to be out of season and inopportune, and sometimes because they clash with other papers on the same subject. But, as long as it does not *immediately* clash with any other, it is rather a good thing than otherwise that a paper should be on a theme that is being a good deal written on. It is quite a mistaken idea that one need always write on a "new" subject, for those often succeed best that are hackneyed, *i.e.*, should a dozen magazines in one year turn out papers on the Grande Chartreuse or on Japanese tea-houses, it follows, as a matter of course, that the Grande Chartreuse and Japanese tea-houses are the very subjects you should write about; whether you have been there or not signifies very little, as the vast majority of your public will most certainly never have been there, and will, therefore, not be too particular; and you can always borrow a friend's kodak views. Or you may even (as a writer in an evening paper has lately demonstrated in an amusing sketch) write every year on the same subject, such, say, as a curious country festival held in a remote village, varying the paper only very slightly, till the thing becomes "a little annuity." People so soon forget! or rather, there are so many journals and periodicals going!

The saddest thing, perhaps, about magazine and periodical writing, is that there are so many men and women who struggle on in London, half starving in the gallant attempt to "make a living" by it. In this connection, many feel, and say, that it is a wrong and a sin for those who have enough already to live comfortably, to write at all, as, to use their own parlance, it "takes the bread out of other people's mouths." Yet it is on the face of it impossible to make literature a "close" profession; its prizes must ever be open, for they are given to those who have most that is worth saying. It is not often that a man or woman, lucky enough to make a fortune by a book, is content to live ever after in idleness, without further effort, and leave the race for others more needy, because he or she has now enough. "Enough!" (as the American millionaire in *The Happy Life* says), "there is no such word in the dictionary!" And if enough money is possible, can one ever have enough fame? It is not, either, as if every writer of note had someone waiting, some forlorn and shipwrecked brother, to step exactly into his or her shoes. The poor strugglers in the profession of writing for periodicals may, indeed, object to the well-to-do lady and rich gentleman making it the pursuit of their leisure hours;

yet, is every magazine editor to say to every contributor, "Show me that your needs are such as to render your getting your living a necessity?" No, afflicting as may be the sorrows of scribblers, the "hill of Parnassus" must always be climbed; and though it is generally sandy and heavy to climb, so heavy that many turn back in disgust, yet for those lucky enough to reach the top there seems a lovely, green, sheltered valley beyond the crest, where no ills come:—

> "Where falls no rain, nor hail, nor any snow,
> Nor ever wind beats loudly."

But till we reach that haven—if, indeed, we ever reach it—let us have patience even with editors, or at least regard them as necessary wayside inns on the road of fame; let us go on our way trying to forgive their many shortcomings, or at any rate to excuse them, remembering that, like Mrs. Carlyle's Annan Baillie, "they are men of like passions with ourselves," and that, as one of their number, much harassed, once informed a lady contributor, "a magazine is not conducted as a charitable institution."

THE HIGHER RASCALITY.

THE Machiavellian "law of the beasts" which prey upon one another is still, we have lately been told (by Mr. Greenwood in *The Nineteenth Century*), the ultimate law in international relations; and that the predatory instincts of mankind are far from being eradicated in domestic affairs the most casual survey of existing social and economic conditions will show. The weapons employed are changed, no doubt, cunning or fraud taking the place of brute force, but the old instincts remain, and find ample scope for their exercise. The subject of the present article supplies a sufficient illustration. In the domain of finance —which, whether local or cosmopolitan, is fast becoming the world's tyrant—the primeval "forest-born rapacity" of the human species may be seen in full and almost unfettered operation. That finance has its uses is obvious, but, of its various qualities, the predatory ones are, I think, the most conspicuous. Its clutch is on everything, while the true Machiavellian—I use the word in its popular sense—spirit animates its devotees. Statesmanship, according to the authority quoted above, is for many of its functions "below morality," and finance seems to enjoy even fuller emancipation from ethical restraints. At any rate, as regards the fraternity of promoters, both individual and corporate, their morals may be best described in the words of Gabriel Borkman, the financier in Ibsen's latest drama, as "the morals of the higher rascality." However, success covers a greater multitude of sins nowadays than ever charity did aforetime. There is a large-mindedness about the spacious times we live in, a spirit of universal toleration, which forbids us to be over-critical of our neighbours' shortcomings; indignation is voted bad form, and the sootiest sheep of the financial flock may hope to find absolution if only he sin on a large enough scale. This peculiar immorality, or rather unmorality, is of comparatively recent growth, and its origin is not altogether clear. Perhaps it is Mr. Cecil Rhodes, with that magnetic personality of his, who has infected us with somewhat of his own noble scorn of unctuous rectitude, of which his followers are so justly proud! Have we not the assurance of an eminent

statesman that he has done nothing that reflects on his personal honour, and if the faults of great men can be thus easily forgiven, why should little people worry about each other's peccadilloes? Be this as it may, what somebody calls "the new Machiavellism" is a fact to be reckoned with, and it is by no means confined to the sphere of politics.

Finance, rather than trade, is now the recognized royal road to wealth, and the cult of Midas, the successful company-monger, is a natural phase of modern Mammon-worship. Our adoration of the golden calf is probably neither more nor less fervent than that of the Israelite of old; but it has this peculiarity, that the Israelite himself often comes in for a share of it. Midas is the good Providence who dispenses market tips and profitable share allotments; to attend his social functions is accounted a privilege; the great ones of the earth assist him in his promotions, and are quite pleased to allow their names to figure as directors or founders' shareholders in the great Omnium Gatherum Trust Company which he is bringing out. When X——, a financier of unprepossessing manners and appearance, was accused of trying to worm himself into Society, somebody retorted that it seemed to him that it was much more a case of Society trying to worm itself into X——. The three cardinal virtues flourish in Midas abundantly, so that eminent divines extend him their patronage and gratefully accept his contributions. He has faith and to spare in the unlimited gullibility of the British public; hope that the said public will subscribe liberally to his undertakings; while as to his charity, it is for ever being blazoned forth in the columns of the daily and weekly Press. His other merits everywhere obtain recognition. We have seen a promoter of mining companies entertained by City Fathers at a Lord Mayor's banquet, while he and his brother financiers were lauded to the skies as patriots, saviours of the City, makers of empire, and Heaven knows what. In politics the company-monger figures more and more. The shadiest promoter, the veriest devourer of widows' houses, may hope to find a seat and a welcome in Parliament, with perhaps a certificate of character from his Party leader. Though his sins be as scarlet, yet may the saving grace of a sympathetic Cabinet Minister wash them as white as snow. Nor does his past career seem any bar to his finding directorships of important industrial concerns or other lucrative employment.

On the other hand, there are a large and, let us hope, an increasing number of people who refuse to bow the knee before the company-mongering Baal, and would gladly dash the ugly idol from his pedestal. They view with disgust the machinations of financial wirepullers and would welcome any practicable means of putting a

check upon them. They hold that this is not merely a question, as is often urged, of a few credulous investors or speculators losing their money. Other and larger issues are involved, such as the lowering of hitherto accepted standards of commercial integrity, the defrauding of trade creditors, and, last but not least, the enrichment of a most undesirable class of money market thimble-riggers. America proves to us that the concentration of vast wealth in the hands of a few scheming adventurers is a grave social danger, and everything points to the multiplication over here of this class of rich men in the near future. The new British financial "boss," the mushroom millionaire who springs up, as it were, in a night, is almost invariably a product, directly or indirectly, of the limited liability principle operating through the stock markets in a vast and ever-broadening field. Fired with his example, there follow in his train a whole host of imitators and would-be financiers, who ape his methods on a smaller scale with varying measures of success. The enormous extension of the joint-stock system, the scientific development of the *haute finance*, and the perfection of modern methods of market manipulation, have placed a most dangerous power in the hands of skilful wire-pullers, and they are not slow to use it. Somehow or other, sooner or later, a check must be put on the depredations of those men who may be termed the vampires or blood-suckers of the commercial world. For the trust or company-monger pure and simple, who is neither producer nor distributor, but is content to make his own dirty profit out of the ruin or impoverishment of other people, is nothing but a blood-sucker, in that he benefits nobody but himself. True commerce is, like charity, twice blest; it advantages both buyer and seller and, through them, the entire community; but wherein does the world at large benefit by our dog-eat-dog fashion of financial cannibalism, the stock combinations and share-splittings and re-shufflings, the rigs, corners, creations of sub-trusts and baby companies, and all the other devices of up-to-date market jugglery? Are they not simply "the law of the beast" working in the mercantile world, the modern counterpart of primitive "tooth-and-claw rivalries" that existed before company-mongering was invented?

It is far easier, I know, to enumerate these abuses than to suggest any adequate remedy that will not bring other evils in its train. Legislation may do something, although laws unbacked by public opinion can but fail of their object, and public opinion on this thorny and intricate subject is difficult to arouse. The experience of the last five years proves abundantly that the existing law is absurdly impotent to deal with the vast mass of lying and fraud connected with company promotion and management.

It was with difficulty that even such a criminal as Jabez Balfour was brought to justice; and it is humiliating to think that nobody has ever appeared at the Old Bailey to answer for the abominable scandals connected with the formation and administration of the notorious Winchester House group of trust companies.

More important than any alteration of the Joint-Stock Acts is the strengthening of the criminal law and its more stringent enforcement by the law officers of the Crown. The common objection to radical amendments of the civil law, that they fetter enterprise, can hardly be urged against bringing rascals to justice. The Board of Trade Committee on the working of the Companies Acts passed over the question of the deficiencies of our criminal law with the remark that, the matter not having been brought before them, they expressed no opinion upon it. It will seem to many people that they left out the most important branch of their subject. All experience goes to show that the fraudulent company promoter or officer has usually little to fear from civil actions. Redress at the hands of the law is always difficult and expensive, in company matters often impossible, to obtain; and business men, when they find they have made a bad investment, are prone to cut their loss and forget all about it as soon as they can, while the ordinary investor is even less inclined to face the worry and waste of time and money involved in litigation. These matters, however, do not only concern the shareholders who are striving to save what little they can from the wreck; they are things of public interest, and it is the function of the Government, not of individuals, to prosecute malefactors of all kinds.

The problem of converting moral into legal fraud is, no doubt, a difficult one; and the company-monger, protected as he is by skilled legal advice and draftsmanship, has brought the art of veiled lying in prospectuses, and otherwise sailing as near the wind as possible, to a high pitch of perfection. Wilfully false statements, either written in company documents or else made verbally at company meetings, should be made a misdemeanour. So, too, ought the acceptance of bribes in the form of secret commissions or otherwise by directors or other officers of a company. Mr. John Smith, Inspector-General in Company Liquidation, offers various other suggestions for strengthening the law in his admirable yearly reports. By the way, I see that these reports have, not unnaturally, given great offence in certain quarters, but I sincerely hope that Mr Smith will not be deterred by hostile criticism from the excellent work he is doing in throwing some much-needed light on the dark corners of city finance. As instances of the deficiencies of our existing criminal law he points out that directors issuing fraudulent balance-sheets cannot be prosecuted unless intention to

deceive certain particular individuals is proved, although misrepresentations may have been made with the deliberate object of deceiving the public generally. Again, the provisions of the Larceny Act are only aimed at the officers of companies, promoters and vendors not being affected; and the law of conspiracy does not touch those very common cases where two persons are engaged in fraudulent transactions, but one is merely the tool of the other. In company matters a number of clever manipulators working together can do things collectively, and amongst themselves, which the law would certainly regard as fraudulent if done by a single individual. These and other defects in the criminal law have been strongly commented on by various judges, and the difficulty of obtaining convictions naturally makes our law officers slow to prosecute. One important suggestion made by Mr. Smith deserves careful consideration—namely, that the principle of the Debtors' Act, 1869, which governs the analogous case of private traders, should be imported into the company law, so that "certain acts or courses of action which result in defrauding the public should be presumed to be done or undertaken with the intention of defrauding unless a jury is satisfied to the contrary."

There remains, of course, the momentous question of the risk we run of frightening the honest director, which bulks so largely on many people's imaginations. I have already discussed this matter in the pages of this Review (February, 1896), and will therefore only briefly allude to it here. It has always seemed to me that the risk is greatly exaggerated. No honest director who knows his business need at any rate be nervous about a reinforcement of the criminal law, and men who go on the boards of companies ought to be competent as well as honest. It might possibly disturb the equanimity of the needy peers, retired colonels, briefless barristers, and other persons who so cheerfully undertake the supervision of mining operations and other duties which they do not understand, but would commerce seriously suffer thereby? The case is somewhat different with regard to reform of the company law, where a director may reasonably dread too severely restrictive provisions which might render him liable to civil actions; but what we have to consider in the whole matter is the balance of public advantage, and for this purpose we must not forget the magnitude of the evils which prevail and the utter inadequacy of the existing law to cope with them. Company-mongering—by which I mean roughly the promotion or management of dishonest or shady companies—is largely on the increase. The general standard of commercial morality amongst the rank and file of business men is still high, but, on the other hand, people are more in a hurry to grow rich, and the temptation to adopt unscrupulous methods is becoming

stronger. Trade profits are low and remunerative occupation is hard to find, while as luxury increases men's wants grow day by day. The Board of Trade Committee, who seem somewhat over-solicitous for the nerves of the honest director, in the course of some general observations on the joint-stock system say, "It must be remembered that the majority of companies are honestly formed for carrying on a legitimate, though it may be a speculative, enterprise or business." The Committee make this observation as though it were a simple truism, but with all deference to its distinguished authors, I think the statement requires examination. Writing in THE NATIONAL REVIEW for May, 1896, Mr. W. R. Lawson quotes the unimpeachable authority of Sir Henry Burdett to show that 950 new mining companies were registered in 1895 alone, and that of these "only 229 ventured to submit themselves to public criticism by advertising their prospectuses and otherwise complying with the regulations of the Stock Exchange." About three-fourths of the capital of these 229 better-class companies went to the vendors; and out of 181 mining companies which settled under a specially-framed rule of the Stock Exchange, "sixty-one had published no prospectus of any kind." What proportion of all these mining companies, I should like to know, can be described as "honestly formed for carrying on a legitimate business"? Add to these mining ventures all the third-rate finance, gambling, and underwriting companies which are becoming the curse of the City, and all the other shady concerns whose prospectuses in times of speculation daily litter our breakfast-tables; recollect the Board of Trade statistics which show that nearly two-thirds of the companies formed become bankrupt or abortive, and it will be seen that the Committee's statement is open to very grave doubt, at any rate so far as recent years are concerned. In justice to its framers, it should be mentioned that the report was drawn up before the culmination of the great gambling and company-mongering orgy of 1895, which might possibly have induced them to modify their views. In any case, the fact that a very large proportion of the companies that appear nowadays are not honest trading concerns, but simply devices for milking the investor, proves the necessity of placing some restrictions on their formation; and the Stock Exchange should assist in protecting the public by prohibiting all dealing in shares before allotment.

Impotent as the law has hitherto proved itself to deal with the company-monger as he deserves, it has been rendered still more so by recent decisions of the House of Lords. The risks that a fraudulent promoter or director formerly ran of being brought to justice were small enough, but the judgment in the important case of *ex parte Barnes re The English and Scottish Mercantile Invest-*

ment Trust goes some way towards reducing them to the vanishing point. Under this decision of the highest tribunal in the land the Court has no power to order the public examination of a director or promoter unless the Official Receiver alleges fraud, and fraud against certain individuals. In other words, a Board of Trade official is expected to prejudge the case, risking all the consequences attending so serious a course, and to make a finding of that fraud which it is the one object of the examination to ascertain, or else there can be no public examination. It is not enough if he says that there appear to him to be matters suggesting fraud or urgently requiring investigation; he must usurp the functions of a Court of Justice, and, possibly without being possessed of all the information obtainable, do what only a Court should do after full enquiry, and say that certain individuals are rogues. It would be difficult to suggest a more invidious or more unfair position in which a public official could be placed, or one more inimical to the public interest. It must be assumed that the House of Lords correctly interpreted the law, but, if so, it may be permitted to an ignorant layman to say that the law is an exceedingly bad one, and should be altered forthwith. Small wonder that since this disastrous decision an eminent judge has declared that "the main utility of the Act of 1890 has gone." The value of public examinations of company officers against whom there is a *primâ facie* case of fraud or irregular practices is obvious. It is a step towards bringing criminals to justice, and it serves to educate the public mind, which most sadly needs enlightening on company matters. These requirements are plainly not fulfilled by private examinations. I have never myself been able to see why the officers of insolvent joint-stock concerns should not be placed on the same footing as individual bankrupts, and be publicly examined, as a matter of course, in open court. If the failure is due to misfortune the directors would suffer nothing by enquiry, and, as the causes leading up to insolvency are always matters of public interest, there is no hardship in calling upon company officers to give an account of their stewardship.

I have already alluded briefly to the necessity for giving more protection to trade creditors of companies, which is admitted even by men opposed to radical reform of the Joint-Stock Acts. Here again, however, the House of Lords have given the distressed company-monger occasion to rejoice. The result of their decision in the great one-man-company case of *Broderip* v. *Salomon*, reversing those of the judge of First Instance and the Court of Appeal, is that a trader in difficulties can, with the aid of six dummies, who may possibly be his own wife and children, turn himself into a limited liability company, issue debentures, and

oust his trade creditors under cover of the mortgage. "To legalize such a transaction would be a scandal," said one of the Lords Justices, but the House of Lords thought otherwise. If the principle of this decision is to prevail, it would be better to abolish the mystical number of seven signatories to the memorandum of association, and to legalize one-man companies pure and simple. The debentures of companies should be registered like bills of sale, and the register be open to public inspection, so that *intending* creditors should have the opportunity of seeing what charges the debtor company has created. Some statutory limitation should also be placed upon the charges which a company may create, and the question of a compulsory reserve liability in new companies for the sole benefit of creditors deserves to be carefully considered.

An interesting essay might be written on the history and evolution of those aggregations of capital formed for the purpose of exploiting the public called "trusts." In America they take the form of gigantic monopolist combinations which, by artificially raising the price of the necessaries of life, have almost driven the nation into rebellion. It is now generally known that the great political upheaval over there in 1896, though nominally a demonstration in favour of one kind of currency against another, was in reality a revolt against the abuse of money power and financial corruption in high places and, above all, a protest by the discontented masses against the methods by which capital in unscrupulous hands exploited them for its own selfish ends. In this country coalitions for the purpose of rigging the market for commodities are, happily, seldom permanently successful. The British trust, though it borrowed certain of its leading features from its American cousin, is commonly simply a dust-bin for the financial refuse or speculative failures of large operators, or else it is of the "bucket-shop" or gambling and underwriting variety, which uses the machinery of the Limited Liability Acts for the scientific manipulation of the stock markets. There are, of course, trusts which carry on a legitimate investment business, but they are not the majority. The nominal "objects" of the finance or underwriting trust may cover anything under the sun, but its real *raison d'être* is nearly always the same—namely, for the directors to speculate in stocks and shares with the capital of investors. It is a grand thing to be able to "punt" with other people's money especially when, as often happens nowadays, it is done on the heads-I-win-tails-you-lose principle, whereby the punter gets a substantial commission if he wins, while the shareholders pay all the losses. The keepers of the tables at Monte Carlo would be well pleased if they could do business on these terms. That the plums and pickings to be gathered in this way are very consider-

able is evident from the fact that the two managing directors of one well-known mining finance and development company pocketed nearly £330,000 as their share of, or commission upon, the profits of a single year's speculative operations, while in addition they generously commuted their share of all future earnings for something over a million pounds' worth of shares! It is unnecessary to point out how widely such a system of paying directors opens the door to abuses of every kind. The disgraceful malpractices connected with the promotion and administration of many of the earlier trust companies have been disclosed in the law courts, although, as I remarked before, the guilty parties escaped scot free.

Gross as the abuses are which have grown up under our limited liability system, it is more than doubtful whether any serious attempt will be made to deal with them. Parliament is apathetic, if not, actually hostile, and the Government is apparently not in earnest about the matter. Its Bill to amend the law relating to joint-stock companies based upon the recommendation of the Board of Trade Committee has been twice introduced into the House of Lords, twice referred to a Select Committee of that House, and Heaven alone knows when we shall hear of it again. The Select Committee, when it sits, listens day after day to the *crambe repetita* of arguments for and against reform, as though the subject had not been thoroughly threshed out before the Board of Trade Committee, which was appointed four years ago. Experts in company promotion dilate at length on the terrible evils which would result from interference with their business; how reform would frighten the honest director, and the laying of rogues by the heels would fetter commerce and clog the wheels of industry. If ever the Bill comes up for discussion in the House of Commons there is reason to fear that it may be so whittled away and emasculated in Committee as to be practically useless. The company-monger is strongly represented in Parliament, and there are many powerful interests opposed to substantial changes in the existing system. A necessary preliminary to any measure of reform worthy of the name is the formation of an effective body of public opinion. The constituencies should insist on Parliament taking action in the matter, Swindling promoters, whose business is no more an "industry" than is piracy or card-sharping, should be prosecuted. The large and growing horde of "somethings in the City," who are "on the make" by any means fair or foul, should be taught that if they exploit the public for their own ends they do so at their peril. Men guilty of shady conduct in City matters should not, as I observed before, be selected as Parliamentary candidates with the sanction and support of their political leaders. Above all, they should be

reprobated in private life, cut by their acquaintances, blackballed at clubs, and otherwise socially tabooed. In this way a healthier tone might be created in commercial affairs, and company-mongering be rendered a less fertile source of public demoralization. As it is, one or two ingenious money-spiders can corrupt half the City, including men whose wealth and position ought to place them above temptation; for it is curious to see how, directly some new device is invented for enmeshing and skinning the investor, merchant princes, bankers, and blue-blooded aristocrats will rush to take a hand in the game. It is deplorable that men of light and leading should so often be found willing to lend their names to financial trusts or companies of doubtful character. An honoured name is a merchantable article, no doubt, but the owner should be careful to whom he sells it. Our best public men have hitherto kept themselves free from the entanglements of City finance, and it would be well if this wholesale tradition were preserved. Scarcely less regrettable is the diversion of so much good business talent from legitimate trade into the shady by-ways of company-promoting and "financiering." Too many directors nowadays keep their eyes more on the share-markets than on the development of their businesses, and one hears even of ordinary trading concerns adopting the practice of underwriting new issues with a view to planting them on the public at a premium.

At the present rate of progress we bid fair to be turned during the next century from a nation of shopkeepers into a community of company-mongers, wherein the Hebrew adventurer and his satellites will reign supreme. The new notions of trying short and shady cuts to fortune appear to be growing in all classes of society. We read not long ago that the idea had been mooted of organizing a gigantic strike on some of our big railways, the strike to be preceded by heavy "bear" sales of railway stock—a simple and efficient method of replenishing the coffers of the labour unions. This cheerful suggestion seems to have found favour with some of the men's leaders and newspapers; and really, if capital is to be allowed to exploit the community without let or hindrance by means of unscrupulous market manipulation, we can hardly be surprised if labour occasionally takes a hand in the game when it thinks it can do so to its own advantage.

There is something disagreeably un-English about the new financial methods and the vulgar trickery and chicane which characterize them; and in these days when finance and politics are connected by the closest ties their demoralising influence is especially to be deplored. Burke was no doubt guilty of unctuous rectitude when he eulogized the "ancient and inbred piety, integrity, good nature, and good humour" of his fellow-countrymen,

but there are still not a few who believe that the national character is one of the main foundations of our greatness both at home and abroad, and that anything which tends to impair it is a source of national weakness. As a commercial people our credit rests upon our good name, and as a nation with an imperial mission we can ill afford to play fast and loose with it. The makers of our Empire in this century may have had their faults, but they have been as a rule, not merely great administrators, but men whose probity of character and freedom from sordid aims have been beyond question. India, Egypt, Nigeria, and in past years the Sudan, bear eloquent witness to the genius of Englishmen for colonizing and ruling subject races; and if the natives of these countries have been on the whole content to submit to our sway, it is because they have learned to look for justice, good faith, and straight-dealing from our countrymen. Only in South Africa, where the influence of the company-monger is paramount, has our good name suffered and the work of consolidating the Empire been impeded. It is not merely rectitude, unctuous or otherwise, it is plain common-sense—"good business," in fact—to recognize that this good name and this national character are things worth preserving, and that the beginnings of pecuniary corruption may also, whatever our new Machiavellians may say, be the seeds of a nation's decadence.

That the limited liability system has been an important factor in our commercial progress is true enough, and the original framers of the Companies Acts may well be pardoned if they failed to provide against its present abnormal and excessive development. The task of cutting away the rank abuses which are fostered thereby belongs to our later generation, which has the light of a larger experience to guide it. The joint-stock principle is daily extending its borders, till it now bids fair to invade every department of life. Syndicates run all manners of men and things, from authors and explorers to race-horses, from playwrights to prize-fighters. As limited liability grows the number of small investors and depositors in limited liability concerns will grow proportionately, until we may some day see it embracing the large majority of the population. The Liberator frauds ought to bring it home to the minds of the working-classes that the matter concerns them intimately, as well as the rich. Sooner or later people will grow tired of being exploited by the company-monger, and his machinations may have in the future more far-reaching consequences than we at present imagine. The English Collectivist agitator, like the American Populist, is for ever searching for the rotten places in our social organism, and he can point to no more glaring abuse of the Individualist system than the company-mongering millionaire. Our greatest living thinker, Mr. Herbert Spencer, reminded us many

years ago that "the system under which we at present live fosters dishonesty and lying," and he now utters the mournful prophecy that we shall drift gradually into Socialism, than which no graver calamity can befall the human race. If this prophecy is fulfilled it will be chiefly owing to the abuse of money-power and economic corruption, whereof such industrial parasites as the Yankee trust-monger and the British company-monger furnish us with the most flagrant examples. If "the individual withers and the State is more and more," it will be because the individual runs riot, as in the United States, and grossly misconducts himself. Socialism may arrive when the community rebels against the tyranny of ill-gotten wealth, as it has rebelled in America against the domination of the trust-monger, the railway wrecker, the millionaire monopolist, and the framer of rigs, pools, corners, and "combines"—the financial adventurer "with the cynic devil in his blood," as Mr. Rudyard Kipling has it,

> "That bids him flout the law he makes,
> That bids him make the law he flouts,
> Till, dazed by many doubts, he wakes
> The drumming guns that—have no doubts."

The first two lines, by the way, suggest reflections concerning certain of our own legislators who have been so remarkably successful in "flouting" those limited liability laws which they may shortly be occupied in remaking. True Individualism, as common-sense and philosophy alike teach us, implies some subordination of the human unit to the community of which he is a member—that is to say, a man while working to benefit himself should also, though perhaps unconsciously, be working for the public benefit. But the trust-monger, whether in his English or Transatlantic form, is antisocial, and in the interests of society must ultimately be suppressed. Let us hope that the public, who are the pawns in the grand game of beggar-your-neighbour, will recognize this fact. Otherwise it is to be feared that in this country, as across the Atlantic, the company pirate and the financial marauder will some day wake, if not "the drumming guns" of revolution, at any rate a popular protest that may express itself in revolutionary legislation.

HUGH E. M. STUTFIELD.

THE COMING PARTITION OF CHINA.

To indulge in political prophecy where the divergent interests of four European Powers are involved would be intrepid, yet one may venture to review the possible turn of events in the Far East. The million are, no doubt, most concerned in the outcome of the diplomatic contest; the thousands who, like myself, have had vested interests in China for years past are likewise anxious about a possible disturbance in the balance of foreign commercial power. We must face the question boldly but rationally. History shows us that for centuries past the nations which, in their day of pre-eminence, were, relatively to their rivals, as great as England to-day, have had to gradually relinquish their supremacy and acknowledge, with more or less good grace, the advance of younger nationalities. In the past it was impossible to check the flood of new-born energy. Our Free Trade principles are based on the axiom of "Live and let live," and if, from an ethical standpoint, our commercial precedence is threatened, it is not so apparent that our commercial prosperity in that quarter will eventually suffer by the evolution now in progress. There is no valid European argument against the occupation of Kiao-Chao by the Germans. Should it really result a fact that Germany will open the new colony to all comers for trade on equal footing, then the occupation cannot make any material difference to any nation's traders; the only advantage to Germany will be through the channel of politics and satisfied national pride, the cost of which has yet to be learnt. In our British Colony of Hong Kong the German, Russian and any other alien trader is absolutely as free as an Englishman. If the British were to evacuate Hong Kong to-morrow and leave it in the hands of the Germans, they (the Germans) would not be one iota better off, for they have at present no disabilities which they seek to remove. So that from a purely commercial point of view, divested of all sentimental considerations, it would be a matter of perfect indifference to the German merchant if he traded at Kiao-Chao or Hong Kong under a British or German government. The influence of the leading financial institution of Hong Kong is more effective in local business than the measures of the Legislative

Council and on the board of that establishment several Germans sit with Israelite and Britisher. It is not unpatriotic to say that if we resolve to accept as inevitable the fact that we are not destined to hold in perpetuity about 80 per cent. of the trade with China, we should hail with satisfaction the advent of the Germans to the Far East to open up ports and districts at their expense for the outlet and employment of the too much accumulated British capital. Even the monied class who depend entirely on home investments ought to welcome this view, for the fact of money being (and likely to be more so) dirt "cheap"—in the banker's sense—is due, in a large measure, to stagnation of capital.

We are not likely to follow the Germans in the way they have us in years gone by. Our capitalists would probably initiate operations on a large scale and independently, whereas, until quite recent years, the Germans in the Far East (and elsewhere in our Colonies) have mostly started as employés of foreign capitalists until they had acquired the knowledge and amassed the means with which to compete during years of strict frugality and dogged perseverance. It is an often repeated remark in the Far East that where a German or a Chinaman cannot get a living it is a poverty-stricken place indeed. There are so many points of similarity of action between the Chinaman and the German that the prospect of the latter's success in the new enterprise is very hopeful. We learn from Lord Salisbury that they intend to imitate our methods of colonial government. In Hong Kong and Shanghai we have, at this moment, Germans trading under their own names translated into English, with the view of assimilation. Imitation seems to be their great forte.

The whole of the rich mining and agricultural province of Shantung will, no doubt, be controlled by Germans, or at least they will almost surely set up a "sphere of influence" theory with respect to it to exclude other future claims. Up to latest advices they hold, besides Kiao-Chao, the city of Chimo with outposts as far as the hamlet of Nukuk'ou on the Kiao river, which practically amounts to an occupation of about 350 square miles. Railways for this territory are already being discussed in Berlin. In their political relations the Germans will, of course, have their own cause to espouse at Pekin, but if their prompt action and peremptory dealing with refractory mandarins can, by way of example, infuse a little more vigour into our own diplomatists we shall be the gainers in this wise. The danger ahead, therefore, is not of a German source. In order to contemplate the vast design of Russia with equity we must, at every phase, ask ourselves "What would England do under similar circumstances?" The Trans-Siberian Railway has cost Russia many millions of money and many years

of arduous toil. Until lately it was thought that in about three years' time it would be finished. Now it appears that, besides the 1,340 miles between Khabarovka and Stretensk and the two large sections in Western Siberia not yet commenced, the swamps and river beds of Manchuria present such difficulties as to necessitate ten years for completion of the system. The first question with Russia undoubtedly is, Where shall it terminate? It would be almost wasted energy to be satisfied with continuing the main line through Russian territory keeping clear to the North of Manchuria and through to Vladivostock. This railway must, like all other self-paying lines, traverse and terminate in a district which, if not a feeder itself, is located within easy access of the trade arteries. Have we not an example of this under our own very eyes in a railway being now brought into London for the almost exclusive benefit of its proprietors? The Russian system must find an outlet somewhere in the Gulf of Pechili or Gulf of Lao Tung or perhaps at Port Arthur. For years past it has been regarded as a determined fact, amongst the many intelligent German and Russian naval officers with whom I have associated in the Far East, that the Trans-Siberian Railway shall cross Chinese territory, or connect with Russian-controlled Chinese Railways and terminate on the Chinese coast without war, if possible, but, *it shall be.* Vladivostock, the most southern port of Siberia, is icebound five months of the year and navigation is partially interrupted for a further two months out of the twelve by huge ice floes, so that Russia has two very natural reasons for seeking to acquire a more southerly port, namely to harbour her fleet in winter and to be within easy each of the railway. Apart from all political advantage Port Arthur meets these requirements and the works now being carried out there indicate a permanent occupation. Were Russia's ambition limited to that and were she disposed to declare Port Arthur a free port, we might well regard her projects as tolerable, and leave future generations, as posterity has left us, to gradually accommodate themselves to the development of the new order of things. It would then be not only excusable, but decidedly wise on the part of Great Britain to abandon all idea of Ta-lien-wan, which as a trade centre is of no value. It has no natural harbour, scant population and no feature worthy of attention as a future emporium. Its opening of Port Arthur on the same conditions as Kiao-Chao would be a happy solution of the difficulty. Lord Salisbury, in his speech on the opening of Parliament told us—"We have received spontaneously from the Russian Government the written assurance that any port which Russia might obtain leave to employ for the outlet of their commerce would be a free port and free to the commerce of this country." The occupation by Russia,

with or without leave of China, of extensive Chinese territory constrains us to seek a *quid pro quo* to which I will refer later on. It is the far-reaching political design of Russia which should claim our more serious attention. The Russian scheme points to the sole control, not to say virtual annexation, of the whole of Manchuria Shin-King province and Chi-li province down to the Great Wall. South of this lies what we might term China proper—the Empire conquered by the Manchus who united it to their own kingdom which Russia now seeks to possess herself of. Southern Chi-li (China proper) in which Pekin is situated, could hardly come under European dominion without a complete break up of the Celestial Empire. If the report (published in the *China Gazette*) be well founded that Russia has already occupied that territory lying between the Ussuri and Sungari Rivers and that 5,700 Russian troops and a large quantity of stores and ammunition have reached Kirin-Ula, the capital of the Manchurian province of Kirin, then we must acknowledge the dismemberment of the Chinese Empire as a *fait accompli*, for Russia can profit nothing by this advance without annexing the only adjoining seaboard, namely the Liao-Tong Peninsula. From Saint Petersburg we learn that this expedition can, in case of need, be supported by over 60,000 troops of all arms already concentrated at Vladivostock. To avoid a conflict our negotiations should be confined to China herself. It is with her that we must make the best bargain possible and be prepared to exact a fulfilment of the treaty and defend our new concessions. We could hardly witness the absorption of the treaty port of Tientsin and our established trade on the Pei-ho without taking stronger measures than protest. Any interference with the treaty ports might disturb the Chinese customs revenues mortgaged to pay the interest on British loans amounting to over £13,000,000 (exclusive of the half of the £16,000,000 raised jointly in London and Berlin). The bondholders' interest is not the only consideration in these loans. As a nation we are morally indebted to the bondholders for the prestige we have consequently gained in China. Private Syndicates can go no farther with loans to China. The end of tangible security has been reached. The Hooley contract fell through for want of guarantees, the only security offered for the interest being the obnoxious Likin tax which was orginally levied as a war tax and ever since retained. The people regard it as an odious impost and resist payment of it to the utmost. In the Chinese Government proposal the collection was to be made by natives, hence all security vanished, whilst the idea that Europeans should collect it could not be revived. The suggestion made by Sir Robert Hart, on a former occasion, that this tax should come under the control of the Customs organization for the benefit of

China had to be dismissed, in view of the anticipated hostility of the local authorities and mandarins who would be thereby deprived of their extortion gains. Future loans to China can only be negotiated between governments at moderate interest backed up by concessions. Russia alone can do nothing in this respect, for, in the European money market, she is known only as a borrower. The German Foreign Minister declared in the Reichstag that Germany had never contemplated co-operation in a Chinese loan. Let us hope we are not yet too late in the field. Since the China-Japanese war our policy with China has been too indecisive, whilst Russia has steadily followed up a fixed policy and supplanted us in prestige at the Tsung-li-Yamen. Every move has been towards the same goal. If business men in China have long understood that a crisis was arriving—that Russia had her railway and her navy interests and a long bill to settle with China for putting her veto on Japanese conquest and lending China £16,000,000, why could not the official and diplomatic mind grasp it and act accordingly? They might have taken a few valuable hints from the local press and the common knowledge of ordinary mankind. Now what do we want? As the Chancellor of the Exchequer very rightly said last month "What we want in China is not territorial acquisition. We think of that country with no selfish interest. . . . We desire that our civilization through trade should be brought into closer touch than has yet been possible with their civilization. . . . We do not regard China as a place of conquest or acquisition by any European or other Power. We look upon it as the most hopeful place of the future for the commerce of our country and the commerce of the world at large and the Government are absolutely determined, at whatever cost, even, if necessary, at the cost of war, that the door should not be shut against us."

We do not want territorial acquisition, but Germany does and has obtained it. If Russia and France seek to satisfy their ambition to the full in the same region, surely it amounts to a partition of China, which, if it cannot be avoided, renders it incumbent on us to take a share. In that event what we want is an extension of our Kowloon possession facing Hong Kong. So far as possible we should seek natural boundaries and take all that point of the mainland opposite Hong Kong bounded on the West by the Canton Estuary, on the North by the Tong Long River as far as the town of Whee Choo and thence strike a straight line South to Bias Bay for an Eastern boundary. Hong Kong is expanding so rapidly that there is little room left for its further growth on the island, the town being situated at the base and partly on the slope of a mountain 1,800 feet high. Kowloon, which is

exactly half a mile across the harbour, is the natural extension of the Colony. It is already a British town in itself with streets formed by hundreds of residential European houses, seaside terraces, barracks for our Indian troops, the Observatory, one of the best dockyards in the Far East, and immense warehouses, coal stores and jetties for loading and discharging the largest steamers. I resided there in 1889 and when I revisited Kowloon fifteen months ago it seemed, at first glance, to have spread out 25 per cent. In twenty years' time the area will be found too small for the increased population and other many public and private needs, but, at that date, who knows if the opportunity will again present itself, as now, to widen that area? Perhaps it never occurred to any official mind to urge this reform as a set off for the Keucheng massacres. Our holding is now so small and consequently Chinese Kowloon within such easy reach of Hong Kong in a *sampan* that criminals find an easy escape out of British jurisdiction within an hour. Lastly, the Kowloon extension is necessary for the defence of Hong Kong from foreign aggression.

We should also acquire by treaty with China, or by force, as circumstances may permit or compel us, Chusan Island and its dependencies whence we could defend our large established trade and divers interests on the Yangtsekiang River and Shanghai district. Indeed we have a better right to these islands than any other foreign nation, inasmuch as they were once actually in our possession. Under the Convention of 1846 concluded at Bocca Tigris by Sir John Davis, Governor of Hong Kong and Ki Ying, the Imperial High Commissioner, Great Britain agreed to evacuate Chusan on the understanding that it should never be conceded to any foreign Power. It was a great mistake to have ever given up Chusan which would then—and I hope may yet—serve as a *point d'appui* for the development and protection of our trade in and around the Northern Treaty Ports. The Convention *per se* quashes all claim to repossess ourselves of the island; it simply gives us a prior right in this respect over other foreigners in the event of an undisguised redistribution of power at the expense of China. We ought to see the British flag hoisted on the island in response to Russia's action at Port Arthur.

We being essentially a naval power the possession of small islands suits our purpose far better than new mainland acquisitions, with almost imaginary limits and unforeseen responsibilities for our own defence. The importance of Chusan as a commercial emporium and a naval station cannot be overestimated. There would be all the prospect of its becoming a second Hong Kong, whilst as a centre whence to keep a watchful eye on our interests

and the movements of our competitors the situation would be unique.

We require, moreover, to have a station of our own still farther North within some thirty hours steam of Port Arthur and well on the route to Pekin—a strategic point for the surveillance of our German and Russian neighbours. It would enable us too to inaugurate a more energetic policy *à l'Allemande* in our dealings with the Chinese, for there is not the least doubt that the Oriental respects far more the master who whips him judiciously than him who fondles him. It appears to me that Woo Choo Island has all the desired conditions, situated, as it is, less than a mile off the Southern coast of Shan-tung and Kiang-Su provinces. We ought to strike the iron whilst it is hot, for this chance of securing the future for British interests may not recur just when the vital importance of it is undeniably manifest to all the world. Cabinet Ministers in their recess speeches have alluded to China as "the most hopeful place of the future for the commerce of our country." I believe it. China is not a newly explored track where the pioneer has to create a market and then barter in it. We are likely to see in the present generation railroads traversing the vast territories inhabited by four hundred millions of souls and the ports opened to foreigners doubled in number. It is our mission to secure the absolute freedom of these ports. There is no sign that we shall ever have the willing co-operation of the Chinese official class who look down with a sort of contempt on *Fan Kwei* and native traders alike, but if one can cajole or coerce them into countenancing that most civilizing factor—railroads—commercial conquest will pacifically follow.

In the task before us we can afford to regard France as a *quantité négligeable*, for already the day of awakening seems to have dawned upon many of her brightest intellects who realize that their country is but the dupe of the Great Bear. So far France has gained nothing by her alliance with Russia but flattery to her vanity. She would, perchance, be willing to renounce her caprice, but for the political consequences at home after all, the jubilant clamour and mutual patting on the back. From *The Times* of the 10th February we learnt that the French Chargé d'Affaires, following suit to Germany, had put in a claim to the Chinese Government to be admitted within eight days with the alternative of French action in the South. Following so quickly on the German move the Chinese Government were sagacious enough to promptly accede to the demand for an indemnity of 100,000 francs for the kidnapping of a Frenchman on the Tonkin border and encroachments by France have thus been arrested for the moment. With

such a bad excuse for seizure of territory the loss to France of prestige at the Tsung-li-Yamen probably outweighs the value of the money compensation. For some time past France has been supposed to have an eye on Yunnan and also the Island of Hainan. The occupation of Yunnan would certainly bring us the disadvantage of a possible future big frontier question, as knotty as the Mekong dispute, seeing that Yunnan borders on the East of Burmah. Hainan would almost surely result more expensive than profitable. We may assume that Yunnan and Hainan would be administrated on the same principles as French Cochin China, Annam, and Tonkin, where trade is stultified by enormously high customs dues and prohibitive tariffs. French imports at Saigon have a preferential tariff, but still so high that European goods are a positive luxury in Annam. Under more liberal regulations these French colonies might afford a magnificent market for European manufactures, vastly increase the wealth of the territory and give a good yield to the mother country. The trade advantages could not fail to become more cosmopolitan, for residents in Annam have assured me that even with the preferential tariff they are unable to exclude our Manchester goods. Foreign Joint Stock Companies are not allowed to establish themselves in Tonkin. They must become French companies with a preponderance of French influence therein and be officially represented at Paris. Many individual foreigners and foreign private firms are located there and in Annam. Indeed at the large town of Cholen, up the Saigon River it seemed to me that the only European promoted industry was rice-milling which is chiefly in the hands of Germans. The Chinese hold most of the small trade and in Saigon itself the open French establishments are chiefly cafés, hotels and restaurants. If future French colonies are to be administrated on the same basis as the present ones they are more likely to become districts blotted out of the commercial map than fields for enterprise. Politically considered, French colonization and conquest still savour too much of "glory": when the more practical trade question comes to the fore it is resolved on the "dog in the manger" principle of rendering trade with the mother country unprofitable by prohibitive tariffs and shutting out foreigners by all means possible. In open competition the French are nowhere. In the China Treaty Ports their trade is comparatively small; in Hong Kong almost nought. In Canton River they shared with us and the United States the Shameen Concession. Next to useless to them for years, they finally sold their portion whilst the British chiefly, and other foreigners in a less degree, pushed a good Canton trade from the Shameen centre. It is not our policy to waste British blood and treasure to keep the

French out of Yunnan and Hainan Island. British diplomacy alone is reported to have recently stolen a march on France in securing the concession to carry on the Burmah Railway through Yunnan. In this case we shall gain through trade all the practical benefits which could accrue to our neighbour with respect to the Franco-Chinese Treaty known as the Gerard Convention of 20th June 1895. Under French rule the Hainan port of Hoi-how would probably drop into the same insignificance as Saigon and Haiphong as compared with Hong Kong and Singapore. France may continue for a long time yet to play the fiddle for the Russian bear to dance, but not to the extent of supplying him with fleets and armies, for then the overshadowing storm of conscious folly would burst.

China, whose civilization is centuries older than any in Europe, seems to have glided into irretrievable decrepitude. Her scorn for the European conception of material progress has suffered no abatement through the many severe lessons she has learnt from outsiders. The Chinese Empire does not possess a single statesman who sees the necessity of going with the times. Li Hung Chang, Tseng and a few such men have perhaps understood the *façon de faire* of the outer world without believing that the Middle Kingdom must follow suit.

Philosophically considered, it may be cruel to force China out of an isolation which she prefers to all the allurements of Western fashion. But as Europe has chosen to impose it on her, only dismemberment can follow any further resistance to the inevitable. China is as helpless as her administration is defective. She has barely the remnant of a fleet, a rabble army and an almost imperceptible vein of patriotic sentiment. Though she has ceased to be even an Asiatic Power, she is still a nation and a factor not to be ignored in the political situation which is apparently drifting into one of grab. Mr. George Jamieson, the Consul at Shanghai, is reported (in *The Hong Kong Weekly Press* of December 16th) to have said in his speech to the China Association:—"The last thirty years in China have been, so far as Great Britain is concerned, thirty years of diplomatic failure and want of support to commercial enterprise." My experience of China only goes over thirteen years, so I will not dispute the opinion enounced, but, if it be so, the necessity of redeeming our position is now forced upon us.

JOHN FOREMAN.

AN ARTIST OF MANY METHODS.

THERE is nothing which more definitely affects an artist during the whole of his working life than the nature of the training that he goes through in his youth. By the rules which are imposed upon him at the outset of his career, and the influences under which he falls while his convictions are is process of formation, the later assertion of his own individuality is inevitably shaped. For good or ill what he learns when his receptivity is not controlled by mature judgment remains active to lead him even in those years of independence that bring him his best opportunities. Against his will he may find his power to initiate hampered by fallacies that he was taught to accept before he was able to recognize their futility; or, unconsciously, he may be guided by the possession of a store of sound knowledge into the fittest and most appropriate way of expressing his æsthetic beliefs. If he is a man of sturdy character, with a definite and well-balanced personality, he may by sheer strength rid himself of the worst effects of the early training by which he has been misled, but the struggle will be severe enough to take from him the best of his vitality, and some ridiculous little disabilities will almost certainly remain to annoy him when he is off his guard. If his natural capacity for the artist's profession is not of a high order, excellence of education will not do more than give him judgment in selection and readiness of hand; it can never bestow upon him the creative faculty, although it may aid him to hide the narrowness of his limitations, and the poverty of his imagination. But when a really artistic nature is developed exactly in the right way, guarded from wrong influences, and surrounded always by an absolutely suitable atmosphere, supremely important results may be expected from it, achievements that may fairly claim to take high rank in the record of art.

It is, of course, not necessary that the training of all able artists should be carried out in the same way. What is fitting for one type of ability, is for another cramping and inconvenient. The artistic temperament is a curious piece of subtlety, and needs very delicate treatment to bring out its best possibilities. A system of educa-

tion which seeks to apply hard and fast rules and rigid regulations to the development of natural gifts that are differently manifested in each individual must fail more often than it succeeds, for it must in the majority of cases lack just that touch of sympathy by which æsthetic endeavour is most surely guided. To some students, beyond doubt, the discipline of a school is valuable, because it checks a tendency to run riot, and to find satisfaction in an extravagance that would soon get beyond control; but for others there is nothing so helpful as the constant attention of a master who will encourage them to overcome an instinctive timidity, and will fan assiduously the spark of originality until it burns too strongly to be ever extinguished. In a few rare instances success in after-life seems to be best ensured by the artist's avoidance of any regular course of study. He prefers to reason out the stages of his own development, and to depend upon the power of observation and selection that is in him, for laying the foundation of exact knowledge required to support and make stable the edifice of fancy that he proposes to build. If he is fortunately possessed of great self-control, and is able to analyse and examine his impressions, so as to distinguish readily between the details of information that are worthy to be codified and stored up and those that are at first sight fascinating, but actually of small importance, he is almost certain by this process of self-education to arrive at better results than would be possible to him if his instinct for experiment had been suppressed by the regulations of a school course. Under a rigid system he would certainly be a bad pupil, constantly at war with the authorities, and eager to rebel against the narrow assertiveness of dogmas, the finality of which he, with his desire for enquiry, would feel irresistibly inclined to question. Academic training would in his case be worse than useless. While he chafed under restrictions that he knew tended to check the growth of his capacity, he would be wasting in resistance the energies that he needed for gathering the only material of which he could make proper use. The struggle of his student days would leave him only with a conviction that he had been the victim of an unjust persecution; and even if in his maturity he might have the courage to begin again, there would remain always in his mind a feeling of irritation at the manner in which he had been deprived of some of his best chances of success—a feeling that would most probably affect his work with a touch of protesting extravagance.

Of all artists the most happy is the man who, possessing the mental qualification for self-education, has also sufficient strength of character to keep aloof from everything that would interfere with the course of study to which he inclines. Untroubled by any

opposition, he can assert his individuality, secure in the knowledge that he is his own severest critic, and that he is competent to revise and correct whatever he produces. He has a definite intention in his effort, and is governed by the strongest motive of all—the wish to convert other people to his own views. Therefore, he keeps his purpose plainly before him, and makes no digression except in obedience to some irresistible impulse arising from sincere acceptance of a new piece of enlightenment. He retains, too, throughout his career, the instinct for progress which is one of the chief safeguards against commonplace or convention; he is ever on the look-out for fresh ways of presenting his æsthetic beliefs; and his self-education is constantly revealed in his eager adaptability and readiness to take up and work out devices of *technique* that seem to him to be novel, or to promise good results. Experiment is the very basis of his art, the central stem from which every branch starts; and he feels that there is no subject too abstruse, no method too difficult, to be unsuited for investigation.

A very excellent instance of the influence exercised over the manner of an artist's work by the nature of the training which he has undergone is to be found in the career of Mr. Mortimer Menpes. There is a perfectly clear connection between the unconventionality of his artistic education and the strong originality that has consistently distinguished his production. He is self-taught, in the sense that he has attached himself definitely to no school, and has not, except in a somewhat desultory fashion, followed any of the accepted systems under which a knowledge of artistic practice is supposed to be developed. But he has replaced systematic obedience to the tenets of a particular school by a general recognition of what is best in all the most characteristic types of art. He has gone from one to the other, studying them all in succession, and selecting from the aggregate of his experience what he wanted to help him in the statement of his personal view. His method, with its variety and vitality, is exactly what might have been expected from the keenness of his interest in the devices of the painter's craft; and in his choice of material on which to test his skill he has by no means limited himself, nor has he hesitated to range about in every direction that seemed to promise a harvest worth gathering.

The growth of his character was probably affected to no small extent by the nature of the surroundings in which he was brought up. His childhood was spent in Australia, where the opportunities of gaining any intimate knowledge of art were then few and far between, and the many facilities offered to the European student could hardly have been said to exist. But he was too much in

earnest to allow himself to be discouraged by such difficulties, and some of his first essays in painting were made in a spirit of investigation, as experiments in the use of materials. He was not content even then to follow the beaten track, and to do exactly what others were doing. His instinct was to enquire, and not to accept any method as the best until he had assured himself by many tests that it could not be improved upon; and, in the absence of the formal teaching which would have given him the results of someone else's experience, this inclination to find things out for himself, and to trust only his own discoveries, became very soon a settled habit. It certainly governed him when he first came to England and decided to make art his profession; for, with increased opportunities of seeing what were the past achievements of the great masters and the tendencies of contemporary workers his unwillingness to take on trust anything that he did not fully understand was distinctly accentuated. It is true that he entered, as a student, the South Kensington Art School; but during the brief period that he worked there he conformed as little as possible to regulations that seemed to him to be of no practical value, and paid a very small degree of attention to the curriculum of the Science and Art Department. A certain amount of drawing from the antique, a little study of anatomy, and some drawing and painting from life occupied his school course; but his real training began a little later when he migrated to Brittany, and took up his abode at Pont-Aven. Here he was once more independent of even nominal control, and yet was brought constantly in contact with a great number of prominent artists, with all the newer lights of the French School. Such an atmosphere was just what suited him best. He was free to work at whatever he liked, and he had unlimited chances of widening by daily argument his knowledge of technical problems. Everyone he met was fanatically devoted to one or other of the dominating principles of the modern school; and in the conflict of opinion, which was constantly raging round about him, he could compare many different points of view, and gather scraps of information that he knew well how to piece together into a useful whole. For two or three years, with only brief intervals of absence, he remained on this battlefield of creeds, working steadily and indefatigably, and gaining daily more and more fixity of purpose and sureness of hand.

During this period he fell under what was, perhaps, the only influence that has ever strongly affected his individuality. He met Mr. Whistler, and was intensely impressed by the power and originality of his work. He found in him an artist whom he could respect, a magnificent innovator, whose courage to assert was only equalled by his rare skill in technical statement. To

Mr. Menpes the methods of such a master came almost as a revelation, because they implied the most accurate agreement between artistic theory and professional manner. There was no sign of uncertainty about the result worth aiming at, no trace of hesitation over the way in which the pictorial meaning should be expressed, everything was confident, direct, and exact, and yet free from pedantry or thoughtless convention. Here was the master doing what the young artist was seeking to do, experimenting, inventing, breaking away from rules and traditions, but always keeping in view the purest ideal of art, the union between originality of intention and perfection of craftsmanship. It was hardly surprising that Mr. Menpes should have learned much from his association with Mr. Whistler, and that his skill in the use of materials, his knowledge of oil and water-colour, and the *technique* of etching should have grown rapidly under such supervision. He was already beginning to exhibit. At the Royal Academy, the Grosvenor Gallery, and other shows his pictures were at this time well treated and favourably noticed; and experts showed no unwillingness to recognize the promise of his work. He had reached, in fact, the end of the first stage of his career, and had made a place for himself among the younger men with claims upon the attention of the public.

By this time he was getting anxious to try new ground. He had laboured assiduously at the subjects which he found in Normandy, Brittany, and the adjacent districts, and had so far satisfied himself as to his ability to handle the different mediums which he had been striving to master, that he craved for larger opportunities; so, by way of making a complete change, he betook himself to Japan, and spent some eight months in that artistic Paradise, examining closely the characteristics of the country and recording with happy delicacy the charm and variety of the picturesque details with which it abounds. A pleasant feature of his visit was the interest taken by Japanese artists in his work, and their readiness to discuss with him their methods of practice. The devices which govern their use of materials, the principles on which they study and practice their art, were explained to him and he was admitted freely to their studios to see the actual progress of many a fine example of their exquisite production. Kyosai, who was at that time acknowledged as the leader of the best school of Japanese work, gave him many hints; and it was interesting to find in his convictions, and even in his manner of interpreting nature, the strongest kinship with Mr. Whistler's beliefs and practices. In point of view, instinct, and even in handling, the similarity between the two masters was thoroughly apparent. Both were striving for artistic perfection, and uncon-

sciously they were both travelling the same way. When Mr. Menpes returned to England after his Japanese visit, the results of his observations were exhibited at Messrs. Dowdeswell's Gallery in New Bond Street, and the collection was one of the chief attractions of the 1888 art season.

The next important work that he produced was a large etching, or rather dry point, after the picture in the Haarlem Gallery, "The Officers of the Archers of St. Adrian," by Franz Hals. It was a most exacting task for a young man to undertake, but its excellent quality established beyond dispute his position among the best etchers of his time, and marked convincingly the progress that he was making in his profession. Not long after the appearance of this plate, his restless energy impelled him to set off once more on his travels. The East again attracted him; but instead of Japan he selected India, Burmah, and Cashmere as his sketching grounds. On this occasion there was a definite purpose in his expedition, a technical intention quite in keeping with his instinct for experiment. His wish was to realize the brilliancy of Indian sunlight, to represent the dazzling luminosity of the atmospheric effects, rather than to make studies of the local colour and the native types. As a means to this end he adopted a particular manner of using oil-paint, applying it to his canvas in such a way that the surface of each picture would have something of the quality of pastel. By this device, and by avoiding hard definition in the rendering of light and shade masses, he succeeded notably in suggesting the curious shimmer of heat, and the blaze of light which in the tropics bleaches even the most vivid colours and reduces them almost to a harmony of warm greys. These oil-paintings, and a number of dry points, provided material for another interesting show.

From that time onwards his exhibitions have been practically annual events. Each one has been inspired by the ambition to solve some special problem of execution, or to present some new view about choice of pictorial subject. His Indian pictures were followed by a collection painted in Venice, in which he worked out a variation on the idea that took him to the East for the second time. The realization of light was again the main intention, but it was to be light as expressed by the aid of colour, and the subtle luminosity which gives to strong hues their greatest charm was studied with loving care. To gain the quality of illumination that fascinated him, he departed very largely from the mode of painting that he had found so well adapted for his Indian pictures. He worked with stiff, dry colour, driving it forcibly on to a white ground, so as to allow the glittering under surface to shine through the thin overlying pigments; and strove in this way, by the use of a permissible technical device, to overcome the difficulty that is

felt by every artist who seeks for results that his materials will not readily give. In his next painting trip, through France, Spain, and Morocco, the same intention to make his colour swim in a luminous atmosphere governed the whole of his effort; but the manner in which this motive was carried out gave evidence of a further change in his conviction. He did not abandon the idea of accentuating the transparency of his pigments by applying them over a white priming, but he used his paints in a different fashion, mixing them with petroleum so that they might flow easily and smoothly over the tempera ground, and might present something of the delicacy of water-colour without losing the richness and permanency of oils. A very marked departure resulted from his visit to Mexico in the following year, for here his chief inspiration was derived, not from aërial delicacies and subtleties of gradation, but from chromatic combinations amazing in their strength and brilliancy. To carry out the idea that impressed him most vividly he confined himself almost entirely to twilight and night effects, ignoring the daytime with its glare and whiteness; and arranged his pictures on a scheme of jewel-like glitter. The white tempera ground again played its important part; but the pigments imposed upon it were chosen especially with regard to their vehement assertiveness, and were kept absolutely transparent. Petroleum was the medium used, but each canvas, as it was finished, was given a skin of amber varnish, so that no diminution of its intense colour might be caused by any drying in or dulling of the surface. The collection as a whole was one of the most remarkable of the artist's achievements, an experiment of which the success was beyond question, and a memorable display of acute observation and original endeavour.

The latest of the series of exhibitions which Mr. Menpes has held at Messrs. Dowdeswell's Gallery was the second group of Japanese subjects arranged there last spring. It consisted of water-colour drawings of ceremonial processions, and studies in oil, water-colour, and black and white of Japanese life. A curious manner of using opaque pigments was illustrated, an application of water-colour that would give the brilliancy of pastel and the depth and solidity of oil. The handling and brushwork of the chief compositions showed an admirable vigour, and asserted a grasp of executive essentials to which he had never before attained so completely. As a demonstration of accurate judgment and of ingenuity in the adaptation of methods and processes, it was apart from his other shows; and it was perfectly free from mannerism or conventional compromise.

What Mr. Menpes is preparing, to support his next appeal to public attention, promises to be the most interesting and valuable of all his artistic attempts. He has for some while been

struggling with a task that must have severely taxed even his indomitable energies, with nothing less than the re-discovery of the method of printing in colours from etched plates, which was practised as long ago as the end of the sixteenth century, but in a crude way; and was abandoned almost at once for coloured engravings. Many mezzotints, aquatints, and stipple engravings were produced in colours during the last century, but the manner of their printing is now but dimly understood, and few recent attempts to imitate them have been anything but failures. But etchings in colour have been almost universally regarded as impossibilities. The difficulties to be overcome, if a passable result is to be arrived at, are many and serious. To use different plates for the various colours is scarcely practicable, for the weight of the press tends to spread the paper and makes accurate registering impossible; and as this paper before printing has to be wetted and brushed so as to roughen the surface to properly receive the ink, the preparation of the sheet for the successive printings would result in the disturbance of anything that had already been impressed upon it. On the other hand, if a single plate, inked with various colours painted on to its surface, is employed, no great depth of effect is possible in the print, and each impression is different in character and appearance. What is required is a process that is certain in its methods, satisfactory in its results, and capable of being used with the same combination of speed and dexterity that in printing from ordinary etched plates is indispensable, if work of real artistic value is to be turned out. Such a process Mr. Menpes claims to have discovered, and when the etchings on which he is now engaged make their public appearance, there is little doubt that the justice of this claim will be admitted. His prints are entirely free from trickery, straightforward examples of pure line work in which combinations of rich colour are gained without loss of clearness or definition. Every touch of the needle on the copper appears at its full value, every line tells with its exact meaning, and every speck of colour keeps its right relation, and yet neither depth nor luminosity are sacrificed. These etchings have the sumptuousness of a painted picture and the quality of a fine engraving; and in a whole series of impressions exactly the same degree of accurate finish can be maintained. A deep, low-toned effect can be given as successfully as a delicate study of subtleties; and the range of colour that is possible is large enough to allow ample opportunities for the adequate suggestion of Nature's variety. All this implies an extraordinary amount of industry and intelligence on the artist's part. What he has succeeded in doing has been the outcome of infinite labour

and constant thought, not of happy accident or chance discovery. He has deliberately worked his way step by step, and with little in the way of records of older work to give him hints as to the direction in which he might most profitably seek a clue.

It is certain that he could not have carried through to unquestionable success an undertaking so arduous if he had not by a life of enquiry accustomed himself to the solving of the problems of his profession. The habit of experiment, which has marked every stage of his life, has brought him into a condition of mind absolutely essential for the proper development of the inventive faculty. Nothing now would seem to him to be impossible, because he has proved in the past that he can surmount the most serious technical difficulties and can escape, by unexpected devices, from perplexities that might well have caused a less determined innovator to admit defeat. He has to thank his training, his reliance on himself, and his habit of choosing from the experience of others only what he felt to be in agreement with his own scheme of work, for his present triumph; and all lovers of art have cause to be grateful to him for his independence. He has given them many sources of pleasure that, without his assistance, might have remained indefinitely closed.

A. L. Baldry.

THE MONTH IN AMERICA.

Washington, February 15th, 1898.

"Boodle" is triumphant once more, and Mark Hanna has again shown himself a good business man. After one of the hardest and most fiercely contested fights before a Legislature ever known, Mr. Hanna succeeded in controlling enough Republican votes to be returned to the United States Senate for the remainder of John Sherman's term and for the succeeding full term. This ensures him a seat in the Upper House of Congress for the next seven years. It is a shameless and scandalous triumph of corruption. Seven members of the Legislature united in charging bribery against Mr. Hanna and his agents. Republican members of the Legislature had to be kept under guard to prevent them from joining the opposition forces, and the most desperate tactics on both sides were indulged in. It is a fitting climax to this disgraceful performance that after Mr. Hanna had been declared elected the Republican Members closed the Session of the Legislature by singing "Praise God from Whom all Blessings Flow," and that the first despatch sent by Mr. Hanna after he had received the official announcement of his election was to his *alter ego*, the President of the United States, in the following words: "God reigns, and the Republican Party still lives." Nothing that Mr. Hanna has done in the course of his public life produced such a feeling of resentment as his despatch to the President. The telegram is a plagiarism of the celebrated words used by James A. Garfield when he first learned of the assassination of President Lincoln. Mr. Garfield was addressing a great gathering in New York who were deeply enraged and fiercely excited over the sudden announcement that the great War President had been stricken down by the hand of an assassin. Mr. Garfield urged the people to be calm, and he closed an impromptu burst of eloquence with the words: "God reigns, and the Government at Washington still lives." After Mr. Hanna's telegram was made public it was suggested that a single letter had been dropped out of the first word. Mr. Hanna wrote "gold," but the telegraph operator made it "God." In the opinion of a great many people of this country the despatch should read: "Gold reigns, and Mark Hanna is still the Republican Party."

Massachusetts more particularly, and the country generally, continues to watch the progress of the strike among the operatives

of the New England cotton mills. While the strike has spread from Massachusetts to Maine and Rhode Island it has not become general enough to cause all the mills to suspend, and both men and masters have evidently prepared for a long siege, determined to see which will tire first. The excuse made for the cut down in wages was that Southern competition prevented the New England mill-owners paying the old scale of wages and making a living profit, and yet in the face of this declaration a mill at Biddeford, Maine, where the men are now on strike, has recently declared a semi-annual dividend of 5 per cent. and according to the statements which have been published in reputable papers the average annual dividend paid by the Massachusetts mills is a trifle over 6 per cent., besides permitting the creation of a reserve fund and the payment of large salaries to the officers of the corporations.

The present strike, however, quite apart from the wage question and its immediate causes, is one of the most interesting labour developments this country has ever known, and is a striking illustration of Protection run mad. Only within the last few years have cotton mills been established in the South. Heretofore the cotton in its raw state was transported from the Southern fields to New England, where it was manufactured into cloth, and then, as a finished product, sent back to the South to be sold. The Southern consumers of course paid freight both ways, and the profits which followed from the cotton being handled in the various processes. Now instead of the raw material going to New England it is manufactured practically on the spot where it is grown. The cotton mills of the South are fully equal to those of the North; in fact, in some places the Southern mills, being of later construction, are equipped with better labour-saving machinery. The cost of living in the South is cheaper than in the North, resulting in a lower scale of wages, the consequence being that the North has lost to a very large extent its Southern market and finds its production crippled.

New England is now clamouring for Protection against the South. In New England there are stringent labour laws which prohibit a manufacturer from working his operatives more than about eight hours a day, while few of the Southern States have yet enacted labour laws, and the average Southern operative works from ten to twelve hours a day. To correct this evil, to enable Massachusetts to hold her own, the power of Congress is to be invoked. A Massachusetts member of the House of Representatives, himself the president of a cotton mill, has introduced an amendment to the Constitution to make the hours of labour uniform throughout the United States. If this amendment should be adopted the mill hand of Massachusetts and the mill hand of Georgia would be forced to work the same number of hours a week, and Massachusetts

believes that, given an equality in the hours of labour, she can still defy Southern competition. It is of course carrying paternalism to its extreme limit, and although the tendency of the times in this country is to accomplish everything by legislation—to invoke the statute to make men virtuous, as well as to force them to pay their tribute to the tax-gatherer—it is not believed that this proposed constitutional amendment stands the least chance of being adopted, and Massachusetts will probably in the near future lose a great deal of her importance as a cotton manufacturing centre, as she has already lost her *prestige* as a producer of iron. The time was when the iron industry of Massachusetts was one of very great importance, but to-day practically no iron is manufactured in Massachusetts, Pittsburg having superseded New England because of the former's natural advantages. For many years Pittsburg was to the iron trade of this country what Sheffield has been to the cutlery trade of the world. To-day, however, Pittsburg is finding a great rival in the South, where there has been an enormous development during the last few years, and where, because of the proximity of ore and coal and other materials, it is found cheaper to make a ton of pig iron in Birmingham, Alabama, than it is in Pittsburg.

Apropos of cotton, my attention has been called to an article in *The Manchester Guardian* in which, commenting on my letter in the January number of the REVIEW, *The Guardian* says I have fallen into a singular error in putting the trade statistics of the current season's cotton crop as not exceeding 7,000,000 bales. "Mr. Dingley's estimate," *The Guardian* adds, "of a possible 11,000,000 or 10,500,000 bales as a minimum seems to be the favourite trade estimate." At the time I wrote there appeared to be considerable doubts in the minds of the best informed authorities as to the size of the cotton crop for the past year, and newspapers usually exact put the crop at not to exceed 7,000,000 bales, the Government estimate, as I stated, being 9,000,000 bales. Mr. Henry G. Hester, Secretary of the New Orleans Cotton Exchange, and whose figures are accepted as official by the United States Bureau of Statistics, announces that the cotton crop of this country for the year ending August 31, 1897, amounted to 8,757,964 bales. *The Guardian's* estimate of between 10,500,000 and 11,000,000 bales is from 1,742,036 to 2,242,036 bales over the actual amount produced.

It is difficult to see how the Republicans can fail to lose the next House of Representatives. In the last campaign they pinned everything on the efficacy of Protection, and practically pledged themselves to secure prosperity to the country in case they were placed in power and could speedily pass a Tariff Bill. Now they

must go before the country and say to every man that he is prosperous; in other words, that he is doing as well as he ought to expect, and must be satisfied with conditions as they are. The country may be a great deal more prosperous than it was—in fact, the country may be as prosperous as it ever will be—but it will be extremely hard to make the average man believe it. No matter how well a man may be doing he will still be dissatisfied, and he will resent being told by smug stump speakers and unctuous political writers that his condition is so good that he need not expect anything better. The men who are working at the old rate of wages while the cost of living has gone up; the men who had their wages reduced, and the men who are still without employment, will be very apt to question the blessings of Protection and the Republican prosperity which has been given to them. The Party in power will suffer.

The appointment of Governor Griggs to be Attorney-General of the United States in succession to Mr. McKenna, who has been appointed to the Supreme Bench, will not help the Republican Party in its fight this fall. Personally, Governor Griggs is a man of charming character as well as of the highest legal attainments, and as chief executive of the State of New Jersey he has shown himself to be a man of force and possessed of high executive abilities. But he has always been associated with corporations, he has been a corporation attorney for a great many years, and his affiliations and interests are with the great monopolies rather than with the people. The Attorney-General of the United States is in a measure the guardian of the public against the encroachments of corporations; on him devolves the necessity of initiating prosecutions under the Anti-Trust and similar laws, and it is therefore somewhat inconsistent to place a corporation attorney in that office. It is in keeping with Mr. Griggs' associations that towards the latter end of this month he is to be the guest of honour at a dinner which, according to newspaper report, is to cost the modest sum of £20 a plate. Even in this city, where elaborate dinners are anything but rare, a function that costs £20 a plate is so infrequent as to attract attention. It will perhaps be heard of again before the campaign is over. Another dinner which was given in this city a few days ago is also worthy of attention. It was a dinner given by Mr. Bliss, the Secretary of the Interior, in honour of the President and the members of the Cabinet. Fifty guests sat at the table, the floral decorations of which, the dining-room and the adjacent apartments, are said to have cost £1,000, while the dinner itself cost a like amount.

Some months ago I stated that the campaign of 1896 settled nothing so far as the money question was concerned, and that

in 1900 the issue would again be fought more bitterly than it was in the memorable campaign of the year before last. Papers on both sides of the Atlantic criticized my judgment; I was told that I must be stubbornly blind to the signs of the times if I could not see that the country had placed its final stamp of disapproval on the silver heresy, and that three years hence silver, as an issue, would be as obsolete as the Schleswig-Holstein succession. I have been perfectly content to let my critics, largely biassed, I believe, by their personal feelings, weave their fine-spun theories, knowing that the trend of events would open their eyes to the truth. To-day no one has any doubt as to what the issue will be. It has been made up and accepted on both sides. Men of the most Conservative tendencies, as well as those who are known to be Radical in their views, admit that we are on the eve of another mighty struggle—a struggle which will be waged around the standards. In the Senate towards the latter end of last month Mr. Hoar, of Massachusetts, than whom there is no more typical representative of the gold standard, a man who stands for everything that is Conservative in thought and habit and belief, to whom the gold standard is as much a cardinal principle of faith as the religion which he imbibed at his mother's knee, a religion tinctured somewhat with the narrowed views of Puritanism, precisely as are his financial and political views, Mr. Hoar, I say, in the course of a speech debating the Teller resolution to pay the principal and interest of the public debt in silver, used these words:—

"Mr. President, to come back for a very few moments, this is reduced by the debate to a very small question, but it is a fundamental question. It is the question at the hinge between the two schools of political economy in this country. It is a question which I agree is to be debated before the American people in the year 1900,and is to be decided, so far as one election can settle it, in the year 1900."

Everyone understands that Mr. Hoar, in a few carefully-chosen words, epitomized the situation. The political opponents of the Senator from Massachusetts are glad to have the issue so narrowly and clearly defined, and two days after he had delivered his speech they showed in the most emphatic and impressive manner that, no matter what party platforms may declare or politicians may declaim, this country, if the Senate of the United States represents public sentiment, will not tolerate the single gold standard. The vote by which Mr. Teller's resolution was adopted is perhaps the most significant thing which has taken place in American politics since November, 1896, when McKinley was declared elected. In connection with the proceedings attendant on that vote it is worth while, for a clear understanding of the situation, to pay some little attention to the surrounding circumstances.

Mr. Teller's resolution was sustained by a majority of fifteen. In support of the resolution there voted every Democrat with the single exception of one—Senator Caffery of Louisiana,—every Silver Republican, and every Populist. The negative vote was made up solely of the straight-out sound-money Republicans and their one Democratic ally, the Louisiana Senator. But even greater significance attaches to the vote by which the amendment offered by Mr. Lodge was defeated. There was no indirection to the language of Mr. Lodge's resolution. Every man who voted for it pronounced himself a believer in the single gold standard; every man who voted against it pronounced himself as opposed to gold monometallism. Mr. Lodge's resolution, which was offered as a substitute to the original resolution of Mr. Teller, read as follows:—

"That all the bonds of the United States issued or authorized to be issued under the said acts of Congress hereinbefore recited, are payable, principal and interest, in gold coin or its equivalent, and that any other payment without the consent of the creditor would be in violation of the public faith and in derogation of his rights."

This substitute amendment was defeated by a majority of twenty-nine, a majority so unexpectedly large that for the time being the gold-standard men were simply dazed. Out of a total vote of seventy-seven they could rally only twenty-four Senators to their support, while fifty-three were found voting in the negative. An analysis of this negative vote is extremely interesting. It shows that some of the men who were most active in their support of McKinley in the last campaign, who were in favour of the declaration of the St. Louis platform pledging the faith of the Republican Party to the maintenance of the existing gold standard, because that declaration was coupled with the assertion that the Republican Party was also pledged to bimetallism, and would do all in its power to bring about an international agreement, are not willing to accept the gold standard when there is no longer any effort to be made to secure bimetallism.

Among the men who voted against Mr. Lodge's resolution were such Democratic Senators as Gray, of Delaware; Lindsay, of Kentucky; Murphy, of New York, and Smith of New Jersey. These men have heretofore been regarded as sound-money men, and as men who had the support of their States in fighting silver. Mr. Gray was one of ex-President Cleveland's strongest advocates and supporters when that gentleman occupied the White House; Mr. Lindsay, with Mr. Carlisle, the former Secretary of the Treasury, led the fight in his State against silver, and it was his influence as much as anything else which caused Kentucky to cast her electoral vote for McKinley and against Bryan; Mr. Murphy

is supposed to voice the strongest gold State in the Union; Mr. Smith, a representative of the important eastern manufacturing State of New Jersey, felt safe in espousing the cause of gold and refusing to affirm his allegiance to the Chicago platform. And yet these men not only voted against a resolution pledging the country to the payment of its bonded indebtness in gold coin, but voted in support of Mr. Teller's resolution, declaring that the payment of the national debt in silver is not in violation of public faith. In this same Democratic company were found Republicans like Hansbrough, of North Dakota; Nelson, of Minnesota; Quay, of Pennsylvania; and Thurston, of Nebraska all of them sound-money men, all of them opposed to the free coinage of silver, and who, while opposing the free and unlimited coinage of the white metal, could not be induced to vote in support of fastening the gold standard upon the country.

Again, considering this vote and examining it in all its bearings, another salient fact is made unmistakeably clear. That Gray and Lindsay and the other Democrats voted with their Party indicates the reuniting of the Democratic lines and the desire on the part of those Democrats who felt themselves unable to stand on the Chicago platform to be now taken back into the Democratic fold. It has been said since that vote was cast in the Senate that the sound-money Democrats have now one foot on the Chicago platform, and that it will not take much more for them to plant both feet squarely on the platform of their Party and make a public confession of faith. While I do not believe we need to be too sanguine about that, it is the shadow cast by forthcoming events. There is now an effort being made by the wisest, most far-seeing, and most influential leaders of the Democratic Party to get the Democracy into line for the congressional elections of this year and the greater campaign of two years hence. Already negotiations are in progress, negotiations which promise to be successful. In brief, the plan is to reaffirm the broad, salient principles of the Chicago platform, eliminating, however, the question of ratio, and leaving that matter to be decided hereafter by legislative action. The Democratic Party, therefore, would go into the campaign pledged to the principle of free silver, but not pledged to a ratio of 16 to 1. That ratio might be 20 or 22 or 24, or any other which wisdom and commercial conditions at the time might dictate. It would relieve the Party of the embarrassment of having to defend a ratio which is only defensible because historic, and perhaps for that very reason indefensible, and it would place them in the position of being able to say to their opponents that the ratio, like the tariff, was one to be determined by experts. It is believed by these managing Democrats that a platform pledging the Party to free silver at a ratio to be determined in the future,

committing the Democracy to the regulation of trusts and monopolies, and standing before the people as the champions of the people for simplicity, economy, and reform, will command the support of a majority of the voters of this country.

The day before the Senate adopted Mr. Teller's resolution President McKinley made a noteworthy and carefully prepared speech in New York at the banquet of the National Association of Manufacturers. That speech had been looked forward to with a good deal of interest, as it was known that the President would firmly re-enunciate his position on the money question. President McKinley is a man who has a peculiar mental twist. He prefers to do by indirection what he might far better and far easier accomplish by direct methods. In his speech delivered before a company of men who believe firmly and honestly in the single gold standard, and who have as little sympathy with silver or the silver men as the average Lombard Street banker, Mr. McKinley voiced the general sentiment of his audience when he declared in favour of gold, but instead of coming out boldly and saying that he was a gold standard man, and believed in gold,he availed himself of euphemisms which of course deceived nobody, but simply broke the force of what he said.

"Whatever may be the language of the contract," the President said, "the United States will discharge all of its obligations in the currency recognized as the best throughout the civilized world at the times of payment." This sentiment was greeted with rapturous applause. It was hailed as the official announcement to the world that the Government would pay in gold, and yet the President did not say so. Again, a little later, he said: "It will not suffice for citizens nowadays to say simply that they are in favour of sound money. That is not enough. The people's purpose must be given the vitality of public law." It is somewhat inconsistent that after the President warns his hearers not to be satisfied with hiding behind the ambiguous phrase "sound money" he should not define what those words mean. With much approval the President quoted the money plank of the St. Louis platform—a plank, my readers may remember, which declares that the Republican Party is "opposed to the free coinage of silver except by international agreement with the leading commercial nations of the world, which we pledge ourselves to promote, and until such arrangement can be obtained the existing gold standard must be preserved." The President, however, voices the opinions of other members of his Party in agreeing that the question has not been settled and is still open. "All those who represent, as you do," he said, "the great conservative but progressive interests of the country owe it not only to themselves, but to the people, to insist upon the settle-

ment of this great question now, or else to face the alternative that it must again be submitted for arbitration at the polls."

The passage of the Teller resolution following the delivery of this speech may be regarded as the answer of the Senate to the President; it is an answer as emphatic and determined as ever voiced by a free legislative assembly. It has demonstrated without question the weakness of the single gold standard in this country and the determination of the Democratic Party to again attempt its overthrow. The conditions will be accepted, and preparations made on both sides to engage in the Titanic struggle.

The position of the President just at the present time is a peculiar one. One day he tells his silver friends that he believes in international bimetallism, and in consequence is roundly denounced by the adherents of the single gold standard for keeping alive the silver agitation. They charge him with encouraging the hopes of the silver men in talking about international bimetallism, which the gold men now hold to be an impossibility and a delusion, and a few days later he goes over to New York and makes the speech, extracts from which have been quoted. Mr. Gage, Secretary of the Treasury, before a committee of Congress, tells that committee the purpose of his Bill is to more firmly fasten upon the country the single standard, and then a few days later, following the example of his chief, makes a speech, in the course of which he declares himself to be an international bimetallist, and is eagerly looking forward to the day when international bimetallism will be an accomplished fact. This course is pleasing neither the Silver Republicans nor the Gold Republicans and their allies the Gold Democrats. The former say that the President's as well as the Secretary's endorsement of international bimetallism is simply a sop thrown to Cerberus, while the gold men are dissatisfied with the President's encouragement of silver, and declare that if he continues to try to ride both horses inevitable disaster will follow.

Some criticism having been made on that portion of my article in the January Review in which I called attention to the Treasury deficit, it may interest some readers to know that there is ample warrant for the enquiry I propounded as to whether the prediction of Secretary Gage could be regarded any more seriously than that made by Mr. Carlisle when he was Secretary of the Treasury. The subjoined table will show that if the prophecy of Secretary Gage is to be verified it is necessary that customs receipts should increase amazingly during the remainder of the fiscal year. I do not say now, and did not say at the time, that Secretary Gage's estimates might not be realized; what I did was simply to call attention to the coincidence that five months after the new tariff

law went into effect, Mr. Carlisle, then Secretary of the Treasury, made a calculation as to the revenue to be realized under the new tariff law. Five months after the new tariff law went into effect Secretary Gage made a similar computation. The stern logic of facts proves that Mr. Carlisle's figures were so woefully at fault, and the tariff on which he pinned his faith to provide sufficient revenue was such a magnificient deficit producer, that had Mr. Carlisle been at the head of a great corporation or mercantile business instead of the Government, his affairs would have been passed upon by the bankruptcy court. Mr. Gage now indulges in similar rosy hopes, but the official figures do not justify either his assertions or his optimism. The Secretary of the Treasury makes public every day the receipts and expenditures. An examination of these statements for the past month (January 13 to February 12) is extremely interesting and instructive. Mr. Gage, it will be remembered, predicted a surplus of from £4,000,000 to £5,000,000 by the end of the fiscal year. His official figures do not harmonize with his predictions.

DAILY RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. (NOTE.—CENTS OMITTED.)

	RECEIPTS.	EXPENDITURES.		RECEIPTS.	EXPENDITURES.
Jan. 13,	$1,298,842	$1,420,000	Jan. 29,	$1,062,175	$ 837,000
,, 14,	1,021,292	1,213,000	,, 31,	1,357,147	1,086,000
,, 15,	972,958	1,575,000	Feb. 1,	897,488	1,314,000
,, 17,	1,463,948	1,660,000	,, 2,	1,272,378	1,423,000
,, 18,	934,549	1,005,000	,, 3,	1,255,510	1,374,000
,, 19,	1,342,254	1,533,000	,, 4,	895,581	1,090,000
,, 20,	1,102,129	1,532,000	,, 5,	1,038,110	1,158,000
,, 21,	1,111,882	1,227,000	,, 7,	1,518,206	1,665,000
,, 22,	1,061,927	1,287,000	,, 8,	1,147,326	1,382,000
,, 24,	1,325,649	1,505,000	,, 9,	1,381,986	8,760,000
,, 25,	905,728	994,000	,, 10,	1,172,332	1,355,000
,, 26,	1,225,860	1,194,000	,, 11,	1,303,452	1,447,000
,, 27,	925,534	1,045,000	,, 12,	1,428,821	1,670,000
,, 28,	777,472	965,000			

Excess of expenditures over receipts, £2,303,093.

It will be seen from the above that only three times in the course of the past month did the receipts exceed the expenditures. The unusual excess of expenditures over receipts on the 9th of this month was caused by the Treasury having drawn a warrant for $7,515,255 in anticipation of the payment of the first mortgage on the Kansas Pacific Railroad, the bonds of which are guaranteed by the Government. This extraordinary expenditure, however, is offset by the fact that during the month of January the Treasury received the final payment on account of the sale of the Union Pacific Railroad, amounting to $8,538,401, so that one item is set off by the other; in fact, the finances of the Government up to date have largely profited by this Union Pacific sale, as during November and December the amount received from the sale of the railroad to the reorganization syndicate amounted to $49,909,822. Had it not been for this sale and the large amounts realized the Treasury deficit would be much heavier than it now is.

In brief, the condition of the public revenues, according to the financial statement issued on the first of the present month, shows that the national debt increased £2,517,954 ($12,589,771). The increase of the deficit during January, excluding the Union Pacific payments, amounts to £1,580,297 ($7,901,484). The total deficit since July 1, 1897, seven months of the present fiscal year, reaches £10,380,365 ($51,901,823).

Readers of The National Review must surely remember in what awful colours Governor Altgeld, of Illinois, was painted during the memorable campaign of 1896 when the Governor was one of Mr. Bryan's chief supporters, and was doing everything in his power to hold his State in the Democratic column. Governor Altgeld was branded as an anarchist, socialist, and destroyer of law and order; he was charged with being in league with the very worst element of society, of inciting class against class, and of permitting riot and bloodshed. To free the State from the disgrace of Altgeld the Republicans and the "Respectable Element" of the Democratic Party were urged to vote for Tanner, who was the Republican candidate for Governor. This candidate of respectability and the better element was duly elected. Now the Chicago *Times-Herald*, a straight-out and uncompromising Republican newspaper, publicly declares that Governor Tanner, after having been in office only a year, is worth at least £40,000, and it asks how he made it. That is a qustion which the public in Illinois as well as elsewhere would like to have answered, but probably their curiosity will go unsatisfied.

I thought at one time that the London *Times* had a monopoly of purveying misinformation to the British Public on American affairs, but Mr. Smalley has now lost his proud pre-eminence and the palm must be awarded to the New York correspondent of the London *Standard*. This astute caterer of news recently sent his paper a despatch in which he asserted "That the defeat of the Bill (Senator Teller's silver resolution) is indicated by fifty-two to thirty-seven," besides adding considerable more valuable misinformation of the same sort. This despatch has been freely copied and commented on by American newspapers as "a fair sample," in the language of one of them, "of the rubbish which is daily served to the British public as American news. Nowhere except in New York City would it have been possible to find anyone capable of such ignorance as is exhibited by the prediction that the measure would be defeated by fifty-two to thirty-seven or by any other vote. It occurs to us to suggest that those amiable persons who are for ever pleading for a better mutual understanding between the two countries might promote their purpose much more effectually by securing the truthful and intelligent state-

ment of American events in London newspapers than by a maudlin and futile advocacy of universal arbitration."—(*Washington Post*).

As I close this letter the Spanish incident caused by the publication of Minister de Lome's letter to the Editor of the Madrid *Herald* is still open and the end is not yet in sight, although it is generally believed in Washington that Spain will extricate herself from an extremely embarrassing position by a disavowal of her former Minister's indiscreet utterances.

The American people are so quickly aroused to emotion, especially when they think the national honour is involved, that it is not surprising following the publication of this letter a tremendous wave of indignation should have swept over the country. Newspapers and public men who appreciate the political value of a vigorous foreign policy and the profit which results from firmly standing up for the dignity of their country, have not been loath to seize upon this incident to impress upon the President the necessity of extremely energetic action. They realize that anything which tends to divert the attention of the country from consideration of the financial question and puts another prominent issue in its place will be to the advantage of the Republican Party, which now looks with considerable apprehension upon the coming fall elections. Very few of these men have been so frank and outspoken as Senator Chandler, of New Hampshire, who in an interview a few days ago said : "The Republican Party will almost certainly go down to defeat in the Congressional elections next fall if the campaign is fought on the money issue alone. Only one thing can save us. The present Republican Administration must come out boldly for the annexation of Hawaii and the freedom of Cuba. If we have a vigorous foreign policy we can forget our differences, rally our forces and win." Mr. Chandler explained why the Republicans are likely to lose the elections on the money issue, and closed his interview in these words: "On the other hand, if we divert attention from this subject to a glorious American policy of adding territory to our domain and giving liberty to an oppressed people, the Republican majority will be so large next fall that we will never get through counting it. If the United States should deliberately and completely declare its determination to make Cuba free Spain will not fire the first gun. There will be no war. If, however, the alternative of war comes, it would strengthen the patriotism of the American nation to be concerned in the struggle of a people who are seeking liberty." There is a saving remnant of the unemotional who do not take this view of the matter, and who consider that while de Lome committed a grave breach of diplomatic etiquette, and, having been found out, he must expect to pay the penalty which always follows detection, the United States in making a

stolen private letter the pretext for a diplomatic explanation have been guilty of an offence no less undignified than that of which they complain. These people, however—and among them are numbered some of the men in Congress whose names command the greatest respect on both sides of the ocean—see the futility of battering their heads against the stone wall of public opinion, and wisely keep silent. In private conversation a few days ago with a public man whose position is so eminent that I cannot describe him with more detail, as that might lead to his identification, he gave it as his opinion that the President should not have dignified the affair by magnifying its importance, but should have quietly intimated to Spain the necessity of withdrawing her envoy because he had become *persona non grata*. This gentleman, in the strongest language, animadverted on the tendency of the American people to become hysterical at the slighest excuse, and called attention to the constant danger to which these repeated emotional exhibitions subjected the country. "We are more emotional even than the French," he added, "and unless there is a change in the national temperament, the next generation of Americans will be so intensely nervous and so anxious to take offence at the least word, that it will inevitably involve us in the most serious trouble with the rest of the world." To entertain or give expression to such thoughts is regarded as being almost tantamount to treason, and possibly I shall be criticized for having reflected the views of thinking men.

A. Maurice Low.

[Note—Since the foregoing pages were written the world has been startled by one of the most terrible naval tragedies of modern times. On the evening of Tuesday, February 15th, at 9:30 p.m., the United States battleship (2nd class) *Maine* was blown up while lying in Havana harbour, where she had been since February 3rd. Most of the men were in their bunks at the time and the loss of life was fearful—it is said nearly 300. The conduct of the survivors was admirable, and Captain Sigsbee, realizing what might be felt at home when the terrible news arrived, had the presence of mind to send this telegram: "Public opinion should be suspended till further report." The American people have had a tremendous strain imposed upon them, but, so far as can be judged amid a mass of conflicting reports, they have acted in the spirit of Captain Sigsbee's injunction. It is unnecessary to add that the British nation has been profoundly stirred by this hideous calamity—they could hardly have been more moved had it befallen one of their own ships. It would be hard to say which of the two competing theories of the catastrophe is the more alarming to the Navies of the world.—Editor *N.R.*]

SECOND THOUGHTS ON RHODESIA.

I WROTE an article last August in THE NATIONAL REVIEW describing Rhodesia and its gold and other prospects. The Rhodesian press in South Africa, backed up by a large section of the English (though here and there, through the storm, a comforting whisper of support reached my ear), met my article with a perfect hurricane of denial, confutation, ridicule and abuse. Seven months have passed since then. On reviewing the article in the light of succeeding events and admissions, there is only one sentence which I should wish to see altered. I said I would give the country five years to be found out. For the word "five" I would now substitute the word "one." Things are moving faster than I expected, and the Rhodesian ship is close on a lee shore. Among men who form their own opinions on this subject, who go to the facts, I find more and more one conviction prevailing; the stern and gloomy conviction that Rhodesia is "a bad business," that the Chartered Company, so far as can be judged at present, possesses nothing in that great territory that will enable it to pay a dividend, and consequently that the large sums of money entrusted to its care are gone to return no more. That conviction may not have filtered down to the masses yet; but it is on its way. It has been started.

A great change has come over the attitude of the Company in the last few months. They used to go the whole hog six months ago. Mining or agriculture, it was all the same. The mining wealth could only be matched by the teeming fertility of the soil. Since then the stops have been put down a bit that made that music. They have lost the old, lavish, unstinted style of eloquence, the eloquence we know so well in the Buluwayo prospectuses. Some stand by gold and some by agriculture, and some still strive feebly to unite the two.

But still, disorganized though they are, round one of these two positions, agriculture or gold, the defenders of Rhodesia are all bound to rally. There is nothing else. If the country cannot pay on farms or mines, it can never pay at all. Let us look at the farming prospects first.

My own travels in Rhodesia dated from February, '95, to the end of July, '96, of which three months were passed in Buluwayo at the time of the siege, and the other fourteen or fifteen in wandering over the country. I did all my travelling on foot, and I estimate that in that time I must have covered a distance of nearly 3,000 miles; from Tuli in the south to the Zambesi in the north; and from the Gazaland border on the east to Buluwayo on the west. I will not quote what I have already written. In my previous article I tracked my course from point to point. From Tuli to Victoria; thence across the Gazaland border; back to Mount Wedza; to Charter; south-west to Gwelo; down the so-called gold belt to Buluwayo; north by the Bembezi, Shangani and Sebukwe district to the Ma Fungi Busi district and on to the Zambesi. Eastward then to the Sanyati river, and south-east by its course along the Umniati to its junction with the Selukwe. Then again south-west to Buluwayo, and from there down to Tati and Mafeking. The reader will see that this route covers a good deal of territory. I have been told that I was unlucky in my season; that the drought was exceptional; that the river courses, dried up then, ought not to have been dried up, and that I should have found hippopotami where there was no water to float a minnow in, and so on. It may be so. I speak only of what I saw. Fifteen months sounds little enough on paper. I thought it would never end.

Rhodesia, like all the central southern portion of Africa, is a vast high-rising plateau. It is subject during nearly eight months in the year to fierce sun and drought; and during the other four, the wet season, to violent occasional thunderstorms. Conceive a country averaging, we will say, 4,000 feet elevation, and with a consequently very rarefied atmosphere, and played upon for three quarters of the year by an African sun. The result is easily described, but it is not easily made visible to English eyes. It is a seemingly interminable waste of hot, sandy soil, sparsely and occasionally thickly covered with a rather black, thorny, dried-up looking scrub—a scrub that looks for the most part as if it had been burnt by fire, so thin and hard and black are its twigs. Certain of the river courses, notably the Sabi in the east and the Zambesi in the north, which are low-lying, are in a sense fertile; that is, they are often almost impenetrably clothed with bush, commonly growing in quagmires and swamps, and could the bush be cleared away and the soil drained, in that moist and sultry climate anything might be grown. But this part of the country is really the most hopeless of all. The man who enters one of these swampy low valleys, enters it with his life in his hand. Fever rages. It is not a question of *risk*; you are bound to catch it. And a malarial

fever, though it may not prove fatal, is one of the most trying of sicknesses and not easily got rid of. I speak from experience.

Low ground saturated with fever. High ground scorched and desert. That is my report on Rhodesia as a farming country. There are here and there spots where a little cultivation might be carried on, and now and then a water-course, which, if there were a population to afford a market, might be used for irrigation on a small scale. But, so far as agriculture as an end is concerned, *i.e.* the colonization of the country on an agricultural basis, the proposition is simply absurd, and is rendered all the more absurd by rinderpest, cattle sickness, tsetse fly, locusts, and other plagues which infest the country. I see that Mr. Rhodes, who, I suppose, can command what there is out there, cannot even get a cabbage for his dinner. His friend, Mr. Bolton, who has been staying with him, tells us in the *Daily News* of February 5th that Mr. Rhodes's kitchen-garden is a very good one, and would grow anything if it were not for the locusts, "which, for two-thirds of the year, swarm in countless myriads, eating every blade of grass and leaf, in fact everything grown on the farm. The kitchen-garden being a particularly favourite spot of theirs, it is almost impossible to grow vegetables, or to get any fruit."

Well, as I say, I described the country in this review as I had seen it. But my description raised a good deal of protest. Among others Mr. Selous (who has been, he tells us, twenty-five years in the country, and naturally speaks with a good deal of authority) came out against me and testified to the hippopotami in my dried-up rivers. I am willing to believe, if Mr. Selous says so, that I saw things more or less at a disadvantage, but I am very glad to notice that, though my adversaries start by denying all my statements, they come home to roost with me in my own conclusions after all. Thus Mr. Selous, after knocking me about a good deal in the *Daily Chronicle* of August 4th, finishes up: "Should it prove that there is no payable gold in Rhodesia, I am inclined to agree with Mr. Blake that it would *soon be deserted by the home-born British.*" That is quite enough. So long as it is no place for the British colonist it does not matter, as far as the Chartered Company's chance of making it pay is concerned, whether it is a little more of a Sahara or a little less. Mr. Selous adds, it is true, that it will be "gradually colonized by the Dutch and the descendants of the British settlers" from other parts of South Africa. But the idea that a few Boers and Afrikanders may ultimately settle in the country when the Chartered Company has done with it will scarcely console investors, I take it, for the loss of their money.

"I never," says this staunchest of my allies in another place

(*Daily Graphic*, December 17th), "spoke in terms of eulogy of any part of the present Rhodesia, except the high plateau of Eastern Mashonaland and Manica, which form but a small portion of the whole of Southern Rhodesia." And a little lower down he qualifies, or rather cancels, even this slender praise by saying: "There is one point which all my critics appear to forget, and that is that I have always written of Mashonaland, or Manica, or Matabeleland, as parts of South Africa, and have never compared them with other parts of the whole." This is about the roughest thing that has been said about South Africa yet. One of the aforesaid critics had bluntly called these districts "a hell." But not a hell, argues Mr. Selous, compared with the the rest of South Africa. I am not surprised that Mr. Selous is in bad odour with the Chartered Company.

One other witness I should like to call: Sir Gordon Sprigg, Cape Premier. He is not only a man of great authority and long experience, but in politics (and I find that the prospects of Rhodesia are largely a matter of politics) a keen Imperialist. Well, Sir Gordon, interviewed by *The Daily News*, of August 7th, says: "Everything in Rhodesia depends on the existence of gold in paying quantities. It is too far from the great markets, and the cost of transit is too high to enable it to thrive solely as an agricultural colony. If no gold is found in Chartered territory in a few years there will undoubtedly be a very serious financial situation to be faced."

If gold in paying quantities is found, *i.e.*, in sufficient quantities to attract a large immigration, every foot of soil which can be made to grow anything will be utilized, and whether the extent be small or great the effect will be more or less to mitigate the cost of living while the mining is going on. But the best friends of the country admit that agriculture will never be an attraction in itself. The most they expect is that it will help to maintain a population who have come there after gold. Such testimony as I have quoted is the best evidence to be obtained on this subject. As for statistics the Chartered Company have taken good care that there shall be none available.

Now we come down to the only position which it will serve the Rhodesians to defend—gold. Mr. Rhodes realizes what it has come to. "We stand or fall by our gold," he says, in a recent telegram. And in the *Daily News* interview, which I have quoted already, there is such a list of the plagues and drawbacks to agriculture in Rhodesia as no friend of Mr. Rhodes' would ever have ventured to publish unless he knew that his leader had given up the agricultural standpoint altogether.

My own observations on Rhodesian gold are soon stated. I went

there as a prospector. News of Rhodesia had reached me. I had had many years', off and on, experience in the Western States gold prospecting and in gold camps, and Rhodesia seemed at that moment one of those chances that now and then offer in the mining world to those early in the field. I bought my license, and I toiled very hard for fifteen months to discover something worth pegging. But I never pegged anything. I never could discover in that country anything worth pegging. Yes, there was gold. The British people seem to think there is a lot in that. "Gold has been discovered" in such or such a country is a great cry. But gold has been discovered everywhere. There is no country in the world, I suppose, in which gold has not been at some time or other discovered. Gold has been discovered in Great Britain; and if it were carefully prospected gold would certainly be discovered again. Gold is a very generally distributed metal, and a sprinkling of it is found almost everywhere. But in comparatively very few places is it found in such large streaks as to pay for mining. And, of course, that is especially the case in quartz reef mining, where, the gold having to be extracted from hard rock, batteries and a plant of expensive machinery are necessary.

The Rhodesian gold districts, that is the main belt from Tati by Buluwayo and up to Gwelo, with a patch at Salisbury and another patch at Victoria, have all been worked before. Messrs. Chalmers and Hatch (great authorities in South Africa) estimate that 90 per cent. of the present gold findings are in the site of old workings; and, except in the Victoria district, I have never heard of any at all important discovery of gold being made otherwise than in an old working. These old workings show a formation of gold perfectly familiar to all miners. They are in the form of big pudding bowls; great cavities sunk into the earth, reaching to a depth of from twenty or thirty to a hundred or more feet. There are occasionally traces of gold found at the bottom of these holes, and, in some instances, though that is rare, the shoot reappears at a lower depth, and then again disappears. This is the ordinary "pocket" formation, which owes its name to the pocket-like holes in which the gold is discovered. It is marked by the rapid petering out, or paiding (disappearing), of this gold-bearing quartz, and by the very small length of the quartz along the outcrop. I speak the A B C of mining, and there is not, I will venture to say, an intelligent boy in our Western States who is not familiar with this most deceptive formation, by sight or hearsay. The first thing to be proved in quartz reef mining is that the vein one is working is a *permanent fissure* vein, *i.e.*, that that is *not* pocket, and does not paid out. So much, I suppose, anyone will understand. There is not much sense in putting up

expensive batteries and machinery when you have not got enough gold quartz at command to pay for the expense of it. That the Rhodesian gold formation, such as it is, and it is a wretchedly poor one, is nothing but a pocket formation; and that a permanent reef does not exist, or, at least, has not been discovered, I know from the patient, arduous observation of fifteen months, from the shape and size of the old workings, and from all I heard both from practical working prospectors and from several well-known mining experts and engineers. But not less significant and valuable on this head is the information to be derived from the behaviour of the Chartered Company itself.

Understand this: it is absolutely impossible to prove that permanent reefs do not exist in any place in the world, whether it be Rhodesia or Hampshire, or any other place. But the proof has got to be on the other side. If you want to float a country on a gold basis, you must prove that permanent gold *does* exist. Now what steps have the Chartered Company taken to prove this? They are enormously rich. They can afford to make any experiments, borings, &c., which they may deem advisable. They know that the whole future of the country depends on the permanency of the gold reefs being proved. They have had four or five years to prove what might easily have been proved in as many months. During all that time they have succeeded, what with their railways and celebrities, and self-advertisement generally, in keeping themselves well before the British public, and their markets open. But if you asked them a few practical questions as to work done, reefs sounded, erection of batteries, amount of of crushing, and so on, why these were always matters which they were just going to begin.

But, it will be asked, what, during the last five years, could the Company have done? What steps could they have taken to answer that burning question whether permanent reefs exist or not? I will tell you. There are three things they might have done: (1) They might have sent up well-known mining experts, men of recognized authority in the mining world, to examine and report, and then have published their reports. (2) They might have sent up a battery or two by bullock wagon and set to work crushing vigorously and opening up the reef, and here again made all results public. And, (3) they might have used a diamond drill, which is easily transported and worked, to make borings, and so prove the continuation of this reef at deep levels. These simple and effective means they might have taken, and these means they would have taken, if they had not had good reason to dread the result. This is evident, because up to a certain point these means were actually adopted. As for drills,

which are in constant use on the Rand for finding the depth and position of the reef, I never heard of their being used in Rhodesia, except, curiously enough, for the finding of coal, and that was right up on the Zambesi. Does it not seem odd that drilling should be sunk for coal on the Zambesi, yet not sunk for gold within twenty miles of Buluwayo? The suggestion is: They sunk for coal because they expected to find it, but they did not sink for gold because they did not expect to find it.

Of mining experts, I know that two at least were sent up to report, but where are their reports? There are plenty of men whom no one ever heard of attached to the various Buluwayo syndicates, who are ready to assay your mine up to anything you please, and guarantee its life till the crack of doom. What we want is an opinion of recognized authority. Give us the opinion of Mr. Charles Rolker, or Mr. Hennen Jennings, or Mr. H. C. Perkins, or Mr. A. P. Sawyer. All these gentlemen either are or have been in South Africa. It is not too much to say that the favourable reports of any one of them would go far to put Rhodesia right again with the mining world. Is it then credible that the Company should have had such a chance of establishing its reputation as the presence of these men gave, and never have used it? Perhaps they did employ some of them. Perhaps two, at least, at different times, were tried. Will the Company tell us if this is so? Did they send up two of these experts? Which two, and above all, *where are their reports?* I challenge the Company to answer me these questions.

Then with regard to batteries and crushing. There have been three small batteries sent up and worked in the country. One into the Salisbury district; two into the Victoria district. *None of these are working now.* I have not heard what reason was assigned for the closing of the Salisbury one. Of course the reason that the vein had worked out was not given in either case. One of the Victoria batteries was "burnt." As to the other there is some difference of opinion. Mr. Selous tells us that the reef was not exhausted, but that the ore was not rich enough to pay for mining. But the Chartered Company, in their official report, declare the mine closed down for want of water. I venture to express my own opinion that these batteries had all closed down for a similar reason, the reason which a great many experienced men had foreseen and foretold, namely, because in each case the gold-bearing quartz was exhausted. The batteries, in fact, had eaten up the mines.

"The hungry stamps look up and are not fed." There they will probably remain; and a few years hence the wandering Matabele

will wonder at these monstrous relics and vague traditions, and very likely link them with the magic rites of an alien race.

The Chartered Company, I hear, are going to issue a report shortly; and I should like, touching this question of development, to warn the public against receiving statements thereon too literally. What often happens is this: A shaft is sunk in the site of an old working, or punch bowl as it may be called, some gold is struck at the bottom, and the shaft continued. When the gold ceases, drives (in lateral tunnels) are cut in various directions with the idea of hitting on a continuation of the vein. Sometimes there are in the neighbourhood other small extinct pockets, and to them and under them the drives are often directed. In this way a good deal of underground work is done, and the total amount of driving may figure at many hundreds, perhaps several thousands, of feet. People reading the report, think that these drives represent so much of the reef itself opened up for stoping. Not at all. They are simply *looking for the reef.* When the Company's report comes out let the readers bear this in mind.

And what are to be the tactics of the Company now? Very naturally their success with their engineer's reports and batteries has not encouraged them to press investigation. The *Daily Telegraph's* special correspondent, December 11th, says, that the earliest equipped mine will not start work for, at least, six or eight months. This mine, I think, is in the Geelong group, in which group, I understand, Mr. Selous has a preponderating influence. It is in keeping with what we know of Mr. Selous, that he should be the man who should insist on pressing forward operations. As for the others, the same letter says that it will be "another year-and-a-half before the railway reaches Salisbury, and, at least, as long ere it enters Gwelo. Till these times have elapsed we shall have touched little but the fringe of the vast goldfields of Rhodesia."

Now, if I read that sentence right it is the intention of the Chartered Company to enter on another long course of delay and to account for it by the old excuse that they are "pushing forward" their railway. But let me draw the attention of the readers to this fact. The main "gold belt" of Rhodesia runs from Gwelo 110 miles off, to within twenty or thirty miles of Buluwayo. It is no difficult task therefore to locate and start mills along this belt, seeing that the railway reaches, or is said to reach, (I shall have a word to say about this in a minute) Buluwayo. In days before the Company had proved their gold and found it wanting they sent, as we have seen, two batteries to Victoria. Whichever way those batteries went, and I do not know which it was, nor does it matter, they must have been dragged over more than four

hundred miles of rough road. If the Company will display a little of that energy now we shall not have to wait a year and a-half for reliable evidence as to Rhodesian goldfields. Do not forget, however, that remnants and short streaks of gold do undoubtedly exist, and therefore a mill may *for a short time* crush with fair results.

The mining companies of Rhodesia have, as I learn from the *Pall Mall Gazette* of August 23rd, already absorbed more than twenty-four millions of English capital. This does not include, of course, Chartered Company shares. The twenty-four millions is the amount of money raised by various syndicates on mining claims pegged out in Rhodesia. Had any of the celebrities who were lately up there made an expedition on their own account they might have come upon acres and acres of these claims marked out on desert sand where there was no more chance of finding gold than on the beach at Brighton. The Chartered Company holds no claims and floats no companies itself. What it does is to annex 50 per cent. from the takings of people who do float companies. "Every registered quartz reef claim is to be held by the prospector in joint account in equal shares with the Company." There is not, nor has there ever been, I should say, a mining law like this. Its very existence is full of suspicion, and points clearly to an understood collusion between the Government and private speculation. If the reefs were permanent and genuine the Government would know that its best course was to leave the gold enterprise as free and unfettered as possible and trust to the indirect profits which would in due time accrue from the number of immigrants who would flock in, and the towns and settlements that would spring up. The syndicates, too, if their enterprise would stand examination would not submit to be fleeced in this unheard of way. As it is they have to stand it because the alliance of the Government is a first necessity. Every little hoax is pushed on its own account, but the whole lot are sheltered under the wings of the Company. If I am told that such a vast and corrupt conspiracy is an impossibility I answer that "to make the best of things" is sometimes the most dangerous kind of deception, and that a government interested to the tune of 50 per cent. in gold profits is likely to make the best of the reefs to a rather startling extent.

Now every scrap of evidence that has as yet come to hand goes to show that, in all probability, the twenty-four millions sterling is as utterly lost as if it had been thrown into the sea. Every claim worked shows the gold to be soon exhausted; all the gold findings show exactly the same formation; and not one single reef has been proved to be permanent. Remember, that if a reef is permanent there is no difficulty in proving it to be so. I do assure the reader that any of the millionaires at the head of the Chartered Company

could, at a trifling cost and in a very short time, determine the vital question as to the existence of discovered permanent reefs in Rhodesia finally and conclusively; and nothing has so effectively damned Rhodesia in mining circles as their unwillingness to do so.

This twenty-four millions then I regard as lost. The only chance for shareholders getting a trifling percentage back is to stop all expenditure directly they are satisfied of its uselessness, and collar what capital the vendors have not appropriated. With regard to the Chartered Company the case is rather different, since they share not only in past, but in prospective flotations. The discovery, therefore, of permanent reefs in the future might still avail to save the Company. It is, in fact, this one and only thing that can save them. What hope is there of such reefs being discovered?

Well, I say at once, that hope is small. True, it is impossible to prove that reefs do not exist, and true, also, this finding of even more traces of gold is an encouraging sign. But, on the other hand, these traces amount in no sort of way to proof, and Rhodesia has been by this time very thoroughly prospected. The Rhodesian gold-bearing regions, composed of metamorphic rocks or schists, are conspicuously unlike the rest of the country. The soil is much darker and redder, the scenery much more broken up and hilly, and the soil much more fertile. There is one big belt of this kind and two or three small ones, and they are contrasted, almost like islands in a sea, with the undulating or almost flat and desolate tracts of veldt which surround them.

This, of course, makes the rough prospecting much more easy, and it is certain that every bit of each of these gold belts has by this time been examined thoroughly and repeatedly. I have it on the authority of a man of experience lately returned from Buluwayo that practical prospectors are altogether abandoning the country. I doubt not that this is true, and it is a fatal sign. That there is a possibility even yet of reefs being discovered I do not deny, but I do affirm that that possibility is very remote indeed. Prospectors do not abandon a country that has been boomed as Rhodesia was boomed until they have pretty well smelt it all over. Remember, they have been at it a good four years now. In that time they have found nothing, it seems, that would stand a searching examination. Now they are giving it up. Speculators may deal in "Chartereds" still; syndicates may yet be floated; but out there even the search for gold is suspended, or soon will be.

Let me finish with a few words about the railway. It is the one part of my indictment which has so far admitted of verification. Last August, three months before the railway was opened, I spoke of it as "a narrow gauge track laid on the sand," and running round

instead of through every sand hill that stood in its way. "A flimsy-looking structure . . . not laid down as a permanent way at all." And I concluded, "when it has helped the boom it will have done all it was meant to do."

This boom was timed to come off at the opening of the railway. Every effort was made to push the line through before the rain came. It was a near shave. The opening celebrations were held in November. On the 13th of that month appears a telegram, three-quarters of a column long, in *The Times*, on "The Buluwayo Festivities." The railway had dragged up, at eight miles an hour, the usual Chartered Company paraphernalia, the "celebrities," the Duke, and the two bitterest of Jingo M.P.'s. The celebrations "passed off throughout with great *éclat*," and the "unjust criticism constantly levelled by ignorant and prejudiced persons against the Chartered Company and its work" was duly protested against. Having repeated their lesson, they were all packed off South again as quick as possible. The long telegram ends with these ominous words: "Heavy rain fell as the special train conveying the departing visitors left Buluwayo."

The rain had begun; those tremendous storms which no one who has been in South Africa can forget. Certainly the Chartered Company had drawn it fine. Only two days later, in *The Times* of the 15th, is this telegram: "Heavy rains have caused serious 'washaways' on the railway between the Khama river and Buluwayo." One of the celebrities, the Governor of Natal, who had been allowed to stay a day overtime, was stranded altogether. *The Times* of the 19th has this message: "It is officially announced that in consequence of 'washaways,' the train service on the new Buluwayo line has been suspended until further notice. The Governor of Natal's party started again on Monday, but did not reach Francistown."

To be hauled to a distant terminus to open a railway, and for the railway itself to vanish before you can get back again, must be rather disconcerting. I would like to have heard the Governor's opinion of this railway as he plodded his way south in the rain. I should like to have compared what he had to say then with his remarks at the "festivities." Had the same thing only happened to them all, which it all but did; had all the celebrities and the Duke and the Tory M.P.'s had to be carted south by coach, the humour of the situation would have been complete, and the roar of laughter which would have followed would have staggered the Company more than a dozen reasoned criticisms.

On no point (for at that time this railway question was a vital one) was the Rhodesian party so savage in denial as on this. However, it seems I was not far wrong. Here is a word or two

from a letter dated Buluwayo, Jan. 1st, and published in *The Daily Mail* of Jan. 29th:—"Much of this line has been washed away by the rains. . . . The grandiose festivities over the opening of the railway are now being seen in their true light, as the counting of the chickens before they were hatched. There is comparatively little difference between laying a railway unballasted and unbridged over a flat country, in the dry season, and ruling the proposed line on a map with red ink."

If, when my original statement appeared and every Rhodesian organ, here and in South Africa, was bursting with dissent and invective, you, the reader, had been able to look forward and read these telegrams and letters, you would have allowed that my criticism was warranted. And if, on this important point, I was telling the truth, and the Chartered Company was suggesting the inaccurate, may not the same be the case with regard to other matters which are still undecided?

J. Y. F. Blake.

THE IRISH LAND ACTS AT WORK.

REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSIONERS UPON THE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE AND METHODS OF VALUATION FOLLOWED UNDER THE IRISH LAND ACTS AND LAND PURCHASE ACTS.

As public attention will have been largely drawn to this report in the daily papers, and possibly in Parliament, before this article appears, I shall deal only with the most salient points in the report, and amplify them more fully than has there been done. I wish it, moreover, to be distinctly understood that whenever I express any opinion beyond that contained in the report, I speak for myself alone, as one of the Royal Commissioners, and none of my colleagues are in any way responsible for such opinion. At the same time I can claim to have a very large acquaintance with the working of the Land Acts in Ireland, quite irrespective of any evidence given before the Royal Commission, and if I now make any suggestions involving State policy, beyond that which is advocated in the report, it arises from the fact that such suggestions were precluded from the sphere of Enquiry of the Commission, owing to the stringency of the terms of reference, which were as follows:—

"To enquire into, and report upon, the procedure and practice and the methods of valuation followed by the Land Commission and the Civil Bill Courts in Ireland under the Land Law Acts,

(*a*) In fixing fair rents.

(*b*) In ascertaining the true value to be paid for a tenant's interest in a holding by a landlord exercising the right of pre-emption.

"Also to enquire into, and report upon, the procedure and practice and the methods of valuation followed by the Land Commission and the Land Judge's Court repectively in carrying out the provisions of the Land Purchase Acts."

The very first result of our Enquiry was the discovery of a fundamental defect in the procedure and practice of the Land Commission, viz., that the Assistant Commissioners, upon whom the working out of the Land Acts, in respect to "fair rent" and "true value," has almost entirely devolved, have been left from the beginning without any guidance as to their action on the most difficult questions of either law or valuation, and, as might have

been expected, the result has been a remarkable diversity in their practice. This has arisen chiefly from the neglect of one of the most important of the provisions of the Act of 1881:

"By the 43rd Section of the Act of 1881, the Land Commission was authorized to form Sub-Commissions, to consist of such number of the Assistant Commissioners, *or of a Commissioner and one or more Assistant Commissioners,* as the Land Commission might think fit, and to delegate to any Sub-Commission such of its powers except as to appeals as they might think expedient."

Had the Chief Commissioners taken charge of the duties of the Sub-Commissions at the start, and laid down general rules and principles for the guidance of all Sub-Commissions, they would long ere this have had a highly-trained staff with uniformity of practice, such as was secured by Sir Richard Griffith in an analogous case in 1853, when he undertook the survey and valuation of Ireland. Instead of this, they have allowed the Sub-Commissioners, selected alternately by successive Governments of the day, with the best intentions no doubt, but without the application of any tests of competency, to work at haphazard, the only check being a costly appeal to themselves, so that the machinery which should have been one for valuation, has turned out to be one for the manufacture of law-suits. The words of the report on this subject are the following:—

"It is a subject of regret that in the early days of the system the Land Commissioners were unable to take a part in the tribunals of first instance; and that the whole original business was left to Sub-Commissions."

The next defect pointed out in the report is, that the Court Valuers employed to value for the Chief Commissioners in cases of rehearing, or appeals as they are commonly called, fail to fulfil the requirements prescribed by the Act of 1881. They are not "independent valuers." In the early days of the Land Commission some attempt was made to secure this qualification, but of later years, and at present, the Court Valuers and Assistant Commissioners are interchangeable, acting in one capacity to-day and in the other to-morrow, and therefore the Court Valuers can in no sense be described as "independent." This is a most serious defect, because the Chief Commissioners have no other guide on questions of value than the opinions of these Court Valuers. It is expecting too much from human nature to suppose that they could give independent valuations as against colleagues, with whom they have acted already as Assistant Commissioners, with whom they may act again to-morrow, and by whom in turn their valuations may have to be revised. The following are the words of the report upon this part of the subject:—

"The investigation of the Court Valuer, as hitherto carried on, cannot be considered an independent one. He generally considered himself bound by the decision of the Sub-Commission as to what improvements were to be allowed for; he ad-

mittedly accepted much on the strength of the pink schedule under appeal ; and he was left at liberty to determine for himself what is a substantial difference from the previous findings.

"A striking illustration of the danger of this course of practice has recently occurred. In thirty-one cases on one estate the amounts allowed for drainage in the pink schedules were considerably in excess of the amounts proved by the tenants at the hearing before the Sub-Commission : the cases were reheard, and in every case the reports of the Court Valuers agreed, as to the amount of drains, with the findings of the Sub-Commission : and yet it was shown to the Land Commission that in every one of the cases the figure was wrong ; for the evidence had been given in terms of the Irish perch, and the pink schedules and the reports were drawn in terms of the English perch : and in every case the change from Irish into English measure had been made on the ratio *not of lineal but of square measure*. Such slavish copying of a blunder is very cogent evidence of the want of independence in the operations of the Court Valuers."

It involves, I hope, no reflection upon the personal characters of these Assistant Commissioners and Court Valuers to point out that the mode of their selection, as quasi-political appointments without tests of competency, and the classes from which they are generally chosen are not such as to command public confidence. How can a tenant farmer, whose own interests suggest a large reduction of rent, be an impartial judge to deal with a landlord's rental? A jury of butchers might as fairly be selected to fix the prices at which farmers should sell their cattle. There appear to me to be but three classes of persons in the community from whom a proper selection could be made. I am not now speaking of legal, but of lay Sub-Commissioners. (1) Land agents, who do not happen to be either landlords or tenants themselves, but who farm lands of their own. (2) Farmers, who farm lands held by long leases or in perpetuity, at rents so low as to be practically unassailable. (3) Inspectors under the Board of Works, with the training of Civil Engineers, upon whose skilled reports Government loans are advanced to either landlords or tenants for land improvements (buildings, drainage, &c.). I have no doubt, moreover, that occasionally suitable persons might be found in the Government Valuation Office, originally under the control of Sir Richard Griffith, recently under Sir John Ball Greene, and now under Mr. J. G. Barton. If it should be found impossible to provide a sufficient staff from these several sources to meet all the requirements of the Land Courts, the Court Valuers at least should be selected from them.

The report deals with this defect of procedure and practice as follows:—

"Our opinion on the defects of the present system will perhaps be best made known by a statement of the alterations which we venture to suggest. In our opinion:

"I. All Assistant Commissioners and Court Valuers should be permanent officials, paid on a sufficiently liberal scale to secure men of capacity and responsibility, who should be required to devote the whole of their time to the work of the Land Commission, and they should be entitled to a pension or allowance in the event of their

services not being required either permanently or temporarily by reason of the diminution of work.

"II. They should be appointed from a list to be approved by the Judicial Commissioner, with the concurrence of at least two other Commissioners.

"III. The Lay Assistant Commissioners and Court Valuers should satisfy certain qualifications besides that of possessing a practical acquaintance with the value of land in Ireland, such as having passed a suitable examination in the subjects with which they will be called upon to deal.

"IV. They should be placed under a single head, who should have power to issue directions and instructions, who should have the general supervision of their work, and who should be charged with the duty of communicating to the Assistant Commissioners all relevant decisions of the Land Commission, or the other Courts.

"V. The districts of the Assistant Commissioners should from time to time be settled by orders of the Judicial Commissioner, and at least two of the other Commissioners, which should be published in the *Dublin Gazette*.

"VI. A power should be given to Sub-Commissions to state cases for the Land Commission on questions arising before the Sub-Commissions, either on the application of a litigant, or of their own proper motion; and a power should also be given to the Land Commission to require Sub-Commissions to state such cases if an applicant showed that the statement of such a case was proper, and that it had been refused by the Sub-Commission. The cases thus stated should be dealt with in a manner somewhat similar to Crown cases reserved—*i.e.*, an opportunity of argument should be given to the parties interested, and in default of their appearance, the matter should be discussed by the Commission in public.

"VII. A power should be given to the Land Commission to make enquiries from the Assistant Commissioners in respect of any matter which has come before them as to the facts proved before them, the processes by which their conclusions were reached, and the principles by which they were guided, and generally in respect of any point arising in the performance of their duties."

I have only to add to these recommendations the further remarks, that to secure a high-class of independent valuers it will not be sufficient merely to raise the salaries of incompetent or unsuitable men, and that the employment of temporary Sub-Commissioners to meet the strain upon the Courts at the commencement of the second judicial term cannot be too strongly condemned. Their revaluation involves the transfer of one person's property to another, without compensation, and it is altogether unjust and unreasonable to entrust such powers to any man, who is either only paid by the job or engaged for a short period to hurry through a crush of work.

The report goes on to show the advantages of the alterations suggested:—

"Hitherto the delegation of duties by the Land Commission to the Sub-Commissions has been unconditional, and has been considered as placing the Sub-Commissions in a position of equal independence with the Land Commission itself; if the changes which we have suggested were adopted, the Sub-Commissions would, in our opinion, be placed in a much more independent position towards the public, but in a more dependent position towards the Head Commission, from whom they would derive guidance and assistance. By the plan we have suggested an opportunity would be given for training and instructing a properly qualified staff (as was done by Sir Richard Griffith when making his valuation of Ireland), and for checking that diversity of practice which after the sixteen years working of the Act of

1881 is still found to exist, and which necessarily creates a sense of uncertainty and distrust in the administration of the law."

One of the main objects aimed at in the report is to simplify the procedure, and relieve the congestion of the Courts, and especially to get rid of the ruinous costs of the present system, by discouraging the employment of attorneys and valuers by the litigants. We have therefore suggested an alternative procedure, which, in our opinion, will secure those important objects. The recommendation is as follows :—

A Suggested Alternative Procedure.

"Before parting with the subject of fair rent, we desire to state our opinion that in the great majority of cases the question is not one of law, but solely of valuation : and that the proportion of legal questions is likely to go on diminishing, as each successive time of fixing fair rents comes round. This consideration seems to show that the legal element at present occupies too large a space in the machinery, and that as years go on, it will do so more and more : it indicates the desirability of enacting a method of settling the fair rent without the necessity of a hearing in Court.

"More fully to express our opinion on this point, we venture to submit that the following outline of a plan should be carefully considered.

"Let the proceedings begin, as at present, by an originating notice. Let two lay Assistant Commissioners be then sent to inspect the holding, with power to listen to statements not on oath, and also to consult their legal coadjutor, and with a further power, when so requested by both sides, to take part and assist in the friendly settlement of the fair rent between landlord and tenant. In the event of a difference of opinion between the two Assistant Commissioners, or in the event of a demand to that effect being made by either party, let a Court Valuer inspect the land, and let the Assistant Commissioners or the Court Valuer, as the case may be, then prepare a pink schedule and supply a copy to each of the parties. Let each party have the liberty within a fixed period after the receipt of the pink schedule to require a hearing in Court ; and in that case let the matter proceed as at present, except that no fresh inspection be made, unless by direction of the legal Assistant Commissioner for special reason shown, and subject to an express power in the Court to visit with costs the party demanding a hearing, unless the legal Assistant Commissioner holds that there was some real and important question which rendered the hearing in Court reasonably necessary.

"If no requisition for a hearing be served, let the pink schedule prepared by the two Assistant Commissioners or by the Court Valuer, as the case may be, act as a conditional order, which shall become absolute, unless within a limited time cause be shown against it by either party on any ground on which an award can be set aside.

"If cause be shown the matter should be sent for hearing to the Sub-Commission, with the usual right of demanding a rehearing, and all its incidents.

"By some such plan as this, we believe that a great part of the cases of fair rent would be disposed of at less cost than at present."

The principle of this suggested alternative to the present system is this, that the landlord and tenant should have a right to apply to the great State Rent-fixing Department, and to say, "Fix the rent on this holding by an impartial tribunal, consisting of the highest class of skilled valuers which the State can provide, without any cost to us or without requiring us to produce witnesses as to value of any kind."

It is a very remarkable fact that the important words "Fair Rent" have not been heretofore defined. The Act of Parliament gives no definition of them, nor has any judicial exposition been given of their meaning. In our report we have undertaken this difficult task, and the following is our definition of the words:—

"In our view, assuming the law to be, as at present decided, that occupation interest is not to be taken into account in fixing the fair rent of the holding, the annual sum referred to in paragraph (*a*) of Section 1 of the Act of 1896 (which we may call the gross fair rent) is the annual sum at which, after all the circumstances of the case, holding, and district have been taken into consideration, the holding in the landlord's hands might reasonably be expected to let from year to year to a solvent and prudent tenant, who desired to derive a benefit from the occupation of the tenement, and not from its sale: and the fair rent of holding in paragraph (*g*) of the same section (or the net fair rent) is the gross fair rent less a reasonable annual allowance in respect of the sum which would represent the present value of the improvements, for which, according to the Acts, a deduction is to be made from the rent."

The report points out that there are two independent lines of evidence, which may be pursued in the estimation of "Fair Rent," the "popular" and the "technical."

"The popular evidence would comprise the prices obtained by the tenant for a sale of his interest, or *bona fide* offers which he had received for it, evidence of the letting value or judicial rents of similar holdings, evidence of the sums paid for conacre or agistment, evidence of the long and punctual payment of a real rent, or of the long arrears of a nominal rent, and evidence of the prosperity or poverty of the persons who had successively lived off the produce of the holding.

"The technical evidence would be that more familiar to professional valuators. They would inspect the land, ascertain the acreages of the several classes of land on the farm, and what they would produce or carry; they would consider the quantity and value of the produce and the cost of production, and the shares of the surplus remaining after the cost of production divisible between landlord and tenant respectively.

"The popular evidence would be affected by all the motives which make men in Ireland desirous to occupy land; the technical evidence would assume the desire of making a money profit out of the occupation of land as the sole motive of such occupation."

The 8th Section of the Act of 1881 admits of the adoption of both lines of evidence. It provided that in fixing fair rent consideration should be given, not to some, but to all the circumstances of the case, holding and district, but one of the Chief Commissioners Mr. Wrench, in his evidence, stated that the Act of 1896 has made a great change in the fixing of fair rents by laying an emphasis on the technical evidence, and throwing the popular evidence into the background. The words of the report on this point are very explicit:—

"We conclude that in the fixing of fair rent it was the intention of the Legislature to include the consideration of all reasonable motives besides the desire to make a money profit by the working of the holding.

"The Act of 1896 does not appear to us to have been intended by the Legislature to alter the meaning of the words "Fair Rent." The First Section is, no doub

mainly concerned with matters which pertain to the technical line of evidence; and this, as we conceive, because the Legislature thought fit to so tie the Courts down to a definite and detailed statement of the particulars required as to the holding, as that each step in the process might stand on record for future use, and be, if necessary, the subject of review. But the Court is directed to ascertain and record 'such other matters in relation to the holding as may have been taken into account in fixing the fair rent thereof, or as may be prescribed,' and under these words we conceive that it is the duty of the Court to consider, as directed by the Act of 1881, 'all the circumstances of the case, holding, and district.'"

This distinction between the "popular" and "technical" lines of evidence has an important bearing on the second branch of Enquiry referred to the Royal Commission, viz., that relating to "True Value." When the Act of 1881 gave the tenant the right to "sell his holding for the best price he could get," it was subject to an important proviso or limitation, viz., that the landlord could exercise his right of pre-emption, and could claim to buy the holding at its "True Value." The report points out, under this head, one of the most serious defects in the procedure and practice of the Land Commission, viz., that the modes in which the Act has been administered in cases of "Fair Rent" and "True Value" are quite inconsistent with each other. One would have expected like principles to have been adopted in the two cases, either the "popular" line or the "technical" line above referred to. If either principle had been adopted throughout, a landlord who had been hit on "Fair Rent" would have gained on "True Value," and *vice versâ*, but by the adoption of the "technical" line in fixing "Fair Rent," and the "popular" line in fixing "True Value," the landlords have been "smitten on both cheeks," and though it is in accordance with Christian principles to endure this with resignation, still it must be admitted that the experience is not pleasant when the pecuniary results are so serious. It has been shown that in estimating the landlord's interest, as measured by "Fair Rent," the circumstances of the case, holding, and district have been entirely excluded in the practice of the Land Courts, contrary to the express provision of the Act of 1881, but it was proved before the Royal Commission, that in estimating the value of the tenant's interest, as measured by "True Value," all sorts of evidence as to the circumstances of the district have been accepted, from auctioneers and similar witnesses, from farmers interested in the results, and even from conversations. This gives rise to great disparity in the assessment of "Fair Rent," and of "True Value." The following case given in the report illustrates this disparity:—

"A holding of 71 acres in the County Cork had been held at a rent of £77. In 1890 this holding came before a Sub-Commission who found, in the form of pink schedule then in use, that there were no improvements allowed to tenant or to landlord, and that the buildings, which were the landlord's, consisted of

an old thatched house of no value, and they assessed the fair rent at £47 10s. The landlord and tenant both appealed, and the Court Valuer agreed with the Sub-Commission, except that he reported that the old thatched house was of the value of 10s. a year, and on the rehearing in July, 1892, the rent was reduced to £40.

"In January, 1895, on the tenant having given notice to sell his interest, the landlord required the true value to be ascertained, and the Sub-Commission fixed the true value at £480; again both parties appealed, and two Court Valuers inspected the property; they reported that the buildings were assumed to be the tenant's, and that they consisted of the following items: (i.) a thatched cottage dwelling-house, somewhat out of repair; (ii.) an old slated cow-house in bad repair; (iii.) a more modern one in fair order; and (iv.) a small detached thatched cottage, sub-let. They further found that the judicial rent appeared very moderate, and that, taking all the circumstances into consideration, they were of opinion that the true value should be fixed at £480. The landlord carried the matter no further, but consented to pay the sum.

"We have heard one of these two Court Valuers, and find that the sum really arrived at by him was £460, but that he rejected, as of no importance, the £20 difference, and reported in favour of the identical sum under rehearing; and further, that no buildings had been erected within a few years before his inspection.

"We find a curious discrepancy in these proceedings: as against the rent the one building only is taken into account, and this is said to be the landlord's; as against the purchase money five buildings are enumerated, and they are said to be the tenant's. When fixing the rent, £40 is held to be enough; when assessing the true value, the moderation of this sum appears as an ingredient to swell the price to £480. This case well illustrates the intimate relation which exists between fair rent and true value, and shows how an error in fixing the former tends to produce another error in the same direction in the latter; and thus to do a double wrong. If, for a moment, we suppose that the £40 was an inadequate rent the landlord suffered first, in that he received too little rent during the tenancy; and, secondly, in that he had to pay too much on his purchase; in like manner, if a fair rent be fixed too high, and the tenant has to sell to his landlord, he will pay too much during the tenancy and receive too little at its end.

"In a second case of true value, a sum of 20 per cent. was charged against the landlord for proximity by the Sub-Commission, and a sum of 25 per cent. by the Land Commission, on rehearing, whereas, in the fixing of fair rent on several holdings on the same estate, and somewhat nearer to Belfast, no sum was allowed for proximity to that city. These properties were visited by the expert members of our Commission, and they could discover no reason for the different treatment of these adjoining farms. Such explanations as could be offered in respect of this case by two of the Assistant Lay Commissioners concerned were heard by us, but without satisfying us of the justice of the proceeding."

One of the most important matters in relation to the fixing of "Fair Rents," is that now well known under the designation of "Occupation Interest." Its discussion takes up five pages of the report. It may be simply defined to be "A right on the part of a sitting tenant to have the fair rent fixed at a smaller sum than that at which it would be rightly fixed in the case of an incoming tenant." On this the report remarks:—

"It has been asserted on the part of the landlords that such a right has no existence in law, but that it has been treated as existing in fact in the fixing of

fair rent, and that the rents have been thereby unduly lowered: on the contary, it has been asserted on the part of the tenants that such a right does exist in law, but that it has not been treated as existing in fact in the fixing of fair rents, and that the rents have been in consequence insufficiently reduced.

"The case of Markey *v.* Earl of Gosford, decided by the Land Commission, determined that in point of law there is no such thing as the alleged occupation right."

After a lengthened investigation of the arguments and evidence *pro* and *con.*, the report states the following conclusion to have been arrived at:—

"The facts that tenant-right generally continues to fetch high prices, that no land is derelict, that farmers generally prosper, that the bank deposits of 1896 are higher than ever, and the increase of the volume of farming stock in Ireland, forbid the notion of a wide-spread injustice towards the tenants in the fixing of fair rents.

"On the other hand, cases have been produced before us in which it is difficult to reconcile the very high prices paid for tenant-right where the tenant had no improvements, with the notion that the fair rent was adequate: these cases are sufficient to make it plain that individual cases of miscarriage have occurred, and to confirm us in the opinion that in some instances an occupation interest has been allowed for. For the reasons already given, we find it impossible to form any certain judgment as to the extent to which this allowance has been made; but *so far forth as it has ultimately acted in lowering the amount fixed for fair rent, it has obviously worked an injustice towards the landords.*"

The importance of these last words renders it a matter of crucial necessity to determine whether or not, as a matter of fact, a deduction has been made for "occupation interest" in the estimation of what has been described above as "gross fair rent," *i.e.*, before any deduction is made on account of improvements made by the tenant.

From the evidence that was laid before us, we must, in my opinion, draw an inference either one way or the other, that a deduction from the rent in respect of occupation interest has been universally allowed or that it has not been allowed at all—no half-way explanation can suffice; because it was shown to us that in estimating the net fair rent, those who allowed for occupation interest, and those who professed not to do so arrived at the same result; and, what is still more extraordinary is, that in the full Court of the Chief Commission, in the case of Markey *v.* Earl of Gosford, already referred to, while Mr. Justice Bewley held that occupation interest should be allowed for, and his three colleagues in the strongest terms asserted the opposite view, they all agreed in confirming the rents fixed in the Court below.

It becomes necessary, therefore, that I should examine more closely the evidence upon this point. In the report these words occur:—

"The practice of making the allowance is not new, for we find that Mr. William Henry Gray, a highly respected valuer, appointed in January, 1882,

allowed about 15 per cent. for it as a deduction; and Mr. Barnes, a valuer of high reputation and large experience from the year 1882 to the present day, spoke before us with great emphasis of the prevalence throughout his experience of the practice of fixing the fair rent at a lower figure than a prudent incoming tenant would be ready to give.

"One valuator said that if the tenant had not the occupation interest he would value the rent at 10 per cent. more. Another witness (an Assistant Commissioner) assessed it at 6d., 1s., or 1s. 6d. per acre, according to the length of time during which the tenant or his family has been in occupation."

Colonel Bayly, an Assistant Commissioner, confirming his evidence given before Mr. Morley's Committee, stated that he did not think the Act of 1881 could have had any other meaning than to make this difference. Other Assistant-Commissioners gave the same evidence. No doubt conflicting evidence was supplied by Messrs. Macafee and Roberts, but they made a lame attempt to explain away their evidence to the contrary effect before Mr. Morley's Committee, by attributing to their words a meaning exactly opposite to that which they usually bear.

The evidence of one witness, in particular, seems to me to show that even where they think that they make no such allowance in estimating fair rent, the Assistant Commissioners imperceptibly and almost unconsciously do so. In the words of the report, "In some minds the habit is inveterate."

Mr. O'Callaghan, Assistant Commissioner, who denied that he ever allowed a deduction for occupation interest, admitted that if a landlord were letting the land to an incoming tenant, he would be entitled to get from him, in addition to the gross fair rent, a sum of money in hand, called an in-put, equal to what he—the landlord—may have paid for the tenant right of the farm, or to what the new tenant would have paid to an out-going tenant, had he taken the farm direct from him instead of from the landlord. Mr. O'Callaghan had further to admit when pressed, that the landlord might expect an increase in the rent equivalent to the interest of that in-put, if he preferred it to the capital sum. What does that mean, but this? that he (Mr. O'Callaghan) had been in the habit of deducting the supposed interest of that in-put, before putting down a figure to represent the "gross fair rent." In other words, that he had always made a deduction in respect of occupation interest, though he did not seem to think that he had. And so I expect it would be found on a close examination of all the Assistant-Commissioners and Court Valuers, who thought they had not allowed for this Occupation Interest, that imperceptibly this process of "unconscious cerebration" had been going on, and that they had all really allowed for it. This fully explains the fact that they all arrived at the same results in estimating fair rent, whether they professed to make

the deduction or not, and it also explains the extraordinary action of the Chief Commissioners, who overruled Mr. Justice Bewley on the legal issue, but agreed with him not to disturb the rents fixed in the Courts below. Obviously they all went by the Court Valuers' reports, not having any other basis to work on, the majority probably assuming that they did not allow for occupation interest, and Mr. Justice Bewley, equally probably, assuming that they did. If further evidence on this point be required, it is furnished by the remarkable memorandum laid before the Royal Commission by Mr. Justice Bewley, which will be found in the Appendix, and which, to my mind, is conclusive as to the matter of fact now in question, though absolutely inconclusive as an argument in favour of the deduction for occupation interest. This memorandum shows clearly that in so far as his decisions, in confirming Sub-Commission rents, are concerned, Mr. Justice Bewley has always allowed for it, and that the Sub-Commissioners have also allowed for it, and that the exact spot where the allowance has been made is, *beforehand in the estimation of gross fair rent.*

His argument in favour of a deduction for Occupation Interest is as follows. Starting with the case of a tenancy in the Province of Ulster, he says:—

"The landlord of a tenant-right estate having got, either by purchase, surrender, or otherwise, a holding into his hands, with improvements on it of the value of £800, let it to C.D. prior to the passing of the Land Act of 1881, on the terms of his paying an in-put of £1,000, and an annual rent then agreed on between the parties. The landlord had power to confer upon the tenant the important and valuable rights of having the improvements treated as if made by the tenant or his predecessors in title, and of having the holding dealt with as one subject to the Ulster Tenant-right Custom; and for the purposes of this illustration it is to be assumed that the sum of £1,000 was a fair and reasonable price to pay for these rights. C.D. having taken proceedings to have a fair rent fixed after the passing of the Land Act of 1881, it is manifest that the payment of £1,000, which was given for the tenant-right, including the improvements, and which *ex hypothesi* represents the fair value, should be taken into consideration in the ascertainment of the fair rent, and a reasonable percentage of interest allowed to the tenant on the capital so expended. The payment is one of "the circumstances of the case" within the meaning of section 8 of the Land Act of 1881, that the Court is entitled to take into account in fixing the fair rent. (See Lanyon *v.* Clinton, [1895], 2 Ir. R. 150). Assume that after making this allowance the fair rent is £50 per annum."

The judge is not very fortunate in the figures he selects for the illustration, because the improvements on a farm of which the rent is £50 would be much more usually represented by £300 or £400, than by £800, and he assumes that £1,000, *i.e.*, twenty years rent, is not an extravagant or fancy price for the tenant's interest in such a holding. However, for the purpose of illustration only, the figures may be accepted. The fallacious premiss upon which the

judge's argument is based is this, that if a landlord purchased the tenant-right and improvements of a farm, or if it had lapsed into his hands on the expiry of a lease, or by failure of heirs to the tenant, or in any other manner, and if he proceeded then, or at any future time, to relet it to a new tenant, "the holding would thereafter be dealt with as one subject to the Ulster custom." Such would be a very exceptional case. The general experience in Ulster is exactly contrary. The special object of a landlord in buying up the interest of a tenant in a holding is to put an end to any custom surviving on that holding, and to become perfectly free to deal with it as his absolute property, free of all such claims. That was guaranteed to him by the Act of 1860, which was based on free contract. Supposing the claim of the old tenant to have been based on historic considerations (as contended for by his advocates), what claim could a new tenant have to a custom which was bought up by the landlord for the very purpose of putting an end to it? It became for him a perfectly new contract, and any money paid by him, as "in-put," to the landlord could only, in the absence of any other special agreement, be considered as a fine for reducing the full rent to a smaller one for which the landlord would have greater security for the future. It is an extraordinary assumption that because "the landlord had power to confer upon the tenant" the rights mentioned by the judge, he was such a fool as to exercise that power to his own detriment, to sacrifice his right of free contract, and to confer benefits on the tenant which were not included in the new bargain, nor were anywhere committed to writing. It can scarcely be seriously maintained as the basis of an argument for cutting down rents now, that the landlord knowingly created the whip wherewith he was to be scourged. Would it not be more reasonable to assume that the landlord by his acts intended to do what was for his own benefit and not for his certain future hurt? The judge next proceeds to extend his argument as follows:—

"Take now the case where the same holding is not in the hands of the landlord, but in the occupation of a tenant, A.B.; that improvements of the value of £800 have been made by A.B. or his predecessors in title; and that A.B. sells the holding to C.D. for the sum of £1,000. If C.D. then proceeds to have a fair rent fixed at the same time, and while the holding was in the same state as in the last case the fair rent ought apparently to be fixed at £50 per annum, C.D. being allowed the same percentage on the capital sum expended as in the former case."

Curiously enough he supplies the answer to this argument in the next paragraph:—

"Under Sub-Section 10 of Section 8 of the Land Act of 1881 "the amount of money or money's worth that may have been paid or given for the tenancy of any

holding by a tenant or his predecessors in title otherwise than to the landlord or his predecessors in title, shall not of itself, *apart from other considerations*, be deemed a ground for reducing or increasing the rent of such holding.'"

And yet he does make it "*of itself*" a ground for reducing the rent, inasmuch as he mentions *no other considerations* whatever.

It is worth while to compare this whole argument with Mr. Morley's statement, when introducing his Land Bill of 1895, on the same subject. He was referring to a correspondence in *The Times* between himself and the late Marquis of Waterford, in reference to a sub-clause recognizing occupation interest. He said:—

"He (Lord Waterford) seems to assume that we mean that the interest on the tenant-right, the sum paid for the tenant-right, is to be deducted from the fair rent from time to time, and he really assumes that we are the authors of so preposterous a proposition as this:—My rent is £100. I have a mind to go. I sell my interest for £1,000. The man to whom I have sold my tenant's interest goes into Court, and has a fair rent fixed, and it seems to be supposed that by this clause we direct the Court to deduct, say, 3 per cent. on the £1,000—for the tenant's right, and deduct that from the rent. (Having shown that this must result in successive reductions until the rent was wiped out, Mr. Morley proceeded:—) Well, we may be abandoned politicians, but we should not have been so idiotic as to make proposals of that kind."

And yet this proposition is identical with that put forward by Mr. Justice Bewley. Even if we so far restrict the case taken for illustration by the judge, as only to consider £200 out of the £1,000 to represent the Occupation Interest, it is obvious what a strange consequence would ensue if his argument were sound. For if the interest of £200, say £10, were deducted from the rent of £100, reducing it to £90, the £1,000 would become worth £1,200 if the new tenant were to sell his interest. The occupation interest of the next tenant would then be worth £400, which would entitle him, on the same principle, to have his rent reduced from £90 to £80, and so on for successive sales, until the ascending value of the occupation interest had entirely absorbed the rent, and the transference of the property from the landlord to the tenant had become complete. The high prices which continue to be given for tenant-right in spite of the depression of the times, as shown by overwhelming evidence at our Enquiry, and the important statements made by Mr. Justice Bewley, not only in the document to which I have referred, but in his evidence before Mr. Morley's Committee, as to what he considered to have been the practice of the Land Commission over which he presided, seem to me to prove conclusively that this process of gradual absorption of the rent is going on, and that the reductions of rent in second-term cases, out of all proportion greater as they are than those of fifteen years ago, are being carried out universally upon this principle of allowance for

occupation interest. If this be so, it must, in the words of the report, be "working an injustice to the landlords."

There is a popular idea current that agricultural depression in Ireland is similar to and as great as in England. A few simple considerations will show that this is not the case. The crops grown in the two countries are essentially different, and the climates are most unlike. The soil in the wheat growing districts of England is totally different from what used to be wheat growing land in Ireland. When wheat has to be abandoned in England, oats do not take its place, as has long been the case in Ireland. Ireland never was a wheat growing country in the same sense as England. Oats has always been her main cereal. The following is an extract from the evidence of Mr. Barnes, the skilled valuator before referred to, given before the Royal Commission:—

"Here is given a comparison of the average areas of the several crops in England and Ireland for the five years 1871-1875 together with the percentage of each. I have selected these years as the average price of wheat then was (war times excepted) at about summit level, viz., 54s. 8d. per quarter, and during the five years previous to 1871 wheat was at nearly the same price. Consequently, the wheat producing powers of Ireland should be then demonstrated to its full extent. But what do we find? that whereas England during these years had 3,284,445 acres under wheat, being nearly 14 per cent. of the available land, Ireland had only 196,854, being $1\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. of available land. The following is the return of average area under wheat for four English counties in 1874 and 1875:—

	Acres.
Lincolnshire	303,075
Yorkshire	293,538
Norfolk	205,552
Essex	193,048
	995,213

being over five times the area under wheat in Ireland at the same time, while the County of Essex alone, which has the least area of the four, with a total of 820,884 acres, has an amount under wheat equal to that of all Ireland.

"On the other hand, we find that the area under oats in Ireland actually exceeds that in England, being nearly 10 per cent. of available land in the former, as against 6 per cent. in the latter country, and oats is the cereal which has fallen least in value in Ireland.

"The area under potatoes in England only amounts to 335,016 acres, as against 949,316 acres in Ireland, representing 1·4 per cent. of available land in the former, as against 6 per cent. in the latter.

"Permanent pasture, which only occupies 42·74 per cent. of avilable land in England, occupies 65·62 per cent. in Ireland, or over 50 per cent. more. It is, therefore, evident that any conclusions drawn from the assumption that agricultural conditions in both countries are similar must be eminently fallacious."

It is impossible, in the limited space allowed to this article, to go more fully into the report, or to touch upon the state of costly confusion into which Land Purchase has fallen, or the remedies

which we have proposed for that state of affairs. I shall, therefore, now conclude by quoting the final paragraph of the report. It is as follows:—

"We have, during the course of our investigations, been deeply impressed by the weight of that burthen which is laid upon the country by the existence of the great staff of officials employed under the Land Acts, and of the great body of solicitors and valuators who gather around them: and not less by the evil wrought by that unrest which is generated by the periodical settlement of rents. To pursue these subjects would be to go beyond the limits placed on our Enquiry. But we venture to submit that if by an automatic adjustment of rents, or by their conversion into rents charge, or by other means which the wisdom of the Legislature may devise, this unrest could be stayed, and this burthen of a perpetually recurring litigation cast off, a great boon would be bestowed on your Majesty's subjects in Ireland."

A. TRAILL.

[NOTE.—The 40th Section of the Land Act of 1896 empowers the Judge of the Landed Estates Court to invite tenants to purchase their holdings on certain classes of encumbered estates, under the Land Purchase Acts, at a price fixed by him after obtaining a report from the Land Commissioners and hearing all the parties interested. The Court of Appeal in Owen's case decided that the clause was mandatory on the Land Judge in all cases to which the section applies. Since the above article was written the Court of Appeal has further decided, by a majority of 4 to 3, that though the Land Judge is to fix the price the Land Commission need not advance more Land Stock than they think proper. The cases when the tenant is both able and willing to pay part of the price in cash are very rare. The Land Judge has described the result as follows:—"The Court will be obliged to put the estate to the heavy expense of hearings on the request and report; the Land Commission must go on at great public expense inspecting and reporting, everybody knowing well that nothing is to come of it all. The great mill must be kept working at immense expense to the landlords, the tenants and the public without producing anything of value. This is a state of things that is simply intolerable."

The dissentient judges in the Court of Appeal (the Master of the Rolls and Lords Justices Fitzgibbon and Holmes) confirm this view.

Lord Justice Fitzgibbon says: "The Judge . . . must go through the business with the gravest face he can, at incalculable loss of time and money, disastrous to the parties, and all this must be done by a judicial Sisyphus who knows that when, with infinite difficulty, he has rolled his burden to the summit of the eminence occupied by the Land Commission, he is powerless to keep it there one moment, if it fails to receive the autocratic sanction of the Purchase Commissioners." Lord Justice Holmes delivered a long judgment in the same sense, and added, "Surely a British Judge has never, in the history of law, been placed in such a humiliating position." We observe that the Fry Commission is unanimously of opinion that the practice of the Purchase Commissioners is over strict in the matter of security. (*Report, p.* 36).

In recommending this 40th Section to the House of Commons, however, Mr. Gerald Balfour stated that the price at which the estate would be sold "would be the price which the Land Judge, having before him the Report of the Land Commission *and all the circumstances of the case*, should fix. (*Hansard, v.* 43, *p.* 413). Ought not the 40th Section of the Land Act of 1896 to be at once repealed and a more rational method of promoting sales of encumbered estates, on terms fair to all parties, invented?—EDITOR *N.R.*]

A COLONIAL CHRONICLE.

We give precedence in these pages to India because we believe there is no greater issue before the Empire than the present condition of its great dependency.

A "Fizzle."

The long threatened debate upon the Indian Frontier War, upon which the Opposition has been concentrating itself for months past, and from which portentous consequences were to ensue, occupied and excited the House of Commons for two nights during the debate on the Address. But it neither occupied nor excited anyone outside that Assembly. The benches were crowded, but the galleries were empty, and in our opinion the public took a truer perspective of the occasion than their representatives, for this full dress debate was necessarily an elaborate "fizzle." However, the "great wise and eminent" who by virtue of sitting on Front Benches conceive themselves to be statesmen, keenly enjoyed themselves. They pounded their boxes, they hammered and humiliated one another and revelled in that costive recrimination which is the life blood of Parliamentary existence. They threw very little light upon the subject they were discussing and they did not carry their weary Party controversy any further, but they demonstrated the unspeakable absurdity of deciding the frontier policy of the British Empire in India by rhetorical displays at Westminster. Indeed, the claim of mere barristers like Mr. Lawson Walton—the mover of the vote of censure on the Government—or Mr. Asquith, the platform hero of the Chitral road, who know no more about the borders of India than they do of the confines of Mars, to settle border questions, serves to exhibit the folly of the Legislature's persistant encroachment on other spheres of Government. Within certain broad limits our frontier policy can be laid down, but these limits must necessarily be somewhat elastic, and so far as we have observed there is no serious difference of opinion among sensitive people as to our proper policy. In the immediate future we must impress upon the Afridis that while in no way anxious to administer them or interfere with their tribal arrangements, we can hit harder than they can when compelled, and the relative miscarriage of our

recent operations must be swiftly and surely retrieved. Secondly, we must maintain order on the Indian border and ensure our own adjoining population from being raided by these fierce mountaineers, who enjoy fighting as Yorkshire enjoys football. In the third place, we must keep open whatever military roads may be necessary for the fulfilment of our obligations to the Ameer of Afghanistan, and the effective defence of India against an external foe. This, in short, appears to be the common sense policy, but to suppose it is as easy to carry out as to transcribe, is to suggest that action is as simple as talking. The problem is confessedly complex, and does not admit of any cut and dried solution. Lord George Hamilton, the Secretary of State for India, was wise in refusing to be more precise. There was, of course, a strict Party vote at the end of the debate, and the hostile amendment was repelled by the Government legions by 311 votes to 208.

THE REAL NEED.

What India stands more in need of at this moment than a hide-bound frontier policy is a great Viceroy, who will be capable of controlling not merely the military element but the financial element in the Calcutta Government. The latter and not the former is the immediate peril, and for the reason that while there is sufficient skilled authority to protect India from rash military enterprises there is no discernible check upon the dangerous delusions which apparently animate Sir James Westland, the Indian "Chancellor of the Exchequer." Lord Elgin is so little a financier that his intelligence would prevent him from pretending to be one. It is equally clear from Lord George Hamilton's stray utterances that he has made no serious effort to grasp the gravity of the financial condition into which India has been plunged, *not by military recklessness, but by civil ineptitude.* We say this in no spirit of antagonism to Lord George Hamilton, who has handled the frontier question with a circumspection that has completely discomfited his critics. He is personally so popular that people endeavour to avoid adding to his difficulties by raising fresh ones. However, no personal or party considerations can be permitted to interfere with discussion at a time when the Indian Government is heading straight for bankruptcy, while India seems to be on the verge of an abyss. Mr. Herbert Gibbs, who has studied the question as closely as anyone, states the case so that all who run can read. Anyone who imagines that he or we (owing to supposed "heresies" on the currency question) may be tempted to exaggerate the pitiful plight into which Sir James Westland is plunging all classes, beyond the official classes, of our Indian Empire, should read a startling article that lately appeared in

The Times. *The Times* is strictly "orthodox," from the Lombard Street point of view, and regards a bimetallist very much as a suddenly aroused householder regards a burglar. During the Wolcott negotiations, which in our opinion offered India an escape from all her financial troubles, *The Times* darkened the firmament with its imprecations and called for God's wrath upon wicked Englishmen who sought to open Indian mints, and upon equally wicked foreigners who wished to open their own. This atrocious "bimetallic intrigue" was temporarily baffled, owing principally to the fact that the Indian Government was without competent financial advice when such was most required. With the powerful aid of France and the United States, India would have been provided with a sound monetary system, and saved from her present chaos. There appears to be no man at hand to ride the whirlwind or direct the storm, and it looks as though the rudderless Government of India would eventually be driven to re-open the Indian mints "without the aid or consent of any other nation," to use a familiar phrase. That will indeed be a triumph for the monometallist *enragé*.

G.W.R. MECHANICS' INSTITUTION, NEW SWINDON.

24 Per Cent. Our readers may remember that in the disastrous despatch rejecting the proposals of France and the United States for the re-opening of the Indian mints, it was declared by the Indian Government that they were engaged upon a successful experiment of their own, which they were desirous not to disturb. The publication of this fatuous document was greeted with uproarious enthusiam in the London Press, and Sir James Westland was hailed as a heaven-born financier. *The Times'* glee was positively indecent, and the American Envoys were abused like pick-pockets for making "preposterous proposals." But the whirligig of time brings its revenge, and the wisdom of Senator Wolcott's principal proposal—the re-opening of the Indian mints—has been abundantly vindicated by *The Times* itself, within a few months of the Westland despatch. On February 14th, *The Times* weekly article on "Indian affairs," dealt with "the monetary situation in India." One naturally expected to learn that, under the genius of Sir James Westland, India had emerged from all her difficulties, and that, now that "the bimetallic craze" had been killed, she was leaping and bounding with prosperity, and revelling in all the glories of the gold standard. However, the article is written in another strain, and begins "The text of the Indian criticisms on the monetary pressure last month has now reached England. It forms very grave reading." "The situation," we are told, "is extremely critical," and "the banking and commercial communities" view "with distrust any attempt to uphold a system

based on the closure of the mints that should be the outcome solely of a confidential interchange of opinion between the Government of India and the Indian Office." This sounds almost seditious. *The Times* proceeds to say that, "Whatever may be the merits or the possibilities of a gold standard, the thing they most fear is that a new currency experiment should be sprung upon India." We cannot pause to comment on the depravity of men who would question the "merits," or the madness of men who would question the "possibilities" of establishing the gold standard anywhere. No wonder we are told that "some of their statements may seem highly coloured, for they were written in times of danger." "But on the whole, the Indian Press has again risen to the heighth of a great occasion, and discusses the position in a manner not unworthy of the men who are engaged in the commerce and banking of our Eastern Empire." In order to show "the severe strain" imposed upon India by closing her mints, the article quotes from various leading newspapers :—

"*The Englishman* speaking for Calcutta and dealing with the subject from diagrams of the exchange and currency record since the closing of the mints, points out that the effect on the Indian money market has been a rise in interest, corresponding with what was predicted some years ago. The average rate of discount rose from 4½ per cent. in 1895 to 5 2-3 in 1896 and 7 11-12 in 1897, with an almost certain further rise in 1898 if the present system continues unchanged. 'The recurrent starving of the country up to the gold point,' it concludes 'and then letting loose a few lakhs of telegraphic transfers is simply prolonging the agony.' How acute was that agony may be judged from the statement that in Calcutta loans were being negotiated as high as 14 per cent. interest, while in Bombay, according to the *Times of India*, 'even 24 per cent. would not bring out an advance upon the most solid of all security—namely, gold bars.'"

A Bombay "Crank."

This famous *Times* article, which has fluttered innumerable dovecotes, also quotes an anarchist crank or repudiator in Bombay, who, one may assume, has shares in some silver mine, which he wishes to palm off on a guileless public, otherwise he could hardly commit himself to these several heresies. However, *The Times* is responsible for the extract :—

"A Bombay correspondent puts his view of the closing of the mints in more forcible terms. 'The truth is that the official and mercantile classes of this country have a widely divergent interest in the future of the rupee. Although it may appear sound in the eyes of the Finance Minister to produce a famine in rupees, and a consequent fall in the prices of commodities generally (including sovereigns), to all students of monetary science such a course is nothing less than a crime of the most serious and comprehensive order. A false rupee, an artificially created scarcity of money, and a ten per cent. bank rate, are not the most favourable conditions amid which to conduct business. A food famine is a very serious matter ; but a money famine such as is now being deliberately induced by the Government of India is far more serious, for it involves not only the gradual asphyxia of trade enterprise and a certain decline in the rate of commercial

progress, but also a consequently widespread feeling of unhappiness, misery, and disaffection, which it should be the continuous endeavour of the British Government to avoid.' "

Apparently, views repeatedly urged in these pages are less insensate than might have been supposed. *The Times* article proceeds thus:—

" This may be taken as an emphatic presentment of the case by the class suffering most directly. But the idea of 'a rupee famine' has taken hold of the Indian mind, and is being closely connected with the food famine. The speaker at the recent meeting in London who held the closure of the mints largely responsible for the scarcity of last year overshot his mark. Yet his statement 'that the present famine was no food famine but a money famine' will be vehemently reiterated in India. A loyal and judicious critic like Mr. B. M. Malabari, in his pregnant pamphlet just issued on 'India in 1897,' raises the question as to whether famine results 'from the absence of foodstuffs, or from the want of means of buying the food.' If the conviction once possesses the Indian mind that the artificial enhancement of the rupee is a contributory cause of famine it will furnish a common rallying cry for all classes, peasant and townsmen, rich and poor, such as the Congress has never yet raised. Put in economic terms, the contention is that the Government, in order more easily to discharge its own gold obligations, has subjected India to an artificial currency that bears down the producing industries on which the present and the future of the people depend. Thus stated, the question is open to fair argument. But if it passes from the Anglo-Indian to the Vernacular Press, it will cease to be stated in economic terms, and become a popular cry of the spoliation of the peasant—that cry for which it has hitherto been our endeavour to avoid giving any just cause."

"A Promising Experiment."

The Times continues its searching examination of what Lord Farrer has termed "a promising experiment," in critical terms:—

"There may be overruling arguments in favour of trying to perpetuate the existing artificial state of the currency, whether by linking it to a gold standard at 1s. 4d. the rupee, or by other means. But the Indian Press asks that before a secret understanding is come to by the Government those arguments should be placed before the public, and that Parliament should be acquainted with the results of closing the mints during the past five years. 'The present situation is intolerable,' writes the usually calm *Pioneer*. 'It is not only that fluctuations in exchange continue, but that the commercial community see that, without further Government action, they must continue, so that all confidence in the future has disappeared. The existing condition of the Calcutta money market is an excellent illustration in point. The exchange banks sent home every penny they could scrape together every time exchange went above fifteen pence. Accordingly for some time past they have had most of their capital out of India and have been working on borrowed money.' The Finance Minister also accepts this as the main cause of the stringency, although it may be questioned whether the diagnosis is complete. The fact is, as the *Bombay Gazette* points out, that the closure of the mints has increased the risk of sending out silver to India, and frightened capital away from it. With silver 'undisposable at the mints and unsaleable in the market,' to quote its perhaps too forcible words, every prudent man, whether merchant or banker, strives to have as little as possible of his capital in India in so dangerous a metal. The result is both an artificial scarcity of currency and an artificial scarcity of capital—conditions tending to chronic stringency and requiring only a few concurrent accidents to lead to very serious consequences. 'India ought not to tolerate for a day longer than is absolutely necessary,' says the *Times of India*,

'a currency system under which it is possible to have money at 12 per cent. here and yet impossible to attract capital from a country where the rate of interest is 3 per cent. and under.'"

We heartily agree with the *Times of India* that the present currency system or rather chaos of India, however "promising" in Lord Farrer's eyes, is not to be tolerated any longer. The grotesque and iniquitous experiment of 1893, when the money of 300,000,000 people was tampered with by a handful of officials behind the backs of their victims and behind the back of Parliament, must be abandoned. If members of the House of Commons really care for India, as in their platform speeches they affect to, they will cease to fritter away their energies in sterile recriminations about the Chitral road. They will rather turn their attention to the alarming conditions which have been developed throughout our greatest dependency, and they will demand that a great wrong shall be undone. Let them show that they have the interests of India at heart, even when the fate of parties is not at stake, and that they have a right to the title bestowed upon them by Sir Henry Fowler when he announced, "we are all members for India." No British constituency would submit for a day to what India has suffered for nearly five years at the hands of spurious financiers.

CANADA.

The Dominion Parliament was opened a few days before the Imperial Parliament, and the new Session promises to be unusually active and fertile. The Speech from the Throne foreshadowed as the principal subject for settlement the opening up and administration of the Yukon district, which is threatened with the invasion of 100,000 people during the next few weeks. Many of these will leave their bones to bleach in the Arctic Circle, and very few will make the fortunes that all dream of, but to endeavour to deter them is about as useless as remonstrating with the north wind. The Canadian Government has to recognize the folly of deluded mankind, and to make regulations to transport and govern it. Both questions are complicated by the fact that Canadian-American relations are far from what they should be, and the much "boomed" Klondike, though in Canadian territory, is near American territory, and the United States controls part of the present route. The Canadians not unnaturally desire to make an all Canadian route. The second question mentioned in the Queen's Speech is the repeal of the present Franchise Act, presumably with the object of simplifying the Canadian suffrage, which an outsider finds most difficult to understand, while the average Canadian, if called upon for an explanation, proves to be by no means an expert. We may anticipate a straight

party fight over this question, as also over the proposed *plébiscite*, on prohibition for which the lists have been preparing for some time. Every nation is the best judge of its own affairs, but speaking generally the policy of prohibition is played out. Nothing is more pathetic at the present moment than the unceasing efforts of the British Liberal Party to throw over Local Option, which three years ago they represented to be vital to our social welfare. To the Prohibitionist, Local Option is a very mild medicine—that the British Opposition are ceasing to prescribe it is significant. We shall return to the consideration of Canadian political problems when the situation at Ottawa is somewhat more developed. Meanwhile, the reader should note this most gratifying piece of news:—"Mr. Scott, Q.C., Secretary of State, has made an important announcement in the Senate. In the present Session of Parliament the tariff will be so amended that after August 1 next only goods from Great Britain, and such British Colonies as are entitled to the concession, shall come in under the *minimum* tariff. This will make the Canadian tariff a preferential one within the Empire only. The reduction will be 25 per cent. in favour of the Mother Country and such Colonies as may be entitled to it."

AUSTRALIAN CRICKET.

The cricket matches in Australia have been reported in England with extraordinary celerity and completeness. One may in passing congratulate the Australians on their repeated and signal victories over Mr. Stoddart's team. Now that the English Eleven has been so handsomely beaten, ungenerous efforts will be made to depreciate it, but when it left these shores it was regarded as one of the finest teams that could have been chosen, and it was confidently expected to outplay the Australians in the Test Matches. It has, however, been outplayed by the best Australian teams, and while one may recognize a weakness in the British bowling, it would be far safer and more sportsmanlike to credit the amazing victories of "the enemy" to the fact that the present generation of Australian cricketers is great in all departments of the game. Their batting is dashing and prolific, their bowling is various and deadly, while their fielding appears to be up to the highest standard of former years. When one considers that the United Australian XI. is picked from a population equivalent to that of Lancashire, it becomes clear that the Australian nation has a genius for cricket such as is possessed by no other people in the world. This is the true reason why their opponents suffer so many unexpected defeats, and the sooner we recognize that playing in their own country and their own climate they are almost invincible, the fewer shocks will

be sustained by the prophets. No doubt the Australian atmosphere assists the home team by handicapping the visitors. Similarly when they in their turn visit Lord's or the Oval, and are expected to see fast bowling through the London haze, they fail to do justice to themselves. An English team is perhaps not at its very best in Sydney on a hot day, but at any rate you can always see the ball there, while we provide our visitors with conditions under which, except for an owl, it is frequently impossible to see the ball. This we should imagine to be one reason why the Australians knock up such prodigious scores in their own country, while they have so frequently disappointed expectations in the old country. The ordinarily received explanation that their fast wickets give them an advantage is tantamount to saying that Australian batting is better than English batting, for good batting can only be properly tested on fast wickets. We believe our batting is equal to theirs, but that their combination of batting, bowling, and fielding is better than anything we can put into the field against them in their own country. That is the secret of their success, and the only adequate explanation of the comparative collapse of such a team as that commanded by Mr. Stoddart.

AUSTRALIAN FEDERATION.

The resources of civilization have been taxed to the uttermost in order to post people in Piccadilly in the latest score made in Adelaide. While one can admire the enterprise and expenditure involved in these early cablegrams, one must deplore the dismal failure on the part of the British Press to keep their readers properly informed of the serious political events which presumably occur in Australia as in other parts of the world. We know, for example, that the fate of the Federal movement, which is one of the greatest facts in the existence of these Colonies, has been seriously affected one way or the other by the action of the third and final session of the Federal Convention, which was opened in Melbourne towards the end of January. But so scanty and unintelligible have been the reports of its proceedings that we defy any of our home readers to evolve a coherent account of its month's work. We have frequently commented on the absence of adequate intelligence from Australia, and it is high time our newspapers should consider the possibility of supplying this deficiency. A good weekly cablegram of a column of political news would enable Englishmen to know what is passing at the other end of the Empire. Groping among such scattered scraps of news as have been vouchsafed one deducts the following disjointed facts: That a proposal to refer the question of old age pensions to the Federal Parliament was negatived on the ground that it is not a Federal but a State question,

but we are not enlightened as to the arguments by which so strange a proposal was supported. On the other hand, legislation affecting aliens was wisely decided to be a Federal matter. Another subject that evidently attracted prolonged consideration was as to the jurisdiction over navigable rivers, and it was ultimately decided to leave the Federal High Court to determine what is a navigable river, and presumably the non-navigable are to be vested in the State. The decision to use the Federal High Court as an umpire and not to limit it to strictly judicial functions is in our humble judgment a serious blunder. It open a very dangerous door, which the United States have very wisely kept closed. Why should the Federal Court abandon its proper function, which is to see that the Constitution is not violated, in order to decide whether a river is or is not navigable? And if it is once used as a miscellaneous referee there will be no end to the references, to the detriment both of its proper work and its prestige. Another decision of great importance which we equally deplore is "that all powers not vested in the Commonwealth shall be retained by the States." Thus Australia follows a bad United States' precedent, when it might have adopted what the best opinion regards as the sounder and more workable Canadian principle, which vests all powers in the Federation which are not specifically reserved to the several States in the Federation. The Convention has necessarily decided in favour of intercolonial Free Trade, and all Victorian efforts to infringe this *sine qua non* of Federation have been voted down, though not without vehement protest and even threats from the minority. These seem to be the main facts in the sporadic telegrams from Melbourne at the time of writing. Their meagreness makes it impossible to judge of the outlook for Federation.

The Age's Opportunity.

It is very satisfactory to find that leading newspapers in Australia, where the Press is said to exercise greater influence than elsewhere, are keenly alive to the disastrous effects of gold monometallism. *The Age*, of Melbourne (Victoria), which is one of the most popular and powerful papers in Greater Britain, in a recent review of the currency question, fully endorses the striking statement which Mr. Keating contributed to a late number of The National Review. It recognizes that—

"These colonies owe not less than £220,000,000 sterling, chiefly to British creditors, the annual interest upon which has to be paid mainly by produce, the value of which has been enormously depreciated by the demonetization of silver, and the resultant appreciation of gold. And the effect of this is to take £6,000,000 sterling per annum out of the pockets of the colonial taxpayers over and above what they paid when a double standard of value was in force; or, to put it in another way, an additional quantity of wool, wheat, hides, tallow, &c., equivalent in value to that amount, has to be shipped every year in order to meet our

engagements in England. But apart from this public indebtedness, there are private and corporate debts of an immense amount owing to British and foreign capitalists, each of whom benefits by monometallism just as much as he would do if he were enabled to exact a higher rate of interest from the borrowers than that originally stipulated. It is true the Australian gold producer reaps some advantage from the appreciation of that metal, but then, as Mr. Keating reminds us, gold only represents about one-fifth of our total exports, and the rest of the producing interests suffer grievously, "in spite of a steady improvement in the volume of production."

The Age can play a very great part in promoting an equitable settlement of the currency question. At present the English "Bimetallic agitators" are met by the statement that Australia acquiesces in a system which automatically impoverishes her and lowers her in the scale of nations. But the article before us emphatically assents to the view that "the new monometallism is seen by all who can read it to be the gospel of greed. It is the claim of the creditor to be permitted to plunder the producer and ruin the debtor." As the Australian Colonies are, relatively to population, the greatest debtor and producing community in the world, is it conceivable that they should uphold the new monometallism? *The Age* has a great opportunity. That it does not stand alone in the Far South in protesting against a standard of value which clandestinely but inevitably alters the contract at the expense of the debtor is shown by a well-merited rebuke in a recent issue of *The Canterbury Times*,—an important New Zealand paper,—addressed to the handful of Canadian bankers who officiously telegraphed to the British Government during the progress of the Wolcott negotiations:

"The complaint of the Canadian bankers that silver is an unsuitable basis for banking and commercial transactions, betrays a strange misconception of the whole position. It is to remedy this very defect that bimetallists are trying to bring about an international agreement for the coinage of gold and silver at a fixed ratio. The basis was satisfactory enough until the dissolution of the Latin Union in 1873. In 1800 the ratio between the two metals stood at 15·68, in 1810 at 15·77, in 1820 at 15·62, in 1830 at 15·82, in 1840 at 15·62, in 1850 at 15·70, in 1860 at 15·29, and in 1870 at 15·57. There is nothing in these figures to suggest that the Canadian bankers have anything to fear, save the destruction of the gold monopoly, from the remonetization of silver, and we are satisfied that their customers, as well as the producers in every other part of the Empire, would derive enormous benefit from the success of the petition of the Manchester merchants and traders."

MR. NAPIER'S PROPOSAL.

Officials exist for the purpose of saying *non possumus* to all and sundry who may prefer proposals to their majesties. Consequently, when Mr. W. J. Napier, the President of the Auckland (New Zealand) Branch of the Navy League and Chairman of the Harbour Board of that important town, suggested to the British Admiralty that an Imperial training ship should be stationed in New Zealand

waters, for the purpose of converting New Zealand boys into British sailors, he must have been prepared for the inevitable Departmental snub. Mr. Napier should, however, realize that his spirited proposal has incited the liveliest interest and sympathy in Great Britain, and that the attitude of the Admiralty is merely regarded as the usual preliminary. It should be recognized in the Colonies, all of which have at different times been discouraged by one or other of the "Imperial" departments, and all of which are liable to similar treatment in the future, that this is simply the normal course of business. The Admiralty has long been a hardened offender in its treatment of outsiders, and delights in pouring cold water on the common herd. For years it steadily resisted all efforts to create a serious British Navy, and was only finally overruled by a tremendous popular agitation; as a result of which the Department had to eat all its former declarations that we had as many ships as we should know what to do with, &c., &c. The public offices are among the few remaining sanctuaries of the Little Englander; but, as *The Times* sharply remarks "it would be just as well for that Department (the Admiralty) to put a little more sympathy and a little less pedantry into its official replies to Colonial overtures, which are at least well meant and inspired by an Imperial sentiment worthy of all encouragement." Mr. Napier had justly pointed out that a generation of boys is growing up in New Zealand who, with proper training, might be developed into excellent seaman. He calculates that from 500 to 1,000 boys might be attracted to a training-ship stationed in Auckland Harbour. As a disciple of the Navy League, he proposed that the maintenance and control of the ship should be vested in the Imperial authority, but expressed the opinion that if the Admiralty would provide the ship the Colony would become responsible for its upkeep. Mr. Napier may possibly underrate the difficulties on this score, as other New Zealand towns might raise objections to the selection of Auckland as the training-station, though it would be undoubtedly the best. He may possibly have exaggerated the number of boys likely to be attracted to New Zealand's "Britannia," seeing that the whole European population of the two islands is, according to the census of 1896, only 703,360, of whom but 371,415 are males.

My Lords' Haste.

In any case Mr. Napier made a very noteworthy proposal, and one in harmony with the splendid manifestation of Imperial unity which marked the Jubilee year. It was entitled to the careful attention of even so august a body as the Admiralty. But *The Times* gives good grounds for implying that it received no such consideration, but was handed over to the summary decision of the minor prophets

of the office, and we all know what that means. It appears, from consideration of time and space, that Mr. Napier's letter reached the Admiralty in the beginning of October, which is a slack time of year, when the chiefs may be assumed to be relaxing their devotion to business. But on October 22nd one may ask whether the Admiral of the station had been consulted by cablegram, and, if not, why not?—a copper-plate official answer was despatched. This document, after expressing my Lords' appreciation of the offer, "regretted that there were many administrative difficulties which rendered the proposal impracticable, in the present phase of the naval system, for the enrolment of boys and for mobilization in time of war." That is a perfectly sound and even conclusive reason for dismissing the proposal, seeing that the Admiralty are responsible for our naval system, and if they gave no reasons for their view their decision could not be reasonably impeached. But, unfortunately, this further statement is volunteered:—"My Lords would also remark that the highly technical character of the necessary training of seamen for Her Majesty's fleet, of which seamanship itself now forms only a small part, but which includes as indispensable the handling of every description of modern gun, great and small, and of torpedoes, renders the stationing of an isolated training-ship on the shores of a particular colony a very imperfect means of educating crews for men-of-war of the present day." *The Times* thereupon points out that my Lords are pronouncing in terms a condemnation of all "isolated training-ships," whether stationed in the colonies or the British Isles:—

"It will be seen at once that this proposition is almost equally true if for the words 'a particular colony' the words 'the British Isles' are substituted, and that it is also equally irrelevant. Boys trained in the home training-ships do not there learn 'the handling of every description of modern gun, great and small, and of torpedoes.' Boys trained in a colonial training-ship need not there learn more than these boys do, and might by a proper adaptation of means to ends easily be taught as much, the remainder of their training being carried out on the lines already existing for home boys. It may not be expedient for other and more cogent reasons to establish training-ships in the colonies; but the only reason actually given by the Admiralty for not establishing a training-ship at Auckland seems to be not only weak, but inconsequent."

In his reply to the Admiralty Mr. Napier shows that he thoroughly understands the question he has raised, and it is clear that it cannot be regarded as closed by the hasty action of a heedless Department. Mr. Napier says:—"I quite agree that crews of men-of-war of the present day could not receive a perfect education in their duties in remote parts of the Empire, and that, at all events under existing circumstances, the completion of the education of the seamen for Her Majesty's Fleet must be done in England. At the same time there is no reason to suppose that the preliminary training of boys for the Royal Navy in habits of

obedience, discipline, and seamanship, and even in the elementary knowledge of modern naval weapons of war, could not be accomplished in a ship stationed in New Zealand and under the control of the Admiralty.

EXAMINATION "GEMS."

Much entertainment has been derived in recent years from the shrewd and eccentric efforts of children to answer examination papers they don't understand. We have not met anything, however, to surpass the collection of examination gems made by the Inspector of the Education Board of Hawke's Bay, New Zealand. In a recent report he says:—"I append a few answers of candidates in history and the use of special words in the construction of sentences as set in the grammar paper. They are very instructive as showing a conception of pupils when dealing with points which are not found in the text-books. I. Question:—Explain the meaning of (*a*) Premier, (*b*) Returning-Officer, (*c*) Spiritual Peer. Answers: (*a*) A Premier is a person who has most to say during Parliament. (*b*) Returning-Officers are those who are sent back after an election to their old positions. (*c*) A Spiritual Peer is one who holds the office of seeing that no liquors are brought into a country without a tax being paid, or that none are made in the country without a license. II. Question:—Make sentences, using in each one or other of the following words: *Antecedent, controvert, eccentric, epitaph.* Answers:—(*a*) Those spoons belong to his *antecedents.* (*b*) The *controvert* was sent to the country. (*c*) George IV. is the Queen's *antecedent.* (*d*) The boy is his father's *antecedent.* (*e*) The *antecedent* of the moth is the grub. (*f*) Adam was our male *antecedent.* (*g*) He became an *epitaph.* (*h*) Health is *eccentric* for life. (*i*) It was a *controvert* sofa. (*j*) The *epitaph* was sharp to the point. (*k*) I shall *controvert* the gases into water. (*l*) He was the first *antecedent* who came to New Zealand.

SOUTH AFRICA.

The present year has opened gloomily in South Africa, and the steadying influences which happily exist there may find themselves even more severely strained in the near future than hitherto. In order to form a true estimate of the positions of the various parties on this complicated chess-board, it is advisable to consult some well-informed but dispassionate observer. This is no easy task as South African questions are peculiarly exciting, and those on the ground usually range themselves violently on one side or the other. It has always appeared to us, however, that we at home have neglected one source of information which ought to be more reliable than many of those which we have found so unreliable during the past two years. The colony of Natal occu-

pies a very important place in the South African group, and ought, for various reasons, to exercise a great moderating influence over its neighbours. We don't hear a great deal of Natal in England, for, so far, it has escaped gold and diamond discoveries, but owing to its more solid and enduring attributes its future is, probably, as safely assured as that of other more highly advertized communities. With a delightful climate, a fertile soil, and an industrious people of excellent abilities, Natal may confidently count on becoming one of the most attractive homes of the British race—provided, of course, that satisfactory relations are maintained with the huge native population, which bears to the European a proportion, we believe, of thirteen to one. This is Natal's solitary anxiety, and obviously it would have to be taken into account by any cold-blooded actuary. But, as regards the white politics of South Africa, the Colony occupies a favoured position, and "the Natal view" should be fairly sound. As between Cape Colony and the Transvaal the racial sympathies of the people of Natal are with their British kinsmen in the former, and with the Uitlander in the latter. On the other hand, owing to various causes, there has been considerable friction between the two Colonies, while Natal has certain material interests in common with the Republic. Speaking broadly, one may say that Natal is not a fanatical worshipper of Mr. Rhodes, but does sympathize with the legitimate aspirations of the disfranchised British of Johannesburg.

A Natal Oracle.

Let us, therefore, by way of a change, consult a Natal oracle on the South African question. *The Natal Mercury* is a well written paper, and a regular reader would say that if it is as well posted on internal affairs as it appears to be on external affairs it should be a reliable guide. In an article appearing on the opening of the year, it took a most discouraging view of the political situation, and though only written two months ago, several events have happened since which are hardly ameliorating. According to *The Natal Mercury*—"We gaze in vain for the silver lining fringing the dark cloud which obscures the vista of the new year. Naturally, man is not a pessimist, otherwise he would cease to exist. That hope which springs eternal in the human breast sustains and supports him even when the outlook is blackest and the chance of improvement most remote. It is human nature always to look on the bright side of things, always to imagine that the next step will see the turning of the long lane of misfortune, and it is this optimism that we must look to, to carry us through the new year." Nor has the writer any doubt as to where the responsibility for this gloom lies.

"Let us trust that in the Transvaal wiser counsels will prevail. It is the policy pursued there in the past that is in the main responsible for the decline of trade, for the unsettled state of the political situation, and for the embittered feeling between the two principal white races of South Africa. In the hands of President Kruger and his Government are the remedies for the existing depression, and if they fail to make use of these remedies, with them will lie the sin and the shame. They stand condemned as the enemies of progress, the foes of industrial development, and unless they come to see the error of their ways and abandon the policy of reaction and exclusiveness, they will assuredly bring the country to the verge of financial ruin and revolution. It is the misgovernment of the Transvaal that is the cause of the depression in South Africa, and that misgovernment must end ere there is any radical change for the better. No country in the world ought to be able to view the future with less apprehension than South Africa, but how far-reaching and disastrous the effects of bad and corrupt government are, can be seen from the fact that the maladministration of a single State plunges the whole of South Africa into a dread of what the future may bring forth. To the most inexperienced student of political history and events, the present methods of government in the South African Republic are fraught with impending dangers, both financial and civil. The system is based on an entirely false foundation, and is as certain to crumble to pieces sooner or later, as the day is to turn into night. It is simply impossible that the Transvaal system of government can go on. A change in accordance with modern principles of sound and just administration must come ere either the Transvaal itself can progress as it ought to or the rest of South Africa follow the lines of natural development and material prosperity so plainly obvious as the future destiny of the country. What reforms 1898 may bring forth no man can tell, but, at least, the prospect is not a bright one."

We do not entirely agree with this view, which throws the whole blame for South Africa's difficulties upon the Transvaal Government. The opponents of the Transvaal Government must share the responsibility, for their follies have played into the hands of the most backward section of the Boers. Still, the Natal view is entitled to a hearing, and it must be conceded that during the past year President Kruger has missed several opportunities of putting himself right with the moderate Uitlanders (*e.g.*, by cancelling the dynamite monopoly and expropriating the Netherland Railway Company) and has thereby weakened his position and laid himself open to criticism he would have silenced. It is no answer to say that Mr. Rhodes, or Mr. Chamberlain, or the House of Commons Committee by their words or acts are to blame for the obstinacy of the Boers. The interests of the Transvaal Republic demanded a more progressive policy, but her statesmen have not been wise enough to promote it. President Kruger has been re-elected to the Presidency by a very large majority, and now has a comparatively free hand. Will he confine himself to such acts as the dismissal of his Chief Justice, or will he make a serious and sustained effort to set his house in order?

A South African Kipling.

The principal literary event of the year in South Africa is the visit of Mr. Rudyard Kipling, who as the Laureate of Greater Britain, has received a most enthusiastic welcome. He goes there, we understand, with

an unbiassed mind, and, as he is not easily fooled, he should be able to form valuable conclusions on the heated controversies and rivalries which influence South African problems. Mr. Kipling is not only a poet himself, but he is the cause of poetry of no mean quality in others, as in following verses taken from *The Cape Times* testify.

TOMMY'S WELCOME

TO

RUDYARD KIPLING.

[Mr. Rudyard Kipling, who is expected to arrive by the Dunvegan Castle to day will be interested to know that the following lines are contributed to *The Cape Times* by a Private in the Medical Staff Corps stationed at Simon's Town.—ED. C.T.]

O, good mornin', Mister Kiplin'! You are welcome to our shores:
To the land of millionaires and potted meat:
To the country of the "fonteins" (we 'ave got no "bads" or "pores"),
To the place where di'monds lay about the street
At your feet;
To the 'unting ground of raiders indiscreet.

I suppose you know this station, for you sort of keep in touch
With a Tommy wheresoever 'e may go;
An' you know our "bat's" a shandy, made of 'Ottentot an' Dutch
It's a language which is 'ideous an' low,
Don't you know
That it's "Wacht-een-beitje" 'stead of "'Arf a mo'?"

We should like to come an' meet you, but we can't without a pass;
Even then we'd 'ardly like to make a fuss;
For out 'ere, they've got a notion that a Tommy isn't class;
'E's a sort of brainless animal, or wuss!
Vicious cuss!
No, they don't expect intelligence from us.

You'ave met us in the tropics, you 'ave met us in the snows;
But mostly in the Punjab an' the 'ills.
You'ave seen us in Mauritius, where the naughty cyclone blows,
You 'ave met us underneath a sun that kills,
An' we grills!
An' I ask you, do we fill the bloomin' bills?

Since the time when Tommy's uniform was musketoon an' wig,
There 'as always been a bloke wot 'ad a way,
Of writin' of the glory an' forgettin' the fatig'
'Oo saw 'im in 'is tunic day by day,
Smart 'an gay.
An' forgot about the smallness of his pay!

But you've *our* partic'lar author, you're our patron an' our friend.
You're the poet of the cuss-word an' the swear,
You're the poet of the people, where the red-mapped lands extend,
You're the poet of the jungle an' the lair,
An' compare,
To the ever-speaking voice of everywhere!

There are poets wot can please you with their primrose-vi'let lays.
There are poets wot can drive a man to drink;
But it takes a "pukka" poet, in a Patriotic Craze,
To make a chortlin' nation squirm an' shrink.
Gasp an' blink;
An' 'eedless, thoughtless people stop an' think!

Yes, the 'and wot banged the banjo an' made Tommy comic songs,
'Oo wrote of Empires, "Lion's 'ead to Line,"
'Oo found an 'idden poem in McAndrew's Injin' gongs,
Was the checkin' 'and wot' gave the warnin' sign,
In a line;
That gave the people soda after wine.

L'ENVOI.

So Mulvaney in P. M. Burg, and the Ortheris in King,
And the Learoyd who is stationed by the Gate,
The broken-banken-ranker and his humble comrades, bring
A tribute to the man who made them great:
Yes, they wait
To welcome out their poet-laureate.

EDGAR WALLACE.

UGANDA.

In a normal year great public excitement would have been aroused by the alarming situation which has developed in Uganda—the province that was confirmed to the British Empire by the magnificent exertions of Major Lugard, and will remain imperishably associated with his name. Either through misfortune or mismanagement it seems to have almost slipped from British rule during recent months, and when the Commissioner, Mr. Ernest Berkeley, returns to his post, after an interval of only a year, he will probably have to begin where Major Lugard began some years ago. But his position will be more arduous, owing to the disaffection of the Soudanese troops, who, having policed the Uganda Protectorate for some years, now appear to have rebelled and raised the whole country, so much so that the white population, numbering some fifty or sixty souls, has been declared to be in danger, and though recent reports are more reassuring, the most optimistic of missionary societies admits that all its work in Uganda and the adjoining countries is suspended. No authentic account has yet been published of these strange proceedings of the Soudanese troops, in whom a number of experienced African administrators continue to express unabated confidence. But it seems to be generally recognized that the trouble is traceable to the excessive military duties cast upon them, in the first place, by the disturbances that arose on the borders of the Protectorate in the spring of last year. Then having been chivied from pillar to post for months on end, a considerable contingent of them were ordered to make a forced march into East Africa and repair to a rendezvous with Major Macdonald, who was subsequently to take them on a distant expedition into an unknown country. They seem to have resented this, and, after some discussion, they either flatly rebelled or were prematurely treated as rebels. At any rate they made off towards Uganda, which they had recently left, followed by Major Macdonald. This disastrous incident occurred in September of last year, and he has been unsuccessfully coping with them ever since. The lives of gallant and distinguished British officers and civilians, such as Major Thruston—who was captured by the mutineers—and Mr. Pilkington, have been sacrificed, and an increasing number of people desire an explanation of a mysterious and tragic affair.

CORRESPONDENCE.

The Sugar Crash and After?

To the Editor of "The National Review."

Sir,

One million, six hundred and eighty-four thousand, six hundred and nine of the Queen's subjects in the West Indian colonies in a condition which can only be described as desperate, and yet is the "great heart" of the nation stirred? Not a bit of it! How many will take the trouble to read the 1,200 pages of the Report of the Sugar Commission? and if they did how many would realize the true condition of things? They will read in the classic language of the Commissioners that "The Sugar Industry in the West Indies is in danger of great reduction, which in some colonies may be equivalent or almost equivalent to extinction"—that "the total or partial extinction of the Sugar Industry would in most places very seriously affect the condition of the labouring classes for the worse, and would largely reduce the revenue of the colonies," &c., &c., but how much do these rounded phrases convey to the man in the street? Let me try to paint the picture in plain English colours. The West Indian colonies vary as to their resources. They may be roughly classed as the volcanic and the non-volcanic. In the volcanic, sugar is not the only resource of the islands, and consequently they are not in so parlous a state. In Trinidad, Jamaica, Grenada and Montserrat the eggs are not all in one basket. A large trade is done in cocoa, nutmegs, limes, fruit and other produce, which will enable those islands to hold on—we need not deal with these at present. In others like St. Vincent, St Lucia, and Dominica, sugar has gone under already, and they are just scratching along "by the skin of their teeth." But in Barbadoes, Antigua, St. Kitts (true a volcanic island, but one in which other products have never been cultivated) and in British Guiana, sugar is the only industry—of the total exports of these colonies the value of the sugar is 97, 94½, 96½, and 94½ per cent. respectively — British Guiana also exports gold, but gold is at present experimental and problematic, and for the present purpose negligible. These non-volcanic islands, the Commissioners say, "do not appear to be suited for the growth of either coffee, cocoa, or fruit on a scale of any commercial importance." British Guiana was a hinterland, which, in time, may be made to produce paying crops and cattle; and the gold industry may have a future. But in the meantime there is nothing but

sugar to depend on. Now what does this mean if the sugar industry collapses? Ruin, bankruptcy, starvation. If there is nothing grown there will be nothing to export. If there is nothing to export there can be no imports. How is the Revenue raised? Almost entirely from land tax on cultivated land and customs duties. If the land goes out of cultivation, there is no land tax. If nothing is imported, there are no customs duties. With no revenue how can the administration be paid for, or the interest paid on the debts? Imagine a country with the revenue suddenly dried up, and it is coming fast to that—no salaries to the public officers, no upkeep for the public buildings, no money to spend on the roads, wharves, piers, quays, embankments, and light-houses, no prisons to hold the convicts, no police to keep order, no courts to administer justice, no magistrates to punish, no fire brigade to extinguish fires, which are so common in a country where, by reason of the earthquakes, the houses are built of wood. The reformatories, hospitals, and poorhouses closed. The sick and aged turned out into the road. The lepers loosed to roam about amongst the healthy. The schools shut up: education, elementary and technical, brought to nought. Postal and telegraph service discontinued. Does not this spell ruin? Where is the interest, to say nothing of the sinking fund to come from on the £1,657,900 of public debt for which these four colonies are liable, largely held in the colonies themselves as investments for savings and for trust money? Barbadoes $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. inscribed stock is now quoted at 109, Antigua 4 per cent. at 112, and British Guiana 4 per cent. at 120. What will they stand at when the sugar goes? Does not this spell bankruptcy? So much for the collapse of the administration. Now see the result of the collapse of the industry on the people. There are over 320,000 souls in these four colonies, almost all black. The few white planters, merchants, shopkeepers, and officials are not more than 5 per cent. of the whole. These 300,000 odd people are all dependent on sugar for their living. It is true they live on very little, men getting 8d. to 10d. a day, and women 4d. to 6d. a day in wages; but when this is withdrawn there is nothing left but a scanty supply of garden produce and bananas to live on.

The negro is, as a rule, a quiet, orderly, easy-going person, but even he will not sit down and starve. Before that he will go for the bakers' shops, and this means trouble. The collapse of sugar means gunboats, marines, and blue-jackets landed, and shooting, as inevitably as the rising of to-morrow's sun—we have had a warning of what is coming in St. Kitts three years ago, when the blacks, on finding their wages reduced in consequence of the fall in the price of sugar, burnt the cane-fields, looted the rum-shops, fired the town of Basseterre, and had to be shot down by landing parties from a third-class cruiser which happened fortunately to be within reach. Ruin, bankruptcy, and starvation, and we must add bloodshed—will anyone venture to contradict this? And what do the Commissioners recommend? The merest peddling palliatives. Emigration forsooth! Where to? The States won't have the black population. They will be worse off in Mexico and Venezuela. Emigration from one congested island to another? Truly the precarious existence of those who

take in each other's washing! Settling the labourer on the land? Yes, by all means: let the negro have his allotment and grow his "ground provisions," and so keep body and soul together. But will that produce an export trade? How much revenue will come in by exchanging sweet potatoes, yams, and eddoes for the products of other countries? The introduction of minor agricultural industries? The Commissioners themselves say these islands are unsuitable for them. And it is true. Sugar is the only crop which it can be hoped can be made to grow there. And even if it were otherwise, what is to happen in the meantime while the experiment is being tried? Rome burns while the fiddling show is being run. Doles from the Imperial Treasury, for central stations, for botanical stations, for steamship subsidies? How will the British taxpayer like that, and what hope do the Commissioners themselves entertain of the success of the venture? Would any business man advance the money after reading what they say? By their admission it is throwing good money after bad, and their modest estimate is £300,000 down, and upwards of £50,000 a year.

Surely it is better to try and save an existing industry than to let it die and fish for a new one! Can it be saved? Who can tell? Perhaps it is too far gone. Perhaps the Commissioners suggest it is doomed through over production the world over. But they do say this, "The best immediate remedy for the state of things which we have shown to exist would be the abandonment of the bounty system of Continental nations. This change would in all probability enable a large portion of the sugar-cane cultivation to be carried on successfully." How is this desirable result to be obtained? By asking Germany, France, Austria, and Belgium to be so very kind as to hold their hand just as their policy of crushing our great West Indian industry is arriving at fruition—we can imagine the guileless foreigners thumb to nose and with extended fingers. Countervailing duties? Shocking heresy! Perish West India first! We are nothing if not orthodox! But would it answer the purpose. Sir Edward Grey and Sir David Barbour say, "No." Sir Henry Norman, the only one of the three Commissioners who has had practical experience of sugar-growing countries, says, "Yes," and many people agree with him. Then why not try the experiment, it can do us no harm. If unsuccessful they can be taken off again. The mere threat will do the business? Probably, but we must be ready to strike as well as to threaten—till *they see us legislate* the European nations will not believe our vapourings—and if we do this and win we must set our West Indian house in order too—"but this is another story." I have said enough for my present purpose, which is to point to the dread spectre which is rising in the West.

I remain, sir,

Yours obediently,

C. G. Walpole



THE NATIONAL REVIEW.

No. 182.—APRIL, 1898.

EPISODES OF THE MONTH.

STORM CLOUDS.

At the moment of going to Press the international outlook is blacker than it has been at any time during the last quarter of a century. There are three wars on the horizon to which the epithets, certain, probable, and possible, are respectively applied by a number of well-informed people. They are the United States *v.* Spain, Turkey *v.* Bulgaria, Great Britain *v.* the Franco-Russian Alliance. The first of these is so fully discussed in the brilliant letter, if we may so call it, of our Washington correspondent that all we need say about it here is that the sympathies of the British people will be spontaneously and unreservedly on the side of the people of the United States should they ultimately succeed in screwing up their invertebrate Administration to snatch the American Armenia from the cruel clutches of Spain. Of the expected conflict between Turkey and Bulgaria, caused by the hideous behaviour of the former to her Christian subjects in Macedonia, there is not very much to be said except that Bulgaria would be clearly overmatched, but that the Powers have so strong an interest in preventing the war that they may succeed in doing so; otherwise, as the Concert is practically dissolved (with the recent withdrawal of Germany and the advertised withdrawal of Austria-Hungary from the task of "keeping order" in Crete), a Turco-Bulgarian

conflict might spread indefinitely, and produce the statesman's nightmare—a general European conflagration. But however critical may be the state of affairs in the Near East, it has barely attracted notice in Great Britain. Public attention here has been chiefly concentrated upon the threatening developments in the Far East, where Russia and France are seen to be working hand in hand —Germany being a benevolent neutral—against a clearly proclaimed British policy, the acceptance of which could injure no legitimate foreign interest, while it would safeguard the interests and aspirations of all nations who desire a fair field and no favour in the gigantic area and amid the teeming millions of the Chinese Empire. Our relations with Russia, though shrouded in a mysterious reserve are, one may assume, more strained than at any time since 1885. But if the spirit that animated Mr. Gladstone's famous Penjdeh speech inspires the decision of Her Majesty's present advisers—and is not accompanied by any subsequent backdown—we believe that peace will be preserved. If there is vacillation, evasion of the real issue, or pusillanimity we shall slowly but surely drift into war. It is noticeable in any case that Russia occupies a much stronger position now than in 1885 when she was completely isolated. To-day she is backed by an ally as obsequious as she is formidable, for Russia can confidently count on the unwavering support of France whatever may be the principle or interest at stake. Indeed, it would be no exaggeration to say that Russia directs French foreign policy, admirals the French Fleet, and generals the French Army. It is a closely-knit working alliance which mutually strengthens the partners and has to be reckoned with by those who do business with the firm. If you differ from Russia you differ from France, and if the quarrel is incapable of adjustment the outsider has to cope with their joint resources. Recent negotiations have emphasized the Franco-Russian Alliance, and it is of the utmost advantage to Europe in general and to Great Britain in particular to know precisely how the partners stand towards one another and inferentially to the rest of the world.

THE OPERATIONS OF THE FIRM.

So as to avoid unnecessary verbiage, we use the word Russia in these pages in its larger diplomatic sense, *i.e.*, to include France. Whether the word France includes Russia when French interests alone are at stake has not yet been indisputably ascertained. Diplomacy would probably be wise to regard them as one and indivisible for all serious political purposes, above all as a fighting unit. Russia, *e.g.*, has no *locus standi* in West Africa, and her own interests are neither directly nor indirectly involved. They are

not connected by any conceivable chain of reasoning, unless we are to be told that the *hinterland* of Abyssinia stretches from the Red Sea to the Pacific, and that Russia's academic interest in Abyssinia precludes her from viewing events in Boussa with indifference! Stranger doctrines than this have been advanced, and nothing would nowadays be surprising where a colourable pretext is required for an anti-British policy. Russia, however, does not want a war anywhere—she counts upon attaining her objects without it—and, least of all does she want a war over the West African Question, which is in a more perilous stage now than it has ever been before, for at any moment we may hear of a conflict in the Sokoto country, where the French officially deny having sent an expedition, and admit that such would be a violation of international obligations. At this very moment the accuracy of the French official statement is being verified locally, and a critical condition will be created should French and British forces meet in a place where, by the latest declaration of their own Government, the French would be trespassers. This is one among half-a-dozen possibilities of conflict in Africa while the negotiations are deadlocked in Paris. If this dangerous dispute leads to war between France and Great Britain, for the latter cannot make any further concessions to the former without becoming as contemptible as China, will Russia espouse France's cause? Are France and Russia one firm in Africa as well as in China and Turkey? Russia knows the French case in West Africa to be thoroughly bad, and has told her so, has urged her most strongly to settle at any price, and will go great lengths to prevent her ally from plunging into a war which, on paper, may be expected to cripple her sea-power. Still, the French Government feel that if they disregard the injunctions of Russia and the worst comes to the worst, Russia will be necessarily compelled to take up France's quarrel and to fight by her side, and for the simple reason that Russia's prestige, position, and policy are dependent upon the efficiency of France, and Russian interests would be just as much damaged by the defeat of her ally, whether the quarrel originated in a trivial and irrelevant matter in which that ally was confessedly in the wrong, or over a question which Russia regarded as affecting her own vital interests.

LIGHT AND LEADING.

We believe the solidarity of the Franco-Russian firm to be the key to foreign affairs, and we should never omit it from our calculations. It explains the feverish anxiety of Germany to embroil us with either of the partners, and it accounts for the startling rapidity with

which the scene is shifted from one part of the planet to another as suits the momentary interests of the firm. If France is being unduly pressed over Boussa, M. Pavloff (the Russian representative) makes a counter demonstration in Peking; if unpleasing assurances are sought as to Port Arthur, Sokoto suddenly becomes the hub of the universe. These kaleidoscopic changes flurry the British public, and are mainly responsible for those "vacillations" of the Press of which Mr. John Morley complains as "an element of danger." We submit that the inevitable "vacillations" of journalists who, in the absence of authoritative guidance, must necessarily guess as best they can, are no "element of danger," provided that these "vacillations" are not reflected in the minds of our responsible statesmen. There certainly is no serious excuse for uncertainty in the mind of the Cabinet just now. They are supported by the greatest Parliamentary majority of the reign, while the Opposition is not only small but is more hopelessly disorganized and demoralized than at any period since the Revolutionary Wars. Moreover, our leaders, in particular Mr. Balfour, Mr. Chamberlain, and Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, have, as regards the portentous developments in the Far East, proclaimed a British policy which all who run may read, and which the whole nation approves. As to how the doctrine of Open Doors and Equality of Opportunity strikes neutral and independent European opinion may be gathered from Professor Vambéry's discriminating tribute, side by side with which may be placed Dr. Markoff's candid and well informed exposition of Russian aims. This country desires to know, and is surely entitled to know, whether the British Government stands by the very popular policy it has declared, or whether it has withdrawn from it, what were the obstacles to it, what would have been the consequences of adhering to it, why warlike speeches were made if Ministers had no intention of "facing the music"? Whether, *e.g.*, the Russianization of Northern China is compatible with Sir Michael Hicks-Beach's tall talk at Bristol, whether Sir Michael Hicks-Beach will eat his words or resign? There may be a perfectly good answer to all these questions, but for the present they disturb men's minds, and the community earnestly desires light and leading from those who were so eloquent and self-confident two months ago. It may be that owing to the internal disintegration of China, concerning which there are ominous rumours, Great Britain has been compelled to reconsider her position. That would be perfectly intelligible, for we cannot make ourselves responsible for the integrity of a dissolving Empire. But what is our present policy if that of two months ago no longer holds the field? The resources of reticence are surely becoming strained.

SMOOTH SPEAKING.

We doubt whether the soapy assurances of M. Hanotaux, the French Foreign Minister, will long continue to impose on this nation. They are so totally at variance with his acts. He has lately got himself interviewed by eminent but nameless diplomatists, who quite accidentally, *bien entendu*, happened to record his unpremeditated observations in a note-book, which was forthwith passed on to M. de Blowitz, *The Times* correspondent in Paris, who, knowing good copy when he sees it, wired the interview to Printing House Square, whence it issued to the public. We thus got the soft sawder which M. Hanotaux considers to be good for our consumption. As to the Niger, we are asked to believe that France wants nothing but "a fair and friendly settlement," which we suppose is the Diplomatic Synonym for the more explicit avowal of the semi-official *Temps*, viz., that France at the end of some years filibustering will uphold the noble doctrine of *beati possidentes*. The "irritating situation" is, of course, attributed to the "English negotiators" in Paris who are frequently "without instructions" and to the wicked machinations of the "Niger Company (which), as it is ceding or is about to cede its territories to the English Government, exaggerates their value in order to get a higher price," but "English statesmen do not buy a pig in a poke," &c. One may indeed ask why, if these territories are of so little value, M. Hanotaux cares to endanger the peace of the world by keeping French troops in occupation of places which, according to the accepted *hinterland* doctrine, by international agreement as well as by prior treaty, are in the British sphere of influence? M. Hanotaux airily dismisses "the Sokoto story" as a myth, for "we have treaties and are in the habit of observing them." According to the best information, however, "the Sokoto story" is no myth, and if the French raiders have not moved on they have by this time come in contact with a British force. Even in referring to our Soudan expedition M. Hanotaux was brimming over with benevolence:—

> "It seems to me chiefly a question of pride for the English. They were forced some years ago to abandon Khartoum. In returning there now they are showing a tenacity which is greatly to their credit. As to whether they hope for great profit from it I cannot say. Opinions are much divided. Some think that the Soudan has for thousands of years been a thorn in the side of Egypt; others that with modern methods Egypt will end by subjugating it despite the obstacle of the desert. As for me, I acknowledge that the expedition will deal a decisive blow at the Dervishes, who will burn their last cartridge at Omdurmann. The English are prepared for this, and are confident of routing them."

One may venture to wonder why Sir Herbert Kitchener's masterly operations have been hampered throughout by French intrigue in

Egypt, and threatened with French intrigue in Abyssinia, and why French expeditions are pushed post haste from all parts of Africa towards the Nile (for the sole purpose of irritating Great Britain), if the recovery of the Soudan is the natural and praiseworthy undertaking described by the French Foreign Minister? With regard to China also M. Hanotaux expressed a series of disinterested and milky opinions which bear no relation to the grasping and curt demands of the French Minister in Peking.

Concessions.

So far we have surmised and speculated. But the anxious reader wants to know what are the actual and verifiable facts. What, *e.g.*, is the position of the Chinese Question at the end of another month of negotiation, rumour, and denial? Let us briefly recapitulate the chief events of this period—leaving aside the groundless gossip. We recorded last month a significant reference to China from the speech on the Address delivered by the Premier, who has not so far incurred the suspicion of indulging in meaningless bluster:—"Not only have we not surrendered one iota of our Treaty rights, but we have no intention of surrendering them, and though I will not make use of those high-sounding words (war) which grate on the noble earl's nerves I will say that there is no effort which this country will not make rather than allow those rights to be destroyed." This was universally accepted as an admirable declaration of policy—in fact as "the diapason of our diplomacy" (to use a famous phrase of Disraeli's) in the Far East. It was shortly followed by two important announcements. In the first place, we learnt that in spite of the machinations of Russia (including France), a loan for £16,000,000 had been arranged for between the Chinese Government and the Hong Kong Bank (British) together with the German Asiatic Bank. An Anglo-German loan is, we think, far preferable to a purely British loan, as being more in consonance with the principle of equality of opportunity. The loan is guaranteed by the Customs duties and the *likin* (internal dues), so far as it is not already pledged, and it has since been taken up in Berlin and London, though without eliciting any great enthusiasm in the British metropolis, where it is regarded in the nature of a "boomerang" if it is to result in the payment of the Chinese war indemnity to Japan, and in the consequent evacuation of Wei-Hai-Wei by the latter Power. A far more important announcement was subsequently made officially by the Foreign Office, viz., that the Chinese Government had consented to make the following concessions to foreign trade on the representations of the British Minister (Sir Claude Macdonald), at Peking:—

"The internal waterways of China will be opened to British and

other steamers in the course of June next, so that, wherever the use of native boats is now permitted by treaty, foreigners shall be equally allowed to employ steamers or steam launches, whether owned by them or by Chinese.

"In view of the great importance attached by Great Britain to the retention of the Yang-tsze region in Chinese possession, the Chinese Government have formally intimated to the British Government that there can be no question of territory in the valley or region of the Yang-tsze being mortgaged, leased, or ceded to any Power.

"The post of Inspector-General of Maritime Customs shall in the future, as in the past, be held by a British subject, so long as British trade with China at the ports continues to exceed that of any other Power.

"A port will be opened in Hu-nan within two years."

Captious critics at home, and Anglophobe newspapers abroad, have endeavoured to treat these most important and valuable concessions as creating "a sphere of influence" for Great Britain, and as marking a departure from our previously declared policy. We think there is a short and complete answer to such objectors. Let other nations obtain similar pledges from China in provinces in which they have interests, and undertake to throw these open to the world at large on equal terms with themselves—the post of Inspector-General of Maritime Customs to be accorded to the nation doing the largest volume of trade with China. Great Britain would have no objection to such "spheres of influence."

A "RUMOUR."

Although Great Britain's action safeguards the principle of equality of opportunity over markets containing a population estimated at 215,000,000, other European Powers were greatly agitated at this "concession" to our diplomacy, and thereby reveal what very different ideals they have in view. The enterprising and substantially accurate correspondent of *The Times* in Peking ascertained that "the Chinese Government, having authorized a Chinese syndicate to construct, with foreign assistance, presumably American, a trunk line from Tien-tsin to Chinkiang through Shan-tung, the German Minister has intervened on the ground that Germany has been accorded the refusal of the right to construct any railway in Shan-tung. The proposal is, therefore, blocked." While Reuter corroborated this with the news: "Germany has obtained the virtual monopoly of railways and mines in Shan-tung. It is reported that Great Britain raises objections to this monopoly." Then followed persistent rumours, upon which our Foreign Office steadily but unsuccessfully sought to pour cold water, as to the

action of Russia. The first was as follows (*Times* correspondent, Peking) :—

"Russia has demanded that China shall surrender to her all sovereign rights over Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan for the same term of years and on the same conditions as were granted to Germany in the case of Kiao-chau ; also the right to construct a railway, under the same conditions as the Trans-Manchurian Railway, from Petuna to Kwang-chung-tzu, Mukden, and Port Arthur. The demands were presented immediately after the ratification of the loan, five days being granted for a reply. In the event of non-compliance, Russia threatens to move troops into Manchuria. China will perforce yield, and that Russia's assurances that the ports will be open to the ships and commerce of the world are deceptive."

The British Government was unable to obtain any information in St. Petersburg as to the truth or untruth of this statement, upon which our Ambassador should have applied for his passports and our fleet should have made a naval demonstration at Port Arthur to show that this country refuses to be ignored by the despoilers of China, in view of our immense stake in those regions. *The Times* correspondent reiterated his statement, and a fortnight later gave the terms of an agreement between Russia and China, which Mr. Curzon affected to treat as a "rumour" that he could not "confirm." Of its practical accuracy there can be no serious doubt, and it reflects very little credit on Mr. Curzon's intelligence that he should remain so completely in the dark of what everyone outside the Foreign Office had long suspected. The "rumour" which Mr. Curzon was unable to "confirm" ran as follows :— "China yesterday (23rd March) agreed to all the Russian demands. The concessions are as follows :—

"1. A lease of Port Arthur for twenty-five years as a fortified naval base.

"2. A lease of Ta-lien-wan for a similar term of years as an ice-free port and terminus of the Trans-Manchurian Railway, with the right of fortification.

"3. The right for the Russians to construct a railway from Petuna to Ta-lien-wan and Port Arthur on the same terms as are laid down in the case of the Trans-Manchurian Railway.

"China 'saves her face' by retaining nominal Sovereign rights, which, however, she is powerless to assert, lease being equivalent to cession."

The following day while the Foreign Office was still unable to enlighten the public, the same correspondent was able to amplify his information :—

"At the Tsung-li-Yamên yesterday further conditions were agreed upon in regard to the lease of Ta-lien-wan. Russia agrees that the port shall be open to the ships and commerce of the world with a Customs tariff similar to that of a Chinese treaty port, although its administration and collection will be the same as at any other Russian port. Russia, recognizing, as urged by China, that Ta-lien-

wan is sure to supplant Niuchwang as the chief port of Manchuria and thus cause a loss to the Imperial Customs revenue, undertakes to contribute to the Chinese Government the balance of the Customs collected at Ta-lien-wan after the payment of expenses. Though this arrangement is obviously temporary, the Chinese are much flattered by the concession. The conditions generally are cleverly designed to conciliate trading nations while Russia consolidates her power and strengthens her base prior to the absorption of Manchuria."

FRENCH PRIVILEGES.

While Mr. Curzon was engaged in "verifying" this last "rumour" *The Times* sleuth-hound in Peking startled the world by producing a summary of the demands preferred to the Peking Government by France. Though not hall-marked with Mr. Curzon's confirmation they bear the impress of reality, but the careful reader will notice that a short period is left open for negotiation, so there may be some modifications in the final draft of Chinese "concessions" to France:—

"The first is that China shall not alienate to another power any territory south of the Yang-tsze Valley—this being desired to check the proposed British extension on the mainland opposite Hong-Kong and the Burmese extension in Yun-nan. Secondly, the cession is asked to France, on the same terms as in the case of Kiao-chau were granted to Germany, of a port at Kwang-chau, in the Lei-chau peninsula, near Hainan, as a coaling-station. Thirdly, the concession is required of the right to construct a railway from Laokai to Yun-nan, with accompanying exclusive mining privileges; and, fourthly, it is demanded that the director of the Imperial postal department shall be a Frenchman. Eight days are given for a reply."

In one of his numerous interviews M. Hanotaux is reported as apostrophizing China thus:—"Heaven grant that we are not to witness the death of China! That would be a disaster which would shake the world. Here there is no question either of acquisition or of occupation. We should not seek in the Far East to augment our already vast colonial domain. We ought simply to seek to put it out of the reach of accidents. We should also above all, seek to prop up the Middle Empire, whose ruins would make so many ruins." The French method of "propping up" China and perpetuating her life is to deliver an ultimatum and clap a pistol to her head. Superficially the French claims, apart from their peremptory character, and the effort to enclose Hong Kong—which only concerns, but does vitally concern, Great Britain,—read innocently enough, but they involve the application of the French system, *i.e.*, closed doors, to Southern China, and they specifically claim privileges for Frenchmen. Unless China is to be regarded as a crumbling mass of ruins—a standpoint M. Hanotaux dramatically repudiates—Great Britain should decline to allow foreign trade to be stifled in any part of China. Our treaty rights enable us to do this, and, in the words of Lord Salisbury, "not only have we not surrendered one iota of our treaty rights, but we have no

intention of surrendering them," and "there is no effort this country will not make rather than allow those rights to be infringed."

PORT ARTHUR BALFOUR.

Of the foregoing announcements although the efforts of France to play their West African trick towards Hong Kong attracted sufficient attention to secure its ultimate frustration, the bold advertisement of the Russian programme produced far the greater sensation. Sir William des Vœux, late Governor of Hong Kong, an able and moderate man, without a touch of Russophobia, expresses himself as follows:—

"If I am right in believing that in order to safeguard our enormous interests in the Far East it is incumbent upon us to do our utmost to strengthen China as against her enemies, both internal and external, it is evident that we must regain the influence at Peking, which, within a period still very recent, had been almost entirely lost. A stronger diplomacy, backed by increased determination at home, has in the last few months made a sensible advance in the desired direction. The success of British and German financiers, against the influence of Russia and France, in respect of the loan was an instance in point; and another was the promise in respect of the Yang-tsze Valley. For, whatever may be the intrinsic value of that promise, it had at least the advantage of exhibiting England as the sole defender of the integrity of Chinese territory. This advantage would, however, be entirely lost if we were to permit the threatened acquisition of Port Arthur, constituting, as it would do, not only a standing menace to China, but a humiliation to its Government, the full extent of which can hardly be estimated here. In fact, this forced cession, by destroying our influence altogether, would deprive China of the last chance of recovering herself, and would thus be an irreparable blow to our interests."

Sir William des Vœux's view was supported by a masterly letter in *The Times* signed "Far East." The writer recalled the famous dictum of Lord Elgin, our first Minister in Peking:—"The Chinese Government yields nothing to reason and everything to fear." He pointed out that from this point of view the French and Russian demands assume a gravity which cannot be exaggerated if the central Government is to be maintained as a going concern. He very reasonably adds:—"With regard to the mere local question of Manchuria, for instance, it may be argued with some force that Russia cannot in fairness be restrained from carrying her great railway to the open sea and from acquiring an ice-free harbour as its terminus. Mr. Balfour himself has frankly committed the Government to this view, and it is one of those common-sense views which commend themselves to Englishmen." But "there is a vast difference between a concession of that nature, coupled, of course, with some substantial security for the preservation of our own commercial rights, and the creation at Port Arthur, 500 miles distant at present from the nearest Russian possessions, of a great naval place of arms with a splendid dock and fortifications that only

require new armament to make them practically impregnable." This acute and well-informed writer points out that once possessed of Port Arthur, Russia would acquire "a strategical position which would inevitably revolutionize to our detriment the whole balance of power in the Western Pacific." Nor is this all. "Port Arthur absolutely dominates the Gulf of Pe-chi-li, the ocean highway to Peking. Russia herself proclaimed *urbi et orbi* less than three years ago that the Leao-tong peninsula in the hands of a foreign Power would be 'a permanent danger to the independence of the Chinese Empire and to the peace of the Far East.' Is that proposition likely to be less true because the foreign Power in question was then Japan and now is Russia?" With a final extract from "Far East's" letter we must leave this question for the present, but we agree with him that "British statesmanship must be prepared to safeguard the vast interests entrusted to its care."

"What other conclusions can China be expected to draw in matters of yet more serious moment if we acquiesce in such an assertion of Russian supremacy over Northern China as the permanent possession of Port Arthur will constitute, if we allow her capital, threatened as it already is on land, to be cut off from all possibility of help by sea? Will not the Central Government, conscious that henceforth it can only hold Peking itself on sufferance, become in the masterful hands of the Russian Minister a mere instrument for carrying out his behests and promoting throughout China the objects of Russian policy? Can it be supposed that one of the first objects of Russian policy will not be to secure for France the full measure of preponderance in the south to which, as Russia's satellite, she may consider herself entitled to lay claim? Three years ago, when the Franco-Russian Alliance was not yet so closely knit, the Russian Minister never hesitated to back up at the Tsung-li-Yamen the French demands with regard to the Shan States in defiance of England's treaty rights. Is it conceivable that Russia would not feel equally bound in honour to-day to back up her ally's demands with regard to the southern provinces of China? Yet even those who question the actual importance of the Russian advance in the North, from the point of view of British interests in those regions, admit that in the neighbourhood of Hong-kong and on our Burmese frontier, at any rate, there are British interests at stake which cannot at any price be surrendered."

THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND CHINA.

Even the most fanatical worshipper of the House of Commons would not claim that its discussions illuminate the field of foreign affairs. For some incalculable reason such topics are surrendered by the really able private Members to the bores and the cranks. One is always urging upon one's friends in the House to abandon some of the trumpery questions in which they are immersed for the larger Imperial and international questions which are ten times more important, twenty times more fascinating, and practically neglected. There is a great public service to be performed and real distinction to be gained by any able young Member of Parliament who will make himself a master of foreign affairs. A smattering of two

modern languages, a modicum of autumn travelling, and a passable amount of tact are the only requisites. The House gave the world a further advertisement of its total inability to cope with foreign politics on Tuesday, March 1st, when the irrepressible Sir Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett proposed, and the inevitable Mr. Bowles seconded, a resolution declaring that it was of vital importance for British commerce and influence that the independence of Chinese territory should be maintained. The mover protested against Russia's being allowed to overrun and control any considerable part of China, and advocated an alliance with Japan and Germany against Russia and France. The seconder, on the other hand, considered that Russia had already secured a predominant and autocratic influence in China, denounced the action of Germany at Kiao-Chau as piracy, and stated that Germany and Russia were in the same swim. Sir William Harcourt, again, was prepared to fall on the necks of both Russia and Germany, and improved the occasion by reading a homily upon international brotherly love, which he has done very little to promote at any period of his career. According to the report of the debate before us, these were the only unofficial speeches made on the greatest political problem that has arisen this century. Mr. Curzon (Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs) made a long speech in replying for the Government. He adopted and amplified the resolution, and hinted that, owing to the instability of the Chinese Government, it might become incumbent upon us to depart from our declared non-territorial policy, but our aim is to preserve the integrity and independence of China, to maintain our treaty rights, and to uphold the principle of free commerce. Mr. Curzon seemed to be satisfied with the rather dubious, because irregular, assurances given by Russia and Germany of their observance of these conditions. Since this poverty-stricken debate took place, "a Chinese Committee" has been formed in the House of Commons. We venture to suggest to its members that they should urge upon the Government to obtain explicit and formal pledges from all Powers earmarking portions of China, that they recognize the treaty engagements of the Peking Government, that ports or territories open to one civilized nation shall be open to all, and that an ice-free commercial port is not a synonym for a fortified arsenal.

SMALL-POX.

The Russian Foreign Minister, Count Muravieff, has suffered a sharp attack of small-pox this winter, which, if the truth were known, has had no little influence upon foreign affairs. His illness is probably responsible for the curious wavering in Russia's attitude on the Cretan Question, on the German occupation of Kiao-Chau, and towards Korea. On all

these three questions her policy has been as vacillating as though she enjoyed the boundless blessings of popular Government. She has opposed, proposed, withdrawn, and renewed, the candidature of Prince George of Greece for the Governorship of Crete; she has agreed to, resented, accepted, and utilized the German occupation of Kiao-Chau, a post she had previously earmarked for herself. In Korea, again, taking only the last few months, she has pushed her advantages to the utmost, and has sought to eject Mr. McLeavy Brown, the British Financial Adviser to the Korean Government. Owing to our protest she accepted his unwelcome presence, but insisted on forcing a superfluous Russian colleague, M. Alexieff, upon Mr. Brown and the King of Korea. Finally, having claimed a suzerainty of Korea menacing to Japanese interests and keenly resented by the spirited Japanese Government, the world was startled to learn in the middle of March that Russia had actually withdrawn M. Alexieff, and had fallen back upon an academic attitude towards the Hermit Kingdom. There were probably Japanese protests, possibly a Japanese ultimatum. We believe, however, that Count Muravieff's attack of small-pox is largely responsible for the extraordinary infirmity of purpose exhibited by the Czar's Government in this and other parts of the world. It is satisfactory to know that this able, if aggressive Minister is completely restored to health, and if he succeeds in overriding the equally able but pacific Russian Finance Minister, M. de Witte, there will be a general "hum." In any case the remarkable episodes that occurred during Count Muravieff's incapacity and convalescence have finally destroyed that beautiful legend so sedulously propagated by the loyal subjects of the Czar, that their empire is free from the changes and chances which handicap the career of other nations. It is now becoming recognized that so far from dominating the bureaucracy, the young Czar is entirely at its mercy, and is systematically deceived as to what is going on. He exercises much less real influence than the Queen, which is a misfortune both for Russia and the world at large.

INFLUENZA.

While Count Muravieff's virulent small-pox attracted little or no attention, Lord Salisbury's mild attack of Russian influenza and subsequent relapse, as the result of working when weakened by this treacherous disease, has excited universal interest. The British Premier has been reluctantly compelled to suspend the active direction of the Foreign Office, which is being temporarily undertaken by Mr. Balfour, who, it must be remembered, is also Leader of the House of Commons, and, consequently, one of the hardest worked men in the British Empire. Mr. Balfour—unlike other men in so

many ways—has always thriven on overwork. It is perhaps this well-known idiosyncracy which is responsible for the freely expressed hope that the present arrangement may become permanent; for it is not generally held that Lord Salisbury will again undertake the impossible task of combining the Premiership with the Foreign Secretaryship. And, though we are rich in political mediocrities, we seem just at present to be singularly destitute of statesmen of talent, and there are not too many politicians of promise. Mr. Balfour has a natural instinct and an acquired taste for foreign affairs. He might develop into an excellent Foreign Minister, especially with the Premier's reservoir of experience to draw upon. Members of Parliament, however, are emphatic in the view that no human being could for any length of time both lead the House and conduct a Department. They also affirm that Mr. Balfour, much as he might wish it, could not be superseded in the leadership of the House by any other Minister; that he could not fairly be asked to leave the House of Commons for the Lords, and that even if he were withdrawn neither Mr. Goschen, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, nor Mr. Chamberlain would for various reasons be suitable. It is said, *e.g.*, that the Conservative Party would not accept or follow Mr. Chamberlain because he is a Liberal Unionist! As this involves the stultification of Unionism by the implication that we are for all time to be governed by an antiquated set of labels and an exploded Compact which Conservatives generally desire to abrogate, one cannot consider such an objection with any patience. It will not govern the question should such a contingency arise. But we are not there yet, and are still facing the formidable, if not insurmountable obstacles between Mr. Balfour and the Foreign Secretaryship. Failing him, and assuming the concentration of Lord Salisbury upon the Premiership, what are the possible alternatives? The man in the street would say Lord Rosebery or Lord Cromer, but then the man in the street has very little voice in such high matters, and is apt to be snubbed by the retort that "neither of them would look at it."

A Problem.

These personal aspects of politics present such fascinating problems that we are tempted to a further speculation. It is common knowledge that on more than one occasion since the formation of the Unionist Alliance in 1886, Lord Salisbury has sought to intern himself in the Foreign Office, leaving the supremacy of the Premiership to the Duke of Devonshire, who has consistently, loyally, and wisely declined this attractive offer. There has latterly been a recrudescence of some such solution among political gossips, who,

assuming that Lord Salisbury abandons one office, believe he may elect to remain Foreign Secretary. If any steps are contemplated that would result in placing the Duke of Devonshire at the head of affairs, they should be abandoned at the earliest possible moment, for, if persisted in, they could only lead to serious political trouble. No English public man is more respected than the Liberal Unionist leader, and his work in protecting the country from the Home Rule craze will never be forgotten so long as this remains a United Kingdom. It would, however, be generally agreed that such a post as the Prime Ministership of the British Empire should never be conferred for past services, except in so far as they are an earnest of services to come. The Conservative Party are not governed by any petty prejudice against a Liberal Unionist, but there is a strong and general feeling that if, at any time, the Premiership is transferred from Lord Salisbury—an event that would be deeply deplored—it should pass, not to another Peer, but to a Commoner. It is now several years since the House of Commons has contained a Premier—Mr. Gladstone having been the last—and, in view of the very wise movement among the Opposition to restore Lord Rosebery to his rightful position in the councils of his Party, the House of Commons would be asked to face, but would refuse to face, a permanent disappearance of the Premier from their midst, if the Devonshire plan were adopted. Commoner should succeed Peer as Peer may succeed Commoner. We devoutly hope that Lord Salisbury will not be moved to relinquish the Premiership. Should he do so, his only possible successor at the present juncture is the Leader of the House of Commons—Mr. Balfour.

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ARMY.

We think that on the whole the intelligence of the community is agreeably surprised by the military proposals of the Government. The utterances of authority had been so discouraging that we were almost prepared for a *non possumus* attitude towards the "agitators," of whom the most effective has been Mr. Arnold Forster, to whom the Empire is under weighty obligations. The Under Secretary for War, Mr. Brodrick, sketched the new proposals to the House of Commons in a careful speech of considerable merit at the end of February. Positively in one portion of it he poked fun at red tape, which must have made Lord Lansdowne's hair stand on end. The vote for the coming year contemplates an addition to the army of 22,000 men, which, with last year's addition, makes the total increase 25,000. The immediate cost is £570,000 and the future normal cost will be £400,000. We have at present 220,000 men serving with the

colours, a reserve of 80,000, and if the 100,000 in the navy, and the Militia, Volunteers, and Yeomanry are thrown in Mr. Brodrick calculates that every year one man in four of those who attain the age of eighteen in the United Kingdom enters Her Majesty's fighting services. Provision is to be made for three army corps for home defence, with five guns per 1,000 troops—thus involving a substantial addition to the field artillery. "A small war reserve" (5,000) composed of men in the first year of their reserve existence, who are to be specially retained by double pay, will be made available without interfering with the big reserve or draining the various units. The effect of Mr. Arnold Forster's attacks upon the condition of our home battalions is revealed in the provisions to keep infantry battalions for the future at a minimum strength of 600, cavalry regiments at a minimum of 356, batteries at a minimum of 100 men. To attract the extra twenty odd thousand men required to complete our present scheme the soldier's pay is to be raised. He is apparently to get the clear shilling a day (in lieu of deferred pay) for which all friends of the army have so long clamoured, though official *amour propre* intervenes to obscure this change from the general public, and our readers should note the criticisms in "The Army as a Career" which is contributed to this number by a writer who has served in the ranks. Among other changes we note the effort to enlist men for three years, and pledges to decentralize, while Mr. Brodrick even talked of War Office reform. The proposals may be shortly described as a serious effort to enable the short service and link battalion system, upon which the British Army is built, to do the work required of it. Mr. Arnold Forster, in a short speech, complimented the War Office on having adopted twenty-five changes which he and his friends had asked for five years ago. His chief complaints were that no effort is made to make the army a real career for the soldier, or to enlist boys of sixteen on boy's pay. With this distinguished critic's desire to bisect the army into a long service foreign army and a short service home army, we confess to being out of sympathy.

IRISH COUNTY GOVERNMENT.

The Irish Local Government Bill is precisely one of those measures that the House of Commons hails with heartfelt enthusiasm. Party politicians pronounce it to be statesmanlike, whereas its contents may turn out to have been merely ingenious, and its promises illusory. No effective centre of resistance to its principles, or even criticism of its details, has, so far, been organized by the loyal minority in Ireland, who, outside a few northern counties and a few favoured classes, will find themselves seriously harassed by the

Land League branches when promoted into County Councils. It is true that it does not provide Ireland with "the plant of an armed revolution" such as the Radicals sought to create, but when future political troubles arise the Nationalist leaders will control an abundance of new engines of oppression. Until then we have nothing worse to endure than the general humiliation of the Irish country gentleman, who has not the smallest chance of being taken on in the popular service as in England, and the wholesale dismissal, without compensation, of those who in humbler spheres have been carrying on Irish County Government. We in this island can view such unconsidered trifles with equanimity, and may enjoy the luxury of doing justice and even generosity to Ireland at other peoples' expense. The victims have no serious voice in Parliament, for their natural mouthpieces, Mr. McCartney and Mr. St. John Brodrick, now sit on the Treasury Bench and are absorbed in heavy departmental work. Colonel Saunderson is not always the wisest of men, and the brilliant Mr. Carson has to give up to litigation talents of a high Parliamentary order. The Bill is consequently passing like butter through the House of Commons, and was read a second time on March 22nd amid a general chorus of congratulations, only broken by the green-eyed monster sitting on Radical Benches. Mr. Dillon declared it would effect a beneficent and far-reaching revolution in Irish Local Government and Irish social life, though he should "like to see the constabulary brought into touch with the popular institutions of the country," and this is no doubt a "reform" we may look for should the Opposition recover office. Mr. Rentoul, an Ulster Unionist who represents a division of Protestant farmers who are numerous enough to protect themselves under the Bill, declared that a very large proportion of the Unionist electors of Ireland approve it.

MR. REDMOND'S HOPE.

Mr. John Redmond, who, though an irreconcilable Irishman, is a much abler and larger minded man than any other Nationalist, made one of the few promising remarks of the debate:—"Their desire would be to work the Bill on fair and tolerant lines, and no man's religion or politics should be allowed to be a bar, if he desired to give his services in this new position. Worked in this spirit, enormous benefit might ensue to Ireland in the fact that men and classes of men long estranged, men of different creeds who had had an almost impassable gulf between them all their lives, would be brought together for the first time in working this new scheme of local government. Under these circumstances he scarcely thought it was altogether rash to express the hope that the Bill might

mean the beginning of a process the end of which would be the creation of a really united Ireland, under which her national liberties would be easy of achievement." Various English Members, who run no risks under the Bill, spoke in warm support of it. Colonel Saunderson, "speaking on the side of the cess-payers of Ireland," pointed out that "it did not follow that, because they dealt out to Ireland exactly the same measure that they dealt out to Scotland and England and Wales, they were treating her with perfect equality, because the conditions of the countries were absolutely different." He gave an apt account of the origin of the Bill:—

"It was a measure not so much for satisfying the expressed demands of the Irish people, if indeed they had been made, as a Bill brought in by the Government to satisfy the conscience of the British people. Local Government in Ireland had never been a question which excited any emotion among the Irish people. None of the leaders of the National Party had ever spoken in favour of Local Government; they wanted something more than that. The Party to which he personally belonged had been perfectly indifferent on the subject, and his experiences of the grand juries in Ireland, as well as a knowledge of their feelings and opinions, differed from those mentioned by the hon. Member for East Down (Mr. Rentoul). He could not conceive the possibility of any grand juror (and he included himself) looking with absolute satisfaction at this or any other County Government Bill, because every grand juror in Ireland must know that, though in future County Government in Ireland might be more exciting than it was at present, it certainly would not be so cheap. This would be the inevitable consequence of giving Ireland County Government."

COLONEL SAUNDERSON'S FORECAST.

As against Mr. Redmond's prophecy, Colonel Saunderson made a forecast which it is interesting to record for future reference:—

"All the Unionists, all those who up to the present time had been connected with County Government and county management in Ireland, would undoubtedly disappear. County Boards composed of such gentlemen as they now saw on the Poor Law Boards would conduct county affairs, and he wanted to know how any Bill they could frame and pass in the British House of Commons could prevent those gentlemen indulging in those eccentricities which had marked the history of Poor Law administration over a considerable part of Ireland. If they could confine, and make sure of confining, them to the business for which they were elected it would be a different thing. But their minds would soar to other things, and long and acrimonious debates would take place on matters far more interesting and important to them than County Government—on Home Rule, the financial relations between the two countries (Nationalist cheers and laughter), and the release of the political prisoners (Nationalist cheers). From that cheer the House would see that hon. Members opposite would embark willingly, when they were chairmen or members of County Councils, on these interesting political affairs, for dealing with which they would certainly not have been elected. That would not tend to carrying out county business in the best and cheapest way."

Colonel Saunderson, however, admitted that this Bill was the inevitable *sequitur* of the Unionist policy. Perhaps the most effective point in the debate was made by Mr. John Morley—one of the few discordant speakers—who quoted "the most sagacious

and profound view" uttered by Lord Salisbury in 1885. The present Premier, in the course of his famous Newport speech, said:—"Local authorities are more exposed to the temptation of the majority to be unjust to the minority when they obtain jurisdiction over a small area than is the case when the local authority derives its sanction from and extends its jurisdiction over a wider area. In a large central authority"—and depend upon it that in years to come you will remember these words—"the wisdom of several parts of the country will correct the folly and mistakes of one. In a local authority that correction is to a much greater extent wanting, and it will be impossible to leave that out of sight in any such extension of local authority in Ireland." The half-crazy Mr. Michael Davitt made his usual tirade against the Irish landlords, and vented a portion of his spleen upon Mr. Redmond for his more temperate tone. The closing remarks of the debate—provoked no doubt by Mr. Morley—came from Mr. Healy:—"The Irish people have got from this Government ten thousand times a better Bill than ever they could have got from the Liberal Party."* Mr. Healy's jubilation probably supplies a fair measure of the average Irish Unionist's gloom.

THE ARCHBISHOP'S PRONOUNCEMENT.

Dr. Temple, the Archbishop of Canterbury, has expressed eminently wise and far-sighted views on the proposal to provide Ireland with a Catholic University. We may hope that they will sink into the minds both of the clergy and the laity of the Church of England, though it is too much to hope that they will soften the Nonconformist conscience, which appears to be as hard as nails on this question. The pulpit selected by the Archbishop for his pronouncement was the *New York Journal*, and the occasion—an interview. Dr. Temple expressed himself emphatically and without any *arrière pensée*, and if his diagnosis of British public opinion be correct, the Government would be very much better employed in creating a University, for which there is a profound desire in Ireland, rather than in expending themselves

* It is noteworthy that the recent round of amenities between Irish Nationalists and British Radicals was completed by Mr. Augustine Birrell, Q.C., M.P., at the meeting of the Party caucus at Leicester, when he said:—"Home Rule was still one of the principles of the Liberal Party, but at the present moment, as a practical question, it had gone clean out of the minds of the constituencies. If it was to be carried it could only be by missionary effort, and how could that be done with any degree of hope in the present state of the Irish Party? He did not think it was too much to ask of them that they should endeavour to make their sacrifice and cease scowling at one another like third-rate tragedians belonging to rival operatic companies, and that they 'should combine once more in the cause of the country they loved."

over this Irish Local Government Bill, which excites considerable distrust and inconsiderable enthusiasm outside the ranks of professional politicians here and in Ireland:—"'I am very much in earnest,' said the Archbishop, 'when I say that I would like to see a Roman Catholic University established by the Government in Ireland, and what I say for myself represents what almost every bishop of the Church of England thinks on this subject. We must not allow Ireland to separate from us. We insist on maintaining the union between the two peoples, and it is only just that we should recognize such differences as exist and deal with them fairly. I think it is far better that the rising generation of Roman Catholics in Ireland should have the advantages of a higher education than that they should be compelled to deny themselves a university course rather than do violence to their consciences. This is only justice. It is not only right, but it would be the means of taking the edge off Ireland's poignant grievances.'" On the interviewer's expressing some surprise at the Archbishop's announcement that the Anglican Church would almost unanimously support such a proposal, the Archbishop rejoined, "'Yes, yes, people only have to get close together to understand each other. I think that nothing better could happen than the establishment of this Roman Catholic University on the lines laid down by Mr. Balfour. That is to say, no religious test should be applied to any but the chairs of theology. Of course it would be a difficult matter to agree on the governing body of such a University. The difficulty would be a very grave one, but not insuperable. Then there is a danger which I foresee. It is that the university might drift too much under the power of the Roman Catholic bishops and priesthood. That is a very real and a very great danger, but we should be ready to face it.'"

THE STATEMENT OF THE BIMETALLIC LEAGUE.

Somewhat long after its promise, but opportunely nevertheless, the statement of the Bimetallic League appeared at the beginning of March. It is a very temperate and restrained account of recent monetary events, and is written with even more than usual gravity in face of the danger threatened to Indian and Imperial interests by purblind action in Calcutta and purblind apathy in London. No champion of the Indian Government—if indeed the Indian Government has any sincere champion of its monetary policy—could find much fault with the language of the Bimetallic League about the Indian Despatch; it would seem to have been rather the object of the League, while pointing out the obvious shortcomings of the Despatch, to say as much as possible for the Government who wrote it. The two most striking and noteworthy features,

however, of the League's statement are its remarks as to the ratio and its courageous indication of a policy for India. There is no new departure in regard to the ratio; the line taken is still "what nations in Council may agree upon." But nations were in Council last October, and the British Government, who had practically summoned the Council, appeared to endorse the view of the Indian Government that the true interests of India demanded a ratio less in favour of silver than the historical $15\frac{1}{2}$ to 1. Hence the bimetallists naturally ask: If the true interests of India demanded another ratio, why did you not, or why do you not now, suggest to the other Governments a modification of their proposals to suit the true interests of India?

THE MINTS MUST BE REOPENED TO SILVER.

The other feature—the clear advocacy of "mints open to silver in any event"—is most useful and most laudable just now, when statesmen both in India and at home are all in the dark, afraid to go forward because there is no way, and afraid to go back because they have come so far from the old path. On all sides we hear loud dissatisfaction with the Indian monetary situation, but hardly anywhere do we hear the voice of the able man saying what should be done. In the City of London there are probably not half a dozen men who want India to have a gold standard. They know at the Bank of England, and they know in Lombard Street, that a gold standard for India means a large initial reserve of gold, and that somehow or other we shall have to provide it, and that we are not in a position to provide it. *The Economist*, in this matter quite out of touch with the opinion of the City, sees only "grotesqueness" in the patent truth that our gold standard has no strength to spare, owing to the volume of our credit transactions and banking system. *The Statist*, outspoken enough in its criticism of the Indian Government and its condemnation of the gold standard for India, hesitates, nevertheless, to advocate definitely the reopening of the mints to silver. *The Times* goes so far as to say that unless the process of establishing a gold standard be quickly accomplished, the mints will have to be reopened to silver. The Gold Standard Defence Association published a pamphlet giving an account of the Wolcott negotiations, in which they upbraided the Bimetallic League for not publishing their promised statement (just as the statement was going through its final drafts) and called the Indian Despatch "crushing." But they are helplessly silent as to how the Indian Government is to get the gold standard so "crushingly" asked for. Even Sir Robert Giffen, while declaring his preference for mints open to silver, has not done much more than say that India must choose quickly between

silver and gold. On the eve of the impending discussion in Parliament, it is helpful to have a clear voice from an organized and representative body of men, saying, "India cannot and ought not to have a gold standard, and her mints ought to be reopened to silver; if possible, with an international agreement for bimetallism, which would create a par of exchange between silver and gold the world over; if not, then *without* it." It is no use calling this last impossible; it is possible, however inconvenient. The gold course is impossible. Those who cannot face the silver course, fearing the low rupee, must face at last the policy which will make the Indian silver rupee free without lowering its gold value, namely, international bimetallism.

THE INDIAN STANDARD AND THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Mr. Vicary Gibbs, a member of the distinguished family to whom the cause of sound and honest money owes so much, moves a Resolution in the House of Commons on March the 29th, before this Review reaches its readers. This Resolution might have been cast in a bimetallic mould; but the first duty was to start a searching enquiry, and arrest the progress of mischief until out of this enquiry should come light; and the Resolution therefore asks for a Select Committee, or a Royal Commission, to investigate the monetary situation of India and make recommendations. There are abundant signs that the country is beginning to see the gravity of the problem; though at the actual moment of writing there are rumours of a conspiracy among politicians, who by virtue of sitting on Front Benches conceive themselves to be statesmen, to burke an enquiry, or to suggest the solemn sham of a Departmental Committee, *i.e.*, that the accused should investigate the accusation. The question is, however, in a fair way to become a burning one here, as it has already become in India. We content ourselves now with noting a significant step in the development of the crisis. Sir James Westland has made his Budget statement without any currency proposals, and has followed it by a speech in which he announces that the Indian Government has communicated their views to the Home Government, and are confident that the Home Government will now take up the matter. We regard this as a confession on the part of the Indian Government that they cannot or dare not formulate a scheme for introducing a gold standard, and must leave it to the Government here. At least, it seems to show that the Indian Government have realized what their gold standard means—a reserve of gold adequate to buy rupees, whenever the possessors of rupees wish to to sell them at 1s. 4d., or a *minimum* a little below it. Let it be clearly understood that this is what the gold standard must

do, and must go on doing, if it is to be effective. It can only remain effective if those who hold or have bought rupees at 1s. 4d. know that they can sell them for that or very little less whenever they want to. Even if the Government announce not only a constant price for selling rupees, but also a constant price for buying them, no certainty is attained unless the Government's power to buy be undoubted, or, if the public believe in the stability only of the former price and do not believe in the stability of the latter, the public will be "all sellers," and will avail itself, that is, only of the Government's fixed *buying* price, and will thus take all the Government's gold away and bring it none back. Hence the necessity for a really large and unquestionable gold reserve. And here comes in the absurdity of the position. India has already to borrow a large sum of gold or sterling money in order to pay it away again in defrayal of her home-charges, and now proposes to borrow a much larger sum of actual gold, not for paying away, but for a reserve on which to start a gold standard. Not finding nearly enough buyers of her rupees at 1s. 4d. to raise her current home-charges, she announces a policy which requires for its legitimate fulfilment buyers of twice or thrice that amount of rupees at the same price. Comment is needless.

THE HICKS-BEACH OUTRAGE.

How much longer is the Chancellor of the Exchequer going to be allowed to imperil this Government? His empty boasting of what he was prepared to do in the event of other nations seeking preferential positions in China—which they have been steadily acquiring ever since his threats—has already made England the laughing-stock of the world. He has now got the Ministry into a serious mess by his ill-tempered treatment of a great deputation from Lancashire and Yorkshire representing the cream of the working-classes. The deputation was to have been introduced by Mr. Tomlinson, M.P. (Conservative), and it consisted of Mr. Maudsley (Cotton Spinners), Mr. Wilkinson (Lancashire Weavers'), Mr. Mullen (Card-room hands)—all from Lancashire, while Yorkshire was present in the persons of Mr. Drew, Mr. Gee, and Mr. Turner, representing the great woollen and worsted industries. These are among the most influential and respected labour leaders in this country, and no group of men are more entitled to courteous reception at the hands of a Government in a professedly democratic country. The object of the intended interview was to urge the desirability of arranging an international agreement on the monetary question, which, we may say in passing, Mr. Maudsley and Mr. Drew, *e.g.*, have studied with far more zeal and honesty than either the

present or the late Chancellor of the Exchequer. It is related in *The Times* that when the party reached the Treasury Sir Michael Hicks-Beach asked Mr. Tomlinson whether the deputation were responsible for a printed protest he had received charging the Government with breach of faith. On its being acknowledged that the deputation had issued this document (which was not addressed to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, but was an appeal to the working-classes, as the reader will see), Sir Michael Hicks-Beach declined to receive them! It is not surprising to learn that this official outrage gave "considerable umbrage," while *The Daily Chronicle* tells us:—"The Lancashire and Yorkshire representatives whose names we have given are not easily discountenanced, but they were staggered by this astounding rebuff. The Chancellor had made an appointment, and now they were sent away with this smack in the face. So they have packed up their traps and gone home. Whatever we may think of the textile views on the double standard, there can be only one opinion as to Sir Michael's standard of courtesy. The deputation had no Party complexion—indeed one strong Conservative was upon it." Sir Michael Hicks-Beach is a notorious bully, but, like other bullies, he only requires tackling. We fancy it will be the interest of a good many Unionist Members of Parliament to bring him to book over this business.

A Famous Protest.

Our readers will be interested to read the protest which seems to have thrown the Chancellor of the Exchequer so completely off his balance, though not addressed to him. It has been signed on behalf of 1,000 trade and labour organizations, and the present writer has been informed that it represents a voting power of 1,000,000. According to *The Daily Chronicle* the Chancellor of the Exchequer stated that "the same room would not be big enough to hold him and anybody identified with such a document." For our part, we should prefer to be identified with the document rather than with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who, on the greatest of all economic questions, has been content to constitute himself the mouthpiece of a handful of Lombard Street money-lenders, to whose passing interests he is prepared to sacrifice the permanent interests of the whole British Empire. The protest is written in vigorous Anglo-Saxon—such as Sir Michael Hicks-Beach occasionally employs upon platforms. In the eyes of a supporter of the present Government, the worst feature of this document is that—though an occasional phrase might have been modified—in substance, it is true:—

"Address to the Wage-Earners of the United Kingdom.

"It is admitted that the demonetization of silver, as international money, twenty years ago, by the mints of several leading nations being closed against its free

coinage for the public, has wrought havoc with the principal industries of this country. The House of Commons, by unanimous resolution of all parties, declared on March 17th, 1896, that this demonetization had 'proved injurious to the best interests of this country,' and the Government accepted the resolution and pledged themselves to 'do all in their power' (short of opening the British Mints for the coinage of silver) to arrange an agreement with Foreign nations so as to secure a stable Par of Exchange between gold and silver moneys, and they specially promised as part of such agreement that they would re-open the Indian Mints to silver.

"In June last, the French and American Governments—believing that the British Government intended to keep their pledges—approached our Government and asked them to carry out their promises. These Foreign Governments did not ask that the British Mints should be open to silver, but suggested other contributions to the agreement, more especially the re-opening of the Indian Mints.

"In support of an International Agreement, various representations on behalf of the industries of the country were made to the Government, urging them to carry out their pledges. These included representation from over 400 Trade and Labour Associations, as well as from manufacturing and agricultural interests—the Labour Memorial being described by *The Daily Chronicle* as 'the most important Labour Petition ever presented to Government.'

"We learn, however, that the Government have refused to open the Indian Mints on any terms, and have not troubled to put forward any counter proposals, thus not 'doing all in their power,' and thereby breaking their solemn pledges to the country, and treating with contempt the interests and demands of industry—upon which the wage-earners of the country exist. They have also thereby disgraced this country in the eyes of the world by showing that no Foreign Power can depend upon the pledged words of a British Ministry.

"The cause of this betrayal is not far to seek: the bankers of London petitioned against a settlement of the question, and the Government have abjectly obeyed the demands of this class interest—a class interest which all experience proves is the most selfish and tyrannical in the world. Nothing could show this more than the way in which the memorials were received and acknowledged by the Government. Those which were sent from Industry, including those sent from the Trades and Labour Associations, got a scanty and tardy acknowledgment, whereas the Chancellor of the Exchequer promptly acknowledged the wishes of the Bankers, declaring that their Memorial had received 'the careful attention to which the number and influence of the signatories are entitled.'"

The protest not unnaturally concludes with an appeal to "fellow-workers" to punish the Government, and the Government undoubtedly will be punished if they go on breaking their pledges to the Bimetallists. Moreover, perfidy should be punished.

THE NILE EXPEDITION.

The Khalifa, towards the end of the month, advanced a large force with the intention of attacking Berber. Military experts were rather surprised at this venture on his part. It is true the state of the Nile was in the most favourable condition for an offensive movement, the river being low and navigation and transport thereby impeded, while the Atbara river offers fords which enable it to be crossed easily. On the other hand, the Sirdar's army had just been strengthened by four British battalions. Besides these, he has at

his disposal twelve or thirteen battalions of Egyptian infantry, of which six are Soudanese; altogether he has some 14,000 troops, a force capable of dealing with double the number of Dervishes brought into the field. The column under Osman Digna and Mahmoud was reported to be 20,000 strong. The object of these chiefs was to cross the Atbara river and to advance on Berber. As soon as the advance was reported the Sirdar broke up his encampment at Kenur, a place some twelve miles south of Berber, and marched to meet them at the Atbara fords. On the 22nd March some fighting took place between the Egyptian cavalry, under Colonel Broadwood, and a body of Dervish horsemen. The latter were armed with Remingtons, carbines, and spears. They were driven off with considerable loss and retired up the Atbara. A general engagement was anxiously desired on our side. It should be no difficult matter to deal with an undisciplined army that advances into the open and attempts to march on Berber with the whole river as far up as Shendy at the mercy of our five gunboats, and with no organized system of food supply or transport train! Such a force would have to occupy a length of many miles of desert country. It would be tired, thirsty, and hungry, and its lack of discipline would render it easily vulnerable.

KHARTOUM.

Whether an engagement takes place now or not hardly affects the question of an advance on Khartoum. It seems improbable that this will be attempted before the railway reaches the Atbara river. This will take another two months, after which commissariat arrangements require time to complete. The Anglo-Egyptian force consumes not less than forty tons of food and forage a day, the whole of which has to be brought up from Egypt. Allowing for needful preparation, the capture of Metemmeh can hardly take place before August. Omdurman and Khartoum would then fall in October. Had the Sirdar not been financially starved he could have pushed on earlier, using camel portage, in default of the railway, above the fifth cataract, and thus have accelerated the capture of Khartoum by four months, in which case British troops would not then have been kept up the Nile all the four hottest and wettest, and therefore most unhealthy, months of the year. A gunboat reconnaissance might have been made up to Fashoda, and possibly to Gondokoro, during the next high Nile. Fashoda would have thus been officially occupied by the end of the year. But penny wisdom and pound folly continue to impede Sir Herbert Kitchener.

GREAT BRITAIN AND HER RIVALS IN ASIA.

THE sickly jealousy and the ill-concealed envy with which several of our Great Powers have for a long time regarded England's prosperity of trade and mighty influence over the far distant regions of the globe, have at last come to a head on the coast-line of China. Human nature allows no one to readily acquiesce in the pre-eminence of another, and States, like individuals, cannot regard with pleasure the growth of their neighbour's predominance, either in material warfare, or in political importance. The rivalry between England and France has existed ever since the two countries were created; it has displayed itself in many larger and smaller questions down to the present day, and during the most recent period, owing to the Colonial policy of the Republic in Africa and Tongking has reached such a climax as to render a mutual understanding, and a peaceful agreement extremely difficult. In like manner, we see Russia stepping forward as a powerful opponent of England in two parts of the world: namely, in the first place in Africa, *i.e.*, in Abyssinia, where the Northern Power, really out of mere kindness, has undertaken the *rôle* of a disturber of the peace; and, on the other hand, in Asia, where the Russian Empire stands on native soil, across the whole breadth of the Continent, face to face with its rival, who has forced her way from the Southern seas to the North. The third member of the Triple Alliance is Germany, who has lately joined herself with the opponents of Britain; for in this case also it is first in the Dark Continent that pains have been taken to drive a wedge into the sphere of British influence; and now, by the seizure or lease of Kaio-Tschau, a desire has been displayed to have in Asia also a "finger in the pie." As we have said, no one can question the desire of these three Powers to gain an advantage in the economical struggle, which is the mark of the times, or their wish to diminish the commercial importance of their opponent, who has up to the present been everywhere successful, and has, throughout her career, displayed consistency, endurance, and ability. That is only natural. It is the old story of the struggle for existence, for welfare, and for importance, between the nations: a struggle

in which the opponents are not too particular as regards the ways and means, and in which no particular account is taken of the possible consequences of the overthrow of the victorious rival.

If, then, national egoism and the desire to attain the coveted end restrain the heated combatants from reflection and consideration, relative to the common welfare of mankind, and to the prosperity of our civilization in distant lands, it is only natural that individual onlookers, who have no share in the struggle, and who are untouched by the special national interests, should occupy themselves with stricter disinterestedness in asking themselves the following questions: Firstly, whether the conquest and overthrow of that factor in the spread of the better light of our modern culture, whose efforts have hitherto been successful, might not have a stagnating, or disastrous, effect; secondly, how far these fresh combatants who have appeared on the field of battle can succeed in shaking the position of the envied foe, or in rendering him entirely *hors de combat* in certain regions.

It may be that to the casual reader these questions may seem irrelevant, but they cannot seem so to those who have studied the problem of the civilization of Asia for years, and to whom it cannot be a matter of indifference by which channel the light of the modern world is to be spread throughout the older half of the globe. In his consideration of this matter the enquirer will, at the first glance, perceive that general developments, reforms, and changes in the Asiatic Continent bear upon them a twofold, *i.e.*, a Russian and an English stamp; and that, too, in accordance with the extension of the domain of these two Great Powers. In the Northern half, *e.g.*, from the Caspian Sea to the Pacific, where upon gigantic stretches of country small fragments of peoples are tumbling one upon the other, Russia, *i.e.*, the Slavonian language and Slavonian culture, is predominant, whereas the Southern half of Asia, with trifling exceptions influenced by Great Britain, has made way for the introduction of the English language and English manners. As the light of the modern world is introduced to Caucasians, Turcomans, Kalmuks, Mongols, and others, clad in Russian guise, and as these people see the ideal of modern culture also in Muscovitism, in like manner, from the Persian Gulf over India, Southern China, and throughout Japan, England's language and England's moral code is predominant everywhere. Siamese and Japanese princes, visitors at our Courts, make use of the language of Shakespeare and Milton; the officers of the Japanese fleet, who visited Constantinople, and were invited to the Imperial table in Yildiz, had to have sitting by their side, not a French, but an English interpreter; in Southern China the so-called Pidjin English has become the principal means of intercourse;

while even in Tonquin and Annam, which are French dependencies, the English language is in much more general use than the language of the French occupants. It is absolutely unavoidable that the broad current of the predominant Power's influence should sweep away the small islands of foreign dominion. Frenchmen will never feel themselves at home on Asiatic soil. Where the mighty genius of a Dupleix failed, the deeds of his less gifted successors cannot possibly succeed.

Herewith we are involuntarily brought to the delicate question of the estimation of the abilities of the only serious factors in our European interference in Asia, and we will and cannot refrain from considering this question. It is not the first time that this has occurred to me; and other surely more competent opinions have been expressed. Russia and England alone need be taken into consideration, for Holland's field of enterprize in Java is too limited, France is still a weakling, and Germany has only just now begun her action, or, rather wishes, to begin. The real test has, up to the present, been applied only to Russians and Britons, and the accomplished results, the experiences gained, may be grouped as follows: As far as the civilizing *rôle* of the Russian in Asia is concerned, it is commonly known that, in consequence of his original Asiatic descent, he is a blood-relation of the Asiatic; to the latter he seems also less strange and less repellant, and therefore, of course, can better work as teacher than the Englishman, who has been brought up in the unadulterated culture of the West, and is saturated through and through with modern cosmopolitanism. Perhaps, in forms of government, in social intercourse, in manners, customs, or in superstitions, the Asiatic sees in the person of his Russian master no particular stranger, no being who seems quaint to him. In view of such mutual relations, it is easily perceptible that the pupil takes up from his master many novelties that please his fancy, precisely as the master himself, on his side, without being forced into the necessity of doing so, is apt to allow himself to be influenced by his pupil; for example, among the Russians who have been for any length of time in Central Asia, very many, in no respect commendable, Tartar and other customs are to be remarked. The action is mutual, and in that the example of the proprietor and occupier of the land meets with greater reverence and more imitation, the Asiatic profits steadily from the half Europeanism of the Russian, which may lead him to a better future. The more well-to-do Tartar in Tashkend and elsewhere, prefers to furnish his dwelling in a European manner; also in food, beverages, and dress he wishes to resemble the proprietor of the land; his children attend the Russian school; in a word, he is already like the Russian, in as far as his religion,

to which he clings pertinaciously, his love of custom, and his Asiatic spirit of conservatism allow him.

Had Russia made its only and principal aim the civilization of Asia, and the bettering of the more sensible conditions there found, the working of the Russian authorities during several centuries had produced much more brilliant results than those we see to-day before us in such places as Astrakhan, and everywhere where the Russian two-headed eagle spreads its wings. Unfortunately, however, the civilizing efforts of the Russians serve only as a means to obtaining the dominion over the conquered districts, and the final goal aimed at is, and remains, the Russifying of the subjugated peoples, *i.e.*, the appeasing of the ever hungry Slavonian Moloch, who has to-day attained gigantic proportions. Unconditional absorption, destruction of the foreign element, was ever the particular aim of the Russian conquest. Therefore is it that Tartars, and Caucasians, in spite of the already ancient Russian guardianship, have, in few or no respects, been modernized. They have become obedient tax-payers, and peaceful subjects of the Czar, but in culture and freedom are not even so far advanced as their Russian fellow-citizens, upon whom, at least here and there, a glimmer of Western light shines. Only when the latter are already far advanced will it be possible for an improvement to take root also among the foreign elements of the Czar's Empire, unless these same elements are not previously swallowed up by the great Russian monster.

If we now turn our gaze from the Russian civilizer of Asia to his British rival, we shall find that the latter in his individual qualifications leaves much to be desired. Still, in general results, he is to be preferred to the former; for the tendency and spirit of his work of civilization, in spite of the meagreness and failings of the means at his command, have still attained a respectable, nay, even a splendid measure of success. The Englishman, as he appears in Asia, appears with the same attributes, advantages, and disadvantages, except for the foggy air, as in his island-home—outwardly reserved, cold, proud, and pretentious. Brought up amid such sights, such teachings and customs, as are diametrically opposed to the Asiatic's point of view, it is not wonderful that, when face to face with Hindoos, Siamese, and Chinese, who bow in the dust before him, he regards himself as a higher being, approaches the latter never or seldom in a friendly manner, values always more highly obedience than sympathy, and, in fact, is more feared and honoured than loved. This sorry truth has been brought of late particularly into prominence, when the accelerated means of communication between the

Mother Country and her Asiatic possessions, renders impossible a continuous long term of internal and actual intercourse with the natives as it does a closer relation with them.

A service of two or three years is followed by a furlough of six or eight months: and as the desire to see Europe grows, the feeling of aversion towards the strange country and climate of the dependent Asiatics increases. This was not ever the case. The Englishman spent decades under the hot sun of India, he got rid of many of the narrow and canting prejudices of his national character: and, in consequence, displayed a greater flexibility in his relations with the natives, and his influence was more advantageous than that of the younger generation of Anglo-Indians. Only under such circumstances was it possible to lay the foundation-stone of that edifice, which we admire to-day in Great Britain's Indian Empire.

Granted that in the individual characteristics of the British civilizer there is so much to censure and find fault with, yet, on the other hand, there is no denying the fact that the faults and foibles in the Englishman's character are outweighed by a display of such excellences and traits of character as place him high above his Russian rival, and qualify him for that civilizing activity, the results of which we do right to admire to-day in every quarter of the globe. These national characteristics find their origin in centuries of culture, and manifest themselves above all in the free development of individualism, in restless activity, in self-reliance, and in a rare display of a sense of justice, what he calls in his language "Fair-play." It is quite natural that the Briton, endowed with such attributes, produces quite different results on Asiatic soil from those produced by the Russian, who, ground down by the stern guardianship of his absolutist government, has his field of action bounded by a despotic will, and is everywhere dependent upon the protection and aid of his officials. The Englishman who comes into Asia, bent upon some commercial or industrial enterprise, seldom seeks his Ambassador or Consul:—"I have nothing to do with that man," are words I have often heard from the mouth of an Englishman: he seeks and finds his protector in his own energy and strength of will, and upon this defiant, unshakable feeling of independence, rests the iron stability of his dealings. One would think the sleepy, indolent, lazy Asiatic fatalist had no appreciation of such characteristics; on the contrary, they inspire fear, respect, and reverence, and actually form a solid rampart against which must break the heedlessness and fatalism of the Orientals. Even in the case of the Hindoo, that prototype of Asiaticism, the national characteristics of the Briton, have had a brilliant success. Here we see the spectacle of a mere

handful of Europeans among 280,000,000 Asiatics, not merely holding them in, but actually leading them by gradual steps to follow the paths of European thought, order, and will: yea, more, a change in culture is discerned here, such as, up to the present day, has found no place in the history of the culture of mankind. The Universities, Colleges, and National Schools of India have turned hundreds of thousands of educated Asiatics into half-Europeans; security of life and property, unknown even during the Golden Age under native princes, is now felt throughout the country. Justice knows no difference between class and class; roads, railways, and canals traverse the huge Indian Empire, and even liberalism, that plant quite unknown to Asiatic soil, begins to spread on each side, as is far from being the case in many regions of the Christian West.

These results are to be exclusively ascribed to the British national character, and he who compares such achievements with the corresponding Russian successes in Asia, will note that the superior pliability of the Russian favours the Russian system of territorial encroachment rather than the well-being, the culture, and the advancement of the Asiatic subject of the Czar. Asiatics thoroughly refined and learned, statesmen, judges, and journalists, such as are to be met with in India, have not yet issued from the society of Tartars subjected for more than three hundred years to Russian influence. We can number by hundreds Hindoos and Mussulmans of India who can hold their own, not merely with the Mohamedan of Russia, but also with Russians themselves, in Western culture; and when, in spite of all this, people among us in Europe speak of the fitness of Russia to civilize Asia, this can only be attributed, firstly, to our sad indifference to this weighty question; secondly, however, to the fashion that has lately grown up among us of glorifying Muscovitism.

Did one desire to extend this parallel between Russians and Englishmen also to the other nations of Europe, it will very soon be clear that, in comparison with German and Frenchman, the Briton easily maintains his part of *facile princeps*. Our views in this respect may seem, to the egoistic pride of the last-mentioned nations, not particularly flattering; yet the dry, unconcealable facts only strengthen our position. As far as France is concerned, we simply ask: Where has she distinguished herself as a civilizer or colonizer, in Asia or in Africa? In Algiers, where she has reigned for more than half a century, the Moslem population has profited little or nothing at all from its French masters. Here we seek in vain for that refining and reforming success, to which the English can point in India with just pride. Here is the same exuberance of fanaticism and ignorance as in the days of the Deys. Our culture

and manners have found no imitator, despite the fact that the relation in numbers between Frenchmen and Arabs here is far more favourable to such a result than, for example, in India; for in Algiers about 300,000 Frenchmen sojourn amidst a native population of 4,000,000, while in India 100,000 Englishmen may be the proportion to 288,000,000 natives. Still, despite the greater proportion of French masters, the result of their teaching is much smaller. It will also be a very long time, if in general it is at all possible, before French Mohammedans will attain such a brilliant success in the field of literature, administration, and politics as are to-day attained by Mussulmans and Hindoos in India, where the number of English-speaking and English-writing natives already exceeds a million, and where the latter, in their national Congresses, and in their numerous journals, discuss public affairs so clearly and frankly, and subject to a sharp and even fierce criticism the government and management of the foreign ruler. What we said about Algiers may be repeated as to Tunis; and as regards the civilizing success of the French in the territories in Africa but lately acquired, there is scarcely any suggestion of a change for the better, for France has so far scarcely obtained a firm footing, and is merely seeking for exclusive "markets."

Now, as regards the position of the French in Tonkin, Annam, and Cambodia, the introduction of the inimical Western culture into these erstwhile Chinese provinces, wherein the Chinese world of culture has left deep traces, might afford, not merely the French, but to any other European Power, considerable difficulty. Still, when we take into consideration the fact that there are more than half a million Christians in Annam and Tonkin, whose conversion dates from the seventeenth century, and that among these there are very many versed in Latin, who could adopt our civilization far more easily than many other Asiatics, the French civilizer seems to have misused a great opportunity, for his work here shows itself quite as unproductive as in Africa.

It is, of course, difficult to deny that the civilizing effect of a European people in the midst of a company of old and strange cultures depends, in many respects, upon the national characteristics rather than on the ethics and political maturity of the civilizer. Not in the higher grades of refinement, but in the individual independence and strength of will, brought to maturity by skilful development, lies the capability of producing a potent influence upon foreign elements; for, in reality, greatness and endurance can be attained, not by Governments, but only by peoples. The best proof of this is found in the Colonial policy of the German Empire, which is, as yet, certainly young. The Germans, the race of thinkers, without doubt, stand higher, as far as school education

is concerned, than Frenchmen and Englishmen. They have, for example, won considerable fame as teachers in the Southern and Eastern parts of Europe that touch their borders; but, up to the present, it has not been proved whether they have the ability to maintain an intercourse with wholly or half wild peoples, and, as tutors, to set them upon the road to a new and better order of things. It is almost a quarter of a century since Germany began to found colonies in Africa; and on the territory acquired up to the present, representing some 920,920 square miles, with a population of 8,370,000 souls, there is not as yet the least trace of a happily grounded civilization of the subjects there; while, for example, England, in just the same time, has attained a respectable success in the Western and Southern regions of the Dark Continent. This must be clear to us at once if we compare the progress of Nigeria or Nyassaland with that in German East Africa. The German possessions in Africa, in reality, were outlets of trade to support the export industry of the Fatherland, and offer no impulse at all to the work of civilization, and before the German Michael turned his thoughts to Colonial politics, the more active and vigorous John Bull has already snapped up the best bits before his nose. Still, in spite of all, the civilizing capability of a people so highly educated as the Germans ought to have made a better impression; and the impartial spectator must come to the conclusion that the experiences gained in Africa on the German side do not justify any great expectations of her field of action in Asia.

If it be so, and I think it is, every person who watches European influence in Asia will agree with me that the stepping into the field against England, whether due to a combined plot or to individual interests, of Russia, France, and Germany cannot appear particularly favourable to our educational mission in the Old World. None of the three nations I have mentioned possesses the degree of endurance, ability, and inspiration for the great work they would undertake in the same measure as England, and none of them would be fit to take the place of the latter should it so happen that the attempt to overthrow England's influence succeeded. Naturally, the European Triple Alliance disowns any such intention in Eastern Asia. It is denied in interested circles that the motto *Pereat Anglia* has been inscribed on the standards; there is only a desire to hedge in the commercial omnipotence and to weaken the supremacy of Britain's preponderance on the sea; for it is hoped, that by lessening the sphere of action of English industry, to bar the way of the Briton, to diminish his welfare in his island home, and by such means to draw the teeth and tear out the claws of the British lion

Now, however, we shall see that the three combined enemies can effect very little openly against their rival, though he may soon stand utterly isolated; for, as we have said, all three are wanting in those fundamental conditions which have helped the Briton to win supremacy, and will probably, in the future, also serve him as instruments in his commercial rule in Eastern Asia. If we pass under close scrutiny the spirit of commerce of the three Anglophobe combatants, it can be shown that the French merchant, for example, in spite of enormous enterprise and the boldest ventures, comes nowhere into prominence—except in North Africa and in the Levant. He is, and remains by preference, as the spoilt child by the side of his mother *La France;* he feels no particular inclination to intercourse with the distant stranger, and only prospers in a place where he can command. On the other hand, the Russian has ever displayed a peculiar desire to roam—a remnant of the Asiatic nomad feeling—and individual Russian merchants had, already in the last century, ventured into the most remote parts of neighbouring Asia little visited by other Europeans. Only these were retail dealers, hawkers, rather than great merchants, in the peculiar sense of the word, who, versed in the language and manners of the Asiatics, set up petty businesses, but never attained the higher grade of wholesale trade by dint of greater enterprises. The German, a complete stranger on Asiatic soil, has, apart from the enterprises of the Hansa, where only foreign agents acted as middlemen, made his appearance only quite recently in the Levant and in East Asia. It is well known that a first appearance has everywhere been attended with success. In Turkey the political and personal relations of the German Government and of German princes have served their country a good turn; and, in spite of the narrowness attached to every upstart, in intercourse with genuine Asiatics, the German is no discounted personality with Turks and Arabs. In India, China, and Japan the German enjoys in like manner a certain degree of reverence, although in his relations in those parts with natives, on account of the use of the English language as a means of communication, he cannot even bring his German peculiarities particularly into prominence.

As to whether now, in the course of time, the three nations we have mentioned will change their individual characters in such a measure as to be able to successfully compete with the Briton, it would be audacious to express an opinion. At present, the Englishman occupies a decidedly advantageous position. He has completely Anglicized East Asia, inclusive of the greater part of Southern Asia, in the strictest sense of the word. And as in West Asia, by the collective words "Frengi" and "Frengistan,"

Europe and Europeans are understood, in spite of the fact that in origin these words mean France and Frenchmen, so from the South of Persia right across to Japan the name of Englishmen is identified with that of the whole of Europe. In view of this fact the three Powers have a difficult position as against their rival. Above all, they have to struggle against the overwhelming superiority in numbers of Englishmen, who, as merchants, artisans, and clerks, have already established themselves in the already-mentioned regions of the Old World, and feel themselves quite at home there. In India this state of affairs is perfectly natural, and this possession of the British Crown was, so to say, the stepping-stone for the further extension towards the East. In this manner Siam has become modernized on English lines. Starting from Hong-Kong, British influence has possessed itself of the whole of South China; and, in spite of the influence of the Catholic missions, the pupils of the Language College at Tung Wen-Kuan prefer to learn English, as the language most widely spread in the Far East. So we learn from the Japanese author, Hitomi Itschitaro, that in Japan instruction is given in six French and eight German schools, as opposed to ninety English schools of languages, and that in the latter there are 5,646 pupils enrolled. If we reckon in also those attending forty-two State schools, forty-nine special schools, forty-seven normal schools, and eighty-two second-grade schools, the whole number of English learning pupils comes to about 50,000. In correspondence with this, the number of Anglo-Saxons in Japan is also much greater than that of other Europeans, for in accordance with a statistical report made in the year 1895, the following number of foreigners was in Japan:—

Englishmen	1,878
Americans	1,022
Germans	493
Frenchmen	391

And it can cause no surprise when the author, Hitomi Itschitaro, in Vol. II., No. 1, of the publication *The Far East* (an English translation of the Japanese monthly magazine, *Kokumin-no-Tomo*), gives expression to the opinion that Shakespeare occupies a predominant place in Japanese literature. With this national representation English commerce also goes hand in hand; which commerce has, during the last two decades, taken firm root in Japan. In this question the following statistics taken from the Japanese report above mentioned might be of service. In the year 1877:—

EXPORTS.

England (Wares of value)	...	...	6,298,219	Yen.
America ,, ,,	...	...	5,219,886	,,
France ,, ,,	...	...	4,866,518	,,
Germany ,, ,,	...	...	55,948	,,

IMPORTS.

England (Goods of value)	...	...	15,679,111	Yen.
America ,, ,,	...	...	1,736,651	,,
France ,, ,,	...	...	3,031,037	,,
Germany ,, ,,	...	...	700,981	,,

After an interval of eighteen years, *i.e.*, in 1895 :—

EXPORTS.

England (Goods of value)	...	...	7,883,091	Yen.
America ,, ,,	...	...	54,028,950	,,
France ,, ,,	...	...	22,006,385	,,
Germany ,, ,,	...	...	3,340,013	,,

IMPORTS.

England (Goods of value)	...	...	45,172,111	Yen.
America ,, ,,	...	...	9,276,360	,,
France ,, ,,	...	...	5,180,135	,,
Germany ,, ,,	...	...	2,233,159	,,

These years prove clearly how disappearingly trivial the trade of the rest of Europe is side by side with the Imports and Exports of England and America. When we turn to similar statistics concerning Chinese trade, according to the Statesman's Year-book of the year 1892—

England with			41,443,633	Taels.
Hong-Kong with			133,217,855	,,
India with			22,471,703	,,
America with			25,705,870	,,
Europe (except Russia) with ...			24,889,675	,,
Russia with			12,081,912	,,

took part in Chinese trade, the gigantic preponderance of the Anglo-Saxon race as compared with the whole of Europe stands quite clearly before our eyes. We find it quite intelligible that such a predominance in the material field is irritating, and provokes opposition. No one is pleased to see others growing over his head, and, least of all, where it is a question of the material welfare of a nation. The Triple Alliance against England in the Far East and in Asia generally seems to be quite justifiable; only to us, the neutral spectators, it will seem that the incongruity between the desires and prospects of these three factors is so striking that the chances

of open victory appear very small as yet, and that their ultimate success depends in reality only upon national and political reform, *i.e.*, Russians, Frenchmen, and Germans will be on equal footing with, or in a more advantageous position than, their British rival on the field of Asiatic competition only when their national character has become as ripened by the sun of political freedom as that of the Englishmen and Americans. Earlier, however, in no case, despite the ambition of individual princes, and despite the dreams of world-empire indulged in by individual dynasties! To found the commerce of the world in the Far East cannot be the task of a Government; rather it depends solely and entirely upon the energy, the courage, and far-sightedness of the *bourgeoisie* of the countries interested. When Queen Elizabeth granted the Letters Patent to the first Indian Trade Company in 1600, shortly before her death, no one, even in his boldest dreams, would have imagined that, out of the so-called "John Company," a mighty Empire of 1,808,258 English square miles, with a population of almost 288,000,000, would have arisen. That this has, notwithstanding, been the case, is to be ascribed to the remarkable energy, the iron will, and the constancy without parallel in the history of mankind, that constancy with which the British national spirit from small beginnings, and through continual struggles, has founded and maintained so mighty a creation. If, with this remark in view, one looks aside at the growth of Russia, with the object of discovering analogous appearance, it should not be overlooked that in the process by which the Duchy of Moscow rose into the giant Empire of the Czar, the chief part has been played, not by the people, but by the State; the State which, even to-day, represents a creative Power, without which the Russian does and can undertake nothing. It is actually this divergence in the sources of power that differentiates the results of the creations of either side. We would look in vain in Russia's efforts for the deep-rooted solidity of the English undertakings. Here there is still much that is hollow and empty; the gigantic manifests itself only in outward form, all is calculated to impose and to terrorize, and the captivating charm of the rich phantasy of the Russians could, finally, deceive only the inexperienced or the superficial observer.

When, thirty years ago, the Russians possessed themselves of Central Asia, the droning notes of a political and material improvement, that in the immediate future spread further, were to be heard. It was that the cotton produce of the Khanates would cripple similar industries in South America, Egypt, and India, and that Russian products would flood Asia and the world with cheap goods. A like sanguine feeling manifested itself with regard to the opening in 1886 of the Transcaspian Road, for which people in Russian

circles predicted a world-wide importance, although the traffic, after ten years, is still at all times very slight. To us the present policy, with respect to Manchuria and North China, does not seem either any more promising for a solid and extraordinary development of Russia's economical and political greatness. Having regard to the want of population in the greater part of this district, it can only affect the far-distant future. Prince Uchtomski, who accompanied the writer on his journey to Asia, may well lay stress on the relationship of the Russian with the Asiatic, consequently, also, with the Chinese, in manners and blood; still it will be a pretty long time before a Czar will sit upon the throne at Pekin. A railway from Manchuria to Port Arthur may and will guarantee to the Russians the long-desired opening to the Southern Seas. Still England need not turn grey-headed; for the lot of the commercial and industrial world struggle lies not in Asia, but at home, *i.e.*, in the great power for work, and in the power of will, and in the free development of the European peoples concerned. Our remarks concerning Russia apply, in certain respects, to Germans and Frenchmen too. The acquisition of Kiao-Tschau will in any case prove itself useful to German trade as an emporium, coaling and provision station, and as a *pied-à-terre;* yet it is still very questionable if it is intended thereby to acquire a part of Northern China in the province of Schan-Tung, for this would indicate the first step towards the partition of China; at any rate a very far remote eventuality, which must be preceded by great international complications. As to the French aspirations in the heavenly flowery kingdom of the Middle, one might simply ask the question. France, by the annexation of the former dependencies of China, through her position in Annam, Tonkin, and Cambodia, has not raised as yet her trade in the Far East to any importance, and has been unable to inflict any very great damage on her English rival. Will, and can she, by virtue of her alliance with the other two opponents of Great Britain, succeed any better in this respect? I scarcely think so. In this whole contest of three against one, Russia will gain the most. The signal was given from St. Petersburg, Russia is the moving spirit of the whole campaign, whom the blindly submissive and passive Republic follows everywhere. Now Germany also has been taken in tow, for her youthful monarch, thirsty for action, seizes every opportunity for realizing his ideal, even when the goal is shrouded in the mist of uncertainty, and is far from considering the cost of the undertaking.

Conceived in this sense, the struggle conducted against England under the protecting ægis of Russia is quite explicable. It is a skilful flank movement in the interest of the world struggle that has broken out throughout the length and breadth of the Asiatic

Continent against the British rival, along a far-reaching line, the individual points of which have already been sufficiently well mapped out, and which is now to find its strategic completion in the final point in the Far East. As there can be no question at all of a retirement of the combatants, so the question, "*quid nunc?*" forces itself above everything into prominence. If the opponents will not step forward in open inimical action, clinging to the latest acquired points, all remains as it was. The German may feather his nest in Kiao-Tschau, the Russians make themselves at home in Port Arthur, and the French ogle with Yun-nan from their neighbouring station. No one will disturb them. However, should the Chinese Triple Alliance, whether in united or individual action, display open antagonism towards England, by making it their object to produce a forcible exclusion of English trade from certain districts of the Chinese Empire, this may lead to complications, the consequences of which can scarcely be overlooked. As universally known, the English occupation of Asiatic territory has, up to the present, nowhere inflicted any damage on foreign trade interests. In Indian harbour towns, as Hong-Kong, non-British trade can move quite undisturbed, and competes openly and freely with the trade of the owner of the country. This is proved by the statistical table of Indian Import and Export trade; France, for example, in 1896, exported from India wares to the value of 8,660,680 rupees, and Germany to the value of 7,718,877 rupees; both countries have engaged in a corresponding Import trade. Of Russia this cannot be said. In her case prohibitive duties and other kinds of chicanery have made foreign trade absolutely impossible, and since the Russian conquest in Central Asia, foreign articles can only with difficulty, or not at all, compete with those of Russia. Whether by prohibitive duties, or by other means of hindrance, England will never submit to the retrenchment of her trade in the Far East, and will shrink from no means of preserving it should it be menaced by the Triplice. Who would issue victorious from the struggle thus forced upon England, is very easy to guess, having regard to the maritime character of the theatre of war, and considering the energetic resistance of which mighty Albion is capable. To us, the disinterested and impartial onlookers at this not very edifying spectacle, to us, I say, the possible downfall of England, cannot be at all a matter of indifference, for we are concerned with the higher interests of Europe in Asia, and up to the present we have been accustomed to see in England the successful standard-bearer of our civilization. It is always questionable whether the possible victors possess the capability and the will necessary for the completion of this task. To judge according to our own experience up to the present, it is a work the issue of

which is doubtful, for the simple reason that the government of the peoples concerned are not inspired by that spirit of freedom, which would alone enable the alien to spread light among the least advanced parts of mankind. The sad picture of the French Republic suggests no indications of successful development of Asiatic society, and, as concerns the two Empires, the grimaces of the everywhere grinning mediæval tendencies are certainly less likely to supply our brushes with the materials for an encouraging picture in the future. With all her faults and failings England is still the truest representative of the aims and endeavours of the nineteenth century; in the spirit of the English people the will and work of our modern cosmopolitanism finds its best expression; and, therefore, the true friend of freedom and enlightenment were truly grieved if England came to any harm, and if this civilizing Power should be crippled in Asia.

H. Vambéry.

THE POLICY OF RUSSIA.

A SURVEY of the last three years of the present Tsar's reign discloses the fact that there is no other department of her political life wherein Russia can show more splendid achievements than in her foreign policy. The results of this last year, especially, show Russian diplomacy at its best. Through her foreign policy, not only has Russia maintained her rights to a foremost position in the European Concert, but she has played her cards so well that now the chief efforts of other European Powers seem spent in cajoling her into manifesting some friendly rapprochement with each one individually.

These efforts show themselves especially in the frequent "pilgrimages"—as they have been sarcastically called—of the Emperors of Germany and Austria and the President of the French Republic to St. Petersburg. The Russian bear, however, is coy, and it is a question whether any one of the so-called "pilgrims" has ever brought any substantial, genuine "relic" back for the edification of his people—whether in treaty or agreement. Let us hope, however, that their visits have yielded them several valuable object-lessons. Each in turn has received a hearty welcome from the Russian people, and they have been able to see with their own eyes that Russia's strength is not confined to her gigantic army, but lies rather in the mutual love which binds Tsar and people together.

The Tsar is "Father" of his people, both in a political and a religious sense.

If, also, the "pilgrims" have been sufficiently skilled to see below the surface they have by this time learnt that *Russia only* pursues a definite and certain policy. She does not depend on a fickle *vox populi* which blows, like the wind, where it listeth, nor is she hampered by the vagaries of Party strife. The Tsar is the head of the nation; he is at the helm of the statecraft ship; he is the father, and the nation are his children. King Majority is not known in Russia, and too many cooks, in politics, never spoil her broth.

Thus it happens that the autocratic power wielded by the Tsar

and which is a *sine quâ non* of Russia's internal government, serves also as the most effective instrument for carrying out her foreign policy.

Why was Alexander III. called the "Peacemaker"? *Au fond*, because he was an autocratic ruler. Why was Russia able to show such progress when Alexander III. ascended the Throne? For the same reason: his predecessors were autocratic rulers.

Why should autocracy be the best form of government? Because through it alone can a settled line of policy be steadfastly adhered to. Russia has such a settled line of policy; and she is the only nation that is able to make that boast. Compare only the political methods of other nations, where the work of one session is often retarded by the next, the good of one Party is regarded as an evil by the other Party, and so on. Progress by other nations is only attained in the zig-zag fashion of the ostrich; Russia alone, and owing to the form of her Government, is able to go straight to the mark.

There are some Russian patriots who think that Russia could gain even wider influence if she would break altogether with the European Concert and pursue her own objects unaided. In this view, however, we cannot entirely agree.

Russia certainly, when she was much weaker than she is now, received so many kicks from that same European Concert that the very name remains as a sort of bugbear to some people. The "European Concert," in fact, though it preaches universal benevolence and well-doing, only performs what it preaches when afraid to do otherwise. A weaker brother is looked upon as legitimate prey: none but the strong deserve the weak. It is a brotherhood whose members treat one another with mutual esteem and suspicion.

Russia, however, is now strong enough to hold her own; but we have not yet forgotten the Berlin Congress, when Prince Bismarck and Lord Beaconsfield combined to rob us of that which we had so dearly bought with our blood and treasure. But after all we brought it partly on ourselves, for we were only treated so badly at the Berlin Congress because we were not so self-assertive as our brother Powers. Time has taught us the value of bluster: we must profit by it. The European Concert seems a sort of competition wherein the prize is to get your leadership acknowledged. Being a partner therein Russia knows all the aims and ambitions of her co-partners, and her only satisfaction is that she is now able to thwart them in any designs which they may meditate against herself. The Power that can afford to play the "waiting game" at the European Concert is the Power most to be dreaded. Russia plays that game, and as neither England nor Germany can under-

take anything in contravention of the wishes of other Powers, and these other Powers are more or less controlled by Russia, it follows that everything tends towards the adoption of a general "blocking" policy, which is just what Russia wants.

Having now strengthened her position in the Near East, Russia can proceed to the Far East and find an outlet for her commerce in Eastern waters. She must have such an outlet, and as the Paris and Berlin Congresses so unjustly barred her from taking, as it were, the real "door of her own house"—the entrance to the Black Sea—she must find that outlet elsewhere. Russia, with her vast wealth, which is only superficially known in Western Europe, needs outside fields for her enterprise; the *idée fixe* now in Russia is to gain open access to the seas—everything else will follow. We are not allowed to use the Dardanelles, so we must go somewhere else. Besides, in seeking an outlet in the Far East, we are bearing in mind another thing: that we shall thus obtain a satisfactory terminus for our Great Siberian Railway, and also complete an iron belt traversing all Eurasia. This is a matter of vital importance to us, and therefore it is not surprising that we should be despatching our most able men to the East to gain, by diplomacy, that which other Powers, through selfish jealousy, do not want us to gain. The diplomacy of to-day, however, has quite changed from that of former times; it is no longer a duel of shrewd wits, with slices of our neighbouring or other territories as the prize. Diplomatists nowadays have to consider the economical and spiritual interests of their nations. Bon-mots have become obsolete, and the rapier-like wit and methods of a Talleyrand have, like crinolines, gone out of fashion. Our methods to-day are more ponderous, more calculating, and cold-blooded. A political question will open now with certain stereotyped formulæ which make diplomacy resemble chess: if our opponent moves his Kt. to K.B. 4, we reply Kt. to Q.B. 4, and so restore the equilibrium—or try to do so.

Europe has just entered on a war of diplomacy with the East—it is not so much a war of skill as a war of differences.

Under the modest cognomen of "The Chinese Loan" we have before us, in reality, the "Chinese Question" in an acute form—or, better still, the Far Eastern or East Asiatic Question.

The real importance of this question lies in the fact that it threatens to disturb the equilibrium of the Powers. It is not altogether new for diplomatists, and politicians have had casual acquaintance with the difficulty for some years. But there is this difference: we used to have only one Eastern Question, and our hands were full with that; but now, since the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed, we have two. All eyes are now directed on the Far

East, and particular interest is being shown in that great Russian engineering enterprise to which the world will owe an unbroken railroad communication from one end of Eurasia to the other—from Calais to Port Arthur. Great thanks are due to Russian diplomacy if only for this boon. It is through the skilful diplomacy of the Minister of Finance, M. Witte, that concessions for the construction and exploitation of this great railway have been granted by the Chinese to the Russo-Chinese Bank. Manchuria, Korea, and Mongolia are very little known in Europe; Chinese diplomacy has surrounded them with a barrier exceedingly difficult to penetrate; but these conditions are about to change. Russia will see that these countries are opened up, and it is not too much to surmise that they are bound to play an important *rôle* in history in the near future. The whole East, to some people, is still enshrouded in a veil of mystery; what may be behind that veil is indeed known to a few, but to the many it is quite unknown.

The question of the hour is, What is Russia going to do?

The English Press tries to show that Russia has only political interests at stake; that she wants to monopolize all China; that she has no commercial interest whatever, neither in China, Korea, nor Japan. In making these, and such like, mild assertions, the English Press quite forgets that the Russian frontier extends along the whole of Northern China up to Eastern Turkestan; and that Russians have had dealings with Eastern nations for centuries past. More than 200 years ago, in fact, we find diplomatic and commercial relations existing between Russia and China.

Besides, we Russians have always taken the greatest interest in the Chinese, and the greatest pains in studying them. Our diplomatists and merchants have always enjoyed peculiar facilities for travelling in China, and without being molested by the inhabitants. Our merchants enter into regular contracts with them, and are received everywhere in a friendly manner. One of the chief factors in this general friendliness is this: that Russians do not look down upon the Chinese. They treat them as their equals in every way, thus gaining their esteem and numerous opportunities for studying their national peculiarities at the same time.

Through this knowledge of Chinese *vie intime* we are able to picture the people in a truer light than the one generally familiar amongst other Western nations.

The Englishman, for instance, is told by eloquent missionaries that the Chinaman is only a poor benighted heathen; that he does not even know the blessings of universal brotherhood, as enjoined by the Scriptures; that he has no clear ideas of heaven; and other evils innumerable are recited.

The Chinese certainly do not know the blessings of Christianity, but they have a very keen eye on the weak points of professing Christians, and with reason. They do not, for instance, see that the Christian ideal of universal brotherhood is carried out in practice. In fact, they are driven to doubt the existence of "universal brotherhood" altogether, when they see that it only leads to conflicts and a display of bickerings between professedly Christian nations. A Chinaman also cannot conceive the idea of anyone loving his neighbour, whom he does not know, and with whom, perhaps, he has no kind of friendly sympathy—the idea expresses an absurdity to him. Neither can he see any reason or good sense in the idea that all men are equals. He at once says: "But how can I look upon a beggar or a criminal as my equal? They have been evil, and the reward for evil-doing is with them."

This retort is perfectly reasonable, because it is no easy thing in China to become a beggar, as all relations must help each other. He must be a very bad man indeed whom relations refuse to help and a hopeless case like this would be ostracized and despised. In no other country is a man himself so directly responsible for his own actions as in China.

The Chinaman is not *à priori* hostile to the foreigner. No cultured European, whoever and whatever he may be, need fear enmity from him. Indeed, it has frequently happened that a Chinaman has entered into friendly, and even intimate, relations with an European. But there is a racial borderline between the two, and whenever the European—even though it may be one esteemed as a cultured man by his fellows—begins to disclose his racial bias, whenever he shows his contempt for the Ching-Chang-Chopsticks, as he may call him, or whenever he forgets himself in drink, then the Celestial ceases to regard him as a fellow-man, but as something apart from himself and wholly noxious. Such men, he reasons, are the weeds of humanity, and he does the same by them as he does by those members of his own society who have forfeited their claims to honour and support by their misdeeds—he tries to root them up.

When we study the principles of Chinese life, and when we see how zealously they try to live up to these principles, then we must see that the race possesses all qualifications necessary to reach the highest degrees of mental, industrial, and political development. At the present time, and from an industrial point only, we can see how Chinese labour makes its way in Canada, the United States, Mexico, Central America, Peru, Brazil, Australia, the Philippines, and Singapore and Saigon. Steady, industrious, and generally free from vice, they only ask to be allowed to work and to be let alone, while the white worker's idea seems to be firstly, the less

work the better, and secondly, complete liberty to interfere in other people's affairs.

Gradually, and as soon as the Chinese become amenable to European culture, they are bound to prove an immense force in the world, both industrially, politically, and morally. It is difficult to conceive even the possibility of their ever becoming Christians, if only for the reason that the missionaries of the different Christian denominations do not live in concord, but are for ever quarrelling. This is quite contrary to the spirit of the Chinese, besides which we spoil our own game by it, for whom is the Chinaman to believe when the apostles of "universal brotherhood and truth" call one another liars? Furthermore, the Chinese can see that the life of the Christians is not built upon firm foundations; that our ideals remain beautiful in theory and are seldom carried out; and that our deeds nearly always contradict our words. Honesty, paternal reverence, faith, constancy, &c., are only too often mere words on the lips of Europeans. The Chinese also despise us and look upon us as a people who will stop at no dishonourable act so long as money is to be gained thereby: we would sell our fathers for money, say they, and the average European cannot understand what a depth of contempt is expressed by the Chinaman in this simple phrase. It is unfortunate for us, perhaps, that they should thus judge the European by his deeds and not by his words, but they do certainly judge us so, and for this reason only call us the "red devils from beyond the sea."

The Chinese as a race, are the most conservative people on the globe, as their history proves. They argue that their ways of life are the best possible ways, seeing that their chief concern lies in securing the happiness of the individual on earth and the welfare of the State. War is held in abhorrence by them, and they are more truly Christians in this respect, practically and not theoretically, than the Christians themselves. The Chinaman is a man of no ideals; that which he is taught to believe is right, he practises, and remains faithful to it.

We can see that people of other nations, when they enter a foreign country, gradually assimilate their life, type, creed, and language to those peculiar to that country, and proportionally so to the length of their stay. On the other hand, once a Chinaman, always a Chinaman.

In the course of their long history they have often lost their independence, but never yet have they proved faithless to their national traditions. China stands essentially the same at the present as she was in the past, but where are those twenty invading nations who conquered China one after the other? They have themselves unstable, become merged into the immutable Chinese

It is a triumph of passivity over activity. Rome could not resist the hordes of Alaric, because time had proved that the foundations of their empire were built on the sands; the empire of China is built on the rock, and has weathered as many storms as the present Eddystone lighthouse. Barbaric hordes have rushed over her—barbarians too, such as Rome never saw—but nevertheless China stands to-day, and where are they? The social bacteria, which find and have found ample scope for developing their evil work on less healthy bodies, can find no hold on China. The country thrives, and its people multiplies in an extraordinary degree. They are overflowing into all contiguous countries, and it is not too much to say, in spite of all our native prejudice, that they are benefiting those countries indirectly by so doing. Who can foretell which countries they will inhabit by sheer passive insistency in, say, 200 or 300 years? And nothing will be able to stop them. For in spite of the spasmodic activity of Eurasia, in spite of her navies, armies, prohibitions, and general fuss and bother, China stands, and will stand. History prophesies so, for from the past we may judge the future.

The artificial barriers, however, which the white man has always raised between himself and the yellow are bound to be eventually broken down before the great power of the Chinese—a power which is more strong, as we have before hinted, because it is passive.

And another thing is certain, the Chinese will always retain their racial characteristics, that is to say, they will not suffer material alteration through any future intercourse with foreigners. The Mongolian stock is absorbent, and just as the Norman Fitzgeralds, Bradys, &c., became more Keltic than Kelts themselves when they settled in Ireland, so it will happen with any foreigners settling in China in the future.

What can be simpler than their life principles—so simple and yet so firm? "Honour thy father and thy mother," are they taught, "that thy days may be long in the land." But what a striking difference there is between the Chinese conception of this commandment and the Christian. Humanity, according to the Chinese, is dependent on the State, the State on the family, and the family on the individual. It is a system of mutual dependence, sound and solid—as firm to-day as it was a thousand years ago. Can Europe show anything the like?

Assyria, Parthia, Greece, Rome, were all destroyed, because their foundations were rotten, and not solely through outside might: they committed suicide. And the French nation of to-day is gradually decaying to its doom through the spreading rottenness of its social fabric. The stamina of a nation is in direct proportion

to the stability of its life principles. Our European nations all lack the stability, or rather, they lack the "attributes of the eternal, which characterize the Chinese, and we need not think, in our self-sufficient satisfaction, that we are going to eat up China like a piece of bread-and-cheese. We are to China what bulrushes are to the oak.

If we go there, we go as English, French, Germans, Russians, all jealous of each other, but the probability is that we shall leave—if we ever do leave—as Chinese. So long as Jesuits, Protestants, Catholics, Greeks, and a hundred other branches of the Christian Church, who now represent European culture to the Chinese, continue to contradict one another with so much animosity, so long will they stand as general laughing-stocks for the Celestial. Cannot they come to some mutual understanding as regards the carrying-out of their missionary work? When doctors disagree, whom is the "poor, benighted, heathen-Chinee" to believe? Again, our missionaries often start commercial enterprises on their own, or their Churches' account, mix themselves up with politics, and in this way also do an immense amount of harm to Christianity. The Chinese judge all things, all men and all sects, by deeds, not by words; and when they notice that the same men who utter the sublime wisdom of the Testament, often act meanly, selfishly, and in direct opposition to their own teachings, the natural result follows—loss of dignity, prestige, and respect for Christianity; the raising of derisive criticism by the Chinese. Professor Douglas calls the Chinese a "nation of pedants"; they are so, to a certain extent, but they are very wide-awake to the weaknesses of others for all that. When they see how Catholics work against Protestants, and the latter vilify the Pope both by word and picture, how can we expect to gain the respect of the Chinaman. He looks very sceptically upon the teachings of Christianity and loses faith in its main principles. Besides this, Christianity is in direct opposition to Chinese principles, especially as it leads to conflicts in their teachings of filial love, and *pietas erga parentes*, and respect is a *sine-quâ-non* with him; if we do not gain his esteem first, we shall do nothing with him. Do not think that because he does not jeer and laugh at us openly, he is blind to our little weaknesses—the usual stoical demeanour of the Chinaman often misleads in this respect. He is a born gentleman so far as absence of outward demonstration goes: "Manners maketh man" is a mere empty phrase with us, but with the Chinaman it is a belief engrafted in his very being, and because Christian *practice* (we will leave aside any comparisons as to theoretical beauty) is on a less perfect level than Confucian, Taoist or Buddhistic *practice*, it fails. Every now and then we hear

mighty trumpetings from Exeter Hall, and such places, proclaiming the speedy regeneration of China, dazzling sectarian supporters with figures and statistics, and exhorting the faithful who hold the purse-strings, to untie the same; but—be not deceived, O ye faithful! Let not the magniloquence of your favourite pastors carry you off your feet; but put on your horn spectacles, as any practical Dr. John Chinaman would do, and look to the deeds first. It is not a case where wilful deceit is practiced—Heaven forbid that we should ever seem to accuse such worthy men on that score!—but one where enthusiasm appears to warp the judgment. They see "signs from heaven," especially manifested on their behalf in every little matter-of-fact occurrence, and from being deluded themselves they seek, in their innocence, to delude others. Besides which, the same enthusiasm leads most missionaries to make proselytes, *coûte qu'il coûte*; and they readily accept as disciples people who are the outcasts of Chinese society.

Now if the reader will carefully consider all that we have already said, we think he must come to the same conclusion as we have, *i.e.*, that European nations are far from being efficiently equipped, either mentally or morally, for successfully undertaking the partition of China—nay, we will go even a step further, and say outright that such a partition is quite impracticable. By dint of brute force we shall certainly be able to hold and maintain a few places on the coast—that is possible: but unless we garrisoned town and country throughout the interior, and carried out a war of extermination which would deluge the whole East with blood: unless we can convert the Chinaman into the European—wood into iron—we cannot hold China.

The land may even be ruled temporarily by Europeans, but in that case it would only mean that the old, old tale would be again repeated. China has been so ruled by foreign races before, but the Chinese people have always absorbed them in the end and they have melted away like clay-banks which dammed a stream. Western Europeans do not understand the Chinese, and so long as we persist in measuring them by our own standard of civilization—a standard which is utterly false to Chinese feelings and customs—we never shall.

Of all Europeans, there can be little doubt but that the Russians are alike by the peculiarities of their race formation, admixture of blood and education, best endowed by nature for rightly understanding the Chinese.

Destiny perhaps, or some other presiding genius, may have alloted this special task to Russia—to be a commentator, and elucidator, of China, and of Chinese wisdom, to the rest of the world. And it is a task which would deserve special honour for its

fulfilment. Russia has always been the bulwark of European culture and of Christianity against the East. From ancient to more modern times we see that over and over again have countless hordes of Mongols, Tartars, and other Asiatics, swarmed into the vast steppes of Southern Russia, settling there, always resisted by the Russians and not penetrating further to the West, and always eventually they have been beaten back.

Where would our boasted Western civilization be to-day if Russia had not acted as breakwater to the waves of Mongol invasion?

The year 1224 A.D. saw almost the last of these irruptions, when the enormous armies of Chinghiz Khan burst into the South of Russia. And it was only the sudden death of Chinghiz Khan that stopped their triumphant march. In 1237 A.D., however, they returned under Batu, and on this occasion conquered the whole of Russia. It must be understood that, at this period, Russia was not a united nation—she was parcelled out amongst different, and frequently antagonistic, princes. The task of conquest, therefore, was not so enormous as it might appear to one ignorant of this fact; though their power was very much weakened before they could hail themselves as masters of the whole land.

Here they settled, therefore, glutted with war, and finding everything their hearts desired—vast rich steppes for their cattle, and cities whose luxuries and riches offered heavens of delight to these rude, famine-tried warriors. For 300 years they ruled Russia; and it was only under Ivan the Terrible that Russia finally shook off their yoke. But the honour of really conquering the Mongol has rested with Ivan's successors; and since his day Russia has followed continually in their track, firstly across Siberia, and then penetrating into their country, never forgetting all these years their dreadful crimes and excesses committed while ruling our country.

The Mongol dynasty was replaced in China by a kindred race, the Manchus.

It was during this period that commercial relations were first entered into between China and Russia; which gave the Russians numerous opportunities for becoming acquainted with the subjects of our former rulers. Then, and from that time, we Russians have been more and more impressed with the fact that Asia would be a scene of strife for Europe in the future, and we resolved to guard ourselves against the danger by trying to make the Chinese our friends. We have nothing to teach the Chinese in moral and spiritual matters—we must therefore confine ourselves to introducing into that vast empire the material advantages of Western civilization. We must do this not inimically, by force, but by all friendly means available.

Russia has always been a bulwark of Europe against the East, and to this fact Europe owes her present-day civilization. What Russia has already been in the past that will she also be in the future; and we Russians can foresee that in the years to come a far greater, because more insidious, danger from the Mongol race will menace Europe. One great Mongol race—the Japanese—has already donned the garb of Western civilization—a nation which is at the present time what the acorn is to the oak. She will nourish herself on the fruits of Western thought, she will evolve her own power therefrom, and unless thwarted she will stifle Europeans in the East, and Russia, of course, first. Therefore we must try to awake Europe to a sense of the present danger. And in this question we must put aside all national jealousies and bickerings which might shatter our hopes for the founding of an European coalition against the "yellow race." We must not forget that while petty jealousies in Europe—Germany against England; France against Germany—seem to forecast a division in our own strength, the struggle in the future will not be that of nation against nation, but of race against race, Mongolian *versus* Aryan. Having had the Mongols as rulers of our country we have been able to study the East and her people—not superficially, but through her languages, customs, and institutions. Therefore we know the East and appreciate the possibilities of her peoples in the future.

Russia does not wish to partition China Proper; on the contrary, desires to maintain her integrity, while wishing, at the same time, to develop her trade to material advantage. Russia wishes to develop China, and the Chinese know that. As we understand their modes of thought and sympathize with their views, so they understand the Russians, and will much more easily turn for assistance to Russia than to any other Power. To Europeans the Chinaman is a foreigner and a barbarian belonging to the coloured races; to Russians he is a friend. He has not yet adapted himself to Western civilization, but surely he will not remain behind, and he will easily follow Russian advice and utilize all the achievements of European civilization to his own advantage, and the more so because he regards the Russians as friends, and does not class them with other foreign devils.

And we think that Russia's policy is one which should commend itself to Europe, and should be supported by her, and especially by England. English and Russian interests in China are identical, and much trouble might be avoided if the two nations would recognize the fact that in this case Russia is the link between Asia and Europe. Through and by means of Russia everything can be done in the Far East. And we think it is only fair that England and other nations should not grudge Russia this position, but, on

the contrary, should help her. Russia is working here for civilization, not for herself, but for the whole of Europe. All the advantages derived from her successes in China will be shared by all nations, and as soon as Russia is strong enough to declare Free Trade, which is one of the ambitions of the present Minister of Finances,—only a question of time,—all artificial barriers will fall down.

Those who have studied England as I have, see what a great influence England has on Russian thought. Russia has studied the history and institutions of Western Europe, and will try and avoid those mistakes which have been made by Western nations, carefully absorbing the best of Western culture, but introducing it slowly so that a natural development can take place. All benefits of freedom will be granted to the Russians by their own Government, and the people will not have to fight for them. The Russian Tsar, "our father" as we call him, does everything for his people, and if he begins to work in China he has good reasons to do so. The Chinese are our neighbours, firstly; and, secondly, the duty of dealing with the Chinese question will certainly fall first of all upon us. We must try to make the East respect the West, and in such a case millions of people will be brought within the sphere of our civilization; but they can never be brought in by mere force. Anyhow, we must not forget that it will be impossible to conquer China by compulsion. Compulsion will never conquer China. China can only be conquered by a higher civilization than her own, a civilization which will be based, not on theory, but which will be carried out in practice. We hope Russia will not be hindered in her work of bringing China into the sphere of European civilization, but will be supported, by England. We also hope that the only two countries which have a real civilizing mission in this world will go hand in hand in agreement with each other in Asia, dividing their spheres of action, and not plotting and planning one against the other. There is plenty of room for both. But if they will not work together, all their separate means will only end in their own stultification, and with the result that they will have made the Chinese great at their own expense, and in order, finally, to be eaten up by them—first Russia, and then the rest of Europe. China will then, in point of fact, be actually "Tyan-Sya"—the Universe, the kingdom under heaven, as they call it themselves.

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RUSSIA'S SINEWS OF WAR.

In the exciting game of bluff which the Great Powers of Europe are now playing against each other every advantage counts. Even legends are not to be disdained as a means of inspiring respect among one's rivals. The Napoleonic legend had no small influence in its day on international politics. The Chinese legend, so cruelly exploded by the Japanese, enabled the Mandarin junta at Pekin to resist external pressure for half a century. Nearer home there is another mysterious empire which owes much to skilfully cultivated legends. From her entrance into European politics Russia has played with great success a Gargantuan *rôle*. Her huge bulk has always served as an excuse for a Gargantuan appetite which had to be gratified somehow, no matter at whose expense. To the rest of Europe it has always seemed natural that Russia should be stretching herself out in one direction or another. It seemed to be her destiny to be continually coveting the property of some unfortunate neighbour, and protesting that she would not be happy till she got it. When she had absorbed a big slice of Poland she discovered that Nature never intended her to be shut up in the Black Sea. But not finding it so easy as she expected to establish herself on the Mediterranean, she has postponed that ambition to the apparently easier one of exploiting the Northern Pacific coast.

The Russian legend has changed its sphere but not its character. It still assumes that Russia is too great a Power to brook the slightest contradiction. Whatever she wants she must have because, forsooth, she is not to be denied. She is so persistent that, sooner or later, she must succeed in whatever she undertakes. Least of all should any of her near neighbours thwart her, for she can make herself so disagreeable when she is offended. The Turks hold Constantinople only at her pleasure. Our Indian Empire hangs on a word from St. Petersburg, and the poor played-out Chinaman has nothing more to live for but Russian squeezing. Such are the legends which Russian vanity is fed on; not at home merely, but in foreign countries. The cult of Russian omnipotence

has many foreign devotees. France, of course, is full of them, but they are not all on that side of the Channel.

Formerly there was a slight flaw in the Russian legend. Eight and a half millions of square miles sounded an immense territory. One hundred and twenty millions of souls subject to a single lord, and three millions of armed men ready to lay down their lives for him, were spectacles to inspire the rest of the world with respect, if not with awe. But there was something wanting in the formidable combination. It had to be admitted that Russia was not as rich in money as in men and acres. If she had capital commensurate with her other resources she would, it was said, be irresistible. Latterly the great aim of the Russians has been to remedy the latter defect, and to raise themselves to as high a financial level as they occupy territorially. But their financial ambition has an ulterior aim. Bold finance is not cultivated in Russia so much for its own sake as for its military uses. It is valued as the best and, indeed, the only means of strengthening the sinews of war.

The Ministers and military chiefs of Russia have studied the sinews of war question more systematically than those of any other Great Power, hardly excepting Germany. They have considered it in all its branches—the war-chest, national credit, and fiscal resources. If they have overlooked or under-estimated any aspect of it, it is the economic endurance of the Russian people. That, after all, is the limit of a country's fighting power. However expert Government financiers may be, however high the public credit, and however easy it may be to borrow in quiet times, the war strain cannot go beyond the capacity of the people to bear the additional burdens of war, and to make the sacrifices it demands. Russia's military financiers may have solved all the secondary problems to their own satisfaction, as they say they have, but if they be at fault on the fundamental point—the tax-bearing capacity of the nation—all the rest will be only a castle in the air. The grander the structure of credit they build up for military use, the worse will be the collapse if the economic foundation it rests on is not equal to its weight. That is the true war problem in Russia. An ample war-chest has been provided for immediate requirements, and France might be counted on for at least one or two war loans, but when these have been expended what would there be to fall back on? What else, indeed, but mortgaged soil and Jew-ridden cultivators?

The so-called "new finance" in Russia, which dates from the advent of M. Wyschnegradski, ten or eleven years ago, has worked on these three parallel lines—the formation of a gold reserve for war use, the consolidation of the public debt with a view to

raising the national credit, and the acquisition of financial support abroad. All three objects have been pursued with a splendid audacity and untiring zeal. As regards each of them tangible results have been achieved; but whether or not they be worth the price that has been and is still being paid for them admits of discussion. Englishmen above all others have an interest in learning the plain practical truth about them, and an attempt to appraise them fairly may, under present circumstances, be opportune.

As to the magnitude of the Russian gold reserve there can be no longer a question, and its importance as a war fund may seem equally indisputable. On the 31st December, 1897, the gold in the State Bank and the Treasury amounted to 1,315 million roubles. It was so stated by the Finance Minister himself in his Budget report to the Emperor, consequently we have it on the highest official authority. At ten roubles to the pound sterling these 1,315 million roubles are equal to 131½ millions sterling. If it were wholly reserved for war use, it would be the most gigantic war-chest ever formed, but it has a pacific use as well, and there we have the first of its several defects. It has to serve at the same time as a metallic guarantee for a paper currency almost as large as itself, and admitting of unlimited expansion. On the 31st December, 1897, there were bank-notes outstanding against it to the amount of 999 million roubles, or almost one hundred millions sterling. These two functions—the military and the currency—must sooner or later clash with each other. Even in time of peace the fluctuations of foreign commerce and exchange may often threaten the gold reserve. The paper rouble which M. Witte has lifted by a *tour de force* to a gold level may not always be easy to keep there. It would not require a very violent political or commercial crisis to force out a large portion of the gold reserve, and thereby to jeopardize both the currency and the war-chest.

This gigantic gold reserve labours under another internal weakness. It has two owners—the State Treasury and the State Bank. Since M. Witte reorganized the State Bank and made it little else than an *annexe* of the Treasury, that may not seem to matter much. In respect of superintendence the two institutions are virtually one, and M. Witte is master of them both; but, as regards the duties they have to perform, they can never be identified. A State treasury and a public bank must always have distinct spheres, and frequently they may have discordant interests. In the event of rivalry, which institution is to have the first claim on the gold reserve—the Government or the public? The odds are decidedly in favour of the Government; very much indeed in its favour so long

as M. Witte is Finance Minister. There has already been gossip in certain circles about secret transfers from the Bank account to that of the Treasury. Whatever may be the legal theory of their relations, the cardinal fact about them is that both are Government departments.

As regards the second factor—national credit—we shall have to show how assiduously that has been exploited in the interests of a military policy. The leaders of the new finance have been most industrious borrowers, loan converters, and reorganizers. An official retrospect of the metallic debt operations of the past ten years shows in that period thirteen old issues wiped out and twenty-five new ones either created or taken over. Of the latter, sixteen are for railways taken over by the State, and two are for a Credit Foncier society in liquidation. All the old Government issues have been consolidated into three standard types—the Threes, Three-and-a-halfs, and Four per Cents. On the 1st of January last the respective amounts of these outstanding were :—

RUSSIAN METALLIC LOANS, 1ST JANUARY, 1898.

	Roubles.
Four per Cents.	1,009,210,000
Three-and-a-half per Cents.	99,422,000
Three per Cents.	263,956,000
	1,372,588,000

The railway and miscellaneous issues make up another 760 million roubles, and the grand total on the 1st January was 2,133,759,000 roubles—say two hundred and fourteen millions sterling.

The paper rouble issues have been as actively shuffled as the metallics; thirteen old issues having been converted or paid off and sixteen new ones having been created or taken over. Most of the latter are railway loans, the principal exception being the Four per Cent. Rentes, of which nearly two thousand million roubles were outstanding on the 1st January last. The aggregate of the non-metallic loans now chargeable on the revenue is officially stated at 2,900,701,000 roubles, or two hundred and ninety millions sterling. Unfunded debt, including liabilities of the Bank of Russia, averages fifteen hundred million roubles, but that is nearly if not altogether off-set by the metallic reserves of the Treasury and the Bank. We have here, therefore, an interest-bearing debt of over five hundred millions sterling, nearly one half of it metallic, and the rest in paper. The annual charge provided for in the current year's Budget exceeds twenty-two millions sterling, fully half as much again as that of Russia's last war year (1877), and six or seven times as much as the cost of her debt at the period

of the Crimean War. The latter was, in fact, fought with paper—forced currency and Treasury notes.

On paper, the Russian debt has been thoroughly well consolidated. It looks clear and simple to have only three or four large issues in place of twenty or thirty small ones. To the converting syndicates the consolidation has been a most agreeable and remunerative operation. But whether or not a better basis has been created for future borrowing—and that is the true object of military finance—will hardly be maintained by any impartial authority. From a market point of view, a grave error has been committed in narrowing the sphere and support open to Russian securities. The old bonds were held in London, Paris, Berlin, and Amsterdam. The new ones are concentrated in Paris, and in their day of trial the Paris Bourse will be their only mainstay. That of itself is a grave danger for Russia, and a vital defect in the sinew of war on which she must chiefly depend. Her gold reserve, big as it is, would soon be melted in a first-class campaign. Her paper money could not without risk of a collapse in foreign exchange be increased fast enough to meet the drain on the Treasury of fleets at sea and armies on land. Foreign money would be needed at an early stage in the contest, and only France could be expected to supply it. London has closed her account with the Russian Treasury, while Berlin and Amsterdam have reduced theirs to a tithe of what it used to be.

France is now the principal creditor as well as the chief ally of Russia in Europe. Not only has she three-fourths of the Government bonds held abroad, but she is stuffing herself full of Russian mining shares and other wild-cat scrip specially manufactured for her consumption. Frenchmen who can appreciate the risk to both countries involved in this Franco-Russian boom—as mad as the Kaffir circus in its worst days—are afraid to calculate the amount of French money locked up in it. The lowest estimate is eight milliards* of francs, and some of them run as high as eleven milliards. The day that sees Russia on the verge of war with another Great Power will give the Paris Bourse a far worse fright over its Russian securities than it is now having over its Spanish bonds. An actual outbreak of war would knock 25 per cent. at least off the market value of these securities—say two milliards off eight. There might not be much appetite for new loans after that.

It is to be feared that France had rather hazy ideas of what she was committing herself to when she joyfully undertook to act the part of benevolent banker to the Russian Empire. Frenchmen do not appear to have examined their security very closely before they advanced their eight milliards on it. But they have had good

* A milliard = £40,000,000 or $200,000,000.

opportunities since to complete their information. Russian finance is a favourite subject with them now, though not always an agreeable one. It is hardly reassuring to them to discover, as they have done, that the Russian people are even more heavily burdened with debt than their Government is. Hopeless indebtedness is the normal condition of peasant and land-owner alike. Eighty million hectares of land—over two hundred million acres—are under mortgage, and the amount of the mortgages piled up on them is estimated at two hundred and forty millions sterling.

A French paper, which professes to have derived its data from official sources, recently published the following inventory of Russian obligations, public and private, now on the market :—

	Francs.
Funded debt	16,275,169,872
Uufunded debt	1,380,366,669
Mortgage bonds of private companies	3,915,522,786
Obligations, railways	2,193,981,739
Do. industrial	268,515,100
Do. municipal	172,044,668
	24,205,600,834

Equal to nine hundred and seventy millions sterling. The same French authority raises an alarm by no means premature about the Joint Stock gambling which has broken out in Russia. It has already produced a deluge of shares, capitalized at nearly four milliards of francs, or one hundred and sixty millions sterling. They range from banks and railways to distilleries and pawnshops, and the return we quote from classifies them thus :—

	Francs.
Mines, oilworks, &c.	1,019,000,000
Cotton and linen	753,500,000
Credit Mobilier companies	452,000,000
Railways	294,103,984
Sugar refineries	239,500,000
Chemicals	180,000,000
Shipping companies	132,500,000
Credit Foncier	124,000,000
Water, gas, tramways	118,000,000
Insurances	117,000,000
Spirit distilleries	87,000,000
Pawnshops	22,000,000
Tobacco factories	9,500,000
Sundries	415,500,000
	3,963,603,984

French promoters trading on the Russomania of the day have introduced a choice selection of the above companies on the Paris

Bourse. As they have only to be offered in order to find purchasers they are invariably started at a premium more or less fictitious, and before there can be any thought of dividends the premium often swells to 200 or 300 per cent. A concern called the Donbowia Balka, floated in Paris only a year ago, has its 500 franc shares now quoted at 1,497. The Chantiers de Nicolaieff, launched in May, 1897, commands 1,300 for its 500 franc shares. The Sud Russe, dating only from last November, was lately at a premium of 320, and the Volga Vichera, barely a month old, pretends to be 195 above par (500 francs). Both in Russia and France this gamble in manufactured scrip is beginning to excite uneasiness, and none too soon.

The Franco-Russian alliance has, of course, a military object; it could, under present circumstances, have no other, but the financial leaders of the two countries have most peculiar ideas of how the emergency they fear should be prepared for. Instead of husbanding their resources, they are "financing" them, which is quite another thing. Russia is using France as a milch cow, and France is using Russia as a sphere of exploitation. Should the alliance have to be put to the test of actual war, Paris and St. Petersburg are not unlikely to be disappointed in each other. The one will need far more than the other may deem it safe or convenient to lend, and before they get down to the real work of the alliance, what a wreckage of exploded bubbles there will be to clear away!

It has taken about eleven years to develop Franco-Russian finance into its now full-blown beauty. M. Witte has tried through it to do for the Russian Treasury what Peter the Great would fain have done for the Russia of his day—modernized it by a brilliant *coup de main*. He found it very much behind the age—grovelling in chronic deficits and paper money. He claims to have transformed the deficits into surpluses, and to have raised the paper rouble to a gold basis. Certainly he has accumulated a gigantic gold reserve—one of the largest, if not the largest, in Europe. He has reorganized the Bank of Russia on the most elastic principles. He has converted all the old and out-of-date Government bonds into brand new Consolidateds, carrying a reduced interest. He has brought up and nationalized so many railways that now five-sevenths of the total mileage in the Empire is State property. In achieving these grand examples of the new finance, M. Witte has added proportionately to the public debt and to the annual liabilities of the Treasury, but the financial situation is thought to be none the worse for that. Rather has it improved, for nowadays no one can be a grand financier who has not scientifically exploited the national credit.

Whatever Russia lacked in that respect, M. Witte has supplied

with lavish hand. She did not know what modern financing was until he and his predecessor, M. Wyschnegradski, taught her by practical example. To judge from their prosperity budgets and an apparently overflowing Treasury, they would seem to have effected a remarkable transformation. The financial flaw in the legend of Russian omnipotence is said to have yielded to their skilful manipulation. But whether the cure is to be temporary or permanent, there are still conflicting opinions. Four good harvests in succession shower gold on an agricultural State like Russia, and "end of the century" financing can produce a beautiful glamour until the trick of it is found out. But Russia might commit a fatal error if she shaped her foreign policy on the assumption that the apparent increase in her financial strength, which M. Witte's Budgets exhibit year after year in more glowing colours, is genuine and enduring. We might also be deluding ourselves with groundless fears if we took it all too literally.

In any future conflict between Great Britain and Russia, finance will be quite as important a factor as armaments. The issue will not be decided by the first shock of arms, but by the slow wearing financial strain to follow. It will be a question of staying power, and that will be a money, even more than a military, question. In her costly wars of recent times, Russia has not distinguished herself much financially. She was completely worn out by two years' fighting in a small corner of the Crimea. Her short campaign against the Turks in 1877–78 so disorganized her finances that it took them fifteen years to recover. The Russians themselves are well aware of this vital defect in their military power, and they have of late years made strenuous efforts to remedy it. To that end both their foreign policy and their financial policy are being studiously directed. Assistance in strengthening Russian credit abroad and replenishing the Treasury at home, has for the past ten years been the price of Russian friendship. Prince Bismarck, much as he coveted the prize, seems to have thought the terms demanded too high. He would not throw open German savings to be exploited by the loan mongers and mortgage brokers of St. Petersburg. So little did he like these gentry that he had Russian securities tabooed in Berlin, and the Imperial Bank of Germany ceased to make advances on them.

Russia vainly attempted to retaliate by closing her market against German exports. Her financiers met, however, with more sympathy in Paris. A Franco-Russian movement was started for drawing the two countries together in the mutually beneficial characters of banker and borrower. That was the germ of what has now become a formal alliance between the republic of the West and the autocrat of the East. On the Russian side it has

been a financial scheme from the beginning, and from that point of view it has served its purpose admirably. With the enthusiastic co-operation of French syndicates M. Witte has succeeded in borrowing several milliards of French savings and in applying them to the great advantage of his own Government. We do not say to the advantage of Russia, because there is little prospect of its ever benefiting the Russian people. So far they are losers rather than gainers by the brilliant schemes of their Finance Minister. Their taxes have had to be increased in order to meet the growing charges of the public debt, and, in the not impossible event of a break-down, it is they who will be crushed under the falling fabric of overblown credit and fictitious wealth. In this connection the Russian Government and the Russian people have unfortunately little in common. Their interests are not identical but different, and at times directly opposed to each other, as we shall see when the official Budget has to be compared with that of the peasant and the landowner.

It is a noticeable coincidence that Franco-Russian finance dates back to about the time of the boycott of Russian securities in Berlin. Whether or not Prince Bismarck had a presentiment of its inevitable results they have certainly justified his opposition. The last Finance Minister of the old school was M. Bunge, who retired in 1887. He was not a man to indulge in illusions, much less to palm them off on his Sovereign. The financial condition of the Empire had long been bad, and he did not try to conceal it either from himself or the world. In his final report to the Emperor he described the situation with a candour rarely heard in the Russian or any other Court. "For several decades," he said, "the Government has been obliged to have recourse to new loans in order to pay the interest on the old ones."

With the advent of M. Wyschnegradski a transformation took place almost as suddenly as in a pantomime. As if by enchantment, deficits which had risen sometimes to one hundred million roubles, gave place to surpluses of from forty to sixty millions a year. How it was done was M. Wyschnegradski's secret. As a professional financier he was bound to have secrets; they were as necessary to him as to a professional magician. He was assisted in his occult operations by a variety of outside professionals who took a friendly interest in the loans which became as distinctive a feature of his system as his surpluses. Among the parasitic finance houses of Berlin and Paris a "Wyschnegradski group" formed itself with the benevolent object of battening on the Russian Treasury. In a few years 800 million roubles was added to the public debt. Then the success of the new finance began to excite envy

among the older bureaucrats at St. Petersburg. Growing opposition was offered to it in the Council of State, which ultimately proved too strong for M. Wyschnegradski. One day he received from the Emperor a curt invitation to resign.

But his policy did not fall with him. It passed on to the abler hands of his friend and successor, M. Witte. There was an odd similarity in the origin of these two Ministers, both having come from the South Western Railway, which M. Witte has since converted into a State line. M. Wyschnegradski was for a long while President of the South Western Council of Administration, and M. Witte, who rose from a comparatively humble position in the company's service, was his *protégé*. When the *protégé* succeeded the patron at the Ministry of Finance, their joint policy received a new and more vigorous expansion. The Russians were shown that the game of high finance could be played as boldly in St. Petersburg as elsewhere. State enterprise invaded all the main channels of industry. It launched into railway building, spirit and tobacco monopolies, exchange operations, and trading in its own securities. To suit M. Witte's advanced ideas, the State Bank was reorganized and made a department of the Treasury, the financial control, hitherto exercised by the Council of the Empire, was modified, and the Finance Minister became virtually independent and irresponsible.

In order to justify these radical changes dazzling results had to be produced for public admiration. Favoured as he was by an opportune improvement in the economic condition of the Empire, due to four good harvests in succession, M. Witte accomplished that feat without difficulty. He had to measure himself against an exceptionally low standard—the famine years 1891-92. Starting from them the revenue should, in any case, have made a sharp rally, and that not only happened but it received a new impulse from the four bountiful years which immediately followed the famine, and did a great deal to recoup the losses it had entailed. These natural causes of improvement M. Witte reinforced by several others of his own invention, and the value of which is less certain. He has raised customs and excise duties; he has multiplied State monopolies, and nearly every important railway in the empire has been financed by him and his syndicates into the possession of the Treasury. In other words, they have been taken under his omnivorous protection. It is far from evident that they are likely to prove profitable investments for the State. Like the kindred experiments in Socialism indulged in by the London County Council, they seem to add to the public expenditure quite as fast as to the public income. Both these have

expanded vigorously under M. Witte's control, as may be seen below:—

Russian Revenue and Expenditure, 1891-97 (In Roubles).

—	Revenue.	Expenditure.
1891	890,545,476	925,355,708
1892	964,687,095	952,575,764
1893	1,031,489,740	996,392,639
1894	1,145,352,364	1,045,512,088
1895	1,244,362,202	1,129,439,236
1896 (estimates)	1,239,471,695	1,231,088,414
1897 ,, ...	1,318,366,495	1,284,858,862
	7,834,275,067	7,565,222,711

In the rescript to the Finance Minister lately issued along with the Imperial ukase, ordering the expenditure of 90 million roubles on warships, the Emperor speaks of 600 million roubles having been saved out of the ordinary revenue during M. Witte's administration. That does not agree with the foregoing figures, taken for the first five years from the reports of the Controller of the Empire, and for the other two years from M. Witte's own Budget statements. These show surpluses of only 269 million roubles, or less than half the amount mentioned in the Imperial rescript. If asked where the other 330 millions was to be found, M. Witte would probably direct us to the extraordinary expenditure, or to the "free funds in the Imperial Treasury," both very mercurial items. Their aggregates are duly entered in the accounts of each financial year, but without any clue being given to their erratic changes. Our latest information about the "free funds in the Imperial Treasury" is derived from the Imperial rescript above referred to. It states that on the 1st January last they amounted approximately to 200 million roubles, of which 106 millions had been appropriated to the extraordinary expenditure of the current year. Only 94 million roubles therefore remained unappropriated, and the 90 millions now assigned to the building of warships practically exhausts it.

The "free funds of the Imperial Treasury," which seem to be drawn on for all special expenditure, are evidently distinct from the ordinary treasury balances. Their source is uncertain, but casual references to them in official reports indicate that they are to a considerable extent replenished from loans, sales of State property, and miscellaneous financing. The most significant fact in their recent history is their rapid diminution. At the beginning of 1896 their amount was given as 294 million roubles. A year later they had further shrunk to 246 millions. On the 1st January last they had fallen, according to the Imperial rescript, to

200 millions, and a year hence they will be virtually exhausted, unless in the interval fresh borrowing may have replenished them. We may be told that they have been well spent, and it is true that new railways and works of public utility form a large part of the extraordinary expenditure to which they have been devoted. But the moral of the present situation is none the less obvious, that the surpluses of the past seven years, whether they were 600 million roubles as the Imperial rescript said, or only 269 millions as the official accounts indicate, have for all future use vanished. If not actually spent they are no longer available for any new claims on the Treasury.

That circumstance might not be so very serious if future years promised to maintain the supply of surpluses. But they do not, and even M. Witte, optimist as he is, has felt constrained to utter a timely warning on this point. In presenting to the Emperor the Budget for the current year, he "cannot help expressing his fears as to the possibility of a delay, or even a falling off in the payment of direct, and some indirect taxes." Last year's harvest "must be considered unsatisfactory," as though "it may be sufficient to feed the population it will not allow of the usual surplus for export." Neither is the prospect for next year altogether encouraging, and the Finance Minister deems it high time to record his opinion that "the data" of the past four years, 1893—96, "must not in future be taken as quite normal, either in estimating harvests or in generally considering the economic condition of the population and the capacity of individual sources of revenue."

The question which the Finance Minister hints at with courtier-like delicacy is how a cycle of average years, not to say poor ones, may affect the revenue. The recent cycle of fat years increased it materially, but the excess has been all swallowed up by heavier expenditure. The fiscal condition of the Empire is, in other words, little better now than it was previous to the short run of prosperity in 1893-96, and one or two more short harvests would make it worse than it was then, as the enlarged expenditure may be difficult to retrench. If the Russian Government were seriously thinking of going to war with Great Britain, or even with Japan, one thing is certain, that it could not hope to screw its ordinary revenue much higher than it is already. All economic authorities who have studied the actual condition of the Russian people agree that they are overtaxed already and could bear no additional burdens. The St. Petersburg correspondent of *The Economist*, himself a Russian, wrote thus in January last of the Budget for the current year: "There is not the least doubt, however, that the excessive Customs and Excise duties are imposing a burden on the people beyond their capacity to

C.W.R. MECHANICS INSTITUTION

bear. If the revenue is growing, it is, unfortunately, not a sign of a better economic condition of the people, but it shows that Russian agriculturists are spending their capital. If we had reliable statistics as to the number of horses, cattle, sheep, and pigs in Russia there is no doubt but they would show a decrease in our live stock, and that this is the reason why Russia exports so little meat, cheese, butter, &c."

Without something deeper rooted behind them, gold reserves, debt consolidations, Bourse jugglery, and all the ingenious devices of Franco-Russian finance will not go far in a grand campaign. They will be as short-lived in serious war as forced currency was in the Crimea. When they are exhausted, Russia will have to stake all on the sinew of war which underlies every other—the financial capacity of her own people. If their margin of free income be large, they will have so much the more to sacrifice for the Empire; and if it be small, they will have so much the less. What the margin may be we can only guess from casual and indirect evidence. In estimating it, we have to remember that Russia, though she has launched of late very wildly into industrial ventures, is still but an agricultural country. She lives by the soil, and, sad to say, four acres out of every five are mortgaged. The fortunes of the Russian agriculturist rise and fall with the price of wheat. Just now, when wheat is abnormally high, they may be easy, but when wheat was low they were very hard. The rate at which mortgages increased during the period of low prices was sufficient proof of the agricultural distress which prevailed even in the most fertile districts. A still more convincing proof was the rapid accumulation of taxes in arrear.

After the famine of 1891-92, arrears of taxes rose to an enormous height, and it is ominous how slowly they afterwards diminished. The Controller's report for the year 1895 gives the amount of arrears for each of the twenty provinces and the percentage they represented of the annual totals. In Orenburg they were 492 per cent., or nearly five years' taxes, in Kazan 355 per cent., Oufa 321 per cent., Samara 342 per cent., Nijni Novgorod 306 per cent., Simbirsk 210 per cent., Penza 206 per cent., and so on down to 2 per cent. in Podolia. *Only five of the twenty provinces were less than one year in arrear.* Evidently, when the famine overtook them they had little or no savings to help them through. Their ruin was as rapid and complete as that of our Indian ryots under a similar calamity. For years before the famine came, neither the moujiks nor the nobles had been making any money. After every harvest the most piteous memorials were being sent to the Czar, imploring relief from taxation or a reduction of interest on mortgages.

One of these memorials—that of the nobility of Poltawa—caused

some commotion by its forcible statement of the agricultural dilemma. According to it, the Government of Poltawa contained 1,050,000,000 dessatines (2¾ acres) of arable land, producing, on an average, 35 million pouds of cereals. Deducting 7 million pouds for seed, there was a surplus of 28 million pouds for sale. At the average price of the day that brought in 11,200,000 roubles, out of which had to be paid the following charges:—Labour, 10,500,000 roubles; interest on mortgages, 2,750,000; land tax, 756,000; total, 14,006,000 roubles, or 2,800,000 roubles more than the value of the crop. Presented in another way, the net return on the capital invested—nearly all borrowed money—had been, in 1881, 4·3 per cent., and in 1891-93 it had fallen to 3·3 per cent. But all the time 5 per cent. had to be paid on the mortgages, even on those obtained from the Government banks. Private mortgagees probably charged 6 or 7 per cent., which would be about double what the mortgagor could earn on the money.

M. Flourens, during his visit to Russia in 1894, was painfully struck with what he called "*l'agriculture russe agonisante.*" "Russia," he wrote, "is at this moment passing through an economic crisis of the greatest intensity, and her agricultural wealth is seriously impaired." Immediately afterwards, a series of abundant harvests, followed by an important rise in the price of wheat, relieved the agony for a time. But a return of low prices would bring it on again in a worse form, perhaps, than before. It is fortunate that new sources of wealth are opening up in Russia. The petroleum industry of the Caspian, the goldmines of Siberia, the growth of domestic manufactures, the extension of railways, and the investment of foreign capital where it is prudent and not speculative, will in time render the empire less dependent on its wheat-fields. But the latter are still its mainstay, and will continue to be for many years to come.

We have the highest respect for the new-born energy of the Russian people, and wish them well in all the pacific enterprises they are carrying out for the benefit of civilization. We do not grudge them the progress they are making, nor would we depreciate in any envious spirit the splendid destiny they have before them. They are welcome to the best they can do for themselves within their own borders, and also to a fair field in foreign competition. For ourselves, we have never asked more than that. It is our proud boast to have always been the least selfish of trading and colonizing Powers. We alone have admitted other nations to an equal share in our conquests on behalf of civilization. Consequently we represent, in this conflict, much more than ourselves. We are the upholders of a principle and a system essential to human progress.

It is our duty not only to ourselves, but to every commercial State in the world, as distinguished from the great military States, to defend that principle.

Russia is the Power against whom it has most need to be defended. From no fault of our own or any ill-will against the Russians we have frequently had to oppose her; for the simple reason that her foreign policy is the antipodes of ours, and that our commercial system cannot co-exist with hers. Wherever she gets a footing on foreign soil, be it Chinese or Turkish, she must Russianize it, which means shutting us out as completely as she can, and along with us all other countries enjoying the benefit of the commercial freedom that accompanies the British flag. The issue now pending between the two foreign policies in China is the most vital that has yet arisen. Within the next few months the future of the northern half of the Chinese empire has to be decided —whether it is to be Russianized, and more or less closed to all but Russian commerce, or to remain open under the protection of the country that first opened it and made it free to all the world.

Why should we hesitate to maintain our established policy against Russian encroachments? Why should British diplomacy falter when it has the sympathy of every impartial State at its back? It cannot be suspected of under-estimating the moral power behind it, but it may easily over-estimate, as many people do, the financial power on the other side. The legend of Russian supremacy still flourishes to the great advantage of Russian diplomatists. It is now more dominant than ever, because the bad finance which was formerly its one weakness is supposed to have been permanently cured. Granting that it has been improved in some respects, it is still far from being sound. As we have shown, its basis is too dangerously narrowed, and the advantage of linking it so closely and exclusively with French finance has yet to be proved.

There is not more than one financial system on the Continent capable of withstanding for any length of time the shock of even a second-rate European war, and the financial systems which would most quickly collapse under it are those of France and Russia—the two countries which are most actively and systematically pursuing a policy of provocation.

W. R. Lawson.

THE ARMY AS A CAREER.

A Voice from the Ranks.

By the provisions of the lately issued Army Estimates the position and prospects of the soldier of to-day are naturally somewhat different to what they were before the new regulations came into force. The uninitiated civilian reader, however, will probably find it somewhat difficult to appreciate exactly in what particular respects lie these differences. The 238 pages of the said Estimates, and the twenty-one appendices attached thereto, all bristling with statistics, do not render the solution of this problem a very easy one, and after many weary hours spent in grappling with the columns in which the information he seeks is supposed to be contained, he will, in all probability, be just as unenlightened on the subject as he was before.

As one who has been "behind the scenes"—having served, as a private soldier and non-commissioned officer, for some years in the ranks of an infantry battalion—I am, perhaps, peculiarly enabled to contrast the old order of things with the new.

It is now some seven years since the blandishments of the recruiting sergeant were successfully instrumental in launching me on a military career. During this period I was in receipt of the "General Advantages of the Army," not only in the "home stations," but also in those portions of the Queen's dominions officially referred to as "beyond the seas." For the space of six out of the seven years of my military life I experienced the various aspects of "soldiering" that occur under foreign suns, in those far-off garrisons where the presence of the Union Jack bears eloquent witness to England's occupation thereof.

Looking back on this eventful period of my life, several points in the question of "The Army as a Career" stand out conspicuously. Whether a non-commissioned officer, or private soldier, is, on the whole, better off than a civilian of the same standing is the problem with which the intending recruit is confronted.

To approach the question from a financial point of view may, perhaps, savour somewhat of a spirit of sordidness, but it is one that eminently appeals to our business-like nation. Little wonder then that the Government placards give such publicity, in the largest of type and most striking of colours, to the "Scale of Pay and Pensions." This is stated to be as follows:—

	Per diem.	s.	d.		*Per diem.*	s.	d.
Private		1	0	Sergeant		2	4
Lance-Corporal		1	3	Colour-Sergeant		3	0
Corporal		1	8	Quarter-Master Sergeant ...		4	0
Lance-Sergeant		2	0	Sergeant-Major & Bandmaster...		5	0

The above table refers only to the infantry of the line; in the cavalry and departmental corps the rates are rather higher. Again, non-commissioned officers and men employed in the orderly-room and regimental offices, as clerks, &c., or in the band, receive a certain amount of "extra-duty pay." Perhaps it would be as well if I were here to give in full the official description of the privileges accruing to the position of "A Soldier of the Regular Forces" at the time of my initiation. Thus ran the document in question:—

General Advantages of the Army.

"In addition to money wages a soldier receives a ration of bread and meat, lodging, fuel, and light, and medical attendance for himself, and, if married, for his family; and, on first joining the army, is supplied with a complete outfit of clothing, and a free kit, containing such necessaries as brushes, combs, razors, &c.; and he is afterwards supplied periodically with the principle articles of his clothing without charge. He is required to keep up his underclothing and necessaries at his own cost, and to pay for repairs to his clothing while in wear, and for his groceries, vegetables, and washing, but not for his bedding."

At first sight, this certainly appeared a fairly liberal condition of things—it was not until later that the cloven hoof presented itself. Seven shillings a week, together with entire freedom from anxiety with regard to food, clothing, medical attendance, education, house rent, and rates and taxes, were certainly not picked up every day, nor, for that matter, can they be now. Little wonder then that, with a number of other embryo warriors, I yielded to the honeyed words of Sergeant Hawke, and offered myself as a candidate for the profession of arms, "for the term of seven years with the colours and five years in the reserve."

The preliminaries were soon over, and, with the taking of the

"Oath of Allegiance," my conversion, from a civilian to a soldier, was finally effected.

A month later certain untoward suspicions that things were not exactly what they seemed slowly dawned upon me. Unwilling to harbour unfounded ideas in this direction, I waited a little time, and when I had completed half-a-year's service I made another examination of the circular in question.

The result thereof scarcely filled me with heartfelt admiration for the veracity of the compilers of the said "General Advantages." Perhaps, however, they took a more roseate view of the question than I, at this period, felt inclined to do. However, as time went on, I made occasional notes of particulars of discrepancies between the theory of the soldier's life, according to this pamphlet, and the actual practice within my personal experience. It is from these notes that I now propose to make a few observations.

Treating firstly, then, of the financial aspect of the soldier's position, I would point out that under no circumstances could the private soldier receive a shilling a day as his regimental pay. As a matter of fact, he cannot do so even now, as I will presently demonstrate. True it is that he is *credited* with this sum; but there is another side to the ledger. This is the *debit* side. From his shilling had to be deducted, firstly, the cost of his "groceries, vegetables, and washing." In the infantry this amounts to 3½d. *per diem* (and in some corps to 4d.). Thus, at one fell swoop, his "shilling" became 8½d. In the cavalry, and many other branches of the service, the "grocery stoppage" was still higher. When, at a later stage in my career, I attained to the rank of lance-corporal, my pay did not increase in accordance with the scale defined on the authorized placard. It remained at precisely the same rate as that which I received as a raw recruit. This was owing to the fact that while the "establishment" of this rank was then twelve per battalion the number of such N.C.O.'s as "probationers" was about fifty. A year later, however, the "establishment" rising to thirty-two, brought me on the list of "paid" lance-corporals, and 3d. *per diem* was added to my professional income. Many of my brother N.C.O.'s, who were junior to me, took a couple of years, and more, to climb into the first thirty-two places necessary to receive this extra pay.

Precisely the same thing occurred on my further advancement to lance-sergeant. For more than three years I together with several other probationary "lancers," though duly wearing our three stripes and performing the duties of this office, received but the pay of corporals (1s. 8d.). In addition to this, as members of the sergeants' mess, it was further depleted by a daily deduction of 7d. for messing alone. When our accounts for such items as subscrip-

tions, washing, and batmen had been settled, there was, as will be readily imagined, not very much left out of a month's pay.

Besides the "grocery stoppage" already referred to, there were (and still are) several other compulsory deductions made from the pay of soldiers of all ranks. These are for haircutting, washing, cricket club, library, and shooting. Anent these various items, the Recruiting Department maintains a discreet reserve. When the different charges have been deducted from a soldier's pay his *credit* balance is considerably reduced. In proof of this I submit some specimen accounts.

I. Private John Smith.

Credits (1897-98).	£ s. d.	Debits (1897).	£ s. d.	Debits (1898).	£ s. d.
To 31 days' pay at 1s.	1 11 0	To 31 days' messing at 3d. ...	0 7 9	... ...	Nil.
		To washing at ½d.	0 1 3½		
		To cricket or football subscription	0 0 3	... ...	0 2 2½
		To shooting club	0 0 3		
		To haircutting...	0 0 1		
		To marking clothing	0 0 1		
		To library ...	0 0 3		
Total Credits	£1 11 0	Total Debits	£0 9 11½	Total Debits	£0 2 2½

	£ s. d.
Monthly Credit Balance (1897)	1 1 0½
,, ,, ,, (1898)	1 8 9½
Monthly Net Gain ... (1898)	£0 7 9

II. Corporal William Jones.

Credits (1897-98).	£ s. d.	Debits (1897).	£ s. d.	Debits (1898).	£ s. d.
To 31 days' pay at 1s. 8d. ...	2 11 8	As for Pt. Smith	0 9 11½	As for Private Smith ...	0 2 2½
Total Credits	£2 11 8	Total Debits	£0 9 11½	Total Debits	£0 2 2½

	£ s. d.
Monthly Credit Balance (1897)	2 1 8½
,, ,, ,, (1898)	2 9 5½
Monthly Net Gain ... (1898)	£0 7 9

III. Sergeant Thomas Browne.

Credits (1897-98).	£ s. d.	Debits (1897).	£ s. d.	Debits (1898).	£ s. d.
To 31 days' pay at 2s. 4d. ...	3 12 4	To 31 days' messing at 7d. ...	0 18 1	... ...	Nil.
		To mess subscription	0 1 6		
		To cricket or football club ...	0 1 0		
		To shooting club	0 1 0		
		To haircutting ...	0 0 1	... ...	0 13 11
		To marking ...	0 0 1		
		To batman* ...	0 7 0		
		To washing* ...	0 3 0		
		To library ...	0 0 3		
Total Credits	£3 12 4	Total Debits	£1 12 0	Total Debits	£0 13 11

	£ s. d.
Monthly Credit Balance (1897)	2 0 4
,, ,, ,, (1898)	2 18 5
Monthly Net Gain ... (1898)	£0 18 1

Thus it will be seen that, instead of the monthly pay of a private soldier, corporal, or sergeant being £1 11s., £2 11s. 8d., and £3 12s. 4d., respectively, the amounts actually drawn by them are, at the most, £1 1s. 3½d., £2 1s. 11½d., and £2 0s. 7d. It will also be perceived that from a financial point of view that of corporal is the best paid rank.

Going a little further into these calculations I will show what, in seven years, a soldier's compulsory deductions from his pay will amount to:—

	1897. (And 6 years previously.)	1898. (And 6 years following.)	Remarks.
	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	
Private Thomas Smith ...	91 2 2½†	9 3 5½	£31 18s. 9d. saved by abolition of Grocery Stoppage.
Corporal William Jones ...	91 2 2½†	9 3 5½	
Sergeant John Browne ...	132 19 5†	58 9 0	

* These two items are not compulsory. They are both matters of private arrangement, but as all non-commissioned officers of this rank are compelled, in virtue of their position, to have a batman, and to pay someone to do their washing, I have mentioned the terms usually paid in the infantry on these two accounts.

† By adding, as a *credit*, for 1897, the item of "deferred pay," each of these three amounts will be lessened by £21. Under the new order of things, however, "deferred pay" is to be no longer a part of our military system, and its place is to be taken by a "gratuity." This "gratuity" is to be calculated at the rate of £1 per annum, or £7 for seven years. Thus, the recruit of to-day is to receive a "gratuity" of £7, and exemption from the "grocery stoppage" of 3d. *per diem*, in place of the former "deferred pay" of £21 and the levying of this food tax. The *net* daily gain under the new system will be approximately 1½d. to the

The civilian reader will, I think, acknowledge that these deductions amount to a somewhat large proportion of the pay with which non-commissioned officers and men are credited. Whether it is a fair proportion or not is a matter for Pall Mall to determine.

To the credit side of the foregoing accounts I have not added any items of "good-conduct pay." As pay in this respect cannot possibly be obtained by soldiers under two years' service (and then only by privates and lance-corporals) it cannot obviously be included among the *credits* of the average soldier. It is issued at the rate of one penny *per diem* for each badge to all men below the rank of corporal whose professional conduct merits such mark of approbation. Lest my readers should be of opinion that, by excessive virtue, a soldier may amass speedy opulence, I must explain that good-conduct badges are awarded only under these regulations:—

After 2 years' service, if clear of a "regimental entry" during this period				1d. and 1 Badge.	
,, 6	,,	,,	if in uninterrupted receipt of 1d. G.C. pay for the preceding two years ...	2d. ... 2	,,
,, 12	,,	,,	,,	3d. ... 3	,,
,, 18*	,,	,,	,,	4d. ... 4	,,
,, 23*	,,	,,	,,	5d. ... 5	,,
,, 28*	,,	,,	,,	6d. ... 6	,,

As I have not included "good-conduct pay" among the soldier's credits, so also have I refrained from including "stoppage for barrack damages" among his *debits*. This is a varying charge, and is levied among all ranks. About twopence *per mensem* would be a fair average under this heading, although I have often been compelled to contribute, in this respect, as much as threepence, and sometimes twice this amount. As far as possible, however, "barrack damages" are nowadays brought home to individuals instead of being indiscriminately, as was formerly the case, among the innocent and guilty alike. In my day, certainly, the sun shone on the just and on the unjust, and the stoppage for "barrack damages" was a painfully familiar item in the monthly accounts of every non-commissioned officer and man in the battalion.

In examining the foregoing tables it must be strictly remembered

soldier. The difference between the old "deferred pay" and the new "gratuity," amounting to £14 in seven years, is to be applied to meet the cost of the contemplated "free ration" issue. By this plan, the £31 18s. 9d. which I have mentioned in the above table will become £17 18s. 9d.

* Under certain conditions, a soldier may receive his fourth G.C. badge in sixteen years, and similarly his fifth and sixth badges in twenty-one and twenty-six years respectively.

that they only hold good in the case of those months that elapse without the non-commissioned officer or man concerned incurring any deduction whatever in respect of the purchase of an article of kit, the repair of his uniform, or temporary detention in hospital. If his misdeeds have been such as to land him in prison (and soldiers are not "plaster saints") he will draw no pay for such period, as he is thus compulsorily absent from military duty. "Fines for drunkenness," too, are responsible for a perceptible alteration in a soldier's monthly credit balance. Again, route-marching and manœuvres very soon wear out his boots, and to sole and heel them will make a large hole in a week's pay. The regimental tailor's shop also demands a certain percentage for repairing the uniform that the frequent field-days, guards, and "fatigue duties" that he undergoes so constantly will injure. A soldier has to be always spic and span upon parade, and if his clothing shows visible signs of age or shabbiness, he is very promptly "put down" for a new garment—at his own expense.

The supply of neither "clothing" nor necessaries is an adequate one, and a man is therefore compelled to keep up his stock by making frequent purchases through his accounts from the quarter-master's stores. Although he certainly does annually receive, as a "free issue," a serge frock, two pairs of boot, one cap, and a pair of trousers (with an extra pair and a tunic in alternate years) from the time that he joins his battalion to the day, seven years or so later, when he leaves it, he receives but one set of brushes, two towels, two shirts, two pairs of socks, and one razor! And, if cleanliness be closely akin to Godliness, the soldier can scarcely be expected to live up to this precept on an allowance of but one piece of soap and a single tin of blacking during this period. Although this is, perhaps, but a trifling matter, yet it is one for which provision might have been made in the new Estimates. The Wantage Committee evidently recognized the importance of these matters, and if their recommendations had been acted upon there would now be no ground for complaint in this direction.

If he have the ill-fortune to be compelled to go to hospital, he will be charged 7d. *per diem* as long as he remains there. This charge is made quite irrespective of the fact whether his admittance is occasioned by venereal disease contracted entirely by his own fault, or for cold or fever resulting from the performance of military duty. For in this manner do the authorities liberally interpret the phrase "free medical attendance." Red tape, however, does occasionally so far expand as to either wholly, or partially, remit "hospital stoppages," in case of the treatment being necessitated by an accident which has occurred strictly on duty.

The all-absorbing food question is the next with which I will deal.

There has lately been a vast flourish of trumpets in connection with the "great improvements in the soldier's messing," but I can only say that the said "improvements" have not yet very conspicuously extended to the troops stationed abroad. Three months ago, when I returned to England from the Cape, the food was almost precisely the same as that provided seven years earlier, when I first joined the service. The daily issue remained exactly the same—¾lb. of meat ("weighed with bone") and one lb. of bread. Besides being "weighed with bone," the meat is also weighed with such an amount of fat and gristle that, by the time it leaves the cook-house for the barrack-room, each man's allowance has dwindled to some six or seven ounces. Sugar, milk, butter, potatoes, with tea and coffee have (until the new regulations are in working order) to be provided by the daily "grocery stoppage" to which each man's pay is subjected. How far 3d. or 3½d. will go to procure these items my readers may imagine for themselves.

Among the many duties which the soldier is called upon during the period of his "colour service" to perform are several which cannot under any possibility be considered as military. I refer to the constant employment on "fatigue duty" that he will undergo. Many a recruit of the better sort is considerably disgusted to find himself almost constantly engaged in such purely domestic and menial occupations as washing up cups and saucers in the officers' and sergeants' messes, sweeping out drains and latrines, scrubbing tables and forms, polishing stoves, and cleaning windows, &c. &c. As "orderly sergeant" it has often been my lot to detail one man to perform two or three different "fatigues" (each extending for a couple of hours or more) in a single day. Little wonder then that the soldier sometimes grumbles when his brief intervals of liberty between parades are thus encroached upon. The result of his grumbling is always the same—immediate confinement in the guard-room, followed by punishment for a breach of the military discipline that is founded on instant and unquestioning obedience. If the soldier's life and training were designed to fit him for employment as a housemaid one could very well understand the benefit of such occupation, but this not being quite the case, its object is not entirely clear.

The prospect of promotion naturally concerns all soldiers who are worth anything at all. The drudgery and scanty pay that form the lot of the private are by these only regarded as a temporary evil. Very properly they look forward to the days when, with stripes on their arms and an increase of pay in their pockets,

they can escape from the uncongenial atmosphere of the barrack-room to the comparative comfort of the sergeants' mess.

How long it will take the average recruit to effect this change it is impossible to state definitely. In different regiments and battalions different regulations naturally prevail. In one corps two or three years may suffice to see a well-conducted man on his journey from recruit to sergeant; while in another three times this period will not bring him sufficiently far up the roll of corporals to be eligible for appointment to lance-sergeant.

The fact is promotion depends on so many things—the candidate's standing in the eyes of his company officer and colour-sergeant, his educational ability, character (from a military point of view), and the number of casualties occurring among his seniors. Broadly speaking, however, I would certainly maintain that the flow of promotion is infinitely swifter in a battalion stationed at home than in one serving abroad.

The reasons for this contention are as follows:—

From the home battalions drafts are being constantly sent out to those on foreign service. Each draft is accompanied by a proportion of N.C.O.'s. On their arrival in Egypt, or India, or South Africa, as the case may be, they are transferred to the new battalion. The N.C.O.'s accompanying them have then to be placed on the roll of such, and absorbed as vacancies in their respective ranks occur. Thus there is in the foreign service battalions about twice the competition to gain admittance to the non-commissioned ranks, and about half the opportunity to reach them. The junior N.C.O.'s who have been patiently bearing the heat and burden of the day there are naturally anything but pleased at the constant arrival from England of the numerous corporals and sergeants who jump over their heads in this unceremonious manner. As the establishment of N.C.O.'s is strictly limited the chances that the juniors in the battalions abroad will ever reach sergeant's rank are obviously rather remote.

The home service battalion, however, benefits immensely by this arrangement. When any of its N.C.O.'s are transferred to the sister battalions abroad the vacancies thus created are filled by the next on the promotion roll at home. Consequently, these N.C.O.'s are very much the junior in age and service, while senior in rank to numbers of the corporals and sergeants serving abroad.

On account of the continual arrival of N.C.O.'s during the six years which I spent abroad an extraordinary state of things prevailed in my battalion. Corporals who originally came out when we first embarked, were frequently superseded by men who had not even enlisted when these had gained their stripes. Indeed,

one N.C.O. who joined us as a sergeant had considerably less service as a soldier than I had as a corporal. The lance-corporals in particular were very hardly dealt with in this matter. Those who received their first stripe on the same day as myself had, many of them, actually to wait from three to five years before receiving further promotion to corporal. I, myself, after almost four years' service in the rank of corporal had not climbed sufficiently far up this roll to attain to the appointment of "paid" lance-sergeant. It was certainly somewhat galling to see sergeants and corporals of a couple of years' service come out and supersede comparative veterans of five and six years' service, but who, owing to the congested state of promotion, were still lance-corporals. At the time of my promotion to corporal I occupied the twenty-seventh place on the roll of this rank; two years later my position was the thirty-sixth, or nine places *lower* down the roll.

No article on "Army Reform" seems to be complete without a reference or two to the subject of "deferred pay." Accordingly I will briefly state how far the issue of this money affects the soldier who has enlisted before the new order of things is enforced.

At the end of each year "deferred pay," to the extent of 2d. for each day that the soldier may reckon towards pension, is credited to him. After seven years, when he is transferred to the reserve, this amounts to £21. If, however, he remains "with the colours" for a further period of five years, and thus becomes non-liable to join the reserve, his "deferred pay" is increased to £36.

Despite the fact that "deferred pay" is issued for "past services," if a soldier thinks fit to procure his discharge from the army by purchase this money, which his past services have entitled him to, is calmly withheld. Thus, a soldier who purchases his discharge after seven years' service is required to forfeit £21 "deferred pay," as well as to lay down another £18 "purchase money." By this arrangement his discharge will cost him £39. Similarly, £36 represents the cost of a discharge purchased with six years' service.

The effect of issuing "deferred pay" at all has been simply to induce as many men as possible to leave the colours at the earliest possible opportunity. £21 was a golden and irresistible bait to many a man who had probably seldom had twenty-one pence in his pocket. By the new regulations "deferred pay" is to be abolished, and a gratuity of £1 for each completed year of service is to be substituted. The money thus saved is to be applied to providing soldiers with an increased supply of rations to obviate the necessity for the present objectionable "grocery stoppage."

I must now bring this paper to a close. Space has scarcely permitted me to offer any suggestions for the remedy of the various

abuses on which I have touched. I will, however, conclude by mentioning a few directions in which reforms seem to be most urgently needed :—

1. Trained soldiers to receive a higher rate of pay than recruits.

2. An annual issue of "necessaries," and a more liberal allowance of clothing.

3. The promotion of N.C.O.'s to run through both battalions of a regiment, and when N.C.O.'s accompany drafts abroad, the returning troopship to bring back an equal number of N.C.O.'s to the home battalion.

4. The stoppage for "washing, marking, haircutting, and library" to be totally abolished.

5. "Fatigue duties" to be performed only by men under punishment.

6. "Hospital stoppages" to be abolished, except where a soldier is under treatment for disease occasioned by his own misconduct.

7. The cost of discharge by purchase to be reduced with each year's service.

8. Reservists to be permitted to rejoin the colours *at any time*, without being required to refund their "deferred pay."

9. A reservist's liability to be "called up" to be in inverse ratio to his period of service in this force.

Finally, in dealing with the momentous subject of "Army Reform," I scarcely think that we can do better than take the advice of *Hamlet*—"Oh, reform it altogether!"

T. Atkins.

THE "RELIGIOUS" NOVEL.

It is perhaps obvious enough that our fiction, like our fabrics, is largely governed by fashion. For a space we were bidden to read tales of adventure; and, accordingly, the table of each subscriber to the circulating library groaned beneath historical romances and tales of buccaneers, framed after the Stevensonian model, but with how little of the Stevensonian genius! At another period the detective story was the literary mode of the moment, deluging the apathetic reader with story after story, in which the stupidest of criminals evaded the most astute of detectives through a hundred weary pages. Hardly yet have we escaped from the reek of the Kailyard, and the taste for morbid introspective studies seems unsated still. But those of us who have dared to hope that in the dirty unrealities of realistic novels fashion had touched the lowest depth of literary degradation were speedily undeceived. For the latest literary vogue is worse, its poison is more insidious, its hold over the general public is immeasurably stronger, and its results to readers who have any respect for sacred things are more nauseating than were those of any fashion that preceded it. That latest fashion in contemporary literature—if for the sake of a convenient title we misuse an epithet—may be described as the Religious Novel. Of its appalling popularity there can be no doubt, even if we are sanguine enough to believe that this popularity will be short-lived. However this may be, having regard to the general favour with which the Religious Novel—for reasons as obvious as they are saddening—is viewed, it seems worth while to enter a protest, which, if it must needs prove ineffectual, shall at least be outspoken; to make one last stand on behalf of the dignity of literature (if so old-fashioned a phrase be permissible), and, still more, on behalf of decency and reverence.

It is not difficult to trace the causes which have brought the Religious Novel into being. In these days, when not to have written a novel threatens to become a rare and enviable distinction, there are but two ways by which an author can hope to bring his work into a prominence greater than that which falls to the lot of the average book. The first is that his story should be told with

exceptional skill, with that rare talent which can touch old themes into new life, which can present episodes of everyday existence with striking dramatic force, or with real pathos, or with genuine humour. And as that path to success can lie open only to writers of especial talent, it is a matter of course that the alternative method should be the commoner—the method, namely, of compelling the attention of the public by the startling subject of a novel, and by "going one better" than any previous writer in the direction of crude sensationalism. Put frankly, the ideal of such a writer is, within the scope of three hundred pages, to outrage as many conventions as possible. Thus, not so many years ago belief obtained that certain subjects lay outside the legitimate domain of the novelist. It was thought that what is euphemistically known as "the sex-problem" was hardly a seemly basis for a story; it was supposed that minute accounts of repulsive diseases found their proper place in the medical journals rather than in the pages of a novel. Presently, however, it occurred to authors hungering for fame (or at least for notoriety) wholly to set aside these limitations, and their success from a commercial point of view quickly emboldened a host of others to follow their example, each in turn striving to outvie all "realistic" predecessors in sheer repulsiveness. But in process of time this field became exhausted. "The force of 'naturalization' could no farther go," and it became necessary to find another subject hitherto considered outside the novelist's province. What so suitable as religion for this purpose? Religion so far had been held sacred at least in this respect; up to this time no author had ventured to offer the public a caricature of the Church or a parody of a Biblical narrative under the form of a romance. How could a cheap effect be obtained more easily than by defying this old-fashioned notion of reverence, and by presenting under the guise of a Religious Novel a liberal dose of sensationalism and sensuality to a public with only too strong an appetite for such fare? Already we had been supplied with romances in which the hero fluctuated spasmodically between Agnosticism and Christianity, and in which religious questions had been debated at great length. This was, however, but a mild innovation compared to what followed. The more sacred the subject, the greater the reverence hitherto attached to it, the more eagerly was it pounced upon as a theme for a novel. One need scarcely name Miss Marie Corelli as the leader of this distinguished school of writers. Lest we should think that any subject could henceforth be considered too sacred for treatment by a novelist, she began by taking the most sacred in the world—the story of our Lord's Passion—and retold it at length, in her own peculiar style, with the setting of an emotional romance. Emboldened by the immediate and striking

success of this experiment, she sought for another "religious" theme, and speedily hit upon one which, from the mystery and awe hitherto attached to it, was particularly suitable for her purpose. The personality of the Spirit of Evil is, we know, treated with much reticence in the Bible, the allusions to the powers of darkness are made with the utmost solemnity; the mystery of evil is one, we are told, that, at least in this world, the human intellect will never be able to comprehend. The inspired writers of Scripture seem to shrink from the topic; the nature of Satan's power is a subject which they tremble to approach, except with the most distant awe. All of which facts, of course, should increase our gratitude and respect for a novelist to whom such feelings are unknown, who makes Satan the hero of a nineteenth-century romance, who furnishes him with dress-clothes, and brings him, together with a French cook, to a fashionable London hotel. With what pride should we regard an age which has produced such a novel as *The Sorrows of Satan!* How gratified we should be by this exhibition of the taste of the public, which has bought that novel in countless editions!

Needless to say, the success of these two "religious" novels was the signal for many other writers to betake themselves to the same fruitful field. Before long the sufferings of the early Christian martyrs was made the subject of a melodrama. Another writer has provided us with a novel in which Lazarus is made to figure as hero. Finally, an elaborate burlesque on the Church of England has been put together by Mr. Hall Caine, and has reached a sale of 50,000 copies in little more than a month. Speaking seriously, is it not time that those few of us who regard these works—quite apart from their glaring literary defects—as transgressing all bounds of decency and good taste should enter a vigorous protest?

That such books as *Barabbas*, *The Sorrows of Satan*, and *The Christian* should be extremely popular is indeed lamentable, but it is not altogether surprising. Both Miss Corelli and Mr. Hall Caine take themselves with the utmost seriousness, and this is a quality which the public dearly loves to find in an author. Each regards a novel as a semi-inspired "message"—Miss Corelli's warmest admirer can never equal Miss Corelli in his opinion of her work; Mr. Hall Caine himself applies the epithet "colossal" to his farrago of absurd theories founded upon imaginary facts. Again, the accident that Mr. Hall Caine, with all his defects, writes admirable English, while Miss Corelli's style embodies well-nigh every fault known to the student of the language, affects in no appreciable degree their relative popularity with the bulk of the reading public, which is blissfully unconscious that such a quality as style exists. On the other hand, it loves a book which it fondly believes to be intellectual—it loves "to think that it thinks." Being illiterate to a

degree itself, it never doubts for a moment that the scraps of theosophy, the antiquated theories of psychology, the fragments of elementary science, which Miss Corelli sets with such infinite pomp before her readers, are not in truth the epoch-making discoveries of a profound and original thinker. Once more, it is impossible to disguise the fact that it prefers its food highly spiced. In the pages of *Vice Versa*, Mr. Anstey remarks on the happy form of compromise known as "Sunday Reading," and observes that a great many persons of the straiter sect will peruse a novel with great alacrity when it is published in instalments in a "religious magazine," although they would be shocked at the idea of reading it on Sunday when, later on, it comes to them from the library in volume form. And by a species of half-unconscious hypocrisy that is somewhat analogous, the same persons who would shrink with horror from a professedly "advanced" or "realistic" book devour eagerly whole pages of "suggestive" writing when presented to them under the guise of a "religious novel." They relish immensely passages which can scarcely be called "doubtful," because, unfortunately, there can be no possible doubt about their meaning. Strongly-coloured descriptions of illicit love-making, lengthy music-hall episodes in which the sensuality is scarcely veiled, these are, it seems, to be the inseparable accompaniments of the "religious" novel, and, under the pretence of attacking vice, its writers contrive to minister to the vicious appetite no less fully than does the frankest of French realists. So it is not altogether surprising that the religious novel sells in mammoth editions, that as many copies of *The Christian* should have been bought in a month as of *Kidnapped* in ten years, while who shall compute the sale of Miss Corelli's works? And we may adduce yet another reason for the success of the religious novel, a reason that, if it seems at first sight paradoxical, has yet some truth in it—the fact that the general public has a genuine interest, albeit a vague and sentimental one, in the study of religious questions. It has enough to welcome a book that deals with these problems in the course of a story, but it has not enough to discriminate between the religious and sacrilegious, between vague feelings about religion and religious feeling, and it holds the author at worst as brutally frank when in truth he is frankly brutal.

The last prominent "religious novel" at the moment of writing is, as has been mentioned, Mr. Hall Caine's *The Christian*, and it is worth while to dwell with a little more detail upon this, the last, and in some respects the most pernicious of its class. To analyse at length one of Miss Corelli's absurd and illiterate romances would be to pay it a quite undeserved attention. Doubtless she will continue to pour forth other volumes of the same kind in quick

succession, but the number of readers who are willing to accept these works at their author's estimation is likely to diminish before long. Perhaps even now a good many of her readers study her works in much the same spirit as they would read one of "Ouida's" early productions, and find delightful amusement in her sketches of modern social life, which resemble the real thing with about the same accuracy as the life of the guardsmen in *Under Two Flags* corresponds with the real and prosaic existence of these gentlemen. But Mr. Hall Caine stands upon a different footing. He has produced books which, despite a certain irritating pomposity of style and a total lack of humour, are yet infinitely superior to the average novel, and are written with much more than average skill and power. Moreover, in bringing his latest book before the public he was careful to assure the public of the absolute accuracy of the descriptions contained in it. We were told in the numerous "interviews" which heralded the appearance of *The Christian* that the proof-sheets had been submitted to various experts, who were able to supply that first-hand knowledge of the subjects treated in it which, with engaging frankness, the author implied that he himself lacked. It was once a tradition of literature (and even now there are some who do not regard it as quite obsolete) that a novelist should depict in his works only such scenes and characters and modes of life as he had become familiar with by long personal study and acquaintance. The new method, apparently, which certainly saves a great deal of trouble, is to rely entirely upon the imagination, and to entrust to a committee of experts the task of correcting the glaring misstatements which necessarily result when a writer describes in detail matters of which he is perfectly ignorant.

In the present instance, however, the committee of experts have performed their rather thankless duty in a very unsatisfactory manner; at least, if the pages of *The Christian* in their published form really give us a corrected portrait of the Church of England one shudders to think what Mr. Hall Caine's first sketch of it must have been. Whether "the power to see ourselves as others see us" is in truth a desirable faculty may well be doubted, but the opportunity of seeing themselves as a novelist imagines them, now afforded to the clergy, will scarcely fill them with gratitude. We—if the writer may speak as a very humble member of the Anglican clergy—have long been accustomed to being caricatured, together with the ordinances of our Church, by the writers of irresponsible fiction. Sometimes one becomes rather tired of the persistent way in which novelists use "clergyman" and "good-natured fool" as interchangeable terms. Sometimes when we are told how a vicar holds a confirmation, or a curate is ordained

priest before he is twenty-two, one is mildly surprised that the writer has not taken the very small amount of trouble necessary to prevent blunders of this kind. But, after all, no one takes these books very seriously, and they do not influence—nor are they intended to influence — the general public's estimation of the Church in the slightest degree. But in the case of such a book as *The Christian* the case is very different. It professes to deal with serious topics in a serious way. It is put before us with overwhelming solemnity by its author as a careful and accurate transcript of contemporary life. Moreover, a large proportion of Mr. Hall Caine's readers have doubtless a simple faith which prevents their testing for themselves the accuracy of his assertions. Therefore, when he draws a grotesque and offensive caricature of the Church, and declares it to be a faithful portrait, when he makes a great show of being acquainted with ecclesiastical technicalities—and falls into blunder after blunder in so doing—and when, having professed to weigh the claims of the Church with impartial carefulness, he solemnly pronounces them to be found wanting, there is a very real danger that a considerable number of the more ignorant readers of his book will fail to detect its absurdities, and will be led to accept the conclusions based upon them. And that is why the "religious" novel, in its latest development, deserves to be condemned in no halting terms. We would not doubt Mr. Hall Caine's sincerity of purpose, it is quite obvious that he takes himself with the utmost seriousness ; he may even believe that he has given us a faithful description of the Church of England's work in London. But if he has not, for the sake of "making a sensation," deliberately given a gross travesty, rather than a faithful picture, the only possible alternative is that his "colossal undertaking," as he calls it, is a monument of colossal ignorance.

It would be out of place to review the book at length, but having said so much, it may be well to recall some of the passages which justify our strictures. We may leave out of question the secular half of the narrative, and we need not trouble now about the good taste or otherwise of the incidents of the heroine's life as a music-hall artiste. Possibly the details here may be accurate enough, though there may be some question as to the fitness of the way in which they are presented, and still more doubt whether in a novel they should have been presented at all. But let us limit ourselves to Mr. Hall Caine's description of the average London church and the average London churchman. For we are precluded by the author's own words from supposing that "All Saints', Belgravia," and its vicar "Canon Wealthy" (how subtle is the humour of this name !) are to be considered in any way exceptional ; "the Church has a good many Canon Wealthys in it," he writes,

and it is because his hero finds that every London incumbent is of the same type that he seeks refuge in an Anglican monastery.*

This "Canon Wealthy," as readers of *The Christian* will remember, "bought a London parish. Then, by the help of an old actor who gave him lessons in elocution, he set up his Pentecost. . . . Ten years ago he was made an honorary Canon, and when he hears of an appointment to a bishopric he says in a tearful voice, 'I don't know what the dear Queen has got against me.'" Later on in the book he is partially consoled by being made "premier archdeacon," whatever that may be. His income, we are incidentally informed, comes in part from shares in a music-hall. His only occupation, besides preaching a sermon now and then, consists in attending Society functions. He has no religious feeling of any kind. He is intensely annoyed when a curate of his travels third-class, and he lives himself in the greatest luxury. When the titled patron of a perpetual curacy asserts as a fact that the last of a crowd of applicants for the post was given sixpence and went away quite satisfied, the "loudest laughter" comes from the Canon. As to his behaviour in the scene at the hospital board meeting, the least said the better, and there are other details of his conduct which decency forbids us to quote. It is well to pass on to the account of the typical London parish "in which there are no poor." Yet he has a staff of seven curates, who apparently do nothing at all. The church of All Saints' is truly magnificent: "Vergers in yellow and buff, with knee-breeches, silk stockings, and powdered wigs," show the congregation to their seats, and another "verger in blue" guards the Canon's private vestry, into which the seven curates are not admitted. The "choir" (*sic*) consists of "two violins, a viola, clarinet, 'cello, double bass, the trumpets and drums, and, of course, the organ." The fashionable congregation attends the service as a kind of theatrical performance—there is not, we are told, a particle of real religious feeling either in the clergy or the people. And this we are invited to accept as a faithful portrait of the average London church and the average London clergyman! Disgusted, as he may well be, with the character of his vicar and the nature of his surroundings, the hero, thirsting for hard work, decides that he cannot find it in any London parish. Spitalfields, Shoreditch, S.

* In his recent defence of *The Christian*, Dean Farrar admits that if the author intended his clergymen to be representative of the whole body, no caricature could be more gross. But he is charitably convinced that this was not Mr. Hall Caine's idea, and regrets that "a couple of sentences" were not added to prove it. But in order to share Dean Farrar's view, one has to ignore the whole drift and purport of the story. It is expressly implied that John Storm's reason for joining the "Bishopsgate Brotherhood" was simply because true religious feeling was unknown among the London parochial clergy, whose ranks he therefore felt compelled to leave.

Peter's, London Docks—there is apparently no work done in any of these parishes; perhaps they too, in Mr. Hall Caine's opinion, are in the hands of other "Canon Wealthys." Finding it impossible to obtain real work in any London parish, the hero goes off to interview the Superior of an Anglican Brotherhood in Bishopsgate Street, having previously been told by the Prime Minister, with "a bitter little laugh," that the Church should be called the caterpillar rather than the pillar of the State—a really epoch-making witticism. Then the interview with the Father Superior furnishes us with a fine example of the artificial and mawkish pathos which is characteristic of the modern "religious" novel. Could any passage ring falser than the following?—

"At that the smile of an angel came into his old face, and he said with a sweet simplicity, 'I love the park. Every morning the children play there, and then it is the holy Catholic Church to me, and I like to walk in it and to lay my hands on the heads of the little ones, and to ask a blessing for them, and to empty myself. This morning as I was coming here I met a little boy carrying a bundle. "And what is your name, my little man?" I said. And he told me what it was. "And how old are you?" I asked. "Twelve years," he answered. "And what have you got in your bundle?" "Father's dinner, sir," he said. "And what is your father, my son?" "A carpenter," said the boy. And I thought if I had been living in Palestine nineteen hundred years ago I might have met another little Boy carrying the dinner of His father, who was also a carpenter, in a little bundle which Mary had made up for Him. So I felt in my pocket, and all I had was my fare home again, and I gave it to the little man as a thank-offering to God that he had suffered me to meet a sweet boy of twelve whose father was a carpenter.'"

Whereupon the hero weeps, and the Father—who, of course, is only in Priest's Orders—"raises two fingers of his right hand" and gives him the Episcopal blessing. Shortly afterwards the hero retires into the monastery, where we have not the patience to follow him. The description of the life there is fully as absurd as the description of "All Saints', Belgravia"; the Anglican Brothers "tell their rosaries," say compline backwards,* and do other equally remarkable things. *The Christian*, it must be repeated, instead of giving us an accurate account of the social work of the Church, merely sets before us a ridiculous travesty of it, written in very questionable taste. Its blunders and confident assertions would be amusing were it not for the saddening reflection that they must have passed undetected by a large number of the semi-educated public, many of whom doubtless have been led to believe that the average London clergyman is a worldly and unprincipled charlatan, and that the majority of London churchgoers attend service only as a pleasing theatrical spectacle. And as we peruse such a book as this, if we

* On p. 116, we are given an account of the saying of compline in the monastery, and are told that the service *ended* with the words "May the Lord Almighty grant us a quiet night and a perfect end." As a matter of fact, these are the opening words of the service.

still believe that the authors who produce "religious" novels do so in any higher spirit than that of writing a sensational romance, if they really believe that the cause of religion is advanced by productions of this kind, we can only re-echo the oft-repeated cry, "Save us from our friends!"

We have dwelt upon *The Christian* at some length as being the latest, and in some ways the most egregious, specimen of its class, but our protest is against the whole *genus* "religious novel" rather than against any one example of it. Supposing that the claim of accurate description asserted for *The Christian* were justifiable, supposing that its picture of the Church was wholly faithful instead of being grotesquely absurd, the book, we maintain, would still be one which should never have been written. The legitimate domain of the novel is extensive enough—there is no class of life, no point of view, no element of comedy, or tragedy, or melodrama, with which it is not free to deal. The limits are far wider than those within which, fifty years ago, Thackeray and Dickens were well content to be bound, and yet they never suffered from lack of material for fresh stories. But certain and immovable limits there still should be; certain subjects should still be considered to be outside the novelist's pale, and religion surely is one of them. If our religion is something more than a vague sentiment or a hazy aspiration, if it is deep, if it is real, if it is sacred to us, the "religious" novel, in which Biblical narratives are eked out with mawkish sentiment and glaring vulgarity, in which Divine ordinances are caricatured, must needs seem nauseating and disgusting. If, again, we value the traditions of our literature, if we are anxious that its future should be not unworthy of its past, we cannot but deplore this lowering of the accepted standard of taste, we cannot but regret that well-known writers, for the sake of selling gigantic editions, should be ready to pander to depraved likings, and be prepared, for the sake of making a sensation, to fling all notions of decency and reverence to the winds.

It remains to be seen what will be the next development of the "religious" novel, or how soon its vogue will give way to another. The readers who dislike it are in a hopeless minority at present; just now its hold over the general bulk of the reading public seems stronger than ever, and any improvement in popular taste must needs be gradual. Protest in this matter is futile enough; one can but hope for the day when the sentimental public will arrive at the not very recondite conclusion that a book professing to deal with great themes is not necessarily a great book, that the "religious" novel can be, in point of fact, grossly irreligious, and that true religion is a thing *toto cœlo* apart from pruriency posing as piety.

ANTHONY C. DEANE.

THE MONTH IN AMERICA.

Washington, March 15th, 1898.

SPANISH affairs, to the exclusion of almost everything else, have monopolized attention in the United States since my last letter was written. Minister de Lome's excessively frank criticism of the President, and his admission of the desperate condition of his own country, might have resulted in more serious consequences had not the explosion of the battleship *Maine*, in the harbour of Havana, on the night of the fifteenth of last month, swept everything else out of sight and fixed public attention solely on the mass of twisted steel and iron resting on the mud of Havana Harbour. Apparently the people of this country could see nothing except the mockery of what was once a great fighting machine; which had so suddenly been transformed into the tomb of more than 250 brave men. The flash of that explosion in the fetid waters of Cuba's capital, the blinding pillar of flame roaring its accompaniment to the shrieks of the dying, obscured the popular vision. Until the mystery was solved, until it was known whether the *Maine* was the victim of an unforeseen accident or had been sacrificed by Spanish treachery, no one could think of anything else.

It is gratifying to know that while there has naturally been most intense excitement, it has been the expression of feeling of the well-balanced, calm Anglo-Saxon, and not the ebullition of frantic rage which characterizes the Latins. The Spanish Legation in this city has not been guarded; Spaniards in the large cities have not been insulted or placed in peril. The self-control displayed under the most trying circumstances has been admirable. Men in public and private have impressed upon the country the necessity of suspending judgment until the facts were known. Captain Sigsbee, the commander of the ill-fated vessel, a man who has before this proved his courage and "nerve" when instant decision and coolness alone stood between him and destruction, struck the chord when, within an hour of the disaster, he telegraphed the Secretary of the Navy not to send a fleet to Havana and urged the public to remain calm. This advice was repeated by the President, the Secretary of the Navy, and other political leaders. They all realized

the tremendous gravity of the situation and the danger of any rash or inconsiderate move. Everyone appreciated that the time for jingo vapourings had passed and the next play might be made with steel instead of words. This restraint was not due to excessive caution or cowardice, but a desire to be just; to ascertain exactly the causes of the destruction of the *Maine*, and act accordingly. The natural temptation to talk war, even if there were no intention of making it, was overcome.

But while the course of the official world has been thus far nicely poised as to elicit admiration, the same cannot be said of the Press, certain of the New York papers as usual being the chief offenders. Within a few hours of the explosion, when only the bare facts were known—that the *Maine* had been destroyed and more than two-thirds of her crew drowned and blown to pieces—these papers had their "Extras" on the streets giving full accounts of the causes of the disaster. They have continued this course ever since. The public has been kept in a state of suspense and excitement by rumours which, published in one edition, have been denied or qualified in the next. Apparently there has been no attempt made to ascertain facts; in truth, they are the smallest things to be considered. The public has been educated to feed on sensations, its appetite has been whetted, and that it will take all the sensations they can dish up seems to be the principle governing the proprietors of these journals. Sensation is piled upon sensation, untruth upon untruth, imbecility upon ignorance, indecency upon wickedness, until the whole is a mass to disgust and sicken, and one wonders how long the public will meekly submit to this prostitution and degradation for the enrichment of a few unscrupulous and conscienceless men.

Personally, I have no sympathy with Spain—whose past is a glorious heritage of shame, and whose future can be only a remembrance of dishonoured opportunities—and little more with the Cubans. The Cuban has all the vices of the Spaniard and none of his virtues; the Spaniard by constant association and an inherent adaptability to sink in the scale of civilization has, in Cuba at least, brought himself to the level of the man he despises. Between the two there is little to choose, and yet Spain has rights which international obligations should cause to be respected. They have not been. While professing neutrality the United States has lent aid and encouragement to the insurgents. Almost without exception the Press of this country has treated Spain as if she were the outlaw among nations. She has been vilified, slandered, abused, derided. No story so outrageous but what it found ready publication. I marvel at it all that Spain has not let

the hot blood of passion carry her to her own destruction and light her funeral pyre with the bodies of some at least of her American traducers.

Of the fiendish and unspeakable cruelties practised by Spain in her impotent efforts to throttle this revolution the world knows.

THE NATIONAL REVIEW a few months ago well termed Cuba an American Armenia, and all the revolting horrors of the Turk in Armenia have been more than met by the Spaniard in Cuba: this no one denies. If the United States, in the interests of humanity and civilization, had intervened the world would have applauded. It has not seen fit to do so. It has professed friendship for Spain; it has officially told Cuba to find its own salvation without the help of the Great Republic. And then, safely entrenched in New York and elsewhere, papers have resorted to every means to drive Spain into war with the United States. That has always been the Cuban hope, and of their American sympathizers. They have realized it was idle to expect the United States to take the initiative, but it might be possible to so crowd Spain as to leave war as the only avenue of escape. To-day that hope seems very near realization.

I have recently returned from a short visit to Cuba, undertaken to determine for myself, if possible, the exact conditions prevailing on the island and the causes which led to the destruction of the *Maine*. That Cuba is lost to Spain no disinterested and intelligent observer questions for one moment. Spain cannot subdue the rebellion. She can neither buy nor bury the insurgent chiefs. If the United States does not intervene the war may drag on for the next ten years. At the end of that time Spain will be exhausted; Cuba, naturally, perhaps, the most fertile spot on the globe, will be a desert waste, and the handful of insurgents triumphant. Spanish corruption and not Spanish cowardice is responsible. Cuba has always been the place of loot for Spanish officialdom in time of peace; in time of war the opportunities for peculation are multiplied a hundredfold. From the Palace to the lowest subaltern the tentacles of corruption spread and embrace Spain's civil and military officials in their corroding grasp.

In Havana, however, one sees little evidence of Spain's lost grasp. There may be a mine under the surface, it may explode at any moment, but the fuse is carefully hidden and the charge is skilfully concealed. The day I arrived the New York papers contained long telegrams from Havana, printed under flaming "heads," announcing that all Americans had been warned by Consul-General Lee to immediately leave the island; that he was preparing to leave within twenty-four hours, and that the life of every American was in peril. General Lee had not given any such warning, and at

the time this letter is written is still in Havana. No American or Englishman was in danger. I walked and drove about all parts of the city day and night. No one offered me insult, on the contrary everyone was studiously polite and accommodating. And yet, day after day, the papers teemed with accounts of the peril in which Americans stood and urged the President to send war ships to Havana. Not content with this, their Havana correspondents have endeavoured to create diplomatic entanglements. To escape the military censor the newspapers run tugs between Havana and Key West, Florida, where their despatches are wired to the North. These tugs have persistently violated port and health regulations, they have in many instances practically defied the Spanish officials, and yet the men responsible for the infractions of the law claim that their American citizenship protects them, and that any attempt on the part of Spain to arrest them will be resented by the Washington Government. More than one of these men is anxious to be imprisoned so as to achieve greatness and give his paper an opportunity to still further inflame public sentiment. If war comes it will be because the United States forces it upon Spain. For one tithe of the insult and contumely heaped upon America, were the case reversed, the sword would have been drawn long ago by this country.

Possibly before this appears in print the official report of the Court of Enquiry appointed to investigate the loss of the *Maine* will be made public, and therefore it seems unnecessary for me to speculate regarding it. What the findings of the Court will be none can tell, but the general opinion, both in and out of the service, is that the *Maine* was blown up by a submarine mine, and the evidence adduced before the court, so far as I have been able to ascertain, confirms that belief. Expert testimony concurs in agreeing that only an external explosion could have caused the disaster, and those deductions are based on certain apparently well established facts. Public opinion will not accept a Scotch verdict of not proven, or a charge of negligence or incompetence against the officers. If the court reports that the explosion was caused by a mine or torpedo, and does not specifically charge the Spanish Government with complicity in the plot, leaving the question open whether it was an authorized official act or the work of a fanatic it is believed President McKinley will be satisfied with a money indemnity. It will be extremely difficult to bring the guilt home, and it may be regarded as certain that Spain will disavow all responsibility. But neither disavowals nor indemnity will satisfy the country, and against his will the President may be forced into war.

If it comes it will find both sides ready. Spain has, of course, been on a war footing for the past two years; the United States is to-day better prepared for hostilities, especially on sea, than she has been at any time since the close of the War of the Rebellion. The American navy, while small, is of modern construction and equipped with all the latest appliances. It is claimed by American naval officers that ship for ship the vessels of the United States navy are the equal of any in the world, the British alone excepted. From what I have seen of the Spanish vessels in American waters, and the ships of the United States navy—and I am tolerably familiar with nearly all of them, having cruised on more than one—there can be no question as to the vast superiority of the American navy. The Republic outnumbers Spain in battleships and protected cruisers; her only marked inferiority is in torpedo destroyers. Spain has several of these useful vessels now on the way to Cuba; the United States has not a single destroyer afloat, and only half a dozen small torpedo boats. But after all there is a greater factor in the equation of war than battleships or cruisers, torpedo boats or projectiles. It is the men behind the guns; the brains behind the conning towers. As Anglo-Saxons I believe that we shall cling to the belief that the men who sprang from our loins are, man for man, better, more scientific than their opponents. Tradition, like blood, counts for much. The traditions of the American navy are glorious. We Englishmen know how America can fight on the sea. A nation that gave to the world Paul Jones, Perry, and Farragut, need have no fear of meeting fate on the sea. Spain's naval past is not one of untarnished victory.

If Spain could make an offensive war; if she would not have her hands full in protecting her Western possession, she might inflict considerable damage upon the American coast. Few of the ports are adequately protected. New York is the best fortified of them all, and yet New York could not make any very stubborn defence against an attacking squadron commanded by the right man. Boston, Portland, and Philadelphia are practically defenceless; Washington could perhaps be successfully shelled and the capital held at the mercy of an invader, and most of the southern ports are protected simply because they are approached by shallow and winding channels which prevent the entrance of any but light draught vessels.

If fighting comes—and its failure to come will be the unexpected—the theatre of war will be Cuba, and not the United States. The plan of campaign, I am given to understand, is the bombardment of Havana, and the landing of troops on the island east of the capital, probably at Matanzas, as being most accessible

and convenient for military purposes. Between the blockading fleet and the army, with the insurgents to assist, Havana would be throttled in a grasp of steel. There are a few modern guns mounted in the fortifications of Havana, but the plans of the defences in possession of the Navy Department convince the Department that before the guns of the *Massachusetts*, *Iowa*, and *Texas*, supplemented by lighter ordnance of the cruisers, Havana would suffer the fate of Alexandria. Some resistance is to be expected from the Spanish fleet, but it must be heavily reinforced to throw much weight into the scale. To-day, Spain has only two protected cruisers in Havana Harbour—the *Vizcaya* and the *Alimirante Oquendo*—both of which are out-weighted by American vessels of the same class. A smaller cruiser, *Alphonso XII.*, whose engines are worthless, and a vessel still smaller, the *Lagaspi*, constitute the fleet. Scattered along the coast are numerous light cruisers, the largest of which is not over 3,000 tons, while the majority are practically nothing but gunboats, valuable for patrol service, but, as military units, of no weight. The present fleet, it is understood here, is to be reinforced, and probably Spain's most effective weapons, or what would be in the hands of competent naval officers, are the torpedo boats. They constitute the great element of uncertainty.

Giving Spain the benefit of everything military, opinion holds to Havana being quickly brought under the guns of the American fleet. The Spanish position will then be untenable, and Captain-General Blanco must either surrender or meet the land force. Judging from their failure to defeat the insurgents, it is a fair presumption that 15,000 or 20,000 American troops can vanquish the army which Blanco can place in the field. Spain's effective force in Cuba, according to Conservative estimates, does not exceed 50,000 men, all that are left of the 225,000 which have been sent to the island since the struggle commenced. The rest have either been invalided home or their bones lie in the numerous military cemeteries, monuments to Spanish corruption and mismanagement. Of these 50,000 half must be held in the "pacified" provinces to hold the rebels in check, so that the military problem presented to the United States is not so formidable as it might appear at first glance.

In fact, it is not the military problem which causes the Administration to hesitate and halt; it is the political problem, the eternal politics which are the bane of all things American when great questions are to be decided. The President does not want war. Not because President McKinley is especially humane or peace-loving, not because he fears defeat or dreads disaster,—these

are not the motives now controlling him. He is pledged to restore prosperity; he fears that war will interfere with business. The men who contributed most to his success two years ago, the men who furnished Mr. Hanna with the sinews of corruption, are opposed to war because war will "disturb values," or, in plain English, tumble down prices on the Stock Exchange. Furthermore they fear that war means a reopening of the silver question in its most acute form. If war is declared, the first thing would be the issuance of a war loan for which Europe would be asked to subscribe. In the present temper of European financiers, the President knows bonds must be specifically made payable in gold if they draw a low rate of interest, or if in "coin" or silver the interest must be much larger and the demand will be reduced. It is feared by the Administration the silver men will seize the opportunity to insist that the bonds be made payable either in "coin" or silver, thus undoing all that was accomplished by Mr. McKinley's election.

Lest I should be charged with making serious accusations which cannot be sustained, of purposely misinterpreting patriotic motives, let me say I know exactly whereof I speak. In proof: A few days ago, while the Naval Court of Enquiry was still engaged in taking testimony in the harbour of Havana, when nothing official could be known of the evidence, as, in addition to the matter being *sub judice*, every member of the Court and every witness examined was sworn to secrecy, information obtained by certain reputable newspapers through their correspondents in Havana pointed so irrefutably to the destruction of the *Maine* by a mine, that the publication of this statement showed the country the extreme gravity of the situation. If the *Maine* was blown up through design everyone admitted war must follow. The New York Stock Exchange became excited, and a small panic resulted. Mr. Hanna —whose intimacy with the President entitles him to be regarded as the mouthpiece of the Administration—promptly assured the professional gamblers of Wall Street that they were becoming unnecessarily alarmed. He submitted himself to an interview, in the course of which he said the Administration was convinced that Spain was not responsible for the destruction of the *Maine*, and the incident would not disturb the friendly relation which existed between the two Governments. Surely Mr. Hanna, a Senator, whose vote may decide the question of peace or war, has no right to form an opinion in advance of the evidence on which he may be called to act. For any man to prejudge a case is indecorous; for Mr. Hanna, the most intimate friend of the President, to endeavour to discredit the work of the Court of Enquiry is indecent. But Mr. Hanna did not labour in vain. His words had their effect, and the stock market in a day or two "recovered its tone."

Business was appeased, and prosperity commenced anew its Sisyphus-like task.

The dread of war re-opening the silver question is not the writer's imagination. That danger has been discussed by the Cabinet, it has been the subject of frequent consultations between the President and members of Congress. Perhaps the President's fears are not entirely groundless. There are some silver men who believe that if bonds are to be issued, whether for war purposes or any other, they should be made payable in gold or silver, and they are disposed to force the issue even at the risk of being accused of being unpatriotic. Members of the Cabinet have frankly told me they hope to avert war as they fear it will disturb business. The present Cabinet is the most pacific in years. The only recognized jingo, General Alger, the Secretary of War, has been dangerously ill, and away from his Department for months. Every other member pipes the carol of peace.

In addition to all this there is still another political phase of the question. The country is for war—the United States is generally for war although it rarely fights—but the politicians while afraid to go against the tide openly, are carefully weighing chances and considering how the most can be made out of the situation. If war is declared and results, as everyone anticipates, in an easy victory for the American arms, McKinley will be another "War President," with a place among the immortals and a second term assured. Patriotic though the Democrats are, this is too much to ask of their patriotism. On the other hand, if there should be any miscalculations, if victory costs ships and lives, the President who was so foolish as to go to war may pay the penalty by the loss of his power. There is much to be played for.

It is easier to capture Cuba than to know what to do with it after the victory. The sentiment of the United States is against the possession because its people are unfitted for American citizenship, and the American form of government admits of no colonies or dependencies. If Cuba is absorbed it will become a territory, and in the course of a few years its people will be clamouring to be admitted into the Union as a State. At some time in the near future, when a Presidential election turns on a handful of votes, the State of Cuba may turn the scale. To guard against this, many men in and out of Congress would like to see an independent Republic under the protecting ægis of the American flag set up in Cuba. It is not generally believed that the Cubans are capable of self-government, or that the new Republic could live a year without a revolution. But the experiment might as well be tried

if only to demonstrate its failure. In the meantime the United States knows no other nation will interfere while the problem is being worked out.

War and the talk of war has once more markedly emphasized the weakness of the American system of government, and the strain to which it is always subjected when an emergency arises. It again shows that a responsible Ministry holding power at the hands of the people can accomplish better results than when responsibility and action is divided between a President and Executive. In the present case Mr. Reed, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, is determined at almost any cost to maintain peace. So far his policy and that of the President has been in accord, but if the President obeys public clamour and determines on war, and the Speaker adheres to peace at any price, Mr. McKinley may find himself powerless, so great is the Speaker's control over the Lower House of Congress. But an even more curious and striking illustration of the lack of cohesiveness between the Government and Congress is shown in the remarkable and unexplained attitude suddenly assumed by Congressman Boutelle. That gentleman is Chairman of the Naval Committee, the Committee to whom, under the rules of the House, must be referred in the first instance all legislation affecting the navy. Mr. Boutelle is a Republican, so is Mr. Long, the Secretary of the Navy. The latter, a few days ago, wrote a letter to Mr. Boutelle asking the immediate enactment of suitable legislation increasing the enlisted force of the navy by 1,500 men, this increase being absolutely necessary, as the Secretary explained, to man the ships now in commission and assembled at Key West. Mr. Boutelle, who does not pretend to any scientific knowledge of naval affairs, who does not know what the Department's requirements are, and who certainly is not competent to controvert the opinion of experts, for some reason or other coolly buried the Secretary's letter, contemptuously remarking that the navy did not need 1,500 additional men, and there need be no haste in providing them. Secretary Long is powerless, and vessels must remain short-handed and tied up at their anchorages until it pleases Mr. Boutelle to yield to the Secretary's request. Government by Committee, as I have before had occasion to point out, has its disadvantages.

I have devoted so much space to Cuban affairs that other subjects can only be briefly touched upon. The defeat of the Hawaiian Treaty of Annexation is now practically assured, and before this is printed a test vote will undoubtedly have been taken, which will demonstrate the impossibility of securing favourable action. In

that event the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations will abandon the Treaty, and attempt to secure the adoption of a joint resolution annexing Hawaii. There will be a prolonged fight over this measure, not only in the Senate but in the House, and while in the former body its eventual passage seems likely, a strong opposition has already developed in the lower branch of the national legislature, and a majority may be recorded against it. The engrossing nature of the Spanish situation has had the effect of diminishing public interest in the Hawaiian question.

The financial condition of the country is slightly improving, and there is no doubt that the Republicans were glad of an opportunity to display the state of the Treasury by announcing that the 50,000,000 dollar fund appropriated unanimously by both Houses for the national defence could be taken directly from the Treasury without resorting to taxation or loan. This amount will seriously interfere with the favourable statement which the Secretary of the Treasury had hoped to present to the country next June.

A. Maurice Low.

OUR DEFEAT AND SOME MORALS.

THE result of the elections for the London County Council has surprised and disappointed the most active organizers on the Moderate side. I certainly have no intention of claiming a truer prescience than they possessed. In fact, I thought that my Party would return to the Council with a majority of from two to six elected members; and if the comments I am about to make on the reasons which led to our defeat have any wisdom, it will be merely that commonplace kind of wisdom which is learnt after the event. Still, while this significant event is fresh in our recollection it may be well to define some of the lessons which it seems to teach. In the first place, this is clear: The London County Council is a much more popular institution than West-End opinion had supposed. The principal, and the most effective, weapon that the Progressives used in the course of these elections was the charge—certainly very difficult for us to repudiate—that the Government did intend seriously to attack the position and the powers of the Council. Every Moderate candidate agrees that his position would have been vastly better if no opportunity had been given to the Progressives of making this charge. It excited and rallied the Radicals in every part of London. It puzzled and disturbed thousands of neutral electors. It must have actually sapped the Moderate voting strength in every working-class division. It is vain to dwell on this matter. The facts are clear. The lesson is unmistakable. May it be hoped that those in high places will in the future understand that the general opinion of London on London questions is not to be gathered in West-End Clubs, and perhaps not even from political organizers, who are not generally interested in its municipal life or the working of its local institutions.

Another cause which contributed to our defeat was the general impression that the Radicals succeeded in producing, that the Progressives were the really serious workers on the Council, and that the Moderates went there for political motives, and neglected the hard routine work of its Committees. This impression is exaggerated and misleading. But it would be foolish for us to

pretend that there was not some excuse for its propagation. In truth, there were too many Moderate members of the last Council who had been slack in their Committee work. And, amongst those who have indeed done good service, there is a prevalent inability to do justice to their own work, because, apparently, it is connected with a body which, unfortunately so many Conservatives will still disparage. After all, it is not unnatural that, *cæteris paribus*, many an elector should prefer to send to the Council a man who is enthusiastic about the magnitude and importance of its functions, and who eloquently dwells upon the assiduity with which he has devoted himself to their discharge, to the candidate who coldly criticizes the work of the Committees of which he has been a member, and who persistently strives to discover flaws, rather than merits in our past performances. This exaggerated impression of the superior business capacity of the Progressive Party was confirmed in many constituencies by the character of the candidates whom the Moderates were called upon to support. In too many cases they were not local men. In too many cases they were obviously thinking more of politics than of sober municipal work. Now it should be thoroughly understood that this unfortunate fact is not the fault of the local Unionist Associations, and certainly not the fault of the central organizations or organizers. The advantage of securing as candidate a local man of business or administrative reputation is perfectly appreciated by all who are responsible for the conduct of these elections on our side. Every possible effort was made to induce such men to come forward. But, alas! with very few exceptions, they made their excuses, and the Party was compelled to fall back upon a political outsider. In fact, many of the conditions which in the rural counties of England give a greater popularity to Conservatives in local than in Parliamentary elections, are reversed in London. There, for the most part, what we may call for the moment the Moderates, can rely upon the candidatures of gentlemen of local position and repute, who for years past have been working unostentatiously and well on all local bodies. And it is the Radicals who are obliged to import some garrulous politician from a neighbouring town to oppose them. Here, at present, the Progressives are able, on the whole, to put forward more men as candidates for the Council who are known to the constituency, and who have served their apprenticeship on the Vestry or the Board of Guardians than can the Moderates.

Another fact that contributed to the success of the Progressives was this: circumstances had compelled them to be comparatively sober and unobtrusive on the Council during the last three years. Parties were so evenly balanced then, that it was only partially

true to regard the Progressives as the Government. Partly from prudence, partly from impotence, they had not frightened Londoners by any new schemes of municipal socialism. Mr. Sidney Webb, severely muzzled, had devoted his energies to the excellent work of the Technical Education Board. The Labour Bench had not ruled the councils of the Party. The very success of the Moderate Party on the Council in checking the rise in the rates, in imposing limits to the activities of the Works Department, in extending the effective control of the Finance Committee over the expenditure of other Committees, and in their remunerative transaction with the Tramway Companies, deprived them at the poll of much electioneering capital. It was difficult to frighten the electorate with old bogies that had not been seen for three years. The terrors of Mr. Sidney Webb's famous threat of a rate of 20s. in the £ had become stale and unreal in the face of an actual fall in the County rate. In point of fact—thanks very much to the untiring industry and energy of Lord Onslow—the Moderate Party exercised great influence over the history of the late Council. And, as an actual result of this, London, last March, was not to be stirred into an indignant repudiation of Progressive hopes and schemes, which had not found effective expression for three years. And here, as one who was closely associated with Lord Onslow, but who did not always agree with his policy during this period, I must record my admiration for the wonderful zeal with which he devoted himself to the leadership of a composite Party. However disappointing the results of these elections may be to him, we were able on the last Council to effect some real reforms, and to do some substantial work for London, and that we were able to do this while in a nominal minority was very largely due to the way in which Lord Onslow kept his mixed followers together, and inspired them with his fighting spirit.

There were other more general causes—outside the range of County Council politics—at work, which told against us last month. The County Council elections of 1895, it must be remembered, were fought in the closing months of Lord Rosebery's Government, while the sands were still being ploughed, and when the wave that swept together the huge Unionist majority of the following June had already begun to gather its strength. Now, without doubt, the pendulum has commenced its inevitable swing, and the appeal to the ratepayers of London to vote for Moderate candidates at a Municipal election, for the sake of Unionist principles, and of the Unionist cause, fell on ears comparatively deaf and irresponsive to such pleas. Then, most of us Unionist London Members were elected in 1895 by majorities of overwhelming size. It is natural that since then we, and our local associations, should have allowed

our organizations to rust. I must plead guilty in this respect. And I hope that one of the consequences of our defeat now will be to awake our Conservative Associations to renewed activity.

Close observers of these recent contests have noted another fact. They declare that the collapse of the Engineers' Strike stimulated the Trades Unionists of London to extraordinary exertions. Many had thought that this event would tell in our favour—that the defeated working-men would show their resentment at the failure of their leaders' policy, and refrain from supporting them, and their Party, at the polls. Certainly, it would seem that, in fact, the very opposite of this took place. And it must be assumed that the Trades Unionists, smarting under one reverse, determined through these elections to do all they could to revenge themselves on what they conceive to be the Party of the capitalist. They worked hard; they voted in shoals during the last hour of the polling. It will be interesting to see what rewards they will receive from the Party in which Lord Tweedmouth, Lord Carrington, and Lord Welby are recognized leaders.

When all these circumstances are taken into consideration, and it is remembered that there was no appreciable difference between the total number of votes cast for the Progressive and for the Moderate candidates, the Moderate Party on the Council should enter upon this period of indubitable opposition without despondency. I think we ought to be able to do much useful work on the Council in the next three years. If we can only rid our Party there of all just cause for the reproach that it is the less hard-working of the two—if we display genuine enthusiasm for the legitimate functions of the Council—if we are fair and sympathetic to the more moderate and reasonable of our nominal opponents, I cannot see why gradually the rigid walls of existing Party division may not be lowered, and why, as the years go by, those who are seriously in earnest in their municipal work, and who have no ulterior political aims in their discharge of it, may not cease to engage in diurnal warfare, simply because on totally different questions some of them are Unionists and some are Radicals.

So much for the Council. What will be the effect of these elections on the future of London's Local Government. The London Unionist Members have unanimously passed a resolution urging the Government to proceed with the Bill, which is described in the Queen's Speech as one "for facilitating the creation of municipalities in London." And in so doing they are reflecting the general feeling of London Unionists. Were the Government now to relinquish their avowed intention of developing the local government of London, Radicals would continue to declare that the real object of Ministers had been "to smash the County Council."

and that, as the result of the recent elections had shown that this policy was unpopular, they had no other practical proposals to make. We believe that such declarations are wholly without foundation. But, under the circumstances, they would possess plausibility, and would undoubtedly be credited by Radicals. But beyond this consideration of political expediency, we have believed that the Government have a serious and practical constructive scheme for dignifying and reforming the local authorities in the Metropolis without in any way degrading the County Council, or essentially impairing its power. As a matter of fact the intentions of the authors of the Act of 1888 have not, so far as London is concerned, been yet realized. The structure of its local government remains uncompleted. In introducing that Local Government Bill Mr. Ritchie said: "We do not put this forward as a complete settlement of the great problem of London government. We have our own proposals to make, and I hope we may be able at some future time to make them. They are on the lines, not of creating separate municipalities throughout London, but of amalgamating, within certain defined areas in London, the existing Vestries and District Boards, and constructing in London, District Councils—having in the various areas in the County, District Councils with large and important administrative functions." That legislation with this object was required has always been recognized by the Radical Party. In 1890 Mr. Stansfeld actually moved an Amendment to the Address, which expressed regret "that the local government legislation of 1888 and 1889 is still left defective, and that no intention is announced of . . . carrying further in the Metropolis and district the organization and powers of local government." In the debate which took place, Professor Stuart said: "The County Council may be compared to the top of a building with an insufficient structure below to support it, as long as the District Councils are not set up, and you will not provide in London the proper men to go to the County Council, and you will not provide men, proper men, locally to be Parliamentary representatives in London, unless you create true and real local life, which can only be done by reformed district government in London." And, in his "London Programme," Mr. Sidney Webb wrote: "The establishment of District Councils on democratic lines forms a prominent item in the London Programme"; and the District Councils "will, no doubt, be given all the ordinary functions of a Municipal Corporation, except those reserved to the County Council." It is true that the report of Mr. Courtney's Royal Commission gave an expansion to the ideas which had previously prevailed of the nominal dignity with which the District Councils should be clothed. Its specific recommendations that these bodies

should receive what are supposed to be "municipal" titles, and that many of the existing local areas were fit to be presided over at once by a mayor and councillors, did no doubt give a somewhat new form to Mr. Ritchie's proposals. But the difference is much more in form than in any solid facts. As a consequence of these recommendations there has sprung up in many parts of London the spontaneous local movement in favour of incorporation. Kensington and Westminster were the first to present their petitions to the Privy Council, praying for Municipal Charters. It was decided that the Privy Council had no power to grant such Charters in London. Hence the necessity for legislation, and the announcement in the Queen's Speech of a Bill "for facilitating the creation of municipalities in London." If this Bill will provide for a simultaneous transfer of certain agreed powers from the Council to the local authorities, and if it would also provide for their reform, it will carry out the original intentions of the Government in 1888, and, as has been shown, it will give effect to ideas which Radicals, as much as Conservatives, have at heart. No blow will be aimed at the County Council. On the contrary, a service will be rendered to it by transferring from it some portion—not large—of its least interesting work. On the other hand, in accordance with Mr. Courtney's report, the first steps will be taken to "enhance the dignity and increase the powers" of the local authorities. The time is ripe for this development of London local institutions. It will be well if the Government realize this, and proceed without delay with their promised legislation.

C. A. Whitmore.

CONSTITUTION MAKING IN AUSTRALIA.

Among many of the interesting features of Australian Federation there are some which have special importance as indications of the present state of political thought in Australia upon questions which are not involved exclusively in Federation. It may be useful, therefore, to compare the proposals in 1891 with those which have been under discussion in 1897; for, while the general plan of the two Bills is the same, there are certain significant differences.

The first and most striking feature which marks off the year 1897 from 1891 is the democratization of the Constitution. The Sydney Convention of 1891 was a body appointed by the Parliaments of the Colonies represented; and, as not having been elected by the people themselves, its conclusions lacked force, and its labours may be compared with those of a Royal Commission rather than with the deliberations of a National Assembly. The Convention of 1897 was called together, it is true, through the use of the Parliamentary machinery of the several States, since in no other way (save by the authority of the Imperial Parliament) could the necessary provision be made for giving it a legal existence; but the distinguishing feature of the Convention was that its members, except those from Western Australia, were elected upon the widest and most democratic franchise known in their respective States. Where, as in Victoria, the plural vote is still in existence for Parliamentary elections, the Federation Enabling Act introduced the principle of "one vote only" for the purpose of this election. The substitution of election for nomination cannot be said to have influenced the constitution of the Convention by securing the return of a class of men different from those who took part in the proceedings of 1891; hardly less than in the earlier Convention its members were Parliament men. But, being elected by the people, it naturally entrusts powers to the people which in 1891 were confided to the Parliaments of the several States. In this respect the most important provision is that by which a change in the character of the Senate is made corresponding exactly with the change in the Convention itself—

its members are to be elected by the people of the States instead of being nominated by the Parliament; and the principle of election was as much a matter of course in 1897 as nomination was in 1891. Democratization may mean centralization; and in their determination that both Houses of Parliament shall be elected on a democratic basis, the framers of the Bill of 1897 provide that the qualification of electors shall be the same for both Houses, and that no elector shall vote more than once. With these limitations the Commonwealth Parliament is to determine the qualification of electors. And, while the Commonwealth is thus secured against "aristocratic" influences in any State, the democracy of the States is protected against the like influences in the Commonwealth Parliament, partly by the provision against plural voting already mentioned, and partly by a section which enacts that present electors for the Lower House in any State are not to be deprived of their vote by any legislation of the Commonwealth Parliament. In the Bill of 1891 there was no provision for an uniform franchise for the Commonwealth, or for the restrictions now imposed; and the matter was left to the States, as it is in the Constitution of the United States, the qualification of electors being in each State "that which is prescribed by the law of the State as the qualification of electors of the more numerous House of Parliament of the State" (§ 25).

Another indication of the movement of opinion since 1891 is to be found in the debates upon the representation of the States in the Senate. In 1891 equality of representation was assumed as a fundamental feature; but in 1897 there was a strong party against it in the Convention, and in the Victorian Parliament: the Parliament of New South Wales was almost unanimous against it; and amongst those who voted for it in the Convention were some who believed it indefensible in principle, who declared that it would be tolerable only by provisions adequately securing the ultimate prevalence of the national will (by which they meant the numerical majority), and who were only reconciled to it even upon these conditions because the smaller States would not consent to come in without it. At the Sydney Convention everything turned upon the Constitution and powers of the Senate. It has been said that those who would deny the Senate equal powers with the House of Representatives are led away by false analogies to the Second Chambers of the existing Colonies. The answer made is that the vote of the Senate, like that of the various Legislative Councils, may make the representatives of a minority of the people prevail over the representatives of a majority, and that while this is so the Senate power must be as jealously guarded as that of an Upper House pure and simple.

This being so, the power of the purse must remain with the House of Representatives in order that they may control the administration; and, secondly, there must be some means whereby the veto of the minority upon legislation may be effectually controlled without a recurrence to extreme measures. In the end, the power of the Senate over many Bills is left as in 1891. The position taken in regard to the many schemes for settling "deadlocks" was very interesting. Those who may be called National Democrats were in favour of a referendum pure and simple, the issue to be decided by the majority of voters. Then there were the Federal Democrats, who frankly accepted the principle of the referendum, but insisted upon the recognition of the Federal as distinguished from the National principle, so that the constituencies of both Houses should decide between them. Then there were those who objected to the referendum altogether, and were in favour of a resort to the old constitutional plan of dissolution, to be applied singly alternatively, successively, or concurrently to the Houses. Again, there were members who believed that machinery for the prevention of deadlocks destroys conciliation and precipitates crises; and these were opposed to the adoption of any "mechanical" means at all. Finally, the practice of dissolution to be applied successively to the House of Representatives and the Senate, or concurrently to both Houses, was adopted, the elections to be followed if need be by a meeting of the Houses as one Chamber. Such a meeting, of course, gives the House of Representatives an advantage in that House has the larger number of members, and the plan gives point to a provision in the Bill, otherwise rather objectless, whereby "as nearly as practicable there shall be two members of the House of Representatives for every member of the Senate." Of course, the settlement is a compromise of the various interests; and it certainly cannot be inferred that the opinion of the Convention or of Australia is opposed to the referendum in legislation. In New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia, the Government of the day has introduced or supported Bills for the reference of dispute or legislation to the constituency of the Lower House, voting on the principle of one elector one vote. Generally, the proposal is that Bills passed in two successive Sessions by the Legislative Assembly, if rejected by the Council, "may be sent to a referendum" on the address of the Assembly. The referendum then is a means whereby laws may be made by the Queen, the Legislative Assembly, and the electors. It enlarges the power of Parliamentary legislation and is in no wise restrictive. Parliament may legislate as fully and completely as at present; there is no popular initiative; there is no requirement of submission of legislation of any kind to the electors. Even after a Bill has been

rejected by the electors, there is no impediment to the passing of the Bill in the next Session by Parliament itself, though the New South Wales and New Zealand schemes provide that a measure rejected by the electors shall not again be submitted to the electors for three years. The referendum as proposed in Australia therefore is different from the referendum in force elsewhere, it is regarded as a means of "coercing the Upper House," and it is this fact which makes the institution so distasteful to Conservatives in the Colonies at a time when it is tending to attract Conservatives in England. The Upper Houses in the Colonies have hardly yet taken up the position of the House of Lords as the protectors of the people against representatives who had mistaken or disobeyed their mandate. Before the referendum is accepted, the Councils will probably insist upon an equal power of referring Bills to the electors, so as to prevent the constituencies being led away from the issue before them by attacks upon the Upper House.

In the provisions concerning the adoption and amendment of the Constitution, the principle of direct participation by the people is accepted. The Commonwealth Constitution is to be submitted to the electors of the several Colonies; there must be a certain number of votes cast in its favour in each Colony to secure its acceptance by that Colony, but if these votes are cast, a bare majority is sufficient. But direct democracy is joined to Parliamentary action, for when the people of a Colony have accepted the measure, it rests with its Parliament to address the Queen. In regard to amendment, the course of Parliamentary initiative and popular approval is adopted—popular approval being substituted in the Bill of 1897 for the Constitutional Conventions provided for in 1891. Popular approval is ascertained by the dual referendum.

On the whole, it is clear that as yet the case for the referendum in Australia does not rest upon any distrust of Parliamentary Government; in a Convention of Parliament men, and in the Parliaments of the several Colonies, such a feeling would be unnatural. It is, I have said, based upon the need for providing a means for accelerating Parliamentary Legislation, now impeded by the action of an obstructive Upper House. But the existence of a rigid Federal Constitution, the fact that the Commonwealth Parliament is even in Federal matters restricted in quite an extraordinary degree, must familiarize the country with the system of a Constitution which is above the Parliament, and may lead to important changes in the political systems of the several Colonies in the nature of an increase of direct popular control. Such changes are likely to be favoured by the newspaper Press, a factor even more important in Australia than in most democratic communities Between Press and Parliament there is a good deal of

jealousy; in some Colonies especially, the politician chafes under the domination of the journalist; and the newspapers on their part, whether "Liberal" or "Conservative," have sufficient confidence in themselves to believe that a system of government by popular vote, directed by the Press, would be better than a system in which the honours have to be divided with the politician.

It was said that one of the characteristics of the Constitution of 1891 was centralization, by which was meant that certain matters of State concern were either prescribed in the Constitution or brought under the control of the Commonwealth. The most important evidence of this was the provision that all communications with the Home Government were to be through the Governor-General, an arrangement which Sir Samuel Griffith believed to be necessary to a "real Commonwealth in Australia." It was represented as essential that Australia should, in all matters, speak with one voice, and the provision was supported as being a merely formal enactment for securing that end. But forms of this kind are very likely to become matters of substance; and, indeed, the provision almost necessarily implied that the Governor-General and the Executive of the Commonwealth would have a voice in such matters of State concern as involved communication with the Imperial Government. The result might well have been that such "control" as the Imperial Government now exercises would be exercised by the Commonwealth; and, in fact, there was recognizable an assumption that the States would assume a subordinate position in the Commonwealth. Of course, it is possible to treat the matter as a decentralizing rather than a centralizing feature, if functions hitherto exercised in London should be exercised at the Federal capital. But, probably, the opinion which treats the provision as a centralizing one was correct, for the Colonial Office would be more likely to leave the Colony to itself than would a new fledged Power in Australia. And this is the view which has prevailed. The States are to be subordinate to the Commonwealth Government in matters of Federal concern; but in the management of those concerns which remain to them their independence of the Commonwealth is asserted by the retention of direct relations with the Home Government. On the other hand, where decentralization might come into conflict with the democratic principle the former has to give way; and, as we have seen, the qualification of electors is, in the Bill of 1897, no longer entrusted to the States. The qualification of members is prescribed by both Bills; but there is matter which the new Constitution leaves to the States. The old Bill expressly provided for the complete separation of the Parliamentary life of the Commonwealth and the States. This was a provision which might have worked most mischievously upon the political

life of a country, which, from its circumstances, is not too well furnished with capable politicians; and it has most wisely been abandoned.

One subject for unqualified satisfaction is the attitude of the Convention and the Parliaments towards the Crown, one illustration of which is to be found in the provision concerning communications. In 1891 there was shown not a little jealousy of the Imperial Government, partly due to the presence of men who had memories of old conflicts with the Colonial Office, and partly due to certain recent events. Much discussion turned upon the right of the Colonies to elect their own Governors. Sir George Grey proposed a clause enabling the Governor-General to be elected by the people; and, although he found but two supporters for his proposition, the Convention went out of its way to insert a clause giving power to the several Colonies to make laws prescribing the mode of appointing their Governors. The appointment of State Governors was, in fact, a matter apart from Federation altogether, and the insertion of the provision was regarded as an invitation to the Colonies to introduce election. The question of appointment was not a new one. Only three years before had been the sharp conflict between the Queensland Government and the Colonial Office upon the appointment of Sir Henry Blake to Queensland, and New South Wales and South Australia had joined in the claim for "consultation." Lord Knutsford's final answer was received in 1889, and he declared that it was not expedient to make any change in the mode of appointing Australian Governors. The Colonies were sore upon the subject, and the Convention of 1891 appeared to offer an opportunity for settling the matter in the way they desired.

In the Convention of 1897, the appointment of the Governor-General by the Crown was treated as a matter of course; while in the discussion on the appointment of State Governors, even those members who were in favour of retaining the provision of 1891 disclaimed any desire to substitute election by the people for nomination by the Crown.

But the appointment of Governors was not the only matter in which the Convention of 1891 showed jealousy of the Imperial Government. A long discussion took place as to the possibility of defining, and the means of defining, the exercise of the prerogatives of the Crown in the Commonwealth and securing the right of self-government. The question of the extent of Responsible Government, as a matter of law or of Constitutional Convention, is, of course, exactly that subject which from time to time has excited the ire of the Colonies against the Colonial Office; and in 1889 a decision was given by the Supreme Court of Victoria, which showed

on how slight a foundation of law the power of self-government rested. The case was that of the Chinese immigrants *Ah Toy* v. *Musgrove*. The majority of the Supreme Court held that the prerogatives of the Crown exercisable in the Colony belonged to the Governor only when they have been conferred upon him by his Commission or instructions, or by Act of Parliament; in so far as they have not been expressly conferred, they remain in the Crown, and are exercisable upon the advice, not of the Colonial, but of the Imperial Ministry. The importance of this decision may be seen from the remarks of Mr. Justice Williams in the course of his judgment. He said: "I have been for years, in common with, I believe, very many others, under the delusion (as I must term it) that we enjoyed Responsible Government in the proper sense of the term. I awake to find, as far as my opinion goes, that we have merely an instalment of Responsible Government." In the face of a decision such as this, there is little wonder that the question was raised at Sydney in 1891; and that Mr. Deakin demanded for the Colonies a legal right of self-government limited only by the needs of the unity of Empire. A special subject upon which the Colonies felt aggrieved was the exercise of the prerogative of mercy by the Governor as a matter of personal discretion, apart from his Ministers altogether. The concession of this point by Lord Knutsford in 1892, the issue at the same time of new instructions more in accord with the circumstances of a self-governing Colony than were the old ones, the Australian Colonies Duties Act, 1895, and the Judicial Committee Amendment Act, 1895, have had their part in allaying Colonial jealousy, and the result is that the Convention of 1897 was ready without debate to agree that the Governor-General should have "such powers and functions of the Queen as Her Majesty may think fit to assign to him." The proper expression of the prerogatives, however, will have to be faced whenever the Imperial Government is called on to give the Governor-General his commission; and the recent action of the Colonial Office in granting a *fiat* against the will of the Western Australian Government for the judicial determination of a claim against that Government is not likely to be acquiesced in by the Colonies, and did call forth a protest from the last Conference of the Premiers at Hobart. On the whole, we may say that on this question of the relations with the Imperial Government, the whole aspect of Federation has changed. A few years ago the movement for Federation was in no small degree due to a belief that an United Australia speaking to the Imperial Government with one voice would be stronger to resist those attacks upon self-government of which the Colonial Office has been always suspected. Now, this force has well-nigh spent itself; and we find the Colonies

looking forward to a preservation of their immediate relations with the Imperial Government as a safeguard of "State rights."

The character of "Responsible Government" came under review by the Convention in another way. The term Responsible Government—probably first used in Lord Durham's famous Canada report—has really two meanings. First, it indicates that the Colony which has it is a self-governing colony; that it has at once the right and the duty of managing its local concerns without substantial interference by the Imperial Government; but, secondly, it indicates a particular form of self-government; that which is known in England and on the Continent as Party Government or Cabinet Government. Clearly this form is not essential to self-government; and many sound reasons have been advanced to show that it is not suitable to the circumstances of the Colonies. The difficulties arise from many causes, one of the most common lies in the character of the Upper House, which is likely to be in permanent opposition to "Democratic" Ministries, and which, wherever it is elective, claims to represent a "select" constituency, to which it owes responsibility not less than does the Assembly to the larger electorate; an Upper House, therefore, counting itself especially the guardian of these very interests which the power of the purse, constitutionally supposed to rest in the Assembly, will attack. Then, as affecting the Lower House, there are amongst the electors no permanent party lines which count, and there is no party organization. Within the House there are numerous groups and corners; and, with the existence of these, it goes without saying that the Ministerial equilibrium is unstable, and Ministries are very much at the mercy of the House. For this condition of things, one Ministry after another has declared that remedy must be found—the country suffers from want of governance, the National interest is sacrificed to local or individual "claims."

One remedy that has been very generally resorted to is the removal of patronage from the sphere of political influence; efforts have been made to put the construction of railways and public works in the same condition. But, with the constantly increasing action of the State, the task is one of increasing difficulty; and, of course, there is a point beyond which Parliament very properly will not allow any of these things to pass from its control. Another remedy is found in a tendency in the Government of the day to cease to lead the House in matters of legislation. The Government has a legislative programme, it introduces Bills to the House; but when once the measure is before the House, the House is allowed a very free hand upon it. Or the Ministry will hold a meeting of their own supporters, or of the whole House, and future action will be determined by the opinions and temper

disclosed in the caucus. This, of course, invokes a departure from the English plan of government, and is sufficiently out of harmony with "Responsible Government" to be used as a ground for attacking a Ministry, but it is difficult to see how, in existing conditions, a Ministry can live, save by such means. A suggested remedy that has received a good deal of support is the election of Ministers by the House itself, with something like a fixed tenure of office. It is represented that, under this system, the Ministers will be chosen for their individual capacity, irrespective of Party ties; that the House will not be accessible to "claims," as is a Party leader; while the fact that it is the House which has elected, with the additional security of tenure to be given, will preserve the Ministry against intrigues. This is not the place to discuss the value of this scheme; but elective Ministries have received much attention, and form part of the Ministerial programme in South Australia and New Zealand. The example of Switzerland is pointed to; and it may be said in general that, at present Switzerland rather than the United States, is the Constitutional model to which advanced politicians in Australia are looking.

Now, full of difficulty as is this matter of Cabinet Government in the separate Colonies, it is much more difficult in a Federation. Here are two Houses of Parliament, each representing different principles of organization, vital to the existence of the Society, and it has been urged that if the weakness of the Executive is one of the dangers of Party Government with responsibility to one House, responsibility to two Houses would break down the Executive machinery altogether. At an early stage in the debates at Adelaide it was pointed out that you cannot have Responsible Government with responsibility to two Houses. This was agreed; but from this proposition very different conclusions were drawn. On the one hand, it was inferred that the Cabinet system must go; on the other, the conclusion drawn was that the responsibility must be to one House alone. As Sir Samuel Griffith, in his memorandum says: "In a Federal Legislature the powers and position of the Senate would be very different from that of any of the existing Australian Second Chambers. If it be accepted as a fundamental rule of the Federation that the laws shall not be altered without the consent of the majority of the Senate, why should not the same principle be applied to the no less important branch of State authority—the Executive Government?" The preservation of Responsible Government came to be associated with the establishment of the supremacy of the House of Representatives, and, on this account, rather than on its own merits, received the support of the larger States. The practical unanimity of the

Convention upon the form of the Executive Government is somewhat illusory; for the question was being fought out in the debates on the Money Bills and on deadlocks. The Convention has even gone further than the existing Constitutions of the Colonies, in establishing Cabinet Government by law, for not merely does it make the Ministers eligible for a seat in Parliament, but requires that if he is not a member, he shall find a seat within three months or vacate his office. The Ministry of the Commonwealth is then to be a Parliamentary Ministry—the American plan of a political Executive outside the Legislature is excluded by law. Still, there is room for great modifications of the Cabinet system. The Senate would be not unlikely to insist upon consideration in the making and unmaking of Ministries. It might even be that the recognition of responsibility to both Houses would steady the political machine. Each House might be able to protect the Ministry from caprice or intrigues in the other; and it would be no small gain if Ministers could see that it was their duty, not less than that of the Crown, to preserve a good correspondence between the two branches of the Legislature. In considering the action of the Convention upon the Cabinet system, as upon the referendum, we must remember that the issue was a complicated one, and must not take their determination as expressing the views of the country, or even of the members themselves, upon the issues, apart from the special circumstances. We must not jump at the conclusion that political opinion is unanimous in support of Cabinet Government, or is decidedly opposed to the referendum. Doubtless, however, the stability of Governments, of late, has made a revision of the Cabinet system less urgent than it seemed a few years ago.

One or two minor matters remain. The financial strain, which Australia has suffered since 1891, has made the country jealous of the cost of government. The Governor-General's salary is, subject to alteration by Parliament, to be £10,000 per annum; in 1891, that sum was fixed as a minimum by the Constitution. The Administrator of the Government, if he be a salaried officer, is not during his administration to draw the salary of his office. The number of members of both Houses has been reduced, and the salary is reduced from £500 to £400 per annum. Elaborate provisions are in the Bill to secure purity of government, and the laymen of the Convention with some zest introduced unusual clauses, which, though general in their terms, are aimed at the lawyers. No lawyer in Parliament may accept a fee or honorarium for Government work, and, as settled at Adelaide, no member of Parliament may, until the lapse of six months after he has ceased

to be a member, accept a judgeship. Political appointments to the Bench in Australia have been rare, more rare than in England, and the zeal of the Convention might have led to the exclusion of valuable men from Parliament and from the Bench. At Sydney, however, the Convention relented, and the period of disqualification was struck out.

W. Harrison Moore.

SHOULD INEBRIATES BE IMPRISONED?

Among the measures conditionally promised in the Queen's Speech last year was a Bill "for the establishment of reformatories for inebriates." It was one of a number which the Government proposed to bring forward "if the time at their disposal sufficed for the purpose." Their intention has since been reaffirmed, but the state of the public mind does not make its fulfilment very probable even during this Session. The hopes of legislation are apt to fade, and measures, which look accessible enough in the offing, so to speak, have a way of receding out of sight when they should be getting nearer. If that should happen to the Inebriates Bill, much disappointment will be felt in some quarters, but delay is not altogether a matter for regret. The question is not really so well understood or so thoroughly settled as has been assumed. It involves far too serious a principle to be rushed upon the public without ample consideration. As Sir Willoughby Wade said at a recent Church Congress, "the treatment of cases of habitual excess by legislation is beset with difficulties which its advocates inadequately appreciate." That opinion deserves the more attention because it emanates from a distinguished member of the medical profession, which is often represented as generally or unanimously in favour of compulsory legislation. In a sense it may be, so far as the theory of the thing is concerned—and so probably is everyone else. Everybody sees that the present system of dealing with incorrigible drunkards is unsatisfactory, and that it would be much better if they could be put away out of the reach of temptation. But when it comes to the practical means for effecting that desirable end, the way is very far from clear. Ardent reformers have no doubts, as is their wont. They see the evil very plainly and possess unbounded confidence in the efficacy of their proposed remedy. That is a valuable quality for the happy possessor, but when translated into legislation it is apt to prove disappointing, if not mischievous. The results never come up to expectation. The advantages are always found to have been overrated, the drawbacks underrated. This is particularly and notoriously the case with that kind of social legislation which aims

at improving the habits of the people. None is advocated with so much confidence and attended by so much disappointment or mischief. Before the public commits itself to such a serious infringement of personal liberty as any measure for the compulsory imprisonment of inebriates, it should have a much clearer idea of the advantages to be gained and the difficulties to be encountered than it has at present.

I wish to deal here with the former—that is to say, with the probable benefit to be expected from the establishment of State Homes for inebriates. The difficulties can be better discussed when the details of any measure that may be brought forward are actually before us. There is only one point that need be referred to here. It may be taken as certain that public opinion will not tolerate any procedure with regard to alleged inebriates which safeguards their liberty less carefully than that of lunatics. No other attitude is admissible, for, however obnoxious inebriates may be, they are less dangerous to themselves and other people than lunatics, and therefore society has a less incontestable right to place them under summary constraint. Now, it is not always easy to bring a lunatic under the law, as may be seen from the constant occurrence of tragedies committed by maniacs at large, and from the conduct of those ladies who haunt the Law Courts to the terror of Her Majesty's judges. Certificates have to be signed by several independent persons stating specific proofs of insanity within the personal knowledge of each witness. These are sometimes very hard to obtain, but it would obviously be extremely difficult, and often quite impossible, to obtain such independent evidence proving inebriety. It is notoriously difficult to *prove* a single act of simple drunkenness. In the ordinary five-shilling police-court case the opinion of a constable is taken, but when it became a question of a year's imprisonment there would be a very different tale. Illness, fits, sunstroke, what-not, would be pleaded, and expert witnesses would be brought to support it. How incomparably more difficult to prove *inebriety!* You cannot call in an independent medical man to certify inebriety on a single occasion as you can with lunacy. Long acquaintance with the patient's habits would be neccessary, such as only the friends and relatives possess; and their testimony, which is not allowed to suffice for lunacy, could not be allowed to suffice in the other case. The plan of making so many convictions for drunkenness prove inebriety would not work; for the inebriate must have the right of appeal to a jury no less than the lunatic, and the only result would be that everyone would shrink from convicting for drunkenness. Remember, that when a drunkard is sober he can answer for himself as well as anyone else in court, and that, coupled

with the medical difficulty of proving drunkenness, would make the conviction of such a client, well defended, almost impossible. If a jury could pronounce Mrs. —— sane, then there is hardly an inebriate in existence whom they would convict. In short, the condition of inebriety is far too ill-defined, too hazy, and too little susceptible of demonstration to stand the searching test of a court of law. And if it is objected that such tests are quite unnecessary, I would reply that, in view of the abuses to which laxity would open the door, it is more necessary to protect an alleged inebriate with all possible care than an alleged lunatic, for this reason: a lunatic's sentence (if I may use the term) is indefinite. A certificate only runs for a fortnight, and at any time subsequently he may—and does—regain his freedom on regaining his senses, which is a matter of observation and susceptible of proof. But the inebriate is to be sentenced to a fixed term, which all experts are agreed should not be less than one or two years, or even more, if it is to do any real good. I shall return to this question of the period of detention again; but, supposing it to be only six months, that is a sufficiently serious matter. The prisoner has to serve his time out. He cannot prove that he has recovered, because he is sane and sober from the outset. And it would surely be a terrible thing if the law were so framed as to permit the incarceration of anybody, even for six months, without due care. A few drugs adroitly administered, and an obnoxious person goes to the "reformatory" for a lengthy period without the chance of release. He or she is an "inebriate," and cannot prove the contrary as a pretended lunatic can. The doctor, in perfect good faith, smiles at the denial, for all inebriates firmly believe themselves cured in every interval of sobriety. In short, proof of inebriety cannot be lightly accepted by the law because subsequent disproof is quite impossible. The example of other countries is little to the point, for two reasons: in the first place, we have no knowledge of how compulsory legislation works there, and in the second, other countries are not England.

I have referred to this initial difficulty attending compulsory incarceration in order to clear the ground. In practice it might be found less formidable than I have represented, but it is sufficiently serious to show that effective legislation is not the simple matter it appears to the ardent reformer. And there are many others which he has equally overlooked. On the other hand, what are the probable benefits to be expected? Are they such as to outweigh the drawbacks?

On this head I venture to think that at least equal misconception prevails. It is necessarily to a great extent a matter of opinion and dependent on speculation, but some light may be thrown upon

it by the experience derived from the voluntary Inebriate Homes already existing.

These establishments—known to the initiated as "dip-shops," from the word dipsomania—were placed on a legal footing by the Act of 1879, which provides that a licence to keep an Inebriate Home may be granted by the local bench of magistrates to anyone making application. From the last report of the Government Inspector, it appears that up to the present twelve such homes have been opened since 1879. Two of them were only started last year, and the number of patients for which they are licensed is not stated, but the remaining ten receive between them 151 patients in all, of whom 85 are male and 66 female. As several of the homes are rarely or never full, the number under treatment at any time falls short of the very modest total of 151. As this cannot, on the most optimistic estimate, represent more than a fraction of the persons needing treatment and able to pay for it, the inference may be fairly drawn that the majority of inebriates are not as yet anxious to avail themselves of the advantages of retreat.* That may be and is used as an argument for their compulsory committal, but it is a somewhat dangerous one to use, for it goes to show that they will resist compulsion if possible, and being committed against their own wish will not be in a condition to profit by the discipline. This is a very important consideration to which I shall return presently. It is strengthened by the fact that, small as is the number of persons now applying for treatment, the majority even of these willing patients prefer to enter for very short—and quite useless—terms, and that upon a private footing which gives their keeper no legal hold over them.

Perhaps I ought to explain that patients may enter a home either on a private footing or on a legal one—"under the Acts," as the phrase usually runs. In the former case no formalities are required, and inmates are still their own masters. In the latter, certain documents must be signed. The applicant must sign a request for admission, for a stated period, before two justices of the peace or a stipendiary magistrate, and two other persons—friends or relatives—must sign a statutory declaration that the applicant is a habitual drunkard within the meaning of the Act. A patient so entered is liable to prosecution and penalties for breaking bounds, obtaining liquor, or otherwise violating the rules of the establishment. These formalities, which are of course intended to safeguard the liberty of patients, are said to act as a deterrent on account of the publicity involved, about which inebriates are often very sensitive; but it may be doubted if the real motive for avoid-

* The annual report of one home states that "in nine cases out of ten the friends are unable to persuade the inebriate."

ing them is not rather the dislike of submitting to legal restraint. At any rate, the majority do not submit themselves to it, and those who do generally consent only to short terms. Out of the whole number of 407 patients treated at the Dalrymple Home, Rickmansworth, since its opening, only 67 entered for twelve months under the Acts, against 107 who entered as private patients for three months, which is a mere make-believe. And the experience of Rickmansworth is more favourable than that of most other homes.

From these facts I draw the conclusion that out of the comparatively small number of inebriates who are sufficiently desirous of reform to undergo the discipline of a retreat, only a much smaller number enter upon the experiment with a sincere determination to do their best. In point of fact, a good many are there mainly because their relations, on whom they are dependent, cannot put up with them any longer, and insist upon their trying the experiment. They have a sort of feeble wish to rehabilitate themselves, but it is as nothing against the habit of gratifying the desire of the moment, fixed by a lifetime of steady self-indulgence. What do they do? In the first place, they regard their period of enforced abstinence with intense loathing, as a martyrdom. That is their standing frame of mind. Then they not infrequently kick over the traces. I do not wish to suggest any charge against the management of existing "dip-shops." Some are better and some are worse conducted, but they are all, or almost all, commercial speculations, and adequate surveillance is very expensive. Besides, servants can be bribed. It may be more difficult to obtain liquor in one place than another, but it is possible in all, at any rate in the male homes. In one which enjoys, and I believe deservedly, a very high reputation, and is always recommended by the most eminent specialists in alcoholism, I know that liquor has been systematically obtained by a confederate outside slinging a bottle over the wall in a basket; and I myself possess a bottle of whisky which was procured and presented to me by a patient in another home. It stands in my cupboard alongside a companion curiosity in the shape of a bottle of potheen presented to me by an Irish priest in the far west of Ireland. I can see him now—the best fellow in the world—running down the steps of his house, his coat-tails flying, and the bottle in his hand as a parting gift. It would be difficult to say which trophy contains the more villainous liquid, but while the clerical one stands for pure hospitality and patriotic pride, my friend in the dip-shop produced his in order to prove how easily he could obtain the forbidden fruit and how courageously he abstained from it himself—which I am afraid he did not. No such proof was needed. If a man makes up

his mind to get liquor, and can command either money or credit, there is no place outside a gaol in which he cannot gratify his desire. I do not say that this is done in all homes, or that it is done all the time in any, but it *is* done, and sometimes a regular outbreak of drunkenness results.

My belief is that it would occur oftener if more patients were committed for a long period. They can get through a short spell fairly well by thinking over past delights, and promising themselves a delicious recompense—just one—for their present pangs when the sentence is up. If they had a longer time to serve, more would break out. The tone and atmosphere of the place are dead against good resolves. It is nobody's fault, but an inherent defect in the system, and an extremely serious one. Here are a lot of persons addicted to a particular vice—very often with concomitant vices—and they are all herded together, cut off from the rest of mankind, solely on account of that vice. What is their conversation about? Well, what is the conversation of criminals about in a similar situation? Invariably about crime—the crimes they have committed and the crimes they are going to commit. So the conversation in a dip-shop is all about drink, the drinks of the past and the drinks of the future. That is to say in the male homes; of the female ones I have no personal knowledge, though from what I know of women generally, and inebriates in particular, I should expect it to be still more true of them, as they are much more loquacious and confidential. But of the male homes I can speak, having known several patients who have been in several homes, and having mixed in their society. The conversation is of drink and women and other dip-shops, and it is not edifying. What else can be expected? Some at least, and generally the majority, are youngish men who have led idle, self-indulgent lives, devoted to amusement. They are cut off from their usual occupations and have no other interests to fall back upon. They lead a pathetically joyless existence, intensified by the consciousness that the world regards them as a species of social outcast, and they inevitably seek consolation in the demoralizing contemplation of those who are worse than themselves. The sense of degradation is made supportable by the spectacle of an equal or a lower degradation, which tends insensibly downwards. A few days spent in this atmosphere seem like a nightmare: months of it must reduce to despair. The moral influence is exactly the opposite to that which inebriates require. The thing they need is the gradual restoration of their self-respect by the companionship of people who are not inebriates and whose example stimulates upwards. This is the fundamental dilemma of the problem, which has been entirely overlooked. The physical benefit of restraint in

a home is neutralized by the moral evil of its associations. The more reckless and degraded spirits set the tone, which tends to weaken the best resolutions. To use the words of a patient, "You go in more or less of a gentleman and you come out a roaring, seething cad." A man may be ashamed of himself when he enters, but his companions soon reassure him. There will be someone to keep him in countenance in his worst moments. He finds himself the member of a sort of fraternity—the noble Order of Dips. Its lodges are the various dip-shops, which are freely discussed by the brethren, just as doss-houses and other haunts are discussed by tramps. Some inmates spend their time going in and out from one home to another, and the recruit soon learns all about them, the strictness of the management, the comfort, the food supplied, the character of the "doctor," and so forth. At the same time he hears of notable dips and their exploits in the way of drinking. In short, he gets to know the ropes and lives in an atmosphere of dipsomania.

What is the result? Let me again quote the words of a patient: "If he be weak, then any resolution he may have formed as to turning himself out a permanent cure is cast to the four winds." And most inebriates are weak, or they would not be inebriates. The upshot is that, whatever their original intentions may have been, the majority become callous to their condition, and only look forward to the hour of release. As the same authority puts it, "Their enforced abstinence from stimulants only whets their appetite, and when they have finished the period for which they entered they embark on a terrific burst, which ends in their condition being worse than when they entered the home." I am afraid there is only too much truth in this account, which further depicts the proceedings of the average patient on leaving at the completion of his term: "It is more than probable that he stops on his way home at the nearest pub to drink success to himself and perdition to all retreats and those connected with them." They do not all cherish this idiotic frame of mind, or indulge in these idiotic proceedings. A certain number derive temporary benefit at any rate, and some, it is hoped, are permanently cured, but, of course, no one can say with any certainty, because relapses may occur at any time. If, however, even a percentage of cases derive substantial benefit, that is no doubt a sufficient justification for the existence and encouragement of the present homes, which are self-supporting or maintained by private charity. But when the State is asked to provide public institutions at the public cost, the whole question stands on a different footing. The Government, as Lord Salisbury said the other day, is a trustee and cannot afford to indulge in philanthropic investments unless there is a

reasonable prospect of getting a fair return for the money. The question is, therefore, not whether a few chosen brands can be plucked from the burning, but whether the aggregate benefit to the community is likely to justify the outlay.

Now, if the results of restraint are such as I have described in the majority of cases, when the subjects are so far desirous of reformation as at least to submit themselves voluntarily to the discipline, what can be expected of the refractory ones who only submit under compulsion? It is true that they would be got out of the way for a time, to the great relief of their friends; but the establishment of State Homes could hardly be justified on those grounds. For inebriates are not a danger to the general community, as criminals are—they are only a curse to themselves and those immediately in contact with them. I take it that reformation is the object in view, and I ask, what chance is there of any result worth mentioning? It will be argued that the disappointing results in voluntary homes are largely due to the short terms of detention, and that if the minimum period were twelve months there would be more successes. There might be, but there would also be another result—namely, fewer patients. I entirely agree that the longer the period of enforced abstinence the more complete the physical regeneration. That is a conclusion based upon experience, in which I believe everyone agrees. Patients who enter for twelve months turn out far better than those who enter for only three or six; but to argue that *compulsory restraint* for twelve months would necessarily bring the three and six months' cases up to the same standard of success is to ignore one half of the whole question. Twelve months' cases do better, not merely because they are under restraint for twelve months, but also because they are better disposed to profit by it. The fact that they have voluntarily submitted to the longer period proves that they are more truly alive to their condition and more firmly resolved to make a serious effort. The compulsory twelve months would be in no such frame of mind. On the contrary, they would be more exasperated and more refractory than if their sentence were shorter. Is it not so with other involuntary prisoners?

This point brings me to the fundamental misconception which tends to obscure the whole question at present. We have so developed the physical side of the problem that we forget the moral one, and even that there is a moral one. I quite agree that inebriety or dipsomania is a disease with a certain physical basis, though what that is nobody knows. We only know that whatever may be the nature of the disease it must be treated by total abstinence. Otherwise there can be no cure. In establishing that principle

medical science has done great service. But to lose sight of the other side, to regard inebriety as merely a physical disease, and to suppose that physical treatment alone will do lasting good, is to make a great mistake, and a very common one. Perhaps nobody would admit taking that view in so many words, but it underlies the reasoning of those who expect much from compulsory abstinence. The theory is that inebriates are the victims of a physical malady which takes the form of an "irresistible craving," and renders them powerless to withstand temptation; and that when the poison is eliminated the craving will be gone with it. There is some truth in it, but only half the truth. The original malady is not physical but moral, and it remains after the other has been removed. It is aggravated by the physical condition and lessened by the latter's improvement, I allow, but as it existed before, so it continues after. This is what seems to be overlooked. We are the slaves of phrases, and "irresistible craving" is one of them. It covers a multitude of fallacies, for those who use it do not see that either there is no such thing or else it involves the denial of all moral responsibility. Every desire which any individual fails to resist, is to that individual an irresistible craving, and in no other sense is the drunkard's craving irresistible. He does not resist it because he does not want to with sufficient energy. He would like to be free from the disadvantages of being a drunkard, but he does not want to stop drinking. If he did he would stop. When he has a sufficiently strong motive he does stop. Let me give two or three examples, some of them classical ones. Dr. Johnson found at one time in his life that if he began to drink he invariably went on until he got drunk, and being a man of great self-respect he promptly ceased drinking at all. He had the "irresistible craving" of the physical malady; only he resisted it because he possessed the moral strength to do so. De Quincey emancipated himself from the opium inebriety, which is far more difficult to cure than the alcoholic, not by his moral strength, but simply and solely because the results of taking opium became more painful than abstention, painful as that was. His case is an admirable lesson in the real principles involved. The "irresistible craving" became resistible in the presence of a stronger motive. I can parallel these classical examples from my own knowledge. A confirmed dipsomaniac who had tried pretty nearly everything was at last given up by his wife and everybody else; when lo! his pride came to his assistance. He said to himself, "Everybody has given me up. Well, hang it! I won't give myself up." And without any further assistance he turned over a new leaf and abstained for a long time. In the second case, an Irish priest in the first stage of *delirium tremens*, and absolutely mad for drink, became quite manageable on learning that

the bishop had been sent for. His irresistible craving—and it was the extremest form—was resisted at once with the assistance of fear. I could give more examples from an intimate experience of inebriates, but perhaps these will suffice to illustrate the point.

I maintain, therefore, that a physical craving which is absolutely irresistible does not exist. Irresistibility has always a moral element, and any theory which does not take that into account only leads to error. This seems to me to be the case with the Inebriate Home theory, as ordinarily held. I agree with it so far as this—that the inebriate's power of self-control is impaired and can only be restored by abstinence; but the theory goes further and assumes that abstinence also gives the desire to use the repaired self-control. That is the mistake. Self-control and desire to reform are different things. Abstinence gives the one but not the other. The utmost that treatment in a home can do—and I am sure every doctor who has conducted one will agree here—is to give a patient a fresh start, and, if any lasting benefit is to result, the treatment must be preceded and accompanied by a strong and earnest desire to amend. Otherwise the patient merely begins again with the same moral defect that originally led to the downfall, intensified, it may be, by demoralizing companionship. In that case the issue is a foregone conclusion. Physical treatment does not mean a moral cure, and in every case inebriety is primarily a moral malady. Drunkards make all sorts of excuses, which impose upon soft-hearted people and theorists, but the habit can only be acquired by a course of conscious self-indulgence. It may be broken off, but if the self-indulgence which led to it remains, then the same thing infallibly happens again. The craving still remains irresistible. In truth, it is fallacious to speak of "curing" inebriety. The inebriate must cure himself, and all that can be done for him is to assist his endeavour by making self-indulgence difficult.

What chance, then, is there of curing those who are so little anxious to reform that they will not voluntarily submit to restraint? And what difference will it make whether they are incarcerated for six months or six years? Just about the same difference that it makes to other hardened offenders. The fear of recommittal may make them somewhat more wary, but they set about gratifying their instincts from the first moment of release. By analogy drunkards will do just the same. The behaviour of the majority of voluntary patients conclusively proves it. I have no doubt that if State Homes were established some poor people who have no place to go to now would consent to be committed, and for them there would be a chance of permanent benefit. Sir John Bridge mentioned a case in giving evidence

before the Royal Commission on the Liquor Laws. He had sent a woman to gaol for six months by consent, and the result was that she was restored to her position. If it is thought worth while to establish public reformatories for such cases, well and good; but they would be very few, and compulsory powers would not be required. I do not understand, however, that any measure of that kind is contemplated. The essence of the system asked for is compulsion, in order to get hold of those who now refuse consent. My contention is, that for this very reason they are virtually hopeless.

And there is another ground for thinking that State Homes would probably prove very disappointing to those who advocate them. Their idea, I take it, is that the habitual drunkards who cause such a vast amount of misery and suffering would then be effectually dealt with. But I am afraid that hope rests upon a prevalent confusion with regard to the "habitual drunkard"—a phrase not less misleading than "irresistible craving." It should mean a person who gets habitually drunk, but it is taken to mean an inebriate or dipsomaniac—that is a person who has lost self-control. Now, in the upper classes, with whom medical specialists in inebriety have to do, the person who gets habitually drunk is always an inebriate: in the lower classes it is not so. The working man—I do not speak of social wrecks—who gets drunk every Saturday, who squanders the bulk of his wages in the public-house, brutally ill-uses his wife and children, or lets them go to the workhouse, is seldom an inebriate or dipsomaniac—at least in England. The difference is that the one does not intend to make a beast of himself; the other does. He acts deliberately and makes no secret of it. He exhibits neither the physical degeneration nor the enfeebled will characteristic of the true inebriate. The reason is partly that he drinks little but beer, which seldom induces dipsomania, and partly that he works off the effect of drinking by manual labour. He does not come within the definition of "inebriate" in the Act of Parliament, because he is quite capable of managing his own affairs and is very often an exceptionally skilful workman: nor would he be caught by the provision respecting repeated convictions, because he habitually takes care to stop short of incapacity to get safely home. The town clerk of Bristol, in giving evidence before the Royal Commission a short time ago, made a statement which excited some surprise and incredulity. He said they had only six or seven men in Bristol who were habitual drunkards, meaning men repeatedly convicted of drunkenness. He was quite right, for the reasons I have given. But they have scores of men who get habitually drunk. The women of the same class are different. Those who get habitually drunk *are* inebriates, because they drink

spirits. Observation confirms the records of the police-courts, where repeated convictions are much more common among women than among men. A compulsory Act might be framed which would get hold of these cases, and terrible cases they are. Unfortunately, they are the most hopeless of all inebriates. One of the existing homes has made a rule to accept no women over fifty, because it is found useless; but the great majority of the female police-court inebriates are middle-aged or elderly women. The inference is that State Homes would not touch the bulk of the male drunkards, and would fail to improve the bulk of the female.

A. SHADWELL.

FRONT BENCH INVERTEBRATES.

THERE is no country in the world in which the cult of peace has been carried further than in England. Our national policy is conducted upon the principle that peace is the first interest of our Empire. Our national life proceeds upon the assumption that the comfort of the individual must not be sacrificed to the good of the State or the race. The teaching of peace societies has gained such a strong hold that there is an intense aversion to militarism and discipline. Everything which appeals to the patriotism or national sentiment of the child is studiously banished from our system of education. The British boy or girl is not taught to salute the flag, is not drilled, is not educated in character. The idea that the individual should draw as much as possible from the nation and contribute nothing is sedulously propagated. We have no national feast-day, and when attempts are made to introduce something corresponding to the American "4th of July," or the French "Fête Nationale," there are not wanting sentimentalists to warn us of the wickedness of reviving glorious memories and offending "friendly" and "susceptible" neighbours.

The danger of the theory which is controlling our national life and policy is that it is absolutely divorced from facts. The honest "peace-at-any-price" man must own that peace, as he understands it, nowhere exists in this world of ours. The sentimentalist, if he clears his mind of cant, will see that though neighbours may be "susceptible" they are not "friendly." In the Europe of to-day there is a state of veiled conflict, not of peace. Nation vies with nation in the training of men to arms and in the building of ships for war. There is no sign that we are approaching the Utopia where the lion will lie down with the lamb. Forces as inexorable, as terrible, as merciless as the forces of Nature are at work, shaping the destinies of Europe, and only the blind can refuse to recognize this fact. The existence of each nation depends not on a vague scheme of international morality, but on its armed strength. It is of no avail to be in the right if you have not the foresight, will, and power, requisite to uphold the right. Nor is it evil that this should be. Moral cowardice, short-sightedness, weakness of will, are not

qualities which deserve to survive in the struggle for life. The statesmanship which encourages these qualities is doing the devil's work, and is menacing not only the national honour but also the national existence.

Some weakness of character there must be in a nation which for years suffered its army and navy to go to ruin—which even to-day, in an hour pregnant with conflict, possesses only the shadow of an army. The history of our Admiralty between the years 1830–1854 is a history of such amazing incompetence, abject treachery to the nation on the part of distinguished naval officers, shameless ingratitude to the heroes who had conquered for us the command of the sea, that I cannot help wondering whether at the bottom England deserved to win against Napoleon, whether, had the third Napoleon raised his hand, we should not have been beaten to the ground. No naval officer that I can discover resigned his place in protest during this dreary epoch of shame. Accident alone saved us from a crushing defeat by Louis Philippe's navy in 1840, as accident has so often saved us since, though the danger has never since been quite so extreme. As for the War Office—what is it to-day?

The theory upon which our foreign policy is conducted being hopelessly wrong, what is the result? It may be said in passing that there is no surer way of ruining a nation than by a fatuous foreign policy. Napoleon III. was as well-meaning as the modern Front Bencher, and like him was anxious to encompass the good of his country, and there is evidence to prove that he hated the use of force. But he had to deal with men who were in closer touch with facts, and who had calculated the means as well as considered the end. At every turn he was outmanœuvred and baffled; he was forced into miserable surrenders; and if France never sank quite so low as England has sunk in the past six months, he led her into a bloody and disastrous war which proved fatal to him and his dynasty. He hoped to find allies in the hour of danger; but, naturally, when his chance of victory was seen to be small, could find none. He had disregarded the warning of his best officers as to the weakness of the French army. Ignorance was beaten by knowledge, weak will by strength of purpose, desire for peace by the readiness of his opponent to stake all upon the battlefield. The weakness of his external policy reacted on his internal policy, depressing the energy and lowering the moral tone of France.

"I can conceive nothing that would more bring into jeopardy the peaceful relations of this country than that an idea should prevail amongst foreign nations that we are so firmly attached to peace that we dare not make war, and that, therefore, any aggres-

sion may be safely ventured against British subjects," said Lord Palmerston in 1849. To love peace is one thing; to proclaim too loudly that you love it is quite another. Exactly what Palmerston foresaw has happened to us. Under Mr. Gladstone, Lord Rosebery, and the present Cabinet, Europe and the world have become so accustomed to British surrenders whenever a conflict arises with another nation, and that nation threatens the use of force, that a settled conviction has grown up of our incapacity to resist pressure. With each new surrender this conviction becomes stronger. Where a little firmness ten years ago would have sufficed, an obstinate stand is useless to day. Promises are readily made to us by every Power, and as readily forgotten. It has ceased to be dangerous to break faith with England.

Our difficulty is how to convince our antagonists that we are in earnest. Inasmuch as Englishmen are by no means convinced of the determination of Ministers, it is not to be wondered at that Frenchmen are incredulous when we assert that we shall fight for Bussa. A state of what one would suppose was grave tension exists with France. She is now in armed possession of British territory, openly defying us to eject her. Warlike speeches by British Ministers, and warlike articles in our newspapers, move her not one jot. Did not Lord Salisbury assure a deputation that all was for the very best in West Africa? At the present minute is not the Queen of England resident in French territory? Did not the Prince of Wales, at the height of the Bussa crisis, visit Paris, lay stones at Cannes, and talk of "the cordial relations between France and Great Britain?" A terrible responsibility weighs upon the advisers of our Royal Family who have allowed such light-hearted words and acts to pass. Either to-morrow, or the day after to-morrow, Englishmen will pay for them in blood and tears. It is now, I repeat, absolutely impossible to convince France that we mean what we say. We must either surrender or fight. Surrender —with the certainty of fresh and worse aggressions; fight—when judgment and decision might have obtained all that we want without bloodshed. The fiction of a friendly France has been carried too far. There is something depressing in a frame of mind which does not resent her acts of barely veiled hostility.

By adopting the principle that "trifles are not worth fighting for," we simply invite our neighbours to squeeze us. We have said that we will not go to war for Madagascar, for Tunis, for certain places in West Africa, for Siam, for Newfoundland, for our trade rights so ostentatiously disregarded by France and Russia. We overlook the fact that though each of these items separately may be a matter of small account, collectively they represent a formidable aggregate. Was Pericles then wrong who told the Athenian

people what British Ministers should tell the British people to-day?—

"I call upon those whom my words may convince to maintain an attitude of determination, even if we should not escape disaster. . . . I would have none of you imagine that he will be fighting for a small matter, if we refuse to annul the Megarian decree, of which they make so much, telling us that its revocation would prevent war. Have no uneasiness; you are not going to fight for a trifle. For in this seeming trifle is involved the trial and confirmation of your whole purpose. If you yield to them in a small matter, they will think that you are afraid, and will immediately dictate some more oppressive condition; but if you are firm you will prove to them that they must treat you as their equal. . . . Any claim, the smallest as well as the greatest, imposed on a neighbour by force where there has been no legal award, can mean nothing but subjection."

Here speaks the statesman of the ages. There is no vapouring of war, be it noted, but the tone of calm determination. There is no wailing over the weary greatness of Athens, but courage and hope. And our English Cromwell is just as strong. "Truly, there are a great many people in this nation!" he said, "who would not reckon up every pitiful thing—perhaps like the nibbling of a mouse at one's heels—but only considerable dangers. . . . Doubting, hesitating men, they are not fit for your work." The danger which menaces our Empire is greater than it was then, and it is not less, but more true, that faith in England is essential in her statesmen at this hour. Those who are depressed by the extent of our Empire, by the greatness of our responsibilities, by the risks of war, are not fit for their work. Nothing great can be achieved without risk.

On one condition only is surrender to be tolerated. It may be the case that in spite of optimistic assurances our armaments are unequal to the work before them. If disaster must result from war, then it might be wise to yield. But there comes no sign either from Admiralty or War Office that our fleets and armies are inadequate. Rather the contrary. The navy estimates for this year show no extraordinary effort, when the delay in carrying out last year's programme is taken into consideration. If we believe War Office experts the British army is in an unparalleled state of efficiency. Is the nation being misled as it has been already so often misled in the past? I do not know; but the heads of the responsible officials are "on the game" if we fight, and so I may assume that we are really ready. Mr. Balfour tells us that under no conceivable circumstance can he imagine our maritime ascendency being disputed, and these are very strong words. It is true that a little later in this speech he seemed to contemplate the total disablement of our fleet; but let that pass, though how to reconcile it with an assured command of the sea one does not understand. If we surrender we must at once take a special vote for the fleet

pre-empt every warship building for foreign Powers in England, occupy every vacant slip, enlarge the capacity of our dockyards, lay down fresh armour-making plant, and build up a formidable army. Under such circumstances England might accept surrender, because then it would be manifest that the surrender was not for long. Only, meanwhile, British Ministers must not prance about with talk of war, which frightens no one abroad, and only produces contempt at home.

It is, however, said—and this is a point with which I must deal—that Englishmen are prone to exaggerate their defeats, and to overlook their victories, that whatever the talk of our "pessimists,"* the position of the nation in the eyes of the world has not been lowered, much less lost. It may be well then to consider how other States treat England when they come into conflict with her interests and aspirations. Acts are of far more importance than words or newspaper talk, because the acts proceed from responsible men, and men with knowledge, who may be supposed to understand our character and to have gauged the calibre of our Ministers.

The conduct of France to England in West Africa was examined with such skill by Admiral Maxse in the last issue of THE NATIONAL REVIEW that it is unnecessary for me to go into it at any length. The principle upon which French statesmen act has been thus clearly set forth by Mr. Spenser Wilkinson:—

"The maxim they inculcate is: If you wish to violate an agreement not to lay hands upon territory in which Great Britain has at least as much interest as France [read: 'which France has by treaty surrendered to Great Britain, and which her maps have transferred to us'], do so whenever it is convenient. Upon receiving a British protest immediately violate a second similar agreement. You may then offer to undo the second wrong as a gracious concession, in return for which you may expect to be confirmed in the possession of what you have obtained by the first."

This was written in 1894 of the New Hebrides. It exactly describes French action in West Africa. Seize Nikki and Wadagugu; when England objects seize Bussa; when she objects to this again send expeditions to Sokoto. Trade Sokoto, on Lord Salisbury's principle of "split the difference," for Bussa; trade Wadagugu for Nikki. What could be simpler? But, unfortunately, the French Ministry has come into conflict, not with "the worthy descendant of the Cecils"—to quote the French Press *passim*—but with the rapacious and wicked Joseph Chamberlain. "Beware of your servants when the enemy praises them," said Napoleon once. And the abuse of the French gentlemen who are trespassing

* A "pessimist" in journalese of our day is anyone who refuses to retail sonorous platitudes about our "magnificent fleet," our "ever-ready army," our "fast increasing trade," &c., &c., who, in a word, is not satisfied with things as they are, but wants them better.

in our preserves in West Africa may well make Mr. Chamberlain proud, and awake for him a quite new enthusiasm in the hearts of Englishmen.

The arch-mistake was in once tolerating such French aggression. Five months ago *The Times* was writing *à propos* of Nikki, "Our patience is at last exhausted" (October 28th, 1897). Alas! our patience is like our War Office organization, so very elastic. Nothing exhausts it. "Incidents like Boria and Wa," M. Villiers, a French correspondent, tells us cheerfully, "are affairs of common occurrence." It is a matter of painfully common occurrence for French troops to haul down British flags and to trespass on British territory. There was one course for any true statesman and one only. When the French appeared at Nikki and Bussa, they should then and there have been attacked and driven out by our troops on the spot. At the same time our fleet should have been mobilized and all our reserves called out, to prevent accidents in Europe. I venture to prophesy that had this been done, not only would there have been no war with France, but also that we should not have been confronted by the present situation in China. The world would have seen that we have a will, and mean to enforce our threats. But, unfortunately, just about the time of the seizure of Nikki, a great London newspaper suddenly pronounced that as France was such a "friendly" Power, "an appeal to the sword over so many square miles of African soil, would be criminal insanity." Such a pronouncement in a Ministerial organ must have been inspired, and unquestionably encouraged France.

We were told by *The Times'* correspondent in Paris, on September 19th, 1897, that our surrender in Tunis was "of good omen for the speedy and equally decisive settlement of the numerous problems arising out of the simultaneous presence of the two countries in the region of the bend of the Niger." *The Spectator* argued—on the principle that philanthropy of a watery kind pays in international politics—that France must give us something in exchange. How have such expectations been realized? She has given us less than nothing; indeed, her diplomatic success and our feebleness have spurred her to fresh aggression. French expeditions are almost monthly entering our territory, seizing posts, killing natives under our flag, and insolently neglecting our remonstrances. We remember Waima, where Captain Lendy fell; no satisfaction has been given, though Waima is now ascertained to have been in British territory. That has not prevented British Ministers from paying a handsome sum for losses said to have been inflicted on French missionaries who had stirred up a civil war in Uganda. There was, Mr. Curzon owned, "a conflict of evidence" as to these losses. There is no conflict of evidence as to Captain Lendy's death. Time was when for

a British officer to be slain by a hostile force in British territory would have provoked something stronger than mild remonstrances. But can we expect high moral indignation or lofty self-sacrifice from a generation whose horizon is limited by the boundaries of the cricket or football field? *Civis Romanus sum* is past and dead; *panem et circenses* has replaced it as a watchword.

Waima, Kishi, Wagadugu, Nikki, Bussa, the occupation of all the towns of Borgu, so triumphantly chronicled by *The Temps*, and the meddling in Sokoto, which, though denied, is credited by certain people who ought to know, are the fruits of a policy of concession in West Africa. Under no conceivable "Hinterland" doctrine can Sokoto attach to any French colony; but that is of no importance. In spite of British warnings, a French expedition is moving on the Upper Nile, if, indeed, it is not already there. And shall we eject it? The answer is to be sought at Bussa. It should not be overlooked that these acts of aggression are all on one side. We have not established posts behind the French Ivory Coast or in French Senegambia—in territory French by treaty. Our conduct has been marked by pusillanimous self-restraint. Right is absolutely on our side. Arbitration has been suggested, and we have nothing to fear from it; but the experience of Newfoundland shows that it will be impossible to persuade France to agree to it. The difficulty lies, not only in the preliminary arrangement as to what is to be arbitrated upon, but also in the open violence France has shown in seizing Bussa, which must be resented by us.

In signal contrast to her attitude towards England is France's conduct to Germany in West Africa. French disputes with the Germans have just been settled "by the application of the recognized principle that prior treaties with the natives override later treaties." But whilst these two Powers show a remarkable respect for each other, they have none for us. Germany gives France Gurma, which is by prior treaties British. She agrees in 1893 with us not to extend German influence to Darfur, Kordofan, and the Bahr-el-Gazal; but three months later, with singular bad faith, resigns to France her claims to these territories. She made an agreement with us in 1888 to consider certain country behind the Togoland Protectorate neutral, and is now filching mile after mile of the neutral zone. Probably we have not protested; perhaps we have shown the egregious enthusiasm with which Lord Granville years ago welcomed the Germans to New Guinea and South West Africa. Indeed, Germany seems to be experimenting to ascertain how far exactly she can go without provoking British Ministers to war. And think of the difficulties which our inability to say "No" thirteen years ago has brought upon us in South Africa. Indecision sows the whirlwind.

From Germany let me turn to the Congo Free State. Here, again, we see the indifference to British interests which marks the policy of greater Powers in Africa. No adequate satisfaction has ever been offered for the brutal murder of Mr. Stokes. Only a weak Government would have accepted such a trial as that of Major Lothaire. If, as I hold, the citizen owes a great duty to his State, his State owes an equal duty to the citizen. His country must watch over his going and coming, and if he is treacherously murdered, must see that justice is done. Otherwise of what use is it to be a British citizen? The enterprise of our merchants and traders in Central Africa within the Free-Trade zone has been checked by this lamentable occurrence. It is better in these days to be a German, because the Kaiser is at least a man, and will not accept excuses if a German subject is plundered, shot, or hanged. Of what use for Ministers to lecture Englishmen on the decay of our trade and the superior activity of our Teuton cousins when such facts stare us in the face? From Mr. Stokes we may pass to the Anglo-Congolese Treaty of 1894, by which, to keep France out of the Nile Valley, we leased a certain tract of territory to King Leopold. A few weeks later we discovered that he had abandoned to France all right of occupation and influence in the territory on the Nile, north of Lado. Yet we made no effective protest that I can discover; and we allowed an act of flagrant bad faith to pass unpunished.

With the Transvaal, and its treatment of British citizens and British trade, I will not deal at any length, because the facts are branded on every British mind. "What has an Englishman now to hope for?" writes Mr. Worsfold, after Junius, on this story of national shame. "He must turn from King, Lords, and Commons, and look up to God and himself if he means to be free." I know no sadder subject of thought than that host of British subjects in the South African Republic, whose rights and interests are daily trodden under foot—a host, to quote a South African journal, "without faith in their country or in themselves, without arms, without hope, without religion." Yet weekly I hear the prayer, "Give peace in our time, O Lord." Peace, but not the abject surrender of all that the soul holds right. And this condition may be directly charged against the British Government, which has forgotten that its one duty may not be to shirk the use of force and to avoid any bold resolve, when right needs to be supported with might.

In the Far East we are now confronted by a situation which may well cause alarm. The direct menaces of our Ministers have been disregarded. The policy of "the open door," for which we were going to fight, has been bluntly set on one side by Russia, and

possibly by Germany. The partition of China, which we bound ourselves to oppose, is now being accomplished. How we were to resist what was apparently settled by agreement between France, Russia, and Germany, was never evident. It seems that we buoyed ourselves up with vain imaginings of Russian hostility to Germany, and friendliness to ourselves. And the evidence of this friendliness is to be found only in a deliberate attack by Russia upon British interests in China. It has been well and truly said by *The Times* that "what is deplorable and ominous in their (the Russian) action is a desire, not merely to aggrandize Russia, but to aggrandize Russia by humiliating and injuring Great Britain." Enough of such friendliness. British Ministers, on their part, are greatly to blame. Who but Mr. Balfour, with the reckless disinterestedness of a philosopher, suggested that Russia might perfectly well help herself to an open sea port? And when Russia acts on his advice Lord Salisbury raises the question of Talien-wan! If he meant to force a quarrel his action was admirably calculated for that purpose. But he did not want to force a quarrel, and backed down at a show of resistance, receiving assurances about the open door and free ports which, on examination, prove very delusive. After the record which I have given we can estimate them at their precise value. Some sort of an ultimatum appears to have been presented by England to China, though this fact was withheld from the House of Commons by the British Ministry. It is difficult to express the growing exasperation of the Party and of the country at this policy of half-measures, verbal protests, and surrenders followed by concealment. Russia has replied by an unequivocal challenge. She has appropiated a surplus of £9,000,000 for naval purposes, during the next seven years, over and above her ordinary estimates. We have not answered this move. The resources of our dockyards and shipbuilding yards are, as it is, being strained to regain the ground lost in the strike, yet the programme of work in hand appears inadequate. The efforts of our rivals have forced us to increase our navy to such a point that all we can do is just to keep pace with them. Sudden expansion to meet the new Russian ukase is beyond our power, if the Admiralty speaks the truth about the want of armour. The purchase of ships on the stocks, or completing for foreign Powers in this country, will mean, at the best, little more than a subtraction from the force of a friendly nation, Japan, and, therefore, no great addition to our own strength.

The British race, said General Gordon, after his bitter experience, is a race of lions led by asses. The foresight of Sir G. Goldie saved the Niger for us years ago, but of what use his enterprise if we surrender what he has won, to-day? The

foresight and enterprise of British merchants, in the face of every obstacle which red-tape could place in their way, conquered a great trade in China. The lions did their work, but now all is imperilled by the weakness of the asses at home in resisting direct attacks upon that trade when made by strong foreign Governments. We built up a considerable commerce on the Ivory Coast and in Sierra Leone; it is perishing now, and we dare not even protect our traders against the duties which France is unfairly levying on our goods. Consul Brenan has called our attention to the decay of British enterprise in the Far East. Can we wonder at it? How can an individual be expected to exert himself when, by no fault of his own, the fruit of his exertions may be taken from him to-morrow? Of what value are the concessions which we have recently obtained from China after the egregious bad faith which China showed us in the Kiang-Cheng affair, and, when in defiance of the treaty of Tientsin, *likin* is still levied on our imports? Ministerial vacillation, hesitation, and timidity, have lowered the moral tone of our race throughout the world, depressed its energies, injured its trade, and tarnished its honour. Such are the first fruits of an indolent neglect of foreign policy, of a concentration on domestic squabbles, and of a failure to apprehend the true issues of national life. Our Ministers cannot emancipate themselves from their past or understand that England is sick of the parish pump, and sickest of all of the Manchester school. They are admirably good at "looking round" and "saving face," but we want something more than this, some sign of policy and courage.

H. W. Wilson.

A COLONIAL CHRONICLE.

THE TRANSVAAL.

Although the South African Republic is not a British Colony its affairs are so inextricably intermingled with neighbouring communities which are, that it is convenient to chronicle its turbulent history in these pages. The precise status of the Transvaal is, indeed, not easy to define. In relation to Great Britain its position is perhaps analogous to that of the great protected principalities of India, *e.g.*, Hyderabad, Baroda, or Mysore, though unlike them it enjoys separate diplomatic representation at foreign Courts. Its complete independence is indeed only limited by the very easy terms of the London Convention, to which both parties avow their adherence,while one of them is determined to maintain it at all costs. Mr. Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary, has lately set forth the views of the British Government with regard to this relationship in a document well worthy of perusal, as the peace of South Africa depends upon the loyal observance of their obligations by the signatories of the London Convention. Mr. Chamberlain's despatch suggests that the Boer Government, under the inspiration of Dr. Leyds, an imported mischief-maker, are anxious to whittle away the Convention; and there are not wanting those who believe that if a favourable opportunity occurs President Kruger will boldly repudiate it. Mr. Chamberlain points out that the London Convention is "not a treaty between two States on an equal footing, but a declaration by the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland of conditions upon which is accorded complete self-government to the South African Republic, subject to her suzerainty ; these conditions having been accepted by delegates of the Republic, and subsequently ratified by the Volksraad." That Convention specifically reserved to the British Government the right to veto any foreign treaty entered into by the Republic, except one with the Orange Free State. It thus practically reserved the control of the Transvaal's foreign relations to Her Majesty's Government, and if that does not constitute a suzerainty it is difficult to say what does. The Colonial Secretary declines Dr. Leyds' ridiculous suggestion that alleged infringements of the Convention

shall be submitted to the arbitrament of an arbitrator chosen by the President of the Swiss Republic, and very properly refuses to countenance the interference of any foreign Power in the affairs of South Africa, pointing out that—

"The clear intention of Her Majesty's Government at the time of the London Convention that questions in relation to it should not be submitted to arbitration is shown by the fact that when delegates of the Republic, in the negotiations which preceded that Convention, submitted to Her Majesty's Government in the first instance (in a letter No. 26, 1883, which will be found on page 9 of Parliamentary Paper C 3,947, 1884) the draught of a Treaty Convention containing an arbitration clause, they were informed by Earl Derby that it was neither in form nor substance such as Her Majesty's Government could adopt."

A MONROE DOCTRINE.

Since the rejection of the Olney Treaty by the United States Senate the arbitration craze has peacefully slumbered, and reasonable men have ceased to regard it as the panacea for all human troubles. Great Britain has proclaimed a Monroe Doctrine in South Africa which she intends to uphold. With the existing possessions of foreign nations we shall not interfere, but we do not regard South Africa as a suitable field for foreign expansion, and shall certainly not submit South African differences to any foreign tribunal. According to our American cousins it is against nature to submit a Monroe Doctrine to arbitration. If any local arbitration court could have been created by elements drawn, *e.g.*, from the Orange Free State, Natal, and Cape Colony, Great Britain might have been willing to waive her dignity as suzerain and to submit infringements of the Convention to such a tribunal. It should be borne in mind that so long as the Convention is in substance maintained, it is not worth while worrying about technical or trivial breaches, and one may hope that the Colonial Secretary will at all times take a broad view of the relationship between this country and the South African Republic. *De minimis non curat* is as sound a maxim for statesmen as for jurists. Dr. Leyds is not a peacemaker between the Dutch and English; in fact, he loses no opportunity of embroiling them—like Mr. Rhodes in the present disastrous phase of his career—and he conducts negotiations in a highly provocative manner. His reply to Mr. Chamberlain's contentions has not yet been received, but President Kruger has given us to understand that it is combative. Common fairness compels one to add that the faults are not all on one side. When some Members of the Imperial Parliament and supporters of the Unionist Government, like Colonel Saunderson, utilize the recess to make blood-and-thunder speeches in Cape Colony, and others, like Mr. H. M. Stanley, to write boorish books about the Boers, the British Government must expect to find the latter alarmed and enraged.

Colonel Saunderson so completely lost his head that even Rhodesian papers like *The Cape Times* had to throw this gallant fire-eater overboard, having previously hailed him as a responsible exponent of British opinion.

BROWN'S CASE.

We feel constrained to devote some space to the famous Kotze episode, which has seriously aggravated the political situation in South Africa, thus falsifying the expectation of those who looked for some amelioration as a consequence of Mr. Kruger's signal victory in the recent Presidential Election in the Transvaal. So far, the Kotze development has excited a good deal of invective in this country, but few writers have been at any pains to master the facts. We shall endeavour to supply this deficiency as a result of a careful perusal of the various statements presented by both parties, but we cannot expect to please either, for right lies somewhere between an autocratic President and a precipitate Chief Justice. The reader should, however, be able to form his own opinion on the facts, and, whichever way his sympathies may lie, he will agree that this fresh anxiety must further postpone the long-postponed improvement in the affairs of the South African Republic. Shortly, the President is accused of seeking to dominate the Bench; the Bench, of aggressive assault upon the supremacy of the Legislature (the Volksraad). The *fons et origo mali* is known as Brown's case, which came before Chief Justice Kotze and his colleagues of the High Court last year. A group of farms had been proclaimed a goldfield from a certain date, by which time Brown, acting, it is said, for a syndicate, had arranged to peg out every claim to the exclusion of independent prospectors who were on the ground in some force. The local authorities, fearing a disturbance, telegraphed for instructions to the Government at Pretoria, and were informed in reply that the proclamation creating the goldfield would be cancelled by a second proclamation. This latter document, however, owing to shortness of time, was not published soon enough to invalidate the first.* So Brown, being prevented from pegging out his claims, brought an action for damages against the Government. The High Court, without questioning the right of the Government to proclaim a farm as a goldfield, or its right to cancel such proclamation, held that cancellation by telegram was not a legal cancellation, and awarded Brown damages, subject to assessment. So far, all is plain sailing, and no question arises between Government and Supreme Court, either upon the facts or the decision in this case.

* See an interesting article (by Mr. Statham) in the March *Fortnightly Review*, giving the Presidential side of the controversy.

THE TESTING RIGHT.

The Chief Justice appended to his judgment in Brown's case a pronouncement on the relations between the High Court and the Volksraad, claiming for the former an analogous position to that of the Supreme Court in the United States and affirming its right to review the acts of the Legislature from a Constitutional standpoint—*i.e.*, test them by reference to the Constitution, or Grondwet, of the Republic ratified in 1858. This assertion necessarily involves the authority to invalidate legislation or resolutions of the Volksraad (*besluiten*) not in conformity with the Constitution. The Executive and Legislature warmly resented this claim, on the ground that the High Court derived no such "testing" power from the written Constitution of the Republic, and that it would be not only in conflict with the practice of years past, but in direct disregard of a judgment delivered by the Chief Justice himself in a former case (McCorkindale's case). One can perfectly understand that, in the absence of that mutual confidence which is almost unknown in Transvaal circles, the Government viewed with alarm a doctrine which would enable a hostile Bench to defy the decision of the Volksraad. On the other hand, impartial outsiders who are neither bound to the Boer oligarchy nor mixed up in "Uitlander plots" cannot lightly join in condemning a judge who stands for the independence of the Bench, and is prepared to "test" the ordinances of such a body as the Volksraad elected by a fragment of the people; for it must be remembered that if the Kotze doctrine is an encroachment on the accepted supremacy of the Boer Parliament, the Kruger doctrine would deprive the majority of the population of the Transvaal of all chance of judicial protection against the arbitrary decrees of an assembly for whose members they are not allowed to vote. It may be that, in claiming "an American control over legislation," the Chief Justice adopted a more advanced position for the High Court than it is entitled to under the Grondwet, but he was supported in his view by all his brethren on the Bench, and by the Chief Justice of the Orange Free State. In any case, his action revealed the danger of recognizing the unfettered sovereignty of a minority Parliament, and made some compromise inevitable. It incidentally emphasized the astounding denseness of the Boer Government in keeping practically all the Uitlanders off the electoral roll. The disfranchised inevitably rally round any centre of opposition to the existing order of things.

THE DE VILLIERS COMPACT.

The action of the High Court in Brown's case led to a violent quarrel between the Judiciary and Executive, followed by a deadlock and accompanied by the passage of a punitive measure through the

Volksraad, which was utilized later as will be seen farther on. The Chief Justice of Cape Colony, Sir Henry de Villiers, was persuaded to intervene as mediator, and a *modus vivendi*, which we will call "the de Villiers Compact," was agreed to—its eminent author has since shared the inevitable fate of peacemakers by being roundly abused by both sides. By this instrument the five judges of the High Court undertook to abstain from testing the acts of the Volksraad. On his part, the President undertook to submit a draft Grondwet to the Volksraad wherein it should be stipulated (*a*) that the Grondwet can only be altered or amended in a special way, after the manner set forth in the Constitution of the Free State; and (*b*) that the guarantees for the independence of the Judiciary shall be embodied in such draft Grondwet. In other words, the judges were prepared to waive their assumed right to the functions exercised by the Supreme Court of the United States, provided steps were taken to safeguard the Constitution against capricious alteration by the Legislature. Further guarantees were to be inserted in the new Constitution for the independence of the Judiciary. This concordat was drawn up a year ago (March 1897), since when the Chief Justice Kotze has continually, but unavailingly, pressed President Kruger to fulfil his pledges. A Presidential Election has intervened which has greatly strengthened Mr. Kruger's position, and practically gives him a free hand. Within a few weeks of his triumph, the Chief Justice addressed the President (February 5th, 1898) a remonstrance which, after recapitulating the terms of the de Villiers Compact, continued as follows:—

"This draft Grondwet, honourable sir, you undertook in March, 1897, to submit to the Honourable Volksraad as soon as possible. Already in my letter of the 8th July I pointed out that you had departed from the understanding, especially in two respects, viz.: First, in regard to the manner of procedure followed by you; second, as regards the time stipulated. I have pointed out in my letter of the 8th July the desirability and necessity to return to the course indicated by the understanding. I also drew your attention therein to the fact that the judges could not remain for an indefinite time under the present unsatisfactory and insecure relations existing between the different State powers. Allow me to remind Your Honour once more of the fact that in order to prevent a collision and crisis which might have shaken the credit and existence of the Republic as a free and constitutionally-governed country to its deepest foundations, the judges had deemed it their duty, as far as they possibly could, to meet the Raad and Government, and had signed the agreement.

"I have already pointed out in my letter of 8th July, and declared openly, that nothing would give me more pleasure than that the understanding should be adhered to loyally on both sides. To my regret and sorrow, I find that the action of the judges has not been valued, as, although I have patiently waited for the understanding to be carried out, no draft Grondwet has been submitted by you, in terms of the understanding, to the Honourable the First Raad during its session from 3rd May to 17th November; neither have steps been taken to recall the measure bearing the name or designation of Law No. 1, 1897 (placing the Judiciary

at the mercy of the Executive). As long as this does not take place the judicial insecurity will continue, and the interference with the independence of the judiciary power will continue.

"I do not seek to magnify or elevate my office, but I must watch that the full independence of the judicial power as guaranteed, and the protection of the judges in carrying out the duties entrusted to them by the people, shall be left free and unimpaired. To assure this, and to have fulfilled the understanding on your behalf, demanded neither time nor trouble."

After indicating the very simple steps required to give effect to the Presidential pledge the Chief Justice added :—

"A whole year has now been lost. If in March last I viewed it as my duty to sign the agreement, and, in anticipation of the speedy fulfilment thereof by Your Honour, bound myself to abide by the same then, I now view it equally as my duty to point out and to declare that the understanding is of a reciprocal nature. If it is not fulfilled or is departed from, then it is no longer binding on the other party, and this is unfortunately the position to which we have now come.

"The only protection which I have as judge, and the only honourable and legal way that I can follow, is to inform Your Honour of the fact that I view the said agreement of March, 1897, as having lapsed and no longer existing."

THE DE VILLIERS NOTES.

This letter was written on February 5th (1898), and by declaring the Compact at an end it threw both parties back upon their original positions—the High Court to exercise the testing right, the President upon the supremacy of Parliament. It is not to be denied, we think, that Mr. Kotze acted rashly in writing this letter, and to that extent weakened his position. This breakdown of the de Villiers Compact brought its author upon the scene. Sir Henry de Villiers (Chief Justice of Cape Colony) was moved to publish his own notes of the famous interview between himself and President Kruger at Pretoria last year at which the Compact was arranged. A confidential conversation between two such important persons as reported by one of them could not fail to be interesting, and we wish we could spare the space to quote some of the admirable political advice tendered to the statesman by the judge,* but we must confine ourselves to the part bearing on the present controversy. The notes show how sharply divided are the most eminent lawyers of South Africa as to the validity of the claim of the Transvaal High Court to exercise the testing right, for while Sir Henry de Villiers' brother, the Chief Justice of the Orange Free State—reputed to be an extreme Afrikander,—shares the Kotze view, the more moderate-minded Colonial Chief Justice himself leans to the Kruger view. The notes detail the delicate negotiation of the Compact to which the President was at the outset stubbornly opposed until he was overcome by the skilful persuasion of the mediator. In one important

*"Chief Justice: President, you have to satisfy, not the enemies, but the friends of your country. It is your real friends who would advise you to meet the legitimate demands of the new population (Uitlanders)."

respect the record reflects upon the recent action of Chief Justice Kotze, for the President seems to have made it plain that it would not be possible to carry the draft Grondwet that Session (1897). The notes report the Chief Justice (Sir H. de Villiers) as replying to a difficulty raised by the President: "The judges would themselves wish the measure to be well-considered by the burghers, and if you do your best to carry it the judges would, I feel sure, consider the proposal to appoint a Committee with a view to legislation next year (1898) as a compliance with your promise." Upon which the President clinched the bargain by saying, "Very well, then, you may inform them that their letter will be accepted." Sir Henry de Villiers, who seems really to have succeeded in maintaining a strictly judicial attitude throughout this trying business, has supplemented the publication of these notes by a statement to *The Cape Times* in the beginning of February, in which he declares:—"I must confess, however, that I shall be grievously disappointed if there should be any further delay in the publication of the draft law for the amendment of the Grondwet. The promise was that the draft law would be laid before the people, and that the President would propose it during the Session of 1898, and use his utmost endeavours to carry it. If owing to needless delay or the absence of the requisite formalities such a law cannot be passed next Session (the present one), there would certainly not be a compliance on the President's part with his promise. I am not concerned in defending either the President or the Chief Justice, but I am truly anxious that the Compact entered into through my intervention should be loyally carried out on both sides. The side which fails to do so will incur a grave responsibility before the world, and will certainly receive no countenance from me."

"I Remain Chief Justice."

Mr. Kruger was not long in showing his hand on his Chief Justice's declaration that the de Villiers Compact had lapsed. The President replied with a letter dismissing the Mr. Kotze from the position he has held for twenty years with marked distinction, invoking to that purpose the provisions of the drastic law passed by the Volksraad in the angry days between the decision in Brown's case and the arrangement of the Compact. This law (entitled Law No. 1 of 1897) empowered the President to ask the judges if they would agree not to assume the "testing right," and, failing their compliance, or on their refusal, to dismiss any or all of them. Mr. Kotze has met his dismissal with a resolute refusal to accept it:—

"Moreover, I cannot admit the legality of the measure which bears the name of Law No. 1, 1897. My appointment as judge is for life in independent dis-

charge of my judicial functions. I may not be interfered with, and where I have been guilty of any supposed judicial misdemeanour I must be properly indicted, and can only be found guilty and punished by a specially-constituted tribunal. These guarantees have been established, not only for the protection of the judges, but also for that of the people and of all inhabitants in the State. These guarantees have been introduced, and are assured by Law No. 2 of 1896 and prior laws by Convention with England and the Grondwet of 1858. The measure therefore which bears the name Law No. 1, 1897, which, I may add, was never previously published for information of people, and was in the short space of three days accepted by the Hon. the Volksraad upon your Honour's urgent request, possesses (I say it with all deference) no legal validity. By assuming and carrying out an authority that is illegal, by the violation of guarantees for the independence of the Judiciary, the condition under which the Republic exists as a civilized, constitutionally-governed country is likewise broken. I regret, therefore, that for these reasons I cannot agree with your Honour's views, nor can I admit the legality of your action. Until I am properly and legally found guilty by a competent Court and dismissed from office, I am, and remain Chief Justice."

We have no confidence in the cablegrams from South Africa, and so leave the matter as between the President and Mr. Kotze where the last mail leaves it. Mr. Gregorowski has been appointed acting Chief Justice. It is said that Mr. Kotze is invoking the aid of the Imperial Government under the terms of the London Convention.

SIR HENRY *v.* THE PRESIDENT.

It is necessary to allude to one other aspect of this extraordinary episode, for it shows to what lengths President Kruger is prepared to go under the sinister prompting of Dr. Leyds. Indeed, the President seems to be incapable of appreciating that there are necessarily two sides to a Compact. For in his letter of dismissal to Mr. Kotze the State President denied that he had ever made any agreement or understanding:— "Your declaration of the 19th March, 1897" (to abstain from "testing"), "cannot and may not be considered as a contract. No agreement can be entered into by a judge with regard to the laws which he shall or shall not apply. The declaration required by the law must be absolute, and cannot be subjected to conditions." This amazing statement again brought Sir Henry de Villiers into the field, this time with a direct repudiation of President Kruger's contention:—"I can only say that the declaration made by the judges was subject to an understanding which was equivalent to a condition. The notes of my interview, supported as they are by the declaration itself, make this perfectly clear." "I am quite clear that they would not have signed the declaration without a mutual promise on the part of the President." Sir Henry brushes aside the quibble disputing a "contract," and repeats simply that "the promises made were in honour binding on

both sides." He adds that this was made "quite clear" to the President, and concludes:—"I still venture to hope that the President's recent letter does not mean that he denies having made a promise which in honour is binding on the Government." So far from sobering and strengthening him, his victory in the recent election seems to have turned Mr. Kruger's head, and there are not wanting those who believe that he meditates aggressive action against the suzerain Power whose hands, he is continually told by Dr. Leyds, are fully occupied elsewhere. We still refuse to believe that the President will be so rash as to play Mr. Rhodes' game. The British Government should, on their side, abstain from giving any countenance to Mr. Rhodes, who loses no opportunity of provoking the Dutch, both inside and outside the Transvaal. South Africa will ultimately be governed by its moderate men, British and Dutch, and the Imperial factor should keep pace with these.

MR. HOFMEYR'S CABLE.

In spite of the deplorable efforts made by extremists on both sides to set the European community of South Africa by the ears there is a gratifying and weighty piece of evidence that these miserable marplots have failed. The Dutch of Cape Colony continue to endorse the principle of a contribution to Imperial defence. The *Cape Times* (weekly edition) of February 23rd contains a most important interview between its well-known editor, Mr. F. E. Garrett, and Mr. J. H. Hofmeyr, the President of the Afrikander Bond. So far as we have observed, though every "Imperialist" utterance of Mr. Rhodes is proclaimed from the housetops of Fleet-street, this valuable declaration of Mr. Hofmeyr's has been carefully concealed from the British public. It gives us peculiar pleasure to bring it before our readers, to whom we have so frequently pointed out the criminal folly of branding the Dutch as disloyal. Mr. Hofmeyr, who is probably the most powerful political figure in South Africa, opened to his interviewer with the just complaint that "nowadays I am becoming used to having the motive of everything I do and say misrepresented." He proceeded to explain his action in proposing "an all-British deep sea cable" as an alternative to Sir Gordon Sprigg's proffer of a battleship. He said that such a link was an urgent necessity—which we imagine no one would care to deny—and that he had repeatedly impressed its importance upon the Imperial authorities. In Capetown in 1885, at the United Service Institution in 1887, and at the Ottawa Conference in 1894, he had advocated the laying of cables, and his present proposal had not been suddenly trumped up to defeat the Sprigg proposal. Moreover the latter was generally regarded as having defeated itself owing to the injudiciousness of the Cape

Premier in promising the Imperial Government to deliver a battleship, about which he had only authority to negotiate. Sir Gordon Sprigg had in fact furnished Mr. Hofmeyr with "a chance of ventilating my own hobby, the deep-sea cable, which I regard as a far more important element in naval defence." That he has carefully thought it out is shown by the following statement:—"I understand that Her Majesty's Government is seriously considering proposals made by the Eastern Telegraph Company for a Gibraltar, Ascension, St. Helena, and Cape cable. I do not, for reasons which are stated with some care in the Capetown Bond's recent memorial submitted to Sir Alfred Milner, consider this route so satisfactory strategically as would be the same line reinforced by a second string *viâ* Pernambuco. There is no reason why the cable should not be doubled for part of its course; in any case it is for the experts to decide details. My point is that I want the cable laid, that I think the Colony might well help to lay it, and that I would willingly help to get the Colony to do so: especially as the Colony would, independently of defence considerations, benefit thereby. I regard this as a contribution to Imperial Naval defence, and I prefer the form to any connected with a particular ship. If Her Majesty's Government will carry it out themselves, with or without assistance from the Colony, my object is attained."

A New Type of "Traitor."

The remarkable conversation we have quoted from closed with a highly significant interchange of opinions. Our only comment on it is that if Mr. Hofmeyr is "disloyal" to the British Empire, as Rhodesian hystericals represent, we devoutly hope that Her Majesty's dominions teem with such "traitors":—"But," said Mr. Hofmeyr, "assuming that Her Majesty's Government makes the cable their own affair—mainly or wholly—it seems to me that if our Ministers use their influence to confirm the cable scheme under consideration in England, it might turn the scale."—Mr. Garrett: "That is precisely what some of us have been hoping might occur, not only for the sake of the cable itself, but in order to remove an obstacle in the path of the direct Navy Contribution. But you know the slow workings of Downing Street. Just now they are not thinking of us at all. They are thinking of China. The point is, if the Premier is able when he makes his proposal to the House of Assembly to announce that Her Majesty's Government will take steps about the cable, will you, Mr. Hofmeyr, then give your support to the principle of a direct Navy contribution?"—Mr. Hofmeyr: "*I am quite prepared to do so. I think that the Colony might well vote a yearly sum of, say, £20,000 with our present average revenue, to be applied to national naval purposes in connection*

with Imperial defence. Once sure of the cable, as the result of our efforts, if the Admiralty choose, by way of compliment, to christen a ship, like your 'H.M.S. *Afrikander*,' let them do so. I doubt whether our people would vote the amount contemplated unless they had clear assurance that the whole thing would not simply end in the addition of only one more ship to the British Navy, without a cable. It should be made clear that, for the amount I suggested to the Cape Town Branch of the Afrikander Bond, both laying the cable and strengthening the Navy would be attained. It would make it even more popular with them if there seemed a reasonable chance that the new cable would not fall into the same hands as those owning and working the present two cables. They will then feel that if they make any financial sacrifice it is not done merely in the interest of sentimental fireworks, but to attain something of solid value to the Empire generally and the Colony especially."—Mr. Garrett: "Practically, then, Mr. Hofmeyr, if the Ministry succeeds in working upon Her Majesty's Government for the cable, you will use your influence with your fellow-countrymen for general navy contribution, as the phrase was interpreted by you just now? And I may say so on your authority?"—"You may do so if you think it will do any good."

Mr. Escombe's Speech.

Mr. Escombe, the late Premier of Natal, who is one of the ablest and strongest men in South Africa, has utilized his temporary withdrawal from Ministerial politics to deliver a wise and valuable address on Imperial Defence. It should be carefully considered by responsible Colonial statesmen throughout the British Empire. The occasion of the observations to which we desire to call attention was the annual meeting of the Natal Naval Volunteers, held on the verandah of the ex-Premier's house. After complimenting this active little corps upon having got its finances into order, Mr. Escombe proceeded to discuss the "great responsibility resting on every British Colony in connection with the Empire." They had learnt from Captain Mahan and from recent events that "the command of the sea was the command of the planet, and while England was mistress of the sea, her rule throughout the world could never be successfully challenged. And England with her Navy was the protector of her Colonies, and the question had been much discussed of late as to what form of support the Colonies should give to the Mother Country. In one instance, there had been the price of a battleship promised, and in other instances money contributions had been thought of; but years ago he had ventured to differ from these views, and he differed from them still; and he submitted to

them and to those whom his words might reach, that the duty of the Colonies was of a totally different character." Mr. Escombe indicated, in terms which we believe will commend themselves to all who have given serious thought to the great problem of defence, the most effective way in which a community such as Natal can discharge its duty to the Mother Country :—

"The duty of the Colonies was to free the vessels of Her Majesty's Navy from any necessity whatever of looking after a colonial port. Each colonial port had got to look after itself, so that not even a single cruiser need be detached to guard it when the services of that cruiser might be wanted in deeper water. If that course were followed—and men in high positions in England strongly advocated that view—then Natal had to take her part with other Colonies. A colony such as Natal should first of all have batteries sufficient to prevent attacks by casual cruisers. Fleets they need not bother themselves about, for they would be looked after by the admirals, but the port had to be defended by the colony when the fleet was wanted elsewhere—and every vessel of the fleet might be wanted elsewhere—so that each colony and port should have batteries to protect itself, and should also provide the means by which, with the greatest rapidity, any vessels of Her Majesty's Navy might secure such assistance as they might require at any colonial port. The Navy lived by coal, and was dependent on its supplies, and on its power to refit ; and what they had to do here was, first of all, to maintain the batteries, as they were now, sufficient for the purpose of repelling a cruiser or two ; next, to find the coal that might be wanted for Her Majesty's Navy ; next, to get the means by which that coal could be put on board Her Majesty's vessels quickly ; and next, to keep such supplies as might be wanted by vessels of Her Majesty's fleet. And if colonial ports did these things they would give the help required."

A Naval Base.

Natal, though a most attractive and promising country, is inhabited by a small white population of about 50,000, surrounded by a sea of natives. With all the good-will in the world it would be impossible for her people out of a revenue of 2¼ millions to make at present any substantial or even appreciable contribution to the cost of the Imperial Navy. In emphasizing this, Mr. Escombe was only doing his duty both to the Colony and the Mother Country. In forcible and picturesque terms he brought home to his audience the infinitely greater service Natal can render by making her splendid coal supply available, than by any mere subscription to the Imperial fleet:—"Money did not count, in reference to the Navy, so much as readiness to help the general movement, and the general movement was that the fleet had to be in command of the oceans, and that that fleet was to place reliance on every Colonial port for the supplies it might require, whether those supplies be coal, refitting, or general supplies. It was necessary for them to look ahead. John Evelyn, the diarist, who was born in the 17th century, wrote a book in which he pointed out the necessity of planting oak trees in England, and he afterwards boasted to Charles I. that no less than one million oak trees had been planted as a result of his

advice. The vessels which fought at Trafalgar were built with the oaks grown in pursuance of the advice given by John Evelyn in the 17th century, and this showed the wisdom of looking ahead of our immediate time. The days of oak vessels had passed away. They had to do now, not with oak forests, but with the fossils which represented ages long gone by, indicated in Natal by the coal at Dundee, and in other parts of the Colony; and thinking men could see that the utilization of coal in Natal was the way in which Natal could help the English Navy. Natal had got to provide coal and the means by which that coal could be supplied to any vessels of Her Majesty's fleet which might come here; and Natal had got to be very careful indeed of the steps taken at the port that no levies were made at this port by cruisers of a foreign fleet. As to their corps, their particular position was well indicated to them by local circumstances. They were young men, and big changes would take place in the world before many years were over, and as all changes that took place must be dependent upon the mastery of the seas, if in a small degree they were all to assist that mastery by what they did here, they could be proud of their service, because they would be rendering help not only to Natal but to the Empire at large."

THE ALASKA BOUNDARY.

Recent events have given a somewhat disagreeable prominence to the Alaska Boundary question. It will be a serious misfortune for three great communities if it is allowed permanently to slumber, and the Foreign Office should spare no effort to press for a final settlement with the United States, otherwise we may have a flare up at a most inopportune moment. A recent answer made by Mr. Curzon (Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs) to a question in the House of Commons reveals what slow progress is being made with the delimitation. He said, "The question of the Alaska Boundary has been dealt with in two sections, namely (1) from Mount Elias northward to the Arctic Ocean, and (2) from Mount Elias southward along the strip of coast to the terminal point fixed by the treaty with Russia of 1825. As regards the first section, a convention was signed at Washington on January 31st, 1897, for the location of certain points along the 141st meridian, which forms the boundary there, and providing for the junction of the points so located by joint surveys. This work is now in progress. As regards the second section, the Boundary Commission, acting under the convention of July 22nd, 1892, presented a joint report on December 31st, 1895, but the maps attached to the report on which the topographical results of the survey were embodied have not yet been received, and up to the present no arrangement for

the determination of the true boundary line has been effected The matter is now engaging the attention of Her Majesty's Government." The net result of this Parliamentary circumlocution is that the actual boundary has not been determined either above or below Mount Elias, though certain points have been agreed upon in the upper section. As regards the lower section, we have reached the stage of exchanging maps. It is true that the Foreign Office is "considering" the matter, but they officially "considered" the Venezuela-Guiana Boundary for about forty years without arriving at any definite conclusion, and their procrastination very nearly landed us in a first-class war. It is imperative that there should be an early delimitation of the frontier between Canada and Alaska. In the meantime it is being positively asserted in Canada that the whole boundary question has been settled and that a serious surrender of Canadian interests has been effected.

A REBUKE FROM CANADA.

A recent writer in *The Canadian Magazine* has commented severely on an apparently innocent remark made in these pages. We said: "There is a very small, but perhaps rather noisy, school of British journalists, with whom we have no sympathy, who think to display their Imperialism by perpetually stirring up the Canadian and American people with a long pole." This observation seems to have given considerable offence on grounds which are not clearly explained, and which we confess to not understanding, but it is suggested that only a person living in a fool's paradise could indulge in this washy sentiment. All we can reply is that if we never reach a greater pitch of folly than is to be found in this observation we shall be fortunate among our fellows. What would be thought of any writer who gave contrary advice, and urged that it was every Englishman's duty to stir up the Americans and Canadians on all possible occasions? Would he not be voted into a strait-waistcoat? To abstain from adding fuel to the flames is a very different thing from refraining to recognize the existence of a fire. If it gives any satisfaction to our critic we cherish no illusions as to the friction existing between the United States and Canada. It is too manifest to be ignored. Canada is not always accommodating, but there is a powerful section of politicians at Washington whose attitude towards the Dominion is perfectly intolerable. It arises from their hatred of everything British—except the gold standard, which several of them worship—and is directed against Canada simply because she is the most accessible part of our offending Empire. A cablegram lately announced the various ways in which Congress was to be urged to hamper Canada in reaching the Yukon district, the proposed route to which, by an evil mis-

chance, involves transhipment on American territory. Canada needs a bonding privilege at Fort Wrangel in order to operate the Stickeen-Teslin route, *i.e.*, in terms:—"The privilege of entering goods, wares, and merchandise in bond, or of placing them in bonded warehouses, at the port of Wrangel, in the district of Alaska, and of withdrawing the same for exportation to any place in British Columbia, or the North-West Territory, without payment of duty." The United States makes no sacrifice in granting this; indeed, it is only an ordinary incident of neighbourliness. However, it gives the Anglophobe group an opportunity of worrying Canada, so they actually propose legislation to withhold this privilege, which is freely granted to the United States elsewhere, unless Canada will agree to buy it with extraordinary concessions, involving (1) a serious alteration of her railway policy; (2) a revision of her tariff; (3) a change of her mining code; and (4) the throwing open of her ports on the Atlantic coast. The adoption of these offensive proposals by Congress is not yet assured; but they will, of course, be rejected by Canada, and she will have to select another route.

Auri Sacra Fames.

Mr. Ogilvie, of the Dominion Survey Department, has incurred a terrible responsibility by his pertinacious puffing of Klondike and the adjoining country. This region has become the scene of one of the ghastliest gold rushes of the century. According to an interesting interview in *The Pall Mall Gazette* Mr. Ogilvie "has discovered gold mines, has spent many years of his life surrounded by gold mines, and has never felt any inclination to own a gold mine." While inspiring other men with the *auri sacra fames* he is strong enough to rise superior to that fatal passion. He renews his voucher for the richness of the country in which he has spent the last ten years:—"There can be no dispute about its wealth. Though it is perfectly true that a good many Klondike stories ought not to be swallowed except with a very large pinch of salt, there can be no doubt about the riches of the country. I have no hesitation in saying that to my own personal knowledge there is at least £20,000,000 worth of gold in sight; probably an estimate of twice that amount would be well within the mark. It is impossible to say what the country is not worth, but, if all indications are not purely accidental, I should put it at something like a hundred millions. I have had every opportunity of judging the mineral wealth of the country, for there is coal as well as gold, and its riches are tangible enough, I can assure you. It is, of course, impossible to generalize in a country 125,000 miles in area, by far the greater part of which is

unexplored. This district contains about 7,000 linear miles of river, stream, and gulch, nearly all more or less gold-bearing, of which only about two hundred have been tested and developed. For all I know, there may be half a dozen Klondikes hidden away in the interior; on the other hand, there may not be one. No one ever will be able to speak with certainty until the country has been prospected. All one can say is that there are no indications why the goldfields should be confined to the Klondike. One thing is very certain. The country that has been exploited so far is auriferous, all of it." The latter part of this statement bears a striking resemblance to what used to be said of Rhodesia by ardent partisans, one of the most prominent of whom affirmed to the present writer two years ago, "You will soon see half a dozen Johannesburgs in Charterland." There is obviously all the difference in the world between the character of the two countries, but sensible people will wait for more definite information than any yet produced before plunging into any of the thousand and one wild-cat schemes which will shortly be floated. Even Mr. Ogilvie admits that "until the country has been developed all attempts to gauge its wealth are the merest speculation."

ANOTHER WARNING.

Mr. Ogilvie, as an honest Canadian anxious to dissociate his country from any suspicion of fraud, is constrained to utter a warning to the British investor which one may hope will not be thrown away, though we cannot help wishing that it had been sounded sooner, and were more comprehensive. However, it cannot help ingerminating a certain wholesome scepticism, and may save some valuable property from being thrown into the pit:—"At the same time, despite the undeniable wealth of the country, and although the Dominion Government is doing all it possibly can to treat the investor on liberal terms and to look after the interests of the capitalist, I consider it to be my duty to warn the British public in the most emphatic language not to put its money into Klondike concerns without the most careful investigation. There is a 'Klondike boom' at present, and it is quite conceivable that a good many people may burn their fingers. Several public companies have been floated of late with the object of buying mining claims in the Yukon. Now, the vendor's title to the claims he proposed to sell should be subjected to the strictest examination. It is necessary to bear the conditions which constitute a mining title in mind. The most important of them is that every claim must be worked continuously and 'in good faith' during the working months. If the claim remains unworked for seventy-two con-

secutive hours, the title lapses and the claim can be 'jumped.' Subject to these conditions claims may be combined, provided the agreement is recorded. It is, therefore, necessary for A, who comes to London to sell his claim, to leave his partner B to work it meanwhile on the Yukon. Now, A may be negotiating in perfectly good faith, but in the meanwhile B, if not overburdened with scruples, may have previously sold the claim out there; or, if a loafer, may leave it unworked for seventy-two hours, when the first comer can 'jump it.' In either case the purchaser in England has no valid title, and the purchase money will probably go into the hands of unscrupulous promoters without benefiting either himself or the country. The public, too, should be warned against the prospectus of any company which claims to have trading or transport monopolies over certain districts. The Dominion Government never has granted and never will grant monopolies of any sort or kind. It is dead against their policy, as I have very good reason for knowing. Not that I have any wish to discourage those who may be tempted to try their fortune in the new country. There is room for all. There are still plenty of claims which can be worked to fair profit, and even if the newcomer does not strike it rich he can always earn high wages." As against Mr. Ogilvie's invitation to all and sundry to brave this horrible climate we have an elaborate and careful paper in the American *Review of Reviews* which is worthy of attention. The writer (Mr. S. S. Bush) "calculates that nearly 100,000 persons will endeavour to get to Klondike this year, and that each man will spend, from first to last, £120. Of this sum of £12,000,000, the United States railroads will get £1,000,000, Seattle will retain £5,000,000 for outfit and board, the steamship companies will receive £2,000,000, while transportation of freight over the passes will cost £3,000,000. £12,000,000 on the whole will be spent this year in order to enable 100,000 persons to have a chance of sharing in an output which it is not estimated will be more than £3,000,000 at the outside. This, however, of course will only be one year's output. In 1899 it is expected that Klondike will yield £10,000,000 sterling." Our own advice to those who meditate going to Klondike or buying Klondike shares is—Don't.

A Significant Election.

It would have been voted absurd a few years ago to expect the average reader of a London newspaper to take an interest in a provincial election held in Canada. Nowadays as a matter of course such a paper as *The Morning Post* publishes a column discussing the results of the recent General Election in the Province of Ontario. It will be readily seen to be a contest of some significance, and if

the tendency therein manifested continues we may expect to see the Laurier Government severely shaken before very long, while there will be an immediate increase of the friction that already exists between the Dominion Liberal Cabinet and the Conservative majority in the Dominion Senate. As *The Morning Post* correspondent reminds us, the extremely narrow escape of the Hardy Ministry (Liberal) in Ontario, in spite of the strenuous support of Sir Wilfrid Laurier and his colleagues, is the first check sustained by the Canadian Liberal Party during the last two years. Everything had previously gone in their favour, the Dominion General Election of 1896, a series of Dominion bye-elections, as well as a series of Provincial elections, to say nothing of the *éclat* which their brilliant Premier and his shrewd fiscal policy excited in the Mother Country. As showing how much importance was attached at Ottawa (the Dominion capital) to political fortunes at Toronto (the capital of Ontario Province), we are told that the Dominion Parliament adjourned for a week so that its members might plunge into the Provincial fray. When the Ontario Legislature was dissolved two months ago, the Conservative minority was only 25 in a House of 94 Members. Owing to the General Election the Conservative Party stands at 43 in the new Parliament, and if the Liberal Government is supported by two Independents its majority will not exceed eight. Such a display of Conservative strength in Ontario, which is as Radical as Scotland, has put heart into the Conservative Party throughout the Dominion, and among the results anticipated is the rejection of the Stickeen-Teslin Railway Bill by the Dominion Senate. This measure has the laudable object of opening out a quick route from Vancouver to the Yukon, but the enormous land grants made to the contractors under the Bill are keenly resented as an excessive mortgage on the future of the country. If the railway can be constructed without them the policy of the Bill is open to objections which are none the less grave because they are obvious.

EXIT A THIRD PARTY.

Our readers, therefore, perceive the importance of this drawn battle in Ontario. It has one further feature of world-wide concern, viz., the disappearance of a third Party. At the last Provincial Election (1893) sixteen Members were returned by the Patrons of Industry, which is an Agrarian-Labour Party, co-operating with the Liberals. It favours Free Trade, Retrenchment both in Federal and Provincial expenditure, and the Abolition of the Senate. The overpayment of officials, from the Governor-General downwards, was, perhaps, its most effective battle-cry. The Patrons of Industry used to wield considerable influence in Ontario politics, and hoped even-

tually to hold the balance of power between Conservatives and Liberals both in Provincial and Dominion struggles. But the correspondent we have quoted recalls their comparative failure at the Dominion General Election in 1896, and now in Ontario they have been completely smashed. Their sixteen seats in the old Parliament are reduced to one in the new. Such a collapse is peculiarly interesting to us in Great Britain, as it is not unlikely to be shared by any semi-detached Party which, while calling itself Labour, plays the game of the Liberals. We are told :— "Most of the seats formerly held by the Patrons of Industry have gone to the Conservatives. Like the Labour Members in Britain, the Patrons of Industry elected to the Ontario Legislature and to the Dominion Parliament usually, if not invariably, acted with the Liberals, and in the Ontario Election, as in the Dominion General Election of 1896, the electors failed to see any appreciable difference between them and the Liberals."

AUSTRALIAN FEDERATION.

We publish this month an article from the pen of Professor Harrison Moore, of Melbourne University, on "Constitution-making in Australia," which institutes an interesting comparison between the handiwork of the Federal Convention of 1891 and that which has just closed its third and final Session in Melbourne. The paper was necessarily written some weeks ago, before this last stage was reached, but its chief criticisms are not affected by anything that has occurred in the interval so far as we can judge from the scanty cablegrams. The present Convention, by adopting the Commonwealth Bill towards the end of March, has discharged its duty to its constituents, and the fate of Federation is now in their hands. If on a poll of the people, three Colonies vote Aye the scheme will become operative, and the nucleus of a federation will be formed to which outsiders might gradually rally. Those who have *not* followed the keen and strenuous discussions which have characterized the sittings of the Convention throughout its existence would conceive it impossible that the Australian nation should deliberately prefer to remain a divided house when given a fair opportunity of taking its place, with Canada, among the great English-speaking communities. For the difference between the power and prestige of a disunited and a consolidated Australia would be almost as great as the difference between a first-rate and a second-rate European Power. However, the issue seems very doubtful, and the Australians are infinitely better judges of their own affairs than any onlooker can be, and they will no doubt weigh carefully all the pros and cons. We venture to hope that one aspect of the question will not be overlooked. It is no

exaggeration to say that since the Federal Convention assembled in Adelaide last year the whole position of the Australian Colonies has been profoundly modified by the portentous developments in the Far East. Australia was invulnerable owing to her remoteness, but for the future she must be considered as within striking distance of the growing fleets of the world. A Federated Australia would be an infinitely stronger defensive unit than a group of disconnected Colonies. Suggestion from the Mother Country is not always welcome, and we have no desire to offer unsought advice. We shall therefore confine ourselves to saying that if the statesmen of the Far South fail to recognize the new menace to their several communities they do not deserve their high reputation for shrewdness. The Pacific is destined to become the cockpit of Sea Powers.

A New Zealand Protest.

We referred last month to the growing interest of the Australian Colonies in the cause of Bimetallism, and quoted one striking passage from *The Age*, the great Radical paper of Melbourne, and another from *The Canterbury Times* (New Zealand). Another New Zealand paper, *The Otago Daily Times*, has thrown open its columns to the discussion of this question. A recent issue contained an able letter from Mr. Donald Reid, junr., of Dunedin. It supplies so terse and lucid a summary of the present position of the controversy between bankers and their satellites on the one hand and currency reformers on the other that we reproduce it. It is most encouraging to us in the Mother Country to know that throughout Greater Britain there are men such as the writer of this letter who have been at the pains to master this complicated question, and who lose no opportunity of enlightening those around them in the sound principles of monetary science. For a community such as New Zealand (whose whole prosperity depends upon the arrest of the continuous fall of prices, which is disastrous to her as a producer and ruinous to her as a debtor) to range herself with the banking faction would indicate that though you may not indict a nation of crime she may convict herself of folly. New Zealand will, however, do nothing of the kind. She will join her voice in protest against a system, which, if maintained, must inevitably reduce agricultural and manufacturing communities to the condition of the West Indies. Mr. Reid writes as follows :—

"My object in writing is to point out that a reform is at present in progress along parallel lines with that of the Corn Law reforms. Twenty-five years ago simultaneous legislation took place in several countries preventing the use of silver as money of full debt-paying power. These laws took away from silver the right of being admitted to the nation's mints and of being coined into money. They took away the rights of debtors to pay their debts in silver as they had hitherto done and obliged them to pay their debts in gold only. The law took away the

debtor's option of payment in either metal and transferred that option to the money-owner of demanding payment in one metal only. No more signal instance of interference with the national law of supply and demand as applied to money, or with the freedom of the people, can be found. A monopoly was conferred upon every money-owner, upon every person to whom debts were due, and upon every creditor. These laws protected the owners of gold and of debts at the expense of every property-owner and debtor in the community where these anti-silver laws were passed. These laws made money scarce and dear, and prices of everything else low. They increased the value of money, so that to-day a money-owner can buy with sixty-three sovereigns as much property as he could buy with 100 sovereigns about twenty years ago. Can you imagine a more fatuous policy than one that legislates for the benefit of 10 per cent. of the money-owners of the world to the detriment of the remaining 90 per cent. of property-owners and the labourers who are dependent upon them?

"For fifteen years the British Bimetallic League has fought for the repeal of the laws against the use of silver as money. Two years ago the Gold Standard Defence Association, principally supported by bankers and money-lenders (and second-rate at that), was inaugurated. To-day the question of the repeal of the laws against free-trade in silver is before the Parliaments of the United States, France, Germany, and Great Britain. Can anyone doubt what the end will be? If so he has only to read the speeches about the repeal of the laws against free-trade in corn, to read the history of the Anti-Corn Law League, of the odium with which this league was treated by the Press, of the Corn Law League formed to meet the arguments of the reformers, and in the end the triumph of Free Trade. This is a country of farmers. Let them read what the British Agricultural Commission has said on agricultural distress and the gold standard. If they do not then support free-trade in money and the repeal of the anti-silver laws, then history has been written in vain.

THE FATE OF NEWFOUNDLAND.

According to *Whitaker's Almanack,* not only is Newfoundland "the oldest English Colony," but "the Government is a responsible one, administered by a Governor appointed by the town; a responsible executive of seven, a legislative council of not over fifteen, appointed for life, and a House of Assembly of thirty-six elected by the people every four years." The "ballot" and "manhood suffrage" prevail. This ancient community of British stock, consisting of nearly 200,000 souls, with all the paraphernalia of Democratic Government, has just committed what to the outsider looks very like political suicide. Being weary of self-government it has decided to deliver itself bodily to a contractor, for we are told that:—"Mr. Reid, the railway contractor, has concluded an agreement with the Newfoundland Government to take over and operate the entire railway system of the Colony for fifty years for a subsidy of 2,500 acres of land per mile. Mr. Reid pays 1,000,000 dols. now, which, at compound interest, in fifty years amounts to 7,000,000 dols. At the end of that period he will own the road. If he fails to fulfil the contract the money and road will be forfeited to the Colony. Mr. Reid buys the St. John's dry dock for 320,000 dols., and brings his workshops there and operates the dock. He also

builds a new railway to Topsail, a distance of fifteen miles, for 100,000 dols., and a terminus at the dock. He builds seven new steamers, one to ply to Labrador and on the six largest bays of Newfoundland, at a subsidy of 90,000 dols. per annum. He takes over the Government telegraph lines at a subsidy of 12,000 dols. per annum for seven years, when the Anglo-American monopoly expires, then to operate free, and give a uniform tariff of 25 cents all over the island for ten words. He operates in new coal areas and pays a royalty of ten cents per ton. He builds an electric railway in St. John's for 140,000 dols., and repairs the Whitbourne Railway for 100,000 dols. This offer was to have come before the Legislature on Tuesday last, and was expected to pass almost unanimously. It is regarded as highly calculated to promote the interests of the country, and to give a new impetus to industries and land settlement." This amazing bit of news was followed by the further announcement that "the Reid Railway contract" passed the House of Assembly by twenty-six votes to six, and had been signed by the Governor—apparently after some hesitation—and the capacious contractor. "Its completion" is reported to cause "great rejoicings, and meets with universal approval." But there is evidently a small minority which keenly feels the humiliation of making a contractor Czar of Newfoundland, and would regard improved material conditions as dearly purchased by political enslavement. Those who are familiar with the rule of the Standard Oil Company in Pennsylvania must view this new departure with profound misgivings.

THE UGANDA ÉMEUTE.

We referred last month to the mysterious and tragic events which have occurred in and around Uganda, to the imperilment of the whole European community: the mutiny of the Sudanese troops who have policed the Protectorate for several years, the abandonment of the carefully planned Macdonald expedition, the pursuit of the mutineers by Major Macdonald, the long delay in smashing them, the loss of valuable British lives, and the reign of unrest in Uganda. Although a blue book and a debate have combined to throw light on the situation, these disastrous proceedings have not yet been satisfactorily cleared up, and it is not unnatural that the Government should be pressed for a further and independent enquiry. In the meantime the public should suspend their judgment. There is a widely prevalent belief that Major Macdonald, though a gallant officer, is not the ideal commander of Sudanese troops, with whom he came to loggerheads some years ago, that he cannot communicate directly with them, and is wanting in the peculiar tact required in

dealing with natives. These suggestions may be ill or well founded, but it would be premature and unwarrantable to pass judgment on a British officer engaged on distant and hazardous service. Mr. Curzon pointed out in the recent debate that the present mutiny had nothing whatever to do with Major Macdonald, but was owing to circumstances anterior to his appearance on the scene. In fact, the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs attributed it, as did also Sir Edward Grey (the late Under Secretary), to the under payment, the arrear in payment, and the overworking of the Sudanese troops. At the end of a considerable spell of arduous campaigning last summer they were ordered on a long forced march to Major Macdonald's camp, and thence on an expedition to a remote and unknown country. Arrangements had apparently been made for the support of their wives and families during their absence, but these had never been clearly explained to them, and they reached the rendezvous with Major Macdonald in a discontented frame of mind. Whether he dealt judiciously with them or not we do not profess to know. At any rate the discontent speedily ripened into a mutiny. *Hinc illæ lachrymæ.* It is noteworthy that, according to the latest news, other Sudanese garrisons have remained loyal, and are ready to co-operate with the Indian troops which have been hurried up from the coast in order to preserve order. The admissions made by successive Under Secretaries as to the under payment of the Queen's troops in the Protectorate throw a disagreeable light on the craze for expanding the Empire on the cheap, which has invariably shown itself to be the most expensive system the wit of man has yet devised. Had the Sudanese received a few more rupees a month, these costly troubles might not have occurred, and the British taxpayer would be spared both the humiliation of feeling mean and some substantial part of the £85,000 just voted by Parliament for the Uganda Administration.

NOTICE.

All communications to the Editor of THE NATIONAL REVIEW should be addressed to the care of Mr. EDWARD ARNOLD, 37, Bedford Street, Strand, W.C.

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THE NATIONAL REVIEW.

No. 183.—MAY, 1898.

EPISODES OF THE MONTH.

THE IRREPRESSIBLE CONFLICT.

There has only been one public topic in Europe during the past month, viz., the irrepressible conflict between the United States and Spain, caused by the appalling condition of Cuba, and finally precipitated by the destruction of an American battleship in Havana harbour. We could write nothing new on this question, the gravity of which we have frequently impressed on our readers, and at this moment it would be difficult to write anything dispassionate. With some diffidence we venture to reproduce a careful analysis which appeared in these pages as long ago as January, 1897, *i.e.*, before Mr. Cleveland had quitted the Presidency. It was written after an impartial study of the Cuban movement in the United States and without any *arrière pensée* or view to immediate contingencies, and it does justice—but, we believe, no more than justice—to the action now taken by the American people. "The European view presumably is that the 'Jingo' and 'Land-grabbing' Party in the United States want a decent pretex to annex Cuba, and that this annexation of Cuba will be a preliminary to further aggressions upon the possessions of other European Powers. That it is consequently the interest of Europe to act as a unit in the support of Spain, as what may now be sauce for the Spanish goose will subsequently be served up to the French gander. This is an ignorant, mischievous, and short-sighted appreciation of the present movement in the United States. It reminds one of Russia's suspicions of our Armenian agitation in its early days—before the Czar's visit to Scotland—which was regarded abroad as a mere cloak for the

capture of Constantinople by Great Britain. There is no more 'land-grabbing' in the Cuban agitation in America than there is in the Armenian agitation in England,* and the possibility that intervention might lead to the incorporation of Cuba in the Union by the desire of the Cuban people has had a most prejudicial effect upon the strength of the movement. Any number of Americans of all shades of politics express the sentiment, 'I would intervene like a shot if we could count on keeping clear of Cuba after Spain had been cleared out'; while others have said, 'I would not have anything to do with the movement for intervention if I thought it involved annexation.' 'We have got territory enough,' is the average American's answer to any 'land-grabbing' propaganda, and it may be affirmed as beyond question that public opinion is not 'ripe' for the absorption of Cuba. The cry for a Free Cuba is a demand for the emancipation of Cuba from Spain, and not for its annexation to the United States. Unless we can get this firmly into our minds we shall misunderstand the whole movement. It is important that the movement should not be misunderstood, because it is liable to become irresistible and overflow such paper barriers as the niceties of International Law or the punctilio of the Constitution may afford. . . . We think it is beyond doubt that were Great Britain in the position of the United States, she would have intervened between Spain and her unconquerable insurgents years ago, and by this time Cuba would be either under a wholesome 'Egyptian' administration, or she would be governing herself as a free colony. In 1875, when the last Cuban civil war had been raging for seven years, *The Times* expressed the common-sense view of the struggle in the following passage:—'Were Cuba as near to Cornwall as it is to Florida we should certainly look more sharply to matters of fact than to the niceties of international law. But everything, we repeat, depends upon these matters of fact. If Spain can suppress the insurrection and prevent Cuba from becoming a permanent source of mischief to neighbouring countries, she has the fullest right to keep it. But she is on her trial, and that trial cannot be long. When she is made to clearly understand that the tenure of her rule over Cuba depends upon her ability to make that rule a reality, she will not be slow to show what she can do, and the limits of her power will be the limits of her right.'"

AN ABOMINATION OF DESOLATION.

"It is impossible to overstate the sufferings of the inhabitants of Cuba during a war which has degenerated into 'a wholesale annihilation of property,' as the President stated in his Message. The Spanish general can't get at the enemy, but he can destroy

* Since this was written Captain Mahan has cogently pointed out the strategic merits of Cuba and has undoubtedly influenced American opinion.

the produce on which their subsistence depends. *The Times* correspondent states in his last letter (December 5th, 1896,) that 'Live stock, plantations, and farm-buildings in this zone of occupation have been destroyed in order to reduce the chances of the rebels' obtaining food supplies or shelter now or at any future time. These are severe measures, and only the present desperate state of affairs can justify the commander-in-chief in taking upon himself the responsibility of such action.' The rebels when taken are treated like rebels, and the deportations of their sympathizers to Spanish penal settlements is a regular feature of the war. The same correspondent, who is known to be a careful and reliable observer, relates an interview he had with a French farmer, who had just been ordered out of Vuelta Abajo, where he had farmed for thirty-five years, by the Spanish military authorities. This Frenchman confirms what one has heard elsewhere as to the character of General Weyler's campaign. 'Nothing could shake the evidence of this man as regards the confidence of the rebels as to obtaining ultimate victory, and, moreover, he holds similar ideas. Possibly his opinion may not be of much value, but as a small working farmer he, to some extent, expresses the feelings of others of his class. *In reply to my question as to what happens to those families who do not comply with the Government order to move into the towns, he answered that such families were treated as rebels and killed.* When these families come into the towns they are made to work at drawing water, sweeping and cleaning the street, and cutting firewood for the troops; for this compulsory labour a small ration of food is allotted, but,' my informant added, 'no money payment is made except now and then a peseta, and this does not provide means to buy clothes and other necessaries.' The italics are ours. According to this evidence men, women, and children are butchered for declining to abandon their homes and become the menials of the Spanish soldiery. It is hardly surprising that 'an outpost of European civilization maintained by such means is odious and impossible in the eyes of many right-feeling Americans."

THE REVOLUTION IN THE REVOLUTION.

"Anarchy reigns in Cuba and Spain is incapable of coping with it; indeed, her General seems to have degenerated into a mere wrecker. Nothing could be more appalling than the present *régime* except its continuance. But is there any hope for the future? Would an autonomous or a Free Cuba be able to govern herself? It has generally been assumed, on the ground that this is a black rising, that she would not, and that an independent Cuba would be a second edition of Hayti, with a terrible race feud thrown in. Spanish campaigning has, however, made many converts, and the original negro rising has become merged in a greater movement

led by white men. *The Times* correspondent who used to take a very gloomy view of the *personnel* of the insurgency depicts it in very different colours now, and shows that there is some hope for the stricken island if only the Spaniards can be induced to withdraw.

"'Many of the worst features characterizing the rebellion up to six or eight months ago have now disappeared, or at least are greatly modified. The white element is largely in the majority in the rebel ranks, whereas for many months after the outbreak occurred the negroes were the predominating feature. Then, again, the sympathy of nearly all of the educated Cubans is with the rebels, no better proof of this being needed than the number of prominent people who have been sent as political prisoners to the Spanish penal settlements during the last six months. The Spaniards argue that Cuba independent would be only a second edition of Hayti. Had the rebellion triumphed with its first elements, I have no doubt that the assertion would have proved a true one. Now, however, the case is different. Cuba as an independent government would certainly be weak and not inspire any great amount of confidence abroad. But the administration would be in the hands of educated men who would be perfectly capable of appreciating the duties of their offices, although, possibly, not very firm in maintaining a strong and decided attitude in times of difficulty. Nor is there any reason to suppose that the race question would be prominent for the present. Naturally the Cubans, both white and coloured, are a peaceful people, and when once a settlement of the existing troubles was made to their satisfaction they would soon settle down again to work.'"

Saving Spain from Herself.

"Such are some of the salient facts that present themselves to the Free Cuba Party in the United States, and their attitude, if regarded as menacing by Europe, should be at any rate appreciated by England. On any fair criterion that can be applied to the Cuban revolution, it has justified its existence by its hardy career in the face of tremendous odds. Spain, on the other hand, has shown that she is as unable to cope with the Cubans in war as she has been unable to govern them in peace. The stubborn pride of the Spanish people and the maddening futility of the Spanish generals are bound to carry Spain to her doom unless she can be persuaded to relinquish Cuba or come to terms with the insurgents, though the character of the campaign makes the possibility of compromise somewhat remote. In the meantime, a rising of alarming dimensions has occurred in the Phillipines, Spain's splendid far eastern possession, where Cuban history seems to be repeating itself, *i.e.*, troops are being lavishly despatched, and great paper victories are being recorded, while the rising steadily gathers force. Cannot Cuba be rescued from Spain? is the question which Americans ask of one another. Europe may surely enquire whether Spain cannot be protected from herself and saved from suicide. She cannot go on much longer burning the candle at both ends. She will ultimately be expelled from Cuba by the rebels or by the Americans unless some friendly mediation can intervene. Great Britain is on good terms with Spain. Why should she not offer to join the United States in a tender of good offices to the Spanish

Government, which all its reasonable members would be anxious to accept? It is the gravest crisis in the history of Spain, and no nation can pass through a cataclysm nowadays without shaking some of its neighbours; so if the promptings of humanity are to be repressed, enlightened self-interest should stimulate some Power in friendly relations with Spain to make a move in the matter. An indefinite reliance on the remarkable conservatism of the American people, to which our Washington correspondent so justly calls attention, will inevitably lead Spain to disaster. The last paragraph of the President's Message (Cleveland) on the Cuban question is quite as significant as any other :—

"'It should be added that it cannot be reasonably assumed that the hitherto expectant attitude of the United States will be indefinitely maintained. When the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the insurgents has become manifest, and it is demonstrated that her sovereignty is extinct in Cuba for all purposes of its rightful existence, and when a hopeless struggle for its re-establishment has degenerated into strife which means nothing more than the useless sacrifice of human life and the utter destruction of the very subject matter of the conflict, a situation will be presented in which our obligation to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by higher obligations, which we can hardly hesitate to recognize and discharge.'"

THE INTERVAL.

The foregoing pages were written nearly a year and a half ago and, in the interval, the condition of Cuba has steadily gone from bad to worse. It is true that, under tremendous pressure, Spain has made certain "concessions" to American indignation, but though with great influence on European opinion their alleviation of the ghastly lot of the rural population in Cuba has probably been imperceptible, nor are all of them *bonâ fide*. (1) The infamous General Weyler was replaced, on a change of Ministry in Spain, by the humane Marshal Blanco, and the *Reconcentrado* order has been revoked, but not until it had accomplished its purpose by starving tens and hundreds of thousands of Cubans—to exterminate a population they could not subjugate having been the deliberate policy of Spain, as was made clear by the letters of *The Times* correspondent in the island. (2) Spain has also granted a measure of autonomy, which looks liberal on paper, and has proved a valuable political and diplomatic weapon to herself. It has had no effect on the insurgents, for the simple reason that their leaders were induced to close the last rebellion and lay down their successful arms by similar promises on the part of Marshal Campos —none of which were kept by Spain. The insurgents have consequently resisted all political overtures from Madrid throughout the present rising, for they realise that even if animated by a sincere desire to grant Home Rule to Cuba, the Madrid Government could only give effect to it at the cost of a domestic revolution. Cuba has, throughout the century, been the unhappy hunting-ground of Spanish soldiers and officials, and the prey of Spanish

bagmen. The land of *prommicamentos* may use the phrase "local autonomy" wherewith to beguile foreign diplomatists, but it is powerless to carry out any such policy. That is the key to the whole Cuban problem. (3) Spain has made great play with one other "concession," viz., an armistice, which was extorted at the eleventh hour, and was proclaimed in Cuba at the twelfth. According to a recent telegram from *The Times* correspondent, it has had no effect on the fighting. Surely the insurgents would have been great fools to walk into the trap of an "armistice" on the verge of the yellow fever season, during which Spanish arms are necessarily inoperative, while the acclimatized forces of the "rebels" are unusually active.

A Momentous Speech.

Towards the end of last March the American people had the condition of Cuba brought home to them afresh, and in a manner which made a profound impression on those who had hitherto exercised all their influence against the policy of intervention, believing that the state of the island had been grossly exaggerated by an over-enterprising Press. This current of feeling was stemmed and turned by the visit which Senator Proctor paid to satisfy his own doubts, and he gave his impressions in the Senate on March 17th. They have probably had more weight with American opinion than any other utterance, and it seems unfortunate that European newspapers have been unable to spare some of the space they have devoted to Mr. Phelps' letter to the infinitely more important speech of Mr. Proctor. He is a Republican Senator for Vermont, which is not a Western or Southern State; he is an upholder of the sacrosanct Gold Standard and is not more Jingo or sensational than, *e.g.*, our present Home Secretary. That is to say, he is a level-headed, careful, and absolutely reliable witness, and is known to have undertaken his mission with an open mind.* Of the six Provinces forming Cuba, the two large Eastern Provinces comprising half the island are practically controlled by the insurgents, and are known as "Cuba Libre." Senator Proctor confined his observations to the other four, *i.e.*, the Western Provinces, where a large Spanish army has been engaged, not in fighting rebels, but in depopulating the country. "All the country people in the four Western Provinces, about 400,000 in number, remaining outside the fortified towns when Weyler's order was made, were driven into these towns, and these are the *reconcentrados*. They were the peasantry, many of them farmers, some landowners, others renting lands, and owning more

* As he says himself:—"I went to Cuba with a strong conviction that the picture had been overdrawn; that a few cases of starvation and suffering had inspired and stimulated the Press correspondents, and they had given free play to a strong, natural, and highly-cultivated imagination. What I saw I cannot tell so that others can see it. It must be seen with one's own eyes to be realized."

or less stock; others working on estates and cultivating small patches, and even a small patch in that fruitful clime will support a family. Some of them had houses of stone, the blackened walls of which are all that remain to show that the country was ever inhabited. The first clause of Weyler's order reads as follows: 'First—All the inhabitants of the country or outside of the line of fortifications of the towns shall, within the period of eight days, concentrate themselves in the town so occupied by the troops. Any individual who, after the expiration of this period, is found in the uninhabited parts will be considered a rebel and tried as such.' Many doubtless did not learn of this order. Others failed to grasp its terrible meaning. Its execution was left largely to the guerrillas to drive in all that had not obeyed, and I was informed that in many cases a torch was applied to their homes with no notice, and the inmates fled with such clothing as they might have on, their stock and other belongings being appropriated by the guerrillas. When they reached the town they were allowed to build huts of palm leaves in the suburbs and vacant places within the trochas, and left to live if they could. Their huts are about ten by fifteen feet in size, and for want of space are usually crowded together very closely. They have no floor but the ground, and no furniture, and after a year's wear but little clothing, except such stray substitutes as they can extemporize. With large families or with more than one in this little space, the commonest sanitary provisions are impossible. Conditions are unmentionable in this respect. Torn from their homes, with foul earth, foul air, foul water, and foul food, or none, what wonder that one-half have died and that one-quarter of the living are so diseased that they cannot be saved!"

THE CUBAN PROBLEM.

Senator Proctor does not pretend to have mastered the whole Cuban problem in one visit, but in two important points he entirely corroborates the view that was presented some time ago to the British public by the conscientious *Times* correspondent at Havana. Mr. Proctor told his audience:—"I had but little time to study the race question and have read nothing on it, so can only give hasty impressions. It is said that there are nearly 200,000 Spaniards in Cuba out of a total population of 1,600,000. They live principally in the towns and cities. The small shopkeepers in the towns and their clerks are mostly Spaniards. Much of the larger business, too, and of the property in the cities, and in a less degree in the country, is in their hands. There are, or were before the war, about 1,000,000 Cubans on the island, 200,000 Spaniards (which means those born in Spain), and less than 500,000 Negroes and mixed blood. The Cuban whites are of pure Spanish blood, and, like the Spaniards, usually dark in complexion, but oftener lighter or

blonder, so far as I noticed, than the Spaniards. The percentage of coloured to white has been steadily diminishing for more than fifty years, and is not now over 25 per cent. of the total. In fact, the number of coloured people has been actually diminishing for nearly that time. The Cuban farmer and labourer is by nature peaceable, kind, gay, hospitable, light-hearted, and improvident. The coloured people seem to be by nature quite the equal mentally and physically of the race in this country. Certainly, physically, they are by far the larger and stronger race on the island. There is little or no race prejudice, and this has, doubtless, been greatly to their advantage. Eighty-five years ago there were one-half as many free Negroes as slaves, and this proportion was slowly increasing until emancipation." In this passage and the following, Senator Proctor explains why the grant of autonomy to Cuba made so little impression in the United States; why the Senate has been so averse to the policy of annexation, and deems "the Republic of Cuba" worthy of recognition:—

"The division in our war was by no means so clearly defined. It is Cuban against Spaniard. It is practically the entire Cuban population on one side and the Spanish army and the Spanish citizens on the other. I do not count the autonomists in this division, as they are so far too inconsiderable in numbers to be worth counting.

"I enquired in regard to autonomy of men of wealth and men as prominent in business as any in the cities of Havana, Matanzas, and Sagua—bankers, merchants, lawyers, and autonomist officials, some of them Spanish born, but Cuban bred, one prominent Englishman, several of them known as autonomists and several of them telling me they were still believers in autonomy if practicable, but without exception they replied that it was too late for that. Some favoured a United States protectorate, some annexation, some free Cuba; not one has been counted favouring the insurrection at first. They were business men and wanted peace, but said it was too late for peace under Spanish sovereignty. I am not in favour of annexation—not because I would apprehend any particular trouble from it, but because it is not a wise policy to take in any people of foreign tongue and training and without a strong guiding American element. The fear that if free the people of Cuba would be revolutionary is not so well founded as has been supposed, and the conditions for self-government are far more favourable. The large number of educated and patriotic men, the great sacrifices they have endured, the peaceful temperament of the people, whites and blacks; the wonderful prosperity that would surely come with peace and good home rule, the large influx of American and English immigration and money would all be strong factors for stable institutions."

We have quoted this convincing because honest and impartial testimony as it has so far practically escaped the notice it is entitled to here. The great majority of British newspapers—*The Times* at their head—have exhibited a keen desire to do justice to the American case, but as their sources of information are unfortunately limited to Manhattan Island, prominence is only accorded to those views which are applauded by a narrow coterie in New York, no matter what importance may be attached to others in the great continent, of which New York is the port of entry.

A Political Analogy.

Let us now place ourselves for a moment in the attitude of the average American — outside Wall Street. Political analogies are liable to misuse, but if we mentally plant Armenia, still under Turkish rule, where Ireland is, we ought to be able, without any severe strain, to imagine the pitch of fury which public opinion would reach if, at the end of three years' fighting between Turkish troops and Armenian insurgents, we learnt that a British battleship and 250 blue-jackets had been blown up while visiting Cork harbour, *ex hypothesi* under Turkish control, and that after an exhaustive investigation by a Naval Board consisting of British admirals and captains, it was found that the explosion was external. As a matter of fact, it would be utterly impossible for such a situation to arise, as, unless the British Cabinet delivered an ultimatum to Turkey in the first three months of the insurrection, the Cabinet would itself receive notice to quit, which, under our political system, they dare not disregard. But in the United States the Administration can systematically defy public opinion almost up to the revolution point, so you must conceive the Armenian conditions continuing in Ireland for two or three years. Would not the situation on this side of the Atlantic reproduce all the features so familiar on the other? There would be a perpetual stream of "filibustering" expeditions from the Scotch and Welsh coasts to Donegal and Kerry; tons of ammunition and food would be poured in in contravention of International Law and Turkish remonstrances; an Armenian committee would be openly organized in London for the avowed purpose of aiding the insurgents, and a vigorous propaganda would be carried on in Parliament and in the Press. The Nonconformist conscience would palpitate with sympathy, nor would the Church militant be silent. Sensational accounts of the courage, the sufferings, the miseries, and the determination of the Armenians would appear day by day in the least "yellow" newspapers, which would not fail to expose the constant cruelty, treachery, and impotence of the Turks, the depopulation of the island, the great injury to material British interests, and the humiliation in the eyes of the world we suffered from the tolerance of a hell upon earth at our doors. Europe would accuse us of having manufactured or invented the insurrection as a pretext for "grabbing" Armenia, nor would our strategists fail to point out the wisdom of such a course. We should be continually warning Turkey that the scandal could not go on indefinitely, and, if Europe threatened to interfere, we should reply that geography made this a British and not a European question. Like the Americans, we should be divided into three parties: (1) A peace-at-any-price party. (2) Time-servers. (3) The great mass of the nation, whose motto

would be "A Free Armenia; by Peace, if possible — by Force, if necessary." On the destruction of the battleship, class three would be reinforced by class two, and class one would be overpowered, and any Minister who officially proposed to Turkey to submit the loss of the British ship and crew to international arbitration would have to disappear from public life. There would be a war—if Turkey fought—about the justice of which we should have no shadow of a doubt, and we should expect any friends we might have abroad to view it as we did, and as we now view the action of the United States. The Continental semi-official Press would rail against "British greed" as it now rails against "American aggression."

Is there a Racial Patriotism?

For further discussion of the American-Spanish crisis the reader is referred to the highly instructive letter of our Washington correspondent. Perhaps the most remarkable feature of this war was its inevitableness. The great mass of the people in both countries were absolutely determined to fight, and all the Presidents, Popes, and Financiers in the world could not by any conceivable efforts have restrained them, and the belief that by further diplomacy, or mediation, or any form of arbitration, either of two brave, proud, and resolute nations, could have been induced to tolerate the intolerable demands of the other is visionary. That Spain's treatment of Cuba has been villainous is beyond doubt, and she has never treated her colonies otherwise, and has consequently lost them one by one, but she has forgotten everything and learnt nothing, and still believes herself entitled to do what she likes with her own. In Spanish eyes, the Cuban population is of no account, and Spain's sovereignty over the island is as unimpaired as Queen Victoria's over the free communities composing the British Dominions, and Spanish indignation at being ordered out of Cuba may be compared to our indignation supposing we were ordered out of Canada by some outsider against the wishes of the Canadian people. Spain is essentially a mediæval and, in some respects, an Oriental country with the paraphernalia of modern Government, but without its attributes, and it would be hopeless to try and convince an ordinary Spaniard that colonies have elementary rights. He thinks all this talk of "a Free Cuba" to be a piece of Anglo-Saxon cant, and his French neighbours, though professing to sympathize with struggles for freedom, have consistently fomented this feeling. So Spain and her Anglo-Saxon neighbour have drifted into an *impasse* from which war offered the only issue. It is not a war made by the rulers, each of whom has gone to the verge of danger in trying to avoid it. It is essentially the handiwork

the two peoples, representing different epochs, conflicting

civilizations, and irreconcilable ideas. The Americans could no longer suffer Spanish rule in Cuba, still less could the Spaniards suffer to be ejected from any part of their Empire. Spain is expected to exhibit much finer qualities in fighting her formidable antagonist than she has shown throughout this terrible Cuban episode, and even from her point of view, though hopelessly overmatched both in men and money, an honourable, though disastrous, war is preferable to the ruinous and fatal peace of the last three years. Spain enjoys the moral support of Continental Europe, and, as "under-dog," necessarily appeals to the sporting instincts. The issues at stake in this struggle are exceedingly grave, and the possible developments menacing to Anglo-Saxon ideas. We devoutly hope that the leading men of the United States are as conscious of a racial patriotism as are those in this country.

AN UNFOUNDED ASPERSION.

At a time when an increasing number of sensible people in the United States and Great Britain—putting aside the gushers who stultify and retard every cause they espouse—are facing the possibility of better relations between the two nations, is it not somewhat unfortunate that the chief committee of the American Senate should level at the Government of this country a charge as offensive as it is groundless? It is authoritatively stated that the Foreign Relations Committee have thought fit to insert the following passage in their report accompanying the joint resolution for the annexation of Hawaii by legislation:—"If Great Britian is not industriously and openly engaged in fomenting this concerted movement for the destruction of the Republic and the restoration of the Monarchy on its ruins, her agents and the Princess, her *protegée*, are kept conveniently near at hand to fasten her power upon the islands when a pretext arises for protecting the lives and property of British subjects in Hawaii." We have resolutely refused to adopt the New York view of the Senate, and have protested against it as false and calumnious, and have consistently borne our humble tribute to the eminent public services of a body which is the one really representative as well as the ablest and most patriotic factor in the United States. At the same time, we think Englishmen are entitled to resent, and should resent, these utterly unfounded and childish aspersions on the part of the Foreign Relations Committee. Some of its members are smarting under a disappointment. They have failed to convince a two-thirds majority of their fellow-members of the wisdom of annexing the Sandwich Islands by treaty. In their chagrin and spleen they turn upon Great Britain, hoping thereby to enlist, on behalf of annexation by legislation, the anti-British sentiment, which is a potent political element in the United States. In reality, the only feeling on

the part of Great Britain with regard to the Sandwich Islands, is one of surprise that so much talked of an event as their annexation continues to be postponed. We venture to hope the Foreign Relations Committee will have the grace to withdraw their unwarrantable imputations.

A Canard.

We must notice another cock-and-bull story of a totally different kind, but not less mischievous in its way. False and foolish interpretations are being placed upon a visit recently paid to Washington by Mr. Henry White, the very competent and discreet Secretary to the American Embassy in London, in such papers as the *New York Herald*, which, after many preliminary hints, finally publishes the following telegram from its Washington correspondent:—

"One official, high in the administration circles, said to me, Mr. White is here in connection with the preparation of a new treaty between the United States and Great Britain."

"The only information vouched for in response to enquiry at the State Department is that Mr. White is here in connection with certain affairs pending at the Embassy in London. In spite of all this mystery, I have good reason to believe that he is here with, perhaps, a proposition—a 'sounding' is the exact diplomatic word—for this Government from Great Britain as to a new treaty, so wide in its scope as to include not only arbitration, but an alliance under certain circumstances."

We should be inclined to bet our bottom dollar that neither the words "alliance," nor "arbitration," nor any suggestion of "sounding" on either of these subjects have passed Mr. White's lips during his visit to Washington, which had exclusive reference to the conditions created by a war that was imminent when he started and that has broken out since his arrival. The arbitration craze is as dead as Queen Anne, and could not be revived by fifty *New York Heralds*, combined with 100 *Evening Posts*, and 1,000 Smalleys. These agencies have surely misled Great Britain sufficiently as to American sentiment towards arbitration, which they do not represent, and are powerless to influence. Moreover, there is as little desire for an arbitration treaty in Great Britain as there is in the United States, a state of opinion on which both nations may be congratulated, as anything more calculated to perpetuate friction than a series of arbitration crises involving the menace of perpetual litigation it would be impossible to imagine. It would be infinitely intolerable and far worse than an occasional war scare. The zeal of the arbitration cranks is entirely free from any discretion, and their methods of propaganda are strange. They avowedly desire an improvement in Anglo-American relations, but to advertize their fad they would accuse British diplomacy of the meanness of seeking to force a measure upon the United States when hampered by war which she had deliberately rejected as distasteful in peace time. This sugges-

tion is of the class which refute themselves, as is also the further allegation that Mr. Henry White has been engaged in negotiating an "alliance" which is not within the sphere of practical politics or within the dreams of any practical politician in either the United States or Great Britain. Let us abstain from weakening any cordiality which a community of sentiment, identity of interests, and the course of events may occasion, by floating our various fads whether in the form of an arbitration that is dead or an alliance that is not yet born.

THE NILE CAMPAIGN.

The Sirdar obtained a brilliant victory over the Dervishes upon Good Friday, April 8th. The Oriental has frequently to pay the penalty of his bombast and boasting. The Khalifa was bound to make some show of his mightiness, and he did so in the most foolish manner. Mahmoud Abu Achmed, a comparatively young Dervish General, a nephew of the Khalifa, and Osman Digna were despatched to drive the "enemies of God" into the sea. The two Generals accordingly marched into the desert, cutting themselves off from their nearest base on the Nile at Shendy. In fact they quitted the Nile altogether, their intention being to make a flank movement and fall upon Berber unawares. The Dervish army was composed of some 15,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry. It made for a place called Nakheila, probably some mud village, situated about fourteen miles up the Atbara river from its junction with the Nile. The river is now but a series of pools. At Nakheila the Dervish force encamped and formed a stong zariba, and entrenched itself. The men who made up the force were brave enough, but they were badly fed and badly organized. The Sirdar, directly he heard of their advance, made his way slowly up to meet them. He commanded a compact and well-organized force, consisting of some 15,000 men, with twenty-four guns and twelve Maxims. His scouts had informed him of every movement of the enemy. The night before the assault he had encamped at Umdablia, within a few miles of the Dervish position. Various reconnaissances had taken place, and some skirmishes, in which the Egyptian cavalry showed considerable mettle. A night march from Umdablia was made on Thursday night, the 7th. The troops kept a strict silence, and halted at 9 p.m. for a bivouac, the men lying down to sleep upon the pebbly desert sand. At 1 a.m. the march was resumed, and by dawn the four brigades were in position within 500 yards of Mahmoud's trenches.

THE BATTLE OF ATBARA.

The artillery commenced a bombardment of the zariba at 6 a.m. on Good Friday. It lasted for about an hour and a half, and it was as severe as has ever been poured into an enemy's position. The fierceness

of the fire seemed to cow the Dervishes, and no reply was made for half an hour. After the bombardment had been continued for something like an hour and a half, the firing ceased, and, to quote Sir Herbert Kitchener's despatch, "at 7.45, three brigades, the British on the left, formed for assault, and the whole force advanced most gallantly, rushing the zariba and trenches down to the river without a check. The losses of the Dervishes are very heavy, as they stood well and reserved their fire till we were quite close to their trenches." The British and Egyptian Brigades were well abreast in the assault. General Gatacre was one of the first to pull down with his own hands the zariba which surrounded the encampment. The enemy were found in deep trenches in rows behind the zariba. As soon as the zariba was broken up, the British and Egyptian troops swarmed in, the Lincoln and Seaforth Highlanders cheering vociferously. The whole position was carried within half an hour. The scene inside the zariba was one of ghastly carnage. The effect of the artillery fire had been terrible. The trenches and pits were filled with dead, *The Times* correspondent estimated them at 1,400. Dead men, camels and donkeys lay about in heaps. Mahmoud himself was captured, Osman Digna escaped. Most of the Emirs were killed. Ten guns, a large number of rifles, 100 banners, and a quantity of baggage animals were captured. Three thousand Dervishes were killed. The British officers killed were Captains Findlay and Urquhart, of the Cameron Highlanders, and Lieutenant Gore, of the Seaforths. Twenty-one non-commissioned officers and men were killed belonging to the British Brigade, and ten officers and 106 men were wounded. The Egyptian Brigades lost fifty-one men killed, and eighteen officers and 319 rank and file wounded.

THE SIRDAR'S TRIUMPH.

The Sirdar's appeal to the troops on the morning of the battle was "Remember Gordon." No man was more entitled to make this appeal than Sir Herbert Kitchener. In 1884 he drew up a scheme for the relief of Khartoum and the rescue of beleaguered Gordon. We do not know the exact merit of the scheme, but judging from the qualities which have been displayed by the Sirdar, it must have had a good chance of success, and, if it had been adopted, possibly Gordon would have been saved, and we should not have suffered the national disgrace of having failed to relieve him. On the night of the Battle of Atbara some stealthy commentator chalked up in large letters on the base of Gordon's statue in Trafalgar Square "Avenged." This is not quite so yet; but the Sirdar has nearly accomplished this task, and by his suppression of the Dervish reign of terror, which has desolated the Soudan for a dozen years now, he has paid the best tribute to Gordon's memory. After the victory was complete on the 8th the Sirdar received a tremendous

ovation from his troops. He well deserved it. It is by his power of organization and incessant toil, added to his masterful manœuvring in the field, that victory has been secured.

AWAITING THE NILE.

The Dervish army having been broken up and scattered, and the dead buried, the Anglo-Egyptian brigades were ordered to march back to their summer quarters. The Sirdar, accompanied by his staff and escorted by Brigadier-General Macdonald's brigade, with five squadrons of cavalry and horse artillery, arrived at Berber on the following Wednesday. Mahmoud, with 2,000 Dervish prisoners, was in the procession. The whole town was decorated, and the natives gave the Sirdar a most enthusiastic reception. Mahmoud naturally created the greatest interest, and there was great struggling to obtain a good view of him. He is a fine looking man —half Arab, half negroid—with good features, but a hard cruel face. The meeting between him and Slatin Pasha, considering how well they had known each other under different circumstances, was most dramatic. Mahmoud protected his altered position by saying, "Wait until you get to Khartoum." A correspondent of *The Daily Telegraph* sent an interesting account of an interview he had with him, from which, however, little was to be gathered, except that Mahmoud's utterances were deceitful. If there was one thing more manifest than another during the recent battle it was that our artillery fire committed terrible execution. The number of dead bore witness to this; but Mahmoud said that the artillery did little harm, and "killed nobody." He attributed his defeat to Osman Digna, who had induced him to leave the Nile, promising to show a route whereby he might capture Berber. He said he had written to the Khalifa complaining in strong language of Osman's conduct. "My error was," he said, "in listening to Osman Digna, and leaving Metemneh and the Nile." He boasted that the Khalifa had men like the sands of the sea, and that we should be defeated at Shabluka and Omdurman. He was amazed at the railway, and to find he could be taken to Halfa in one day, and expressed childish wonder at the engine. He enjoyed highly being photographed. Operations on the Nile are now suspended until July, when the river will have risen; the correspondents have been ordered back from the front.

GOVERNMENT BY BACK-SCRATCHING.

Parliamentary proceedings have ceased to interest the public. At any other time a Budget which reduced the tobacco duty and relieved the small Income-Tax payer would have created a lasting sensation, while the satirical speech delivered by the Minister of Education (Sir John Gorst) at the expense of his own Party, to say nothing of Mr. Gerald Balfour's painful jokes on champagne and

distress, would have set the political world agog. They are already forgotten, and this oblivion, with a hundred other signs, emphasizes the eclipse of the House of Commons. The passing of Parliament is attributable, we think, not merely to foreign events, but to the fact that Her Majesty's Opposition have, under the withering influence of Sir William Harcourt, almost abandoned their valuable constitutional functions. How to supersede Sir William Harcourt is the one topic of conversation wherever two or three Radicals are gathered together, and when his presence is seen to sterilize the action of a great political Party it ceases to be a mere Party question. All fair-minded Unionists recognize that their opponents are almost as important to the nation as themselves, and as long as the wilder Radical spirits can be restrained, and their more dangerous projects defeated, it is not compatible with the highest British interests that the present ineptitude of the Opposition would be indefinitely prolonged. It has an evil influence on the policy of the Cabinet, who in the absence of an effective enemy are apt to fall into slovenly ways and to perpetrate blunders which could easily be avoided. In fact, there is a danger lest the dry rot pervading the Radical Party, which, we believe, spreads from headquarters downwards, may be caught by their opponents, in which case the plight of the country would be deplorable. The two Front Benches seem to be forming a sort of mutual admiration society, and are hardly happy out of one another's company, while the development of "deals" behind the Speaker's chair alarms private Members on both sides of the House. Our respective leaders should remember that the Party system, which is England's chief contribution to the art of government, was not built up on the principle that one good turn to-day will deserve another to-morrow, but on the healthy conflict of men as well as policies. If the Opposition could select an efficient leader, all this back-scratching business would cease, and Parliament would revert to an earlier and healthier tradition.

THE FAR EAST.

The solitary occasion when the House of Commons rivetted public interest during the past month was when Mr. Balfour, in deference, not to the importunity of the Opposition, but to the restiveness of his own followers, made a statement on the Far-Eastern Question. It was one of the most important utterances of recent years, and was delivered the day before the rising of Parliament for the Easter Recess, *i.e.*, on April 5th. The House and galleries were crowded; the Unionists were critical and the Opposition were purring with pleasure at the obvious discomfort of their opponents. Mr. Balfour began with a promise of papers upon the pending negotiations, and then plunged *in medias res*. He frankly recognized

that "during some weeks, perhaps during some months, the public mind has been in a condition of considerable anxiety—I had almost said irritable anxiety. I do not use these expressions with any suggestion of blame, but they have not, I think, shown that confidence in the Government which we had indeed, perhaps, no right to ask for from hon. Members opposite, but which, certainly, we had some right to expect from those who support us in this House and the country." The view on the Ministerial Front Bench—with which doubtless the Opposition Front Bench agrees—apparently is that any manifestation of independence by a Unionist Member or organ is, no matter how great the provocation, an act of treason to the State. Our political Party may be in theory less democratic than the other side, but the Balfour view that a supporter must under all circumstances support will not, and should not, find general acceptance. Mr. Balfour attributed the recent excitement to the occurrence of "entirely new political phenomena"—viz., "the extraordinary, I had almost said the unaccountable, weakness of the vast Empire of China which has in one way or another provoked, I will not say attacks, but changes, in the Far-Eastern policy of more than one country." Mr. Balfour expatiated on this "new state of things" in picturesque language:—"History, indeed, is full of accounts of the weakness and decay of great empires, but I do not think that history shows a single case in which an empire numbering its inhabitants by hundreds of millions, which has never received any blow directed against a vital part, whose inhabitants have many of the qualities which go to make great nations, being thrifty, industrious, enterprising, courageous—I do not think that history shows a single case where an empire of that kind has been apparently wholly unable to act against the feeblest form of attack." We fear that Mr. Balfour's artistic analysis might be easily brushed aside by anyone who cared to point out that if any matter has been common knowledge to all mankind, it is the utter feebleness of the Chinese Empire. Was it not established by the Japanese War, and is it not written in Mr. Curzon's book? It is somewhat late in the day to plead that the recent exhibition of debility by the Chinese Government came as a revelation which no foresight could have foreseen.

"Guiding Principles."

Mr. Balfour proceeded to point out that British interests in the Chinese Empire transcended and preceded those of other nations, for besides possessing "by far the greater share of Chinese commerce," we "first opened that commerce, so far as it is as yet open, to the world, and that before France had any colonies in the Far East, before Germany had a Colonial policy at all, and whilst Russia was still divided by interminable tracts of waste territory from the Chinese

Empire." To answer the question, "What is the policy we ought to pursue in the face of this new and unexampled situation," Mr. Balfour recapitulated his famous speech of January 11th, which had taken place two days after a Cabinet Council and expressed the views of the Government :—

"In obedience with the directions of the Cabinet I laid down three propositions. The first was that territorial occupation by itself and for itself in the Far East was an unmixed evil, that it necessarily carried with it responsibility for populations not always very easy to deal with, and that unless the acquisition of territory was required for the purposes of a military or naval base, such acquisition was, if possible, to be avoided. The second proposition I laid down was that the interests of this country, though not territorial, were commercial; and, in the third place, I pointed out that there were two ways in which those commercial interests might suffer. The first was by foreign Powers obtaining stations, by lease or otherwise, along the coast of China, and introducing into those ports or stations differential fiscal regulations which might operate in favour of their own commerce and operate disadvantageously against our commerce. The second of the two ways in which our commercial interests might suffer was by any Power acquiring the means of putting pressure upon the Chinese Government at Peking and thus indirectly causing injury to our trade and commercial interests whilst nominally leaving treaty rights undisturbed. I think I have restated those propositions quite clearly."

Mr. Balfour referred to the "general meed of approval" with which those propositions were received at the time, and declared that "those general principles of policy thus laid down in the early days of last January have been the principles which have guided Her Majesty's Government through all the subsequent months, and which are still guiding the policy which I am about to expound to the House." Two elements have to be borne in mind, "our direct and immediate commercial interests," and "the influence, be it for good or be it for evil, which can be exercised indirectly upon those commercial interests by the power which any Government has of putting pressure at Peking." Again, our immediate commercial interests have to be subdivided under two heads—viz., as they are affected by Chinese concessions to ourselves, and as they stand in territories leased to other Powers. Mr. Balfour repeated the valuable concessions and safeguards granted by China to this country: (1) The non-alienation of the region of the Yang-tsze. (2) The successor to Sir Robert Hart, the head of the Imperial Maritime Customs, to be an Englishman, "so long as the commercial predominance of this country in China gives us an equitable title to have an Englishman there." (3) The opening up of the great waterways of China to foreign navigation, "made at our instance, but not made for our benefit alone." (4) The opening of three new treaty ports, Ching-Wang Peitaiho, an ice-free port in the Gulf of Pechili; Funing, near Sam Sa; and Yo-chau on the Tung-ting Lake, far up the Yang-tsze Valley. Mr. Balfour fairly claimed that "for two months' negotiations this is a considerable harvest," and he was ful

entitled to add:—"Confining myself, as I am now doing, to that branch of the question which deals simply with opening up the ports of China under Chinese control to foreign trade, I think the Government may congratulate, not themselves, for that is a small matter, but may congratulate the commercial interests of this country and other countries on the great and rapid progress that has been made. I doubt whether in the whole history of China so much progress, or, indeed, anything like it, has been made in so short a time."

"Assurances."

Having dealt with the concessions made by the Chinese Government on the suggestion of Great Britain in regions remaining under exclusive Chinese control, Mr. Balfour turned to consider our commercial interests as affected in those parts of China where leases and concessions have been made to Russia and Germany. He disavowed sympathy with what may be called a dog-in-the-manger policy, and maintained that railways "by whomsoever constructed and under whatever conditions they may be constructed, cannot but be on the whole a benefit to British and general trade. . . . I should say so far as our commerce was concerned, altogether apart from our rights, I would far rather have the railways and the (differential) duties than neither railways nor duties. And I do not believe that anybody who has studied the course of international trade with an impartial eye will deny that in holding that view I have, at all events, got a case which it would be pretty easy to defend by statistical arguments." Mr. Balfour hastened to add that the choice did not arise, for "neither Germany nor Russia has I believe, the slightest intention of depriving us of any of the rights which we already enjoy by treaty:"—

"The assurances of Germany have been in their general tone and spirit perfectly satisfactory. They have not, indeed, been very specific. They have not been very detailed; but their statements that the port they have taken is to be open to the commerce of the whole world and that they mean to regulate, so far as they can, the region over which they have got control on principles agreeable to us, indicate what I believe to be the absolute truth, which is that within China—certainly in China—I do not limit the statement to that, but certainly in China—British interests and German interests are absolutely identical. Jealousy, I suppose, there may be between individual traders, individual concessionaires, and individual producers. But fundamentally the interests of the two countries are the same and must be the same, and I certainly believe that we shall be able without difficulty to work hand in hand towards carrying out these general commercial objects which I believe approve themselves to the sense of this House."

The German Emperor it must be admitted has scored heavily on the Chinese Question, and in four ways: (1) By acquiring a valuable sphere of influence in the Shan-tung province; (2) by the conversion of his previously sceptical subjects to the support of a big navy; (3) by setting Russia and England by the ears; (4) by obtaining

friendly expressions of opinion from British Ministers after an interval of two and a half years. On turning to our commercial relations with Russia, Mr. Balfour was constrained to confess that though her assurances had been "specific" their "exact form has changed," and he referred his hearers to the forthcoming Blue Book.*

"It is certainly not my business to criticize the course pursued in this respect by the Russian Foreign Minister, nor is it my business to explain it. But this I will say—and it is, after all, the fundamental and essential part of the question—in every one of the assurances, whatever forms they have taken in regard to detail, every form of assurance agrees in this—that no treaty right at present enjoyed by this country is to be abrogated by the recent arrangement between China and Russia; and I need not say that, as they have repeatedly and in the most emphatic form laid down that principle of policy, we accept it in the spirit in which it has been given and we fully believe that it will be carried out to the letter. As I shall in one moment have to express rather strong differences in respect of policy between the views of Her Majesty's Government and those of Russia, let me say before I come to that that Russia has not—as from the language of some people you would suppose—attacked any territory or rights of ours; she has not endeavoured to abrogate any treaty which we enjoy, and her policy, in so far as it is a commercial policy, in so far as it is expressed by the words 'railway extension and open ports,' is a policy of which we have no reason to complain, but is a policy that, in my view, is highly beneficial to this and all other commercial peoples."

This statement is evidently intended to convey the idea that the doctrine of the "open door" and "equality of opportunity," for which the Cabinet in general and Sir Michael Hicks-Beach in particular were prepared to lay down their lives in the early part of the year, stands where it did. Russia has laid hands on the north of China, but we are asked to believe that the trade of Manchuria will be as free to any subject of the Queen as to any subject of the Czar. *Se non è vero, è ben trovato.*

PORT ARTHUR.

Mr. Balfour then proceeded to the more serious portion of his speech, dealing with interests which he classified as "political and military":—"I must come by the natural sequence of my argument to points on which we think the Russian Government have pursued an unfortunate course." Here Mr. Balfour was very precise and, alas, convincing:—

"It would have been well in our judgment could Russia have confined her policy to the extension of her railway system from Siberia to an ice-free port. She might then have obtained all the commercial advantages which she seeks and she would have given no shock to an already enfeebled empire. She would have done nothing to disturb the balance of power at Peking. Unfortunately, as we think, her statesmen took a different view of their duties and their interest and they insisted that in addition to the railways and in addition to the ice-free commercial port, with which a few months ago we had every reason to think

* It has appeared as we go to press, and too late for notice here, but one's first impression of it is far from agreeable.

their ambition would be satisfied, they have resolved to obtain the control, at all events for a period, of the harbour of Port Arthur. Now, sir, Port Arthur is not a commercial port. Port Arthur is scarcely, I think, capable of being made a commercial port. The character of its accommodation, its geographical position, its relation to Ta-lien-wan, all forbid the idea that either now or at any future time will Port Arthur become a commercial centre. Its significance, therefore, is a purely naval and military one, and the character of that significance may perhaps be as accurately and as forcibly described in the words of Russia herself in 1895, when she objected to the occupation of Port Arthur by the Japanese, as it could by any words I could find to express my meaning. Russia then stated that the occupation of Port Arthur was a constant menace to the capital of China."

We fear, however, that in spite of this tardy awakening as to the political influence of the Cronstadt of the Far East, it will be known in history as Port Arthur Balfour, owing to an incautious speech made by the First Lord of the Treasury at Bristol some two years ago, when he publicly invited Russia into an unspecified "ice-free port" which the Russian Government understood to be that upon which they had set their affection, viz., Port Arthur. However, when the Cabinet—and we say Cabinet advisedly, because no single individual can be held responsible for the collective folly of which Committees are capable—realized that Russia was ready to appropriate the prize she had as a matter of common knowledge ear-marked for her own, they became penetrated with surprise and alarm, and entered on a period of protest :—

"Accordingly, as soon as we heard from Peking, as soon as we had reason to believe from information that reached us from our representative at Peking that the negotiations with regard to Port Arthur were advancing, we laid our views very clearly before the Russian Government. We expressed our sense of the evils which, as we thought, they were bringing upon the Chinese Empire, the dangers they were incurring, and we offered, on our part, if they would abstain from taking Port Arthur, ourselves to give a corresponding pledge, on our part, that we would occupy no port in the Gulf of Pe-chi-li. I think that offer was a fair one. I think it would have been well if it had been accepted. It was not accepted, and we therefore wrote a despatch, to which I have already referred and which will in due course be laid on the table."

In reply to an interruption, Mr. Balfour admitted that "the telegram in which we expressed our dissatisfaction with the Russian policy and the offer of a pledge from us" was March 22nd, 1898!

WEI-HAI-WEI.

The balance of power being disturbed in the Far East by Russia's acquisition of Port Arthur, the British Government sought to restore it by acquiring "the one port in the Gulf of Pe-chi-li, which, by the confession of every competent judge, may be held to balance the possession of Port Arthur." "We have asked the Chinese Government, and we have obtained from the Chinese Government, a lease of Wei-hai-wei, with the right of occupation after the Japanese shall leave it, on the same conditions and for a like term of years as those obtained in the case of Port Arthur. The speaker

affirmed, and with justice, that this action involved no departure from the original policy laid down by the Government, since Wei-hai-wei, though "geographically it is on the mainland, is really, from many points of view, rather to be regarded as an island than a mainland port." It has no population, and consequently does not involve us in the territorial responsibilities we have consistently disclaimed, and though Port Arthur has "by far the greatest natural strength," it is "contracted in area and contracted in depth," while Wei-hai-wei, "though not very extensive, undoubtedly does under certain circumstances afford accommodation to larger ships and to a larger force than would find a place in its rival on the north side of the gulf." Mr. Balfour added:—"I think it is absolutely beyond question that by taking this port under our protection, by putting the British flag side by side with the Chinese flag in that harbour, we at all events preserve it from being reft from the feeble hands of the sovereign power at Peking, and by so preserving it we prevent the Gulf of Pe-chi-li from falling under the undisputed maritime control of any one Power." Mr. Balfour, after declining to admit that there was anything to apologize for in the conduct of Her Majesty's Government, concluded with a guarded suggestion as to the future, pointing to the possible co-operation of Powers who are interested in protecting China from piecemeal dismemberment:—

"I am not going to throw out any rival prophecies to those of which I have spoken, but I am, for my own part, not ready to admit that China, either by inoculation from outside or by some spontaneous reform from within, is wholly incapable of changing her present unhappy condition for a better one; and while I certainly would not venture to say that such a consummation was impossible, still less would I venture to say that the time may not come when the great Powers primarily interested in the commerce of the world may not feel that their interests draw them together and require them to join in an alliance which no man can resist for the purpose of seeing that China shall not fall a prey to any single exclusive interest."

Sir Edward Grey.

Sir William Harcourt, as titular leader of the Opposition, followed Mr. Balfour in a speech of the more-in-sorrow-than-in-anger order, making several good parliamentary points which were not pressed home. Probably the most significant remarks of the evening fell from Mr. Yerburgh, the Conservative Member for Chester, who has taken a prominent part in organizing the China Committee, which has aimed at stiffening the Government. He stated that "in the speech of the hon. baronet for Berwick (Sir Edward Grey) he did not hear a single word he was able to dissent from, and he believed that speech represented the opinions of the vast majority of the members of the House." The Radical speech which received this remarkable tribute from a Conservative Member

was admirable, far better, we fear, than would be the policy of any Cabinet of which Sir Edward Grey is ever likely to be a member. Apart from his special criticisms, which were unanswerable, Sir Edward Grey made some general observations marked by that mellow wisdom and discriminating command of language which characterizes his speeches:—"The anxiety under which we have been this Session has been exceedingly great. Not, I believe, because we thought danger of war was imminent, but because we have seen for ourselves vast and far-reaching changes beginning in the Far East and progressing at a time when our influence, which ought to be an important factor in determining them, is apparently dormant. It is because we are not sure that the Government have had foresight and grasp in the earliest stages of matters absolutely necessary for British influence, because we have not been sure that decisions were taken as promptly as occasion demanded, because the essence of success in these matters is to prevent things drifting by prompt declaration in clear, plain, unquestionable terms. There had been doubt felt, not merely on the Opposition side of the House, and expressed even more strongly in other quarters, that, great as our power and interests were in the Far East, our influence had not been exercised at critical moments in proportion to the magnitude of those interests or the greatness of our power. It was doubted whether the Government had the energy, mind, and grasp necessary to wield that great power and influence." Sir Edward Grey's peroration was curiously responsive, in certain phrases, to that of Mr. Balfour, and furnishes the country and the Empire with food for serious reflection:—

"What seems to me the outcome of the situation is that we must not in the future use such language as the First Lord of the Admiralty used some time ago about 'splendid isolation.' Isolation is sometimes apt to be mistaken for indifference, and likely to be unsuccessful. We must find a common ground of interest with other Powers. Though we criticize much the Government have done, and though we have felt it necessary to explain why we have suffered anxiety in the course of events, still we have no desire to embarrass the Government in future steps they may have to take in the exceptionally responsible position they now occupy. A Government always has great responsibility, but the responsibility of the present Government is exceptional, and critical issues may be affected not only by mistakes but by omissions. Our confidence can only be given to the Government if they prove—as I think we have a right to expect and to call upon them to prove—that they are clear in their own minds; that in the future they will make clear what they mean; never say anything they do not mean; if they can make it clear to us that they are concentrating their attention upon things that are essential, on things that can be made effective, and if they can convince us, as I hope the course of events may convince us before this Session closes, that they have a policy which is prompt in decision, and not merely the result of a common unanimity among themselves, but a unanimity which has something positive and energetic about it, and which is the outcome of a serious and reasonable purpose, directed by a Government as strongly as though it were directed by a single mind."

ALTERNATIVE POLICIES.

During the debate, of which we have given our readers such a dose, Mr. Curzon complained that one of the speakers, though perpetually finding fault with the Government, never suggested an alternative policy. A painter might as well complain that his critic confined himself to criticism and refused to show him how to paint. Is the criticism deserved is the practical question? However, to oblige Mr. Curzon, we venture to indicate two alternative attitudes which the British Government might have adopted as regards Port Arthur, either of which would have been preferable to the course they have chosen. *Their* policy has consisted in public bluster, futile paper protests, and the acquisition of a second Cyprus. Alternative policy Number One may be described as "the champagne supper policy," as it would probably have ended in a champagne supper with the Russians at Port Arthur. For on the opening of the Chinese question, instead of talking about "war," Sir Michael Hicks-Beach or some other equally pacific member of the Cabinet, could have been put up to explain to the British public that Russia was about to obtain the ice-free port, for which she had made such efforts with the approval and sympathy of the British Government, and that she had promised to build a railway to open out the north of China to the great benefit of British trades, &c., &c. In other words, Russia would have acquired Port Arthur with our goodwill and co-operation. We should have bowed her in. She now holds it in spite of us. Strategically we need have been no worse off than we are now, for the acquisition of a naval base might have been a part of this policy. The second alternative would have been to officially inform China—not from a platform—that while willing to see Russia in possession of an ice-free port, we should regard her occupation of Port Arthur as she had regarded its occupation by the Japanese. Japan would have supported us, the show of force would have been overwhelming, and Russia's influence at Peking would have been killed. As it is, we have exasperated Russia without injuring her prestige, and we may count upon her enmity everywhere. We might have conciliated her, and we could have coerced her, but we have shown ourselves willing to wound but afraid to strike. She has been allowed to order the greatest Sea Power of the world out of Port Arthur than which there could have been nothing more damaging to our political credit throughout the Far East. We are in for a period of perpetual friction with her, and when she has consolidated her strength she will not hesitate to use it. No reader of Mr. Curzon's book can doubt but that either of the policies we propound would have possessed merits not to be found in that with which he is identified. The policy of the stupidest individual is necessarily superior to the policy of the

cleverest committee, and our Far Eastern policy is the handiwork of an exceedingly clever committee. *Hinc illæ lachrymæ.*

ZOLA'S NEW TRIAL.

The Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the Seine Assize Court, condemning Monsieur Zola and the publisher of the *Aurore*, on the ground that the law does not distinguish between civil administration and military tribunals, and that, consequently, the Minister of War could not legitimately take action on behalf of the Court Martial. The entire prosecution became thus annulled. It was satisfactory to the unprejudiced English mind, that has been amazed and scandalized by the proceedings at the Zola trial, to learn that Monsieur Chambareaud, the Judge deputed to report on the appeal, held that the exclusion of evidence on the illegality of the Dreyfus trial on the ground that it had no connection with the Zola case was "open to criticism," also that in the refusal to allow General de Boisdeffre to be questioned on facts he had referred to, which the Court had declared to be irrelevant, it had "violated the rights of the defence." There was great indignation in France at the action of the Court of Appeal. The wisest thing would have been to let the matter rest there. It was, however, open to the Government to revive the question. They permitted the Minister of War to do this, and to convene a Court Martial to consider whether it would institute a fresh prosecution of Monsieur Zola. The decision of this Court Martial was not only that Monsieur Zola should be prosecuted again, but that General Billot should be requested to apply to the Grand Chancellor for the expulsion of Monsieur Zola from the Legion of Honour! The summons served on Monsieur Zola to appear at the Versailles Assizes, on May 23rd, cites only the following paragraph out of Monsieur Zola's six columns of impeachment which appeared in the *Aurore*:—"A court martial has just, by order, ventured to acquit an Esterhazy—an unparalleled blow dealt at all truth, at all justice." The summons to the first trial was ampler than this. Monsieur Zola complains bitterly, and with justice, of this restricted citation, which is obviously designed to restrict evidence and reference to the narrowest ground.

COLONEL SCHWARZKOPPEN'S STATEMENT.

In the meantime a statement is published in the *Siècle* of a gentleman of unimpeachable honour, Count Henry Casella, who quotes what Colonel Panizzardi told him of conversations he had had with Colonel Schwarzkoppen, who was the Military Attaché at the German Embassy in Paris at the time of the famous

alleged bordereau transaction, on which Dreyfus was condemned. Colonel Schwarzkoppen said plainly, "The bordereau does not emanate from Dreyfus." "You are personally persuaded, therefore, that Dreyfus is not guilty?" "Yes," the Colonel replied; "I know he is not guilty." "Who then is the culprit?" asked Colonel Panizzardi. "Did you know Major Esterhazy? He himself has confessed his relations with you. Would it be indiscreet to ask your personal opinion of him?" "I think him capable of anything," replied the Colonel. "On Monday I dined with Colonel Schwarzkoppen, and he, with much frankness, reverted to the Dreyfus question. I seized the opportunity of asking him if it were true that he had manifested his surprise at not receiving the visit of any member of the Dreyfus family. 'Yes,' he said, 'it is true. I have said that and I repeat it. I do not know what I could have done at that date. Perhaps nothing. Perhaps, also, the affair would have taken another turn. The whole thing is very sad. I have my share of anxieties, believe me.' I then asked him why should not the German Government say definitely that Dreyfus is innocent; the culprit is such or such a one. He replied: 'It is not for us to accuse, and the French Government cannot by diplomatic methods ask us whether Esterhazy is or is not guilty. We can do only what we have already done spontaneously—that is, to declare, as is the truth, that we never had any relations with ex-Captain Dreyfus. But if the French insist on it that Dreyfus is the traitor, we have nothing more to do. The question no longer concerns us." It is currently reported that all the Military Attachés in Paris are acquainted with the true circumstances of the Dreyfus affair, and that nothing but etiquette and the necessities of diplomatic usage and discretion compel them to remain silent. Would it not be possible by the concert of their respective Governments to authorize their evidence being given in favour of an apparently innocent man now imprisoned in the *Ile du Diable*, and undergoing every form of persecution. One form may be instanced. He is the father of a family and is not allowed to receive the letters of his wife. They are first copied out and corrected by a prison official.

THE ADVANCE IN THE SOUDAN.

THE colossal blunder of retiring from the Soudan in 1885 was not without its excuses. The Government, and especially its chief, had in hand such an accumulation of proof of the iniquity which had marked Egyptian rule—"the rule of the Turks" the natives called it—that it jumped to the conclusion the people of the Upper Nile Valley were "rightly struggling to be free," though there was even then ample evidence that the rule of the already dead Mahdi and that of his successor, the Khalifa Abdullah el Taashi, was, in comparison to Egyptian rule, as a whip of scorpions to a whip of raw hide, or as a knout to a kourbash. Then there was the threatening aspect of affairs on the Indian Frontier with Russia on the move, and it did not seem that we could spare the troops to remain in the Nile Valley for the moment. There were various other more or less cogent reasons for a policy of prudence in the early summer of that year, reasons which were not altogether on the surface or visible to the general public at the time. To say this is not in any way to excuse the abnegation of duty which was committed, but only to put on record as a preface to what is to come the fact that there was a *primâ facie* reason for what was done. It should not be forgotten either that Lord Salisbury's first Cabinet came into office in time to arrest the mischief before it had gone far, and that it practically accepted the situation created for it by its predecessors; nay, that between Midsummer Day, 1885, when it came into power, and the spring of 1896, when it reversed the whole policy of the Nile Valley, it had been in office some seven years altogether at intervals. And during that time it acquiesced, as part of the price of the Unionist Alliance, in a policy of "as you were," with a further limit at Sarras than the "recognized" frontier at Wady Halfa. What fighting there was during all these eleven years was fighting on a purely defensive basis. It involved great forethought in the adaptation of means to ends, and it remained, notwithstanding, a heavy burden on Egyptian finances. Nothing could have been more economical or effective within its limits than the

military administration of Sirdars Sir Evelyn Wood, Sir Francis Grenfell, and Sir Horatio Herbert Kitchener. Every para was looked at half a dozen times before it was spent. There was not a man or a boy kept on duty who could be done without; the utmost risks, in my judgment, were run in order to relieve the Egyptian Treasury of the cost of British officers who could possibly be dispensed with. But a time came when the Unionist Members of the Cabinet became as convinced as its Tory Members had been that it was impossible for Egypt any longer to bear the strain of the presence as a permanent threat of a brutal, barbarous, irreconcilable horde always menacing its frontier, and that Egypt had the right to demand from England as her protecting Power a relief from this ever present danger and the restoration of territories which, though they had not paid in the past, had failed to pay chiefly on account of peculation by "Turkish"—though, indeed, both Christian and Mussulman and native—officials, and by the want of enterprise born of unsettled political conditions. It is, to my own mind, a question even now, looking at the Nile Valley with some peculiar experiences of it, afloat in my own whaler and ashore, whether it will pay Egypt enough for a quarter of a century to make it pecuniarily worth her while to do what we are making her do. But there can be no doubt whatever that, whether it pays her to go to Khartoum or not, it was a necessity to go, and this partly because she would be stifled by the Dervish hordes on her borders, and partly because she must be the mistress, she or her protecting Power, of the vital sources of her wealth, her existence even.

So when the third Government of the Marquis of Salisbury entered upon its first real session with a majority so large as to leave it no excuse for failing to do its clear duty for fear of consequences in home politics, the word was given to do what had long been waiting to be done. The excuse afforded was the defeat of the Italian force at Adowa by the Abyssinians, our inability to see our ally who had relieved us of the burden of Kassala too hardly pressed, and the increased activity of the Dervishes who had already been twice or three times hurled back from their prey in the Delta but seemed ready to come on again. If there had not been one excuse there would have had to be another, for the thing had to be begun before long.

When it was begun, it was with insufficient materials. The British garrisons of Cairo and Alexandria had, three years earlier, under the Gladstone Government, been increased by two battalions, but no attempt was made to stiffen the Egyptian army of about 16,000 men, really as much a gendarmerie as a military force, by an admixture of English troops. Such as they were, and there

were very grave doubts about the sturdiness of the Fellaheen battalions in general, and the cavalry in particular, Kitchener had to do his best with them, for so long as he did not meet with a reverse there was little prospect held out to him of other help that he could get from a number of most carefully selected brother officers. His first step was to begin the repair of the railway, which had been made before the abandonment as far beyond Sarras as the Dal series of rapids, through the Batn-el-hagar, or belly of rocks, the most savage and desolate region my eyes have seen in travels in four continents. It was given out, for what purpose is unknown since it deceived nobody, that Akasheh, near the southern end of this chaotic mass of boulders, was the present objective of the expedition. But soon that shallow pretence was abandoned, and the real object of the move avowed. This was to continue the rail up to a point beyond Hannek, the nominal Third Cataract, from which there was water unbroken by rocks up to Dongola, or El Ordeh, the former capital of the only province above Assouan that used to produce a surplus for the Cairo Treasury. The construction, or to a large extent re-construction, of the line was not unwatched or unopposed by the Dervishes. On the May Day—somehow Kitchener's fights are generally on a notable day—there was a stout fight near Akasheh, in which the Dervishes got badly mauled. But there was a worse foe at hand than the Dervishes. For years together this section of country is practically rainless, though the deeply worn nullahs, or khors, show that when rain does come it is in irresistible torrents. These washed away a very large part of the line, and undid the toil of weeks. Then cholera and enteric fever struck the camps, and for awhile it looked, as our grandmothers would have said, as if there were no blessing on the work. But it was persevered with manfully, and just above the Dal rapids, at a place called Ferkeh, or Firket, where the Dervishes had taken up an excellent position in considerable force, they were thoroughly worsted and driven back on Dongola on June 7th—Whitsun Monday. Over three months of severe work followed, and it was not until September that an advance could be made on Dongola itself. From this ruined city, one of the few localities in the Soudan where there is a fertile neighbourhood—for commonly there is far from one acre in ten thousand that can be expected to grow a stalk of dhurra or cotton —a message of success was flashed to the Queen the very day she passed the period of the previous longest reign in British history. Once more the Egyptian flag flew over the best region of the Nile after an interval of eleven years, and the success had been achieved solely by native troops, many of them belonging to one of the most timid races of the world, and all of them, at the outset, entertain-

ing a fixed belief that they were no match for the Mahdists. No greater triumph of English organization is recorded in history.

But now there was to be a new departure. A governor of the Frontier or Dongola Province, Colonel, now General, Hunter, was appointed; and it was resolved to give up, at any rate for the time, the construction of a railway by Debbeh across the Bayuda Desert, or Steppe, to Khartoum. A certain quantity of material had been collected at Dongola for this railway even before Lord Wolseley's expedition in 1884, and on the evacuation it fell into the hands of the Dervishes. Now it was resolved to make no further advance in this direction beyond establishing a few posts of natives who, disgusted with the fearful tyranny of the Khalifa, were wishing themselves well back under the rule they had formerly hated, and willingly took up the patrol work of watching the ends of the desert routes from Khartoum and Metemneh. Subsequently, these posts were strengthened by regular soldiers. A portion of the victorious troops fell back upon their base at Wady Halfa, a portion began a move up the great water way. Some day, perhaps, Wady Halfa may be connected by rail with Assouan, but it has not been necessary to make that line yet as the water carriage to Halfa is open, though sometimes with enough difficulty, all the year round. Even if the line is made, it is the conviction of most of us who know the river well that it will not even mainly follow the bank, but take a run through the desert to join, in the vicinity of Bir Sufir, the line of the Soudan military railway which has been pushed on with truly remarkable speed through the waterless desert south-east from Wady Halfa to Abu Hamed, thus cutting off the biggest bend of the Nile over a terrain, in which scarcely a shrub grows, of over two hundred miles. This rail does not follow even for a mile the old line to Sarras and Akasheh and the Third Cataract. It climbs a slow and gradual ascent to a plateau where it runs in a straight line for fifty miles. The line was begun without much hope of finding water along it, but at 77, and again at 126 miles, the search for a water stratum was successful. And at both places the supply was good in quality and abundant in quantity at reasonable depths. There are no habitations, no animal, little insect, and scarcely any vegetable life on the 236 miles between Wady Halfa and Abu Hamed. Nor is there any probability there ever will be any dwellings other than the few huts that have been put up to shelter the men attending to the wells, the pumps, and the tanks, who are not allowed to settle there, but go back for a few days at a time to their families at Halfa. Thence to Abu Hamed is about five hundred miles by river, and less than two hundred and forty by rail. Preceding the iron road, and following the river a good part of the way, General Hunter took from

Dongola a compact force in the height of the summer of last year, knowing that the Dervishes had sealed the desert track from Korosko at Abu Hamed. He had a fight or two on the way, but steadily drew near his goal. A few miles below Abu Hamed he, after more than two months' effort, obtained a position in which he could safely laager his transport under a guard, and then, on the morning of the 7th August, he took to the desert through a bit of dom-palm scrub bordering the gravelly plateau, and made his appearance soon after dawn on the high land at the back of the wretched village which was the starting-point across the Nubian Desert for Korosko. There was an affair sharp, indeed, but short, and before breakfast-time Hunter was master of this most important point, past which, well within six months, a British brigade was carried by rail to a camp yet eighteen miles further on the road to Berber.

Never in this world before was such a railway so made at such a rate. From the time the steel rails are landed at Alexandria never a horse helps. Everything is done by human agency. At various points, where the rails are shifted from water to land, or land to water, chain-gangs of apparently well-contented convicts are employed, rags their clothing by day and night, and a morsel of bread, flavoured with onions or garlic, their food. They handle the heavy rails deftly and with little apparent effort, loading or unloading steamers, big sailing craft, railway waggons, in an uncommonly short space of time. But they do not make the railway. That is the duty of the railway battalions, of which there are now two, one having been added in the last three months. These are regularly enlisted soldiers, getting the same meagre pay as other native soldiers, a trifle more food, a little more tobacco, but wearing no uniform, so that at a little distance they are undistinguishable from the chain-gangs as the ragged clothing of neither would fetch the price of old rags in the meanest junk-shop. They grade the willing soil. This is a sandy gravel, hard on the top, but readily worked when the shovel is once through the crust. Two gangs start about ten yards apart, following a stretched cord. They dig a shallow trench, throwing what comes out of it towards each other right and left, except when the wind blows very strongly, and then they work only to windward. The trench is seldom more than a foot deep, few are the cuttings for the line—that is, it is seldom below the level of the plateau,—and not many of the embankments are above a foot high. One battalion can grade two miles a day. When the rails and sleepers arrive they are whipped off the waggons as though it were sport for a holiday. Under the eye of a native ganger the sleepers are quickly laid, and rails pinned down to them with singular rapidity. Thus, after the grading is done,

the railway is completed at the average rate of a mile and a half a day, save where a khor or ravine has to be bridged, and these are incredibly few in the desert; indeed, I think there is only one iron bridge between Wady Halfa and Berber, a distance of 300 miles and more. Where there does chance to be a cutting the small hill is generally hurdled to prevent the sand drifting down on to the line. Chairs are only used at points, and the side tracks are mostly triangles, which serve the purpose at once of a side-track and a turn-table.

Although the locomotives are heavy and the train-loads sometimes exceed 200 tons, accidents by running off the line are very few in number, and each train carries screw-jacks and other appliances, so that no great difficulty is experienced in getting an engine on again. The telegraph is freely used, and, owing to the dry climate, the wires work admirably, though they sometimes in gales get tangled at stations as they are not strained so tightly as in Europe.

In the last days of 1897 the Intelligence Department (admirably organized under Colonel Wingate Bey and Slatin Pacha) which has its spies in every Dervish force, and which knows, in a few days at most, the secret counsels of the Khalifa himself as well as every military movement almost before it has begun, learnt that Omdurman and its advance posts at Metemneh and Shendy were gathering water-skins for a large expedition. A few days later it was known that the Dervish objective was Berber, with a view to an attack on the rapidly-advancing railway, and to punish the people of that straggling town for having made common cause with "the Turks." Application was at once made for British troops. Steps were taken to promptly concentrate a four-battalion brigade on Abu Hamed, and the news that British troops were not only on the way, but had actually arrived at Abu Hamed, was, somewhat before the realization of the fact, carefully made known in Berber, where the Dervishes naturally have their own sources of information, as, indeed, they have in Cairo itself. At once the Dervish advance was stopped, and the Emir Mahmoud, a near relative of the Khalifa, returned for instructions. This gave time for the brigade to be got up to railhead, then about eighteen miles south of Abu Hamed, and for the arrival of General Gatacre and his staff from Aldershot and India. By the time we arrived at the camp the Dervish expedition appeared to have been abandoned, but the troops were kept out in order to train them for the work of the summer and autumn, while other troops were sent forward to Cairo and Alexandria, in some cases intercepted on their return from India in the usual course of relief. Everything settled down, and the Sirdar even proceeded north to meet Lord Cromer, when news came that the Dervish advance had been resumed. At

once the troops were concentrated to the front, the British brigade, which was to have marched light about once a fortnight twenty miles on to keep pace with the railway, making a forced march right up to Berber in admirable order and condition, and so on to near the Atbara, which the Sirdar had fully made up his mind not to be tempted to cross with his infantry until the rise of the Nile, beginning at the earliest in June, enabled him to get more gunboats of a new type up, and until his railway was completed above the so-called Fifth Cataract, so as to give a clear run of water for the steamers from railhead to the Shabluka Cataract, and, with that exception, to Khartoum. Mahmoud burnt at least a portion of Metemneh, and by crossing to Shendy, in doing which we destroyed part of his boats, put the river between himself and his proper line of retreat on his base at Omdurman. He fortified Shendy in a fashion, but left no guns there to man the works. Meanwhile, his delays had enabled every preparation to be made for receiving him. A fort built at the junction of the Nile and the Atbara was provisioned for two months and placed in charge of the Fellaheen brigade, the least trustworthy in the field of the Sirdar's force, but good enough it was thought behind such a fortification as is made by Nile mud and abattis of thorn-bushes. An advance depôt was formed a few miles farther north, and some camel transport, fortunately hired at the beginning of February at Wady Halfa, was added to the far from large train at the Sirdar's disposal, and not too soon; for from railhead to Berber and back was a week's journey for the camels, and there was to be fed at and beyond Berber not only 12,000 men, but 3,500 of them Englishmen, who do not thrive on pulse.

When Mahmoud arrived within striking distance of the Atbara, he found his way to Berber was effectually barred. And so he drew off up the Atbara to some thick scrub, very rare in the Nile basin, where he entrenched himself in several lines from the high ground of the desert down to the bed of the enriching stream, now a series of detached pools. As he would not come on, Kitchener sought to spur him. He sent his gunboats with a battalion and some friendlies belonging to the district up to Shendy, where Mahmoud had provided himself a kind of rallying point in case of defeat. Shendy he utterly destroyed, leaving Mahmoud in the air. Had he been a European, in these desperate circumstances Mahmoud would probably have fallen back up the Atbara on Adarama and on Gos Rejeb, and tried an attack on Kassala, for he was well assured the Sirdar had not transport to pursue far. Parsons Pacha would in that case have been in undoubted danger at Kassala, where he had only one Egyptian battalion and a few thousand local levies. But Mahmoud had no

stomach for enterprise. He was short of provisions and his people were deserting him daily. He had been sent forward evidently much against his will, or he would not have lost his chance of getting to Berber by referring to Omdurman for instructions. He could only guard his right with his horsemen and sit tight. He would not even be drawn by several reconnaissances up to his very trenches by which the Sirdar learnt all he wanted to know. But until Kitchener got several days' supplies up by his camel train from railhead the Sirdar could not move up to deliver a general attack. And so the adversaries waited facing each other, every day weakening the Emir, every day strengthening the major-general, and, what was more, lengthening the tether which bound him to the Nile and the camel train. At last he had food enough, ammunition enough, and transport enough to deliver an attack without much fear of the consequences. He made his main attack on Good Friday by the high ground, while, at the same time, striking also full at the front. Mahmoud's right was turned, for his horsemen had been driven off by artillery and machine-gun fire, the trenches were entered and swept down to the river, and though the Dervishes made a stout stand as long as they had ammunition, even of a poor sort which could not be depended on over four or five hundred yards, and which they reserved accordingly for close quarters, all was soon over, and the stoutest force of the Khalifa, though far from his whole force, was either killed, wounded, fugitive or prisoners, not half escaping, though that moiety as usual included the once redoubtable slave-dealer, Osman Digna. The pursuit was continued by some cavalry and farther still by the native friendlies, so many of whose relatives have died a thousand deaths under the remorseless tortures of the Madhi Mohammed Ahmed and his successor, Abdullah, and whose motto is to smite and spare not. We shall never know how many these avengers accounted for, and it is better not to enquire. Let the eternal silence of the desert hide their end for ever.

But the work is far from done of whose beginning and continuance some slight sketch has been given. It will not be done even when in the autumn, probably by Michaelmas, we shall be flying the Star and Crescent beside the Union flag over Omdurman and Khartoum. For we cannot stop there. That may be all Egypt is entitled to, or we may admit her right to resume the Equatorial Province. However this may be, we must see to a connection made and maintained with the Nile sources. The whole valley must be under one authority before our work is done. Roddy Owen, on whom be Peace! planted the Union flag at

Wadelai. Manifest destiny calls us to meet it there from the north.

Up till the present nearly everything has worked out just as the Sirdar foresaw; not quite. His desert march in the 1896 move on Dongola was a prodigious bit of work that tried the troops far too high and left them without energy enough to meet an active enemy if one had been encountered at the southern end. The fact is Kitchener is a man of such iron will and iron frame that he reckons everybody ought to be as tireless as himself. There are few men in the world who can live up to his standard. He was mistaken in supposing Mahmoud was not coming on to Berber, but he prepared just as though the Dervishes were coming on. He is very cautious and very daring. And he has the defects of his high qualities. He has a conspicuous talent in the selection of just the sort of men that he wants. In this direction I cannot recall a single mistake he has made—one, perhaps, but there antecedents within his personal knowledge fully justified his selection. There have been grumbles about his treatment of the Press correspondents. I not only have nothing to complain of, but I am bound to say I have been asked to do nothing that is not well within the lines of the very necessary rules laid down in *The Soldier's Pocket-Book*. Kitchener has a personal dislike to gossip about coming things, but he has always given facilities for recording accomplished facts, and he has the best of reasons for not letting the anti-English gang at Cairo know, even through the home Press, what he has in contemplation. If I am to speak of the man as I find him, it can only be said that with me he has been frank and communicative as regards his future plans up to Khartoum, and such confidence must be held sacred seeing it involves the safety of precious lives. In one case in which there was a big stroke the correspondents did not see, Kitchener is entirely free from blame. One of the most enterprising of my colleagues admitted in my presence that it was through no fault of the Sirdar that the Press representatives were not on the spot.

Now the troops are retired to healthier camps than those in and near Berber save such a force as is necessary to watch the river and to hold the town. As I write, the Sirdar has come down the river to inspect his lines of communication and to get in closer touch with the Egyptian War Office, for though an amusing correspondent of *The Times* the other day assumed there is no Egyptian War Office, anyone in the capital knows better, and knows, too, that it does a great deal of work before our War Office clerks are out of their suburban beds. There is much to do before operations are resumed at Nile rise. And it has

to be decided whether there is to be another British brigade sent up for the advance on Khartoum. I am sure, if Kitchener had to decide the point, he, on the score of food and forage only, would prefer to do the remainder of the work substantially with the men he has. But as it is not likely Egypt can raise and provide for more troops at present, or that if they were raised they could be trained in time, a second British or an Indian brigade appears to be indispensable to the sureness of the operations of the autumn on the Nile. One thing is at length settled. Kitchener will be left to finish the work he has so well done up till now.

CHARLES WILLIAMS.

SURPRISE IN WAR, FROM A MILITARY AND A NATIONAL POINT OF VIEW.*

THE object of every strategist is to arrange his plans and his marches some time before the decisive battle actually takes place, so that, if the enemy loses the battle, the enemy will be placed in a perilous position, his line of communications will be threatened, and he will continue his operations at a considerable disadvantage; or, on the other hand, if his own army loses the battle, he can retire in safety, fall back upon a new position or a new base, and continue his operations with some prospect of ultimate success. All wise plans of campaign are illustrations of these principles. When we come to tactics, or the incidents of the day of a decisive battle, the object is to turn, if possible, the defeat of the enemy into a ruinous rout, so that the beaten army may be driven away from its base and supplies, cut to pieces, or compelled to capitulate. To put the enemy off his guard at the true point of attack, or, in other words, to surprise him, is the best method of securing these results.

Arminius cautiously handled his attacking forces while Varus was retiring from the Weser to the Rhine, till the Romans got into the defiles of the Teutoberger Wald; there he let loose all the converging Germans on the invader, destroyed his legions, and shook the prestige of Rome among the peoples of the North. Thus Cromwell, when Leslie left his strong position at Dunbar, enveloped him in the plain, conquered Scotland, and enslaved its soldiery. Thus the wily Moreau, in 1800, enticed the columns of the Archduke John into the woods of Hohenlinden and subdued South Germany.

So Napoleon, at Austerlitz, deceived the Austrians and Russians into attacking his right, and while he broke the left or inner flank, no small portion of the allies were drowned in the Satschan

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Lake, and the old German Empire, which had lasted since the days of Charlemagne, came to an end.

Wellington, at Vittoria in 1813, while attacking Joseph in front on the Zadora, sent General Graham against his right on the St. Sebastian road; Joseph lost all his baggage and 151 out of 152 guns. The French retired from the Iberian Peninsula, having lost in their efforts to annex it 250,000 men.

Thus the Afghans, in 1842, hovered over the British retiring from Cabul, till they entered the Khood Cabul Pass; then the sons of the mountains swooped down upon them, and out of 14,000 only one survived to tell the story of destruction.

In the campaign of Virginia, 1864, all Grant's tactics were based on the hope that he could cut General Lee on the inward or right flank, and, therefore, interpose between him and Richmond. Week after week he delivered tremendous blows against his opponent's line from the woods of the Wilderness to the River Chickahominy. But all in vain; Lee was not to be surprised. He constantly closed in on his right and presented a fresh front, with well secured communications, to every assault of his adversary.

In August, 1870, when MacMahon's flank march ended after the defeat of Beaumont, the Germans were not content with interposing between him and Bazaine; they also cut him off from his line of retreat to Paris, and when three of their corps joined hands south of the Belgian frontier, between Iges and Givonne, the disaster of Sedan amazed Europe, and 83,000 Frenchmen went as prisoners to Germany.

I will not be very careful to draw the line between strategic and tactical surprise for the remainder of the lecture. To plan operations before the day of the battle is the duty of the strategist; to manœuvre on the battlefield is the duty of the tactician.

It seems, however, probable that the days of great strategic surprises on the Continent of Europe are over. Such movements as those of Marlborough and Napoleon from the Rhine and the Alps into the very heart of Germany or Italy, overrunning vast extents of territory before a decisive battle, are not likely soon to recur. The reasons are that armies are tied to railways, and each terminus of each great railway line near the frontier tells its own story of the direction of the operations. Again, the electric telegraph circulates information so rapidly that surprise will be the result of lack of preparation rather than of bewilderment because of lack of information. The Press is ubiquitous—I refer not only to the powerful leading journals—with their numerous agents and their enormous expenditure; the small and local Press to be found in every little town is almost as fatal to secrecy. Then

there is the influence of commerce; leading business houses have eager agents in every part of the world. All must be keen to procure any news that would enhance the profits or diminish the losses of their principals. War news is most valuable and worth any money to skilful financial enterprise.

Brilliant strategic conceptions of a far-reaching character may be out of date in Europe; the first point would seem to be to get through the first barrier, to get between the fortresses which stand in the way of invasion.

Here surprise, of course, would prove of much assistance, but it is difficult in the extreme. If you look at any of Artaria's military maps you will see that surprise is difficult when armies are very numerous, mobilization very rapid, and frontier defences very frequent. From the commencement of the war the armies confront each other very closely, and the scope for turning movements is very small. A preliminary operation will be to push through the frontier line. To elude the enemy's main body by flank movements on both sides of the original line of advance, and rapid massing of troops, will be the prelude to desperate battles which will speedily follow. After each important battle, of course, new strategical combinations and developments will arise, and the element of surprise may well resume some part of its old influence. All flank marches and flank attacks owe much of their effect to conditions favourable to surprise; secrecy in council and celerity of execution are the mainsprings of success. The enemy must be deceived by elaborate diplomacy; hard lying by word of mouth and the making of lies by deceptive movements and feints, are vital matters in the art of war. A skilful officer deceives the enemy, and begins by deceiving most of his friends. Elaborate dissimulation, false marches, complicated machinery of deceit, are all splendid instruments of surprise. Hannibal's whole career was one series of brilliant ruses. Marlborough, in 1704, threw dust in the eyes of all Europe, with the exception of one Englishman, Godolphin, and one Dutchman, Heinsius. His plans were elaborately veiled till the very moment of their execution. His passage of the lines *ne plus ultra* was one of the finest stratagems in history. Jackson had only one confidant, a clergyman, the Rev. Dr. Dabney, and deliberately deceived his officers only the evening before as to some scheme for the next dawn. Napoleon's audacity in deception caused the secretaries who were writing his despatches to drop their pens in sheer amazment. When Sherman was marching through Georgia, 1864, he cut himself adrift from friend and foe, and his appearance at Savannah on the Atlantic coast seemed as marvellous to the people of

Washington as to those of Richmond. The Germans thought Chanzy was going southward in December, 1870, when he was really westward on the right of their own line. I remember being informed, with full detail, of how Lord Wolseley proposed to disembark at Damietta when he was in reality entering the Suez Canal. The surprise of Arabi was worked out very cleverly for a long time in advance, as General Maurice proves.

Flank movements are particularly successful against half-trained or uncivilized armies. The apparition of artillery and cavalry, even without many infantry, on their line of retreat, makes them dissolve like an American camp meeting. When Lee's guns suddenly enfiladed Pope's corps at the second Battle of Bull Run the Federals crowded in confusion to the rear.

To change front under fire seems to be almost impossible for any but highly-trained troops. The Federals would not budge out of a strong position, as was proved by the repulse of all Lee's attacks at Gettysburg, but they never held out against a well-timed surprise on the flank. Nor can highly-organized and veteran troops afford to be caught napping in any part of their line. The Austrian soldiers were good, and in spite of the needle-gun, they were more than holding their own in front on the Bistritz, July 3rd, 1866, when the unexpected occupation by the Prussian Guard of the village of Chulm on the right flank brought about their complete defeat.

We have been long accustomed in England to read diatribes against our cavalry for not giving timely information, not reconnoitring, preventing surprise, not scouting along every possible avenue of approach on either flank as well as in front. I hope our cavalry will remember all this good advice; if they do no British force can ever be surprised; but what has always puzzled me in reading Continental campaigns is the little utility of hordes of cavalry in regard to reconnoitring. We may be bad; they are worse. Napoleon was surprised on June 18th by the Prussians, though he had the fine troopers of Milhand, Kellermann, Guyot, Le Febre Desnouettes, Jaquinot, Subervie, at his disposal. Why could not some few squadrons have found out what might appear on the right flank? It was found out when too late. When the British Guard repulsed part of the French Guard and Pirch's Prussians drove another part of the French Guard out of Planchennoit Napoleon was ruined. Surely, reconnoitring on the 17th as to the Prussian line of retreat, and on the 18th as to the Prussian line of advance, might have prevented such an utter catastrophe. The French cavalry did nothing to prevent the surprises at Rezon or at Beaumont in 1870. The German cavalry

gave no information to prevent advanced guards beginning serious actions at Spicheren or Woerth

In the Loire campaigns I fail to see how the German cavalry were the eyes of the army. They gave little information about the true state of the case after the second occupation of Orleans. Prince Frederick Charles was quite at sea as to the roads by which the French were operating on several occasions.

For every blunder with regard to possible surprises made by British cavalry, whether in war time or in peace time, I undertake to produce three blunders made by the crack cavalry of the Continent. No cavalry did better as scouts, or as searching hostile lines, or raiding, than the Confederate cavalry, 1862; and Stuart, Ashby, and Morgan surprised the enemy again and again. On the other hand, the Federal cavalry leaders, Grierson and Forrest were equally active. Surprises and raids by cavalry have not been usual in Europe since Murat's time—he went 840 miles in six weeks in the Jena campaign. A small Russian cavalry force under Gourko raided south of the Balkans at the beginning of the Russo-Turkish war in 1877-78. As to the cavalry action of the rest of the Russian cavalry, their vast numbers produced no effect on either the strategy or tactics of their opponents. Malleson's book on Surprises is very good, and contains references to Innsbruck when Charles V. was surprised by Maurice of Saxony, the surprise of the Prussians by the Austrians at Maxen, and the repulse by our soldiers of the Russian night surprise at Inkerman.

Some of the most celebrated surprises in this century were:—

Napoleon in Italy, 1800.

Napoleon in Germany, 1805.

Napoleon in Champagne, 1814.

Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley, 1862.

Jackson and Lee against Pope, 1862.

Lord Roberts at the Peiwar Kotal, 1878.

Lord Wolseley at Tel-el-Kebir and the capture of Cairo, 1882.

Now, with regard to surprise from the national point of view, it seems strange indeed that any community which has gone to all the trouble involved in establishing a condition of civilization, the accumulation of vast stores of fixed and circulating capital, the construction of numerous and costly private and public edifices, the skilful cultivation of the soil, and providing the multitudinous agencies of opulence, should run the risk of losing all or any considerable part thereof through the neglect of military preparations against the time of danger. It seems, I say, incredible; especially when every race could easily learn from history the inevitable

consequence of the loss of military power, or of forgetfulness of the fundamental conditions of National safety, which are the will to fight and the power to fight, preparation for the fight, and an ample supply of all the necessary materials for success in the fight, food, horses, weapons, as well as discipline and skill. But the sons of opulence are also the children of ease; regular and strenuous exertions are distasteful to persons pampered by generations of prosperity and luxury. A poor rising man is often very careful to provide for posterity, and to insure out of his small earnings, and to have his children properly reared and educated; he looks to the future. The wealthy man often lives rather for the present, and is less concerned about the careers of his offspring; they will do well enough; "let the world slide," but it sometimes slides the wrong way, and his family degenerates and decays.

Whatever the cause, history is one continuous record of the fatal results to any community of national surprise. The exigencies of the commercial position of a "nation of shop-keepers" have, since the days of Elizabeth, compelled us to keep, on the whole, a fairly good navy; thus Britons have been secure against a ruinous surprise, and, as long as we were a self-supporting insular state, we could live out a few months of surprise; for no one could reach us before that time; we suffered much, but we could hold on till we had pulled ourselves together. We are no longer an insular power, as we cannot live on the produce of our isles for half a year; we depend on all the world for our means of subsistence, and our frontiers now touch those of our neighbours in several parts of the world—in Africa, America and Asia. We cannot for the future risk any surprises; if we are weak as compared with any two of our neighbours, we can be utterly ruined in three months. Nor will our wealth save us. Blucher considered London as good for plunder, and aspiring young soldiers on the Continent make clever calculations as to how much financial bleeding we could stand. We cannot any longer afford conditions of unreadiness such as prevailed in 1755-6 and 1793-5 without the risk of peace at any price, with an enormous fine in money and the loss of some of our most valuable possessions. A temporary loss of our means of communication, even without a serious defeat, would mean to us terrible loss and deprivation. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary to put our army and navy in good order, and to keep them in good order. Our flabby and timid diplomacy, our many concessions in recent times are at home explained by our philosophic humanitarianism, our love of peace, our neighbourly sympathies, but foreigners ascribe our amiability to cowardice or an apprehension of disaster because of our military deficiencies.

I rejoice to observe that all classes of our people are at last

awakening to the true state of our case. If we cannot have both the Navy and the Army sufficient and efficient it will be due as much to official incompetence as to national indifference. The Press and the people are awaking from the stupid torpor of the Manchester school.

The fate of ancient and powerful civilizations, whose stupendous works of art are still standing in solitary sublimity amidst awful deserts, swamps or forests, or mounting sentinels, as it were, at strategic sites by famous rivers, must make us pause. From those early days when the Medes and Persians surprised the first of great historic communities during a Bacchanalian revelry, even until Japan shook China out of its secular sleep in the arms of a complacent philosophy, it has ever been the same.

The strong man armed has forced the house of the inert, and kept it till he in turn became inert.

It is melancholy in the extreme to read of the fate of the Persian monarchy—how Alexander, at the head of less than two modern army corps, traversed it in a few years from end to end. The frame of the body politic was large, but the soul was feeble; and after the surprise of the Cicilian gates, the last Darius, flying in despair, met death at the hands of a subject. The inroads of Goths, such as Alaric, and Huns, like Attila, were startling surprises to the people of Italy, who, confident in their legions of strange mercenaries, and in the tribute of many a subject realm, turned from arms to games, and only tolerated a Cæsar who pampered their idleness.

That the sons of the desert, inspired by the fierce fanaticism of the Prophet and his successors should, with no resources except mere valour, be able to overwhelm in a few generations Persia, Palestine, Asia Minor, Egypt, carry their creed to the Oxus and the Jaxartes, and, crossing into Europe at the pillars of Hercules, surprise the troops of Charlemagne at the defile of Roncesvalles, would seem marvellous to all who have not learned that without a strong development of the military spirit in a race, all its resources make it only a sheep in a lion's skin.

For centuries, while the Eastern Empire and the Caliphate of Bagdad were resting on past fame, from between the Caspian and the Aral Seas and the Hindoo Kush fierce warriors rushed through Asia, East and West, over the Euphrates, over the mountains of Suliman, to revel in what was left of the wealth of Asia Minor and to the sack of Delhi. Timourlane brought back booty to Samarkand, but left behind him misery and ruin never since repaired.

The careless Saxons were easily surprised and for ever subdued, in spite of their sea barrier, by William of Normandy, whose

predecessors had harried all the lines of coast from Denmark to Dublin, from the Isle of Wight to the Levant.

The English surprised and ruined the French forces by a very simple stratagem at Poitiers, and did as they pleased in France for a few generations simply because they had an efficient force of infantry, in which the French were deficient.

A singular surprise to all Central Europe was the apparition of Gustavus Adolphus and his host of Swedish and British soldiers carefully trained in tactics, and his decisive interference on the Protestant side in the Thirty Years' War. Here is a splendid example of how a small community may become a leading military state by superior military enterprise and nothing else. Sweden gained a high political position in consequence, and held it firmly for nearly a hundred years, till the death of Charles XII.,

> "Who left a name at which the world grew pale,
> To point a moral and adorn a tale."

The period of Frederick the Great and the wars of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years' War was fertile in every kind of strategic and tactical surprise, not only in Europe, but also under British naval and military officers in America and India; but I have not time to dwell on these. However, Carlyle and multitudes of German writers have voiced the merits of Frederick loudly enough, and fortunately a popular and eloquent writer, Macaulay, has given William Pitt fair play. The public know something about his policy and his heroes. Perhaps some other historical enthusiast, fired with admiration of our past, may in time arise to chronicle our other glories.

I must now for a while dwell upon a most singular series of national surprises in a very short period of years—twenty-two years in all. The events of the French Revolutionary period can scarcely be paralleled by Zenghis Khan and Timourlane, because the modern nations of Northern and Western Europe were of proved valour and far from degenerate, like the victims of the Tartars. The French Revolution was a new power of a new species. It adopted conscription for the first time in modern history; moreover, it used all the resources of the state for military purposes, it was indifferent to bankruptcy, it was merciless and fanatical; in the ranks of its army a career was opened for talent. The brave but methodical and old-fashioned armies of its neighbours collapsed at once.

The Rhine was passed. Belgium was annexed, Holland was subjugated, Italy was plundered, Egypt was conquered, Switzerland was made a base of operations—all in six years. A pause then ensued, and Napoleon, of the same type as Alexander, in spite

of his failure in Syria, and the imprisonment of his Eastern army by the British fleet, reaped the fruit of his renown. Italy was conquered again, 1800; all South Germany overrun, 1800; the Army re-organized, 1804; an invasion of England planned, 1804-5; South Germany traversed, 1805; Vienna taken, 1805; Berlin taken, and the Prussian monarchy knocked to pieces, 1806; the stolid Russian infantry driven back to the Nieman, 1807—all in seven years. What a series of national surprises! So much for the power of the hero compared with whose gigantic efforts the toils of lawyers, wire-pullers and philosophers are only worthy of pigmies. How did all those surprises come about. The Republican generals and Napoleon and his marshals were ready and smart; their opponents were unready and slow. Why speak of the remainder of the career of Napoleon, "the greatest, not the worst, of men, whose spirit, antithetically mixed, was extreme in all things." As he had no sea-power he could not surprise Great Britain. We assumed the offensive after Trafalgar, won as many Colonies as we pleased to take, and placed our ever victorious army in the Peninsula. He could not surprise Russia; not even by the destruction of its ancient capital were its vast areas seriously compromised. Great Britain and Russia, by inflicting crushing losses on this mighty leader, gave other nations time to recover themselves, and by the pressure of the whole weight of Europe he was forced to his doom. His brilliant career, itself one continued series of surprises from Toulon to Arcis and Charleroi, illustrating all the marvels of intellectual capacity and military organization, collapsed before the energy, resolution and wealth of Great Britain and the resolution, courage and poverty-stricken wintry solitudes of Russia. Wealth is not the chief thing; poverty is not the greatest drawback; patriotism, resolution and military energy are the life-blood of States.

But a nation may collapse without any foreign invasion. Some sudden domestic difficulty may utterly paralyze its ordinary arrangements, and if it has not then a sound system of government, supported by an awe-inspiring military force, it may drift into chaos, or only be restored to its normal condition after a disastrous civil war. The South American Republics can scarcely be called responsible institutions since they separated from Spain; they might be rich and great—they are a series of ephemeral governments depending upon paltry *coups d'etat.* Their wars are frequent and objectless; their revolutions base; their whole system corrupt and degrading.

In the middle of this century leaders of political opinion in the United States of America were like other political dreamers for whom the past had no lessons; they ardently expected the arrival

of the millennium like our Exhibition enthusiasts in 1851. The Crimean War, the Solferino Campaign, did not disabuse them; they only thought less than before of military Europeans, who were lost in admiration of the barbaric pride, pomp, and circumstance of brutal war. But a change came over the spirit of the dream of the Northern folk when the surprise of the first battle of Bull Run awakened them to the truth of the old maxim, that if you wish peace you must prepare for war. They had no proper military system, they had not prepared for disturbance in time of peace, and they had war with a vengeance. Their Capital was threatened forthwith.

In the midst of a war they had to organize and equip an army; nor could that army crush what might have been a petty insurrection, had the Federal States possessed four good army corps in 1861, till they had buried 500,000 men in national cemeteries and spent £1,000,000,000 in four years.

Now, I shall read the following extract to show you why any non-military state is like China; I quote from the *Illustrated American*:—

"How like to China in some things we are after all. Germany seizes one of China's seaports, and China hardly makes a protesting sound. She keeps silent because she cannot resist, and it seems more dignified to acquiesce with seeming immobility than to set up a ridiculously feeble squeak like a trapped mouse. Yet China is the most multitudinous nation on earth. She has riches and resources untold. Her men, with training, might make very fair soldiers. Without feeling the expense, she could have fortified every port and bought a fleet equal to the entire Naval strength of Germany, and infinitely more formidable, because so close to the base of supplies and repair. But China has no military patriotism. Her government is too sleepy to comprehend the danger, or too senile to meet it.

"We have plenty of patriotism, but do we make a much better showing materially? Japan's great navy could wipe our Pacific squadron from the seas, and shell San Francisco before our North Atlantic squadron could double Cape Horn. A concentration of the superior German navy could overwhelm our Atlantic fleet by sheer force of numbers, while German transports could land at any one of a dozen of our smaller Atlantic ports a disciplined army. . . . A similar coalition of European Powers against us could exact its own terms in a single fortnight from nearly all our sea-coast cities, if not from the nation itself. We are the best fighters in the world, but what have we to fight with? We have illimitable resources for a prolonged war, but modern wars are generally finished in a few weeks. We have a gallant little

fleet, but we have not a dry dock on the Atlantic coast large enough to repair a battleship."

If Little Englanders had their way this argument would soon apply to the United Kingdom.

As Captain Mahan proves, unless Americans can play a leading part in the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea, they will be excluded from the strategy and greater commerce of the future. But they can live well for generations on the products of their soil; we would starve on ours.

Probably gentlemen would prefer that I did not repeat what everyone in this generation has heard a thousand times—the details of the Franco-German War; but our points with regard to national surprise may be shortly illustrated by a few facts.

France challenged Germany, and was surprised to find herself unready, and Germany armed to the teeth. The first skirmish took place on August 2nd; half of the French army was beleagured by August 19th; the other half surrendered September 2nd; Paris was invested September 19th; all the country on a line from Montbeliard to Le Mans and North thereof was in thraldom by January 18th; Paris was occupied January 28th. France paid £200,000,000 to its foe, and altogether lost £725,000,000 in the short period in question, or about four millions sterling per day for the war time, not to speak of the loss of Alsace and part of Lorraine and the fortresses of Metz, and Thionville and Strasburg. Such is the cost of a modern national surprise, and yet in the spring of 1870, everyone talked of peace. France was supposed to be a leading military nation. France is a fine power, with a splendid history and unexampled recuperative energies, and in spite of its losses still stands up straight. Most nations, after such an experience, would have fallen into the dust, and remained in the dust for generations.

My Lord and Gentlemen, I have trespassed too much on your time. The subject is one of surpassing interest, and I am pleased to be able to say that as many examples of successful surprises could be culled from our history, in regard to wars in every part of the world, as from the history of any Continental state. Nor do I think that our officers and men, now that our people are beginning to learn their value, to appreciate them, and to try to encourage them and to compel the War Office to tell the truth and to keep faith with recruits, will do worse than in the past.

But "security is mortal's chiefest enemy"; let us avoid careless self-confidence. National prosperity is too precious to be left to chance; we pay a sufficient price for insuring our private houses, let us gladly contribute sufficient funds for insuring our nation's home. I cannot too often repeat the teachings of the Elizabethan

school, and of the Pitts, that a good navy and a sound race of military men are the only national insurance for any state.

Rome could hold on a century or two; Constantinople held on several centuries. France could stand crushing defeats for six months. We would be utterly ruined under similar conditions in three months; therefore, we must never be surprised. It is true that we have a watery wall; but Byron warns the United Kingdom—"In the fall of Venice think of thine, despite thy watery wall." Think of the £1,200,000,000 per annum of wealth floating in British vessels on every sea. Think of our 360,000,000 subjects in foreign lands, whose future is identified with ours, and whose social ruin would follow a serious disaster to our forces. Think of the fierce and uncultured wild races of Africa, whose salvation, as Mr. Bigelow declares, can come from us and from us only. Think of the crowded myriads by the banks of the Ganges, who from time immemorial have been the creatures of stereotyped superstition, with active minds in feeble bodies—and thus perforce submissive to the extremes of tyranny and savage brutality, from which they can be protected by British soldiers only. Think of the mighty cities which, in less time than the Psalmist's spell of human life, have been planned and built by British enterprise at the mouth of the West River, in the Malayan Peninsula and on the Irrawaddy. We have to guard them from internal discord and external force. Can the nursing mother of that fine young nation that stretches from the mouth of the St. Lawrence to Vancouver's Island, and of states rapidly rising to manhood in Australia and New Zealand, forget her duty to so noble a progeny? By the banks of the Nile the skill of British officers recalls the beneficent foresight of those Pharaohs whose works of irrigation, now being repaired, are not less wonderful than the Pyramids and the Sphinx. The Genius of Liberty, supported by British naval and military forces, has again elevated the Egyptian working man, and endowed him with prosperity and hope. The same good Genius, under the same guidance, is about to take her flight over the wasted and half-depopulated Soudan; we can almost hear the flapping of her wings.

A national surprise, therefore, to these imperial isles would be promptly followed by waste and war, horror and dismay, among many races of mankind. We cannot be untrue to ourselves without being false to humanity. I am no advocate of extravagance. I know the dangers of over-taxation; but I also know that it would be far better that we should be as heavily taxed as were our ancestors from 1800-1815, and better far to have a National Debt as heavy as it was in 1856, rather than to fall behind our rivals on any sea, or to lose any part of our Empire. Better war to the knife than ignominious surprise and well-merited defeat, in spite of the

warnings of all prudent thinkers of every age and every nation. We *can* hold our own; let us resolve to do so. I know that my audience do all that they can by way of precept and example. Every man who dons the national uniform sets a good example; but our party politicians and the masses of our folk have lived so securely for such a long period of peace, and they are so badly educated in military history, that they have a very vague notion of the conditions upon which depend the "True greatness of kingdom and estates." War is terrible, but can be sublime. The fall of a state through cowardice and indolence, or false philosophy, or cant, or hysterics, is even more terrible; and for a nation to be surprised out of its eminence is worse than terrible—it is despicable.

T. Miller Maguire.

THE CHARTERED COMPANY.

The following article was written before the general meeting of the Company's shareholders on April 21st. Nothing that occurred there, however, seems to affect what I have written. Mr. Rhodes referred to several important projects such as the engineering of another railway *via* the Zambesi, Lake Tanganyika, and Uganda to the Nile Valley and Khartoum; and also to the great part that Rhodesia was destined to play as a market for English exports. These, however, are what Mr. Rhodes calls "future politics" or "my ideas." With regard to the actual resources of Rhodesia, especially its gold reefs, Mr. Rhodes has not a word to say of proof or evidence, except to reiterate his unbounded faith in them.

THE directors of the Chartered Company have just issued their report. The one previous to this was issued three years ago. During that time the Company has suffered from rinderpest and rebellion in the country itself; and from the attacks of various critics here at home, who have dared to question the resources of the country, mineral and agricultural. It has been said by men who have prospected the gold belts carefully that there was no trace anywhere discoverable of a permanent gold-bearing reef. The gold was all located in small spots, or pockets. All but a very few of these pockets had been worked out and exhausted by miners in times past. Nothing had been discovered which would justify the erection of permanent machinery. Moreover, the gold-bearing portions of the country had been by this time so thoroughly prospected that small chance remained of finding such a reef.

These assertions were backed up with a certain amount of proof. It was pointed out that the three or four batteries sent up country several years ago had all, on one plea or another, stopped working; the presumed reason being that they had come to the end of their ore, *i.e.*, exhausted the pocket. Further, it was asked, why did not the Chartered Company take steps to prove its reefs. It might long ago have transported machinery to the nearest mines. It might, as is done on the Rand, have taken soundings with diamond drills, and proved the permanence and quality of the reef to any depth required. Above all, it might have sent up celebrated mining engineers to examine and report on the gold formation. This last point was specially insisted on, and it was even asserted that the Company had employed certain well-known

engineers who were, or had been, in South Africa, and that the consequent reports sent in had been suppressed by the Company.

Well, whether it was these attacks or the inaction of the Company, at any rate confidence in Rhodesian prospects has been to some extent shaken. A year ago I do not believe that five per cent. of London men had any doubt about the good fortune of the country. Now would it not be truer to say that not five per cent. are entirely without doubt and misgiving on the subject?

Of course, the Company know all this as well as anybody, and a great deal better. And this gives an interest to the present report. Considering the difficulty of its present position and the suspicion now spreading, illustrated in the most practical way by the steady fall in the Company's shares, it is quite certain that it would do all it could to meet the charges, and especially to bring forward some sort of proof, if any existed or could be obtained, of the value of its reefs.

It has quite failed to do this, however, in the present report. There is the usual prophecy of a good time in the near future, that everlasting good time which, like the glittering water of a Sahara mirage, is for ever appearing and receding in front of the Chartered Company. We are told that it is "confidently anticipated that, within a comparatively short period, ample proof will be forthcoming both of the mineral and of the agricultural resources of the country." We have been fed on this diet for the last six years. What we should really like to know is, on what grounds these confident anticipations are based.

Of course, the mining question is the crux of the whole business. Considering what is known of Rhodesian land prospects, droughts, fever, pests, and diseases, and, above all, its ungetatable and remote position, we may be sure that it will not attract much attention from permanent settlers until such parts of the world as Australia, New Zealand, British Columbia, &c., have been much more tightly filled up than they are as yet. Gold is practically Rhodesia's only attraction, and there is not much in the present report to revive our fainting confidence in Rhodesian gold. There are, indeed, sundry mining reports appended, but these—and presumably they are selected ones—are in effect the private reports of the various syndicates reporting on their own properties, and I do not find that evidence of this class commands any attention from professional miners. What was wanted was an authoritative statement by a man of recognized standing and eminence in the mining world on Rhodesian reefs. Such a statement could easily have been procured, but it has not been. As to the allegation that such reports have been obtained

and suppressed because unfavourable, this charge is not alluded to. We are told, however, that "it has not hitherto been the policy of the Company to engage directly in mining operations," and that it has accordingly "been dependent on the courtesy of the various companies for technical information."

The Chartered Company, we must remember, is itself as deeply interested in gold flotations as all the private companies put together, for it shares to 50 per cent. in the vendor's scrip of each one of them. This being so, the attitude of innocent detachment from the whole business which the company now takes up cannot but seem surprising. The accounts sent in by these various companies are, the report says, "highly encouraging." They have "tended to demonstrate the permanency and value of the reef." So one would have anticipated. There is no doubt that if the Chartered Company wanted to get favourable reports on its properties it has gone the right way to work by accepting the reports of the private syndicates which go shares in those properties. All I want to point out is that by professional miners such reports are not thought to be worth the paper they are written on.

But the time has been when the Chartered Company was not so ready to leave others to guard interests so essential to its own existence; when it was not content to draw on the "courtesy" of its private partners for its reports, but, on the contrary, sent on its own initiative men of high reputation into the country, whose reports should confirm once for all the value of its gold deposits. These reports, unfortunately, are not forthcoming. As long ago as 1891 two experts of world-wide reputation among miners were sent into the country by that very Company which to-day professes to be dependent on private syndicates for its reports. The verdict of these men was never given to the public. It has, however, leaked out in scraps and driblets in the letters of Lord Randolph Churchill written from South Africa. It is worth going back seven years for a verdict of that kind, partly because it is the only first-rate authority that we have, and also because there seems to be a tendency in the Chartered Company to-day to take mere self-advertisement in lieu of such first-rate authority.

In 1890-91 Mashonaland, the eastern portion of Rhodesia, was being opened up and prospected. Matabeleland, the western portion, was not dealt with till two or three years later. It would be judging the Chartered Company harshly to suppose that in these early days it was being conducted on anything but what seemed a fair and legitimate basis, with good hopes before it There were good grounds for hope in those days. The goldfields of the Rand had thoroughly interested everyone in South African gold, and it was not then sufficiently realized how very singular

and unique the Rand formation was. The gold discoveries in Rhodesia, following hard on the Rand boom, did seem a sufficient ground for confidence, and, as luck would have it, the signs of gold in Rhodesia were, in themselves, extraordinarily misleading. We have it now on several high authorities, some of whom I will quote presently, that the outcrops in Rhodesia are often rich, and that it is not till the reef is followed down some way and proved to diminish, and finally disappear, that the deceptive nature of these outcrop promises is realized. True, this pocket, or "blow-out' formation, is familiar enough to miners, but it must be remembered not only that men's minds had been worked up to a great pitch of expectation, but that most of the prospectors were Englishmen, raw hands, not of any very great mining experience, and liable to exaggerate the importance of mere superficial signs of gold.

The *bona fides* of the Company in 1891 is, I think, proved by the steps it took to test its gold. It engaged Mr. Charles Rolker and Mr. Henry C. Perkins, two of the greatest living gold experts, to do its prospecting; and it engaged Lord Randolph Churchill as special reporter. I say *engaged* Lord Randolph, because when I find, as I do from Lord Randolph's own book, that Mr. Cecil Rhodes had given him a "cordial invitation" to visit Rhodesia, that arrangements had been made for him to correspond with a London newspaper, and that he had been associated with the two experts in their explorations, then I know quite enough to feel certain that Lord Randolph, the popular, clever, and brilliant Lord Randolph, was expected by Mr. Rhodes to act the part of advertiser of the Rhodesian goldfields. He, with his great prestige and ready eloquence, was to spread abroad those favourable reports which, at that time, it was not doubted, would be returned.

Had good gold existed in Rhodesia it is impossible to conceive a stronger exploring party than this. To give an idea of its strength I must explain to the reader that of all the men who are qualified to put M.E. after their names not one per cent. is paid any attention to by the mining world. Miners and people interested in mining are scattered everywhere throughout the universe. Gold, also, is scattered everywhere throughout the universe. In very few places, however, is it concentrated in paying quantities and formations. False alarms, false discoveries, are therefore of constant occurrence. There is an ignorant public to be dealt with. Any discovery may mean a boom, to which a good glowing report is the first contribution. The supply of these is equal to the demand. In other words, there are always found a quantity of M.E.'s ready to return reports, I do not say absolutely false, but coloured and misleading, of these gold discoveries.

But besides the ignorant public there is the mining world—the

professionals. And as there is a vast quantity of M.E.'s ready to lend their services in aid of speculative flotations, so there are some, a minority, who find their gain and honour in a scrupulous and exact honesty, and in gaining the confidence of the miners themselves. The names of these men are known in their profession; they are signals, beacons. Miners, as I say, are scattered everywhere. They will not gather at the call of a man they don't know. If they did, life indeed for them would be a perpetual wild-goose chase. Realize the circumstances, and you will understand the enormous influence wielded by the few men who have the ear of the mining world, and whose knowledge and honesty can both be relied on.

Now, from the way in which I have heard Mr. Rolker talked of by miners, I feel the greatest confidence in saying that the reputation he has among them is second to the reputation of no man living. H. C. Perkins is another celebrity of the same type. Men like these are not to be unfairly influenced by any means. Their reputation is based on the confidence felt in their integrity. They know it, and no mortal consideration will tempt them to risk it. Judge, then, of the strength of this expedition. Two of the first living experts to prospect, and the brilliant Lord Randolph to describe the country and paint its riches to the public. It is self-evident to me that the Chartered Company at this moment had confidence in its future. The organization of this expedition is a proof. We can guess whose guiding hand planned and launched it.

And what came of it all? What do my countrymen, who have lavished their money in Rhodesian syndicates, know about this great test expedition? Has anyone who reads these lines ever heard of it? You have heard of Lord Randolph Churchill's South African travels and letters to *The Daily Graphic*, of course; but did any of you know that he was associated with two of the most famous mining experts, that these (one certainly, if not both) were in the pay of the Chartered Company, and that the whole expedition was got up by the Company with the express purpose of booming Rhodesian gold?

And what came of it all? Why, absolutely nothing. The preparations were tremendous; the rest was silence. Discoveries were made (I will show in a moment that this was the case) which, if they had been made public, would have slumped Rhodesia. They were, therefore, hushed up. To do this two things were necessary. It was necessary to suppress the experts' reports; and it was necessary to ridicule, discredit, and, as far as possible, boycott Lord Randolph's published letters.

These measures were taken. To suppress the reports was easy enough. They were sent in, it is safe to presume, to some of the

heads of the Chartered Company, and the Company retained them. The public have never heard of them since. It may, in passing, be pointed out that what the Company lost by this was the support of professional and experienced miners, to whom it had no credentials of any value to show. This did not, however, so greatly matter since the Company was dealing not with an experienced public in gold matters, such as the Americans, who have long ago bought and paid for their experience, but with the English public, who are in a state of infantine ignorance. Since then, the country has been let go of by the solid body of the profession, and is dealt with chiefly by sanguine young colonists, who, in mining matters, are necessarily rather greenhorns ; or else by avowed speculators who are after the public, not after the gold. All flotations, it is worth remarking, have been effected in England.

There remained, after the suppression of the reports, Lord Randolph to deal with. Lord Randolph had blurted out a number of opinions and criticisms in his letters to *The Daily Graphic*. It was necessary to silence him. For this purpose the Rhodesian influence in the Press was called into play. I will not hazard a guess as to the extent of that influence. Few people have any idea how great it is. The Chartered Company controls many newspapers all over South Africa. It has more or less hold over several English papers. Also its great Stock Exchange experience gives it a kind of intentive sagacity in hitting on those cries which seize the ear of the public. Thus it has seized on the Imperial, Jingo or patriotic cry, and allied itself to this party in the Press, by which means its power has been vastly increased. Only a few months ago it was remarked in *The Spectator* in what a mysterious way the report of Sir Richard Martin on Rhodesian administration had been boycotted by the Press. That was the work of the Rhodesian Patriotic Alliance. To question the Chartered Company, its resources, administration, or anything else, was voted unpatriotic. It was running down Colonial expansion.

Much the same thing happened seven years ago with Lord Randolph. No one could have been more heartily optimistic than he was over our two chief interests, Kimberley and the Rand, in South Africa. But at that moment Rhodesia was the Promised Land. People's expectations were turned high, and any criticism that did not match them was liable to be rejected. The Rhodesian brigade struck the keynote. The Imperial ally followed suit. Lord Randolph, in spite of his general optimism, was a Little Englander, and a runner-down of Colonial expansion. The patriotic chorus, not for the first time nor the last, tided over the difficulty. Lord Randolph tells us himself in his preface that the newspapers "pronounced with tolerable unanimity that these

letters of mine were devoid of merit and unworthy of perusal." These letters, among them matter of great value, contain the judgments of Messrs. Rolker and Perkins. They seem to have been worth, to the public at that time, somewhere about twenty millions sterling.

That was seven years ago. Now let me rapidly turn a few pages of these letters and give the reader one or two of Lord Randolph's conclusions. The agricultural part of the question need not detain us, because by this time it is admitted by even the friends of the Company that Rhodesia is not a country where any European is likely to settle for what he can make out of the soil. Here, on this point, are one or two of Lord Randolph's remarks :—"The vast tract of country between Fort Victoria and Fort Charter is unsuitable and grievous either for man or for domestic beast. Any profitable cultivation of this sandy soil is impossible. . . . . Where, then, I commenced to ask myself, is the much-talked-of fine country of the Mashona? . . . On the low veldt, where the soil is of extraordinary fertility, fever and horse sickness afflict human beings and exterminate stock; on the high veldt, where neither of these evils extensively prevails, the soil is barren and worthless." Again: "To one person only" [I quote this last sentence because I think it partly explains Mr. Selous' hopefulness] "would this country be attractive, to the sportsman or the hunter." Later, when he had reached Salisbury, he concluded his criticism: "Nor can I yet escape from the opinion that, as a field for emigration, Mashonaland is a disappointment. . . . The prevalent malarial fever, the various animal pestilences, and apparent general absence of rich deep soil, such as distinguishes the Transvaal, seems to offer invincible obstacles to large settlements of white people." If gold is discovered, he adds, people will come, but "in the absence of such discoveries I cannot yet perceive that Mashonaland has much to offer to, much to attract, the British emigrant." These views have since then been repeatedly insisted on, and have been admitted by both sides to be in the main true. Rhodesia does not even try now to stand on its agricultural leg. It stands on its gold leg, or it does not stand at all. Mr. Rhodes himself expressly admits it. The importance of the country, he says to the Cape electors, "simply depends on the North proving itself a gold producing country." On that and nothing else.

To the gold question, then, we turn. Mr. Perkins and a Captain Williams had been prospecting on the Mazoe River. "They brought," says Lord Randolph, "no good report of the gold discoveries in the Mazoe district. Many mines had been visited and examined, but nothing very promising seen. The reefs appear to be similar in character, long, thin, and fairly rich (some of them)

on the surface, but in all cases so far as hitherto worked, either 'pinching out' to nothing at a depth of from twenty-five to fifty feet, or degenerating into quartz containing little gold." Here is the first whisper of that charge, which has swelled so loud since, that Rhodesian gold is nothing but pocket gold—that permanent fissure veins do not exist. Lord Randolph, in another place, says: "Both the eminent experts, Messrs. Perkins and Rolker, were of opinion that, although here and there were reefs of comparatively limited extent and depth, which might yield a small profit to the small individual miner, nothing had yet been discovered, nor did the general foundation encourage much hope that there would be discovered in that particular district any reef of such extent, depth, and quality as would justify the formation of a syndicate or company, and a large expenditure of capital to purchase and to work it." Here is a detail or two by Captain Williams. They visit the "Yellow Jacket" mine, "of which Mr. Perkins and Mr. Rolker made a careful examination. . . . The attention of the prospectors was arrested by the outcrop, which extended for some distance and gave very rich pannings. . . . Unfortunately, the vein decreases lamentably in size and richness as it descends, and samples taken at the bottom give very poor results. This was a great disappointment, as at the top the future seemed very promising, and represented a mining venture with which anyone might have been deceived." Lower down, in another district, the "Jumbo" and "Golden Quarry" were visited. "The former had but little to recommend it, as far as present development permitted to judge. The latter seems to be a large burst of quartz, very wide on the top, but, like all the rest, rapidly losing grade and thickness as a lower level is reached." Again, a page further on, dealing with yet another group of mines: "The reefs throughout presented the same character, and, so far as we have seen, appear uniformly superficial, extending longitudinally for considerable distances, but pinching out and losing their gold as depth is attained."

I need scarcely point out how exactly all this tallies with the conclusions which recent travellers have been trying to hammer into the heads of the public. The gold is pocket gold, says and reiterates Mr. Blake in last August and last February's numbers of this Review. The gold-bearing quartz does not lie in permanent fissure veins, but pinches out at depths varying from twenty to a hundred feet or so, while practically all these holes have been worked out long ago. It might pay individual miners to work some of these patches themselves, but nothing that has been discovered will pay for expensive machinery. That, too, is exactly what prospectors whom one meets in Johannesburg who have come down from up country—practical working men I mean, not

members of syndicates with companies to float—will tell you. The suggestion has been made that it might have paid to take a small battery to the gold belt and move it from place to place, cleaning out the old workings and the bits of outcrop rich enough to pay for milling *en route*. One thing they are all agreed on, and that is that the present system of floating companies on a given number of claims with the avowed intention of putting up large batteries on them as if the reefs were permanent and the supply of gold-bearing quartz unlimited, is a mere pretence, and will never be put into serious operation. The flotation is the object. That end achieved and the syndicate extricated in good terms, the "mine" has served its purpose. It would do the public no harm to hear, though I should be sorry to tell them, the opinion entertained of their credulity by these old professionals who have often seen the game played before. Here on the top of what I have quoted is the final opinion of Mr. Perkins: "It would be possible to make them" [the reefs] "pay a little profit by small individual enterprise; but neither the extent of the reefs, the quality of the ore, nor the general formation of the country, so far, at least, as judgment can be formed on what has been seen, could justify the formation of large London companies for their further development."

Farther north, from the Salisbury and Hartley Hill districts, which at that time were being enthusiastically boomed on the strength of the usual surface discoveries, the reports remain the same. "It seemed impossible," says Lord Randolph, "that such a mass of apparently substantiated report and of rumour could turn out to be altogether valueless and misleading. I speedily found out, however, that this was the case." Where the outcrop gold is good the reef itself is found "either to have no appreciable depth or else at an appreciable depth to yield little appreciable gold." Here is what Lord Randolph gathers from some prospectors who have been exploring on Lo Magundi and neighbouring country: "Many prospectors, some working for syndicates, some on their own account, many of Australian and American experience, have now been occupied in these districts for some time. Not one, although they are all sufficiently communicative, appears to be able to claim, or to be desirous even of claiming, that he has discovered anything of value or promise. Day by day I see them abandoning the country with the usual expression that 'it is not good enough for them.' Mr. Henry C. Perkins tells me that he 'was never yet in any gold district where so few rich specimens of quartz were brought for inspection.'" Thus even at that early date the real gold-seekers, men "of Australian and American experience," were abandoning the country and leaving it in the hands of the novice and the speculator. I think I need not quote

more. The reader cannot do better, if he wants reliable information about Rhodesia, than read through these letters carefully for himself. He will find, I think, that I have not selected unfairly, or given a misleading impression of the opinions which the two mining experts frankly avowed to Lord Randolph, and which, in the midst of descriptive and sporting writing, he now and then jots down. I should like to give the ultimatum, set down after a talk with Mr. Perkins: "The goldfields of the country are of an exasperating character. When first seen and cursorily examined, the general appearance is promising and hopes are high, but the more they are developed, and the more work is done upon them, the more unpromising and valueless do they become." This initial and deceptive promise of the Rhodesian reefs seems to be a main factor in the South African problem. Combined with the system of give-and-take between the Government (*i.e.*, the Chartered Company) and private enterprise, it seems to be responsible for what one cannot but fear may turn out to be the biggest speculative bubble of this century.

Considering the nature of the facts which in 1891 were made known to the Company, and that these facts have never been divulged, this much is obvious: that for the past seven years the Company has been encouraging and stimulating the public to invest in Rhodesian gold, and all the time has been keeping to itself knowledge which if divulged would have deterred the public from so doing. The system of concealment dates from the expedition of 1891. Down to that time the Company was for showing its resources; afterwards it was for hiding them.

This comes out in a most unmistakable way when we turn to the Company's reports, especially to the report next following the expedition we have been discussing. Mr. Rolker was in the employ of the Chartered Company itself. Mr. Perkins, so it is said in South Africa, there can be little doubt truly, was in the employ of one of the most prominent of the Company's promoters. The Company issued a report in 1892, the year following the expedition. In this no reference is made to these experts whatever. Not only that, but the very districts and some of the very reefs which they had carefully examined and pronounced to be worthless are spoken of in terms which would make the public augur most highly of their future. These favourable reports were gathered, as all such reports have since been and are still gathered, from the syndicates and private companies themselves. If the reader is at all familiar with mining speculations, he will know that a syndicate in describing its own properties and its own future is sometimes apt to take too hopeful a view of things. And this being so, he would place more reliance on the judgment of such

absolutely independent and standard authorities as Messrs. Rolker and Perkins. The Chartered Company took the contrary view however. It suppressed the opinions of two men of the highest possible authority, and it published the opinions of men of no authority at all to an exactly opposite effect.

But, it will be asked, What was the object of the Chartered Company in acting in this way? The answer is not altogether a pleasant one, but I shall discuss it openly. The Company share to the extent of *fifty per cent.* in every mining company floated on the English public. All these syndicates that have mopped up twenty-five millions and more of English capital have to pay over to the Chartered Company a half share in the vendor's scrip. It will be said, perhaps, that I am imputing base motives. I am pointing rather to a bias which is certain to have its effect. The Chartered Company is a huge organization. It consists of men exactly like, and equal to, any other body of Englishmen of the same class. But any class, any body of men, I care not how high charactered individually, if acted upon constantly by a fifty per cent. clause, will show in its collective action the palpable effects of the bias.

It is important to understand this point. Let us see how it comes about. The reader probably thinks that the best thing the Royal Chartered Company could do, itself occupying the position of Imperial Government of the country in question, would be to keep the public as well informed as it was itself concerning Rhodesian gold; but how easy to find an excuse. Here is what one director might say to another:—"I have carefully considered the experts' report, and I cannot say that I regard the present moment as one favourable to publication. The public are notoriously liable to panic in these matters, and, on the other hand, the experts are themselves of opinion that another year must elapse before the country can be thoroughly investigated and their judgments in all respects confirmed. I would suggest, therefore, that these reports be temporarily withheld and mining work vigorously prosecuted. It would be well if the various companies would from time to time courteously inform the Chartered Company of their progress and the quality of their reefs." And probably if you whispered "fifty per cent." into the ear of the writer or receiver of that letter, neither of them would know what you were driving at. Thus the matter gets handed over to private companies whose interests are the same. Fifty per cent. presides over the drawing up of the reports. Fifty per cent. presides over their selection and arrangement by the Chartered Company. This may sound cynical, but when we remember how easy it is to think what we hope, how instinctively we snatch at evidence that tallies with our hopes, and

how contagious is the sympathy of a large mass of men all dominated by the same hope, the result of a most misleading bias at the finish will scarcely astonish us. It is much to be suspected, indeed, that this fifty per cent. clause is the financial coalition between the Government and the private speculator, is at the root of all the misapprehensions under which we have been labouring so long as to the resources of the country.

In finishing, let me put the little cluster of facts I have been dealing with plainly before the reader's eyes. In 1891 Lord Randolph, at the invitation of Mr. Rhodes (who joined the party himself in the gold districts, by the way, and was managing director at the time), travels in Rhodesia. He is associated with two of the most celebrated mining authorities living. Their opinion, a very adverse and unfavourable one as we can judge from Lord Randolph's allusions, is summarily suppressed by the Company, while Lord Randolph's letters are ridiculed and discredited. The warning, in consequence of this action of the Company, fails to reach the public, who, since then, have invested over twenty millions of pounds in Rhodesian gold syndicates. The Chartered Company shares to the extent of fifty per cent. in the profits of these syndicates.

L. March-Phillipps.

HANDICAPS.

No institution in this country has, in the course of its history, more completely than racing, belied the carpings of pessimists and the vaticinations of croakers. At regularly recurring periods have been heard the oft reiterated outcries that the Turf was rapidly deteriorating; that it was not what it used to be; that it was no longer the sport of gentlemen, or, in fact, a sport at all, but a huckstering, money-making trade; and that the main object of racing men was to make large sums of money by betting and stakes, and that the improvement in the breed of horses was becoming a secondary consideration. Of course, pessimists and croakers, like grumblers at clubs, have their uses; they serve to keep up the standard by exposing, and securing the correction of, abuses; though at times, not unjustly, suspected of being actuated by no higher motive than the gratification of a bilious and splenetic temperament. It is only just to recognize the possibility that those who have in times past been the loudest and most energetic in their denunciation of abuses, and in their prophecies of approaching evils, have themselves contributed largely to the falsification of their own Cassandra-like forebodings. And if it be true of racing in general that it has always been the butt of pessimists and faddists, it has certainly been fashionable to lay the blame of all the supposed rascalities of the Turf at the door at that particular feature of the sport which forms the subject of these pages, namely, the handicap. The handicap has always been inveighed against as a mere gambling counter; it is the handicap which gives inferior horses the chance of beating the best, and thereby gives experienced, but not over-scrupulous owners and trainers a chance of bringing off a profitable *coup*. It must be admitted that at different periods, high authorities in matters of racing have expressed themselves as unfavourable to handicapping generally. Even Admiral Rous described the handicap as "the black cloud which was hanging over racing, and which would eventually do great injury to the Turf"—and this at the expense of disparaging his own *métier*. And it must, no doubt, be admitted that there have been times when the Turf was in real danger of falling into discredit, and that the Jeremiads and denunciations of

those who posed as Turf reformers, must be credited with the salvation of racing generally. It must also be admitted that the institution of the handicap, with some of the faulty incidents attending it, has been to a large extent responsible for the situation. It is, however, not intended in these pages to undertake the colossal task of sketching the history of the English Turf, for the adequate performance of which at least three volumes would be requisite. What I take as my subject is that special feature of racing called the handicap, with a view, certainly not of writing a handicapper's *vade mecum,* but rather of tracing, as far as possible, in necessarily limited space, its origin and the history of its progress ; pointing out the place it has at different times occupied, and now occupies in the industry of racing, and the various proposals and enactments which have from time to time been made for its regulation. I shall also have some remarks to make concerning the qualifications, training, and duties of handicappers generally, especially in view of the legislation which has recently taken place in reference to those officials.

But the foregoing scheme is not unattended with difficulty, seeing that the theme, as above mapped out, is an untrodden field, except so far as occasional and desultory treatment is to be found in the scattered columns of monthly, weekly, or daily periodicals ; and considerable labour is necessarily incidental to the first collation of the facts and history of any subject. This is, to a certain extent, the case with the history of the Turf generally, for the literature of the Turf is decidedly scanty. There is White's *History of the Turf,* 2 vols., published in 1840 ; also Rice's *History of the Turf,* published in 1879 ; and, more recently, Black's *History of the English Turf.* While all of these contain a considerable amount of information, neither of them can be called complete, and all of them are, more or less, open to the charge of being unsystematic and unmethodical. It is remarkable that all of them miss the point of the handicap as a distinct institution of the Turf, with features and an individuality of its own. None of them seem to recognize that the handicap has a history, in some senses separable and independent, but, at the same time, interwoven with the whole history of racing. Being a somewhat mongrel and certainly not a Saxon term, it is, perhaps, not to be wondered at that most of the ordinary English dictionaries refuse to catalogue it at all, and we have to resort to the *Slang Dictionary* for an explanation of what has become one of the most ordinary words in our vernacular. The French have no word of their own to express the idea ; consequently, as in the case of "le jockey," "le betting," "Société des Steeplechases," they have plagiarized from us. It is a corruption of "hand in the cap." A wants B's horse, and is willing to give his watch for it, or, in

other words, he challenges for it. C is appointed handicapper, or referee, to say how much A is to give to make up the price of the horse. The three deposit a stake in a cap or hat, and C makes his award. If A and B are both satisfied with the award, C takes the stakes, and the same if neither party is satisfied. If A is satisfied, and B not, A gets the stakes. Before C makes his award, each party puts his hand into the cap. C then, whose interest it is to make neither party satisfied, makes his award in the most complicated possible terms, so as to prevent either A or B following for the moment what the award is. The result is probably that neither A or B admit themselves satisfied, so that C takes the stakes. After a convivial dinner-party, the fun used to get rather fast and furious, and boots, waistcoats, and shirts, were often challenged for, and it was considered unsportsman-like to refuse. This form of amusement has long been obsolete in this country, though it survived until comparatively recently in Ireland. It is not difficult to see how the expression came to be applied to a contest between horses, in which the amount of advantage to be conceded by either party to the other was to be settled by an independent award.* Handicaps were little known in the early history of racing, and probably the ordinary racing man is not aware that in 1740 a Statute was passed, the provisions of which were somewhat inimical to the idea of a handicap. It contained a statutory scale of weight-for-age, according to which five-year-olds were to carry 10 st., six-year-olds 11 st., and aged horses 12 st. Mr. Cheney, the then editor of the *Racing Calendar,* in 1742, wrote, pointing out the preposterous absurdity of such weights, and the Statute was repealed in 1745.

While it was not until about 1770 that a scale of weight-for-age came to be at all recognized, the handicap was a later thing still. No doubt it was originally applied to matches only. The first big sweepstakes of any importance, in which the weights were adjusted by a handicapper, was the Oatlands Stakes, the conditions of which race were somewhat complicated. In 1791, it was run at Ascot, and was won by the Prince of Wales's Escape, the same animal whose inconsistent running later in the year led to the retirement from the Turf of the Prince of Wales, the fall of Chifney the jockey, and the publication by the latter of *Genius Genuine* in his own justification. This was a very heavy betting race, and for so early a period a lot of money changed hands in the betting-stand. In subsequent years, the race was run in classes, the winners of which ran it off against one another. The Continental wars at the commencement of this century were

* The *Rules of Racing* previously to their revision in 1858 contained a definition of a "handicap match" on similar lines.

not favourable to the progress or development of racing, from any point of view. From about 1816, handicaps began to figure rather more frequently, but we must go to the early 'forties before we can find the handicap as having reached the zenith of its importance, and taken its real place in racing. In 1824, the Chester Cup had been instituted; in 1828, the Liverpool Summer Cup; in 1840, the Chesterfield and Stewards' Cups at Goodwood; in 1839, was the first appearance of the important Autumn Handicaps, the Czarewitch and the Cambridgeshire, the former being endowed with a prize of £300 by the Grand Duke of Russia, the latter with £100 by the town of Newmarket. Both these races early assumed the popularity which has ever since characterized them. 1845 was the first year of the Newmarket Handicap, and in 1846 was instituted the great Metropolitan Stakes at Epsom, which was largely endowed by the Licensed Victuallers of London, with a view of making the Spring Meeting rival the success of the Summer Meetings in which the Derby and the Oaks were run. There were, of course, numerous others, but the above were among the most important. Steeplechasing, too, was fast coming into fashion, and in this branch of racing the handicap assumed even a larger proportion of importance than in flat racing. The Steeplechase Handicap originated in Ireland, and as steeplechases were there at first confined to gentlemen riders, it was found difficult to get a sufficient number of such riders who could stay a stiff course; consequently, the defect in numbers had to be supplemented from the ranks of professional riders, and to equalize the chances of the two the handicap was adopted rather than a scale of penalties and allowances.

But scarcely had the handicap grown into adolescence as an institution than it was vigorously attacked in the contemporary Press as an emblem of deterioration. The attack was led by Craven.* He declared that racing was rapidly becoming a money-making business instead of a sport, and that the handicap "substituted the inebriated passion of 'betting round,' for the honest exultation of winning." It must be admitted that the handicap, according to the system in vogue in those days, gave considerable handles for attack. There was no official feather-weight, that is, there was no minimum weight which a jockey was allowed to carry. Conventionally it was supposed to be four stone, probably because no boy who was fit to ride a race could reduce himself below that weight. Of course, this very low weight was an encouragement to enter a lot of very inferior horses, so long as any boy could be found to ride them, so that the race became simply a huge scramble among inferior horses ridden by inferior riders, in which

* Captain J. W. Carleton, of 2nd Dragoon Guards, who contributed largely to *The Sporting Magazine* and *Sporting Review*.

one had about as much chance as another. It is not surprising that the entries for such handicaps were very large, and the acceptances in proportion, certainly in comparison with the figures to which we are now accustomed. Thus for the Chester Cup, in which the lowest scale of weights was always adopted, in 1847 there were 176 horses entered, and no fewer than 106 acceptances; in 1849 there were 201 entries, and 107 acceptances. There were, therefore, considerable grounds for the criticism of Craven, though he failed to see the place the handicap was bound to take in racing, and, consequently, overstepped the mark in aiming at abolition rather than reform. At the same time there were not wanting those who saw the other side of the question, and did not allow their vision to be dimmed by nebulous moralizing. They saw that racing could not live by weight-for-age alone, and that owing to the necessary inequality amongst horses it could not be kept up as a national sport unless horses not in the very front rank were given a chance of winning: buyers would cease to buy, breeders would cease to breed, and our best stock would leave the country. It will, however, possibly surprise the reader to be told that the same writer, Craven, who had previously so persistently attacked the existence of the handicap, in 1849 wrote as follows: "I have become a convert to the handicap, and pronounce it to be the life and soul of the Turf." Craven himself had come to see another side of the question, and the reason of his conversion was an interesting point. The coaching industry was being threatened with destruction through the rapid progress of the railways; and so what had theretofore been the market for well-bred, though inferior horses, appeared to be equally in peril. The existence of the much-abused handicap and steeplechase seemed to afford a substituted market which would absorb the average produce of breeders, and so stop the efflux of our thorough-breds; hence the conversion of Craven. No doubt the absence of any feather-weight limit was to a large extent responsible for all the evils incidental to the handicap, and I propose accordingly briefly to trace out the legislation in respect of the feather or minimum weight.

It may be as well first to consider the real relevancy and importance of this topic. No doubt, the greater the margin allowed in the weights, the easier is the task of the handicapper, the greater the scope for his discrimination and diagnosis, and the greater his chance of obtaining a good acceptance. It possibly may not be in the true interests of racing that he should be able to bring the veriest selling plater to terms of equality with a first-rate horse; and, no doubt, anything which tends to unduly enlarge the field, is to be deprecated as reducing a race to a scramble, and in short

races unduly enhancing the importance of the art of getting off. The modern rule, that no prize can be awarded to any but the first four horses, is designed to obviate this. But it has long been recognized that if the minimum weight be raised it is a mistake to suppose that equality can be produced by merely raising the top weight proportionately. Owners will not run the chance of having their best horses broken down by running them with 11 st. on their backs. Admiral Rous, writing in 1860, said: "When my City and Suburban Handicap appeared, there were 136 horses to be handicapped, from 9 st. to 4 st. 7 lb. One hundred of these accepted. Had I commenced at the standard of 10 st., instead of 9, one half of these horses would have been scratched. The higher you make your standard of weight, the more it goes to the detriment of first-class horses, because if you put your minimum weight at 7 st., you must raise your cracks to welter weights, which must injure or break them down in a long course."

The Duke of Beaufort once asked Mr. Scott, the trainer, "What would you do if a first-rate horse of yours appeared in a handicap with 11 st.?" To which the answer was, "Scratch him at once." So that to raise the feather-weight involves a certain amount of responsibility, for it is almost certain to reduce the number both of nominations and of fields.

The first enactment on the subject was contained in the Revised Rules of 1858, when the minimum weight was fixed at 4 st. 7 lb. In 1860, this same question of feather-weights was taken up in Parliament. Lord Redesdale brought in a Bill, the main object of which was to limit the feather-weights to a minimum of 7 st., afterwards reduced to 6 st. In the Chester Cup for that year, which then had been run not many months, twenty-nine horses started, only six of them carrying more than 7 st.; the highest weight was 9 st., and the lowest 4 st. 10 lb. The winner, who was ridden by a boy, was weighted 4 st. 7 lb., carrying 5 st. 3 lb. One aged horse carried only 6 st. The great argument against the then existing state of things seemed to be the physical danger and demoralization of the young boys who were put up to ride in these races, and also the fact that it did not tend to improve the breed of horses, as speed was cultivated at the expense of staying power. The debate was somewhat instructive.* For argumentative force, and well collated statistics, Lord Derby's speech was a masterpiece. Lord Granville attacked the measure in a playful vein. He described the speeches as curiously consistent with the characters of the speakers. "The mover of the Bill took a steady heavy-weight gallop over the old beacon course; the noble Duke

* *Hansard*, Vol. 159, p. 302.

who followed (Beaufort) preferred a short half-mile run, while the noble Earl, who spoke on the same side (Winchilsea), was as light and frolicsome as a fresh two-year-old. There is an old maxim, *de minimis non curat lex*, which, I think, may be translated, 'Do not legislate for feather-weights.'" The Bill was eventually withdrawn.

Two years later, the Jockey Club met the matter by raising the minimum weight to 5 st. 7 lb. At the Craven Meeting at Newmarket, in 1877, it was shifted back to 4 st. 7 lb., but this retrograde movement only lasted for two months; for at the Second Spring Meeting it was restored to 5 st. 7 lb. It does not appear what was the reason for this see-saw, but no further alteration was made until the last revision of the Rules in 1889, when the minimum weight was raised to 6 st.

As I have already said, this is bound to have some effect both on entries, acceptances, and fields, which does not seem to be taken into consideration in the comparisons which it is fashionable to draw between the numbers of the present and those of bygone days.

I must not pass over another attempt at legislation in 1870. There was again a great outcry about the state of the Turf, which was again said to be simply an instrument for reckless and ruinous gambling, and, no doubt, the recent proceedings of certain persons of high social position gave some colour to this suggestion. There was, too, a great outcry about the latitude allowed for running yearlings and two-year-olds to the detriment of their constitutions, and the consequent injury to the cause of horse breeding. Mr. Hughes, the Member for Frome, took the matter up in Parliament. He brought in a Bill ostensibly to prohibit two-year-old racing; but intended, as it appeared, as a peg on which to hang further legislation respecting both betting and handicapping.* This Bill was also withdrawn. But the matter was also taken up by the Jockey Club, who appointed a Committee to consider the state of the Turf. This Committee drew up a report of considerable ability,† in pursuance of which, while the question of the feather-weights remained untouched, an important alteration was effected by a rule that two-year-olds should no longer run in handicaps before October, and then only with horses of the same age. The racing season was also shortened by the introduction of a close time from November to the end of March. It may be as well to add that the proposal to forbid two-year-old racing altogether was expressly discountenanced by the report of the Committee. Such a rule would cut down the

* *Hansard*, Vol. 201, p. 1350.

† *Racing Calendar*, 1870.

chance of either pleasure or profit to be derived from a horse; that it would seriously diminish the number of horses in training, and the result would be that all our best stallions would leave the country for other countries where there would be more demand for their services. I mention this fact as showing that this Committee advocated the retention of two-year-old racing on the same grounds as those on which Craven became reconciled to the handicap, viz., that its extinction would act as a discouragement to the breeding of thorough-breds.

The last revision of the Rules in 1889 can for our present purpose be passed over shortly. The handicap survived, practically untouched. With the exception of the raising of the minimum weight and a rule limiting the proportion of handicaps in the day's programme, the only enactment of any importance was the rule that all handicappers at meetings under Jockey Club rules must be specially licensed, a provision which has not yet been followed by the National Hunt Committee for steeplechase meetings. The proposal which was contained in the original draft submitted by the Rules Committee, to abolish selling handicaps, a class of race which had always incurred the animadversion of Admiral Rous, was rejected as being prejudicial to the financial interests of race meetings.

Let me now say a few words about handicappers themselves. Their name has not by any means been legion. At the end of the last century, when handicaps were more for matches than any other kind of race, it was a very amateur business. The three persons who were known as most skilful in the art were Lord Barrymore, Charles Fox, and Colonel Mellish. In 1839 it appears that Mr. Weatherby handicapped at most of the big meetings, such as Epsom, Newmarket, Goodwood, and Ascot. But it was a common condition of races that the handicap was to be framed by the stewards, or any person whom they might appoint. The want of system and method in apportioning weights met with a good deal of criticism, but it was not till 1855* that Admiral Rous took upon himself the duties which he continued to perform till his death in 1877. During that period he was practically, if not in theory, the official handicapper to the Jockey Club, and in consequence necessarily officiated in a similar capacity at most of the important meetings in the country. From 1877 to 1886 Mr. Weatherby acted. Since then to the present time Major Egerton has occupied the post, subject to the important changes effected last year, to which I shall allude hereafter. Not that these gentlemen monopolized the whole of the handicapping industry of the country, that would have been im-

* Thormanby, *Kings of the Turf*, Art, "Admiral Rous."

possible, but certain meetings such as Liverpool, and some north country meetings had handicappers of their own. At all events, the handicapping for over half a century has been performed by remarkably few persons, and consequently there have been very few vacancies to be filled up. So the difficulty that was felt last year, when it became necessary to increase the number of licensed handicappers, has but seldom pressed itself upon the authorities.

Let us now take a glance at the handicapper's functions. He has, in theory, to fix the weights possibly for a very large number of horses, and in such a manner within the limits allowed by the rules as far as possible to equalize their chances of winning. If he wishes to see the highest tributes of respect accorded to his work —good acceptances, good fields, active and all-round betting, and close finishes—he has to do, to learn, and to observe a great deal; he must not be content with the mere study of book form. To perform his task regularly in a satisfactory manner, he must be a constant and observant frequenter of the race-course; he must see the various horses themselves from time to time, and must be a constant eye-witness of races. He will usually have to deal with a number of horses that have run several times before at different distances, at different weights, on different courses, ridden by different jockeys, and in different ways, and in different physical conditions. One horse may have lost one race in which he was ridden to make the pace when he ought to have been made to play a waiting game. Another horse may be a rogue and have a mere boy on his back, when a stronger jockey would have got more out of him. Again, see how variously the state of the ground or conformation of the course affects different horses according to their build or constitution. One horse is said to like the hard ground, by which is probably meant that it affects him less seriously than other horses; another horse is the superior of his rivals in going up or coming down a hill. One horse has a considerable dash of speed for a five-furlong course; another breaks down at six furlongs; a third can get a mile; while a rarer specimen is occasionally come across in the shape of a real good stayer. Shape, make, and build will, no doubt, be valuable evidence for the handicapper to go upon in estimating the qualities of any particular animal he may have to deal with. A long-backed animal may be very well suited to a flat galloping course, but will, in all probability, find a difficulty in negotiating an ascent. A long-legged, "pea-cocky" horse will be unsuited to a course with any marked descent; a big, heavy horse will be at a disadvantage on sloppy ground; while a shorter, more compact, and wiry animal will, like Gallio, care for none of those things. Again, in estimating the importance of a horse's defeat on any occasion, especially where such defeat is inconsistent

with his other form, it is very desirable that the handicapper in dealing with him on any future occasion should be able to judge whether or not his defeat was due to temporary want of condition; for it is by no means an unknown thing for a horse to be made to run *because* he is out of condition, for the edification of the handicapper! Of course, this is a very different thing from saying that that official ought to study the condition of a horse before he assigns him a weight, and still less that he ought to pay any attention to rumours of his being unfit. This was what happened in the Cambridgeshire of 1875, when the winner, Sutton, a four-year-old, got in at 5 st. 11 lb. in consequence of rumours that he had lost his two-year-old form. If a horse is not fit, he ought certainly not to be in the race; still less should he have what we may call "sick-room allowance." Then there are the nursery, or two-year-old handicaps, which by rule cannot be run before September. These would be mere lotteries if the handicapper had nothing but book form to go upon. Many of the colts and fillies engaged have never been brought together before, some of them, perhaps, having only run in selling plates against selling platers, all of them precluded by rule from running more than six furlongs before July; whereas nurseries are frequently mile races.

It is not as though winners only had to be dealt with; where the keen and experienced eye comes in is in correctly estimating the performance of the beaten horses; the winner may have won by some lengths, but *non constat* that the second horse was not eased when victory seemed impossible. A horse with an undoubtedly good chance may have been jostled in the race by one against whom, not being the winner, there would be no remedy by objection; while in short distance races with large fields, much depends on getting off. Of course, a horse-race must always be something of a lottery; the horse is not a steam engine, and his lungs do not work like a blacksmith's bellows; but he is an animal of highly nervous organization, with inevitable "off days" like human beings. Consequently, his performances can never be counted upon like machinery or clock-work.

In a work entitled *The Philosophy of the Turf*, published anonymously in 1840, a curious attempt was made to reduce the speed of a horse, for any given time, to a matter of mathematical calculation based on such data as his ascertained speed for a second, the weight of the animal, and the weight on his back! A backer who operated on such a system would require a large bank.

Again, and this is specially true of fillies in the first half of the season, when you get horses of extra nervous, sensitive temperaments, they invariably defy with their vagaries the most subtle and abstruse calculations of handicappers and backers alike. On no

two occasions is their running consistent. Such a horse has well been described in the following lines :—

> "A wonderful, blunderful racer,
> If you back him you lose
> Shirts, breeches, and shoes ;
> Bet against him—he gives you a facer."

These numerous considerations are sufficient to show the sort of information which forms the necessary materials for a handicapper in the discharge of his duties. Probably he will not altogether keep his eyes and ears shut if he happens to be residing in the neighbourhood of training stables ; a Newmarket domicile is said to be inimical to the chance of bringing off a good thing!

And besides being a good judge of racing, he must be a good judge of men. He must be ever on his guard against the numerous tricks and devices commonly resorted to for the purpose of throwing dust in the eyes of the handicapper—which are too well known to need any enlargement. Defoe,* writing as early as 1724, before handicapping in horse-racing was known, speaks of similar practices designed to aid betting operations. Speaking of an owner of a horse he said, "He never produced a horse but he looked to be what he was not . . . and so hit some of the greatest gamesters in the field." There is one form of deception against which he has to be specially on his guard, that is non-acceptance. I will here repeat a story of Admiral Rous which has before now been told by Mr. John Corlett. A was the owner of a horse called Deceit, which was known to be better than Fairwind, which had just beaten a good field for the Ebor Handicap. Deceit was meant for the Czarewitch, but was put into the Great Yorkshire Handicap, so as to feel the Admiral's pulse about him. His weight for this was fixed at 4 st. 5 lb. The owner did not accept; and when the weights for the Czarewitch came out, what was his astonishment to find that he was weighed at 8 st. 2 lb.! The Admiral had perceived the plant.

One of the most trying duties of a handicapper ceased to exist with the abolition of overnight handicaps. As these frequently closed at six, and the weights had to appear by ten, they made a great demand on the energy, strength, and experience of the official, especially as he might have to rush off the same night or early next morning to get to some other meeting.

But the handicapper must also be a man of certain moral qualities. He must have independence of mind, and must not be oversensitive. He cannot please everybody ; it is no use for him to try. In the first place, there are plenty of opportunities for

* *Tour Through Great Britain*, I., 115.

differences of opinion; a possibility which is never more strongly brought out than when the weights for several races are published at the same time, framed by different handicappers, especially now that the rules have, as I shall show presently, caused a better distribution of the work, and called into play the energies of a larger number of officials. The Spring Handicaps of this year, successful productions as they were as a rule, did not show entire unanimity —*tot homines, tot sententiæ*. In the next place, he is bound to make some mistakes, and even if he did not, some owners are impossible to satisfy. He must, therefore, always expect some hostile criticism, and must have sufficient self-control to put up with annoyance and disappointment. Even Admiral Rous did not escape this; for while, on the one hand, we read of him as "able to estimate the merits of a horse to a nicety, as being ever on the Grand Stand looking out for non-triers doing a shunt";* on the other hand, he has been spoken of as one of such probity of character himself as to be too easily deceived by others.† His handicaps for the Czarewitch and Cambridgeshire of 1875 came in for much hostile criticism, when he let Prince Soltykoff's Duke of Parma in at 5 st. 11 lb., carrying 6 st., who won easily, being 4 to 1 in the betting; and for the Cambridgeshire, a four-year-old, Sutton, was only weighted at 5 st. 13 lb., on the supposition, based on rumour, that he had lost his two-year-old form. Handicappers cannot know everything, and sometimes will be deceived. Inevitably they must at times let in a good horse below the weight which would have been allotted to him had his real merits been known. Thus Plaisanterie, in 1885, carried off the double event of the Czarewitch and the Cambridgeshire, which created a great outcry, and led to the ostracism of foreign-trained horses from English handicaps, a provision which, to the credit of the sportsman-like spirit pervading English racing, was repealed in 1890. Again, in 1889, the victory of Primrose Day in the Czarewitch led to some comment, she being a four-year-old let in at 6 st. 1 lb. And in 1896 Winkfield's Pride was let into the Cambridgeshire and the Old Cambridgeshire Stakes at weights which ensured easy victory in both cases. It is best, therefore, to recognize at once that surprises cannot be prevented in racing, still less in handicaps, and the more you try to fetter the handicapper in his discretion and shackle his judgment by laying down red tape rules for his guidance, the more injustice and dissatisfaction is likely to result. The principle of the handicap is that the handicapper is to exercise his own judgment with respect to the weight which each horse is to carry, and all such rules are an infringement of this principle.

* Rice, *History of the Turf*, II., 263.

† See an Article in the *The World*, 11th January, 1876.

Thus, after the Primrose Day case, there was a suggestion that there should be a minimum weight of 7 st. for four-year-olds, and that horses running for the first time in a year should be weighted with the heaviest of their age. The proposals, however, never became law. In the second July Newmarket Meeting, 1897, Simonburn, a six-year-old, was let into the July Handicap at 6 st. 7 lb., and won easily. I did hear the suggestion made that the handicapper should be instructed not to put six-year-olds in at so near the bottom weight. I could not help thinking at the time that any such instructions would also be contrary to the principle of a handicap, but I believe the incident passed without further notice. Equally futile must be any rules prohibiting the publication of the entries before the weights appear, though this has at different times been advocated. Craven, writing in 1849, clamoured for the change on the ground that the publication of the odds in the betting was embarrassing to the handicapper. It was again suggested in the report of the Committee of the Jockey Club in 1870, to which I have already alluded, but the proposal was rejected. Before their revision in 1886 it used to be one of Tattersall's Rules of Betting that the Committee would not adjudicate on any bet on a handicap made before the weights had been published; a futile attempt to keep the handicapper unbiassed, seeing that the public estimate of the different horses will probably appear in the betting on other races. But nowadays the betting before acceptance is not important. So, again, any rules which handicappers may make amongst themselves are liable to prove fallacious as guides; such, for example, as a custom in framing the weights, to minimize the importance of selling-plate form, or invariably to handicap a horse according to the best form he has shown.

It is, of course, quite unnecessary to suggest that the handicapper should be a man of probity, seeing that at the present day the more fulsome forms of corruption need not be considered a practical possibility. As far as smaller country meetings go, it cannot be said that it was always so. Admiral Rous, in his *Laws and Practice of Horse-racing* (1866), strongly condemns the then common practice of the clerk of the course who "ran" the meeting himself, occupying the post of handicapper, under which system the best subscriber got a pull in the weights. It was also a common practice in those days for the handicapper at that class of meeting to stand in with the winner in the matter of the stakes and bets, so that "£2,000 may be picked up in three days by a clever handicapping lessee out of the pockets of the liberal horse-owners" (*ibid.*). But the above state of things may be said to be non-existent nowadays; two comparatively recent rules have been steps in the right direction—one making a Jockey Club licence a necessary qualification

for the post, and the other forbidding any official to hold more than one post at the same meeting.

But apart from such considerations the handicapper must have sufficient of that particular, but not very common, form of strong-mindedness which is proof against flattery, blandishments, and hospitality. It may be very nice for an aspiring young handicapper to be invited by an owner to dinner, to meet some of the smartest people; the dinner is of the best, and the host produces his best bottle of port after dinner, telling the young aspirant (before all this smart company) that he only brings that out when he knows it will be duly appreciated; that he believes him to be as good a judge of a bottle of port, as he knows him to be of horses and of racing; and in the course of conversation the host intimates to the general company that his horse, Tortoise, has no doubt a fine turn of speed, but that having been tried with Runaway in the same stable, he has been found deficient in staying power, and cannot get a mile, when he knows all the time that he is keeping and training him for a long distance handicap at a meeting at which the young aspirant is expected to officiate. No mother angling for a son-in-law can be more captivating than a scheming owner striving to secure lenient treatment for his horses.

It becomes, then, a question of some interest and importance, in view of the somewhat special qualifications necessary for a handicapper, to ascertain what training will best conduce to fit him for his duties. Mere natural facility will not be enough; considerable experience and education will be necessary, without which he would be perfectly useless, even in assisting somebody else to handicap. From what I have said as to the necessity of the handicapper attending race meetings and carefully studying the horses and their running, it would appear that this is equally necessary as part of the education of any person who wishes to take up this line. But assuming him not to have any horses of his own in training, the next point to consider is how far without some alternative stimulus he is likely to follow the subject with sufficient thoroughness and diligence. To speak frankly, I believe there is only one way of keeping his interest fixed, and that is by betting in moderate sums on all or most of the races he sees. This to some people may be very shocking advice, but I presuppose a person of some self-command; it will certainly be a great aid to concentration, and will implant the form of running horses upon his memory far more than mere watching as a spectator would do. How notoriously wrong non-betting stables often are about their own horses! Sometimes they do not know when they have got a good thing, and at times allow themselves to be run away with by an idea about an animal which occasions nothing but disappointment in his actual perform-

ances. I cannot help thinking that the practice of backing one's own opinion about horses is a very good guide to the judgment. Another practice he should not neglect—that of playing at handicapping; he should constantly compile handicaps and compare his own productions with the official weights when published.

Last year, the subject of handicapping, and the way in which the weights were apportioned, occasioned some outcry that there was no system or method about it; sometimes a horse which had not won at all, or only once, received a high weight, while others which had won seemed to be let off lightly. The evil was laid at the door of the fact that the then existing handicappers were too few for the ever-increasing number of race meetings. They had more than they could do. It was unanimously agreed that handicapping was in too few hands. Some handicappers officiated at two meetings at the same time. A Committee of the Jockey Club was appointed, and in the result a report was presented which led to the making of some new rules, the most important of which were: (1) That no handicapper should handicap at more than one meeting in the same week without official permission. (2) That the overnight handicaps—which I have above alluded to as being a great tax on the handicapper's powers—should be abolished. Of course this necessitated the appointment of additional handicappers. The difficulty at first felt was, "Where are they to come from?" It was expected that there must be a certain amount of latent handicapping talent in the country, but, if so, it was quite an unknown quantity. As I have pointed out above the duty of appointing handicappers has not often devolved upon the Stewards of the Jockey Club in the history of racing, so that the advisability of having a regular source which could be safely relied upon as supplying a competent handicapper on an emergency, has possibly not received the attention it would seem to deserve. As things are, the merits of every newly licensed official must be a matter of uncertainty. It is quite unnecessary to say that any difficulty that was anticipated on this score last year was soon removed, and a sufficient number of competent recruits were added to the ranks. But is there any guarantee that this will always be so, and that applicants for licences will in all cases give satisfaction to the executives of meetings? I would venture to suggest that this blank would soon be filled up if the number of handicappers, at all events for the larger and more important meetings, were increased either by rule or usage to two. Not that there should be a joint handicap; but one would be the handicapper of the meeting and the other the assistant handicapper. Possibly, though this would be open to consideration, it would be advisable that there should be a certain number

of persons licensed as assistants only. At all events, there would then be no friction between the two officials. The assistant would occupy somewhat the same position with regard to his chief that what is known as a "devil" does in a barrister's chambers; it would be his duty to take the more laborious part of the work off his chief's shoulders, that is, he would have to prepare a draft handicap, which would be finally settled by his chief, no doubt with the "devil" at his elbow ready to justify his apportionment of the weights by facts derived from observation or book form. Of course it would be a matter of pride and self-interest with the "devil," as in the legal profession, to prepare a draft that would be likely to pass muster with his chief with a minimum of alteration. This division of labour would be sure to produce good results, and the arrangement would involve the formation of a service or school of handicapping; the body of assistants would be replenished from time to time as occasion required, and would be certain to contain some persons fit to act as fully licensed handicappers, should there be a vacancy. At all events, each of the assistants would be able to make known to the authorities his "form" in handicapping, which at present is impossible, without a full licence. It would not be difficult to ascertain the competence of any person to act as assistant, which would have to be tested on his application for a licence; and, probably, a few years of the training I have suggested in these pages would qualify him. The extra expense which the adoption of this system would entail to the meetings would, I feel sure, be very small. However, this is a suggestion for the future; and although sufficient for the day is the evil thereof, everyone admits that the division of labour effected by the new rules has put handicapping on a more satisfactory footing. The recent acceptances for the spring handicaps certainly testified to this; in the following list the entries and declarations of forfeit are put after the respective races, the difference, of course, showing the acceptance in each case:—Babraham Plate, 31, 8; Spencer Plate (Northampton), 26, 6; Northampton Stakes, 25, 3; Great Metropolitan Stakes, 39, 11; Chester Cup, 50, 10; Jubilee, 40, 5; Lincolnshire, 50, 16. This list shows a large and flattering proportion of acceptances.

But all said and done, racing, with its handmaiden the handicap, survives and flourishes; Craven's second thoughts were the best, the handicap has proved "the life and soul of the Turf"; and Admiral Rous' "black cloud" may be said to have passed away. We never, nowadays, hear outcries about the demoralization or decadence of the Turf, nor has its organization or hierarchy been in any way affected or changed. For while we have seen that the legislature has twice tried to interpose in racing matters and

bring about reforms, the abortive results in each case have shown that the Parliament of the Turf is at Newmarket and not at Westminster.

And this suggests the reflection which is true of other things besides racing and handicaps, that where you find abuses or shortcomings in any existing institution which has grown up spontaneously out of the natural evolution of circumstances, and which ministers in any way to the requirements or even the enjoyment of mankind, it is wiser to remember the law of "live and let live," to pause before hastily adopting a policy of extermination, and to consider whether the reformer may not effect more desirable results than the iconoclast. But this is a doctrine diametrically opposed to the principles of faddism, and faddists would have swept away the handicap, and all racing with it, a long time ago if they had had their way.

G. Herbert Stutfield.

THE MONTH IN AMERICA.

Washington, April 15th, 1898.

A MONTH ago I thought we were on the verge of war. I expected to see the formal opening of hostilities any day. For two months the country has practically been on a war footing—ships stripped for action, the army mobilized, and the call for volunteers ready to be issued at an hour's notice; dockyards and arsenals working night and day, land defences strengthened, and harbours planted with mines; agents scouring Europe to buy ships, and guns, and ammunition. With all the preparations made to welcome war the fickle goddess pouts and lingers, and refuses to be wooed. Pallas Athene may soon be the chief Olympian divinity of the American people.

Whether peace or war surely the world has never been called upon to witness a more remarkable exhibition of shilly-shallying indecision than that displayed by President McKinley in his management of affairs during the past month. It is worth while at this point, to thoroughly understand the relations between the United States and Spain *re* Cuba, to go back into ancient history, history not more than a couple of years old.

It is, of course, familiar to the readers of THE NATIONAL REVIEW that the present revolution in Cuba broke out in the eastern part of the island on February 24th, 1895. It was, after the settlement of the Venezuela boundary dispute, the most complicated question with which President Cleveland and his extremely able Secretary of State, Mr. Olney, were called upon to deal. The Cubans have displayed great skill. Their military ability in carrying on the kind of war they waged has been demonstrated. Outnumbered from the start, badly armed, short of ammunition, insufficiently clad, miserably clothed, and without surgeons or medicine, they have decimated the best troops of Spain, and caused her to expend untold millions in the prosecution of the war. They have made a laughing-stock of Spain's greatest generals; they have treated with contempt the mild rule of Martinez Campos and the seventeenth century brutality of Valeriano Weyler. Apart from everything else the military

genius of the Cuban leaders must command the admiration of the world.

But even more brilliant than their strategy has been their diplomacy. When the army was without arms or ammunition, when cartridges were so scarce privates were permitted to have but one apiece, and were severely punished unless that cartridge found a place in a vital spot in a Spanish body, the Cubans were maintaining a "legation" in the city of Washington; in New York the junta was conducting a propaganda which was as effective in its way as were the bullets of Gomez' ragged army in the cane-fields of Cuba. The wrongs of Cuba were spread broadcast throughout the United States; newspapers were furnished material for many a leader; public men with facts, perhaps a trifle perverted, to serve as the basis for speeches in which the brutality of the Spaniard and the humanity of the Cuban was painted in glowing colours. The public at first was indifferent. Cuba, though only a short hundred miles from these shores, was a foreign country, its people spoke a foreign language, and they had the taint of negro blood in them. The American is, as a rule, too much interested in himself to care much about his neighbours, especially a neighbour with woolly hair and a language which he does not understand. From the time of the outbreak of the rebellion until nearly the end of Mr. Cleveland's term, the interest of the United States in Cuban affairs was, at best, only languid indifference. At times passion was aroused, when news of some peculiarly atrocious act reached the ears of the American public, or when some man saw in it an opportunity to gain a measure of notoriety by savage denunciations of Spain. There were times when these men in the security of the capital could scarcely be restrained from rushing in single-handed and declaring war on Spain.

Truth is, American sympathy with Cuba has largely been a manufactured article. It has afforded a magnificent chance for the "yellow journals." Special artists, special correspondents, special commissioners, were in their glory. The average reading public, whether in America, Great Britain, or elsewhere, rather delights in horrors. Pictures of massacred Armenians are as popular with a certain class in London as are pictures of starving Cubans with the same intelligent reader in New York, Boston, or Chicago. People who like that sort of thing bought the newspapers to get more of it, and although some people foolishly imagine newspapers are philanthropic institutions published to promote the welfare of humanity, the average publisher will not scruple to tell you he issues his paper to promote the welfare of his individual bank account.

Perhaps the Cuban question might have remained a minor issue had it not been made political. The Republicans and the anti-Cleveland Democrats were strenuously demanding the liberation of Cuba, and Mr. Cleveland with equal determination was resolved not to plunge the country into war to put a stop to Spanish barbarity. And so matters dragged along until the time came for the two great parties to meet in national convention. The Republicans met first and took a decided stand on Cuba. Here is the plank of their platform :—

"From the hour of achieving their own independence the people of the United States have regarded with sympathy the struggles of other American peoples to free themselves from European domination. We watch with deep and abiding interest the heroic battle of the Cuban patriots against cruelty and oppression, and our best hopes go out for the full success of their determined contest for liberty.

"The Government of Spain having lost control of Cuba, and being unable to protect the property and lives of resident American citizens or to comply with its treaty obligations, we believe that the Government of the United States should actively use its influence and good offices to restore peace and give independence to the island."

It was understood at the time of its adoption that this plank caused a good deal of discussion in the platform committee. Sweeping as it was there were some members of the committee who did not consider it went far enough. They wanted the Republican Party to pledge themselves to secure the independence of Cuba. The Democratic plank was briefer and less decisive. It reads :—

"We extend our sympathy to the people of Cuba in their heroic struggle for liberty and independence."

During the campaign Cuba was on the lips of many an orator. Virtually the Republican Party stood before the country pledged to secure Cuban independence. When McKinley was elected and the Republicans were placed in full possession of the governmental machinery, I think those of us who looked ahead realized that before Mr. McKinley's term expired he would be brought face to face with a situation which might prove to be full of embarrassment for him. More than once the attention of readers of THE NATIONAL REVIEW has been called to this. Fifteen months ago (January, 1897) I said :—

"It is difficult to understand how action in regard to Cuba can be much longer postponed. . . . It is realized, and has been for many months past, that at any moment events may force the United States into championing the cause of the insurgents. . . . It is the general expectation that McKinley will not

be able to withstand the pressure of public sentiment which is now so loudly clamouring for action on the part of the United States, and that the coming summer will see this country and Spain at war. The country will hail a war with great satisfaction, and it would give the administration great *éclat*. There is only one opinion as to the result. Military men, as well as civilians, believe that the Spanish fleet would be blown out of the water in the first engagement, and that in a very short time after the declaration of hostilities the American flag would be floating over Moro Castle. In fact, one of the reasons why war with Spain is so universally popular, is that it is looked upon merely as a military promenade, just as the French in 1870 marched up and down the Boulevards shouting '*À Berlin*,' and talked of bivouacking under the Lindens before three months had passed. A war means plenty of excitement, chances to make money, and liberal pensions, three things all very dear to the American heart."

Mr. McKinley might have staved off action had it not been for the tragedy of February 15th. The destruction of the *Maine* shaped the President's policy, sorely against his will. Mr. McKinley's course throughout has been remarkable. He has been both a Jingo and a Conservative; he has trimmed and temporized and vacillated when firmness and boldness were required of him. The Republicans in Congress, who accepted the platform of their Party as their creed, who had made speeches pledging themselves to secure the freedom of Cuba, and who had denounced Mr. Cleveland and the Democratic Party for their cowardice and indifference to the cry of oppressed humanity, found themselves unable to reply to the taunts of their opponents, or to satisfactorily explain to their constituents why a Republican administration calmly permitted atrocities to continue which they had so fiercely denounced. They urged Mr. McKinley to action. He did not discourage them, he did not refuse to act; he encouraged them to hope, he led them to believe that he was as much the friend of the Cuban as they were. And, on the other hand, Mr. McKinley told the coterie of wealthy men which surround him that he was for peace, that they need not fear he would plunge the country into war. Had the question been put to a vote, had the country been asked whether it would go to war to free Cuba or leave the island to its fate, the answer, I assert, would have been an emphatic negative.

But there came that dire tragedy in the harbour of Havana, on the night of the fifteenth of February, which changed the situation as quickly as a powerful battleship was transformed into a heap of twisted steel. The brutality of Weyler, the sufferings of the *reconcentrados*, the impotence of Spanish rule, the injury to American commerce, were all lost sight of. Spain had destroyed the *Maine*, cowardly, treacherously, despicably. The method of the midnight assassin had been pursued. American sailors in a time of peace had been slaughtered as they slept.

The people of this country believed that the *Maine* had been deliberately blown up by a mine purposely placed in Havana

harbour to be used against an American vessel of war. They believed this the moment they heard of the disaster, they believed still more firmly a few days later, when the American newspaper correspondents commenced their work of investigation, and, with rare intelligence, made such discoveries as pointed irrefutably to an external explosion; their lingering doubts were removed once and for all when the official Court of Enquiry reported that a submarine mine was the agent of destruction employed.

In the light of this report the American people expected that President McKinley would deal with the case firmly and boldly. They were not asking the President to bully or hector Spain, but they had a right to demand Spain would be sharply called to account, that the destruction of a national vessel and her crew in a supposed friendly harbour at a time when peace nominally prevailed, could not be permitted to go unnoticed. The country would have justified a ringing declaration from the President; nay, more, they considered it his duty to speak to Congress in no uncertain tones. Instead, Mr. McKinley sent to Congress a message which was not only weak in composition but "flabby" in purpose. Spain was not asked to make speedy and ample reparation. The President considered he had done all that was required of him when he told Congress: "I do not permit myself to doubt that the sense of justice of the Spanish nation will dictate a course of action suggested by honour and the friendly relations of the two Governments." The words were a mockery. At the time there were no friendly relations existing between the two Governments; Spain then, as heretofore, had been accused of being devoid of both justice and honour.

The effect of this message upon Congress and the country was remarkable. Indignation in the legislative body was aroused to such a pitch that it needed only a suggestion for the President to have been publicly insulted. This feeling was not confined to politicians. Throughout the country it was felt that the President had deliberately trifled with the national honour, and endeavoured to minimize the greatest injury which one nation could do to another. In the language of the administration the destruction of the *Maine* was an "incident." The country refused to so regard it. An editorial in the *New York Times*, one of the most conservative and dignified papers in the United States, a few days after the President's message was sent to Congress, expresses most admirably the prevailing sentiment. "What has made Jingoes of peaceful American citizens?" asks the *Times*. "What has made American citizens see in the most moderate and reasonable proposals of the Spanish Government nothing more than pretexts for the delay of war until war can be made on terms more favourable

to Spain? It is the destruction of the *Maine*. That cannot be taken into account in diplomatic correspondence, because it would be necessary to assume that the Spanish official report that the *Maine* was destroyed by accident was entitled to equal faith and credit with the American official report that she was destroyed by design. There is not one American in a thousand, or in ten thousand, who will admit the assumption. The testimony against Spain is simply overwhelming. The report of our Court of Enquiry has made us all believe that the *Maine* was deliberately moored over a Spanish mine for the purpose of destroying her in case she should make a hostile demonstration."

With fatuousness so remarkable that it seems incomprehensible the President and his Cabinet totally missed the drift of public opinion. The *Maine* was an "incident" merely, to be settled by diplomacy; but in the meanwhile the President proposed to keep the Cuban question alive by asking Congress to appropriate £100,000 for the relief of the starving *reconcentrados*. The country was not to be permitted to go to war about the *Maine*, but Mr. McKinley was determined Spain should allow the United States to feed her starving subjects, and if she refused she must take the consequences. The Americans are as charitable as any people in the world, but they rightly believe in charity beginning at home. It was time enough to talk about charity to the *reconcentrados* when justice had been done to the men who wore the uniform of the United States.

Mr. McKinley laboured over his policy of feeding the starving Cubans while the dead Americans went unavenged. He could not understand the resentment he had aroused, he could not understand "what had made Jingoes of peaceable American citizens." His vision was obscured, and he fancied that he alone prevented Congress from waging an unholy war. He turned a ready ear to the financial magnates who told him the country did not want war, and that the destruction of the *Maine* could be settled through the ordinary channels of diplomacy. The city of New York, as might be expected, was opposed to war, because war unsettles the rate of exchange, and increases marine insurance premiums. It is not surprising that the New York view found a reflection in the London newspapers, all of whom with but a single exception obtain their American news from New York. Mr. Smalley, of course, with that marvellous genius for blundering which he usually displays in treating of things American, pictured Mr. McKinley standing steadfast resisting the clamour of Congress for war; the New York correspondent of *The Standard* cavalierly dismissed the *Maine* as not being a factor in the case.

The eyes of the President were not long permitted to remain closed. Congress gave him to understand, in no uncertain tones, that unless he adopted a more vigorous policy they would take the direction of matters out of his hands. This they could do. Congress alone has the power to declare war. Congress could adopt a resolution declaring war against Spain, and the sending of that resolution to the White House would have placed the President in a most embarrassing position. To save himself Mr. McKinley caused it to be known that he would recommend Congress to give him authority to intervene with force in Cuba. Still mindful of the proprieties, remembering that the business element opposed hostilities, the President determined he would ask for authority to intervene on the grounds of humanity. "Humanitarian intervention" was his phrase. It sounded well. Humanity covereth much. It meets the approval of the Church; even Wall Street cannot afford to be unmindful of the obligations of humanity.

Apropos of this message there have been some very remarkable things said and done. The President had practically pledged himself to communicate with Congress on the sixth of this month. On that day the galleries of both Houses of Congress were filled to overflowing, the whole country waited expectantly for the President's delivery. It came not. Its postponement was officially announced as being due to the representations of Consul-General Lee that if the message was made public while he, his associate Consular officers and other Americans were still in Cuba, an indiscriminate massacre would be the result. I have every reason to believe a despatch of this tenor was received from the Consul-General. I am assured by a Senator, whose name is as well known in London as it is in this city, that the President handed him the telegram, which he read. And yet when the announcement was made it was discredited. Congress believed the President had juggled with them: that at the very last moment he had lost his courage, and lacked the spirit to assume the responsibility. These were not the idle vapourings of insignificant individuals, they were the expressions of men of character and standing. Doubtless, a great injustice has been done the President in this regard; I am convinced he consented to delay believing the lives of Americans were in jeopardy. But the incident is suggestive. It shows how the country has come to distrust Mr. McKinley, how his vacillation and indecision have destroyed respect for him. Unfortunately for Mr. McKinley, his every move has, apparently, or merely coincidently, been anticipated by the stock market. When Congress looked for a message which should breathe war, the stock market was unusually buoyant. Some of the President's closest friends are said

to be heavily interested in the rise and fall of speculative securities. The President's misfortune is that he has such friends. When you also remember that at the very time the President was writing his message charging Spain with the destruction of the *Maine* his Private Secretary was urging the business men of the country to support the President, and prevent Congress from acting contrary to his wishes—accusing Congress of being determined on war while the President stood out for peace—one can understand there was some foundation for the suspicions aroused in the minds of the public.

Last Monday public curiosity was finally gratified, and the President's message was sent to Congress. Verily it was the case of mountain being in labour and bringing forth a mouse. Never had a thing been heralded with such a beating of drums and blowing of horns which was so unimportant when it came in sight. This message, which the President had not dared to make public so long as General Lee remained in Havana for fear it would drive the Spaniards to frenzy, when examined was found to be so innocuous that even the excitable Spaniard must have smiled as he read how skilfully the President indicted Spain with all the tediousness of legal verbosity, and then in the last paragraph moved to quash on the ground that no statute had been violated. I need not comment on the message at length, as it is an old story now, but anyone who will take the trouble to read it carefully will see that the burden of the President's complaint against Spain is the policy of concentration which was established by General Weyler, and the expense which has been entailed on the United States by the duty of preventing filibustering. Mr. McKinley shows that the concentration order has been abrogated, so that the chief reason for intervention is not in the name of humanity but because it is expensive for the country to enforce its neutrality laws, laws which have been persistently and continuously violated since the inception of the rebellion, and which had they been rigidly enforced would have prevented the Cubans from obtaining their supplies in this country.

The message was thoroughly characteristic of the President. It is the province of Presidents to lead their Party, in an international matter to lead the country, not to follow and be subordinate to Congress. This is the position in which the President has placed himself. He has abdicated his leadership by failing to make any positive, definite, unmistakable recommendations which would blaze through the jungle of an unknown situation so that Congress could follow him without question. The men who rate country above Party are wandering in uncertainty. They are willing to

follow the President, but they do not know where he proposes to lead them. The believers in war regard the strong utterances against Spain in the first part of the message as sufficient ground for Radical action, while the Conservatives point to the last paragraph as indicating a good and sufficient reason for undue haste. In fact, in the words of one of the cleverest newspaper writers of the day: "The message in its effect upon Congress is like a patent sign that displays one legend if squinted at from the left, another if viewed from the right, and still another if inspected from a point directly in front."

Writing at this moment no one knows what the outcome will be. We are all in a hopeless maze. By the time this is read the United States may be at war or the armed truce may still be maintained. I am simply giving the situation as it exists to-day: a situation as unfortunate as it is unparalleled.

I have roughly sketched the course of events during the past thirty days. It is not my purpose to put an unfair construction upon Mr. McKinley's acts or to place him in an unenviable attitude before English readers. The facts, however, are that his course has been neither consistent nor dignified; it has been wanting in firmness and, apparently, courage. It has been the policy of a politician rather than that of a statesman; of one who has essayed the difficult and generally unsatisfactory task of carrying water on both shoulders. With this understanding one can perhaps appreciate why the President and Congress have not been in complete harmony; why the country has seemingly been in sight of war one day only to find peace still existent the next. It explains why McKinley's name has been greeted with hisses in public gatherings; why Mark Hanna has been burned in effigy. The Americans will condone much, but the one thing they will not forgive is the suspicion that their public men are invertebrate.

It is the boast of the American that he has a keener appreciation of humour than anybody else in the world. This enjoyment of the ridiculous is a national trait fully developed. We are at the present moment too much occupied with the serious side of war and warlike preparations to have much thought for the absurd, but when war's alarums are over it will doubtless occur to many people, considering the time and money and tribulation it required to get ready to fight Spain, a bankrupt, fourth-rate Power, with a toy navy, perhaps it was the mercy of Providence which caused Lord Salisbury to "back down" during the Venezuelan excitement. I remember those days very well. I remember the way in which public men and the Press talked about fighting England, about

sending a fleet to Venezuela, just as if England were another Spain. And the comical part of it was that the bloviating members of Congress and the writers for the Press really believed it could be done. It was admitted that England had a respectable navy, that she might perhaps—but it was an admission always made with considerable reservation—bombard a few cities and do a little damage. But there was always the American *deus ex machina*—"Yankee ingenuity"—to come to the rescue. "Yankee ingenuity" would build battleships and torpedo-boats as easily as one could order his tailor to make him a coat, and improvise other deadly implements of war. "Yankee ingenuity" in our present "war," or war scare, has not yet been very much in evidence. Not a single vessel of consequence has been added to the navy except those bought in British yards; England has supplied the United States with rapid fire guns, and powder, and projectiles.

It is pleasanter, however, to forget these little foibles of our kin and note how in the time of her trouble America has found the readiest sympathy from England; how the country has instinctively realized that if the emergency should rise England stands ready to extend something more substantial than sympathy to the people who sprang from her loins. The United States know to-day as perhaps they never realized before that men of the Anglo-Saxon race, men with the common heritage of speech, whose traditions are one and whose glorious past is the same, can never be divided though seas separate them. One reads with gratification in a leading American newspaper that:—

"It can be only a pitiful fraction of the American people which does not very cordially appreciate the tone of English feeling as reflected by the London Press and the verses of the British Laureate. . . . In the first place, it is most satisfactory to have a foreign observer do justice to the behaviour of our Government and of our people in a very trying situation. Apart from the satisfaction which we have in finding ourselves understood, there is a more practical consideration. . . . . It is quite out of the question that if we had a statesman at the head of the State Department he should have allowed these months to go by without expressing approval, on the part of the United States, of the position Great Britain has taken with reference to the trade of China. If the President finds himself forced to be his own Secretary of State it would be well for him to acknowledge the friendly feeling shown by Great Britain in the most welcome and the most practical way, while at the same time promoting American commercial interests."

The earnest efforts made by Sir Julian Pauncefote, Her Majesty's Ambassador at this capital, to prevent war, and the cordial sympathy of the British Government with the policy of the American Government, have been fully appreciated and welcomed. After all we may have reason to thank Spain. Anything which binds the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race

will cause no discordant note in England. Perhaps the time for an Anglo-American alliance is nearer at hand than we think For the good of the world and the lasting benefit of both nations it can come none too soon.

When some months ago I suggested that developments in the Far East had forced American public men to consider whether it was not the natural policy of the United States to lend their active support to Great Britain in her determination not to permit Chinese ports to be closed, the suggestion was received in some quarters with derision and in others with contempt. I may be pardoned for referring to the fact that I pointed out American public men of the advanced school were considering whether the traditional policy of international isolation was the wisest policy to be followed to-day. A noteworthy contribution on the literature of the subject has been furnished by Mr. Richard Olney, Mr. Cleveland's Secretary of State, unquestionably the ablest American of his time, and a writer of singular force, clearness, and directness of expression. In an address delivered at Harvard College—which will be published in full in the *Atlantic Monthly* for May—on "International Isolation of the United States," Mr. Olney shows that the rule of international isolation for America formulated by Washington "could hardly have been adhered to more faithfully if it had formed part of the text of the Constitution. But there can be no question that such common understanding and practical application have given an extension to the rule quite in excess of its terms as well as of its true spirit and meaning."

Mr. Olney claims that Washington laid down the rule of non-participation "in the ordinary vicissitudes of European politics," but coupled it with the express declaration that extraordinary emergencies may arise in which temporary alliances with foreign Powers may be properly resorted to. Mr. Olney argues with great force that the whole theory of the Washington rule of isolation is obsolete owing to changed conditions, as having outlived its usefulness.

"If we shall sooner or later—and we certainly shall," says Mr. Olney, "shake off the spell of the Washington legend and cease to act the *rôle* of a sort of international recluse, it will not follow that formal alliances with other nations for permanent or even temporary purposes will soon or often be found expedient. On the other hand, with which of them we shall, as a rule, practically co-operate cannot be doubtful. From the point of view of our material interests alone, our best friend as well as most formidable foe is that world-wide Empire whose navies rule the seas, and

which on our northern frontier controls a dominion itself imperial in extent and capabilities. . . .

"But our material interests only point in the same direction as considerations of a higher and less selfish character. There is a patriotism of race as well as of country—and the Anglo-American is as little likely to be indifferent to the one as to the other. Family quarrels there have been heretofore and doubtless will be again, and the two peoples, at the safe distance which the broad Atlantic interposes, take with each other liberties of speech which only the fondest and dearest relatives indulge in. Nevertheless, that they would be found standing together against any alien foe by whom either was menaced with destruction or irreparable calamity, it is not permissible to doubt. Nothing less could be expected of the close community between them in origin, speech, thought, literature, institutions, ideals—in the kind and degree of the civilization enjoyed by both. In that same community, and in that co-operation in good works which should result from it, lies, it is not too much to say, the best hope for the future not only of the two kindred peoples, but of the human race itself. . . .

"It is enough to point out that of all obstacles to the onward march of civilization, none approaches in magnitude and obduracy 'the scourge of war,' and that the English and American peoples, both by precept and by example, have done more during the last century to do away with war and to substitute peaceful and civilized methods of settling international controversies, than all the other nations of the world combined have done during all the world's history. It is not too much to hope, let us trust, that the near future will show them making even more marked advances in the same direction, and, while thus consulting their own best interests, also setting an example sure to have the most important and beneficent influence upon the destinies of mankind."

Considering the position, standing, and prominence of the writer, these utterances of Mr. Olney are the most important which have been heard for many years. Mr. Olney at the present time holds no official position, but Democrats throughout the country cherish the hope he may again re-enter public life, and many Republicans knowing his courage, honesty, and intellectuality, would welcome his presence in the White House. The influence of a man of Mr. Olney's character is far reaching. If the country is in a mood to consider anything but war when the *Atlantic Monthly* appears, I feel convinced the counsel of the former Secretary of State will be listened to with the greatest attention, and I believe bear fruit in the near future. Public men have feared foreign alliances because they worshipped a fetich, and dreaded to arouse the displeasure of the

immortals. Mr. Olney renders a great service in pointing out that the living present is sometimes a safer guide than the dead past.

Had not the thought of war engrossed public attention to the exclusion of practically everything else an agreement reached a few days ago to bring about a settlement of the long-standing questions in dispute between the United States and the Dominion of Canada would have attracted general attention, both in this country and in England, as it is but little has been said on the subject. It will be recalled that when Sir Wilfrid Laurier visited Washington a few months ago to attempt to reach an arrangement on the question of pelagic sealing General Foster, acting on behalf of the Washington Government, proposed a total cessation of pelagic sealing, but made no offer of compensation. This proposition the Canadian Premier declined to accept, and in turn proposed the creation of a high joint commission to consider all questions affecting the interests of the two countries. The President refused to sanction a commission, and negotiations were suspended. Sir Julian Pauncefote, who has consistently worked for the establishment of a closer *entente*, and has exhibited rare skill, tact, and force in the conduct of diplomatic affairs, was convinced that the welfare of both the United States, as well as Great Britain, demanded that matters which have from time to time caused considerable friction, should be permanently settled, and that a high joint commission was necessary to bring about that result. Patiently waiting for the right opportunity, he was able a few weeks ago, when it was proposed to consider a modification of the sealing regulations, under the terms of the Paris award, to suggest the advisability of a diplomatic conference to discuss all pending questions and decide which of them could properly be submitted to adjustment by a commission. Partly influenced by the very cordial relations existing between the United States and Great Britain at the present time, and also animated by a desire to remove all causes of friction, President McKinley signified his willingness to the calling of the preliminary conference, which will be held in this city in the course of the next few weeks. If the conference is successful, as there is every reason to believe it will be, the commission will take up for consideration with a view to settlement by means of treaty stipulations, the fur seal question, the protection of fish in the waters of the rivers and lakes contiguous to the United States and Canada, the subject of reciprocal immigration, commercial reciprocity, or any other unsettled question between the United States and Canada which either of the Governments may see proper to bring forward. Too

much credit cannot be given Sir Julian Pauncefote for what promises to be a very happy solution of what more than once in recent years has threatened to very seriously disturb the friendly relations existing between the United States and the Dominion.

A. Maurice Low.

[Note.—Since Mr. Low's letter left Washington the situation has developed rapidly, and the "armed truce" between the United States and Spain has ripened into war. After a short and severe conflict between the two Houses of Congress a Joint Resolution was passed. The House of Representatives desired to authorize but not to compel the President to intervene by force in Cuba, thus leaving the door open for further negotiation; also to leave the future Government of Cuba an open question. The Senate, convinced that the resources of negotiation had been exhausted, believed that the moment had come for action, and its resolution directed the President to intervene by force; at the same time, the Senate was concerned to clear American policy of the suspicion of "land grabbing," and to act in harmony with the insurgent Government. So its resolution recognised "the Republic of Cuba." After a conference, in which there was some give and take, though on balance the victory seems to have rested with the Senate—as immediate action was enjoined and a self-denying ordinance was adopted—a Joint Resolution was agreed upon, which, after reciting the "abhorrent conditions" existing in Cuba, runs as follows:—

1. That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent.

2. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

3. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States and call into the actual service of the United States the Militia of the several States to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.

4. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over the said island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determinaton when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people.

After its acceptance by the Legislature this Resolution was

presented to the Executive, and the President, realizing that Congress was in no mood to be trifled with and would overrule his veto by the necessary two-thirds majority, affixed his signature on April 21st. An ultimatum to Spain, in accordance with the policy of Congress, was forthwith drawn up, and on being shown to the Spanish Ambassador in Washington he applied for his passports and crossed the border into Canada, leaving Spanish interests in the United States in the care of the French and Austrian Ambassadors. On hearing of the ultimatum, but before receiving it, the Spanish Government handed his passports to the American Ambassador in Madrid, General Woodford. He left Spain the same day, confiding American interests in that country to the British representative. Relations were thus completely ruptured between the United States and Spain, and war commenced. The United States squadron sailed from Key West to blockade Havana and the adjoining ports, capturing a few prizes on the way. A second squadron is sailing for the Philippines, and an army of 125,000 men is being raised to invade Cuba. So far Spain has made no move, and no decisive event is expected for the present, owing to the unreadiness of America on land and Spain's inferiority at sea. Both belligerents have substantially adhered to the Declaration of Paris, but this action must not be regarded as final.—EDITOR, *N.R.*]

THE AUTOCRAT OF THE SICK-ROOM.

"ARE we not in danger of being over-nursed?" is a question which was put to me some time ago, and which has given me food for thought since. It is a point of view of the nursing question which had not occurred to me before, and I begin to think there may be some truth in it.

If it is the case that "we never materially benefit the world by taking on ourselves the duties of other people," may there not be a danger of the nurse usurping (or having handed over to her) the duties of the family? Is there not a risk of a letting down of *our* obligations to a low standard, to make life easy and pleasant by shifting the burden of our responsibilities on to the nurse's shoulders?

One fact is certain: the number of nurses is constantly increasing, and the demand for them, as yet, appears to exceed the supply. Where there were hundreds a few years ago there are now thousands who turn to nursing as a profession—a profession and not a vocation. There lies the difference between the time of the commencement of nursing as an organized system and the present day.

In former days I can remember what a serious step it was for a young woman to enter on the nursing career. How we others looked up to her with a feeling akin to reverence, as one set apart for the service of God and her fellow creatures; for it was accepted, as a first principle, that religion was the mainspring of the action. Now, what a change! It is not, of course, to be expected that all the members of so large a society should be worthy of this high calling, but I confess it often jars on me to hear nursing discussed and weighed in the balance with teaching, or even dressmaking, or typewriting, as a remunerative employment for any young woman who has to earn her own living. Many of them enter on the first stage of training as probationers in a hospital, with so little thought beforehand of the painful and disagreeable duties they have no heart for, that at the outset they are discouraged and give up; and better that they should do so, than struggle on, only to swell the ranks of those who

enter the nursing profession without any feeling for it beyond that of earning a livelihood.

How different this is from the spirit of the nursing sisterhoods of the foreign religious communities! who are bound by their vows, and drawn by the cords of Christian love and charity to all suffering humanity. No thought of gain for themselves distracts them from their high ideal. The cup of cold water, given in the name of the Divine Master, does not ask for its reward here, and such service is indeed doubly blessed to her who gives, and to the one who receives it at her hands. It is evident that it would be Utopian to expect such a high standard as this amongst all the members of the nursing profession as established in England, though there are in its ranks many women as nobly unselfish and as devoted as any sister of the religious orders. The remainder must, naturally, be of varying degrees of excellence, or the reverse; and yet, as a rule, the public treats them all as though they were on the same level, without the slightest attempt at discrimination.

When illness invades our homes, we, who can afford to do so, send—telegraph generally—for "a nurse" (we should probably be more explicit did we require a cook or a housemaid at short notice!), and when she arrives we take her for granted. Her certificate of proficiency, enhanced by her uniform, impresses us so much that we meekly abdicate in her favour, and leave her in command of the sick-room.

No consideration of her suitability for the particular case, no doubt of her sympathy and kindness for her patient, disturbs our blind confidence in her.

Is it cowardice, or stupidity, or selfishness that makes us act in this way? I fear, too often, the latter; for, having devolved all responsibility on the nurse, who we choose to exalt on a pedestal of perfection, we are free to follow our usual avocations, complacently leaving events to take their course, through the stages of convalescence as well as of sickness.

Yet we wonder, and are indignant, when, at the end of weeks, or it may be months, of this enforced intimacy, we sometimes find that our brother, son, or even grandfather! has become engaged to, and intends to marry, the nurse, who, he thinks, he finds indispensable to his comfort and happiness. Then, instead of blaming our own selfishness and neglect for this, to us, unpleasant state of affairs, we are too apt to throw all the blame upon the nurse, forgetting that professional etiquette does not remove temptation from the path, and that we have no right to thrust others into danger.

A nurse is, after all, and before all, a woman, with the failings as well as feelings of her sex, and it might be well to remember the

fact that some women are born flirts, and a nurse's cap and gown does not alter their nature, or lessen their attractiveness. Any matron of a hospital, where there are a number of probationers, could tell the same tale of anxiety and worry, caused by the necessity of watching this very human tendency in many of the young women who are being trained under their care.

I have sometimes ventured to think that this hospital training with its strict routine, admirably as it works in its proper place becomes, when introduced and carried into its full practice, in private nursing, a hard substitute for the more homely treatment of former days.

In a long and weary convalescence, only one who has endured it can realize how trying this clockwork regularity can become; and, in a case where two trained nurses are employed, their ministrations, gentle and kind as they may be, are often an absolute nightmare to a nervous patient, who has to be handed over, in exactly the right state of preparation, and at the appointed moment, by the nurse "going off duty," to the nurse "coming on," and who must sometimes long to exchange this perfection of discipline, for the perhaps less complete service of the good old-fashioned nurse, who, while obeying the doctor's instructions, felt she might allow a margin of liberty to her patient, and generally carried her point by coaxing.

I think one becomes very like a child in a long illness, and I, for one, would prefer to be treated as one, rather than as a *case*, given over to mechanical routine at the hands of a nurse, who can have no personal interest in you, who never saw you before, and who possibly would not care ever to see you again, once she has left you!

I admit the necessity of this routine in a hospital, where all the work would be at a deadlock without it, but I pity the patients, who bear it so patiently, with all my heart. When I walk down the wards I never fail to picture to myself the scene in the early morning, when, as all has to be in order in good time before the visit of the doctors, the nurses make their rounds, waking, washing and dressing, as far as may be, the willing and the unwilling. Then the breakfast to be eaten to the moment, whether ready or unready for it. Must not some of the sufferers think with regret and longing of the dear, though perhaps untidy and ill-regulated home! I do sadly realize that it is all indispensable in a public institution, but why, I am impelled to ask, do we import this tyranny (for it is nothing less) into our homes?

It seems to me then, that it is very possible to be over-nursed, both for the patient physically, and for the patient's family morally. These last must deteriorate and lose the possession of many of the

best qualities (or the chance of acquiring them) by having every care and attention (and consequent self-abnegation), which should be theirs to give to those to whom God has bound them by the ties of family, taken out of their hands and performed for them by one who is, after all, only a hireling.

But there is a sadder and more serious aspect of the case, when the same course of giving up all control of affairs to the nurse is taken in a dangerous, or even fatal, illness.

Why in the name of Christian charity and common-sense does a woman, who is a competent head of her household, efface herself directly the nurse comes on the scene? Welcome her, make use of her, be as nice to her as you can be, but do not abdicate your position in her favour, or yield all your authority to her, for your own sake. And for the patients, can you doubt its being a support and consolation to them to know that they are not left absolutely to a stranger's care, but that at any moment of the day or night, some faithful, loving heart is watching and within call?

For the sake of all concerned, it is only fair that the employers should not ignore their share of the responsibility of the case, be it a serious one or not. And if we are to avoid the danger of being over-nursed, and if the nurse is to prove the blessing in the house which she can and ought to be, I can only suggest that she should not, under any circumstances, be allowed to become the "Autocrat of the sick-room."

MARGARET VANE.

A PUBLICIST'S VIEW OF FRANCE.*

HAD Mr. Bodley confined his work within reasonable limits, and had he adopted the impartial tone of Mr. Hamerton, which he admires so much, the result would have been welcome indeed. True that readers can obtain all they probably care to know of modern France, social or political, in brief and lucid summaries by French writers. Nevertheless, an English view of the same subject is ever interesting and instructive. Unfortunately the volumes before us, as we learn to be followed by others, exact much more leisure than most serious readers possess, whilst the strong anti-French, or rather anti-Republican, bias largely detracts from the value of the book. Apparently written under the inspiration of the Comte de Mun, that pillar of the Ultramontane or Reactionary Party in France, Mr. Bodley's work might almost be called a bitter indictment of the Third Republic. We are reminded at every page of table-talk in what is called *la société*—namely, that section of French society still holding aloof from the Elysée as a lazar-house, and summing up affairs in general by the phrase, "*Cette canaille de République.*"

The first volume concerns itself with the historical aspect and effects of the Revolution—Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, and Patriotism. The second, which is far fresher, freer from prejudice, and more interesting, deals with the Parliamentary system and political parties. The latter subject, so complex in itself and so difficult for a foreigner to handle, is admirably dealt with, although at much too great length. Cut down by a third, the volume would gain immensely. Mr. Bodley's enthusiasm for his theme as a whole has led him into strange misconceptions. He is evidently under the impression that English travellers in France never quit the beaten track, and what is more curious still, he thinks that his countrymen know little or nothing of French history. On page 14 of the introduction we read: "Apart from its ecclesiastical and industrial features, Bourges presented a phenomenon which, outside

* *France.* By J. E. Bodley. (Vol. I., p. 316, "The Revolution and Modern France"; Vol. II., p. 458, "The Constitution and Chief of the State".) Macmillan. Price 21s. net.

Paris, and away from the Alpes Maritimes and certain summer resorts, I have rarely encountered on my travels in France—we met an Englishman." Such a statement from the pen of Arthur Young need not have surprised us ; at the present time it awakens a smile. Nowadays the *New York Herald* figures with the *Petit Journal* in tobacconists' shops of tiny Norman or Breton towns. English cyclists bowl past us as we drive along the splendid roads of George Sand's country. That wild and sombre region known as "Les Causses," in other words, the plateaux of the Cévennes, has become familiar to the Anglo-Saxon tourist. Again, had Mr. Hamerton searched France through, he could hardly have lighted upon a less accessible spot than the Morvan, Autun being twelve hours' journey from Paris, and no expresses running between that city and La Roche or Dijon. Yet so disturbed was the author of *Round my House* by English intruders, that he found it necessary to place the following notice in his entrance-hall : "English guests not invited to sleep at Pré Charmoy are requested to leave by six o'clock." In the biography of her late husband, Mrs. Hamerton gives an amusing account of these intrusions. No ! the real phenomenon of French travel at the present time would be the discovery of any place without its English tourist. When we turn to French history, whether past or contemporaneous, we find the same misapprehension. Mr. Bodley seems to think that such matters are wholly ignored on this side of the Channel, that the researches of M. Aulard, the first living authority on the Revolutionary period, the monumental works of MM. Lavisse and Rambaud,* the latter actual Minister of Public Instruction, are wholly unfamiliar to English readers. A few instances will suffice to show how illusory is this conviction, and how refutable are many of the views and statements here insisted upon.

Here is Mr. Bodley's complacent summing up of *lettres de cachet* and the Bastille : "We now know that the demolition of that fortress revealed that the rare prisoners interred in it were not friends of liberty, and *had not much to complain of.*" The italics are my own. But no less than 14,000 *lettres de cachet* were issued during the reign of Louis XVI. alone,† and it happens that an English traveller‡ of unimpeachable authority can tell us whether or no the victims of *lettres de cachet* "had much to complain of."

"I was led" (July 15), writes Dr. Rigby, "by the sound of an approaching crowd towards the end of the Rue St. Honoré, and I

* "*L'Histoire de la Civilisation Française* of M. Rambaud is used as a text-book for the Modern History Tripos at Oxford.

† *L'Histoire de la Civilisation Française, par* A. Rambaud, Vol. II., p. 98.

‡ *Dr. Rigby's Letters from France in 1789,* edited by his daughter, Lady Eastlake. London, 1880.

there witnessed a most affecting spectacle. The Bastille had been scarcely entered and the opposition subdued, when an eager search began to find out and liberate every unhappy captive immured within its walls. Two wretched victims of the detestable tyranny of the old Government had just been discovered and taken from some of the most obscure dungeons of this horrid castle, and were at this time conducted by the crowd to the Palais Royal. One of these was a little feeble old man; he tottered as he walked, and his countenance exhibited little more than the smile of an idiot. The powers of his mind had fallen a sacrifice to his situation. The other was a tall and rather robust old man; his face was directed towards the sky, but his eyes were but little open. Had he been really shut up, as I was told, two-and-forty years where the light of heaven is denied an entrance, it is easy to explain why his eyes were so little open. He had a very long beard, and on the back of his head the hair was unusually abundant, exhibiting a singularity which had the appearance of a disease not unknown to the human species, called the Plica Polonica. It had grown behind to an incredible length, and not having been combed, as was said, during the long period of his confinement, it had become matted together and divided into two long tails, much resembling the tail of a monkey. These tails, I should suppose, would have nearly reached the ground, but as he walked he supported them on his arm."

By the way, did Mr. Bodley ever make a study of the Musée Canavalet, and the instruments of torture discovered in the Bastille at the time of its downfall, the iron stays or corsets and the rest ?

Fortunately French people entertain profound indifference for what foreigners write about them. Fortunately, also, there lives not the French man or woman who would read two bulky volumes of just upon nine hundred pages, many of which merely re-echo in English dress the views of M. Taine. Even Mr. Hamerton's *French and English*, in translation, a comparatively small work, and written in a genial temper, found nothing to be called a public across the water. Otherwise Mr. Bodley's strictures on French character and French institutions would be bitterly and deservedly resented in France. Every national failing or drawback is, of course, attributed to the Revolution, but the vast majority of Frenchmen know that it is not so, and are only too familiar with this way of attacking the Republic. Here is an instance of Mr. Bodley's method : "The contrast between the favour shown to third-class passengers on railways in Monarchical England and the penalty of miserable travel inflicted upon them in Republican France is most significant, as there the Government has

infinitely greater powers of pressure on the companies than has ours. But the poor traveller in the land of Equality has to loiter with the discomfort of fifty years ago, whilst the privileged rich enjoy the luxury of swiftness. One reason may be that all legislators have first-class passes to travel on all the railways of France."

Now, it would be every whit as logical to attribute the comparative discomfort of French hotels to Republican institutions. The real cause is the easy-going character of the French nation, and, in the matter of railway travel, the total absence of competition. Take that all-powerful monopoly, the Paris-Lyon-Méditerranée Company. Whilst a Bradford business man bound to London has the choice of three lines, under the control of three separate companies, his compeer of Marseilles or Toulon has no choice whatever. Thus it comes about that at certain seasons, early in October, for instance, travellers, after arriving in Paris an hour or more behind time, have yet an hour or more to wait before obtaining their luggage and a cab. But the P.L.M. is not a State railway, and the Government is powerless to interfere. Here is another fact showing the futility of Mr. Bodley's charge: for the last twenty years I have annually visited French friends in Burgundy. Why am I compelled, against my will, to take the P.L.M. line to or from Dijon, instead of varying my route by the more interesting Ligne de l'Est? Simply because, in spite of protestations and petitions to the Chamber, the powerful company just named will not permit the Compagnie de l'Est to have a terminus in the town. Were a competitive express started between Dijon, Marseilles, and Paris, we should soon find third-class *rapides* and other improvements. In this instance, as it happens, a public protest was made, and in vain. As a rule, our neighbours take such grievances with a complacency absolutely incomprehensible to the insular mind. One reason may be that French people are never in a hurry about anything. Nothing more dismays and alarms French travellers in England than the excessive rapidity of our express trains.

Just as every drawback in the life of modern France is here attributed to Republican institutions, so every defect or vice of national character is directly imputed to the Revolution. Mr. Bodley's bitter attacks upon French politicians and Frenchmen generally do not come with grace or appropriateness from the pen of a stranger. Especially at the present time are these severe incriminations to be regretted, following as they do on the heels of three most genial and well-thought-out appreciations of ourselves by French writers. I allude to the excellent and widely-read works of MM. Max Leclerc, Leroy-Beaulieu, and Demolins. But it

must be borne in mind that we are now looking at France through Ultramontane spectacles, and that in certain French eyes, fortunately constituting an insignificant minority, *cette canaille de République* is still "the putrid carcase, the mother of evil," anathematized by Burke. What, for instance, should we say of any French writer selecting the murder of the youthful Rutland at Tewkesbury as an instance of the ferocious hatred of Englishmen for each other? Yet the following parallel holds good. Mr. Bodley thus moralizes on a picture in the Luxembourg having for subject the "legendary death" (legendary, of course, because the culprits were Royalists) "of the young Barra said to have been killed by the Blancs for crying 'Vive la République!' "It is a story the currency of which falsifies history for the presumable purpose of proclaiming that the murder of children by Frenchmen is a normal incident of French civil disturbance." Elsewhere we find: "The bitterness of Frenchmen for Frenchmen may be traced to the period when the principle of fraternity was officially enunciated"; and further, "we need only refer to the cruel annals of the Revolution" for the same conclusion. But, as M. Rambaud and many writers point out, the horrible tortures publicly inflicted upon criminals, Protestants and others, had gradually brutalized and hardened the people for centuries before. The crimes of the Revolution—a drop in the ocean compared to those committed on French soil in the name of religion—are directly attributable to influences for which the State and the Church were alone responsible. Just thirty years before the fall of the Bastille, Damiens was tortured in the eyes of all Paris, fashionable and proletarian. His agonies—intensified by every device of human ingenuity—lasted four hours, and, doubtless, ended far too soon for his tormentors. In Madame Roland's Memoirs, she speaks of the awful shrieks of victims being broken on the wheel which reached her convent walls. To go a little farther back. This is how the ancient *régime* educated the masses; this is how the love of Frenchmen for each other was fostered under a Christian king! A common spectacle after the greatest political crime in French history, namely, the Revocation, was that of Protestant galley-slaves on the march, peaceful citizens whose only crime was their religion. Thus writes a victim, a youth of twenty: "At nine o'clock we were unchained and taken into the courtyard. We were then ordered to strip naked—as I have said, it was mid-winter and freezing hard—the dilatory getting brutal blows from the cowhide. In this condition, naked as we had come into the world, a bitter wind blowing from the north, we were kept two full hours whilst the soldiers searched our clothes, laying hands on anything they chose, pocket-handkerchiefs, linen, tobacco; remonstrances being answered with

curses and blows. We were then ordered to march to the other end of the courtyard, where our clothes lay in a heap. But, oh, horrible spectacle! most of us were so rigid with exposure that we could not move an inch. Then the cowhide fell right and left, and the incapable were thrown forward like carcases for the butcher. Eighteen of our number died of this brutal treatment."* Such things are, of course, legendary in the eyes of Ultramontane writers. They never tire of telling us how Louis XVI.'s last words were stifled by the drum, but even M. Duruy, himself no admirer of the Revolution, points out that here was retribution. Thus had the dying utterances of Protestant pastors been stopped under the Bourbons and within memory of the Revolutionaries. First and foremost as a hardening and brutalizing influence was the Church—witness the horrible tribunals of Toulouse and Avignon; next were the barbarities of the penal code that had been borrowed from Roman legislation. These points are so obvious and so well established that it seems indeed hardly worth wasting what Sterne called inkshed upon them. When we come to matters of contemporary history we find Mr. Bodley, with even more *naïve* complacency, relying upon the ignorance, or rather the credulity, of his readers. Let us cite the following passage on civil burial:—"It is a notable contrast that in England, amid bitter feuds on the subject of funeral rites, universal sentiment is so opposed to burial without prayers that it is considered an indignity, reducing man to the level of the lower animals, which even a suicide should be spared; whereas in France, though civil obsequies are equally repugnant to mourners, and rare outside the great towns, they are sometimes, in the case of Ministers of the Republic and other prominent persons, flaunted before the public, as though to deprive weeping women and children of hope and consolation were an act of civic virtue. On such occasions is displayed the sectarian spirit animating the exponents of Freethought. The French term *libre pensée* more plainly indicates the presumed connection with liberty, yet in France its cult has produced the most curious phase of intolerance manifested under the Third Republic." Now, Mr. Bodley utterly ignores one point, and that a vital one, in the question at issue. He refuses to take into account the fact that civil interment may be every whit as much a matter of conscience as that of a Quaker's refusal to swear upon oath. The admission may be painful to many, to Protestants as to Ultramontanes in France, but indisputable it is, the vast majority of Frenchmen have long cast off dogma. Civil burial, instead of

* See *Works of Oliver Goldsmith*, edited by Peter Cunningham: "Memoirs of a Protestant condemned to the Galleys for his Religion, 1758"; also "Passages from the Life of a Galley Slave." Blackie. 1895.

being a display of sectarian spirit, is simply and solely the carrying out of a sacred charge. Mr. Hamerton was not a naturalized Frenchman, it is true, but he had married a Frenchwoman, a Catholic born and bred. If civil burial were regarded in France as "an indignity reducing man to the level of the lower animals," and an ostentation of agnostic intolerance, is it at all likely that the widow and her children would have committed this good man to the earth without religious rite and paraphernalia? Be it remembered, also, that Mr. Hamerton, doubtless from motives of delicacy, had never left or expressed any instructions whatever to this effect. With a noble-mindedness all must admire, Mrs. Hamerton thus carried out what she knew to be her husband's secret wishes; and little indeed of solemnity or reverence could priests, candles, and chants have imparted to that most impressive scene. Scores of Frenchmen (and occasionally Frenchwomen) are similarly laid to rest, and for the same reason, people whose lives, in their austere virtue, their lofty ideals of duty, and fraternal spirit, can compare with that of our lamented countryman.

Mr. Bodley acknowledges that sanitation has improved throughout France of late years, but adds—"On another point of civilization there has been decided deterioration under the Third Republic. Public decency is less respected than at any time since the Directory." It might be well to compare the Elysée of to-day with the court of Compiègne under the Second Empire. Here is an eye-witness's account of a favourite pastime, "La Curée des Dames":—"When Blindman's Buff was over, the ladies gathered round the Emperor, who, from a baize bag at a signal, scattered on the floor all kinds of trinkets to be scrambled for, brooches, necklets, earrings glittering with pearls and diamonds. The pleasure of the Imperial donor consisted in watching the indecorous scramble of the ladies as they disputed the spoil on hands and knees."* What is the testimony of Prosper Merimée in his *Lettres à une Inconnue?*†

Mr. Bodley's immense contempt for a bourgeoise Republic renders him unjust at every turn. "Under the Monarchy of July," he writes, "when the bourgeois was paramount, half the brilliant names in every branch of literature were claimed to be of noble origin. Chateaubriand, Lamartine, Lamennais, Rémusat, Ségur, Barante, Victor Hugo, Alfred de Musset, Tocqueville, Alfred de Vigny, Balzac, all were, or professed to be, members of noble families. They represent the whole range of French style and

* *Histoire du Second Empire, par* H. Magen, p. 179.

† "À la Cour où y était décolleté d'une manière outrageuse, par en haut et par en bas aussi; une demoiselle était en nymphe Dryade qui aurait laissé toute la gorge à découvert si on n'y eût remedié par un maillot, ce qui semblait aussi vif que le décolletage de la maman dont on penetrait tout l'estomac d'un coup d'œil."

opinion in history, poetry, drama, romance, theology, and political philosophy, and each of them had made a name before attaining the age of forty. No doubt the Monarchy of July was a period of exceptional literary splendour, to which every class of society contributed, whilst the Third Republic is, by comparison, commonplace."

But the dazzling genius of Renan would alone shed lustre on any age, and the term commonplace cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be applied to the world-wide names of a Zola, a Daudet, a Loti; no poet, again, since Victor Hugo has attained more deserved distinction than De Hérédia, a French subject by the way, who would have been a pariah before the enfranchisement of the Revolution! Coppée is another acknowledged classic. When we come to the field of criticism and learning, the list of illustrious names is equally long. We need only recall Maspéro, Anatole France, De Fonillée; and English readers may well be reminded that the greatest book ever written about Wordsworth is from the pen of a middle-class French Professor under the Third Republic.* Shelley, too, for the first time, has been translated into French. In the matter of scholarship, advance since 1870-1 has been very great. The late eminent scholar Dr. Holden thus wrote to a friend on the subject:—"You ask the names of some leading *savants* of France in order to confirm my statement, viz., that the Republic has been more favourable to a high standard of learning than previous forms of government. The *Collection des éditions savantes des classiques Latins et Grecs avec commentaires*, published by Hachette, is in many respects superior to the editions which emanate from German presses, both in scholarship and learning. The *Euripide* and *Démosthène* of H. Weil, the *Sophocle* of E. Tournier, the *Vergil* of E. Benoist, the *Homère* of A. Pierron, the *Thucydide* of A. Croiset, the *Tacite* of E. Jacob, are works which may be named in comparison with any editions, past or present, and of any country."† In the sphere of historic research it is, of course, unlikely that Mr. Bodley would appreciate the researches of M. Aulard and the monumental work of Lavisse and Rambaud.

On political corruption under the present *régime*—why always unaccented throughout these volumes?—Mr. Bodley is very eloquent. Again, we would say, is political corruption the creation of the Third Republic, a mushroom growth instead of a legacy of former Governments? But it is useless to argue with a writer who

* Just published in English, *The Early Life of William Wordsworth*, 1770-1798. A Study of the Prelude. By Emile Legouis. Translated by J. W. Matthews. With a Prefatory Note by Leslie Stephen, and a Photogravure Portrait of Wordsworth. Demy 8vo, 7s. 6d. net. J. M. Dent & Co.

† This letter was written for publication. See *France of To-day*.

thus sums up the Revolution and its after-consequences; surely, the strangest, most grotesque paradox ever penned on the topic :—

"The best that can be said of the French Revolution is that, just when civilization was on the point of making history colourless, it burst forth and produced for the student and the artist a collection of pictures and documents thrilling and pathetic, grandiose and revolting, such as no epoch of antiquity or of modern times has supplied. But to provide intellectual pleasure for the cultivated it was hardly worth while that millions of the human race should have lamentably perished before their term."

We need not go to "Jacobin writers," as Mr. Bodley calls them, for a refutation of such verdicts as these. The learned historian of Rome, M. Victor Duruy, Catholic, Imperialist, and Minister of Public Instruction under Napoleon III., thus concludes his brief history of the Revolution*:—"The eighteenth century expired, having bequeathed to society the grand thought that society, like the individual, must incessantly strive after amelioration, having held out a protective hand to the pariahs of law, government, even Nature. Serfs, negroes, heretics, the insane, the sick, by its aid were succoured and upheld. Whatever its faults, much must be pardoned an age which, in the words of Mignet, created science, immensely furthered well-being, in the sphere of morals conquered the principles of tolerance, justice, and individual right, banished barbarism from criminal procedure, and inculcated liberty in government, progress as national ambition, law and sovereign."

By far the best portion of Mr. Bodley's work, as I have already said, is that devoted to the Parliamentary system and the various political parties. Our author unravels for English readers all the labyrinthine mysteries of electioneering procedure, of *scrutin de liste* and *scrutin d'arrondissement*, and he gives us agreeable sketches of leading politicians. These pages will be useful to all interested in French politics, and, indeed, political systems generally. But even Mr. Bodley is too leisurely and apt to fall into many inconsistencies, not to say, direct contradictions. For instance, on page 146 of Vol. I., he writes :—"Under the Third Republic it is the minority which imposes its narrow policy on the majority," and on page 360 of Vol. II., we read :—"In 1893 two departments in Brittany and one in Normandy alone returned a bare majority of Royalist Deputies." But if the French Government is supported by an immense majority of Republican Deputies, how can it be said that the reverse proposition is true? The fact is, but it is a fact to which Mr. Bodley resolutely shuts his eyes, France is Republican to the backbone, and this has been unanswerably proved

* *Histoire de France*, Vol. II., p. 555.

throughout three recent crises, any one of which would have more than sufficed to overthrow an unstable or unpopular Government or political system. I allude, of course, to the Boulangist conspiracy, the Panama scandal, and the assassination of President Carnot. The last of these events, as we know, was regarded auspiciously by at least one pretender. Yet neither this national calamity nor the sudden resignation of M. Casimir Périer caused any kind of disturbance.

Seven years' study of French life and institutions may seem much, but after twenty-two years' devotion to the same subjects, I can only account for many statements in these volumes by the author's surroundings. Side by side with instructive accounts of this or that institution we come upon the strangest misconceptions. By way of illustrating French indifference to politics, for instance, Mr. Bodley cites the habitual remark, "Je ne m'occupe pas de politique?" But this simply means that peasants, artisans, and local tradesmen are not inclined to discuss the matter with a stranger. The atmosphere, moreover, of Ultramontane Château or Bishop's Palace is not conducive to openness on the part of folks round about. Again, there is no topic on which Frenchmen are more reticent than the Parliamentary vote, by far the larger proportion of Frenchwomen being under priestly influence, their husbands and male relations naturally avoid political discussion at home. But when Mr. Bodley affirms that "it is difficult to foresee who would protest in France if a dictator treated the Deputies of the Chamber constituted in 1875 as did Louis Napoleon their more respectable predecessors in 1851," he must of set purpose forget the peasant vote that saved the Republic just upon ten years ago!

M. Betham-Edwards,
Officier de l'Instruction de France.

PLUNDER BY DEATH DUTIES.

An old building in the town of Leominster bears the following curious inscription :—

> "He who gives away all before he's dead,
> Let 'em take this hatchet and knock him on ye head."

The date of the tablet is obliterated by time, but it probably belongs to the early part of the last century. The moral it is intended to convey is one that would have appealed to our forefathers as it never can to us, and the words in the first line of the couplet should be carved anew. They should now be :—

> "He who saves in prudence waiting till he's dead."

And it is Sir William Harcourt's Bill that has made the difference. The Leominster carver had not contemplated the possibility of a Finance Act which makes it necessary for a thrifty man to give away before he is dead, lest the State should do so afterwards for him.

The subject of the Death Duties is dry, difficult to grasp, and dismal, and yet it should be of interest to most of us. There is no man so poor, or so unfortunate, but hopes to inherit something, and it may be at any moment of importance to him to know what toll a paternal Government will exact for permitting him to take it. For those more happy, who have lands and money to bequeath, it becomes necessary to calculate what proportion of the estate will be absorbed in the claims which the State will make upon it, and to many the thought, like Lord Campbell's *Lives of the Chancellors*, will add new terrors to death. It is surprising, therefore, that we know so little about them. To most of us the dreadful Death Duties, "the infamous Death Duties," are like the great mystery of Death itself, impossible of explanation, and only to be accepted because they are inevitable.

The duty which is exacted from every successor to property, derived under will or intestacy, is the charge which the State levies for the protection it gives to the rights of inheritance, and by way of contribution towards the costs of the necessary machinery for registering his title. It is a payment in the nature of an insurance

premium, and where the rate is not excessive it is, perhaps, the fairest tax which a subject pays to the National Exchequer. It is true that the author of the Finance Act, 1894, when introducing the Bill claimed, on behalf of the State, a great deal more than this. He would have us believe that the State "has a title to a share in the accumulated property of every subject, and those who take under his will have only a subsequent and subordinate title." He appeared to make a virtue of the fact that the State left even a residue to the successor. But the principle which he calls "an axiom of finance" is one which smacks of Socialism, and is such as no civilized Government, even in South America, is at present prepared to accept. It would be more accurate to say that the right of the State is only to a contribution from the successor—not to a division of the inheritance.

It may be interesting to give a short history of these Death Duties. Down to the year 1694 none were in existence, and the author of *Coningsby* would have suggested that Dutch wars and Whig finance first made them necessary. But when first imposed they were only charged upon personalty in the form of Probate Duty, and there was the fair argument for their imposition that they were intended to cover the cost of verifying the title of the executor or administrator in the Ecclesiastical Courts. It may not be generally known that the title of the successor to real estate has never depended upon Probate. When a person died owning land and no money, it was not necessary either to prove his will or to obtain Letters of Administration in case of intestacy in order to vest in his devisee or heir his landed estates. This being so, there was no unfairness in the rule that property in the nature of land should not contribute to the Probate Duty. For nearly a hundred years this was the only duty paid on successions, but in 1780 a further duty, known as Legacy Duty, was added, and this, with certain modifications introduced in the years 1796 and 1815, and which the cost of French wars made necessary, continued in force until the present time. Probate Duty was chargeable *ad valorem*, that is, according to the value of the personal estate of which the deceased died possessed. But Legacy Duty was fixed according to a new principle, and differed in every case according to the degree of relationship borne by the successor. It varied from 1 per cent. charged in the case of lineal issue to 10 per cent. in the case of a stranger in blood to the deceased. The argument for exempting land from Probate Duty did not apply in the case of Legacy Duty, but by reason of its many existing liabilities, and possibly by reason of the large influence possessed by landowners in the House of Commons, it escaped attack until the year 1853, when the first Succession Duty Act was passed. Even then there was a differ-

ence made in the method of taxing the two properties land and money. For money, as we have seen, a percentage was paid by the successor upon the actual amount of the estate. For land, it was assumed by the framers of the Act of 1853 that the property in it was a thing to be enjoyed by the successor for life only, whether the gift was absolute or not, and the value of his interest was calculated upon a table estimating the average duration of life, and duty charged accordingly. Some slight modifications were made by succeeding Chancellors of the Exchequer, and in every case to the disadvantage of the successor. Mr. Goschen in the year 1888 raised very substantially the rate of duty on land gifts, the rise being equivalent to a 50 per cent. increase on the duty payable by lineal issue and collaterals, and in the year 1889 imposed a further Estate Duty of 1 per cent. in the case of all successions of real or personal estates exceeding £10,000 in value. This last was generally known as the "temporary Estate Duty," because it was limited for a term of seven years expiring on the first of June, 1896, and it was this duty which appears to have suggested to the author of the Finance Act its most remarkable feature. There was yet another, known as Account Duty, imposed in the year 1881, for the purpose of reaching those funds which, arising from gifts in the nature of voluntary settlements, escaped the ordinary duties.

The position at the time Sir William Harcourt introduced his measure was as follows: A successor to land and personalty paid a Stamp or Probate Duty on the total net amount of personalty left by the deceased, and this Stamp Duty, which previous to 1881 had varied according to the value of the estate from 2 to 2½ per cent., was fixed at 3 per cent. in all cases where the estate exceeded £1,000 in value. He paid also Legacy Duty at rates varying from 1 to 10 per cent., according to his degree of relationship to the deceased, and if the total succession exceeded £10,000, a further duty of 1 per cent. on the net residue payable. On the land he paid no Probate Duty at all, but only Succession Duty upon the calculated value of his life interest, and at rates varying according to the degree of relationship as in the case of Legacy Duty, though considerably in excess of those charged for personalty; and he paid, if the property exceeded £10,000 in value, the Estate Duty of 1 per cent. in addition.

There was certainly much confusion in such a system, and the anomalies gave a handle to those who argued that land was too favourably treated in the matter of Death Duties. The oft repeated explanation is that land had in the past borne the whole burden of local taxation; that the grants, which during the past twenty years have been made to local authorities from Imperial sources towards meeting that burden, were not equal to the additional ones

imposed on them from time to time by Imperial Parliament; and that by the Act of 1889 a much heavier Succession Duty had been charged on land than on personalty. And when the relations are remembered between the total value of the real estate in the United Kingdom and the total value of the personal estate, and that upon the former is charged all the cost of supporting the poor, of maintaining the roads and the police, as well as the cost of education, and the support, in the form of Tithes, of the National Religion, the unfairness, if any, is that land should be called upon to pay any duty at all on its transmission from one owner to another.

From Sir William Harcourt's sympathetic acknowledgment of this unfairness at the time he brought in his measure of finance there was reason to expect that the sympathy might take a practical form in the alleviation of the burden weighing alike on landowner and farmer. But his Government made no effort to reform the unfair incidence of local taxation, and every attempt made in that direction has met with his undisguised hostility. The most serious objections we have to the Finance Act would have been removed if a measure had been passed at the same time "to put the taxes on land and personalty," to quote Sir William Harcourt's own words, "on a fair and equal basis"; and if this had been done, landowners as a class would have had very little cause for complaint. The duties would in any event have been considered oppressive, and there are details in the methods of raising them which call for criticism, but the general principle would have been unassailable. But while the Chancellor of the Exchequer admitted that the landed interest was bearing a weight which the personal interest should in fairness share, his method for making matters equal for them was to cast on both an additional burden. It is true that there is an apparent equality in the extra weights imposed, but the equality, though apparent, is not real, for the capacities for bearing them are not equal, and to the land interest, already tottering under its load of difficulty, it is as the last straw which breaks the camel's back. So much for Sir William Harcourt's sympathy!

It must be admitted that the task of amending and consolidating the many duties payable was a difficult one, and that the measure by which it was accomplished, considered as as instrument of extortion, was a brilliant achievement. But many of its provisions were of necessity too hastily contrived, and in every section it appears to have been conceived rather in a spirit of hostility to accumulated wealth, particularly such as takes the form of land investments, than with the object of settling the question on a fair and permanent basis. The Act is chiefly remarkable for

three alterations in the existing law. It substituted for the Probate Duty of 3 per cent. a new duty known as the Estate Duty, varying in amount, not, as might have been expected, according to the value of the succession, but according to the aggregate sum of property in land and money devolving upon the death of the testator, and derived under his will or otherwise*: it fixed realty as well as personalty with this new duty; it abolished the old method of calculating successions to land according to the age of the successor, and from the passing of the Act duty was payable by heir or devisee of landed property upon the market value of the gift, just as by a legatee of money upon the net amount received.

But its greatest hardship lay in the fact that the duties it imposed were made retrospective. It is true that the new duties were only payable on estates of persons dying after the 1st of August, 1894, the time fixed for the commencement of the Act. But there was no saving clause in favour of owners of reversions, whose interests were already absolutely vested. These successors found themselves suddenly deprived of a large share of the succession to which they believed themselves securely entitled. The reversioners were in some cases old men, and, inasmuch as it was impossible to foresee these duties, no provision could have been made to meet them. Here is a case in point. Mr. C., a comparatively poor man and sixty years of age, is entitled under the will of a friend to the reversion of a landed estate worth £2,000 a year. Upon his marriage he had settled the reversionary interest upon his wife and children. If it had fallen into his possession a month before the passing of the Act he would have paid no Probate or Estate Duty, but merely a Succession Duty of 11½ per cent. upon his calculated life interest in the net income. This life interest would have been probably estimated at about £18,000, according to the Government tables, and a payment of £2,070 would have been all that would have been required. Now, when he succeeds, he must first pay at

* The rates of duty are fixed by Sec. 17 of the Finance Act according to the following scale:—

On Estates between:—

£100 and	£500	£1	per cent.	With exemptions from Legacy and Succession Duty.
500 ,,	1,000	2	,,	
1,000 ,,	10,000	3	,,	Same duty as at present.
10,000 ,,	25,000	4	,,	
25,000 ,,	50,000	4½	,,	
50,000 ,,	75,000	5	,,	
75,000 ,,	100,000	5½	,,	
100,000 ,,	150,000	6	,,	Increased duties.
150,000 ,,	250,000	6½	,,	
250,000 ,,	500,000	7	,,	
500,000 ,,	1,000,000	7½	,,	
1,000,000 ,,	upwards	8	,,	

least £2,025 for Estate Duty on the *gross* capital value which may be estimated at £44,500, and a further payment of £4,200 for a 10 per cent. Succession Duty on the net capital value estimated at £42,000, making in all £6,225. This amount would have been far in excess of a year's *net* income and surely a sufficient tax upon the inheritance. By the settlement he has covenanted to bear all duties on the fund, and he cannot, therefore, authorize their payment out of capital. This deduction is equivalent to more than *three years' gross income* from the estate, and the result is that Mr. C., at sixty years of age, unless he lives for at least four years after succeeding, will have derived no benefit whatever from the property. And, if he dies in the meantime, his family will have to pay this Estate Duty over again. The case I have quoted leads us to the argument that even if it had been impossible to except all vested reversions from the incidence of the new duties, it was only right that an exception should have been made in favour of those which had been settled *bona fide* in consideration of marriage. A precedent is offered by the 21st Section (Sub-Section 3), which excepts all such expectant interests as have been *bona fide* sold or mortgaged before the passing of the Act; and the arguments which tell in favour of the one exception if marriage is to be considered, as it always has been, one of the highest legal considerations, should tell in very nearly the same degree in favour of the other.

But there are other hardships resulting from this Act besides those done to vested interests. There is the cruelty of charging widows with Estate Duty. There are the many hardships worked in applying the principle of "aggregation"; in taking into account the "future values," from which the successor may personally derive no benefit, and by the refusal to allow the family charges made upon marriage as a deduction from the deceased's estate. There is the hardship involved in charging Estate and Succession Duty upon the capital value of those large estates which, by reason of a generous system of management, yield little or no income to their possessors.

There are a great many arguments in favour of releasing the widow from duty altogether. The principle of doing so has been already accepted by the exception made in her favour by the Succession Duty Act, 1853. Husband and wife may be considered as one. There is, in their case, a community of interest which does not exist between any other relations, even between parent and child. Upon the survivor the duty devolves of maintaining the home and supporting the family. The husband's death removing, as it does in most cases, the breadwinner of the family, makes this duty doubly difficult to perform. And it is hard that a heavy toll

must be taken from the widow's scanty residue before permission is granted to her to make use of it. Take the case of a clergyman in receipt of an income of £400 a year from his benefice and interested in a settled fund of £11,000, in which his widow takes, upon his death, a life interest. The income which maintains the family is reduced upon his death from £730 to £330 a year, but the widow must pay duty not only on the small bequest of furniture and loose personalty, in which she may take an absolute interest under her husband's will, but she must also find herself crippled for years with the payment of £440 for Estate Duty on the settled property. And, for reasons which are referred to a little later on, the heavy claim is still more difficult to meet when the husband's property consists only of land.

A great deal may be said, too, in favour of excepting policies of assurance when they have been effected either for the benefit of a husband or wife or for the children of the deceased, or where they are limited for the express purpose of securing the payment of duties. In the former case the policy is hardly of the nature of property. The title to it is precarious in the extreme, seeing that the omission to pay one year's premium may, after forty years' subsistence, invalidate it altogether, and the payments are frequently kept up with much difficulty by the joint efforts and with much self-sacrifice on the part of the survivors. There is a precedent in giving this class of property special treatment in the provisions which regulate Income Tax, and which enable the Income Tax payer to deduct premiums for policies of assurance from income on which the tax is payable. Even stronger is the argument for excepting a policy which is for the express purpose of paying duty. This last does not form part of the property which reaches the successor, and to include it as such is to discourage prudence and thrift.

The anomalies created by this act may perhaps be best understood from a few simple examples. Let us suppose that Sir Pitt Crawley was still living in the year 1893, and that he was entitled to the Queen's Crawley estate in fee: that it was worth £4,000 per annum: and that he had also £100,000 in consols. Let us also suppose that the whole estate and all the money were early in the year 1894 left to Mr. Pitt Crawley, then sixty years of age, subject only to a deduction of £20,000 from the latter for younger children. Mr. Crawley's life would be worth some ten years' purchase, and the duty he would have to pay upon the land would be about £1,000.* He would have £3,300 to pay in addition for Stamp Duty on the £100,000 in consols, worth at market price

* Before Mr. Goschen's Act of 1888 the sum would have been only £400, and before the Act of 1889 which imposed the Temporary Estate Duty, £600.

about £112,000. No Legacy or Succession Duty would be payable because lineal issue are exempt from both charges, and the total amount he would pay for Probate Legacy and Succession Duty would be less than £4,400. Then let us assume that Sir Pitt Crawley dies after the 1st August, 1894, and that he has made the same testamentary disposition in favour of Mr. Pitt Crawley. The claim of the Government is *more than trebled.* The land is to be calculated at twenty-five years' purchase, and allowing some deductions from the rental for repairs, insurance, and collection, must be taken at a capital value of £92,500. The land and personalty must be aggregated to ascertain the rate of Estate Duty. Total £204,500, upon which Mr. Crawley the successor must pay 6½ per cent.—£13,290. The duty on the land succession before the 1st of August, 1894, would have been £1,000, after the 1st of August, 1894, £6,012. But in the last case, if we can assume that Sir Pitt Crawley's daughters were both married, and that he had settled upon each, at the time of marriage, a sum of £6,000, payable during his life to her trustees £240 a year, as being equivalent to £4 per cent. on the amount settled, there should be a corresponding reduction in the sum total of his estate. He might be assumed to have parted with these two funds, and as his executor is under a legal obligation to pay them, just like any other debts which may be owing from the testator, Mr. Crawley might consider himself justified in deducting the amounts from his father's estate, in presenting his own account for duty. Not so, however. The amounts are to be "aggregated" with the remainder of the estate, and are liable to Estate Duty as part of the large estate from which they are payable, although the daughters have been enjoying the income of the funds, and therefore, for all practical purposes, in possession of their money from the time of marriage. And if the fund settled on one daughter had been only two thousand pounds, and on the other £10,000, the result had been the same, and the less favoured one taking only £2,000 would have been mulcted in a heavy 6½ per cent. Estate Duty merely because she happened to be the child of a rich man, who had it in his power to give her a larger share of his estate. In other words, the law would punish her because she is half-sister to a man who inherits a large property. In the case I am assuming, Sir Pitt has not parted with his consols. He has only covenanted to leave £6,000 to each of his daughters, and paid her the interest in the meanwhile, and yet in the calculation of his estate this liability under a covenant is not treated as a debt. Nor would it be considered as a debt *if he had actually mortgaged part of the Queen's Crawley estate* to her trustees to secure its payment! On the other hand, had he actually transferred the

£6,000 at the time of the marriage, or at any time afterwards, so that the transaction took place twelve months before his own death, no duty whatever would have been payable. Truly a distinction without a difference!

Or let us assume that the whole of Sir Pitt's fortune had been settled upon the occasion of his marriage with the daughter of "the noble Lord Binkie," and that he had only the sum of £10,000 in free personalty to bequeath to his two daughters, Miss Crawley and Miss Rose Crawley, charged with an annuity of £40 a year to his friend and servant Horrocks, and that he had given to Mr. Horrocks's daughter a small freehold property worth £500. For duty purposes the settled and unsettled estates are treated as one and *aggregated*, and the grand-daughters of the ironmonger at Mudbury would have to pay the penalty for being half-sisters to Lord Binkie's grandson, by giving up about £600 to meet a 6½ per cent. Estate Duty,—a sum equal to two years' income from their small fortune. The faithful Horrocks, at seventy years of age, would receive his annuity subject to a similar penalty in the form of a charge of £54 to cover Estate Duty, Settlement Estate Duty, and Succession Duty, and the daughter whose ribbons were so offensive to the amiable Miss Sharp, would pay Estate Duty at the same rate as the heir to the Queen's Crawley estate, and a 10 per cent. Legacy Duty in addition. Horrocks, if he did not live two years after his master, would get little or nothing from his bounty, and Miss Horrocks would have to surrender as much as £80 from her gift of £500! This might possibly be in either case as much as the recipient deserved, but the contributions are excessive and wholly out of proportion to the legacies received, and if the Horrocks family had been patterns of morality and virtue, the toll taken by the State would have been exactly the same.

In the case of the Queen's Crawley estate, I have assumed that the land is of ordinary agricultural value. But let it be supposed that £1,200 a year is derived from ground rents, yielded from 300 house-plots in a watering-place or manufacturing town, let for terms of sixty years, of which twenty are unexpired, at rents averaging £4 yearly. Before the passing of this Act, this fact would not have affected in any way the rate or amount of duty payable by the successor, and unless Mr. Crawley happened to live until the leases fell in, he would pay on the income of £1,200 to which he succeeded, and no more. Now, however, he would be called to pay on the capital value of the property, less the value of the lessees' interests. The 300 houses in a fashionable seaside watering-place may be taken to be worth, on an average, £80 a year each, and the capital value at twenty years' purchase £480,000. The lessees' interests may fairly be taken at £280,000, and there

is a residue or capital value of £200,000, to which must be added £16,000 for the value of the £1,200 a year until the leases terminate. There is a total capital value of this part of the property of £216,000, and the Estate Duty at 7 per cent. will amount to more than £15,000, a sum equal to *twelve years' income* of that part of the property. Not only is there an enormous increase of duty for that part of the estate, but the effect of introducing the element of future values is to increase the total estate to £393,000, and on the principle of aggregation to raise the duty from 6½ per cent. to 7 per cent., not only for the successor, Mr. Pitt Crawley, but also for his unfortunate sisters and the Horrocks legatees. Mr. Pitt Crawley's share of the 7 per cent. duty on the whole estate, including the future values, would be nearly £26,000, a sum equal to *four years' gross income* of the estate he inherits. At his age of sixty the succession may, in such a case, be considered absolutely valueless. No Succession Duty is payable, but if Sir Pitt had settled the land by his will, Mr. Crawley, as tenant for life, would pay an additional 1 per cent., or about £3,700 for Settlement Duty, making a total for Estate and Settlement Duty of £29,700! But assuming the whole property to have been bequeathed to Mr. Crawley absolutely, and that he died within twelve months, bequeathing all to his brother Rawdon, this heavy Estate Duty of £26,000 would have to be paid again, with 3 per cent. in addition for Succession Duty. The Estate and Succession Duties on the two successions would amount to more than £62,000. A few more successions, and at this rate the Queen Crawley estate will have ceased to exist.

It is not only when large estates are concerned that cases of hardship arise. They occur, perhaps, even more frequently when properties are so small that the money required to meet the duty can with difficulty be spared, and this must generally be the case when the succession is to small freehold properties. The legatee of £2,000 in consols can easily instruct a broker to sell out £100 to meet duty claims. But the devisee of a farm worth £2,000 has no such simple plan of paying his debt, and if the farm comes as a gift by itself, that is to say, without an accompanying gift of money, he may have a difficulty in making the payment. It may be suggested that he can, from his farm of 100 acres, strip off a field as the legatee his block of consols. But isolated fields are not always saleable. As often as not there would be no buyer at any price. And even if a buyer can be found, no one who knows anything of a farmer's difficulties will fail to realize the objection to such a course. In the case of a properly equipped farm, the loss of one field destroys the balance, and may possibly make for a time at least, just the difference between farming at a profit and at a loss. The devisee's

only resource then is the money-lender, and to meet an excessive duty he is compelled to learn at once the fatal lesson of borrowing. A man at sixty years of age paid under the old system for a farm of 100 acres inherited from his uncle, and worth £100 per annum, the sum of £30 and no more. Mr. Goschen's alteration in 1881 raised the payment to £45. These sums he could afford to pay easily from the profit of the farm. Now he must pay £67 for Estate Duty, and £65 in addition for Succession Duty, and if he makes a will in favour of his wife, and dies within a year or two, there is the £67 to pay over again. The cruelty of aggregation may arise in such a case, if the farm, instead of coming to him from his uncle, a small freeholder like himself, is a gift from a rich man whose estate is liable to the higher rate of duty. Let us suppose that the devisee has been the hard-working bailiff of Lord C., who leaves him the farm by his will as an acknowledgment of his services. Lord C.'s estate is, of course, liable to an 8 per cent. Estate Duty, and the poor bailiff, like the future Lord C., must pay at the same rate. The gift is reduced by 8 per cent. on £2,250 = £184, and by a further deduction of 10 per cent. on the residue of £2,066 = £206. Total duty on a farm worth £2,250 = £390. At this rate it is easy to understand how even a small property can be absorbed in duties after a few successions.

Here is another example of aggregation in the case of a small estate and one that has actually happened. A farmer died after the passing of the Finance Act, possessed of stock and crop worth between £400 and £500, and entitled in fee to a farm worth £2,000. He left surviving him six daughters and one son only nine years of age. His death occurred suddenly, and there was no will. He owed debts to the amount of £200, of which sum £60 was borrowed for the improvement of the farm. The personal estate, after deducting these debts, became reduced to £300, and the seven children take this in equal shares. The farm descends clear of all deductions to the boy. In calculating the claim for Estate Duty, the farm and personalty are aggregated, making a total of £2,300, on which 3 per cent. is payable. This is a hard case for the six daughters. It is true that the Finance Act does not effect the devolution of the property, but the daughters, who by the oversight of their father, take no share of his real estate, are made to suffer a reduction from their own small residue because their brother is privileged to inherit it. If there had been no farm the whole estate would have been less than £300, and the seven children would have paid a 1 per cent. Estate Duty with exemption from Legacy Duty, but by reason of the rule of aggregation they must now pay at the same rate as if they had inherited a full share of all their father's property.

These duties are oppressive and excessive. Appended to this article is a table translated from the "Bulletin de Statistique et de Legislation Comparée, August, 1888," in which a comparison is given of the rates charged on succession and transmission in most of the countries of the world. It will be seen from this table at a glance that the charges in the United Kingdom for succession to land and money were, *even before* the passing of the Finance Act largely in excess of those charged by every other Government. They were more than treble those of the few countries like France, Spain, and Russia, where duties are imposed on lineal descendants, and still more out of proportion to those of other countries where that class of successor, the most numerous of any, paid no duty at all. In no case is there anything to compare with the confiscating rates imposed by the Finance Act, and only in Switzerland is a progressive scale adopted. The duties charged on succession in the United States are not given in the table, for the reason that in that country none were then payable.*

Nor is the new system free from complications. All was to have been so simple, when the many classes of duty were amalgamated. But it is no exaggeration to say that the work of passing accounts under the Finance Acts has been trebled in quantity, and that the responsibility in preparing them, and the attendant costs have been increased accordingly. There are endless forms of Inland Revenue Affidavit, all lengthy and complicated, and the difficulty even for those who make this class of work their constant practice is to determine which of these is in each case to be adopted. And the officials themselves are not unfrequently in a state of doubt and uncertainty leaving it to litigation by unfortunate successors to determine the meaning of their own Act. From one well-known firm of solicitors, to whom I wrote an enquiry on the subject of this Act, I received a letter from which the following is an extract:—

"The severest thing we can say against the Act, and which we find tells with lay persons outside the profession, is that although we do not approve of Sir William Harcourt as a legislator, we still recognize him as being really one of the best friends solicitors have had as a statesman during the present generation, for we cannot mention a single case of winding up an estate of a deceased party, since the Act came into operation where there has been settled money or land to be dealt with, that has not more or less given extra professional work."

* At different times during the last ten years, succession taxes have been imposed in fifteen States of the Union, but, with two exceptions, these apply only to cases of inheritance by collaterals and by strangers. Only in Ohio and Illinois, is there anything in the nature of a progressive tax, the maximum being fixed at 6 per cent. on estates of $50,000 and upwards passing to collaterals or strangers. Lineals are in most cases exempt, and the duties compared to those fixed by our Finance Act are light, varying for collaterals from 2½ to 5 per cent. In the remaining thirty States of the Union there are as yet no Succession Duties of any kind.

STATEMENT SHOWING THE RATES OF SUCCESSION AND TRANSMISSION DUTIES PER 100 FRS.

—	SUCCESSION IN DIRECT LINE.					SUCCESSION BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE.		SUCCESSION IN COLLATERAL LINE.							
	DESCENDING.			ASCENDING.											
	Legitimate Descendants.	Natural Children.	Adopted Children.	Father and Mother.	Other Ancestors.	Special rates for reserved portions.	Ordinary Rates.	Brother and Sister.	Nephew and Niece.	Grand Nephew and Grand Niece.	Uncle and Aunt.	Great Uncle and Great Aunt.	Cousins German.	Collateral relations from the fifth to the twelfth degree.	Successions between persons other than relations.
	Frs. c.	Frs. c.	Frs. c.	Frs. c.	Frs. c.	Frs. c.	Frs. c.	Frs. c.	Frs. c.	Frs. c.	Frs. c.	Frs. c.	Frs. c.	Frs. c.	Frs. c.
France	1 25	1 25	1 25	1 25	1 25	3 75	3 75	8 75	8 75	8 75	8 75	8 75	8 75	10 00	11 25
Alsace-Lorraine	1 00	1 00	1 00	1 00	1 00	3 00	3 00	6 50	6 50	7 00	6 50	7 00	7 00	8 00	9 00
Baden	Free	Free	—	Free	Free	Free	1 ⅔	3 ⅓	3 ⅓	3 ⅓	10 00	10 00	10 00	10 00	10 00
Bavaria	,,	—	—	4 00	6 00	,,	Free	4 00	4 00	4 00	6 00	6 00	6 00	8 00	8 00
Bremen	,,	—	—	Free	Free	,,	,,	4 00	4 00	4 00	8 00	8 00	8 00	8 00	8 00
Prussia	,,	4 00	2 00	,,	,,	,,	,,	2 00	2 00	2 00	4 00	4 00	4 00	8 00	8 00
Saxony	,,	—	—	,,	,,	,,	,,	Free	Free	3 00	3 00	3 00	3 00	5 00	5 00
Wurtemburg	,,	Free	3 00	2 00	3 00	,,	,,	2 00	3 00	6 00	4 00	6 00	6 00	8 00	8 00
United Kingdom*															
Probate Duty	3 00	3 00	3 00	3 00	3 00	3 00	3 00	3 00	3 00	3 00	3 00	3 00	3 00	3 00	3 00
Legacy and Succession Duties	1 00	—	—	1 00	1 00	Free	Free	3 00	3 00	3 00	5 00	6 00	5 00	6 00	10 00
Belgium†															
Succession Duties ...	Free	Free	8 20	Free	Free	,,	5 50	6 30	8 20	8 20	8 20	8 20	13 80	13 80	13 80
Transmission	1 40	1 40	6 80	1 40	1 40	1 40	6 80	6 80	6 80	6 80	6 80	6 80	6 80	6 80	6 80
Spain	1 00	2 00	—	1 00	1 00	1 00	3 00	4 00	5 00	6 00	5 00	6 00	6 00	7 to 10	10 00
Italy	1 36	1 36	—	1 36	1 36	3 90	3 90	6 50	7 80	7 80	7 80	7 80	10 40	11 70	13 00
Luxemberg†															
Succession Duties ...	Free	—	—	Free	Free	Free	4 00	4 00	6 00	6 00	6 00	6 00	10 00	10 00	10 00
Transmission	1 00	1 00	—	1 00	1 00	5 00	5 00	5 00	5 00	5 00	5 00	5 00	5 00	5 00	5 00
Monaco															
Personal Estate ...	0 50	—	—	0 50	0 50	1 25	1 25	2 00	2 25	2 25	2 25	2 25	2 25	2 25	3 00
Real Estate	1 00	—	—	1 00	1 00	2 50	2 50	4 00	4 50	5 00	4 50	5 00	5 00	5 00	6 00
Netherlands															
Succession Duties† ...	1 00	—	—	3 00	3 00	1 00	4 00	4 00	6 00	6 00	6 00	6 00	10 00	10 00	10 00
Transmission Duties†..	1 00	—	—	1 00	1 00	1 00	5 00	5 00	5 00	5 00	5 00	5 00	5 00	5 00	5 00
Transmission Duties on Personal Property‡...	0 25	—	—	0 25	0 25	0 25	2 00	2 00	2 00	2 00	2 00	2 00	2 00	2 00	2 00

STATEMENT SHOWING THE RATES OF SUCCESSION AND TRANSMISSION DUTIES PER 100 FRS. (*continued*).

—	SUCCESSION IN DIRECT LINE.					SUCCESSION BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE.		SUCCESSION IN COLLATERAL LINE.							Successions between persons other than relations.
	DESCENDING.			ASCENDING.											
	Legitimate Descendants.	Natural Children.	Adopted Children.	Father and Mother.	Other Ancestors.	Special rates for reserved portions.	Ordinary Rates.	Brother and Sister.	Nephew and Niece.	Grand Nephew and Grand Niece.	Uncle and Aunt.	Great Uncle and Great Aunt.	Cousins German.	Collateral relations from the fifth to the twelfth degree.	
	Frs. c.	Frs. c.	Frs. c.	Frs. c.	Frs. c.	Frs. c.	Frs. c.	Frs. c.	Frs. c.	Frs. c.	Frs. c.	Frs. c.	Frs. c.	Frs. c.	Frs. c.
Roumania	Free	—	—	Free	Free	Free	Free	3 00	3 00	3 00	3 00	3 00	3 00	6 00	9 00
Russia	1 00	—	1 00	1 00	1 00	1 00	1 00	4 00	4 00	6 00	6 00	6 00	8 00	8 00	8 00
Switzerland															
Aargau	Free	—	—	Free	Free	Free	Free	1 00	3 00	6 00	3 00	6 00	6 00	9,12&20	20 00
Bale	,,	—	—	2 00	4 00	,,	,,	4 00	6 00	9 00	6 00	9 00	9 00	12 00	12 00
Berne§	,,	Free	—	1 50	3 00	,,	1 50	3 00	6 00	9 00	6 00	9 00	9 00	12 00	15 00
Fribourg	,,	2 00	—	Free	Free	2 00	8 00	2 00	3 00	3 00	3 00	3 00	4 00	6 & 8	10 00
Geneva	2 10	—	—	2 10	2 10	10	5 25	5 25	5 25	5 25	5 25	5 25	8 40	12 60	12 60
Glarus	0 50	0 50	0 50	0 50	0 50	0 50	0 50	0 50	0 50	0 50	0 50	0 50	0 50	0 50	0 50
Lucerne	Free	—	—	Free	2 & 4	Free	Free	Free	4 00	8 00	4 00	8 00	8 00	12 00	12 00
Neuchatel	,,	Free	—	,,	Free	,,	2 00	3 00	4 00	5 00	4 00	5 00	5 00	6 & 10	10 00
Saint Gallen	,,	,,	—	,,	,,	,,	Free	2 00	3 00	4 00	3 00	4 00	4 00	5 00	10 00
Schaffhausen§	,,	—	—	,,	,,	,,	,,	4 00	8 00	12 00	8 00	12 00	12 00	16 00	20 00
Soluthurn§	,,	Free	Free	2 00	4 to 8	4 00	12 00	4 00	12 00	14 00	12 00	14 00	14 00	16 00	16 00
Ticino	,,	—	—	Free	Free	3 00	3 00	3 00	4 00	5 00	4 00	5 00	5 00	6 to 10	10 00
Thurgau§	,,	—	—	,,	4 00	4 00	4 00	4 00	6 00	8 00	6 00	8 00	8 00	8 to 12	12 00
Unterwald	2 00	—	—	2 00	2 00	—	—	3 50	3 50	3 50	3 50	3 50	3 50	10 00	10 00
Uri	Free	—	—	Free	2 00	—	—	2 00	4 00	5 00	4 00	5 00	5 00	6 to 13	—
Vaud	,,	Free	—	,,	2 00	3 00	3 00	2 00	3 00	6 00	3 00	6 00	6 00	8 to 10	10 00
Zug	,,	—	—	,,	Free	5 00	5 00	2 00	2 00	3 00	2 00	3 00	3 00	4 & 5	5 00
Zurich§	,,	—	3 00	,,	12 00	Free	Free	3 00	9 00	9 00	15 00	15 00	15 00	15 00	15 00
Chili	1 00	2 00	—	2 00	2 00	1 00	3 00	3 00	5 00	5 00	5 00	5 00	5 00	5 00	8 00
Guatemala	1 00	2 00	3 00	2 00	2 00	3 00	3 00	3 00	5 00	5 00	5 00	5 00	5 00	5 00	10 00

* Probate Duty, for which Estate Duty is now substituted, is levied concurrently with Legacy and Succession Duty, and on large estates the duties *may be equivalent in the case of successions by strangers in blood to about* 17 *per cent.!*

† These two duties are not levied concurrently.

‡ These duties are levied concurrently with Succession Duties.

§ Maximum progressive rates.

It is everywhere the same cry. Increase of duty, increase of responsibility in passing accounts, increase of costs in preparing them.

This brings me to one suggestion which is constantly being made. The measure should have provided some kind of appeal for those who are, or believe themselves to be, unfairly dealt with, and without the necessity for litigation. The official is a mere machine, and has no power to take into account the equity of a claim. What is wanted is a right for every claimant to take his case before two competent persons, either barristers or solicitors, who should be appointed with full discretionary power to determine all questions in dispute, and particularly such as arise from time to time by reason of the difficulty in construing the different Duty Acts. And it is advisable that one, if not both of these Commissioners, should be wholly unconnected with the Revenue Department. At the present time, claimants, by taking their grievances into Court, have the privilege of obtaining for the Government, but at their own expense, an interpretation of the meaning of the Government Act. This is grossly unfair. In cases where the Commissioners see any difficulty, either the authorities, or the successor, should have power to get the question determined in court, but at the exclusive cost of the Government.

It may not be out of place here to offer a suggestion for taxing land values. The Act has done some injustice in the case of those estates which, representing a large capital value, yield under a specially generous system of management, a proportionately small income to their owners. Certain estate accounts with which the public has recently been made familiar, show plainly how very small a part of the nominal income from a landed property is permitted to reach the pockets of the owner, and in some cases when all voluntary contributions are deducted, there can be no residue whatsoever. It is clear that the new duties will make it impossible for those whose incomes are mainly derived from land investments to continue their present policy of supporting local institutions, of letting their lands at less than competition rents, and even of incurring the necessary outlay to keep their estates in repair. Their subscriptions must be withdrawn, and their establishments closed with this result to poor agricultural neighbourhoods, that already impoverished by bad seasons and low prices, they must become poorer still. It surely cannot be the policy of the State to compel great proprietors to farm their estates on the same commercial principles as needy ones, and it is only fair to ask that all charges for maintenance, and all subscriptions for the benefit of local institutions, even though voluntarily given, and continued on the principle of *noblesse oblige*, from one successor to another, should be liable to deduction from the net income in the same

way as annuities, or interest on mortgages.* What is wanted, too, is a right on the part of every successor to land inherited, settled or unsettled, in the event of his deciding to retain the property in kind, to deliver his account from his nett income derived from it, for a period of, say, five years, and to pay an *Income Duty* in substitution for the Estate and Succession Duties now levied on the capital value. To make matters equal, this income duty should be calculated on a higher basis, and it might perhaps be fair to ask for three times as much as the existing charge for Estate Duty. There should be a provision, too, that in the event of a sale by a person "competent to dispose," within a period to be determined, duties should at once become payable on capital values just as if the alternative scheme had not existed. It would also be necessary that the privilege should be safeguarded by stringent penalties to meet any possible case of their abuse. Such a scheme would go far towards remedying the injustice done by the Finance Act to landowners, and should be accepted on all sides as a reasonable compromise.

The space allowed in a Review does not permit one to deal with more than an outline of the subject, or to show more than a few of the more glaring anomalies of the much boasted of new system. But it may be satisfactory to repeat shortly the alterations, which are most necessary if the Finance Acts of 1894 and 1896 are to be considered a fair and permanent settlement of the duty question. First, there should be a partial, if not a total exemption, of husbands and wives from payment of Estate Duty: there should be a partial, if not a total exemption, in favour of monies payable under policies of assurance, the premiums on which have been kept up by the deceased: there should be a modification of the rules as to "future values" in ascertaining capital values: "aggregation" of estates should be limited to those, the income of which devolve on a death to one and the same person: charges on land or personalty made in favour of son or daughter in consideration of marriage should be treated as ordinary debts, and be capable of deduction accordingly: and the prohibitive rates now charged on the graduated scales for Estate Duty, as well as the method of assessing land values, should be very carefully modified.

* The Duke of Bedford, in his "Story of a Great Agricultural Estate," gives some interesting figures. His Thorney Estate, of more than 19,000 acres, in the County of Cambridge, yields at the present time, after payment of all costs of maintenance, no income whatever, and the accounts for the Woburn Estate, of 28,000 acres, in the Counties of Bedford and Bucks, show a yearly deficit of nearly £7,000. And yet his successor, for the privilege of distributing an income, no part of which can reach his own hands, must, under the present system, pay in the one case the sum of £25,000, and in the other the sum of £40,000.

It is impossible to devise a measure of this kind which will please everybody interested, and at the same time provide the means which the Chancellor of the Exchequer requires, but if the suggested alterations are made, and if the methods of working the new system are simplified, the chief objections to Sir William Harcourt's Acts will have been removed. But I only express this opinion in the belief that the promise to review the anomalies in local taxation expressed or implied at the time this measure was introduced is to be faithfully redeemed.

C. Morgan-Richardson.

A COLONIAL CHRONICLE.

India.

India remains unhappily to the fore, and her condition has become a grave Imperial concern, which affects the Colonies equally with the Mother Country on account of the remedies to be applied, as we hope to show our readers. The Plague, the Famine, and the Frontier War have all received abundant, and superabundant attention from the British Press. In spite of their detractors, we venture to affirm that both the Military and the Civil Services of India have met and discharged their great responsibilities with skill and promptitude, and with almost unqualified success. There may have been some administrative blundering in Bombay in coping with the pestilence, and some want of pre-vision on the part of the higher authorities elsewhere with regard to the famine, but when the stress came, the Indian civilian upheld the splendid traditions of his order, and exhibited afresh the noble qualities which, in spite of all our faults, justify our retention of India. There has been a great deal of impatient and ignorant criticism of the Frontier Campaign by those unacquainted with the exceedingly arduous theatre of war, but it will not be denied that the regimental work by both officers and men was as intrepid and thorough as ever. Possibly the character of the campaign might have been varied, possibly there was occasional want of co-ordination between some of the commanding officers, while it is even said that the staffs were overloaded with "swells from Simla" who were more fitted for Departmental duties or private theatricals than for active service in the field. There is always scope for criticism in every military enterprise, and this was no affair of outposts, but the greatest operation undertaken by the Indian Army since the mutiny of forty years ago. What is the net result? Speaking of the Tirah expedition, which is the only one to which attention is invited, for the unbroken and brilliant successes of other forces are overlooked by the fault-finders, the Commander-in-Chief, Sir William Lockhart, is able to point out that the troops have been able to march throughout the Orakzai and Afridi countries, punishing both tribes and securing the submission of the former, while that of the latter has since been reported. At any rate, it is said that no further expeditions are necessary, and one may hope that the "spirit of self-abasement," with which Lord Elgin charges the British people, will be suffered

to leave the Indian Army alone which has acquitted itself this winter with conspicuous credit.

THE "INTOLERABLE" AND THE "IMPOSSIBLE."

Civilians may find it convenient to lay India's difficulties at the door of the military, and to credit her deplorable economic conditions to the extravagant inroads which the Army makes upon the Treasury. We have pointed out before that India is not imperilled by military extravagance, but by civil ineptitude. By playing ducks and drakes with the money of the Indian people the financiers and administrators are primarily responsible for the difficulties they desire to cast upon the military. In closing the mints of a great silver-using and silver-hoarding country to the free coinage of silver, and in creating a rupee, which, though rare, does not inspire confidence when found, the following effects have been produced:—(1) A most damaging depreciation of the silver stock of the natives involving probably a loss of over £100,000,000 in five years. (2) The natural supply of money has been cut off at a time when it was most sorely needed to alleviate distress. (3) The weight of taxation has been automatically augmented without increasing the revenue. (4) A monetary stringency has been created involving a bank-rate of 12 per cent. and 14 per cent., which perturbs and paralyzes the business world. (5) The Indian exporter finds himself handicapped by a bounty of about 60 per cent. in favour of his competitor in silver-money countries. The export trade is consequently in revolt. (6) As the rupee can only be raised by reducing the sale of council drafts—the means by which the Indian Government pays its way—a heavy deficit is being piled up. (7) Capital, being a shy bird, is leaving a country which plays such astounding antics—thus India loses what she most requires. These crying evils from which our great dependency is suffering are the handiwork of a few currency cranks with ulterior objects, and their continuance is due to the fact that a handful of amateurs, as incapable as they are well-meaning—Lord Elgin and Sir James Westland—are temporarily able to masquerade as the Indian Government. Behind these stand our Parliamentary statesmen, who are ultimately responsible for the crazy experiment which has broken down in India, with consequences which even *The Times* pronounces to be "intolerable." Moreover, our Front Benchers seek to make confusion worse confounded by saddling India with a gold standard, thus escaping from the "intolerable" to what Sir Robert Giffen, the leading monometallist, declared to be "impossible." Indeed, they meditated perpetrating this further political crime without any previous enquiry, and it was only owing to the unflagging and resolute efforts of a few private members of the House of Commons that we have been spared a financial *débacle*.

THE GIBBS MOTION.

India does not owe much to the House of Commons, which has rarely intervened in her affairs with judgment, but by rare good fortune, while the gold standard plot was hatching, Mr. Vicary Gibbs, one of the Conservative members for Hertfordshire, was successful in balloting for a day to discuss Indian Currency. There was weeping and gnashing of teeth among the discomfited bunglers of Calcutta and Whitehall as soon as it was known Parliament would intervene. The debate was to have taken place on the 29th March, but in order to cripple the discussion the Government appropriated the afternoon on the pretext that Government business was in arrear though, as a matter of fact, it was in a more advanced state than at any previous period in the memory of man. Thus the debate was limited to the evening, and the great majority of intending critics of the Government's pitiful policy were precluded from speaking. Fortunately the attack was led by a man who has a mind to speak and is not afraid to speak it, while the terms of his motion adroitly covered the ground. Mr. Gibbs moved: "That a Select Committee or Royal Commission be appointed to consider the monetary condition of India and the effect of closing the Indian Mints to silver on the different classes and interests affected thereby, to report on the suggested establishment of a gold standard in that country, and to make such recommendations as they may think fit.' In an able and vigorous speech, the mover contrasted the prosperity of India before the mints were closed with the present parlous condition. "India was flourishing; her manufactures were increasing; she was enjoying an automatic currency, and getting an enormous stimulus to her productions from the low rate of exchange." Now "the position is appalling. Nobody can engage in commerce successfully in a state of chronic panic; yet that is the position to which India has been reduced." The speaker had had "innumerable letters from Bombay, Calcutta, Burmah, and Ceylon, showing the effect upon the commercial and financial state of India of these experiments of the Indian Government. They all tell one story: a 12 per cent. rate of discount, and as much as 24 per cent. per annum paid on the security of gold bars by the natives." At the same time exchange has fluctuated as much during the five years of this experiment as during the five years 1884 to 1889. A heavy blow has likewise been dealt at the producing power by artificially raising the exchange, and, whereas for the nine months ending December, 1897, there were 43,000 chests of opium valued at Rx4,000,000, the production for the nine months ended December, 1893 (before the closing of the mints), was 53,000 chests, valued at Rx6,000,000.

THE HOARDS.

After illustrating the effect of the Indian Government's monkey tricks with the rupee upon the banking and mercantile classes, who are invited to play in a game of "heads I don't win and tails I lose," for the rupee could never rise above 1s. 4d., but might sink indefinitely, Mr. Gibbs added:—"I will not labour the commercial question any further. I know very well that the doctrines of Robin Hood, that it is a meritorious action to plunder the rich, are so well established in this country, that it is hardly worth while to dispute them to-day, and I am not going to do so, but I am going to call the attention of this House to the question of the very poor of India—poor in a sense which Englishmen hardly realize. I mean the poor Indian ryot; and I am going to ask this House to consider how this action has affected them, and whether they can say that it is honourable, justifiable, and worthy of this great country." The hoards have been variously calculated, necessarily by guesswork, but they are admitted to be enormous. "Let us imagine the position of the man who tenders this silver in 1893 and who tenders it now in 1898. In 1893, with an open mint, for every 180 grains of silver in bangles or other things that he tendered he got one rupee or sixteen annas. With a closed mint, and the present price of silver, for that same number of grains of silver he gets ten annas; that is to say, you have taken away, or the Indian Government has taken away, without warning, without notice, from the very poorest class of her subjects about 37½ per cent. of their hoards . . . and when Englishmen, during an Indian famine, are asked to subscribe, and they give £100 or £1,000, they think they are doing very finely in so far helping the poor Indian, and all the time they have sat by and let their Government take vastly more than all their charitable subscriptions can possibly put into it." Mr. Gibbs dealt effectively with a number of other points, and in particular referred to the failure of Japan to establish an effective gold standard, and to the serious menace to the British gold reserve of an Indian demand for gold, which would have to be met in London as "the only free market for gold" in the world. We need not refer further to this aspect of the case, as we present our readers with an important letter, in this number, protesting against the adoption of a gold standard in India. The writer, Mr. Fowler, is a Vice-President of the Gold Standard Defence Association, a banker, and an eminent monometallist. Mr. Gibbs concluded a particularly valuable speech coming, as it did from a Conservative member, by quoting the words of the famous Royal Proclamation that was issued when we took over India from the Company after the Mutiny: "In her prosperity shall be her strength, in her contentment our security, and in her gratitude our great reward."

LORD GEORGE HAMILTON.

We pass over the intermediate speeches, and come to the reply of the Secretary of State for India (Lord George Hamilton). Though not responsible for the closing of the mints, he defended that action as "the right course" in "circumstances of very great difficulty," and added: "I believe I am the oldest bimetallist in the House, as I became a convert twenty-five years ago, and I had a great deal to do at that time with starting the organization which has since developed itself. The object of bimetallism is to establish a stable rate of exchange between gold and silver money, and the object of anybody who takes an interest in Indian finance is to try and bring about that stability of exchange. It is my belief that if that ever can be established so as to induce capitalists to send their money to India for investment with the knowledge that they will be able to get it back at very much the same rate, I know no bounds to the productive prosperity of India. How is it possible to establish that stability of exchange between England and India? It might be done by international agreement, and, theoretically, that would be the best plan, but the world, unfortunately, does not agree." Lord George Hamilton has not devoted any considerable portion of his political energies to the task of converting the world to the views he has held for a quarter of a century. He added that from the time of the demonetization of silver by Germany twenty-five years ago, and the consequent fall in price, there has been a steady addition to the gold-using countries, and a corresponding diminution of those with a silver standard, which are now reduced to two—Mexico and and China.* As France cannot accept any other ratio than $15\frac{1}{2}$ to 1, and as the market ratio is about 35 to 1, there is no chance of an international bimetallic arrangement, and none would be made without her. Having somewhat superficially disposed of what he regards as the best solution, Lord George Hamilton proceeded to affirm that no nation "can by its own unaided exertions rehabilitate the price of silver." Consequently, the closing of the Indian mints to silver and keeping them closed, was and is the only policy open to the Indian Government. He affirmed that "India was, unquestionably, on the verge of bankruptcy" when she had recourse to this step, and he enlisted the well-established bimetallic argument against bounties to silver-using countries as a plea for maintaining the closure. "Now, what is the plea upon which bimetallists have appealed to the working-classes of this country? Is it not that the constant fall in the price of silver raises prices in those countries where silver is the standard, and that in consequence an impetus and bounty is given to the export trade? But if you open your mints you at once re-establish the bounty system on behalf of the exporter which the closing of the mints has taken

* Reinforced by Spain on April 23rd, 1898.

away from him, and therefore anybody who has made an appeal as a bimetallist to the working-classes of this country to get rid of the bounty which the fall in silver gives to the exporter, must vote against the re-opening of the mints in India, because, if those mints were opened, that bounty which they have denounced would once more be established. It does seem to me absolutely inconsistent with the whole theory and principle of bimetallism that those gentlemen who have been holding up the iniquity of this bounty system should now ask us to re-open the mints and re-establish it in full vitality."

THE HAMILTON MOTION.

As the mouthpiece of officials "stiff in their opinion and always in the wrong," Lord George Hamilton was constrained to suggest that the closing of the mints has been a brilliant success, and that the prophets of failure had been discomfited: "The area of cultivation was not diminished in India. The price of staple commodities remains very much the same; the value of exports has not fallen; the prices of exported produce have not fallen; and the prices of imported produce have increased," the volume of trade with silver-using countries has increased, and the proof that India has not been ruined is shown "by the extraordinary recuperative power she is now exhibiting in recovering from one of the greatest disasters that have ever visited any country." The dearness of money is due to the want of capital, which in turn is due to the great economic convulsions caused by "drought, famine, plague, and war," and to the fixing of a gold point above which the rupee could not rise, while it might fall to any lower point. The speaker made a calculation as to the loss and difficulties that would be suffered by the Indian Government on the assumption that the mints had remained opened, and that the rupee had fallen as low as silver now is. We should have hardly expected the "oldest bimetallist in the House" to be so childish as to argue that silver would have fallen to its present price if the Indian mints had remained opened. The practical point of the speech was that "I want it to be distinctly understood that so far as the Indian Government are concerned, both here and in India, we believe that an attempt to open the mints without some international arrangement being come to would be an act of lunacy." Having pronounced it to be "an act of lunacy" to re-open the Indian mints, and having refused to be any party to an enquiry which "would lead to the reversal of the policy established in 1893," Lord George Hamilton declared himself in favour of an "impartial enquiry" conducted by men who are not "extreme controversialists"—but what is he?—and proceeded to move the following resolution in substitution of Mr. Gibbs':—"That in the opinion of this House it is desirable that a further enquiry be made into the monetary

system of India, and into the proposals of the Government of India for the establishment of a gold standard in that country."

Disingenuous.

The Government having originally made every effort to stifle the discussion and burke enquiry, had been brought to their bearings by being told by the Whips that their supporters would not submit to such treatment. Their next step was to meet the grievance by offering a Departmental Committee consisting of officials—in other words, that the criminals should judge their crime—which was summarily rejected as worse than useless, and the Government were compelled to make further concessions. Hence the Hamilton motion, which the Secretary of State interpreted as signifying the appointment of a committee with "power to make recommendations," in which "gentlemen of experience in connection with India, whose names carry weight, should be asked to participate," and "*they ought certainly to be more in number than the officials.*" So the officials are to be swamped, which is something, as India's monetary difficulties are of official manufacture. This enabled Mr. Gibbs to accept the Secretary of State's motion as an alternative to his own. It must also be noticed that while Lord George Hamilton declared that only the method, and not the principle, of establishing a gold standard in India was before the Committee, Mr. Balfour subsequently stated that the principle, as well as the method, was in issue. In fact, the Government seem to find it as difficult to make up their minds upon this as upon other questions, and their conduct has certainly been disingenuous. Lord George Hamilton, *e.g.*, stipulated that the enquiry "should be made as soon as possible." Three weeks have passed, and the composition of the committee is still withheld from the public. We understand that this is due to the fact that Lord George Hamilton has sought high and low for the "extreme controversialists"—whom he declared to be tabooed—wherewith to pack this "impartial enquiry" so that its "power to make recommendations" shall not be utilized in favour of the reopening of the Indian mints. A carefully packed tribunal will carry no weight whatsoever, and as any effort to force a gold standard upon India will seriously imperil the scanty British gold reserve, the Government will find when their Committee commences to sit that the City—which we believe to be on the right side on this question—will refuse to submit to the creation of a money famine in London, in order to precipitate a catastrophe in India.

Monometallist Opinion.

We are not inviting the reader's attention to any bimetallic grievance. Mr. Fowler's letter shows how the question strikes a keen monometallist, and men like Sir John Lubbock, the President of the Gold Standard Defence Association, view the proposed policy with the

utmost dismay. The late Lord Hillingdon, who was one of our few remaining great bankers in the old sense, and who, as Treasurer of the Gold Standard Defence Association, has taken an active part in monetary politics, met a friend of the writer's a short time ago and held up his hands in horror at the prospect of a gold standard for India, which he said could not be established under £75,000,000. His death at this juncture is nothing less than a national calamity, as he would have been a strenuous opponent of what he regarded as a huge blunder and what seems to us to be a hideous political crime. Take, again, the view of Sir Robert Giffen, who, when he is fighting against bimetallism, is regarded by the London Press as a pundit of the first magnitude. What has this great monometallist expert to say on the question. See his evidence before the last Royal Agricultural Commission (Vol. II., pp. 152 *et seq.*):—

Question 18,348. Asked if he could form any estimate as to what the demand would be on gold for establishing a gold standard in India.

Answer. Could not say. "I do not think it is possible for India to have a gold standard.

Q. 18,349. Asked if he could give a rough estimate.

A. "I am quite unable to do so, because I do not think the thing can be done at all."

Q. 18,350. Asked what he meant by saying a very considerable amount would be required to do the thing properly.

A. Certain measures of precaution would have to be taken involving the accumulation of a certain stock of gold, but—"My opinion is that you could not do it at all."

After questions bringing out that apparently the idea of those who favoured a "gold standard" for India was to introduce such a standard without accumulating gold, while Sir Robert's idea was that the only proper way was to accumulate gold, "not so much as £80,000,000 perhaps, but a very large sum":—

Q. 18,355. "In fact you maintain that there is a proper and improper way of doing it?"

A. "Undoubtedly."

Q. 18,356. "The proper way of doing it you hold to be impossible?"

A. "That is clearly my opinion."

Q. 18,357. "The improper way of doing it you anticipate will end in the policy being abandoned?"

A. "I think it must be."

Q. 18,358. "So far as you are concerned, although we are absolutely confronted with the policy, you have no apprehension from it?"

A. "Not the slightest"

THE MENACE TO THE COLONIES.

We stated a few pages back that this Indian gold standard question is of vital interest to the Colonies, and we shall have no difficulty in proving our statement to the satisfaction of every intelligent reader—again relying on monometallist testimony. According to Lord Hillingdon, the proposed operation would require a gold accumulation of £75,000,000 for Indian use. Other monometallists

have named an even higher amount; take, however, the lower estimate. It is equivalent to the whole of the Rand output of gold for more than seven years, and would absorb almost the entire world's gold supply for two years. No doubt it would be abstracted in homœopathic doses of £20,000,000, which we understand is the initial amount asked for by the Indian Government, but the ultimate result upon the white man's industry throughout the civilized world would be the same when the final £20,000,000 had been swallowed up by this great Asian vault. Sir Robert Giffen has taught us how the contraction of the world's currency in the 'seventies, when nations which had used silver money adopted gold money and abandoned silver money, has caused an "appreciation" of gold in terms of commodities, or, in other words, a fall in the general level of prices. Mankind is now threatened with another gigantic contraction of the currency which, if accomplished, would inflict untold misery and injustice upon the producing and debtor nations and upon the individual producer and debtor in all countries with gold standards; for the Indian demand for gold would make gold dearer in other countries and would correspondingly cheapen commodities. How would this process affect such communities as our Colonies with gold debts which they have to pay in commodities? To some of them it would mean red ruin. To Australia, for example, it would mean the repetition of 1893. We have no space to state the case in its full cogency, but it must be abundantly clear to our fellow-subjects in Greater Britain that their welfare is confronted with a clandestine but perilous menace, which they may be expected to take steps to ward off. The gold standard for India cannot be legitimately decided upon by a hole-and-corner committee sitting in Whitehall. The Colonies should lose no time in addressing emphatic remonstrances to the Imperial Government against the pursuance of a policy which would be disastrous to the civilized world in general and themselves in particular.

AN AGENT-GENERAL'S SUGGESTION.

A considerable flutter has been caused in Colonial circles by an outspoken speech made by Sir Westby Percival, Agent-General for Tasmania, at a meeting of a local branch of the British Empire League held at Eastbourne. Speaking as one "born in a Colony," he referred to the "isolation" of our Colonies, and complained that they are so little in contact with the public men of the Mother Country "that even now he questioned whether the Colonies, as a whole, were in entire sympathy with the policy which emanated from the Colonial Office. We were, of course, fortunate in having as the head of that office Mr. Chamberlain, who had certainly won the respect and esteem of the Colonies in a most marked degree. No man

who had held the position of Secretary for the Colonies had ever attained anything like the popularity which Mr. Chamberlain had. The fact remained, however, that Mr. Chamberlain personally knew very little of the public opinion of the Colonies. He was brought in contact with officials; he saw the Premiers when they came home; but it always seemed a matter of very great regret that the head of a Department which was, perhaps, the most important the country had, should never himself have paid an official visit to the Colonies. He was personally of opinion that it would do the very greatest good if Mr. Chamberlain could see his way, during the coming recess, to pay a visit to at least Canada and Australasia. He was sure the right hon. gentleman would do much to settle the differences of the Australian Colonies, which were trying to come together under one Federal Government." This is surely excellent sense, apart from the final suggestion. The First Lord of the Admiralty is continually inspecting the navy, the Secretary of State for War attends reviews, the Home Secretary and Minister of Education are expected to make personal acquaintance with the various institutions under their control, the Foreign Secretary, again, is continually going abroad, but the Secretary of State for the Colonies never sees, and, in some instances, never has seen, a Colony. It is not unnatural that this "isolation" should puzzle Greater Britain, and that there should be continual comment on a neglect, which does not seem to be altogether compatible with either the Democratic or Imperial spirit. Mr. Chamberlain is probably as conscious as are the Colonies of this shortcoming on the part of the Imperial factor, and it is common knowledge that he undertook his present office with every intention of creating a new departure. Had it been possible for him to get away from England for any recess he would undoubtedly before now have paid a personal visit to our daughter nations, and we may still hope that he will be able to carry out his original project before relinquishing his post. So far, however, it has been utterly impossible for any important Cabinet Minister to leave the country for any length of time. Ever since the Jameson or Rhodes Raid we have lived in a continuous whirl of crises which have demanded almost unremitting attention from every member of the Committee of the Cabinet by which it is understood that the British Empire is governed. We venture to suggest to the Colonies that they should in any case invite some of the leaders of the Opposition to visit them. There is no urgent need for their presence at home just now—they are for the most part lamentably ignorant of the British Empire, and in the ordinary course of events they should become Her Majesty's Imperial advisers.

CANADA'S EXTERNAL RELATIONS.

It has been an important month for Canada, though her affairs have not attracted the attention of the outside world as they would have done at other times. In the first place, it is announced that a conference is to take place between the Dominion and United States Governments, with a view to settling their outstanding difficulties—none of which are grave, though all are exasperating—the British Ambassador in Washington acting as intermediary. We should have attached no serious importance to this report, which follows so many of a similar character, were it not for the neighbourly desire manifested by the United States to satisfy the judgment of the recent Commission which, acting under the award of the Behring Sea arbitration, had allotted a sum of $473,157 to the Canadian sealers who had been disturbed in the pursuit of their lawful avocation by United States cruisers, acting under orders from Washington, at a time when the American Government sincerely believed that the Behring Sea was the private property of their nation. It is unnecessary to recapitulate the history of this long-postponed payment, which has given rise to some misunderstanding both in Great Britain and Canada, partly because people outside the United States have never been at pains to appreciate the executive functions accorded to the Senate by the Federal constitution, and partly, it must be added, owing to the desire of a section of the Senate to disoblige Great Britain. However, we can let bygones be bygones; the Senate has, on the initiative of Senator Cabot Lodge, decided to meet this trifling account, and the money is to be paid forthwith. The incident is both felicitous and opportune, and some are disposed to accept it as an earnest of a desire for improved relations with "the hereditary enemy." We have been so scolded by a Canadian writer for expressing the view that Canada should, without sacrificing legitimate interests, do all in her power to establish friendly relations with her only neighbour, that we hesitate to reopen the question. All sensible Englishmen earnestly hope that the Dominion will feel able to meet the United States half-way should an opportunity occur, *e.g.*, there is room for a concession in the matter of pelagic sealing which, without being very valuable to Ottawa, is a constant irritation to Washington, and a *modus vivendi* with the object of saving the herds should be well within the resources of diplomacy. After all, Canada, the United States, and Great Britain are not so rich in friends that they can afford perpetual quarrels with one another. These may be a source of strength and delight to their numerous enemies, but they are a source of weakness to *all* the parties indulging in them.

INTERNAL POLITICS.

The Parliamentary situation at Ottawa is developing several features of interest. Sir Wilfrid Laurier's Government are pushing on their Reform Bill, which aims at simplifying and cheapening the existing electoral system, by making the Dominion voter one and the same person with the Provincial voter. Thus the present cumbrous and complicated distinctions will be swept away, and the duty of making up the Federal electorate is to be cast upon the Provinces as in the United States. It is noteworthy that, though introduced by a strong Liberal Government, the Bill does not extend the principle of manhood suffrage throughout the Dominion. The second episode to be recorded is the passage of the Yukon Railway Bill through the Dominion House of Commons (where the Liberals predominate) by a majority of 111 votes to 72, and its subsequent rejection by the Conservative Senate by the overwhelming majority of 52 votes to 14. We ventured to anticipate this action by the Senate in writing last month, and the Bill is certainly open to two grave objections: (1) it would not provide an all Canadian route; (2) by adopting an extravagant system of land grants to the contractors, it obtains fairly easy terms for the present generation by imposing an excessive mortgage on their successors. This is surely not compatible with good Liberalism. Moreover, it is difficult to believe that the Senate would have acted thus, and by so great a majority, unless they were fortified by popular opposition to the Bill. They have in any case raised the Second Chamber question in an acute form, but it has been occasionally found in the Mother Country, that when raised, this question produces unexpected results. There has been a remarkable silence in Ministerial circles at Ottawa since the Senate's vote, but railway communication with the Yukon is imperative, and it is now asserted that means will be formed to avoid all friction with the United States by selecting a terminus on indisputably Canadian soil. There is very little prospect of the opening of any railway this year, and the inevitable delay must necessarily create a very serious crisis among the unfortunate people who have found their way to the Klondike and adjoining country.

THE DEBATE IN THE SENATE.

As the antagonism between the Senate and House of Commons, representing respectively the Conservative and Liberal parties of Canada, cannot fail to have important consequences, we reproduce the epitome of the debate (from the *Canadian Gazette**) that occurred in the Upper House when the Second Reading of the Yukon Railway Bill was rejected. The *pros* and *cons* are clearly stated:—

"Senator David Mills, when moving the Second Reading of the Yukon Railway Bill in the Senate, said in regard to the land grant that he could see no force

* A threepenny paper published in London every Thursday, which no politician should be without.

in the contention that the grant was too large. If the lands had any agricultural value he could understand such a contention. These lands, however, were utterly useless except for mining purposes. Only a small proportion of the land granted was of any use, for gold was only found along the creeks and rivers. The extent of the area was no indication of the value of the land. Discussing the question of quartz deposits being found in the Yukon, Mr. Mills said that prospecting for quartz was an exceedingly costly and difficult operation, inasmuch as the ground was covered with a bed of moss two feet deep, which had to be removed to show the colour of the ground. The Government, in awarding this contract, did not want Messrs. Mackenzie and Mann to fail in their undertaking. The land grant was large because the work was immensely costly and difficult, and the Government maintained that it was essential to the preservation of that country for Canada. Senator Kirchhoffer explained that the real question at issue was not the advantages Canada would derive from the construction of the railway, but whether the consideration proposed to be given under this contract was fair and reasonable. He quoted from Mr. Ogilvie's report to show that his estimate of the richness of the Yukon goldfields was not more favourable than the report made by the United States officials when gold was discovered in California. Both were prophecies made in advance of actual development; but if Mr. Ogilvie was as correct as were the United States officials in regard to California, the Yukon would yield enough in ten years to pay off the national debt of the country three or four times over. Sir Mackenzie Bowell, in the course of his speech against the Bill, said that the enormous rush of miners to the Yukon country would provide enough traffic to warrant the construction of a railway such as the one proposed as a business venture without a single acre of land or a dollar of subsidy. If constructed over a suitable route, a railway to the goldfields of the Klondike would be an exceedingly profitable investment. In conclusion, he said: 'I am convinced that if a well-devised plan is submitted to Parliament the Senate will be willing to go a long way towards assisting the Government in opening up that country, providing that they are not asked to surrender the whole territory to one monopoly.' Senator Mills, in closing the debate for the Government, said that in throwing out the Bill the Senate was taking the responsibility for the most serious blow that had been aimed at Canadian commerce since Confederation. In defending the land grant he said that the Government could have given Messrs. Mackenzie and Mann a one-hundredth part of the area and still have given them all the placer mining lands they would receive under this contract. But the effect would have been that they would have been likely to have failed in the English money market. They had not the same chance of succeeding with a small area that they had with a large one. Carrying the grant three miles back from the base line did not add at all to the area of placer mining granted."

A Pioneer of Imperialism.

At the time of writing, the text of the Canadian Budget speech delivered by Mr. Fielding (the Dominion Minister of Finance in Sir Wilfred Laurier's Government) has not reached us, but the cable has indicated its significance. The principle of Imperial preferential trading receives unequivocal and indisputable recognition, so, not unnaturally, Cobdenite cranks in the London Press studiously refuse to discuss the new Canadian Budget, epoch-marking event though it be. The present reciprocity tariff, which allows a discount on foreign goods as well as on British goods, will be repealed on August 1st, when it will be replaced by a preferential tariff confining its favours to the United Kingdom, British India, New South Wales, and the British West Indies. This will surely

send the Cobden Club into convulsions, and we shall not be surprised if Sir Wilfred Laurier is requested to return the medal of which we heard so much last year. Preferential trading is not free trading in the narrow sense of the fanatics, it is something very much better, as it opens up a prospect of freer trading within the four corners of the Empire. Equally important is the life-buoy thrown to the West Indies by the Canadian Government. It entitles the Dominion to be called a pioneer of Imperialism, and shows her policy to be inspired by more practical sagacity than that of some Governments nearer home. For we are told that the only change made in the tariff increases the sugar duty: on raw sugar from 50 cents per hundredweight to 65½ cents subject to a preferential cut of one-fourth on West India sugars, as against the bounty-fed sugars of Europe; on refined sugar from one dollar to 1·25 dollar per hundredweight with a preferential reduction on sugars manufactured wholly from the raw product of any British possession. "In announcing the extension of the preferential tariff to the British West Indies Mr. Fielding said: 'As the West Indies are British Colonies, and are the natural markets of Canada, we feel we all have some Imperial responsibilities, and should be willing to lend a helping hand to those Colonies.' The proposal to adopt countervailing duties having been rejected by Mr. Chamberlain in his speech at Liverpool, measures were now before the Imperial Parliament for aid to the West Indies in the shape of loans and public works, and it was in view of those circumstances that the Government thought Canada should assist in the solution of what he considered a very grave problem. Therefore, without demanding concessions from their somewhat hard-up neighbour, and without insisting on a rigid compliance with Canada's preferential tariff, it was proposed in August next to extend the preferential tariff to the British West India Colonies." In the face of this lead we may ask: What does the British Government propose to do for the unfortunate West Indies beyond granting a few miserable doles?

AUSTRALIA'S NEED.

The incoherent and poverty-stricken information cabled from Australia with regard to the progress of the Federal movement has caused a growing protest that must ultimately compel a remedy. Surely our great London Press can arrange to receive a common column from Melbourne or Sydney which might profitably replace some of the superfluous columns which keep us "in touch" with Lisbon or Sofia. Judging from one's own experience, these expensive streams of minor Continental tittle-tattle remain unread by the ordinary newspaper reader. The failure to keep the British public posted in the momentous events now occurring at the other end of the world is positively pitiful, and we should like to impress

upon the Australians that their isolation is a serious detriment to themselves. They may not be so foolish as to wish to cut a shallow splash in the world, but no Colony or group of Colonies can desire to hide its light permanently under a bushel, and on the more vulgar ground that it is "bad business" they should reconsider their attitude of reserve and secretiveness, in so far as they may be responsible. Surely they will lose their legitimate weight in the councils of the Empire, they will miss opportunities of material development, in short, they will neglect their own vital interests if the great virtue of modesty is carried to excessive lengths. The *Canadian Gazette* may be regarded as expressing an impartial and sympathetic opinion on this question, and its remarks afford food for very serious reflection to the people of Australia:—

"Thanks to the enterprise of *The Times*, and the somewhat improved service which Reuter gives us, Canada fares better nowadays than was the case a few years back. But Australia is in a very different plight. What could have been more inadequate or unsatisfactory than the meagre and disjointed cablegrams forwarded with respect to the Federal Convention at Melbourne? How could the average Englishman glean from them any connected or intelligent idea of the progress of deliberations destined to have a great and possibly a permanent bearing upon Imperial issues? Of course, the newspaper man will tell you that the demand will in time create or help to create the supply—that when the English public evinces a keen and loving interest in Colonial affairs and Colonial opinion, the newspaper manager will, in self-defence, promptly meet its requirements. No doubt he will endeavour to do so. But the great obstacle to any development of this kind, the dead-weight which bars almost all journalistic enterprise in this direction, is found in the high cable rates enforced between the Old Country, South Africa, and Australasia. Journalism is one branch of industry which suffers severely from a monopoly as injurious to our commercial as to our Imperial interests. Until this monopoly is removed, we can, we fear, hardly expect to see Great and Greater Britain in the close and direct touch which might be brought about by full and constant intercommunication."

We make a monthly protest on this question because it is only by dint of repetition that a remedy will be applied, and we are glad to observe that the subject is being ventilated elsewhere.

WILL THEY FEDERATE?

The movement towards a United Australia has emerged from the "convention" stage to face the final ordeal of a poll of the people in the various Colonies associated with it. In strict accuracy we should, perhaps, speak of the present phase of the question as an effort to form the nucleus of a federation which may eventually embrace the five Colonies on the Australian Continent and the adjoining island of Tasmania. For the proceedings at the various conventions, and at the subsequent meetings would deter any but an inveterate optimist from anticipating the immediate formation of a complete Federal Union. Queensland, *e.g.*, has not sent delegates to any of the Conventions, and takes no part in the present *plébiscite*, though it is asserted that she will become a partner in any federa-

tion that may be formed. Her geographical position would in view of recent developments in the Far East point to such a course as not merely prudent but imperative, for consolidation means strength; but Queensland has been such an unblushing flirt on the Federal question that it would be idle to predict her final course. Of the five remaining Colonies it is requisite for three to approve the Commonwealth Bill before it becomes operative. For some months its fortunes have seemed to us to be in the hands of the electors of Victoria, South Australia, and Tasmania, but the *Sydney Morning Herald* (New South Wales) indignantly pronounces this view to be absurd. We sincerely hope it may prove so, and that the youngest and the oldest Colonies of Australia—Western Australia and New South Wales—may play their proper part in forwarding a cause which enjoys the unstinted approval of their ablest and wisest men. But will they? Western Australia is notoriously lukewarm. Her recent rapid growth, consequent on the opening up of new gold-fields, has failed to attract a population keenly alive to the beauties of the Federal system, or to the advantages that its adoption would confer on Australia. These Uitlanders are, indeed, hardly identified with Australian interests, and their enthusiasm for the Commonwealth Bill is inconspicuous. New South Wales, again, is a doubtful quantity—*pace* the *Sydney Morning Herald*—for a different reason. One of the conditions precedent to the creation of an Australian Union is the assent of a certain minimum of the electors in each Colony. The opponents of Federation succeeded last year in raising the *minimum* required in New South Wales from 50,000 to 80,000 votes. As a valuable analytical article in *The Times* points out, "with an adult male population of little over 400,000 this involves the active approval of so large a section of the voting population that the ultimate fate of any project which depends upon it must be extremely doubtful."

NEW SOUTH WALES.

If the close of the Convention left the friends of Federation in the Mother Colony (New South Wales) with the heavy task before them of beating up the formidable minimum of 80,000 electors—more or less supine—subsequent events have tended to aggravate their difficulties. It appears that there is fierce and open opposition in that Colony to the principles of the Commonwealth Bill. Mr. Reid, her very able Premier, Mr. Barton, Mr. Wise and others have taken off their coats in the cause to which they have contributed so much, but we are told that Mr. Reid's support of the Bill "has aroused the fierce hostility of the labour members and of the anti-federalists." and that his Attorney-General, Mr. J. H. Want, has resigned, and proposes to lead this opposition, so "an exciting campaign is anticipated." Subsequently Mr. Lyne, the leader of the Parliamentary

Opposition in New South Wales and one of the delegates at the Federal Convention, addressed a mass meeting in Sydney, and spoke in "unqualified condemnation of the leading principles of the Commonwealth Bill. His greatest objection was the equal representation of the States in the Senate. This, he said, was absolutely antagonistic to the principles of democracy." (Yes, but it is vital in the formation of a federation.) He objected to the financial proposals, and maintained "that the Federal capital should be within the boundaries of New South Wales; otherwise the Mother Colony would lose her prestige. The Bill gave too much power to the smaller States, and he should oppose it." Now it is obvious that if these cablegrams are reliable, the chances of New South Wales rallying to the cause of Federation are slender, in the face of a hostile Labour Party, a critical Opposition, a disunited Cabinet, and a required poll of 80,000 electors. We devoutly hope that the *Sydney Morning Herald* may be right, and that our forecast may be falsified. All friends of Australia must hope to see her united, and if the present movement fails it will be many years before there is another. But to hope for something is different from expecting it.

A "Globe Trotter's" Notes.

A "globe trotter" in Australia sends us some notes which record his passing impressions, which are decidedly suggestive:—"You people who live at home at ease have no idea of what the Colonies have become. Adelaide and Melbourne and Sydney are far ahead of the old country in municipal affairs, such as lighting, roads, streets, trams, &c., &c. Cabs are better in London, but then there is such a perfect system of cable and steam trams and ferries that one hardly wants a cab. There is hardly a house in Melbourne and Sydney which has not telephonic communication! The streets vary in size from the Strand to four times the breadth of Piccadilly. The Public Gardens are excellent. The average wage of the ordinary working man is 8s. per day for eight hours work, and as food is cheaper and other articles not much dearer than in England, you can well imagine the easy time he has of it. However, when he is at work he does his level best, there is no shirking—so all the employers I have talked with, say. The Labour Vote practically controls Parliament in all the Australian Colonies, and it is a very curious and interesting fact that property of all kinds is as safe, if not safer, from all socialistic attack than it is in England. But there is little doubt that the time will come, and probably shortly, when Labour and Capital (as distinct from property) will have a battle to the death. The Australian workman is far ahead in general intelligence of the English workman, but he has not yet grasped the fact that Labour and Capital are dependent upon one another, and that Labour can never, in the nature of things,

control Capital. A profit-sharing scheme between employers and workmen will, undoubtedly, be the outcome of the strife out here, as workmen will never permit their *wages* to be lowered, but would fully understand and accept a decrease in their profits if trade deteriorated."

ARE WE DECADENT.

Our "globe trotter" adds:—"There is a strong feeling amongst Australians that British policy is weak and undignified, and that the powers that be do not protect and help British trade and British subjects in the way that Germany and the United States do. I believe there is a feeling of deep loyalty to the Empire with all this, and that no Australian of any standing or influence has any Republican or Separatist feeling at present. In a war our Colonies would assist us, but whether in the event of defeat they would still follow our fortunes I very much doubt. Federation is dead (at present), I am afraid. The great difficulty is Free Trade *v.* Protection, and control of the Rivers. Minor points of difference are, which is to be the Federal capital, and representation of minorities. Curiously enough, another point is that every Colony has a different railway gauge! You can fancy the delay and expense this occasions. Troops going from Sydney to Adelaide would have to detrain three times. I have had many conversations with representative men during my travels, and there seems to be a concensus of opinion on the following points: (1) The United Kingdom is on the down grade. (2) It possesses only politicians, but no statesmen. (3) Germany is the coming nation, and is cutting off our trade and commerce in every direction. (4) The average British workman is fifty years behind the Belgian and German in intelligence, energy, and capacity for hard work. (5) That to fail in a war would be less disastrous than to perish by senile decay, while a successful war would be followed by a closer federation of the Empire. P.S.—The Brasseys have not been a success in Melbourne; the Hampdens are respected in Sydney."

THE CHARTERED COMPANY.

The Chartered Company of South Africa has had a continuous and splendid advertisement during the past month, and its affairs have been a subject of much speculation—in a conversational and literary sense. The Duke of Fife, who recently retired from the directorate, opened the ball in a straightforward and sensible speech at the Colonial Institute. Needless to say, he infuriated the Rhodesian partisans by impugning the divinity which hedges a Chartered Company, and must, we suppose, be ranked henceforward with the "Little Englanders." He had the audacity to point out that a board sitting in London, no matter how constituted or how conscientious, could not exercise the same control as the Imperial authority, and therefore

he warmly welcomed the increased supervision to be exercised by the Colonial Secretary. He illustrated his point by alluding "to a certain deplorable incident—the invasion of a neighbouring country's territory by the forces of the Company of which he had been a director—an invasion deliberately planned and carried out by the Company's agents without their knowledge and without their possible consent, as he could show if he were to go into matters which he would prefer to forget. It was preposterous to suppose that such a grave violation of duty could have been perpetrated by any individuals who felt themselves under the direct control of the British Government." As the Duke of Fife is the Prince of Wales' son-in-law, his unequivocal declaration should finally silence a good deal of twaddle that has been talked abroad with regard to the Raid and the eminent personages "in the know." The next episode to be noted was the issue of the long-postponed Report of the Chartered Company which throws no further light upon the great gold problem,* on the solution of which the prosperity or collapse of the Company depends. This document has had a cool reception from the once perfervid London Press. *The Times*, which has done so much on behalf of Rhodesia, now advises shareholders to look for dividends in the shape of patriotism rather than cash. There is, however, one passage in the Report calculated to give unqualified satisfaction to the shareholders, but it foreshadows a policy to be strenuously resisted by all who are not shareholders and one may hope that there is sufficient independence among the inhabitants of Rhodesia to resent it. We are told that the Company keeps separate accounts of its outlay and revenue as a Government, and that when self-government is established in Rhodesia the deficit—already £6,000,000—will be debited to the Colony, which will thus begin life with a national debt, while the Company retains its mining and commercial interests. A man would have to be suffering from a very acute attack of Charteria before assenting to this unheard-of proposal.

* The unimpeachable *Economist* discusses it thus: —"And as to this momentous question the reports carry us no further than we were before. And this is not because the reports are for a former period, since the statements on this subject are brought down to as late as April 4th, 1898, and seem, in fact, to have been procured for the purposes of the present report, which is itself dated April 7th. They consist of reports from the managers or engineers of the various companies formed to develop the gold reefs. But none of these companies have reached the productive stage, and the reports are without exception merely of the class that is met with in prospectuses of new companies. There is no record of crushings on a considerable scale, and, in fact, no gold has apparently, so far, been produced. That is a circumstance which all the difficulties that have been encountered seem insufficient to explain away, for in every other case where gold has been discovered in payable quantities some tangible results have been achieved within a comparatively short period. So far as can be judged from the outside, therefore, the prospects are by no means brilliant, and not much light is shed upon them by the latest addition to Chartered literature."

Mr. Rhodes.

The general meeting of the Chartered Company was held on Thursday, 21st April, at the Cannon Street Hotel, after a fateful interval of three years. The Duke of Abercorn presided, but he was not the central figure of proceedings which were marked by unbounded enthusiasm. The hero of the day was, of course, Mr. Cecil Rhodes, who had come from South Africa for the occasion. After he, Mr. Maguire and Sir Sidney Shippard (as a substitute for Mr. Beit, who felt constrained by his interests in the Transvaal to decline the honour) had been elected directors, Mr. Rhodes entered and faced the music of deafening cheers. His critics should always remember that, though he may owe his principal power to being a millionaire with political ambitions, which he is determined to gratify at all costs, he also has the rare faculty of exciting personal devotion in those with whom he comes in contact. On the other hand, his entourage has always been one of his most vulnerable points, for he has a profound contempt for character. His style of speech is singularly uncouth and frequently ungrammatical, but he gains by avoiding the Parliamentary sing-song, and his abruptness is frequently effective. Mr. Rhodes, with all his shrewdness, does not rate human intelligence very high, and can hardly be impressed by many of his own statements. Take, *e.g.*, these :—"I have always said that it (Rhodesia) would be a country that would make a great return of mineral products. The last thing left for our opponents was to say that there was no gold in the country; but now that they know there is gold they say that there is no payable gold. (Of what use would gold be which did not pay?) I admire them; it is a great battle that is going on in Africa. They want the country to be damned, and they want it to be a hopeless country. . . . You have seen these reports; there are some paid papers which do nothing else but write bad reports about that country which carried my name, and which you have created. They say that if it is successful north it means a united South Africa under the English flag; if the north is a failure it means a united South Africa under a Republican flag." Is this a convincing appeal to address to a British audience? Mr. Rhodes must be aware that with the exception of Mr. Labouchere, there is no one in England who does not heartily hope to see a united South Africa under the Union Jack, and, if the pace is not forced, it will inevitably come. Nor does anyone here desire to do injustice to Rhodesia. Criticisms of that country are entirely due to a desire to prevent injustice from being done to British investors, particularly those whose credulity is large out of all proportion to their means, and who for several years have been encouraged, by a combination of powerful interests,

to believe that Rhodesia possesses mineral resources of which in five years no serious evidence has been adduced. Many of us who are as keen Imperialists as Mr. Rhodes, detest having the Empire associated with all this stock-jobbing business, and feel that the Imperial cause will receive a serious set-back if people at home are persuaded to pour millions into a country from which millions will not return.

THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL.

The affairs of South Africa have not been less pregnant during the last few weeks than those of other parts of the British Empire, but, having devoted so much space to the Indian currency peril, which threatens every farmer in Cape Colony and Natal (by causing a further "appreciation" of gold, which, as Captain Brabant pointed out at a recent meeting in Capetown, is the chief cause of agricultural depression), we are compelled to scamp this part of the British Empire. The election of a new Legislative Council in Cape Colony must, however, be recorded, and if it is a true indication of the way the wind is blowing, it foreshadows the eventual return of Mr. Rhodes to power. In the late Council the Afrikander Bond held 16 seats against their opponents' 7, while in the newly-elected Council the Bond returns 9 members and the Progressives 14. Shortly before the election, Mr. Rhodes, at the urgent solicitation of his friends, came forward and declared himself to be a Progressive with certain reservations. The general election for the House of Assembly will take place this year, and both sides are straining every nerve. Probably, if the Progressives relied solely on progress, they would feel less confident of victory, but they are abundantly provided with the sinews of war, and their organization is being rapidly perfected. Since the Council election, Mr. Hofmeyr, the President of the Bond, has made a remarkable speech, affirming his loyalty to the British Empire, upon which *The Spectator* makes the following pithy comment:—"It is a mad or evil policy which proposes to treat such a man as a rebel." Happily, the effort to brand the Dutch of Cape Colony as disloyal is dead.

NATAL'S CONTRIBUTION.

We had the satisfaction of calling the reader's attention last month to the admirable address on Imperial Defence delivered by Mr. Escombe, the late Prime Minister of Natal. He discussed "the great responsibility resting on every British Colony in connection with the Empire," and pointed out that "the command of the sea was the command of the planet, and while England was mistress of the sea her rule throughout the world could never be successfully chal-

lenged." After reviewing the various ways in which the Colonies might assist the British Navy, Mr. Escombe affirmed that Natal could render conspicuous service by making her splendid coal supply accessible to the Imperial fleet and inaccessible to the fleet of the enemy. During the last few weeks there has been a most gratifying piece of evidence of the willingness of Natal to play her part in Imperial Defence, and few incidents of recent years have given greater pleasure to the Mother Country than the publication of the following cablegram from Officer Administering the Government of Natal to the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Chamberlain):—"30th March. I have received following minute from Ministers. (Begins.) 'Ministers* have the honour to request His Excellency to telegraph to Secretary of State for Colonies informing him that Government Natal is prepared to supply free of cost 12,000 tons of steam coal annually to ships of Her Majesty's Navy calling at port of Durban. Ministers also desire to state that all possible facilities will be afforded to any of Her Majesty's ships so calling.'" (Ends.) Mr. Chamberlain replied as follows, under date April 2:—"In answer to your telegram of March 30, inform your Ministers that Her Majesty's Government are very much gratified with the generous offer of the Natal Government, and highly appreciate the spirit which has dictated it. The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty will be glad to avail themselves of the offer as far as possible." *The Times*, which is always masterly in discussing naval problems, pays the following tribute to the action of Natal, which may be read with interest elsewhere:—

"Whatever may be said in favour of rival theories concerning the nature and functions of naval bases, all are agreed upon the vital importance to the British Navy of secure coaling-stations and adequate supplies of coal. In the offer of the Natal Government we have at once welcome evidence of the growth of a sense of Imperial unity and of a correct appreciation of the means by which the defence of the Empire as a whole must be effected. This useful contribution to the efficiency of the navy is offered, it will be observed, without any conditions that might tend to hamper the general dispositions and conduct of the navy in time of war. The coal is simply placed at the disposal of the Imperial Government, and if its utilization involves the more frequent visiting of Durban by our ships of war, nothing but good can come of correspondingly increased familiarity on the part of the colonists with the fact that their security and independence are secured by the Mother Country's command of the sea."

THE REAL PROBLEM IN SOUTH AFRICA.

Amid the dust of the countless controversies enveloping South Africa, we are in danger of missing the governing factor. The future of this group of communities does not depend on any supposed struggle between Dutch and British, or between Repub-

* Mr. Binns is the present Premier of Natal.

lican and Monarchical principles; between Mr. Rhodes and President Kruger, or Germany and Great Britain; but upon the relations between the scattered islands of white men below the Zambesi and the black sea of natives around them. This neglected aspect of the South African problem was effectively emphasized in a thoughtful and suggestive speech delivered by the Governor of Natal (Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson) at the Bulawayo festivities last year. As the head of a community in which the white polulation (50,000) is outnumbered by the natives (1,350,000) in a ratio of about 13½ to 1—leaving out a Coolie immigration of 50,000—he speaks with peculiar authority on a question which is worthy of far more attention both in the Mother Country and the Colonies than it has yet received. The speaker said :—

"In the first place I should like to say that, in my view (and I believe it to be the view of many of the leading public men in South Africa), the question which really overshadows all other South African questions, by reason of its importance, and, above all, by reason of its permanence, is the native question. Other questions may bulk as large, or even larger, at present, but they will be settled in the course of South Africa's development. The native question will always be a source of anxiety and care to the South African statesman, and upon the manner in which its various phases are dealt with in the present and in the future, the peace, prosperity, and progress of South Africa will always largely depend. It has been well observed that in South Africa the brain is white, but the muscle, for the most part, is black. Throughout South Africa it is the muscle of the black man which has for the most part enabled the conceptions of the brain of the white man to be realized. As in the past, so in the future, the speed of our advance, the scope of our development, will depend not only on the genius and energy of our race, but also on the willingness and efficiency of the black workers, in contributing their indispensable share to the general progress of the country. What is the universal try throughout South Africa? Labour. Labour for the gold-mines in the Transvaal; labour for the coal-mines in Natal; labour for the farms and homes, and for commercial and industrial undertakings throughout the land. It is to the teeming thousands of native inhabitants of South Africa that we must look, in the main, for the indispensable service that is required. Putting it, therefore, on the lowest ground—the ground of self-interest—leaving out of the question all considerations of religion, of morality, of philanthropy, it is of vital importance to South Africa that the native should learn to regard the white man as his friend and protector; that he should learn to rely on his fairness, sense of justice, and good faith; that he should be taught to appreciate the dignity of labour, and that our best efforts should be directed to securing for him the means of such improvement as is possible within his natural limitations, so as to enable him the better and more efficiently to contribute his due and indispensable share to the development of the resources of South Africa."

CORRESPONDENCE.

Indian Currency.

To the Editor of "The National Review."

Sir,

You have asked me to state my view of the present situation. I do it, of course, as a strict monometallist, but one who has never desired to abolish the use of silver as standard money where it suits those who so use it.*

Of course I see the peculiar difficulties of the Indian Government in consequence of the fall in the gold price of silver, and the necessity of turning their silver revenue into gold in order to pay heavy gold obligations. A Government so situated must desire to raise the value of the silver rupee in exchange, and even to get rid of it as an inconvenient standard, so far as Government is concerned.

But we here who hold India, not by choice of her people, but by conquest, are bound to consider her people first and the Government last. It has never been shown that the people of India have been injured by "cheap silver" except indirectly by increase of taxation, and although I have never thought that the people of India are highly taxed, no one can dispute the difficulty of making any increase of taxation, or of reducing expenses.

However clear all this may be, it is equally clear that the revenues of India must continue to be received in silver, unless a change be made so far-reaching as to involve political and social dangers even more serious than an occasional deficit, or an application to England for help. One cannot conceive, for example, a change in the Land Settlements involving payments in gold instead of silver.

* Throughout this discussion it seems to have been assumed that silver must have fallen as it has done, even if the mints had never been closed. It is, however, worth observing that the closure of the mints caused a fall at once of 11 per cent. in the metal, and no one can say what the demand, with free coinage since 1893, might have done towards maintaining the price. No calculation is possible on that head, but it can hardly be disputed that if Government had avoided that blow at silver, and had permitted its free coinage in India, we should not have seen the excessive and alarming fall which has caused so much anxiety and loss to Government.

If this be so, what good can arise from introducing a gold standard, and a rival currency which cannot be used by the people at large? The rupee is a coin large enough for them, and there is a great employment of coins of far less value, as the anna, &c.

Sir D. Barbour, in his Minute of 21st June, 1892, says, "I have no doubt that, even with a gold standard, the people of India would, in almost all their transactions, prefer to employ silver rupees. . . . We could not pay our soldiers or police in gold coins. . . . Neither could the ryots pay their rents in gold."

But, it is said on the other side, we have raised the exchange value of the rupee by stopping the natural increase of those coins arising from free coinage. It may, however, be replied that you have done this at the cost of crippling trade by enormous rates of interest on loans, and causing a semi-panic in the great trade centres of India, and what you have done is equivalent to the imposition of a duty on exports, though no Government would have dared to propose such a duty as a direct tax.

More than this, you have put India in the position of having no proper money. Fearing injury to the Budget, you seem to have given up the idea of treating silver as a true money. It is to be arranged and valued by law, instead of by the course of business. The Government say that, as things are, they do not care to restore the old par value of twenty-three or twenty-four pence (see Despatch of 16th September, 1897), but twelve pence is too low, and so they light on sixteen pence in gold, for some reason which is not very clear. Gold is not legal tender, and silver is not freely coined, so that there is no true money. But now it is suggested that gold shall be the true money, legal tender, and freely coined. Apparently it is intended to make the rupee also legal tender for any amount, closing the mints to silver, except to Government (see Despatch 16th, September, 1897).

The case of France is often quoted, as there silver is no longer freely coined, but the five-franc piece is still legal tender for any amount, and is maintained at par with gold. But France has a great store of gold which India has not, except in private hands. The Indian Government intend, I presume, to secure the new value of the rupee at sixteen pence by offering to purchase the coin at that price in gold. In this way there will be, it is said, a stable exchange at sixteen pence, and capitalists, no longer fearing a fall in the gold value of the rupee, will be more willing to invest in India than they now are.

At present Government offer to take gold, but holders of gold do not care to buy rupees at sixteen pence. Government ask for power to offer gold for rupees in the future, and holders of rupees may be glad to get gold at a rate 50 per cent. beyond the value of the silver in the coin.

However that may be, the Indian Government must be prepared with a store of gold, so that they may be ready to purchase whatever rupees may be offered. The question then arises whether large amounts will come forward at a rate so favourable to the holder. All estimates on this head are guesses, and so the amount of the necessary reserve of gold is most

variously given. Mr. McLeod talks of £100,000,000, Mr. D. Yule of £77,000,000, Mr. H. C. Gibbs of £50,000,000, and long ago Sir D. Barbour would have ventured on the operation if sure of £15,000,000 in hand. It is said that the Indian Government now ask for £20,000,000 at once.

The discrepancy of course arises (1) from the well-known uncertainty as to the amount of rupees existing in hoards or circulation, and (2) from difference of opinion as to the desire of holders to turn silver into gold.

Several years ago Sir R. Temple estimated the rupees in existence at Rx.250,000,000 and Sir D. Barbour the active circulation at Rx.115,000,000.

In a Minute appended to the Despatch of the Government of 21st of June, 1892, Sir D. Barbour argued that much gold might not be wanted because gold could not circulate to any large extent, and that every year a larger circulation in silver is required, so that if Government hold enough gold to keep up confidence in their power to pay for rupees in gold they need not provide more, and thus taking his low estimate of the amount of rupees, he arrived at his figure of £15,000,000 in gold. But this is merely an estimate like the others above mentioned, and makes no allowance for alarm amongst holders owing to the recent gold price of silver, or by reason of the action of the Government, which shows an entire want of confidence in any possible restoration of the gold value of silver, whether from the present great and increasing output of gold, or otherwise. Government tell the people that silver bullion cannot rise, and sixteen pence is better than less. When Sir D. Barbour wrote, the difference between the exchange value of the rupee and the value in gold of the silver in the coin was far less than it is now.

It seems quite evident that a large amount of gold must be sent to India before even a beginning can be safely made. From whence is the gold to come? This is a vital question for bankers and others in England. We are familiar with panics and all their terrible consequences. Thanks to much more prudence in banking in town and country, we have had no serious panic since 1866. There have been alarms and high rates of discount, as 9 per cent. in 1873 and 6 per cent. in 1878, but, generally speaking, low rates and entire freedom from panic. Our reserve of gold has rarely been excessive, and any considerable reduction is surely followed by higher rates of interest and some anxiety. It has long been a common observation how great an effect is produced by what may seem a trifling withdrawal of gold from the Bank, and it has been argued that our reserve should be much larger in order to prevent foolish alarms. However this may be, it is perfectly clear that, at this moment, the position of the Bank is far from strong, having regard to the magnitude of the daily transactions of trade and to the demands for gold which are continually arising. During the whole of last year the imports of gold were very large, but the exports were greater, so that, whatever the cause may be, we have now about £6,000,000 less gold at the Bank than we had a year ago.

Apparently, for the present the demand from the Continent of Europe has ceased, Russia having acquired some £130,000,000, and France and Germany being well supplied, but the recent demand from the United States has been heavy, and without war that demand is likely to expand as the year goes on, having regard to her enormous exports of food-stuffs and cotton, &c. So we cannot spare even a few millions of gold. A small additional export would be followed at once by an advance of the Bank rate to 5, and the Directors would not stop there, if gold should still leave us. No doubt we receive much more than we used to do, thanks to new and large sources of supply, but the demands have been more than proportionate, and whatever may arise years hence, for the moment great care is needed to secure our own position. It comes to this—we cannot now afford to find a large gold reserve for India. Even £15,000,000 is impossible. This being so, what is the use of advocating the proposed change as a remedy for the Indian trouble? A remedy that is impossible now, and may be so for many months, if not years, to come is not of much practical use. If we are to have any change, we need something which can be set to work at once, and will produce tangible results, and will remove the pressure of a situation which has been pronounced by well-informed men to be "intolerable."

We do not yet know officially what is proposed by the Indian Government, but certain plans have been published which are so alarming as to seem hardly credible. For example, it is said to be part of the Government scheme to sell 10 crores of rupees for their value as silver bullion—truly an extraordinary proposal. It is putting on an overstocked market an amount more than equal to the whole silver output of the world for a year, and thus depressing the value of the silver in the remaining rupees, and at the same time realizing a very heavy loss on the coin sold. One can hardly imagine a proposal more discouraging to the present holders of silver, coined or uncoined, and the Indian people must certainly get the impression from such a suggestion that their Government are careless as to the depression of silver and desire to drive it out of the field as a monetary metal, even in the East, except as mere token money.

Here it is important to observe that if silver coins now hoarded should be converted into gold coins they would probably go back into hoards, as gold is very convenient for hoarding, and of little, if any, use as currency in India. It is also necessary to remark that, apparently, one cannot in the least depend on gold coming out of hoards in order to be coined and used in the circulation. Gold bars might come out and be coined, but they would probably return to the old receptacles, seeing that gold coins are not wanted, and those who have acquired the habit of hoarding are just as likely to hoard coins as bars. This opinion is confirmed by Sir D. Barbour in his Minute of 21st June, 1892, and he also says that even if the rupee, through action of Government, became worth more in exchange than its bullion value, rupees would not be brought out of existing hoards. Mr. H. D. McLeod, in his letter of 20th of October last, appears to depend on gold hoarded as the supply for working out the gold

standard, but, in the face of such an opinion as that of Sir D. Barbour, I venture to think that no prudent statesman would depend on such a source.*

It should not, I think, be forgotten that there may, in the opinion of many, be grave political dangers arising from such persistent attempts to depreciate silver. It was bad enough to close the mints in 1893. That was a heavy blow and had serious results. But it was a trifle compared to that which is now said to be proposed—a changed standard and a forced sale of a mass of rupees. Surely such proceedings are calculated to touch acutely people in India of all classes, and that in a matter as to which they are very sensitive, if they find that Government, instead of supporting their property to the utmost, are taking measures which may depreciate it seriously and permanently, and will remove even the chance of recovery through fresh discoveries of gold or otherwise. No doubt all this will have been carefully considered, but those of us who can remember 1857 do not forget that governing people are apt to mistake the tendency of feeling amongst the natives of India, and to assume that the opinions approved by the Governors are sure to prevail in the country at large.

There are dangers on all sides. "Something must be done," it is said—a very dangerous position. Lord George Hamilton regards the reopening of the mints as "an act of lunacy," by reason of the dangers of such a fall in exchange as would prevent satisfactory budgets, and, though a friend of silver for many years, he refuses to believe in any recovery in its value. Probably he will regard in much the same way the proposal of a forced sale of a great mass of rupees.

We must hope for some fresh light from the labours of his Committee. At present opinions are much divided, but I think it will be found that men of business here would prefer open mints and the risk of a low exchange to the risk of causing a panic in London, in order to remove the "intolerable" muddle which has come about in India through the action of Government five years ago.

I remain, &c.,

WILLIAM FOWLER.

43, Grosvenor Square, 22nd April.

* In the same Minute, Sir D. Barbour states that, in his opinion, any attempt to give the face value of the rupee in gold would fail. The gold would be "drawn away," the gold standard would cease to exist, and "we should find ourselves exactly where we started." But all is to be different if a lower gold price—say 16 pence—is fixed, and he advocates the coinage of a 10-rupee piece, containing gold to the value of 160 pence.

The danger of gold being "drawn away" seems to remain, if there be an offer to pay even 16 pence for what is at present worth about 10 pence, and one is glad to have the help of so strong an advocate of the gold standard as Sir D. Barbour on this head.

THE

NATIONAL REVIEW.

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EPISODES OF THE MONTH.

THE PRIZE ESSAY.

We publish this month the Navy League Prize Essay, to the writer of which, Mr. J. N. Hampson, of 6, Old Quebec Street, London, W., has been awarded the sum of £50, contributed jointly by the Navy League and THE NATIONAL REVIEW. Sir John Colomb—one of the pioneers of the modern science of sea power—kindly undertook to act as referee, and in making his award wrote the following explanatory letter to Mr. Trower, the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Navy League:—

"House of Commons,
"16th May, 1898.

"SIR,—In accordance with your request made on behalf of the Committee of the Navy League, I have duly weighed and considered the relative merits of the essays submitted in competition for the prize of £50 offered by the Navy League for 'A type-written essay or story of not more than 10,000 words giving a forecast of the probable effect upon the United Kingdom of an indecisive war against two first-class Powers, it being borne in mind that ocean cables would probably be cut before war was declared, and that the price of bread would rise to at least one shilling per loaf.'

"Having regard to the fact that the object of the Navy League in offering this prize was to obtain for publication an essay or

story calculated to promote public appreciation of British Naval requirements and to popularize knowledge of the magnitude of the problems embraced in the maintenance of our sea-supremacy, I award the prize to No. 29, the essay marked 'Aut Nunc aut Nunquam.'

"I hope it may have the widest possible circulation, not only in the United Kingdom but throughout our Empire, the outlying portions of which, whether Colonies, Dependencies, or Spheres of Influence, are as much concerned in sea-security as the Mother Country. It is to be hoped that by such means the Governments and the subjects of the Queen abroad will come to recognize the necessities imposed on them, not merely by their loyalty but by their self-interest, of joining with the people at home in providing the means, in proportion to their wealth and resources, for maintaining the sea-going and sea-keeping fleet necessary to put British supremacy at sea beyond the risk of its ever being contested.

"Doubtful sea-supremacy invites contest which in any case must be, for our Empire, pregnant with tremendous issues beyond the scope of human power to forecast.

"Yours faithfully,

"John C. R. Colomb.

"H. Seymour Trower, Esq.,
"Chairman, Executive Committee,
"Navy League."

Sir John Colomb alludes to "doubtful sea-supremacy," the consequences of which are so well worked out in Mr. Hampson's comprehensive, able, and suggestive essay. We need not recapitulate them here, but we cannot help thinking that the reader will inevitably ask himself, whether our Cabinet is justified in running the tremendous and needless risks described by the essayist, at a time when the assumed contingency of a war with France and Russia is by no means remote. Leading Cabinet Ministers have recently made grave and gloomy references to the international outlook, and almost every peroration reminds us that we shall have to put forth all our strength in order to hold our own. We are further counselled "to husband the resources of the nation for serious emergencies," and not to squander them in "quixotic enterprises." And yet at such a crisis the Chancellor of the Exchequer is permitted to "squander away" a part of the tobacco-tax which, so far as we can ascertain, will be pocketed by a handful of plutocrats. Was there ever a more "quixotic enterprise"? Our whole future depends upon our navy. As to that there are no two opinions. We are

running behind in battleships, and several of our battleships now are actually armed with muzzle-loading guns! We have never had enough cruisers. We are short of bluejackets; we are terribly short of lieutenants; our repairing docks will take years to build at the present rate; without more destroyers our coaling-stations will be in jeopardy. Our reserve is perilously small. We need every farthing we can spend on Sea Power. Is this the moment to endow tobacconists?

THE WAR. The war between the United States and Spain has naturally been the chief topic of the past month, but being abundantly dealt with by Admiral Colomb and Mr. Low it does not fall within our province here. Regularity has been its principal characteristic up to the time of writing, and although the air is thick with rumours of impending surprises, we believe the expected will continue to happen. It is now clearly seen that the United States completely overmatch Spain in every single respect except individual bravery, in which neither nation could be eclipsed by any other. But in resources, ingenuity, numbers, efficiency, thoroughness, and dogged determination to miss no opportunity, there is no comparison between the combatants. Spain never stood an outside chance of serious victory, and she has no prospect of retrieving her position as the war drags on. It may drag on indefinitely, for the American Army is only in the raw material stage, and until the finished article is ready the Administration will not be so foolhardy as to risk preliminary reverses in Cuba where Spain has a large if a wasted force. It is perhaps *conceivable* that the Federal Army, now being fashioned, may never see active service; for if the responsible people in Spain had their way she would now make overtures for peace on the basis that she keeps her fleet, as well as the Philippines, while surrendering Cuba—the future of Puerto Rico to be the subject of negotiation. The advisers of the Queen Regent know that they are engaged on a forlorn hope, from which nothing but calamity can ensue, but they dare not make the first advances for fear of the wrath of the Spanish people, who have been fed with official lies about their army and navy for years past. Should the United States make any peace proposals they would probably be most acceptable to Madrid, and the Spanish politicians would tell their fiery compatriots that America had been so punished in war as to be clamouring for peace, and something might come of it. The problem has, however, been tremendously complicated by Commodore Dewey's unforeseen and most brilliant achievement in Manila Bay. The Sagasta Government dare not discuss the surrender of the Philippines, at any rate for the present and so

they are endeavouring to excite Europe over these islands. On the other hand, the Americans may ultimately find it as difficult to withdraw their troops from Manila as we have found it to withdraw ours from Egypt. They may say to themselves, "We cannot allow these islands to relapse into anarchy, especially remembering the glorious event by which we acquired them; it would be immoral to return any colony, once emancipated from Spanish rule, to that hideous dispensation; it would be undignified to hold an auction among the Great Powers; none could accept them as a gift without the risk of war with others; the only solution is that we make an American Egypt of them." It will readily be seen how the gallant Commodore has shot the problem with difficulties, and while his victory has convinced the Spanish Cabinet of the madness of prolonging the war, it has introduced a new element which renders that conviction exceedingly difficult to act on. The desire for peace exists in high quarters in Spain —whether it can be acted on time alone will show.

THE DEATH OF MR. GLADSTONE.

After a long and most painful illness, borne with the utmost heroism and watched with heartfelt sorrow by the whole nation, Mr. Gladstone passed peacefully away at Hawarden Castle on Thursday, May 19th, having attained the great age of eighty-eight. It is customary in this country to canonize the departed, and within reason the custom is salutary, if only as a discipline to the living, but it has occasionally happened that a severe strain is imposed on men's chivalry when they suddenly find themselves called upon to recognize all the cardinal virtues in some politician whose aims and methods were, and ever would be, abhorent to them. Unless our political contests have degenerated into mere shams, and they are certainly moving that way, it is not wholesome for Radicals to prostrate themselves at Conservative shrines or *vice-versa*, and no honest man is justified in throwing stones at an absentee from these emotional exhibitions. Fortunately no one is called upon to play the hypocrite on the present occasion. Mr. Gladstone was beyond all shadow of doubt the most eminent Englishman of his day and generation, and was probably the most remarkable man who ever engaged in public affairs in any country. We question whether it would be extravagant to say that he is the greatest political leader the world has yet seen. The loss of such a personality impoverishes not a Party or a nation, but the civilized world. That is being universally recognized, and all loyal Englishmen are called upon to do honour to fame that increases the fame of their own country. This is no place or time to review Mr. Gladstone's amazing career, to appreciate his strenuous statesmanship, or to

hazard a forecast of his place in history. Probably no man living is sufficiently detached to undertake any of these tasks, and they will be transmitted to posterity as a legacy of unending discussion. Let us to-day be content with the simple record that an illustrious man has departed whose like none living will ever look on again.

LORD SALISBURY'S TRIBUTE.

We are unable to do justice to the unique demonstrations of sorrow and admiration evoked from every corner of the planet by the news of Mr. Gladstone's death. A great political hero had been removed, and his passing profoundly stirred mankind. Nowhere, perhaps, was the universal feeling more strikingly displayed than in the House of Lords—a chamber with which Mr. Gladstone had been in almost continuous and ferocious conflict, and whose death-warrant he signed on the eve of his retirement from politics. However, the Upper House, which personifies the dignities of our public life, never fails to rise to a great occasion, and Parliamentary history records few more impressive episodes than the obeisance paid by the Lords to their illustrious enemy. On May 20th Lord Salisbury, the Premier and Leader of the House, rose to propose a motion that was unanimously carried:—"That a humble address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that Her Majesty will be graciously pleased to give directions that the remains of the Right Hon. William Ewart Gladstone be interred at the public charge, and that a monument be erected in the Collegiate Church of St. Peter, Westminster, with an inscription expressive of public admiration and attachment, and of the high sense entertained of his rare and splendid gifts, his devoted labours in Parliament and in great offices of State, and to assure Her Majesty that this House will concur in giving effect to Her Majesty's directions." Lord Salisbury commended the motion to the House in a few admirably chosen words:—

"Mr. Gladstone's history, his merits, his wonderful authority, have been dwelt upon by many tongues and many pens, and I need not repeat them here; but the point which seems to me remarkable, and which, I think, will attract the attention of foreign nations, perhaps more than any other, is the universal assent of all persons, of all classes, and of all schools of thought in doing honour upon this sorrowful occasion to a man who has been more mixed up in political conflicts than probably any man in his generation. The controversies of the past are so far forgotten that there is no difference of feeling or of opinion in the honour which we may pay to the great statesman, or in our desire that that honour should be duly displayed before the eyes of the world. What is the cause of this unanimous feeling? Of course, he had qualities which distinguished him from all other men; and you may say that it was his transcendent intellect, his astonishing power of attaching men to him, and the great influence he was able to exert upon the thought and convictions of his contemporaries. But these things, which explain the attachment, the adoration of those whose ideas he represented, would not explain why it is that sentiments almost as fervent are felt and expressed by those whose ideas were not expressed by his policy."

A Christian Statesman.

Lord Salisbury enquired to what is the wider regard due? Surely not "to anything so far removed from the common feelings of mankind as the abstruse and controversial questions of the policy of the day." Rather—

"It was that men recognized in him a man guided—whether under mistaken impressions or not it matters not—but guided in all the steps he took and in all the efforts he made by a high moral ideal. What he sought was the achievement of great ideals, and whether they were based on sound convictions or not, they could have issued from nothing but the greatest and the purest moral aspirations, and he is honoured by his countrymen because through so many years, across so many vicissitudes and conflicts, they have recognized this one characteristic of his action which has never ceased to be felt. He will leave behind him, especially to those who have followed with deep interest the history of his later years—I might almost say of the later months of his life—he will leave behind him the memory of a great Christian statesman. Set up necessarily high, from which the sight of his character, his motives, and his intentions were so situated that they would strike all the world, he will have left a deep and most salutary influence on the political thought and the social thought of the generation in which he lived, and he will be long remembered, not so much for the causes in which he was engaged, or of the political projects that he favoured, but as a great example, to which history hardly furnishes a parallel, of a great Christian man."

Lord Kimberley, the Leader of the Opposition, who described himself "as the only person now remaining who sat in all the Cabinets over which Mr. Gladstone presided," closely echoed the Premier's tribute:—"It is, as the noble Marquess said, the appreciation of the moral qualities of the man, of the high-mindedness of his character, of the unvarying uprightness of his conduct, and of the sense which the nation feels, as the noble Marquess justly said, that in him we have lost not merely a statesman of great power and great reputation, but that we have lost a man who set an example to all who occupy high places in this country, and to all the people of this country, whether high or low, of a life nobly spent, pure in its intentions and pure in its conduct, and which, I agree with the noble Marquess, will hereafter be considered a bright example to this nation."

Lord Rosebery.

The Duke of Devonshire, "a supporter, a colleague, and an opponent of Mr. Gladstone," made an appropriate allusion to the Home Rule split in 1886, when the Liberal Unionists severed their connection with their former leader:—"But although it was not in the character of Mr. Gladstone to shrink from letting his opponents feel the full weight of his blame or censure when he considered blame or censure was deserved, I can truly say that I can recall no word of his which added unnecessarily to the bitterness of that position. My Lords, deeply as we regret the difference of opinion which caused

the separation between Mr. Gladstone and so many of those who had been his most devoted adherents, we never doubted, and we do not doubt now, that in that, as in every other matter with which during his long public life he had to deal, he was actuated by no other consideration but that of a sense of public duty, and by his conception of that which was in the highest interests of the country." Lord Rosebery, who is known to have held a very special personal relation to Mr. Gladstone, entered upon a far more elaborate encomium than any of his fellow Peers. It was the sort of speech the descriptive reporter delights in, and was described by that enthusiast as "modelled and delivered in accordance with the best traditions of Parliamentary oratory." But to our humbler taste, though it contained fine touches and undoubtedly came from the heart, there was too much style about it and too little simplicity. The other speakers gave the impression of expressing what they felt at the moment, but Lord Rosebery was more laboured, and conveyed the idea that he had charged his memory with a well-rounded panegyric. However, "as Mr. Gladstone's last successor in office, and as one who was associated with him in many of the most critical episodes of the last twenty years of his life," Lord Rosebery is entitled to pay his homage to his political master in his own way. After affirming that we are too near Mr. Gladstone to see his intellect, character, and career in their true proportion, he said:—"They are, at any rate, too vast a subject to treat on such an occasion as this. I may, at any rate, at least cite the words, which I shall never forget, which were used by the noble Marquess when Mr. Gladstone resigned the office of Prime Minister, 'that his was the most brilliant intellect that had been applied to the service of the State since Parliamentary Government began.' That seems to be an adequate and a noble appreciation."

MANHOOD. Lord Rosebery presented a stimulating side of Mr. Gladstone's character in his love of manhood:—"There was no expression so frequently on Mr. Gladstone's lips as the word 'manhood.' Speaking of anyone, he would say, with an accent which no one who heard him could ever forget, that so-and-so had the manhood to do this, and so-and-so had the manhood to do that. And no one, I think, who has heard the converse will ever forget the supreme scorn with which, employing the negative phrase, he would remark that so-and-so had not the manhood to do that, or so-and-so had not the manhood to say this. It was obvious from all he said and did that virile virtue, the meaning of which he comprehended—the courage, righteous daring to disdain odds against you—that that virile virtue of

manhood was that which he put first. . . . Mr. Gladstone was the bravest of the brave. There was no cause so hopeless that he was afraid to undertake it. There was no amount of opposition that could cow him when once he had undertaken it." Turning to another aspect of his theme, Lord Rosebery described the four years that had elapsed since Mr. Gladstone's retirement from public life, as "a preparation for his death"—both for the nation and himself:—

"Had he died in the plenitude of his power as Prime Minister, would it have been possible for a vigorous and convinced Opposition to allow to pass to him without a word to be said, the honours which are now universally conceded to him? Hushed is the criticism, hushed are the controversies in which he took part. Hushed for the moment is the very sound of Party conflict. I venture to think that that is a notable fact in our history. It was not so of the elder Pitt; it was not so of the younger. It was not so of the elder Pitt, in spite of his tragic end, his unrivalled services, and his enfeebled old age. It was not so of the younger Pitt, in spite of his long Parliamentary services to the country, and his absorbed devotion to the State. I think we should remember that it is creditable not merely to the man but to the nation."

After a touching allusion to Mrs. Gladstone, Lord Rosebery concluded his splendid tribute with a stately peroration:—

"And yet, my Lords, putting that one figure aside, to me, at any rate, this is not an occasion for absolute and entire and unreserved lamentation. Were it indeed possible so to protract the inexorable limits of human life that we might have hoped that future years, and even future generations, might see Mr. Gladstone's face, and hear his matchless voice, and receive the lessons of his unrivalled experience, we might, indeed, grieve as those that have no hope; but that is not the case. He had long exceeded the span of mortal years. His later months had been months of unspeakable pain and distress. He is now in that rest for which he sought and prayed, and which was to give him relief from a life which had become a burden. Surely this should not be an occasion entirely for grief, when a life so prolonged to such a limit, so full of honour, so crowned with glory, has come to its termination. The nation lives that produced him. The nation that produced him may yet produce others like him; and in the meantime it is rich in his memory, rich in his life, rich, above all, in his animating and inspiring example. Nor do I think that we can limit this benefit to our own country and to our own race. It seems to me that if we may judge by the papers to-day, it is shared by and it is in the possession of all civilized mankind, and that generations yet to come will through many long years look for encouragement in labour, for fortitude in adversity, for the example of a splendid Christianity with constant hope and constant encouragement, to the pure, the splendid, the dauntless figure of William Ewart Gladstone."

THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

By a strange irony of fate, whereas the House of Lords surpassed itself in rendering homage to an illustrious enemy, the tributes from the House of Commons, of which Mr. Gladstone had been the idol, and which had witnessed his greatest triumphs, were distinctly inferior. Mr. Balfour, the Leader of the House, though a delightful debater, rarely shines on State occasions, when slip-shod speaking makes

an audience feel uncomfortable. Moreover, he was far from well, and he had hampered himself with copious notes—in his case a sure prelude to failure. Fortunately he has one great Parliamentary gift denied to Mr. Gladstone. When he has spoken worst he reports best. Mr. Balfour proposed a motion akin to that presented to the other House, with the difference that the Commons were asked to "make good the expenses" of the public funeral and monument, in which the Lords were invited to "concur." Mr. Balfour declined to discuss Mr. Gladstone "as a politician, as a Minister, as a leader of public thought," but dwelt on him as "the greatest member of the greatest deliberative assembly, which, so far, the world has seen."

"Sir, I think it is the language of sober and of unexaggerated truth to say that there is no gift which would enable a man to move, to influence, to adorn an assembly like this, that Mr. Gladstone did not possess in a supereminent degree. Debaters as ready there may have been, orators as finished. It may have been given to others to sway as skilfully this assembly, or to appeal with as much directness and force to the simpler instinct of great masses in the country; but, Sir, it has been given to no man to combine all these great gifts as they were combined in the person of Mr. Gladstone. From the conversational discussion appropriate to our work in Committee to the most sustained eloquence befitting some high argument and some great historic occasion, every weapon of Parliamentary warfare was wielded by him with the sureness and ease of a perfect, absolute, and complete mastery. I would not venture myself to pronounce an opinion as to whether he was most excellent in the exposition of a somewhat complicated budget of finance or legislation, or whether he showed it most in the heat of extemporary debate. At least this we may say, that from the humbler arts of ridicule or invective to the subtlest dialetic, the most persuasive eloquence, the most cogent appeals to everything that was highest and best in the audience he was addressing, every instrument which could find place in the armoury of a member of this House he had at his command without premeditation, and without forethought, at the moment and in the form which appeared best suited to carry out its purpose."

A Famous Scene.

Mr. Balfour recalled a scene in "an outworn and half-forgotten controversy" twenty years ago, when Mr. Gladstone was placed in the difficult position of opposing "the united and vigorous forces of his opponents" having behind him "the irritating and somewhat timid sympathy of his friends":—"In this debate Mr. Gladstone had to speak, not once, or twice only, but several times; and it was not until hour after hour had passed in this preliminary skirmishing that, to a House hostile and impatient, and utterly weary, he got up to present his case with that conviction that he was right, which was his great strength as a speaker in and out of this House. I can never forget the impression it made on my mind. As a feat of physical endurance it was almost unsurpassed; as a feat of Parliamentary

courage, of Parliamentary skill, of Parliamentary endurance, and Parliamentary eloquence I believe that it was almost unique. Sir, alas! let no man hope to be able to reconstruct from our records any living likeness of these great works of genius. The words, indeed, are there, lying side by side with the words of lesser men in an equality as if of death; but the spirit, the fire, the inspiration are gone, and he who could alone revive, he who could alone show us what these works really were, or reproduce them for us, has now been taken away. We who thus heard him know that though our days be prolonged, and though it may be our fortune to see the dawn or even the meridian of other men destined to illuminate this House and to do great and glorious service to their Sovereign and their country, we shall never again see anybody, never again in this assembly see any man, who can reproduce for us what Mr. Gladstone was—who can show to those who never heard him how much they have lost." Sir William Harcourt, as Leader of the Opposition, seconded the motion in a type written tribute—a proceeding that would have scandalized its subject. The motion was unanimously agreed to, but it was understood that Mr. Redmond and his friends remained outside the House, their loyalty to the memory of Mr. Parnell forbidding them to accord honour to that of Mr. Gladstone.

THE DISEASE OF ISOLATION.

Mr. Chamberlain has made an interesting experiment which has already produced striking results, though whether it will be ultimately successful we are not competent to say. In any case, it is noteworthy and requires careful watching. The enterprise consisted in a responsible Minister's declaring on a public platform some of the sentiments on foreign affairs which have found expression in private circles during the last few weeks. It was a daring performance, but the Colonial Secretary usually knows what he is about, and his critics would do well to suspend their condemnation until the mischief caused by his "indiscretion" is more apparent than it is so far. The Birmingham Town Hall was the field of Mr. Chamberlain's experiment, the audience being composed of the Grand Committee of the Birmingham Liberal Unionist Association. He commenced by defending with his accustomed vigour and dexterity the actions of the Government, maintaining that if foreign nations took their cue from those who charge our foreign policy with weakness and vacillation, they would "make a great mistake. They would find that courteous diplomacy and moderate language, and even graceful concessions are not incompatible with a firm maintenance of the honour and essential interests of the country." This vindica-

tion, however, was merely the preface to the body of the speech, which continued thus :—

"Now I want, according to my manner, to submit to you a plain statement of the situation as it appears to me. Ours is a democratic Government. We gain all our strength from the confidence of the people, and we cannot gain strength or confidence unless we show confidence in return, and therefore, to my mind, there is no longer any room for the mysteries and the reticencies of the diplomacy of 50 years ago. You must tell the people what you mean and where you are going if you want them to follow you. I do not mean to say that I can tell you all the details of secret negotiations. That, of course, would be absolutely absurd, and would make negotiations impossible. But the plain issue and the main principles and the particulars of the problems with which we have to deal—those might be stated in language to be understanded of the people, and I would take the judgment of the people upon them just as soon as I would take that of the wisest diplomatist in the world."

With the lucidity of crystal Mr. Chamberlain proceeded to explain "the crux of the situation," which is that ever since the Crimean War, Great Britain has pursued a policy "of strict isolation" without seeking allies and without attracting friends. In this way we have avoided "entangling" engagements and "have escaped many dangers," but we have had to accept "the disadvantages that go with such a policy," the principal drawback being the general suspicion aroused by those who are "willing that other people should draw the chestnuts out of the fire for them." While in the past successful, this policy of aloofness is now confronted by "a new situation."

"All the powerful States of Europe have made alliances, and as long as we keep outside these alliances, as long as we are envied by all, and suspected by all, and as long as we have interests which at one time or another conflict with the interests of all, we are liable to be confronted at any moment with a combination of Great Powers so powerful, that not even the most extreme, the most hotheaded politician, would be able to contemplate it without a certain sense of uneasiness. That is the situation which I want you to have in view, which you must always have in view, when you are considering the results of the foreign policy of any Government in this country. We stand alone, and we may be confronted with such a combination as that I have indicated to you."

TWO REMEDIES.

Having diagnosed the disease as "isolation," Mr. Chamberlain proceeded to prescribe the remedies. He had no difficulty in drafting his first prescription, nor is there any doubt as to its popularity with the patient :— "What is the first duty of a Government under these circumstances ? I say, without hesitation, that the first duty is to draw all parts of the Empire closer together, to infuse into them a spirit of united and of Imperial patriotism. We have not neglected that primary duty. We have pursued it steadfastly and with results that are patent to all the world. Never before in the history of the British Empire have the ties which connected us with our

great Colonies and dependencies been stronger; never before has the sense of common interests in trade, and in defence and in war, never before has the sense of these interests been more strongly felt or more cordially expressed." Mr. Chamberlain's next remedy is known as "The Anglo-Saxon Alliance":—

"What is our next duty? It is to establish and to maintain bonds of permanent amity with our kinsmen across the Atlantic. They are a powerful and a generous nation. They speak our language, they are bred of our race. Their laws, their literature, their standpoint upon every question are the same as ours; their feeling, their interest in the cause of humanity and the peaceful development of the world are identical with ours. I do not know what the future has in store for us. I do not know what arrangements may be possible with us, but this I know and feel—that the closer, the more cordial, the fuller and the more definite these arrangements are, with the consent of both peoples, the better it will be for both and for the world. And I even go so far as to say that, terrible as war may be, even war itself would be cheaply purchased if in a great and noble cause the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack should wave together over an Anglo-Saxon alliance. Now, it is one of the most satisfactory results of Lord Salisbury's policy that at the present time these two great nations understand each other better than they have ever done since more than a century ago. They were separated by the blunder of the British Government."

Now, we think that no serious student of public opinion in Great Britain, will question the popularity of Remedy No. 2. Let us remember, however, that its application involves the assent, not merely of stray sections of another nation, but the hearty concurrence of that nation as a whole; in other words, a revolution in American public opinion, and of any such revolution there is so far no serious evidence. Is it not suspicious that hitherto almost the only persons in the United States who have responded to the demand for an Anglo-American alliance, are the very persons who let us in over the Arbitration Treaty, for which they alleged the whole American people were panting? These well-meaning marplots having been responsible for one perilous fiasco, are quite capable of promoting another; but there is a respected adage, "Once bitten twice shy," which the British people will do well to bear in mind. There is no reasonable prospect of "an Anglo-Saxon alliance," and if the Washington and London Governments mutually beguile one another into any "alliance" negotiations, they will commit a gratuitous blunder, for their proposals will be summarily rejected by public opinion in the States. It is generally conceded that the arbitration fiasco had a mischievous effect upon Anglo-American relations. How infinitely more damaging would be an alliance fiasco. On the one hand, the average American would feel that the British Government had endeavoured to entangle him in a disadvantageous arrangement to further British interests, while the Englishman would say, "It is impossible to maintain decent relations with a country where the

Government is invariably overruled by the people." As we value friendly relations with our American cousins, let us cease to discuss an alliance until we hear that Mr. Bryan, *e.g.*, has espoused the cause in his native city of Lincoln, Nebraska, with an enthusiasm equal to that displayed by Mr. Chamberlain in the Town Hall of Birmingham. As it takes two to make a quarrel, so it takes two to make an alliance.

WARE FIASCO!

Our relations with the United States have improved this year, and there will be a further improvement as soon as London editors learn that New York is not America, and that New York spectacles give an utterly distorted and false impression of American affairs. Every American outside New York, *i.e.*, $\frac{34}{35}$ths of the American people, resents this British way of looking at their country. From the British point of view it is incredibly foolish, and is the cause of many of our misunderstandings. That, however, is another story. What we are concerned for the moment in enforcing is, that though clippings from New York papers may encourage our enthusiasts to think that they have a mandate from the whole Anglo-Saxon world to contract an alliance, no such an alliance is on the horizon. The vast majority of the American people have given no thought to the project, nor are they likely to do so, unless ill-advised journalists or Governments persist in forcing it to the front, in which case, as we have pointed, we shall have an inevitable fiasco. An Anglo-Saxon alliance offers no serious solution of the problems propounded by Mr. Chamberlain, and probably for that very reason he suggested a supplementary or alternative foreign policy. Coming to the regions where British policy is said to have been checked, he dismissed Armenia and Crete, which "would have infallibly brought about precisely one of those combinations which I have indicated to you as possible," had a "more active interference" been resorted to by this country. While, as regards China, the Government could not fairly be accused of having failed in foresight:—

"Everybody has foreseen, everybody has known—not for the last few months, but for many, many years—that it was the persistent ambition and the continuous policy of Russia to extend her Eastern dominions southwards, to have an ice-free port for her trade, and an ice-free harbour for her safety. Nobody was ignorant of that. The Government knew it as well as the man in the street."

. . . . . .

The expected happened, and Russia did go down to Port Arthur and to Ta-lien-wan. As to the way in which Russia secured that occupation, as to the representations which were made and repudiated as soon as they were made, as to the promises which were given and broken a fortnight afterwards, I had better perhaps say nothing except I have always thought that it was a very wise proverb, "Who sups with the Devil must have a long spoon."

This last remark was greeted with "laughter," but the observation had better have been left unsaid, and Mr. Chamberlain would be the first to own that British statesmen say things on platforms which they bitterly repent afterwards. Russian statesmen escape all such temptations, and they must make allowances for their less fortunate contemporaries. Mr. Chamberlain defended the lease of Wei-hai-wei as being the suitable and sufficient response to Russia's appropriation of Port Arthur. Otherwise:—"We might have declared war on Russia. We might for a year or two have held Port Arthur against Russia, but we have no military force there to back us and no frontier in China. I am one of those who think that for any country there are worse things than war; there is loss of honour; there is loss of those interests which are so vital to the security of the existence of the nation. But, in any case, I hope I am sensible enough never to give my voice for war unless I can see at the commencement of the war, a fair probability that at the end of the war the objects of the war will have been obtained."

Remedy Number Three.

Having thus led up to a hypothetical war with Russia, from which Great Britain could not hope to reap advantage, for "without allies we cannot seriously injure Russia, although it may also be true that she cannot seriously injure us," Mr. Chamberlain pointed the inevitable moral;—"If that is the case, it is a case which deserves the serious consideration of the people of this country. It is impossible to overrate the gravity of the issue. It is not a question of a single port in China—that is a very small matter. It is not a question of a single province; it is a question of the whole fate of the Chinese Empire, and our interests in China are so great, our proportion of the trade is so enormous, and the potentialities of that trade are so gigantic, that I feel that no more vital question has ever been presented for the decision of a Government and the decision of a nation, and for my part I have tried to-night to state clearly and without exaggeration the conditions of the problem that we have before us. I think you will see that it is complicated enough to preclude all hasty judgment. One thing appears to me to be certain. If the policy of isolation, which has hitherto been the policy of this country, is to be maintained in the future, then the fate of the Chinese Empire may be, probably will be, hereafter decided without reference to our wishes and in defiance of our interests. If, on the other hand, we are determined to enforce the policy of the open door, to preserve an equal opportunity for trade with all our rivals, then we must not allow jingoes to drive us into a quarrel with all the world at

the same time, and we must not reject the idea of an alliance with those Powers whose interests most nearly approximate to our own." This passage in Mr. Chamberlain's speech created a sensation in Europe, where it is taken to indicate that Great Britain hereby renounces that policy of "splendid isolation" glorified last year. That she has become a convert to the view that a nation without allies is as forlorn and powerless as a man without friends. That British statesmanship confesses that it has been on the wrong tack, and finally bows to the superior wisdom of the founders of Dual and Triple Alliances. There is, at the same time, some scepticism as to whether Great Britain really means honest business, or whether she is merely preparing some ingenious contrivance by virtue of which, though nominally her allies, other countries will continue pulling the chestnuts out of the fire for her. For we must always bear in mind that though, in her foreign policy Great Britain may be as simple as a child, she enjoys the reputation of Machiavelian cunning. If we make any move, however innocent or even accidental, every nation in Europe is on the *qui vive* to detect some deep laid design against its interests.

THE REIGN OF AN ADJECTIVE.

Mr. Chamberlain has startled and puzzled the Continent which realizes that, while he alone is responsible for the language of his speech, it expressed the views of his colleagues in the Cabinet. We in this country, however, should realize that this pronouncement was intended primarily for home consumption. Our Government had no idea of issuing an announcement to the world at large that Great Britain is in search of an ally, and that her backing is on offer. Rather was it desired to intimate to the British people that the time has come *for them* to re-consider the settled policy of "avoiding entangling alliances." Let us look for one moment at the subject from the purely British point of view. We have never been able to appreciate the prejudice against alliances which is alleged to animate the British people, and which has dominated British policy for many years. Nor do we believe the policy of isolation to be the fruit of calculation and foresight. It was probably an accident which has developed into a blunder. Some politician, more fluent than his fellows, invented the epithet "entangling" to discredit some particular alliance, and this word became a convenient brickbat to throw at any alliance, and ever since it came into vogue it has put all alliances "outside the pale of practical politics," and successive generations of statesmen have simply declined to entertain any serious proffer of foreign friendship, for fear of giving the orators of the Opposition

an opportunity of using the fatal word. A boastful and barren proclamation of "splendid isolation" has held the field, while behind the scenes, advantageous offers made to Great Britain by the one really great nation in Europe, have been steadily declined. The latest of such episodes was very recent, and the conduct of our Government was hardly courteous. Consequently a nation friendly in disposition has been converted into a vigilant and aggressive opponent of our diplomacy in every part of the globe. Our Press, which is patriotic enough to take a hint from the proper quarter, has been tacitly encouraged to pour hatred, ridicule, and contempt upon the nation in question, and upon her Sovereign, who, when all is said and done, is a man who always knows what he wants and generally gets it. As a result, Germany is now settling down into enmity, and the German Emperor has changed from a warm admirer of England into a hot-headed opponent. Will any reasonable man maintain that British interests have been fortified thereby, or that they would have suffered had we stood in with Germany as she desired? Mr. Chamberlain's speech is a crushing answer to those who mow and jibber about "entangling" alliances, and a complete condemnation of the policy of isolation. But what a situation! At the eleventh hour we are told that this nation has been nursing a dangerous delusion, and that she is incapable of defending her interests unless she can enlist an ally, while it is not obscurely hinted that the very nation who has repeatedly sought our alliance and been rebuffed for her presumption, would be our most valuable ally! However, as long as we are thought to be Machiavelian it, perhaps, does not matter much what we really are.

SIR W. HARCOURT AND LORD ROSEBERY.

Home politics are as dead as a door nail, and neither the passing of an Irish Local Government Bill, of "a large and liberal character," by a Unionist Government, nor significant gains by the Opposition at bye-elections, cause even a momentary flutter of excitement. The decline of Sir William Harcourt and the rehabilitation of Lord Rosebery are perhaps worth a passing word. The position of the former has become positively pathetic. He clings tenaciously to his titular leadership of the Opposition, but his Party has no faith in him, and does not follow him with any zeal. And there is undoubtedly a growing desire among the Radicals to depose him. Unless Sir William Harcourt's friends are candid with him and persuade him to desist from the impossible task of leading unwilling followers, there will be disagreeable developments in the autumn, and candid people who are not his friends will make the matter clear. For the active section of the Opposition who are stimulated

and strengthened by every victory in the country, are absolutely resolved to check the Parliamentary dry rot which they credit to the absence of leadership. They feel that outside the House of Commons their prospects are generally improving, and that great masses of electors who have hitherto voted Unionist are now abstaining or boldly supporting the Radical candidate. But in the House of Commons they realize that their position is going from bad to worse. One and all are saying "we can do nothing under Harcourt." We hazard the prediction that prior to next Session a new Leader of the Opposition will be chosen. Side by side with the Harcourt mutiny is to be noted a Rosebery revival. So far, Lord Rosebery has flatly refused to be "revived," and if he is wise he will persist in his refusal. Should he yield and resume the leadership now, he would find himself beset with intrigue and treachery, and as he suffers from super-sensitiveness he would probably make a second and final exit from public life. On the other hand, should he judiciously stand aside, nothing can prevent him from being Prime Minister in the event of his Party returning to power, for the simple reason that there is no alternative Premier. With the Party firmly in power and resolved to stay there, Lord Rosebery as Premier would be master of the situation. One way and another the next few months should be interesting.

THE WEST AFRICAN QUESTION.

It has been stated that this question is settled, and the *Figaro* declared that a formal convention had been signed by the British and French Governments. This, however, is altogether premature. The Press is always in a hurry. Governments have to be slow. All that has happened is, that the Commissioners in Paris have reported to their respective Governments the results of their discussions. It is probable that the lines of a settlement are in sight. One fact has emerged. The French are prepared to evacuate Boussa. That is something, though we do not regard this as a concession. The circumstances of their seizure of Boussa amounted to a flagrant breach of faith with England: in Europe this would have constituted an act of war. The circumstances were, that at the time of its seizure there was an agreement between the British and French Governments that, pending the Bida campaign then being waged by the Niger Company, the troops of neither country should occupy any portion of territory which was within the range of the Arbitration Commission negotiations at Paris. This was a favourable arrangement for France, and it may be said that Boussa was already established as within the British sphere. No sooner had the British Government given a pledge that such territory would be respected, than Lieutenant Bretonnet descended

the Niger from Ilo and seized Boussa. We are accustomed to be called "*Perfide*" by our witty neighbours, but it is difficult to conceive a more perfidious act than this. The King of Boussa, who had long been a subsidized vassal of the Niger Company, piteously appealed to its officers for help. The senior executive officer of Leaba wrote to the Governor: "The King still holds to the agreement that his predecessor made with us. I told his messenger that we had referred the question to the Government of the Queen and that they must have patience." The chief difficulty of coming to an amicable settlement with France has been that, having seized Boussa in the manner described, she has actually demanded compensation for evacuating it. We have always held that the evacuation of Boussa should have preceded all negotiations whatsoever: and that Lieutenant Bretonnet's raid from Ilo to Boussa should have been disavowed.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN'S FIRMNESS.

We have every confidence in Mr. Chamberlain's management of the West African Question. He has been firm without menace. He has recognized throughout that there is a necessity for some concession on our part, and he earnestly wishes to keep the peace, but not peace at any price. It is probable that some concession may be made by us on the east coast of the Niger above Ilo. The French covet that country much, and if the Sokoto kingdom be better defined as the result, and Lieutenant Bretonnet's raid be disavowed, we can afford the sacrifice. Nikki is distinctly within the Hinterland of Lagos, and its surrender will be a greater concession on our part; but we say if this seems a fair arrangement, and if Lugard's treaty may be disregarded, let it go. The *Figaro* must be entirely misinformed in its statement that "we (the French) shall have two ports on the Middle Niger." There can be no question of ceding any such ports. What, then, is a question upon which concessions may be made, is that of affording trade routes across Lagos from Dahomey to the Lower Niger, upon which French bonded warehouses may be established. This, of course, is no surrender of territory. It is merely facilitating the establishment of commerce by other nations as well as our own—a principle we have never grudged. Some concessions we may also make in the Hinterland of the French Ivory Coast where we occupy Bona: we may surrender this in return for the expansion northward of our Gold Coast Hinterland up to the twelfth parallel. Wa and Leo would thus be recognized as within the British sphere. The claim to Wagadugu may have to be abandoned. We have pushed our concessions to the utmost in order to maintain peace. If we have ever felt warlike over this question

it is not on account of the territorial value of Boussa and Ilo, but because we have been so affronted and defied by African France, while the Government seated in Paris has offered no redress or apology. Monsieur Hanotaux's earnest desire to remain on friendly terms we are assured of. The result of the last General Election has probably left him freer to act on his own views.

THE NILE CAMPAIGN.

The national interest must not be diverted from the work we are engaged in on the Nile. The Anglo-Egyptian Army may now be said to be reposing on the laurels it won at the Battle of Atbara. As the details of that battle have only arrived since the publication of our last number, it may not be amiss to consider some of its features. The most satisfactory one was probably the behaviour of the black troops under their British officers. An officer who was in charge of Sudanese troops writes :—"Whilst we were halted for one-and-a-half hours in attack formation opposite the Dervish position, at about 600 yards from the Zariba, whilst our artillery was shelling the place, I could see by the faces of our blacks that they had the utmost confidence in the arrangements for the fight, and they were content to sit or kneel and watch the shells bursting for as long as we cared to keep them waiting, then when the word to advance was given, and the whole line of deployed battalions (three British on the right and six Sudanese on the left) made for the Zariba, our blacks followed their British and black officers without a doubt in their minds that we should carry the enemy's position."

DERVISH DISCIPLINE *v.* ANGLO-EGYPTIAN.

The Dervish camp turned out to be honey-combed with small trenches which were occupied by riflemen, and each man had provided shelter for himself, and frequently for his donkey. The Dervish camp was about 1,200 yards long, and each of the three brigades took about 400 yards of it, starting from the desert side and all making straight for the Atbara river, so as not to fire into one another inside the Dem or camp, the depth of which was, also, about 1,200 yards. The Dervishes stuck to their trenches with marvellous pluck. The Dervish discipline is brutal, but it is effective. Desertion is practically unknown, notwithstanding that we offer a reward for it. Mahmud was able to control the fire of his army for a whole hour during the bombardment. It was the same at the battle of Abu Hamed. The Emir Mahomed El Zain who commanded there, and who was captured, said afterwards that he lay low in order to equalize the superiority of British weapons. At 200 yards the Remington is as good as the Martini. Mahmud

acted on the same principle. What beat them both was the steady disciplined advance of our drilled battalions, a proceeding they had never seen or imagined. In 1883-5 we used to fight in squares always waiting to be attacked, with cumbrous transport camels in the middle, so we had little or no mobility. Now we are fighting an enemy armed with rifles, and who, in consequence of the acquisition of these weapons, has taken to fight on the defensive. It is not cowardice, but the weapon which has made him adopt these tactics. The old headlong rush of half-naked spearmen was perhaps the more formidable foe, he had, however, to be fanatical enough to glory in his death. To draw any conclusions from the battle of Abu Klea is quite fallacious. The square formation belongs to the past—let us hope it is no longer needed. We have in our six Sudanese battalions and in our Egyptian Artillery, a native force which it has taken many years to create, but which nothing native in Africa can stand against. The Dervishes fought most gallantly at Atbara. They stuck to their trenches, and 1,300 dead bodies were counted inside the Dem itself, 200 in the dry river bed and pool of Atbara, about 1,500 more wounded got away and died in the bushes on either side of the river. Their entire loss must have amounted to 3,000. Plenty of provisions were found in the Dem, which disposes of the stories of impending starvation.

THE CHIEF FEATURES OF THE BATTLE.

The chief points to note in the Battle of Atbara are :—

1. The excellence of Sir Herbert Kitchener's Commissariat and transport arrangements at a point thirty miles off his line of communications.

2. The extreme accuracy of the leading of four large brigades (of four battalions each) in a night march to a position which was concealed, but had to be struck at dawn.

3. The evenness with which the task allotted to each of the three assaulting brigades was apportioned. No brigade and no battalion had the lion's share.

FORWARD.

After the victory of Atbara the Anglo-Egyptian army returned to summer quarters at Berber : the Dervishes are probably no nearer than at the Shabluka Cataract. The remnants of Mahmud's "invincible" army have retired up the Atbara towards Andaraman and Kassala ; while a portion made its way back to the Nile across forty miles of desert. The effect of the defeat on the Khalifa and on the populace of Omdurman cannot yet be ascertained. The former has taken all the steps he can to minimize its effect. Operations have to be sus-

pended on our part until the Nile has risen sufficiently to become navigable. It is sincerely to be hoped there will be no hesitation about immediately pushing on to secure the waterway right up to the Great Lakes. We have to join hands with our Indian troops from Uganda in the neighbourhood of Dufilé. One battalion of Sudanese troops on the gunboats would be sufficient force; the smaller it is the better, on account of provisioning. After the fall of Khartoum and Omdurman we have a free hand and a splendid opportunity. We could cut our way through the *sud*, that tangled weed that chokes the otherwise navigable Upper Nile, and clear a commercial route up to Wadelai, two, probably three, years before the Uganda railway is completed. From the East Coast for hundreds of miles things have all to be carried on human backs into the interior. By the Nile route nothing need be carried on a man's back. Camels can work the cataracts from Beddin to Dufilé. All we have to do is to bring up boat builders and to build boats and to keep on building them, launching them and then creating intercourse throughout a vast country where intercourse has hitherto been restricted to raids and slave catching, and in which no one could own either a boat or a wife with any certainty when there was a stronger neighbour. If we are prompt and masterful we should be able to build boats above Dufilé for Lake Albert Nyanza before the rainy season of 1899. The Uganda railway cannot reach Victoria Nyanza till 1903 at the earliest. By that time both routes will be wanted and several branch ones besides. Sir Samuel Baker urged that this should be undertaken 30 years ago and no one cared. What would not the French give to be in our position, or any great nation?

IN FRANCE.

The Zola case has been postponed on a technical point. Monsieur Labori (Zola's counsel), when it was coming off at Versailles, raised the question of the Court's jurisdiction, and gave notice of an appeal to the Court of Cassation. The subsequent proceedings were a scandal. The Procureur-Général (the highest judicial officer in France) actually delivered himself of the following diatribe on M. Labori's application:—"Condemned by the Seine jury, and fleeing before the Seine-et-Oise jury, MM. Zola and Perreux will not be tried to-day, but their cause is judged. The law will reach you in spite of all your subterfuges." We commend to the perusal of our readers an article upon the whole Dreyfus scandal published further on. In the meantime it has been proved in a law court that the Esterhazy letter, which contained such infamous remarks about the French Army, and which he declared to be forgeries, are authentic. It is becoming clearer every day that the unfortunate

Dreyfus is being punished for crimes committed by the infamous Esterhazy! The whole civilized world is shocked, but the French, who are ordinarily anything but an impassive people, refuse to stir a little finger to redress a hideous outrage. Must this acquiescence in injustice be taken as a premonitory symptom of that national decay which is creeping along other branches of the Latin Race? In France the situation is strange. Politics have never been so flat—certainly not during this century—as they are now. The believers in progress seem to have disappeared. Radicalism is extinct. There is no man and no aspiration. Militarism, Clericalism, and Materialism are the prevailing forces; and the General Election which has just taken place expresses them. George Meredith's lines are appropriate:—

"We look for her that sun-like stood,
Upon the forehead of our day,
When in the shape of glad array.
We see a vacant place,
We hear an iron heel."

The following is the result of the General Election:—

Republicans	253
Radicals	108
Socialist Radicals	74
Socialists	56
Ralliés	37
Conservatives	44
Nationalists	9
	581

On the whole the Elections have been unfavourable to the Méline Ministry. Its reliable majority is reduced to twenty, exclusive of the thirty-seven Ralliés who cannot be relied on. The present Premier has been in power for two years and our papers are anxious to prepare us for his withdrawal—possibly because he is a Bimetallist. We hope he will remain—his zeal in a good cause is almost the only wholesome thing in France just now. M. Lebon, the Colonial Minister, Monsieur Goblet and Monsieur Jaurès and the Colonial group generally, consisting of Deloncle, de Mahy, F. Charmès, Monteil, and Delafosse have all lost their seats. In an international sense the General Election has been good, French jingoism being weakened.

SIR SYED AHMAD.

Mr. Theodore Morison, the son of the late James Cotter Morison, one of our most brilliant men of letters—contributes a striking memorial article to this number in honour of the late Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, than whom Her Majesty has never had a nobler subject. It would be

superfluous to add anything to Mr. Morison's eloquent tribute, or to emphasize the splendid services rendered by its object to the State. Sir Auckland Colvin, formerly Licutenant-Governor of the North-west Provinces, has testified that Sir Syed Ahmad has done more than any man, English or native, to strengthen the British Empire in India. Under the circumstances it is only natural and right that Sir Syed Ahmad's British admirers should desire to shew their regard and veneration for one of the greatest men of the century, by raising a permanent memorial in his honour, which would be presumably associated with the College of Aligahr—that University of learning and loyalty to which he devoted the last twenty-five years of his life. Mr. J. Parker Smith, M.P., House of Commons, Westminster, has kindly consented to act as temporary Treasurer of the Syed Ahmad Memorial Fund.

"MONEY MURDER."

We do not propose to belabour the currency proposals of the Indian Government. They have been extinguished by a universal shout of laughter, and it is always unprofitable to slay the slain. Indeed, it would be no exaggeration to say that no scheme ever put forward by any responsible Government has ever met with so scornful, derisive, and indignant a reception from men of business. To many minds currency controversies are repulsive in the extreme, and men are apt to shirk this branch of economics, though the most important of all. But "the business man in the street" can appreciate the amazing fatuity of the Westland policy which proposes to remedy the intolerable money stringency in India, not by increasing the supply of money, but by destroying some of the already insufficient supply *i.e.* by melting down rupees. This disgraceful proposition has been branded "money murder" by Mr. William Fowler, Banker and Vice-President of the Gold Standard Defence Association, to whose active efforts to counteract the Indian Gold Standard craze, all who seriously care for the welfare of the three hundred million people inhabiting India, are greatly indebted. Those who are already alarmed at the blind manner in which a blind British Cabinet has followed a blind Indian Council on this wretched Indian business, need have no anxiety as to this particular project. It has already been politely but firmly intimated to Sir James Westland and Co. that their precious scheme is unacceptable. The "business man in the street" is also learning one other thing, and his tardy awakening is fraught with incalculable future advantage to our Indian Empire. He sees that the establishment of what is called an effective gold standard in India can only be carried out at the risk and to the detriment of the British gold standard. And is not this obvious?

An "effective" gold standard necessarily involves the accumulation of a gold reserve—the Indian Government cheerfully suggest £20,000,000—which will be drawn from London as "the only free gold market" in the world. The British gold reserve is already small enough to be a constant source of anxiety to the City, and any such drain upon it as is coolly proposed by a handful of officials in Calcutta—which would probably be the first of many instalments—would cause such a rise in the Bank rate and such a general fall in all securities as to be tantamount to a panic. As a Director of the Bank of England remarked in the winter, "the Indian Government desire to transfer their monetary stringency to London." He was right, but fortunately London is not seeking for a panic just now, and appears to be taking the necessary steps to avert it.

AN ACT OF LUNACY.

We are anxious that our readers should understand that there is no quarrel between monometallists and bimetallists on the Indian currency question. Bimetallists have no desire to force any form of bimetallism upon India, either the real bimetallism which existed in France until 1873, or the sham bimetallism known as "the limping standard" which has existed in France since that date, and which has suddenly fascinated the Indian official mind. In France a vast mass of overvalued silver is kept at par with gold, by means of a large gold reserve and owing to the fact that France is a great creditor country with a constant balance in her favour. India is a great debtor country with a heavy external gold debt, a somewhat precarious trade balance, and no gold reserve. If India tries to imitate France by adopting a bastard form of bimetallism—which France would like to abandon for the real article—her fate will be similar to that of the frog who tried to blow himself out to the size of an ox. She will come to hopeless grief, and no bimetallist worth his salt would care to associate himself with such a peril on the chance of being able to fish in troubled waters. Bimetallists realize that Silver monometallism *i.e.* mints open to free coinage offers the only possible solution of the Indian problem. Monometallists on their side—with the exception of a few monomaniacs—feel that while the gold standard suits Great Britain, which is a rich country, it is wholly unsuited to India, which is a poor country. "Gold monometallism for Great Britain, Silver monometallism for India," is their formula. A few fanatics desire that gold should "appreciate" indefinitely and general commodities should continue falling in value. They would face an Indian Mutiny rather than abandon their craze for artificial cheapness, but

they are not the most influential monometallists, and their views will not prevail. Lord George Hamilton, the Indian Secretary, may wriggle as much as he likes; he may pack committees with officials; he may limit the scope of enquiry to exclude the silver standard; he may denounce the opening of the Indian Mints as "an act of lunacy"; but the more people look at the question, the more convinced they will become that "the act of lunacy" is an act of necessity, and order will be evolved out of the present *chaos.* As an eminent monometallist writes: "I am quite sure the Indian Government is in a wrong groove, and I see no course open to them but to re-open the Mints, with such precautions as are possible against sudden fluctuations."

GREAT BRITAIN *V.* FRANCE AND RUSSIA.

THE student of history can hardly fail to be struck by a certain resemblance between the general political situation at the time of the outbreak of the late war with France and Russia, and that which obtained in 1778 when, during the American War of Independence, France made war against England, and was in the following year joined by Spain. The addition of Holland to our adversaries in the earlier war, in 1780, need not be taken into account, as that country was forced into war by England for her own purposes, and added nothing to the strength of the Allies. The resemblance between the general course of events in the two wars, and between the results, is less marked than that between the antecedent situations; but in each case the war was indecisive, England holding her own on the sea, though it needed the exertion of her utmost strength to enable her to do so. It is true in 1900 England was not engaged in a struggle with any of her Colonies, but the position of affairs in South Africa, and the growth of racial antagonism between the English and Dutch elements throughout that country, in addition to native troubles, were such as to give the Government grave anxiety, and to necessitate the detention of a considerable number of troops in Cape Colony and the neighbouring British territories. In India, also, there was a spirit of unrest abroad, which arose from a variety of causes. The measures adopted to prevent the increase of the Plague in Bombay and the surrounding districts had aroused the opposition of the Hindus, as being contrary to their religious tenets, while a wave of fanaticism among the Mahommedans had resulted in the rising of the tribes on the Afghan Border in 1897, and the extensive operations of that and the following years. It is irrelevant to our purpose to enquire whether this wave of fanaticism was due to exaggerated reports of the Turkish victories over Greece in the early summer of 1897, and to the consequent supposition that the hour had arrived for a general rising of the Faithful and the extermination of the Infidels, or to any other cause. We have only to take count of the fact that there was a spirit of dissatisfaction abroad in India which, though the native army does not appear to have

been infected with it to any appreciable extent, and though the loyalty of the feudatory princes was shown by their offers of assistance in the frontier war, tended to produce a feeling of insecurity among Anglo-Indians, and which, when war broke out, prevented the movement of any large numbers of troops from India to other points of danger. We have reason, moreover, in the light of later events, to believe that the disaffected natives were encouraged in the idea that the Raj was coming to an end by emissaries from Trans-Caspian Russia. In the Nile Valley, again, though the Anglo-Egyptian forces had occupied Khartoum in 1898, the Khalifa himself was still alive, and his influence remained considerable, while the presence of more than one French expedition on the Upper Nile was making itself felt.

As in 1778, so in 1900, England's difficulty was her enemies' opportunity; but in other respects the parallel between the two sets of circumstances is still more striking. At the former period England's wealth and prosperity were such as to arouse the fear and envy of less fortunate States. In the Seven Years' War, which had terminated fifteen years earlier, she had conquered Canada from the French, and had also driven them out of India, thus acquiring one Empire in the West and another in the East at the same time. The navies of France and Spain had been driven from the seas, their sea-borne trade had been ruined, and their colonies had been taken, one after another, while the "trade of England increased gradually every year, and such a scene of national prosperity while waging a long, costly, and bloody war, was never before shown by any people in the world."* So it was in 1900, with the difference that the interval since the last great naval war was in this case eighty-five years instead of fifteen. The commercial supremacy of Europe had been in the hands of Great Britain since the decline of Holland about the beginning of the Eighteenth Century, and it had been put in a position, humanly speaking, of absolute security for a long time by the destruction of the French Navy in the war with Napoleon. During the eighty-five years of naval peace this supremacy had not only been maintained, but had been enormously extended till it had spread over the whole world, and before the growth of the commercial spirit in Germany during the last quarter of the nineteenth century it had been without a formidable rival. During the same period the British Empire, as we now know it, had come into existence, and the several parts were being gradually drawn closer together by ties of kinship and common interest, while various schemes for a more formal federation, on a military, commercial, or legislative basis were afloat. Once more the wealth and prosperity of Britain excited the

* Mahan, *Influence of Sea-Power upon History*, p. 319.

cupidity of her neighbours, a fact which was evidenced not only by the outbreak of war with France and Russia, but still more markedly by the declaration of an Armed Neutrality of the other European Powers under German leadership, following the precedents of 1780 and 1801, and the "boycotting" of British trade. We cannot consider this rivalry either unnatural or inexcusable, for the foreign Powers would argue that so large a share of the world's riches should not be in the hands of a single Power which, in their view, used its opportunities for its own selfish ends, and that other nations had as good a title as the British to the advantages of wealth.

Another point of resemblance in the situations at the outbreak of the two wars is the relative strength of Great Britain and her adversaries. In the Eighteenth Century the standard of strength for the British Navy laid down by Hawke and his contemporaries had been equality with the combined fleets of the two Bourbon Powers, France and Spain; and in 1889 Lord George Hamilton, in introducing the Naval Defence Bill, announced that the then existing Government had decided that the navy must be kept at a strength equal to the combined fleets of the two strongest naval Powers on the Continent, these being France and Russia. This standard was verbally confirmed by successive Governments of both parties. In neither case, however, was the standard of strength laid down maintained, owing to causes into which it is not necessary here to enquire. Our adversaries, on the other hand, had in both instances been making special exertions to bring their naval forces up to such a state, both of numerical strength and of efficiency, as should enable them to meet the British fleet at least on terms of equality. Towards the end of the Seven Years' War, Choiseul, seeing that the only hope for France lay in restoring the navy, devoted his energies to that end, and when he was dismissed from office in 1770, seven years after the conclusion of peace, France had sixty-nine sail-of-the-line afloat. At the same time he did all he could to maintain and strengthen the Family Compact with Spain. A parallel to this may be found in the great additions made to the French Navy during the closing years of the Nineteenth Century, and in the Russo-French alliance, which, though primarily intended as a set-off to the Triple Alliance, was in fact brought into play against England only. "When war openly broke out in 1778, France had eighty ships-of-the-line in good condition, and sixty-seven thousand seamen were borne on the rolls of the maritime conscription. Spain, when she entered the war in 1779 as the ally of France, had in her ports nearly sixty ships-of-the-line. To this combination England opposed a total number of two hundred and

twenty-eight ships of all classes, of which about one hundred and fifty were of the line."* In 1900 England had fifty-six battleships completed, France thirty-nine, and Russia twenty-eight. In the earlier war also the armament of our enemies' ships was both more numerous and of heavier average calibre than ours. So in our modern fleets the number of guns has been subordinated to capacity for storing coal and ammunition, and in most foreign navies the ships are more heavily armed than in ours, but have less storage capacity. The result is that British ships have generally the greater "staying power" as regards both steaming and fighting, while foreign ships are able in an engagement to pour the greater weight of metal into their adversaries at each discharge. The British ship can sustain the longer engagement, but the foreigner has the better chance of sinking the enemy with her first broadside. The foreign ship, also, is generally speaking less liable to be called upon for a long voyage, and so has not the same need for great coal capacity as the English ship.

In one most important particular the situations at the two periods were very different. In 1778 Great Britain was self-supporting and, with a small population, was free from the danger of starvation through the interruption of her foreign trade. In 1900 the case was far otherwise. "Her island myriads fed from alien lands"† depended absolutely for their existence on the supply of food, especially wheat, from abroad. The maintenance, therefore, of a navy adequate for the protection of the principal trade routes was essential to the life of the nation, while the danger of the failure of the food supply was enhanced by the fact that some 40 per cent. of the sailors manning our merchant fleet were foreigners, a considerable number of them Russians. In many cases these foreign seamen did not care to face the risks of war, in spite of the higher rate of wages paid, and taking possession of the ships they manned, carried them into hostile or neutral ports.

At the beginning of the year 1900 there was no special indication of coming trouble, though in several parts of the world the situation had long been such as might at any time lead to a crisis The Eastern question continued to be a cause of dissension in the European family. In regard to Africa there were various points of dispute between Great Britain and other Powers, the most important being connected with Egypt and West Africa, where French and English interests clashed, and with South Africa, where the dispute with the Transvaal was complicated by the growth of racial antagonism between the English and Dutch elements throughout the country, from the Zambesi to the Cape

* *Influence of Sea-Power upon History*, p. 337.

† Tennyson, *The Fleet.*

and by the support given by Germany to the Dutch. In the Far East, again, the rivalry between England and Russia might at any time come to a crisis, in which case Japan was expected to side with England, and France with Russia, while the attitude of Germany was considered doubtful, though it was anticipated that, in the event of war, she would refrain from active interference, in the hope of reaping the commercial benefits of neutrality at England's expense.

In the event, however, the *casus belli* arose in none of these quarters. In April the British authorities on the north-west frontier of India arrested a Cossack officer, who had been travelling in the country, on a charge of espionage and of inciting the natives to rebellion. The Russian Government instantly demanded his release; but the evidence against him admitted of no doubt of the truth of the charge, and he was imprisoned in a fortress, the English Foreign Secretary intimating to the Russian Ambassador that the demand of his Government could not be entertained. It was a curious coincidence that at the time the Russian demand was made the Baltic Fleet, including twelve battleships, was paying a visit to Brest. Here all the battleships of the French Northern Fleet, with those stationed in the Bay of Biscay, and their reserves, amounting to eighteen in all, were concentrated in honour of their guests. On the British Government rejecting the Russian ultimatum, this fleet of thirty battleships, in addition to cruisers, steamed out of Brest without any previous declaration of war. The Allies hoped to obtain complete command of the Channel, while we were still unprepared, and, by shutting up the several portions of the British Channel Squadron in their ports, to land an invading army on the English coast without let or hindrance. The Admiralty, however, had not been altogether blind to the suspicious movements in French and Russian ports, and as soon as the arrest of the Cossack officer was reported orders were given that the Channel Squadron, which had lately returned from its spring cruise, should concentrate at Spithead, while the guard ships and the reserve ships in home ports were to be in readiness to join it, those in the more distant ports of the British Islands being at once quietly moved to the Channel. Notices were also served upon all Naval Reserve men at home to hold themselves in readiness for immediate mobilization; and the surrounding seas were patrolled by cruisers and destroyers. The *personnel* of the Royal Navy had now been brought up to one hundred and ten thousand men, and that of the Naval Reserve to fifty thousand, while the mobilization scheme had been greatly improved during the past two years. There were thirty-five battleships in home ports, but several breakdowns and delays took place, so, when

orders to mobilize were issued upon Russia presenting her ultimatum, only thirty-one of these were able to assemble at Spithead. The rival fleets were thus almost exactly equal in regard to battleships. On the English cruisers warning the Commander-in-Chief of the approach of the enemy the British Fleet put to sea, and fell in with the Allies in the neighbourhood of the Channel Islands. It was, however, no part of the Allies' plan to fight a hostile fleet equal in strength to their own, and when they found what the numbers opposed to them were, the signal for retreat was made, and the projected invasion of England was given up for the moment. The British followed with all possible speed in the hope of bringing on a general action, but only a running fight took place between the fastest and consequently most advanced English ships—being those of the *Majestic* class—and the rear of the Allies. This running fight lasted till the allied fleet was once more under the guns of Brest, and in the course of it the enemy lost three battleships, which broke down and were captured, and two destroyed, the British also losing two destroyed. Our advanced squadron, having seen the enemy safe into Brest, cruised in the offing, with an inshore squadron of fast cruisers and destroyers to watch the port more closely, and were joined before long by their slower consorts. These, in the meanwhile, had encountered the smaller craft of the Baltic Fleet on their way to join their battleships in the Channel, and many of these were destroyed and a few taken, and the rest retreated towards the Baltic followed by English cruisers. The British Fleet had now been joined by the remaining battleships in home ports, which brought its total strength up to thirty-three, while the enemy had been reduced to twenty-five. Eight battleships and a number of cruisers were now despatched to reinforce the squadron in the Mediterranean, where our fourteen battleships were opposed by twenty-nine of France and Russia, and the remaining twenty-five lay off Brest, watching the enemy in that port.

The British Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean had been warned by the Government when our relations with Russia began to look threatening, and had concentrated his command at Gibraltar, but some days before the outbreak of hostilities communication by cable had been interrupted, and he had no further intelligence from home till a cruiser sent by the British Admiral in the Channel, which had evaded the allied fleet after the latter left Brest, brought him news that war had begun. At the same time one of his own cruisers reported that the Russian Black Sea Squadron, in which were five battleships, had passed unmolested through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, accompanied by many vessels of the Volunteer Fleet, and had joined their Mediterranean

Squadron, also containing five battleships, in the Levant. The Russians were steering south, presumably to Egypt or the Suez Canal. At the same time the French Mediterranean Fleet, with its reserves, was reported to be concentrating at Toulon. The Admiral saw that his only hope lay in fighting the French before they could unite with their allies, and he at once got up steam and sailed in an easterly direction. Off Cape Spartivento the enemy were discovered steering south-east in charge of a large convoy of transports. The British had only fourteen battleships to the nineteen of the French, but the latter were somewhat scattered, not expecting to be overtaken, and were hampered by their convoy. To protect the transports the French Admiral detached two battleships and a number of torpedo boats, instead of concentrating his whole force against the British and leaving the transports to take care of themselves. The result was that the British, coming up somewhat in the rear of the French and in good order, were able to bring their whole strength against the rearmost ships of the enemy, and by the time the latter were able to collect all their available vessels the British had destroyed three of their battleships without losing any themselves, and the two fleets were now equal. The battle, which was exceedingly hard fought and accompanied by terrible destruction on both sides, was eventually drawn. The losses were nearly equal, for the British lost six ships, sunk or blown up, and the French eight, none being taken by either side, while the remaining ships of both fleets were in such a condition as to be quite incapable of further fighting for the present. The remains of each fleet retired to the nearest friendly port, the French to Bizerta and the British to Malta; but the latter, being better supplied with cruisers, were able to some extent to mask their own movements and to observe those of the enemy. English cruisers were also able to follow the French transports, convoyed by the two battleships detached for that purpose, and, as these continued their easterly course, it became apparent that a combined Franco-Russian descent on Egypt was intended. This was carried into effect, and the Allies took possession of Alexandria and Port Said, and landed thirty thousand troops, followed by twenty thousand more Russians at the former port. The Anglo-Egyptian Army was not equal to coping with these numbers; and, it being impossible to send any considerable number of troops from India, Lower Egypt passed for the time into the hands of the enemy, who also occupied Cyprus. Whether they had any intention of moving through the Canal to attack our Oriental possessions or to strengthen their own forces in the Far East is not known; but such a movement was made impossible by the sinking of two British transports in the narrowest part of the Canal as soon as

the news of the approach of the Black Sea Fleet was received, while our cruisers controlled the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.

Meanwhile, the eight ships detached from our Channel Fleet had reached the Mediterranean, and, after communicating with the Admiral at Malta, proceeded to Bizerta to complete the destruction of the remains of the Toulon Fleet in that port. By means of night attacks by torpedo boats five French ships were destroyed, and the English Commander, leaving three of his vessels to observe the other four, sailed with the rest to Malta to join the eight ships of our Mediterranean Squadron, which had survived the battle of Cape Spartivento, an attack being expected from the twelve ships of the Allies which had escorted the expedition to Egypt.

At the end of the first month of the war the position in Europe was, therefore, as follows :—The projected invasion of England had failed, at any rate for the time, and the twenty-five battleships left of the allied Northern Fleet were lying in Brest Harbour under the observation of an English Fleet of equal strength. The Allies had occupied Egypt and Cyprus, both of which are included in the European theatre of war, but the Toulon Fleet was practically annihilated; and they had twelve untouched battleships in the Levant to oppose five sound British ships and eight which were *hors de combat* of the same class at Malta, while three undamaged British ships were keeping a close watch over four shattered French ones at Bizerta. The total forces of battleships in the Mediterranean were, therefore, sixteen British and sixteen of the Allies, but the latter had twelve fit for service, and the former only eight.

Italy now began preparations for the mobilization of her navy, but it is understood that King Humbert received a private intimation from the German Emperor that, if he exposed his country to a French invasion by coming to the assistance of Great Britain, the terms of the Triple Alliance would not apply to the circumstances, and that Italy would be left to repel the invasion by itself. At any rate, the Italian preparations were discontinued, and a week later it was announced that the neutral Powers had, under German leadership, entered into an Armed Neutrality directed against England. The Powers which formed the League of Neutrals pledged themselves not only to resist rights of search and to insist on the effectiveness of blockades, as on previous occasions, but also to exclude British trade from the Continent under a system of tariffs which, taken in conjunction with the enormous rise in insurance rates, was nothing short of prohibitive.

While these events were taking place in Europe, there had been

fighting in other parts of the world. In West Africa the British Colonies of the Gambia and Sierra Leone were occupied by troops from the neighbouring possessions of France without great difficulty, for although the British naval forces were undisputed masters of the Atlantic on that coast, it was impossible to send any reinforcements from England as long as the maritime war in Europe was undecided. On the Gold Coast and in Nigeria, on the other hand, Her Majesty's troops, acting in consort with those of the Royal Niger Company, not only held their own, but took possession of a number of French posts in the Western Soudan and on the Ivory Coast, besides occupying the whole of Dahomey. In this region, therefore, gains and losses were pretty equally balanced. In East Africa the British possessions were at present unmenaced, largely owing to the understanding with Abyssinia, negotiated by Mr. Rennell Rodd in the autumn of 1897, though, if we had lost command of the Red Sea and Indian Ocean they would have been exposed to attack from the sea, more especially if the obstruction in the Suez Canal had been first removed. As it was, an expedition from Aden, slightly reinforced from Bombay, seized the French possessions at Obock.

Asia was the scene of more important events. Till the Armed Neutrality was declared, Russia was prevented by fear of complications with the Central Powers from making any demonstration against India, but as soon as this fear was removed an army of two hundred thousand men invaded Afghanistan and seized Herat, while a smaller force was concentrated on the Pamirs and besieged Chitral and Gilgit. The Ameer was faithful to his promises to the Indian Government, and the Russian General hesitated to lead his army into the interior of Afghanistan, but obtained the consent of the Shah to its passage through Persia, in order, if desirable, to invade India by way of Baluchistan. Meanwhile a strong Anglo-Indian force entered Afghanistan to support the Ameer, but was much hampered by the hostility of the Frontier tribes. On the other side of the Indian Empire a French force from Annam and Tonquin invaded the Shan States of Upper Burmah, but its left flank was threatened by the Siamese troops, and it was unable to advance beyond the Me-Kong river, though the Indian Government could not spare enough troops to act otherwise than on the defensive in those parts.

In the Far East, England had now five battleships, five armoured cruisers, of which two were quite new, and nine unarmoured cruisers. This squadron was opposed by eight French and Russian battleships, and twelve armoured and four other cruisers, both sides having also a number of torpedo and gun vessels. The British could be reinforced by eight cruisers, including one armoured, from the

Pacific and Australian stations. The combatants in this scene of operations were, therefore, pretty evenly matched, but the Allies, besides being slightly stronger numerically, leaving the available English reinforcements out of consideration, had the further advantage of being in direct touch with their home Governments by overland telegraph, while the British communications were interrupted through the cutting of the submarine cables. In view, however, of the critical situation, the squadron had concentrated at Chusan some days before war broke out, in readiness for any eventualities. The Pacific Squadron was at the same time ordered to China. Nevertheless, the Allies were in a position to strike the first blow, and they should have brought all their strength against our China Squadron before the reinforcements arrived. Fortunately the divergence of their interests prevented any effective combination, the French, who had seized Hainan in the preceding year, directing their efforts to attacking Hong Kong and harassing our trade, and leaving the Russians to face the whole of our naval force with their fifteen battleships and cruisers. A battle followed off Chefoo. The Russians hoped to compensate for numerical inferiority by the greater power of their individual ships, but ours were the better handled, and the result, while indecisive by itself, was very much in our favour, the enemy losing seven ships, of which one was taken, and the British only three. The Russian Squadron, reduced to eight, exclusive of small vessels, as against sixteen of ours, retired into Port Arthur, where they were blockaded by twelve British ships. The remaining four of the latter, after being joined by the Pacific Squadron, which contained one armoured and three unarmoured cruisers, sailed to relieve Hong Kong, but arrived to find that the place, our only dockyard in those waters, had fallen before greatly superior French forces which had attacked both from the south and from Mirs Bay. The garrison had destroyed the docks and defences, and had lost in killed and wounded two-thirds of their numbers, before surrendering. Being unable to bring the French Squadron to action, our ships cruised in the neighbourhood for the protection of British trade, blockading Hong Kong at the same time. It had been rather expected in England that Japan would give us active support, availing herself of the opportunity of settling old scores with Russia, but Japan, like Germany, thought neutrality the best policy and did not move.

In Australian and American waters the war was almost entirely confined to actions between cruisers and attacks on commerce. The exceptions were an unsuccessful descent on the New Hebrides made by the Australian forces, and the capture of the French West India Islands Guadeloupe and Martinique.

We must now return to Europe. After several attempts to elude

the British Channel Fleet, the Brest Fleet managed to escape about two months after its retreat to the port, and, after steering north-west as if for a descent on Ireland, turned south-west and made for the Mediterranean, hoping to combine with the allied fleet in the Levant and destroy the British Squadron at Malta. The Channel Fleet, however, was well served by its cruisers and received early notice first of the enemy's escape and then of his change of course, and followed with all speed, passing Gibraltar the day after the Allies. The three English ships off Bizerta were warned of the enemy's approach in time to escape and join the squadron at Malta. Five of the ships damaged in the battle of Cape Spartivento had now undergone sufficient repairs to enable them to put to sea, and our squadron in the Mediterranean had now thirteen battleships fit for service. Two of the four battleships of the Toulon Fleet at Bizerta were also seaworthy again, and joined the Brest Fleet on the British ships leaving. As soon as the three ships from Bizerta reached Malta the whole squadron got up steam and steered for the Straits of Bonifacio, hoping to avoid the enemy and join the Channel Fleet. In this it was successful, the two divisions of the British meeting off Minorca. They counted in all thirty-eight battleships opposed to thirty-nine of the Allies. The latter, having failed in their object of destroying our Mediterranean Squadron before the Channel Fleet could come to its assistance, now made for Egypt in order to maintain the communications of the expeditionary force. The British followed, and a battle took place off Port Said in which our fleet was victorious. The Allies were far from being annihilated, but their losses were so heavy that they had to abandon the task of guarding the communications of the army in Egypt and retire to the Black Sea. The British were not in a condition, after the battle, to follow in the face of a probably hostile Turkey, but twenty battleships were able to remain at sea, Cyprus was recaptured, and communications with our forces in Asia restored through the reopening of the Suez Canal, while the enemy in Egypt were cut off from assistance.

This practically ended the war. The Allies having failed in their objects, except in Egypt and at Hong Kong, in each of which their forces were in a most precarious position through our successes at sea, and their combined naval forces being now inferior to those of England, made proposals for peace on the basis of a mutual restitution of all conquests, while Egypt was to be evacuated by their troops but not to be reoccupied by the British. Our Government was also anxious for peace, and was apprehensive that if the war were continued Germany might join the Allies. Great Britain was willing to agree to the mutual restitution, but insisted on Egypt being acknowledged as part of the British Empire, and

on the abrogation of the French fishing rights in Newfoundland. The Foreign Secretary pointed out that the English Navy had regained complete control of the sea as far as France and Russia were concerned, both in Europe and elsewhere, that the allied army in Egypt was cut off from Europe, that the British military forces had been largely increased and improved during the war, and that there was now nothing to prevent Great Britain sending an expedition, strong enough to recover Egypt, to that country. In other parts of the world also the war had, on the whole, been favourable to the British arms, while if other European Powers joined the Allies it was probable that Japan, and perhaps the United States, would come to England's assistance. Finally, France and Russia agreed to the English conditions, and about six months after the outbreak of war peace was signed.

Among the principal reasons against the continuation of the war by England were the terrible damage inflicted on her trade and the consequent distress prevalent in the United Kingdom. When the war began the supply of food in the British Islands was sufficient to last about six weeks with very careful distribution, but this did not prevent the price of the quartern loaf rising to a shilling immediately on the outbreak of hostilities. The effect of this increase in the price of bread was very soon seen in a corresponding increase in the distress among the poorer classes, especially in the poorer districts of London and other large towns. Here, in addition to there being infinitely more mouths to fill, in proportion to the available quantity of food, than in the country, and to the existence of a large population, sometimes described as the "submerged tenth," with, at the best of times, uncertain means of livelihood, a certain percentage of whom is constantly in a state of semi-starvation, news travelled faster than in the rural districts. The result of this was that the rise in prices came far more suddenly than in the latter, and was therefore more severely felt, at any rate at the beginning of the war. In the country, on the other hand, the pinch was not felt so soon, but, as the war went on and the prices continued to rise, it became quite as terrible as in the towns, if not more so, for the natural tendency of the imported supply was to go where the demand was greatest, that is to the towns. Fifty or sixty years earlier, at the time of the repeal of the Corn Laws, nineteen-twentieths of our population were home fed. Now five-sixths of it were fed on imported wheat. Again, when the Corn Laws were repealed, we had over four million acres of land under wheat, but in 1900, with a population increased by between fourteen and fifteen millions, our wheat area had sunk to little more than fifteen hundred thousand acres. The want was far greater than it would have been had the war come even twenty years earlier, owing

to the great amount of arable land that had fallen out of cultivation during the past few years. This was especially the case in the south-eastern counties, such as Kent and Essex, while their exposed position and the fear of invasion at the beginning of war tended to aggravate the miseries of the situation in these counties, and the distress was felt in them earlier and more severely than in most country districts. The cutting of the trans-oceanic cables before the commencement of the war rendered it impossible to communicate rapidly with our food-supplying Colonies and with neutral countries such as the United States, and so to import a large quantity of provisions before the hostile cruisers were swarming on the trade routes.

Though the want of bread was felt first, and, as being the most urgent, felt most severely, it must not be thought that it was by any means the only need. Other articles of common consumption such as meat, sugar, tea, coffee, vegetables, dairy produce, and tobacco, being all largely imported, rose enormously in price, and the want naturally fell most heavily on those who were least able to bear it, that is on the working-classes. Nor was the rise in prices balanced by a corresponding rise in wages, as it would have been had it taken place in normal times, and been produced by natural causes; for the employers, though more able to bear it, felt the strain as well as the labourers, and while the farmers, for instance, got higher prices for their produce than had been known at any time since the repeal of the Corn Laws, they also had to pay enormously, not only for their own food, but for other necessaries, such as machinery, and fuel to work it with. For, of course, the scarcity was not limited to food-stuffs. It was common to all supplies of which any considerable proportion was imported; and the rise in the prices of these spread even, though in a less degree, to articles of home production such as coal and iron. All imported raw materials became, not only difficult, but practically impossible to obtain, as apart from being themselves liable to capture by the enemy's cruisers and privateers, nearly all the available shipping was employed in carrying either food, or else war materials such as the ingredients of high explosives, which had naturally to be given preference over all other imports. Owing to this the cotton industry in Lancashire was at a complete standstill before the war came to an end, and although the woollen manufactories did not suffer to quite the same extent, owing to there being a certain amount of home-grown wool to draw from, though at ruinous prices, yet the want of material was felt with very great severity in this industry also, and the distress in both Yorkshire and Lancashire was terrible, though even worse in the latter than in the former. The same conditions obtained in a greater or less

degree in all industries; but the losses of the manufacturers themselves, and of the wholesale dealers, were slight compared with those of the retailers. In every town the small tradesmen whose livelihood depended upon getting constant and punctual supplies of goods, failed and shut up their shops by scores, and they and their employés were added to the number of those for whom food had to be provided by the local authorities, assisted as they were most generously by those who were able to spare anything from their own needs. The price of coal also rose enormously, reaching in some cases fifty shillings per ton. This was due to two different but kindred causes, as well as to the general rise in prices mentioned above. The first was the unlimited supplies of fuel required for the navy and for the merchant steamers which were able to keep the sea, and which had to increase their fuel consumption in order to minimize the risk of capture by steaming continually at the highest possible speed. The second was the quantity consumed in building new ships for the navy, and in the manufacture of war materials, for instance, guns, rifles, and other weapons. In the working of the coal and the manufacture of war material, as well as in the increase in the *personnel* of our naval and military forces, a certain amount of relief was afforded to the general distress, employment being given in the mines, arsenals, and dockyards to thousands who had been thrown out of their ordinary vocations and who would otherwise have been without the means of livelihood.

The fishing industry was among those which suffered most severely, both in home waters and in more distant fishing grounds, such as those of Newfoundland, where the existence of French fisheries in rivalry with ours caused the British boats to be the objects of special attention from French cruisers. As long as the war lasted the fishing business generally was exposed to such risks that, but for the absolute necessity of its maintenance both as a means of livelihood to the fishermen and of adding to the food supply of the country, it would probably have been altogether ruined. As it was, about half the total number of boats were laid up, a great proportion of the crews taking service in the navy, and losses by capture or destruction at the hands of the enemy amounted to quite 20 per cent. of the remainder. The boats in the British seas were the heaviest sufferers, except perhaps those off Newfoundland, as these seas were specially infested by the enemy's small cruisers and privateers, which would dash out of their own ports for a raid on the English smacks, and return in safety after accomplishing their object before any of the British warships in the neighbourhood arrived upon the scene.

The enemy's larger cruisers were also very numerous in British waters in spite of the vigilance and activity of our vessels of the same class. The Irish Sea was the scene of several actions between the enemy's cruisers and ours, and the trade between Great Britain and Ireland was carried on at risks almost as great as those which beset the foreign trade. The mails, again, between the two islands became most irregular, while the foreign mails were, as was to be expected, altogether disorganized. This not only added enormously to the difficulties under which commercial undertakings laboured, but made it necessary that some of Her Majesty's fastest and strongest cruisers should be exclusively employed in carrying the most urgent mails and the despatches of the Government. Thus the country lost their services as fighting ships, scouts, and protectors of its trade, for their commanders were directed never to fight if they could possibly avoid it when carrying mails. In a few cases our open seaport towns and watering places were bombarded, or ransoms were demanded as the price of immunity from bombardment; but this method of procedure was not so largely adopted as many people had anticipated, the hostile cruisers generally finding that commerce-destroying was more profitable, while the risk of disturbance by the arrival of British warships was smaller. Moreover, many of the more important and wealthier of our coast towns were protected by submarine mines and torpedoes, while the ransom to be extracted from those not so protected was not worth the expenditure of ammunition and risk of capture involved in a bombardment.

Our heaviest losses were of course in our sea-borne trade. Apart from captures and destruction by the enemy, immense numbers of vessels with their cargoes were lost through being manned, and in many cases commanded, by foreigners, the foreign seamen in the mercantile marine amounting to over one-third of the whole of its *personnel.* In hundreds of instances the foreign crews took possession of the vessels and carried them into hostile or neutral ports. In other cases, where a vessel manned by foreigners was lying in a home port, the crew declared the risk of death or capture too great, and refused to go to sea except on the prepayment of wages so high that the owners could not afford to give them. In spite of the high prices realized, when a cargo, especially a cargo of wheat, was safely brought into port and unloaded, the net profits were small owing to the enormous rise of insurance rates. To escape these many owners transferred their vessels to neutral flags, and in a yet larger number of cases British merchants shipped their goods in neutral bottoms, a practice which was almost universally adopted by foreign merchants who had hitherto been in the habit of shipping in British vessels. In fact, it was one

of the conditions of the Armed Neutrality that the merchants of the Powers adhering to it should be forbidden to make use of British shipping. The United States, though not a member of the League of Neutrals, and Germany have through these causes acquired a considerable proportion of our carrying trade, and, to judge from historical precedents such as the case of Holland at the end of the seventeenth century and that of the Northern States in the American War of Secession, it is exceedingly doubtful whether it will ever be recovered. By far the greater proportion of the sailing ships in the merchant service were laid up on the outbreak of war, except those engaged in coasting and other trade between the different parts of the British Islands. There were two reasons for this, which were the risk of capture, and the want of crews to man them through the strike or desertion of foreign seamen. The sailing ships were inevitably discarded in favour of the faster steamers, and though a few put to sea, only a very small percentage of these escaped capture or destruction. The system of convoys was resorted to whenever the Admiralty could spare vessels for the purpose, but the convoys consisted exclusively of steamers, as the inclusion of sailing ships would have impeded rapid progress and so increased the risk of capture. Auxiliary cruisers were largely used for escort purposes, while the regular cruisers which were not employed with the fleets of battleships were more generally engaged in cruising on the trade routes and seeking out the enemy's commerce destroyers.

Another factor which helped to hamper British trade was the existence of the Armed Neutrality. The League of Neutrals adopted, as one of the conditions of inclusion, the imposition of prohibitive duties on all goods coming from the British Islands and their dependencies. This resulted in our trade being practically excluded from Continental Europe, as it had been under the Berlin and Milan decrees in the time of Napoleon. In the existing circumstances British merchants could not afford to pay these ruinous duties, and the only course open to England was to retaliate by excluding the products of the League of Neutrals from her ports and expelling from the British Islands all natives of the countries which had formed it, except those who had become naturalized British subjects. This was done; but, while the expulsion of aliens somewhat reduced the number of mouths to be filled, this advantage was far more than counterbalanced by the diminution of the supply of food entailed in the exclusion of European products. In one respect, however, the exclusion of British trade from Continental Europe was beneficial to the Empire, for it resulted in the commercial relations of the Mother Country with the Colonies becoming closer than they had

been before, and a real Imperial Federation was brought nearer by this, as well as by the other circumstances of the war. At the same time the friendly, though neutral, attitude of the United States was of great assistance to us, as our supply of wheat was drawn almost entirely from that country and from Canada. The length of the voyage from Australia, or even from India, entailed too great risks for dependence to be placed on obtaining so important an article of consumption in large quantities from those parts of the Empire.

The threat of invasion at the beginning of the war produced a panic on the Stock Exchange, the prices of foreign stocks especially going down with a rush; and this was followed by a tendency towards a run on the banks. The concentration, however, of our Channel and Reserve Fleets at Spithead restored some degree of confidence, and the run on the banks ceased altogether with the enemies' retreat to Brest. Still, many small provincial banks stopped payment, and some even of the more important London houses were perilously near doing so when the panic came to an end, for in the abnormal circumstances the Bank of England was able to afford very little help to other houses. Trade throughout the country was dislocated through the prevailing uncertainty, the interruption of foreign communications, and the great rise in insurance rates. Many important mercantile and shipping houses became bankrupt, while others practically stopped carrying on active business, at least for the time. The Insurance Offices themselves, in spite of the rise in their premiums, had such heavy losses to make good that their average profits amounted to little or nothing. This, of course, applies especially to Marine Insurance Offices, but Fire, Life, and other offices also suffered heavily. All these misfortunes told upon the social conditions of the country. Deaths from want, of which there are always a certain number in normal times, increased to an appalling extent; epidemics of diseases produced by hunger, and by inferior food, broke out in many parts, especially in the crowded dwellings of the poor in towns; the hospitals were overcrowded, and frequently their resources were found unequal to the additional strain placed upon them in spite of all the efforts of the staffs; schools were thinly attended on account of illness and other causes; and the workhouses and gaols were full. At the beginning of the war the demand for newspapers was almost unlimited, and their circulation, especially that of the halfpenny journals, increased by leaps and bounds, but when the excitement and novelty died out the demand declined and, as the rise in the prices of food and other necessaries continued, and money became scarcer and scarcer, the circulation fell far below its normal numbers. The trades which suffered first, and suffered most severely, were, naturally, those

dealing in articles of luxury and not of necessity, and the book trade, which had long been in a bad way, was one of the first to feel the evil effects of the war, and many publishing and bookselling firms which had hitherto been regarded as sound were declared bankrupt.

Very soon after the beginning of the war, with the quartern loaf at a shilling and still rising, the result of the scarcity of food was seen in abnormal distress, especially in the large towns, and in London more than all. As before mentioned, the interruption of the submarine cables made it impossible to communicate with the United States, our Colonies, or other countries from which the food-supply could be replenished, except by means of fast cruisers or merchant vessels, with the result that by the end of the first month the price of the loaf had risen to two shillings and sixpence The precautions, such as the adoption of circuitous routes, necessary to guard against provision ships falling in with the enemies' commerce destroyers, made the passage from New York or Halifax to a British port take considerably longer than in time of peace, in spite of the high rate of speed maintained whenever possible and this was still more the case when the port of departure was more distant, as the Cape, Calcutta, or Sydney. The loaf never rose above two shillings and sixpence, but fluctuated between two shillings and that sum during the remainder of the war.

The people on the whole bore their hardships patiently, and among all classes—the labouring as well as the educated classes—the determination to bring the war to a successful issue never faltered, for it was clearly understood that England could not afford to be beaten, and that at all costs victory must be ultimately secured. Large numbers of the mechanics out of employment were enrolled in the navy as engine-room artificers, while many of the less skilled labourers found at any rate occupation by joining the military forces of the country, whether regular or auxiliary. Nevertheless there were serious riots in some of the larger towns, especially in those, such as London and the seaports, where there was considerable foreign population. These riots took place principally during the earlier weeks of the war, before the declaration of the Armed Neutrality and the expulsion of aliens. On the first of May there was a mass meeting of unemployed in Trafalgar Square, in which a large number of foreigners from the Soho and Leicester Square districts took part. Some of these made Anarchist speeches, and as the English part of the mob consisted largely of members of the criminal classes, their sentiments were not treated with the contumely they generally meet with from an English crowd. A strong police force was unable to prevent the mob marching down Whitehall and

doing on the way great damage to the Government Offices. Their object was supposed to be an attack on the Houses of Parliament; but in Parliament Square they were met by two squadrons of Household Cavalry, who were eventually compelled to charge. The loss of life was considerable, and, some of the mob being armed with revolvers or other firearms, half a dozen troopers were killed and more wounded. The riot was ultimately suppressed, and a large number of arrests made. Similar scenes took place in Liverpool and Glasgow, in both of which the Irish element promoted the disturbances, and others of the large towns, but in none did the riots assume such a formidable aspect as that of the first of May in London, and in all cases they were promptly and firmly dealt with by the authorities. After the first outbreaks had been suppressed, the discontented part of the population generally sank into sullen acquiescence, varied by meetings to protest against the continuation of the war, and to abuse the Government. There were in the early weeks of the war fears of a formidable rising in Ireland, and of an attempt to land French troops in that island; but through the energetic measures adopted by the Irish Executive, ably seconded by the military dispositions of the Commander-in-Chief, nothing more serious happened than a few isolated outbreaks in the south and south-west. Moonlighting raids, however, became frequent again, and the Constabulary, which had been gradually diminished during the past few years, was largely augmented.

An attempt has been made since the restoration of peace to keep the price of wheat up, and though it is to some extent promoted by our present critical relations with Germany it is not probable that it will succeed. Apart from the outcry for the restoration of the cheap loaf and the danger to public order if it is disregarded, there has been an immense influx of Canadian, American, and other foreign wheat into the country since the end of the war. This influx of foreign wheat exceeds all previous experience in a similar space of time, and the farmers will have to give way in order to avoid ruin.

In two ways the war has been productive of good results. In the first place, the common danger and the absolute necessity of united action in order to save the country have tended to considerably diminish Party feeling, while it has been made evident that Englishmen are still possessed of the old fighting spirit and the dogged determination to suffer any losses and hardships that victory may ultimately be secured. In the second place, as before mentioned, we have been brought into closer relations with the United States, as well as with the Colonies, and the way has been paved for a real Imperial Federation which will make the British

Empire an organized political entity, while an Anglo-American Alliance, perhaps leading in the future to a Pan-Anglo-Saxon Federation, has come within the range of practical politics. But, if the war has been advantageous to us in these respects, we fear that these advantages are more than counterbalanced by the commercial losses we have sustained. Though it is too early yet to form anything like an accurate estimate of the future results of these losses, we have sufficient data in the previous experience of nations to make us extremely apprehensive. In addition to the loss of many ships through their foreign crews carrying them into hostile or neutral ports, and to the capture or destruction of hundreds more by the enemy's commerce-destroyers, the loss in our carrying trade resulting from transfers to neutral flags is variously estimated at from 25 to 40 per cent. of the whole. By far the greater proportion of this has passed into the hands of Germany, and, judging from the experience of Holland after the Peace of Nimeguen in 1678 and from that of the United States after the War of Secession, we cannot hope to regain it, at any rate for a long time to come. There is, in fact, a very strong and ominous analogy between the present position of Great Britain and that of Holland two centuries ago, and although in some respects we are more favourably situated than the United Provinces were—for we have no land frontier to defend in Europe, our mineral and manufacturing resources are still a great source of wealth, and our Colonial Empire, which is infinitely greater than Holland's even then was, can supply us both with food and raw materials for manufacture, as well as with practically unlimited men for our naval and military forces—still, on the other hand, we are far more dependent than Holland ever was on Sea-Power for our food, and we are consequently far more liable to be starved into surrender, if we once really lose the command of the sea. That we did not lose it in the late war is due rather to the decrees of Providence than to our own foresight and preparations, and even the partial and temporary loss of it produced disastrous results both in our internal economy and in our foreign commerce, from the effects of which we shall not recover for many years, if ever.

As our present position resembles that of Holland two hundred years ago, so Germany to-day stands in some degree in the position in which England stood then. It has been evident for some years past that this Power has been preparing to dispute our commercial, colonial, and maritime supremacy, and there is a great danger that, now that we are just at the end of an exhausting war, in which many of our finest ships have been destroyed, and the number of our trained fighting seamen killed or permanently incapacitated for active service is put at about

one-third of the whole, while we have not had time to train others to take their places, she may take the opportunity of pressing claims which we could not but resist, with the result of another war, in which we should probably be hampered by hostilities between the English and Dutch and South Africa. Germany's attitude towards England during the war, though neutral, has been consistently inimical, and by retaining her neutrality she has reaped the benefit of a large proportion of our carrying trade, and a by no means insignificant share of our general commerce passing into the hands of her merchants. In going to war with us now she would run no risk of having other European enemies on "her back," for France and Russia, the only Powers which would be at all likely to attack her, are even more exhausted than we are, and quite unable, even supposing they were willing, to do so, while Japan would in all probability maintain her attitude of neutrality as in the late war. It is possible that the United States might come to our assistance, but we cannot at all depend upon her doing so. Our best hope lies in this, that in the course of history no Power has ever attained military and maritime supremacy at the same time, a fact which is specially illustrated by the careers of Louis XIV. and Napoleon. Assuming that it is beyond the capacity of any Power to achieve these two objects at once, we may conclude that Germany, being at the present moment undoubtedly the first military Power in Europe, would, if she now tried to gain possession of maritime supremacy also, be preparing her own downfall. Yet it does not follow from this that we should retain our position, and it behoves us to make every effort to restore our navy while we have time, at the same time doing everything possible to promote Imperial Federation. The mercantile marine, also, should be, as far as possible, re-established, and every inducement should be offered for the employment of British, and the exclusion of foreign seamen, and for the rest we must place our dependence on that Power Who has brought us safely through many dangers and difficulties, and,

> "Beneath Whose awful Hand we hold
> Dominion over palm and pine." *

J. N. Hampson.

("*Aut Nunc aut Nunquam.*")

* Kipling "Recessional."

FIRST IMPRESSIONS OF THE WAR.

THE war has arisen between two nations, neither of whom was, in the smallest degree, prepared for it, though each must have been feeling that it was coming for months, if not for years past. Experience, I suspect, will never teach us the real imminence of war at every turn. Up to the very last moment my impression was that *fin de siècle* methods would avert the catastrophe. But then, as soon as America had committed an overt act, or even when Spain had given the United States Ambassador his dismissal in order to forestall the presentation of the kind of ultimatum that President McKinley had cabled, all seemed to fall into a natural condition, and war news was expected and ready as a matter of course.

If the people most concerned were neither of them ready, those who might have been less concerned were more than ready. The astonishing volume of what was called news, but was most of it subjective, that was poured out upon us by the Press from the very moment a state of war was established, formed a spectacle which, perhaps, was never exhibited in the world before, and I began to wonder whether the undertakers of such work would not wholly o'erleap their sells. The real news was buried under such bushels of what was either false news or no news, that sometimes the mind, after working through three or four columns, was left dazed and incapacitated from rightly comprehending anything at all.

The official cause of the war was the oppression by Spain of her Cuban subjects. The official object was humanitarian, and it would be logically attained as soon as Spanish authority was destroyed in the island. The object was akin to that set forth by Russia in 1854; to that which gave much of the backbone to the Federal States in the American Civil War; and to some extent to the object of Japan in her war with China. The war was a police measure, and was so considered all over the United States and by most people in the British Empire; the result being, for the time, a specially friendly feeling from the former towards the latter. But on the Continent of Europe, sympathy with

Spain was widespread, and the humanitarian views of the United States were not credited. In Great Britain there was a sub-dominant feeling with Spain in her poverty and inferiority when her older history was forgotten, and only the help we gave her to free herself was remembered. But the maintenance of such a feeling required that Spain should defend herself up to her means, and there was clearly disappointment that no single piece of active gallantry on the part of a Spanish officer had been, in the first three weeks of the war, recorded.

But it must, perhaps, be allowed that the immediate and final cause of the war has been the destruction of the *Maine* in Havana harbour, and the almost universal belief in the United States that the loss of their ship and of so many lives was the deliberate work of Spanish officials. My impression is that a wilder hallucination could not have seized upon the minds of a democracy. It is not conceivable to me that Spanish officials could have deliberately exploded a mine under the bottom of the *Maine*. Such an act by such agents would have been less than objectless. It was an act which such agents would have considered one of cruel madness. In a very far-fetched and roundabout way, it might be possible to argue that a gang of Cuban insurgents constructed and placed in position the mine which is supposed to have exploded "two or more" of the magazines of the *Maine*. From the Machiavelian point of view, it might have been the interest of the insurgents to destroy a great ship and, perhaps, hundreds of their best friends, on the chance that those who remained would saddle the crime upon their enemies. There is, of course, a third hypothesis to which certain evidence before the official United States Commission might have given countenance had it been worth anything. That is, that the work of destruction was the act of isolated individual ruffians of the type of our Irish Fenians, but without their organization or political aims.

I have special reasons for doubting the existence of any mine or outside agency in destroying the *Maine*. I happen to have been a member of a committee appointed to review the evidence and finding of the court-martial that sat to enquire into the loss of our own *Doterel*, which was destroyed when at anchor in the Straits of Magellan by the sudden explosion of her magazine in the year 1881. Reading the evidence before the United States Commission is like re-reading that which was before our own court in all that related to the character of the explosion, and there was not wanting in our own case even the suspicion of foul play in the shape of a submarine mine. There was the same gradual development of the idea of a primary explosion of something outside the magazine, and then of

the final explosion, which was the effect of the first. In the earlier evidence in the *Doterel* case it was not clear that there had been a distinct double explosion; but the conception grew in the mind of the court, and the judgment was that there had been an explosion of coal-gas first, which had communicated flame to and had ignited the powder in the magazine. We were asked to review the evidence, and to take fresh evidence, on the hypothesis that the cause of the primary shock was the explosive vapour given off by a particular kind of varnish called xerotine siccative. I rose from the enquiry absolutely convinced that there was no primary explosion to be accounted for; that the *Doterel's* magazine had exploded in the way in which all magazines exploded, namely, in a series of shocks with parts of a second of interval between them, and that it could never be known what fired the first charge.

To me, the evidence before the United States Commission tells the like story, only it is plainer. The evidence is direct and clear that to the nearest observers outside the ship the first shock was not that of a submarine explosion—which no one can mistake—but of something above water, like a gunshot. The diver's evidence renders it plain that the blackness of the water in Havana harbour and the softness and lightness of the mud bottom made it impossible to see anything of what was far under water. In its judgment, the United States Commission draws special attention to the state of the wreck above or near the surface of the water, and its verdict appears to base itself on belief that this could not have been produced by the mere explosion of the magazines. To my mind there are fatal objections to the inference. We know of ships that have been destroyed by torpedoes, and we know, experimentally, the effect of torpedo and mine explosions on ships' hulls. What we know does not correspond to the damage done to the *Maine*. Whatever the nature of the first shock of the explosion might have been, it is certain it was not so severe as those that followed. Yet the inference we must draw, if we allow that the *Maine* was struck by a torpedo or submarine mine, is that the lesser shock created the greater damage, the conditions of which were not disturbed by the effects of the subsequent greater shocks.

But the rise of the idea in the minds of the United States Commission that there was a primary and distinct explosion to be accounted for was far more natural than the rise of the same idea in the mind of our own court-martial. When the *Maine* made fast to her buoy in Havana harbour her officers were full of suspicions of Spanish treachery. Special precautions to guard against it were taken, and United States officers would scarcely have been human had they not been convinced that their suspicions were justified.

And yet my first impression is clear. There was no Spanish or other treachery; but a dire coincidence had led up to what will probably end in the destruction of Spanish power outside her own borders, with other changes not measurable.

But when, from whatever cause, this growing great country and dwindling small one drew the sword against one another, my impressions passed away from the causes of the war, and even from the objects of the war—except in so far as they were bound to affect and control its strategy—to its nature and conduct. From the fact that the prize was an island, and that the combatants were separated by an ocean, it was obvious that the first phases, at any rate, must exemplify naval war in its most modern dress. It has been all along a singular illustration of naval modes of thinking, that while to some degree, and of late certainly to a much greater degree, there has been a disposition to admit the value of close study of the naval wars closing in 1815, there has been an indisposition to allow that the study of steam wars since 1854 has like value. We have all admitted that steam, steel ships, armour-plating, rifled guns, breech-loading, quick-firing, and torpedoes have immensely changed the character of naval war. We look to some future naval war to tell us how far these changes will go, but we wish to take up the study of such a war, when it comes, from the point of view of the student of Nelson's time and of Trafalgar, rather than from that which must be the standpoint of Admiral Ito.

So it is impossible that we should not regard the outbreak of the war between the United States and Spain with the highest scientific interest as being that "future" naval war for which we have been waiting, and which is to settle for us all sorts of strategical and tactical questions that the years since Trafalgar have thrown little or no light upon.

On both sides fighting material embraced most of the latest improvements, and on the Spanish side the utmost development of inventive skill had found its illustration in a certain number of the newest pattern torpedo-boat destroyers. At the outset, also, Spain seemed greatly to exceed the United States in the possession of a number of gunboats and small vessels. But in ships of 1,000 tons displacement and over, America started in the war with about half as many again as the Spaniards. The total forces given on the best authority as available on each side came to thirty-one ships of and above 1,000 tons, an uncertain number of small vessels, and nine torpedo vessels and boats on the side of the United States; while Spain had twenty-one ships of and above 1,000 tons, seventy-three gunboats and small vessels, and twenty-six torpedo vessels and boats. But both sides before the war

actually opened were seeking to buy warships, and were buying and converting merchant ships and yachts into a light class of warships. Doubtless, the United States with her greater command of money, her greater power and energy, soon drew beyond Spain in this race for naval force. An American writer has stated that before the end of March America had added to her navy two steel-protected cruisers, four torpedo-boats, and forty-two steel gunboats of good speed, each protected by a water-line belt. In provision of officers and men the two nations were more on an equality, the seamen and marines on the Spanish side outnumbering those on the American side. But here, again, the American vitality exhibited itself, and it was claimed that she had, before the end of March, added 11,000 men to her navy.

Regarding the general status and characteristics of the war, considered as a naval one, much was at first heard of the right of search, of contraband of war, and of the Declaration of Paris. My first impressions were, that as the war went on we should hear less of these things. Neither side would willingly raise trouble with the great neutral Powers, and neither side had naval force enough to spare from the main objects of the war in order to attend to these subsidiary matters; and I thought that neutrals were only likely to come into contact with either of the belligerents in the matter of blockade-running.

The United States appeared to raise herself in moral status when she proclaimed herself ready to adhere to the spirit of the Declaration of Paris; and Spain seemed to be thrown back in a like degree when she held herself free on the question of privateering. I did not think that either of these announcements were of much practical importance. It seemed to be forgotten that a privateer was only a warship with limited powers; and that there was not commerce enough under either flag to raise a demand on the part of speculators for Letters of Marque, especially when the distance apart of the two countries was considered, and the extreme difficulties of coal-supply on an enemy's coast became obvious.

It was to be expected that the naval war would show itself in its usual preliminary forms. Captures of merchant ships would at first be made, and the strongest navy would make most of them.

So when at the end of the first week eleven captures of Spanish ships and one capture of an American ship were reported at Lloyds, when in the second week there were four captures of Spanish ships and none of American ships, and when in the third week only one Spanish ship and no American ships were captured, the general war seemed to flow on the recognized and orthodox lines.

The moment we regard these two small navies and compare

them with the length of coast and the number of ports exposed to attack, or requiring defence, offered by each belligerent, we can see that there could be at the opening of the war no such "struggle for the command of the sea" as we have found to be preliminary in our earlier wars with Holland and France; and no such admission of a commanded sea as our enemies have almost always offered to us, except, perhaps, in the war of American Independence. Later, perhaps, it might be that the stronger naval force would be able to localize the weaker, and to close it up in its own ports in such a way as to prevent its offering battle except at a disadvantage; but at first there must be independent ships and independent squadrons on both sides, each naval force operating more or less independently of the other.

The geographical conditions of the war and its object were both anomalous. The ostensible object of the United States would be achieved by the invasion of Cuba and the defeat and surrender of its Spanish garrison. Speaking broadly, the consummation was brought very much nearer by the fact that a mass of the population of Cuba had long been in a state of insurrection against Spain, and had maintained themselves, to the infinite distress of the whole island, in possession of the eastern and other parts of it. There was, therefore, no necessity for a systematic, planned, and sudden invasion of Cuba. Troops, arms, ammunition, and stores could be landed on friendly shores in small or large detachments, and at irregular intervals, until the insurgents, with their United States allies, were able to meet the Spanish garrison and finish the war by the result of one pitched battle on land.

The whole coast of Cuba, covering roughly 1,400 miles, is a series of ports and anchorages, and the nearness of the United States coast, with its admirable "naval base" at Key West, was capable of giving to its superior navy facilities for the assemblage and descent of military forces upon Cuba not to be surpassed. It was open to the United States to occupy a Cuban port or anchorage in insurgent hands, and defend it and the port of embarkation with her fleet assembled in sufficient force to defy all the assaults of Spain, and to pour into this port, in a continued stream, the forces judged sufficient, with the help of the insurgents, to compel the surrender of the Spanish Army.

Against the adoption of a plan of this sort in form, lay, in the first place, the stubborn fact that the troops required did not exist. But this was not, after all, such an important matter as it appeared, for from the beginning of May till the end of October the climate of Cuba is deadly to newcomers; so that to begin landing early, for early operations, might be but opening the waste of many armies on an impossible task.

But, beyond this, it was difficult to ignore the Spanish Navy, or to forget all that was open to its counter-attack should it be left free to operate by the concentration of the United States naval forces in Cuban waters. The bulk of it was in European ports at the outbreak of war. Apparently, the whole of what it was superior in, its six destroyers and its seven torpedo-boats, were all on the other side of the Atlantic, and there was nothing in the West Indies but two heavy and six light cruisers, with perhaps a considerable number of small gunboats. On the other hand, almost all the greater forces of the United States were in position to attack and defend. The advanced squadron was being assembled at Key West, only 100 miles from Havana, and the reserve squadron at Hampton Roads, the headquarters of the United States Navy. Two things were at once obvious: the United States was only ready to carry out very imperfectly the recognized first operation of naval war. She announced the blockade of the eastern ports of Cuba from Cardenas on the north to Cienfuegos on the south coast, and the squadron at Key West was scattered on this duty, Admiral Sampson, with his flag in the cruiser *New York*, and other ships, taking up the blockade of the principal port, Havana. When this arrangement was made, we had indeed, locally in the West Indies, the whole position which close students of older wars had asserted must certainly arise at the opening of any great naval war in which we engaged. The one side threw itself wholly into the defensive, and the other side wholly into the offensive attitude. The United States claimed, and Spain admitted her to hold, the command of the sea locally. No Spanish men-of-war were found to issue from Cuban or Puerto Rico ports, and the United States pushed its operations beyond blockade; she attacked shipping in port, and made, or attempted to make, isolated attacks upon territory with simply destructive objects.

Besides the great Island of Cuba in the West Indies, the Spaniards possessed the smaller and less important Island of Puerto Rico. Though its coast was not wanting in anchorages, it possessed no first-class port; the chief one, St. Juan, on the north shore, being incapable of sheltering many large vessels, and being in fact, only a small-craft harbour. In this island there was no insurrection, but probably the garrison was not very large, or the defences of suitable landing-places very strong. It seemed possible that the United States, while not neglecting to assist the Cuban insurgents with men, munitions, and provisions, might make her first descent in form and in force upon the Island of Puerto Rico. What, according to the experience of naval war, was held to delay this expedition—if the want of military force did not—was the doctrine, so curiously misapplied and misunderstood, of "the fleet

in being." The danger involved in sending a flotilla to land an army on the coast of Puerto Rico was, that it might be caught in mid-air, or, as the Italian flotilla was caught at Lissa when actually engaged in the landing of the troops, by a Spanish fleet that was able and free to make such an attack.

As time went on we got news of the assemblage of such a squadron, first at its own islands in the Eastern Atlantic, and latterly at St. Vincent in the Cape de Verde, a neutral port belonging to Portugal. St. Vincent is the nearest point in the Eastern Atlantic to the West Indian Islands, being, in fact, but 2,100 miles from Antigua, and at the orthodox ten knots speed a squadron starting from St. Vincent would reach Havana or Key West in about fifteen days. This squadron was composed of some very fine cruisers of the newest type, a few of the newest type of destroyers, some torpedo-boats, a transport, and a collier. A squadron of mixed force, from battleships down to destroyers, was understood to be assembling at Cadiz; and the ports of Ferrol and Carthagena, though little direct news came from them, were understood to be not inactive in fitting out and manning ships and vessels.

My first impression of the condition of things as events began to develop stood, therefore, as follows: The United States Navy in Cuban waters, when watching the principal ports in Spanish hands, was free to communicate with the insurgents in Eastern Cuba, to supply their wants of all kinds, and to assist them by landing leaders, advisers, and small bodies of seasoned men. It was not free to cover and control any large expedition such as the invasion of Puerto Rico might be, because there were not ships enough to do that, and at the same time to continue an effective blockade of the Cuban ports. In no case could it undertake this task unless it was fairly certain that, from the date of the sailing of the flotilla from a United States port until the conquest of the island was completed, not more than a fortnight should elapse. With the naval force in hand, the United States Navy could not afford to run the risk of being caught in an unprepared state even by the moderate squadron said to be at St. Vincent.

But the United States, while assembling at Hampton Roads as its headquarters, and at other northern ports, naval forces which might in the end overmatch the whole Spanish Navy without drawing on the squadrons in Cuban waters, could not safely send it south to strengthen them. It was impossible to say that, granting Spain to be an enterprising enemy, she might not prefer to make a counterstroke at some one or more of the northern United States ports. The world was all before the Spanish squadron at St. Vincent where to choose, and not a little alarm was felt and shown along the coasts of New England when the conditions were realized

But, as usual, the conditions were not fully or properly realized. Cities which are physically open to bombardment from the sea are generally clothed in a suit of moral armour that forms an efficient protection. Every belligerent is now intelligent enough to know that mere mischief and destruction is more likely to postpone than to hasten the approach of peace. Even the superior Power is aware that retaliation should not be too lightly provoked when it touches on the borders of illegitimate war. Account in any case was not taken of the historically strong dislike that belligerent ships have to enter hostile harbours, and to entangle themselves in narrow waters possessed by the enemy. It is quite one thing to engage fortifications at long range from the open and free sea, or even to throw shell into a crowded harbour from the same point of advantage; but quite another thing to pass through more or less tortuous channels into harbours where unknown dangers may be encountered. Therefore, my impression was that the United States, with their systems of closing their ports by submarine mines and so on, had acted on unfounded alarms, and were spending a good deal of money and energy very uselessly. They have been following our foolish example in this respect.

At first I thought little or nothing of Manila and the Phillipine Islands. Even when attention was drawn to the presence of an United States squadron at Hong Kong, and its superiority to the Spanish squadron in the Phillipines, my first impression was that the Spanish squadron would concentrate at Manila, finding itself, with the aid of fairly powerful batteries, able to defy the attacks of the Americans, though it would leave them in full command of the sea locally, and able to blockade Manila. But I had not accurately measured the relative forces of the ships to be engaged, and I had credited the batteries with much more power than they proved to possess. The relative forces were—not counting small craft—on the American side, five ships averaging 2,923 tons and 265 men, carrying on an average fifteen guns of the average calibre of 4·24 inches; on the Spanish side, five ships averaging 1,568 tons and 190 men, carrying on an average 9·6 guns of the average calibre of 3·47 inches. Under the assumed conditions, I was taken by surprise when the news came that Commodore Dewey had annihilated the Spanish squadron. No doubt this officer had measured relative forces much better than I was in a position to do, and was aware of his entire superiority before he made his attack. But I scarcely think this ought to lessen our sense of the skill and gallantry with which the attack was planned and carried out.

After it is all over I recognize the difficulty of defending ships in Manila Bay by anything but their own inherent power. The

bay is of immense size, and, though the entrance to it is narrowed by Corregidor Island, the southern passage is five miles wide, very deep, and subject to currents. Hence Commodore Dewey had not much to fear from submarine mines, and by passing at night he escaped such danger as might have arisen from well-served batteries on each side of the channel. But in any case it was a small matter to run between batteries five miles apart. The real guard at night for such a passage is the locomotive torpedo. Half a dozen boats or small vessels lying, with torpedoes mounted and ready to discharge, in the channel, through the night, might conceivably have given an account of one or two of Commodore Dewey's ships.

But when the Spanish squadron was annihilated, Commodore Dewey—much to public surprise, but hardly to the surprise of such as had been accustomed to study naval war—found that his work was over. The threat of bombardment kept him free from annoyances, and enabled him to hold Cavite with such small garrison as he could afford to land; but he kept his ground really on the condition that he should not bombard.

I was very much surprised that the batteries did so very little. The range at which the American ships engaged was not very great (4,000 yards it is stated), and the failure of the batteries may have been due to their mounting only obsolete guns. In any case, however, a long, low, unindented shore mounted with batteries is bad cover for ships seeking their support and protection. The ships themselves mask and interfere with the fire which they depend on for their defence.

The interest in the Manila contest was very soon over when it was seen that Commodore (soon to be Admiral) Dewey was reduced to the especially naval function of blockade. We turned back to proceedings in the West Indies with renewed keenness of view, because on the 29th of April four of the finest cruisers in the world and three of the latest kind of torpedo-boat destroyers under the Spanish flag had sailed from St. Vincent, no one knew whither, though the inference was that they were bound for Cuban waters. On the next day the three Spanish torpedo-boats, a transport, and a collier left St. Vincent, possibly on the same errand. These two squadrons were buried at sea for a fortnight, and the second of them was not heard of even then. Much public dissatisfaction was expressed, and some public contempt was poured upon Spain because of this supposed delay. But if the ships were bound for the West Indies they could not possibly have appeared in Cuban waters till at least a fortnight had elapsed, and if they were to have any chance of striking a blow, it was of the utmost consequence that the striking of it should be the first announcement of their whereabouts.

Meantime, there were often exchanges of fire round Cuba between batteries on the land and the ships at sea, exchanges which have nothing to do with the course of the war, and are the mere fringe of it; but in each case we had sensational reports of "bombardments" and hints that all was over, because such and such a town and its defences "were in ruins." Then after a few days would come the report that the loss of life had been one mule!

There were also landings, with small objects on a small scale, such as we were well accustomed to in the Baltic during the Crimean War. Some of these were not successful, and the report told us it was all over with America. But as it became certain that the Spanish squadron was at sea, it was absolutely necessary for Admiral Sampson to concentrate his force, and we presently heard of him with all his heavier ships, some eight in number, off the north coast of Puerto Rico, having left his smaller vessels, with reinforcements, probably, of which we had heard nothing, in isolated groups blockading the Cuban ports.

My impression was that we had before us one of the most interesting strategical problems that had ever been propounded in naval war, such as could not have been set in sailing days. I was puzzled at Admiral Sampson's advance to Puerto Rico, and quite unable to see why at such a critical time—the fourteenth day since the Spanish squadron had put to sea—he should have wasted his ammunition in an exchange of fire with the Spanish batteries at San Juan.

It seemed to me almost certain that the Spanish squadron would enter the West Indies between Martinique and St. Lucia—if possible in darkness—and would then steer south of Jamaica and round by the west extreme of Cuba to strike a sudden blow either on anything that might be at Key West or on the inferior squadron blockading Havana, or, perhaps, on each in succession. I calculated that if all the ships were complete with coal on leaving St. Vincent, the first squadron under Admiral Cervera might, if the destroyers were taken in tow, be off Key West or Havana on the 15th of May, might strike the blows above referred to, and then might pass into Havana harbour to complete and be ready to issue again as soon as opportunity offered, or to harass or even to drive off the American squadron attempting to blockade, by persistent torpedo attacks at night. If owing to the inherent difficulties of blockading such a port as Havana, the Spanish squadron should have a certain freedom of exit, it might, supported by the possibility of another squadron arriving from Cadiz, paralyze, for an almost indefinite time, further operations by the Americans in the way of invasion.

My first impressions did not altogether mislead me, for the

report came on the 13th of May that Cervera's squadron had touched at Port de France, Martinique. Later news left it very doubtful whether the ships had anchored there, or had, as was first stated, coaled there. But it became almost certain that one of the destroyers had put into St. Pierre in the north of Martinique, and that another—said to be disabled—was actually in Port de France. However it may have been, apparently authentic information reached us on the 16th that Cervera's squadron had been, on the 15th, in and off the port of Wilhelmstad, in the Dutch island of Curacoa.

I was surprised that this squadron should have so frankly disclosed its whereabouts in these two instances. Supposing that coaling necessities were the impelling cause, it ought, I considered, to have been foreseen, and a point, or points, to meet the colliers might have been arranged which were not so open to the public gaze as these two ports were. But at least it seemed to me that Cervera's strategy was following the lines that my first impressions had led me to suppose it would.

I write now on the morning of the 19th, and the field of strategy assumed is still open. Cervera is expected to have left Curacoa on the 15th, steering west, but nothing more has been heard of him. Meantime, there have been reports that colliers with 8,000 tons of coal are known to be *en route* to join him at some rendezvous, and it is also asserted that two more cruisers direct from Cadiz have been seen in the neighbourhood of the Leeward Islands.

Evidently, the blockading squadron off Cienfuegos, consisting apparently of four small vessels, was in considerable danger from the possible vicinity of Cervera's squadron. Presently we heard of Admiral Sampson, with the strong part of the American fleet, in the Windward Passage between Hayti and Cuba, and seemingly on the horns of the dilemma as to whether to proceed south in the hope of meeting Cervera off Cienfuegos, or north 500 miles to Havana for the protection of the squadron off it and of any ships there might be at Key West. In a sense it would appear that the existence of this "fleet in being" near at hand, probably, but in a situation and with objects unknown, had placed Admiral Sampson in a cleft stick. I am not able, as I close this article, to understand why Admiral Sampson ever left his post off Havana, and why he did not, at least before the 16th of May, withdraw his isolated blockading ships from every post in Cuba and concentrate his whole fleet off that port. Cervera could not then have hoped to attack with success, and he would have had nothing open to him but to have passed into a port, such as Cienfuegos, and awaited the development of events.

Commodore Schley's squadron was drawn south from Hampton Roads by the supposed appearance of Cervera's squadron in the West Indies, but it does not appear to have been considered safe to leave the northern ports wholly open, or, as Sir George Roke put it, "naked and exposed" to attack, and it paused at Charleston.

Practically, as I close these first impressions, no one with only our published information can say exactly where Cervera will strike, or if he will strike at all. Great and extraordinary dramatic issues are rare in war, and my impression is that, after all, the situation may develope into something very commonplace.

P. H. Colomb.

Postscript.—If the very latest news is true that Cervera put into Santiago de Cuba on the 19th, then the commonplace seems to have been the end of it.

MR. GLADSTONE—FRAGMENTS OF PERSONAL REMINISCENCES.

GLADSTONE has died. That is, in domestic affairs, the event of the past month, and a whole nation is paying its tribute to the grand personality of their departed statesman. But what is, perhaps, most remarkable in the forms of praise and sorrow which his departure has evoked, is the deep personal affection with which he has manifestly been regarded by all sorts and conditions of men. Nor can there be any wonder in this to one who, like myself, was privileged to know him from my childhold up—to see him in his own house and family, and to serve under him in Parliament. The keynotes to this personal affection was the nobility of his character, the simplicity of his nature, the sympathy of his disposition, and the feeling which everyone who approached him carried away, that for the moment every issue had been raised to a higher level—every subject or controversy infused with something far above the ordinary tone of the common world. One left his presence a better and a more hopeful man.

But all this will be said by thousands. I would merely offer one or two personal reminiscences, and what the French call "appreciations," which may, perhaps, throw side-lights on some parts of his varied character.

While I was Private Secretary to Lord Palmerston, and Mr. Gladstone was his Chancellor of the Exchequer, it was a constant source of sorrow to me, and a perpetual cause of mystery, to note how they misunderstood one another, and how evidently each mistrusted the other—though perfectly cordial and most friendly in their mutual intercourse—all this is very generally known; otherwise I should not refer to it. Of course one of Mr. Gladstone's weaknesses was want of knowledge of character. He was no judge of men as individuals, whatever his profound intuition of the instincts and aspirations which sway large bodies of men. He never, therefore, understood Lord Palmerston. The light and airy mode of treating questions—inheritance and tradition of the school of which Lord Melbourne, Lord Palmerston, and Lord Derby were the last representatives, was an enigma to him. He never

succeeded in fully realizing how much seriousness, how much strenuous work, and how deep a sense of responsibility underlay this mask of apparent indifference which the old aristocratic class of statesmen considered fitting for men of the world to wear. He was also unable to grasp the doctrine which Lord Palmerston used often to expound to me, that a man may be either a minister or an agitator—but that he cannot or at any rate ought not to be both at the same time. Mr. Gladstone, in his earnestness and enthusiasm, occasionally almost overstepped the boundary, and then thought that there was opposition to the cause he had at heart, whereas there was only the feeling that, till the country had fully made up its mind, those who were administering its affairs should not personally contribute to any artificial or premature expression of public opinion. Lord Palmerston on the other hand—though knowledge of character was his "forte" and, as was said of the first Lord Shaftesbury, he only required to hear any man talk for ten minutes on any topic, however ordinary, to gauge him and judge him pretty accurately—did not understand Mr. Gladstone. The clue to the chief misunderstanding was revealed to me by Mr. Gladstone himself, as I will state later on, but whenever Lord Palmerston, as Prime Minister, made any proposal which involved large expenditure, he was strenuously opposed by Mr. Gladstone—even to hints of resignation. If the proposal was adhered to, Mr. Gladstone incontinently gave way. This seemed to Lord Palmerston a case of gratuitous difficulties put into his way, and attempts to thwart without the courage to resist. "If you are in earnest, Colonel, I will come down," says the American legend. That was the impression left. Soon after Mr. Gladstone became Prime Minister he said to me one day, "You do not know what a comfort it is to me to have got out of an office where the duty of its holder is to oppose everything that involves outlay of money. It is an irksome and ungrateful task and duty." Here we see that he considered he held a brief for the defence in any attack upon the Treasury, and that, in the interest of his client, he was bound to do his utmost until the delivery of the verdict, when he became discharged from his duty. This view was so utterly strange to any of Lord Palmerston's possible conceptions, that it is no wonder if he failed to grasp it. But it was a view which the training of College and University life might easily have engendered in a conscientious and earnest mind.

I have alluded to the simplicity of his nature. This, when coupled to his prodigious attainments and wide knowledge, was most attractive. I will give an illustration which I may, perhaps, be pardoned for introducing, because the incident is one which I

own was to me at the time, a source of great, and I think, legitimate pride. When he first assumed the Premiership he wrote begging me to call on him at his house in Carlton Gardens, as he wanted to consult me as to whom he should appoint as his Private Secretary. (I was, of course, aware that it was only to my ecent experience as Private Secretary to a Prime Minister that he was appealing.) When I arrived he placed before me the list of gentlemen whom he was considering for the post. There were excellent names no doubt, but Mr. Gladstone was inclined only to such as were borne by men noted for academical honours, or for devotion to literature and science—regardless of other qualities which, though inferior in themselves, are often of much more value in such a position, so far as the interests and comfort of the Chief are concerned. I gave him my opinion as to the name on the list which would best serve his purpose. He expressed his great astonishment, but he adopted my advice, and I venture to say that no selection could possibly have turned out more honourably and advantageously to both parties.

He was very sympathetic. It was one of his greatest charms. Nobody, however timid or however undeveloped, need have been fearful of meeting Mr. Gladstone. He would be certain to greet any such with the greatest kindness and consideration. I was going to add "attention," but perhaps there might not have been quite so much of that, in the strict meaning of the word. Though Mr. Gladstone not only often intended to listen but also thought that he was listening, the copiousness of his thoughts and of their expression not unfrequently reduced his companion to a willing and interested passivity. I remember one instance which exemplified how the note of sympathy was not rarely the first struck in his chord of thoughts and considerations. While I represented the Colonial Office in the House of Commons, the complications in Zululand, and the question of its future, gave us great anxiety and presented many difficulties. The knot was suddenly cut, and half the question solved, by the death of Cetewayo. I was sitting on the Treasury Bench when the message announcing this was handed to me. I instantly ran into Mr. Gladstone's room waving the telegram and giving him the news. "Poor old man, I am very sorry for him," were the first words that fell from Mr. Gladstone, who had met Cetewayo and interviewed him the previous year in London. I own that for the first and last time in my life I allowed a cry of impatience to escape from me in Mr. Gladstone's presence, and replying, "Well, Mr. Gladstone, you are the only man in England who is sorry," I left the room. But I was wrong in my haste. It was but the personal sympathy which would have its play before

the other public and national considerations had time to come into the field of vision.

"He was not only a great man, but he was a great gentleman." These words of Sir William Harcourt's spoken last week in the House of Commons will be echoed by everybody who knew Mr. Gladstone at all intimately. There is less "great gentlemanhood" in the world than might be expected, and certainly neither birth nor rank ensures it. We prize it all the more. It is an indefinable quality, but one of the most admirable. Though we cannot define it, we recognize it at once when we meet it. The self-respect, the consideration for others, and specially for the weak, the estimation of men and things at their intrinsic and not at their fictitious value; the hatred of flattery and subserviency, the belief in the good motives of others until the contrary is shown, the absence of self-assertion and of all ostentation. These are present and more—these were all present in his case.

In 1890, at the outset of his political Home Rule campaign in the West, he came under my roof at Broadlands, as a meeting was announced to be held in the market place at Romsey which he was to address. I was, of course, more delighted than words can express to receive him and Mrs. Gladstone, and to renew our friendly and even affectionate relations. But I refrained, from obvious reasons, from accompanying him to the meeting. Sir W. Harcourt took charge of him, and escorted him. I need not, however, have abstained. With the kindliness and good taste of a gentleman he avoided—greatly, I fear, to the disappointment of the people of Romsey—all political allusions and topics, and gave them instead a vivid and interesting account of his personal relations with Lord Palmerston and other public men of that generation.

I conclude these hurried and disjointed lines with a recollection that remains imprinted on my memory, not only as illustrative, but also as tending to clear him of the charge so often levied against him, that he only undertook his successive attacks on the existing state of things in Ireland when urged by the spur of Party motives. One afternoon of November, 1868, in the Park at Hawarden, I was standing by Mr. Gladstone holding his coat on my arm while he, in his shirt sleeves, was wielding an axe to cut down a tree. Up came a telegraph messenger. He took the telegram, opened it and read it, then handed it to me, speaking only two words, namely, "Very significant," and at once resumed his work. The message merely stated that General Grey would arrive that evening from Windsor. This, of course, implied that a mandate was coming from the Queen charging Mr. Gladstone with the formation of his first Government. I said nothing, but waited while the well-directed blows resounded in regular cadence. After

a few minutes the blows ceased and Mr. Gladstone, resting on the handle of his axe, looked up, and with deep earnestness in his voice, and great intensity in his face, exclaimed: "My mission is to pacify Ireland." He then resumed his task, and never said another word till the tree was down.

Did he succeed in the mission which he thus deliberately set himself? Did he adopt the best methods for success? Were there any possible means likely to attain success? All these questions will be answered in various ways by various men according to their beliefs or prepossessions. All I can myself say is that, to a large extent, he did succeed. Ireland is more prosperous, more peaceful, and more contented than she was before 1868; and, as far as the mere pacification of Ireland was concerned, Mr. Gladstone might perhaps have still further succeeded had he been allowed to have his own way. But there were other and even weightier considerations than the condition of Ireland to be taken into account. When, by declining in 1886 to follow Mr. Gladstone any longer, I not only did violence to my personal feelings, but faced the probability (which turned out alas! a certainty) of an end being thereby put to my political career, I did so mainly on Imperial grounds. The whole is greater than a part, and the welfare of an Empire more important than that of only a portion of it. That Ireland itself might probably be better governed by Irishmen in a Home Parliament, apart from busy men strange to and careless of her peculiar circumstances and idiosyncrasies, was, and is, an arguable question. At any rate, I, in my humble capacity of a resident Irish landowner, felt but little dread of such a prospect. Mr. Gladstone only saw the one side; or, rather, derided the other.

EVELYN ASHLEY.

THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DREYFUS CASE.

THE salient facts of the Dreyfus case are fairly well known to readers of English newspapers; yet the following sketch will, I think, interest the English friends of France who still hope that the War Office and Government of that country will even yet at the eleventh hour retreat from a position which, if adhered to, will assuredly render them of ill report in the eyes of posterity.

Commandant Esterhazy, the hero of our narrative, is a well-known figure in Paris, tall, erect, with long, dark moustachios, which, when he is listening to a recital of his own achievements, he is wont to pull with a nonchalant air. Of Austrian extraction, he was brought up in Germany, and began his military career as a Papal Zouave. That he is an alien explains, though it hardly justifies, the inextinguishable hatred and contempt which he entertains for the French Army, of which he wears the uniform, and with the honour of which he is at present by a most singular irony identified. He is a man of pleasure, to use a mild term; and one of his former mistresses, Madame Boulancy, whom he long ago abandoned, retains not a few of his letters, written in his very characteristic handwriting and signed with his signature. In these he very freely expresses himself about the French Army, and with some of the most telling extracts from them I may fitly begin my narrative. These letters were lately published in the *Figaro* newspaper at Paris, where they can be purchased in a separate pamphlet entitled *Esterhazy Judged by Himself* for the sum of one penny. In one of these letters, then, he remarks as follows of his brother officers :—

"The Germans will put all these fine fellows in their true places before very long."

In another he wrote this :—

"Look at this precious French Army. It is disgraceful. If my position were not at stake I would be off to-morrow. I have written to Constantinople. If they there offer me a suitable commission I will go there. However, I do not mean to quit this before I have played such a trick on these blackguards as I know how to play."

These last words are prophetic.

In another letter Esterhazy wrote as follows :—

"Our great military leaders, poltroons and ignoramuses, will once more go and people the German prisons."

In another letter we have this :—

"I am absolutely convinced that these people are not worth the very cartridges that would kill them ; and all their petty acts of meanness, worthy only of low women, entirely confirm me in my opinion. There is for me but a single human quality which I prize, and the people of this country are quite lacking in it. If this very evening someone came and told me that I should be slain to-morrow as a Captain of Uhlans cutting Frenchmen down, I should assuredly be perfectly happy. . . . I regret that I ever set foot in this cursed country (France). . . . I would not hurt a dog, but I would with pleasure have a hundred thousand Frenchmen put to death. . . . Paris taken by assault and handed over to be pillaged by a hundred thousand drunken soldiers—there you have the feast of which I dream. Pray that it be so!"

It is no matter for surprise that Esterhazy, nursing such dreams as this, should have embarked some eight years ago upon a systematic course of treason towards the army and State whose uniform he wears. The military *attaché* of the German Embassy at Paris was at that time a Colonel Schwartzkoppen, a man of noble family and great abilities, who since his withdrawal from Paris in the course of last autumn leads a regiment of the Royal Guard at Berlin. To him Esterhazy went and engaged himself to regularly sell any French military secrets which he could obtain. In all Schwartzkoppen procured from him a total of 162 secret military documents, of which some thirty are of first-rate importance. It is proof of the loose way in which the French staff guards its secrets, that Esterhazy, a subordinate infantry officer, found so little difficulty in obtaining so many to sell. Most of the documents he sold are in his own handwriting, and the originals of them are now in the military archives at Berlin. Photographic replicas of the entire series are in the possession of another Government, whose agents in such matters go shares with the Germans.

It must not, however, be supposed that Schwartzkoppen, who is a gentleman, was in any way a personal friend of Esterhazy's. It is the duty of a German military *attaché* to accept and pay for French military secrets if a traitor offers them to him; and Schwartzkoppen could not decline what was offered to him. So he paid Esterhazy a fixed salary of so many francs per month, with an occasional bonus for any secret of special importance. Esterhazy, who is a man of loose morals and luxurious habits, and also much addicted to gambling, was in constant want of money, and would sometimes persuade his paymaster to give him something in advance. The latter is now gone back to Berlin; but his former client is nevertheless not in any want, for the French War Office,

which is now protecting him for reasons which we shall presently explain, makes him a regular and sufficient allowance, at the same time that it shadows him with detectives wherever he goes. With such a man, as we may imagine, Schwartzkoppen never shook hands, but always treated him as what he was, namely, as a hireling. "Il ne lui serrait jamais la main," has said one who knows.

The French War Office enjoys some 600,000 francs a year, to be spent in bribing, as may be, the editors of French newspapers or the underlings in foreign Embassies. Grooms and porters, footmen and concierges, are all alike the object of their solicitude. Perhaps, however, it was simple patriotism and not greed of money which in September, 1894, led the Alsatian porter at Colonel Schwartzkoppen's lodgings in Paris to bring to the French War Office, instead of handing it to his master, a *bordereau*, or memorandum, in which Esterhazy had written out in his own hand, but without adding his signature, a list of five secret pieces which he was sending to Schwartzkoppen.

This *bordereau* is of so much importance that we translate it in full. The exact way in which it came to be known to the whole world in its original handwriting I shall presently relate. It of course never reached the hands of Colonel Schwartzkoppen as did the pieces enumerated therein:—

"Sir, though I have no news indicating that you desire to see me, nevertheless I am sending to you some interesting bits of information.

"1. A note on the hydraulic break of the 120, and on the way in which this piece behaved.

"2. A note on the covering troops (some modifications will be entailed by the new plan).

"3. A note on a modification in Artillery formations.

"4. A note relative to Madagascar.

"5. The project of a firing manual for Field Artillery, 14th March, 1894.

"The last document is extremely difficult to procure, and I can only have it at my disposal during a very few days. The Minister of War has sent a limited number of copies to the several corps, and these corps are responsible for its return, each officer in possession of one to return it after the manœuvres. If then you would like to take out of it whatever interests you and hold it afterwards at my disposal, I will take it. Unless indeed you would like me to have it copied *in extenso* and then address to you the copy.

"I am just off to the manœuvres."

The Jews are a gifted race, and when they are allowed to compete with Gentiles they often outstrip them not only in making and in keeping bargains, but also in higher intellectual pursuits. This is why the Russian Government recently decided to restrict the number of Jewish students in its Universities. For, by winning a number of prizes out of all proportion to the ratio in which they stand to the rest of the population, the Jews had annoyed an

administration which in such matters is guided by that ring of reactionaries and obscurantists which is known as the Holy Synod and presided over by the Arch-Inquisitor Pobiedonostzeff.

But if Russia has its Holy Synod, France has its Jesuits; and it is no secret that the latter have for a long time viewed with jealousy the successes achieved by young Jewish officers in the École Polytechnique, which in France answers to our Woolwich. Out of a total, say of 200 officers, admitted to their careers by open competition, it was common for as many as twenty to be Jews; although the Jews in France are far from constituting one-tenth of the population. Now these Jewish officers owe nothing to the Jesuits. They are not trained by them, nor do they ever come under their influence. And in this connection, it must be remembered that, after the priesthood, the army is the chief profession in France for which the Jesuits can freely prepare candidates, especially such candidates as are drawn from the ranks of the *noblesse*. Nor is this all. The French Catholic officer is a regular gold mine to the priests, to whom, like the pious centurion that he often is, he pays large sums at his birth, at his marriage, at his death, and even after his death when it becomes imperative to get him out of purgatory as soon as possible. It is only if we take these facts into consideration that we can understand how it is that General Billot, the Minister of War in a Republic which professes the principles of the French Revolution and does lip-service to the memory of Gambetta and Victor Hugo, recently stood up in the French Chamber and congratulated himself before all men on having been born a good Catholic and on being neither a Jew nor a Protestant nor a Freemason.

The French Republic was safer from these insidious influences as long as the Royalist Party kept aloof from it in their old attitude of hatred and proud disdain. They could no longer preserve this attitude when, a few years ago the present Pope, with no little foresight, gave a new *mot d'ordre* to the clergy and nobility to recognize the Republic as the form of government which the least divides Frenchmen. The result has been the rise of the party of so-called *Ralliés*, that is, of Royalists and Catholics who, with certain reserves, recognize the Republic as a legitimate form of government. This party is not yet very numerous in the Chamber, but it is growing; and the same influence which gave it birth makes itself felt outside its at present narrow limits. For a perceptible thaw has set in to melt the icy indifference towards Republican functionaries of the old aristocracy; and the wife of the present bourgeois Premier, Madame Méline, in consideration of her being an abjectly devout Catholic, and of her using all her influence over her husband in the same interest, is graciously permitted to

join in works of charity with the *grandes dames* of the Faubourg St. Germain.

And there are other signs in France just now of a Catholic reaction. It is *bon ton* to be a good Catholic, or, at least, to affect to be one; and many a young man goes to Mass and Confession because he has a vague feeling that it will smooth the path of his ambition to be in with the Catholics. M. Brunetière is the spokesman of this Catholic reaction in the world of culture. In him a nebulous piety consorts harmoniously with respect for old families and for ancient religious traditions. In a recent number of the *Révue des Deux Mondes* he has written an article entitled "Après le Procés," which is a thinly veiled apology for the conduct of the present French War Office. In it he arrives at the conclusion, so suitable to his inspiring motive, that of all aristocracies an aristocracy of intelligence is least acceptable, because most dangerous, under a Republican form of government. In other words, riches and superstition are to rule France. Can we be surprised that M. Méline, the Premier, recently denounced the intellectual classes from the tribune of the French Chamber, because among them are chiefly found men courageous enough to raise their voices in protest against the stupendous crime, to the history of which I must now return?

A discerning Russian writer has remarked that every country has the Jews which it deserves to have. Now, during the first three-quarters of this century the Jews have been well treated in France, and they have been, and are still, correspondingly loyal, supplying their adopted country with many of its best soldiers and most devoted statesmen. It is, perhaps, the sinister example of the new French ally, of the persecuting Russian Government, which has made it possible for M. Drumont, the most mercenary and false, the most violent and pitiless of the literary gladiators that disgrace modern France, both to initiate and succeed in his anti-Semitic crusade. The Jesuits who control and finance his paper* had, no doubt, long been preparing the soil; but only among so electric a people as the French could the seed of hatred so deftly sown spring up in so rapid a growth so as to become in a short decade a veritable upas tree.

Now it happened in September, 1894, when Esterhazy's memorandum was taken to the French *État Majeur*, that there was attached to the military staff a Jewish officer, Alfred Dreyfus, the son of a very rich manufacturer at Mulhausen, in Alsace. This officer, along with his three brothers, elected, after the war of 1870, to remain French subjects, though this entailed their leaving their

* The *chef-gérant* of the Jesuits in France is chairman of the committee of M. Drumont's paper, the *Libre Parole*.

parents and their home.* By sheer ability, for he owed nothing to his great wealth, nor ever trusted to it to secure promotion in the French Army, Dreyfus forced his way into the *État Majeur*, being, I believe, the first Jewish officer that ever did so. He was a very hard worker, and in the often rather frivolous entourage of the army his reserve and serious manner and taciturnity made him unpopular, though much respected. He is a man of strong family affections; and, when the blow fell four years ago, he was already the father of two little children, to whose mother, now the object of world-wide sympathy, he has ever been fondly attached.

The authorities of the French Army having got hold of Esterhazy's *bordereau* at once opened an enquiry to discover who had written it. They began by counting on their fingers. Two of the five pieces enumerated in it concerned the artillery; therefore the traitor was an artilleryman. But, they reasoned, he also knows something of the other branches of the service; therefore he must be a member of the general staff. It in no ways disturbed their sapient reasoning that the writer of the document talks of a hydraulic brake where the hydropneumatic brake of 1894 is obviously referred to. Still less, that the writer of it uses the phrase: "La manière donc c'est *conduite* la pièce," where every gunner and, *à fortiori*, every person of sufficient intelligence to be in the staff corps would have used the phrase: "S'est *comportée* la pièce." Lastly, the writer of the *bordereau* proves that he was not in the artillery, or he would not dwell on the difficulty of obtaining a firing manual which was in the hands of every artillery officer. Now

* In the first Zola trial M. Lalance, since 1875 a *membre protestataire* or intransigent representative in the Reichstag of the Francophil population of Alsace, presented himself to make a deposition of which this is the gist:—

"The Dreyfus family consists of four brothers, so bound together as to be one soul in four bodies. After the war the three younger ones left their home in order to remain French subjects and enter the French Army. The eldest, who had fought in the Alsatian Legion during the war and was past the age of military service, remained at Mulhausen to look after the family business, but he promised that if he had any sons they also should at eighteen quit their home in order to serve in the French Army. He has had six sons, of whom two were in the *École Polytechnique* in 1894, when their uncle Alfred was unjustly condemned. They were driven out of the *école*, and their careers blasted. The two next were in a military school at Belfort. They also were expelled. Under such circumstances a Christian would have recalled his sons to himself and have lived in enjoyment of their society in the annexed province where all men know and respect him. What did this Jew do? He called his two youngest sons to himself, and said to them: 'My children, duty calls you. Your name is infamous in France. But it is your country. Go thither.' And he himself has quitted the annexed province and has gone to live in France at Belfort.

As one reads this deposition, which, of course, the presiding magistrate would not allow to be given in the court, but which was published the next day in the *Siècle*, one is inclined to ask oneself: And does France, after all, deserve to have such children as this?

Dreyfus was a gunner, a member of the staff corps, and an unpopular Jew as well. A certain Commandant du Patey de Clam, who was considered by his brother officers to be a judge of handwriting, was asked to give his opinion about the *bordereau*, and discovered in it a resemblance to the handwriting of Dreyfus. He was at once appointed to preside over the inquisition—worthy of Spain in the sixteenth century—which followed. Two experts in handwriting were also called in, M. Gobert, of the Bank of France, and M. Bertillon, a Commissary of Police and a deviser of a plan of measuring the skulls of criminals with a view to their identification. The former of these two experts on comparing the document with letters of Dreyfus could discover no identity. Bertillon, who is always certain of everything, decreed at once that it was the work of Dreyfus, who had, he argued, intentionally disguised his handwriting. So only could the many dissimilarities be explained. Dreyfus, he further argued, had made in the *bordereau*—which is written on very thin paper—a tracing of his own handwriting already, as we have seen, disguised. So he had hoped to shield himself, according to Bertillon. It never entered the head of this sapient detective that, if Dreyfus were really the traitor and had wished to disguise his handwriting, it would have been easier for him to have simply used his typewriter rather than employ such elaborate devices. Still less did he reflect that there were hundreds of other French officers whose handwriting, if subjected to the same tortuous hypotheses, would equally incriminate them.

However, his explanations satisfied the heads of the French Army. Dreyfus was arrested, tried *in camera*, and transported for life to the Isle du Diable. To the seven officers who formed the court-martial the then Minister of War, General Mercier, refused to reveal the origin of the incriminating document, though it was clearly essential to their deliberations to know where it came from, since, if it did not proceed from the embassy of a hostile Power, it might conceivably be a forgery, accusing no one. However, the court-martial asked no questions, and were probably content with the rumour set afloat in Paris at the time that it had been picked out of the waste-paper basket of the German Embassy.

General Mercier, however, took another step in regard to this court-martial, which was flagrantly illegal, and, in law, invalidates its verdict. The experts consulted about the handwriting had disagreed. Two of them denied that it was that of Dreyfus; the other three, among whom were M. Bertillon and a nominee of his own, were sure that it was. The majority of the members of the court-martial, dissatisfied with the evidence, were hesitating to condemn the accused when General Mercier took them aside, and behind

the backs both of the accused and of his counsel, showed, or rather *read* out to them a document containing the following words: "Ce canaille de Dreyfus devient trop exigeant." It is certain that General Mercier *read* this phrase out rather than *shewed* it in the actual document to the officers appointed to try Dreyfus; for, had they seen the actual document, they must have noticed that the phrase as *written* in it ran as follows: "Ce canaille de D . . . devient trop exigeant." Now the letter in which this sentence occurred had been brought to the French War Office ten months previously by the same Alsatian spy who had procured the *bordereau*. It had lain in the archives for ten months, during which no one had thought of connecting it with Dreyfus, much less of filling in the blank space left in it with his name. It was only when a Jew had to be found guilty of treason that the French Minister of War was brought to attempt so curious an identification. The stratagem succeeded, and the Jew was unanimously condemned. The reason why this piece was not shown to the accused or to his counsel in a trial which was already being held within closed doors will, I think, be pretty obvious to my readers. Subsequently, when doubts began to be expressed in the French Press as to the justice of the verdict, the same stratagem was once more resorted to; for, on September 15th, 1896, the French War Office sent an inspired communication to the *Éclair*, one of their organs, in which we read the following:—

"In our opinion, and it will be that of all Frenchmen, it is patriotic to break silence and to produce all the pieces which attest with an unsparing rigour that the judges of the military tribunal gave their verdict from sound knowledge, that they were accurately informed, and that they were thoroughly convinced that Dreyfus, in spite of his denials,* was guilty, being accused by a host of moral presumptions and by proofs which were formal, *since one of them bore his name.* . . . Towards September 20th Colonel Sandherr communicated to General Mercier this letter. . . . It had to do with the service of espionage at Paris, and it contained the following phrase: 'Décidément cet animal de DREYFUS devient trop exigeant.'"

This Colonel Sandherr was a noted Jew-hater, and was in 1894 already suffering from the brain disease of which he died three years later. He was the presiding officer in the Dreyfus court-martial, and it would appear that he and Mercier together planned the stratagem which secured the adverse sentence. The above article in the *Éclair* must have been written by one of the six officers who sat with Sandherr on the court-martial. It accords with the facts as they have been related, that he misquotes, using the word *animal* where the document itself has *canaille*.

* In face of this admission, what becomes of the forged Dreyfus confession of guilt recently put forward by M. Méline?

He is evidently repeating from memory what he had only heard read out aloud.

The *Éclair* printed the name *Dreyfus* in capitals; and, of course, the anti-Semitic Press of France went into ecstasies over this *preuve accablante* of Dreyfus' guilt. If the episode were not so replete with discredit for the French War Office and for the ephemeral Ministries which in rapid succession are its humble and cringing servants, if it were not so tragical for Dreyfus and so big with future disaster for France, it might provoke a smile to learn that those who are behind the scenes are of opinion that the letter, in which these words occurred, was a harmless one; that devoid alike of any military or political significance, it simply referred to a commonplace intrigue, one of the parties to which had a name beginning with the letter "D."

All over Europe during the past few months people have been asking the reason of the extraordinary reluctance of the French War Office to discuss or allow discussion of the Dreyfus verdict, and of the superstitious fervour of French Ministers on behalf of the *chose jugée*. The reason is not far to seek. It lies in the illegalities of the trial, in the use of a secret and of a forged document never shown to the accused or to his counsel. The use of a secret document, even of a genuine one, would annul the verdict; and the French High Court has lately hinted, in no obscure terms, that it only waits for a courageous Minister of Justice to set it in motion, when it will so annul it. But the forgery virtually practised by Colonel Sandherr and General Mercier exposed those two officers, of whom only one survives, to still severer penalties than the mere judicial irregularity. With such skeletons in the cupboard, how can the French War Office do anything else than burk enquiry, and subsidize their hireling Press to rouse the mob to fury against the Jews?

In May, 1896, the same Alsatian porter at Colonel Schwartzkoppen's hotel, brought to the French War Office a third document. It was a letter-card addressed to M. le Commandant Esterhazy, 27, Rue de la Bienfaisance, Paris, and its contents were the following:—

"Above all, I await a more detailed explanation than that which you gave me the other day on the question at issue. In consequence, I beg to you to give it me in writing, that I may decide whether I can continue or not my relations with the firm R . . ."

This document, the *petit bleu* as it has come to be known (that being the Parisian name for these letter-cards) was—not *is*, for the French authorities have probably destroyed it now as a piece incriminating their *protégé* Esterhazy — in the sufficiently well-known handwriting of Schwartzkoppen. Now, at this time, May,

1896, the chief of the Intelligence Bureau of the French War Office was a certain Colonel Picquart, a Protestant, and seemingly, with the exception of Dreyfus, the only able and conscientious servant that the inside of that office has for some time known. To him the letter-card was brought, and he at once began to suspect that Esterhazy was in relations with the German *attaché* of a kind to require clearing up. Therefore, as Prefect, so to speak, of the Military Police, and obviously in pursuit of his duty, he proceeded to quietly make enquiries about Esterhazy, both in his regiment and in other quarters. He learned from his colonel and brother officers that Esterhazy habitually neglected his own regimental duties, at the same time that he was for ever inquisitively asking about this, that, and the other in branches of the service, with which as an infantry officer he had no direct concern. Picquart next procured from Esterhazy's colonel some specimens of the suspected man's handwriting, and at once recognized it as a handwriting that he had seen before. It associated itself in his mind with the *bordereau*, which till now he had regarded as the work of Dreyfus. He sent for the *bordereau* to his bureau, and in an instant the whole truth was clear to him. It was in Esterhazy's handwriting, and Dreyfus was innocent. However, he proceeded cautiously, and for many months communicated his discovery to General Gonze, his official superior, and to no one else.*

The latter admitted the truth of Picquart's conclusions, as the correspondence between the two proves, and later on, and for a few weeks, the French War Office authorities were wavering, undecided whether to revise the Dreyfus case or not. But the highest among them were afraid, for they were too well aware of the illegalities which had sullied the Dreyfus verdict. It was no mere judicial error of which they would have to render account at the bar of public opinion, but the crime of open defiance of the military code and of fraudulent interpretation of a secret document. It was therefore resolved that the *chose jugée* must be upheld as sacred and all

* In this connection General Picquart deposed at the first Zola trial that he laid the *bordereau* afresh before M. Bertillon in May, 1896, along with a letter just written by Esterhazy, only keeping back the latter's name. "It is the writing of the *bordereau*," exclaimed Bertillon. "Do not be in a hurry to express an opinion," replied Picquart. "Will you not have a facsimile of the *bordereau* back again and study it at leisure?" Bertillon answered: "Oh, no, it is not necessary. It is the same hand as the *bordereau*. Where did you get it?" "That I cannot tell you," said Picquart. "Then it is of an earlier date?" asked the other. "No, of a later date," replied Picquart. Whereupon M. Bertillon used these very words: "The Jews for the last year have been at work to get some one to write like the *bordereau*, and they have thoroughly succeeded, that's clear." Colonel Picquart next showed Esterhazy's letter, still concealing the authorship, to Du Paty de Clam, who said: "Why, that is the writing of Matthieu Dreyfus." This officer's explanation of the *bordereau* has been from the first that Alfred Dreyfus had made in it a mixture of his own and of his brother Matthieu's handwriting!

enquiry forbidden. And Colonel Picquart, who had made so disconcerting a discovery, was sent off at five minutes' notice to the French Sahara, whence he was only brought back recently in order to be deprived of his military rank and expelled without his pension from the French Army. Thus, in France, do you expiate the crime of being an honest and efficient public servant. Truly, as General Boisdeffre, chief of the *État Majeur*, remarked in the recent Zola case, military justice is not the same thing as civil justice.

On November 10th, 1896, General Mercier, by way of silencing the doubts expressed in certain quarters of Dreyfus' guilt, published the *bordereau* in facsimile in the *Matin*. He was still firmly persuaded that it was the work of Dreyfus, and it was no doubt this conviction which had led him at the court-martial to fill in the secret document with Dreyfus' name. He now imagined that the public had only to see the *bordereau* itself in order to recognize in it the hand of Dreyfus.

And here the frivolous character of French military justice is remarkably evidenced. In 1894, Dreyfus is tried *in camera* because the exhibition before the public of the *bordereau* might endanger the foreign relations and security of France. In 1896 the same Minister of War, who, two years before, had formed such a decision, gives the document to the whole world in facsimile in the columns of the *Matin*.

However, General Mercier's action gave those who had never believed in Dreyfus' guilt a real clue. They submitted the photographic replica of the *bordereau* along with specimens of Dreyfus' handwriting to the nine best graphological experts in the whole of Europe and America. One of these was M. Crépieux Jamin, a Frenchman and an anti-Semite. He, like the rest of the nine, after a careful study, decided that the *bordereau* could not possibly have been written by Dreyfus, and his report contains a chapter on the types of moral and intellectual character revealed in the respective handwritings, which deserves to be here quoted. No one as yet, except Picquart, knew that Esterhazy was the writer of the *bordereau*; yet M. Crépieux Jamin from its mere handwriting devined the character of its writer with a clearness and fulness which leaves nothing to be desired :—

"L'autre écriture, celle de la pièce de question, nous dit une intelligence peut-être aussi cultivée que celle de Dreyfus, mais un esprit faux et illogique : ce qui est le contraire des qualités de Dreyfus.

"Son émotivité est extrême. C'est une nature fausse, menteuse, profondément antipathique.

"Son énergie est faible, inconstante, et ses passions se trouvent à la merci des caprices de son imagination et de son jugement médiocre.

"On comprend très bien que cet esprit-là ait écrit la pièce *X*, si incohérente

qu'il est impossible de savoir si le projet de manuel de tir est livré, ou promis, ou copié. Dreyfus eût été plus clair.

"Entre les deux hommes il y a une différence fondamentale: Dreyfus est médiocrement sociable, mais il est un caractère; l'auteur du document *X* est plus en dehors extrêmement fourbe, dangereux et sans caractère" (see *L'Affaire Dreyfus: une Erreur Judiciaire, par* Bernard Lazare, p. 100. Paris: P. V. Stock. 1897).

At this stage, then, Colonel Picquart alone had detected Esterhazy's guilt. That was in May, 1896. He informed General Gonze of his discovery, but otherwise kept it to himself until the July of 1897. Then, finding himself persecuted by his official superiors because of his discovery, he communicated it through a trustworthy intermediary to M. Scheurer-Kestner, the Vice-President of the French Senate and "The Grand Old Man" of Alsace. The latter went quietly to work to obtain a revision of the case, and still works unflinchingly for that end. In his endeavours he is supported by most of his fellow Alsatians, who trust and revere him. So far, he has achieved no other result than to draw on himself and on other Alsatians, who, after the war of 1870, quitted their native country in order to remain French subjects, a storm of insults and obloquy. In the annexed provinces, among those who have for twenty-eight years kept their hearts warm for France, the crimes of the present War Office excites the fiercest resentment. If they are persevered in a little longer these provinces will be reconciled to the German connection.*

Before long, however, the true authorship of the *bordereau* was to be revealed, independently of Colonel Picquart, by the very man in the streets. Esterhazy gambles on the French Bourse, and had used a broker, De Castro, to buy and sell for him. The latter was so well acquainted with his writing that he knew which were his letters before opening them. In October, 1897, De Castro was sitting in a café on the Boulevards, when a hawker came up selling facsimiles of the *bordereau* which he had not hitherto seen, though General Mercier had published it in the *Matin* a year before. The facsimile caught the eye of De Castro, the rest of whose story we will relate in his own words:—"I was struck aghast when I saw that writing, for I seemed to see in it a letter of the Commandant Esterhazy. I went home in a state of perturbation. Next morning I went with my brother-in-law and looked up the letters of Esterhazy which we had on our files. I even made some comparison of the handwriting, with the result that I found a perfect

* Among the candidates standing at the May elections of this year is a General Rebillot, who alludes to M. Scheurer-Kestner and other Alsatians, who, after the war, left their homes in order to remain French subjects, as follows:—"Entrée en France par la brèche qu'y a faite en 1870 le canon Allemande, une horde de cosmopolites s'est abattue sur elle; ces vagabonds d'esprit et de mœurs venus on ne sait d'où et imprudemment naturalisés ne peuvent être Francais."

resemblance, I may say, a striking identity." By the advice of Dreyfus' brother, De Castro took his discovery to M. Scheurer-Kestner, who in turn advised Matthieu Dreyfus to formally denounce Esterhazy to General Billot, the Minister of War, as the real author of the *bordereau*. This he did, November 15th, 1897.

But Esterhazy had not waited as an innocent man would have done. He was already across the Belgian frontier. For he supposed that Dreyfus would be released and a price set upon his own head. So also did the *Figaro*, whose editor now printed the letters of Esterhazy to Madame Boulancy, from which I have given some extracts. So confident was the *Figaro* that the French War Office would do what was right that it had already appointed a Special Commissioner to proceed in hot haste to French Guiana, announce to Dreyfus his acquittal and bring him home in triumph.

But the Commissioner never went. The *Figaro* had to change its editor, and turn itself into what it now is. For the French War Office, as we have seen, had more than a year before known the truth and formed the resolve to brazen it out and burk enquiry; nor were men of the stamp of Billot, of Boisdeffre, of de Pellieux, of Zurlinden, of Mercier, of Gonze, of Henry, of du Paty de Clam, of Ravary, of de Luxer, not to mention many other names, people to be deterred by the emergence into the full light of day of the real criminal. So they sent anonymous letters to Esterhazy in Belgium, where he had taken refuge, assuring him of their powerful protection if he would only return. For the fact of his flight was an acknowledgment of his own guilt and in the same degree a public indictment of themselves, since it was proof patent that Dreyfus was innocent. Esterhazy accordingly returned, and du Paty de Clam, who by now had been rewarded with the grade of Colonel for the part he had played throughout, was deputed to meet him in a secret interview at a street corner near the Arc de Triomphe and give him what is known as the *Document Libérateur*, in other words, a written assurance that the French War Office would shield him. This interview took place on the eve of Matthieu Dreyfus' denunciation. For the War Office realized the necessity of having Esterhazy back out of his self-imposed exile before the formal indictment was delivered. If not, it might be said that he had run away because he knew he was guilty. This interview with du Paty de Clam is the fact which underlies Esterhazy's story of the veiled lady; de Clam was the lady on this occasion, but he was not veiled in any way. One other circumstance should be noted here, which, on April 8th, 1898, was attested in the columns of the *Siècle* by Colonel Panizzardi, the Italian military *attaché* at Paris, and the friend and confidant throughout

of Colonel Schwartzkoppen. It is this. I give it in the Italian *attaché's* own words :—

"As soon as Esterhazy got wind that he was going to be exposed, even before the denunciation of Matthieu Dreyfus, he dared to go to M. de Schwartzkoppen, and said to him: 'Colonel, you must go and see the Dreyfus family and tell them that the action they propose to take is all useless and mere waste of time, because you yourself have in your possession the proofs of Dreyfus' guilt. It is the only way to save both you and me.' Whereupon M. de Schwartzkoppen replied: 'I think that you are mad, M. le Commandant.' At these words Esterhazy pulled a revolver out of his pocket and pointed it at the Colonel."

In November, 1897, it was still not too late for the French War Office to allow a revision of the Dreyfus case; but cowardice easily associates itself with crime, so they took the guilty man under their protection, and continued to affirm in the French Chamber that the *chose jugée* must be respected, that Dreyfus had been legally tried and justly convicted—this, although it is through their own admission that we know a secret piece, and a falsified one to boot, to have been used in order to secure that innocent man's conviction.

Matthieu Dreyfus' denunciation was, therefore, not listened to; but the case provoked so much attention that the War Office early in this year felt itself obliged to give Esterhazy a formal white-washing, and a sham court-martial was appointed both to try and acquit him on the charge of having sold secrets to a foreign Power. All reference to the Dreyfus case in this new trial was forbidden, and the judges were instructed to assume the validity of the Dreyfus verdict and make it the basis of their deliberations—a most necessary precaution, inasmuch as Dreyfus' guilt means Esterhazy's innocence, and *vice-versa*. This court-martial decided to hear *in camera* such witnesses as would by their depositions compromise the War Office, Colonel Piquart, for example. General de Luxer presided, and they acquitted Esterhazy "to order," as Zola has justly said.

Before this court-martial Esterhazy admitted that there exists a "shocking resemblance," *une effrayante ressemblance*, between his own handwriting and that of the *bordereau*. This, he pleaded, was due to the fact that Dreyfus in order to shield himself, had imitated his handwriting, and, of course, he found himself at no loss for experts who endorsed his view. If the court-martial had been a serious one, it would have asked for some proof that Dreyfus had ever been acquainted with Esterhazy and his handwriting. They sought for none, but, on the contrary, accepted the explanation as the most natural thing in the world. Dreyfus, of course, had he been a traitor, and had he imitated another man's hand, would in his trial have defended himself by saying: "I did not write this document; but So-and-So wrote it. He is the culprit." It is on record, how-

ever, that Dreyfus made no such defence, but was content to deny that he had written it. He did, it is true, when he first saw the *bordereau*, say to his judges that it reminded him of the handwriting of a particular officer whom he named, and specimens of that officer's writing were at once fetched for comparison. That other officer was not Esterhazy; and Dreyfus was the first to admit that he had been mistaken, and that the resemblance was merely superficial. The truth is that the assurance which Esterhazy had already received, October 29th, 1897, of protection by the War Office made it superfluous for him to seriously defend himself in the court-martial of January, 1898. His guilt is anyhow less than that of his protectors.

I pass over the many minor infamies that have followed in the wake of this great crime. For example, the forged confession of guilt invented by the French Ministry, never heard of till yesterday, and expressly denied in the minutes of the court-martial of 1894, the intimidation of witnesses, the suppression of evidence, the unblushing partisanship of the presiding magistrate in the recent Zola case, all, no doubt, to be renewed in the new trial which impends as I write, and will be over before these pages are read. This is all so fresh in men's minds, and would take so long to recapitulate, that I pass on to make some concluding reflections on the general situation as it presents itself to the eyes of a minority of loyal but despairing Frenchmen. There is first the awful fact of the French Army, which the nation has at the utmost sacrifice built up during the last twenty-eight years, being under the management of such men as those who form the *personnel* of the present French War Office. It is not merely that they are wicked, but at all turns of this dreadful history their stupidity and want of foresight are too apparent. The Germans across the frontier are rubbing their hands in unholy glee at the spectacle of the Boisdeffres and of the Paty du Clams and others like them paraded in the recent Zola trial. An army led by such men as they can surely not be formidable. If such are the victories of the French Army at home, what will it be worth when led to meet a foreign foe?

The affection of the French for their Army is as ardent and romantic as that of a woman for her lover. But what if by a sudden revelation it were brought home to the masses, who now parade the streets, crying: "*Vive l'Armée, mort aux Juifs!*" that their confidence has been betrayed, that the swaggering officers whom they cheered so madly at the trial of M. Zola are the real traitors to France, and that Dreyfus is the victim of their base conspiracy? For the Emperor William holds in his hands a weapon with which, when the occasion arises, he can smite the entire *État Majeur* and destroy the confidence of the French people in their

Army for at least a generation. The series of secret documents sold by Esterhazy does not stop in October, 1894, the date of Dreyfus' arrest, but extends on into the year 1896. It included many important documents of later origin than October, 1894, all in the handwriting of the *bordereau*. Dreyfus cannot have written these, for he was already in prison. The defenders of Dreyfus have themselves a list of these documents, obtained evidently through some well-informed person; for in the middle of April, the *Siècle*, in an open letter to General Billot, gave details of several of them, among others signalizing the plan of mobilization of the Third Army Corps of Rouen, to which Esterhazy was attached in 1896 when he communicated the plan to Schwartzkoppen. Now the Emperor William, by communicating to the French or European Press in facsimile any one of these documents of origin later than 1894, can, whenever he likes, tear across the web of lies with which the French War Office is now striving to hide its misdeeds. Perhaps the *dénoûment* will come in this way; for the Emperor has, it appears, already authorized Schwarztkoppen, at the close of the last year, to communicate to Count Casella, for publication in the *Siècle*, on April 8th last, many hints of the truth, and these hints were enough, in the elegant phrase of the Socialist paper, *Les Droits de l'Homme*, to cause the members of the *État Majeur* to "sweat with fear." How long will it be before William II. draws tight the noose into which all the leading French generals and colonels and nearly all the leading politicians of every party, save the Socialists, have so obligingly adjusted their necks?

Happy for the French if, without such intervention, they can recover their own self-respect and the regard of the civilized world which they have justly lost. That even among the Russians, their sworn allies, they find no sympathy is clear from the paragraphs which I append from the *Law Journal* of St. Petersburg. They are extracted from the second of two articles similar in tenour by M. Ignatius Zakrewski, President of the Russian Court of Appeal. In it he refers to the recent decree of the French Court of Appeal quashing the verdict of the first Zola trial on the ground of technical irregularities in the following manner:—

"The trials of Dreyfus and Zola could not otherwise than deeply distress the true friends of France. The first of these trials presented a variety of improbabilities and irregularities, of which the most flagrant was the production before the judges alone in the court-martial itself of a secret document by order of the military authorities. This astonishing infraction of the rules of all correct procedure renders the condemnation of Dreyfus null and void. Guilty or not guilty, he has not been fairly tried. They have simply deported and imprisoned him according to the administrative procedure in countries where despotism reigns. It is the bringing back again of *lettres de cachet* and of the Bastille under the pretext, it is true, of subserving reasons of State, as if that was not the pretext which shielded the most iniquitous acts of the ancient regime. As to the Zola trial, it exhibited the culminating point of con-

tempt for judicial rules, the complete *débacle* of justice. All the passions of the street seemed to have been transported into the tribunal. At every step the rules of procedure were flagrantly set at nought, no less than those of simple politeness. The hall of the Court of Assize of the Seine, where the present writer assisted some years ago at such imposing audiences, this hall was turned into a political club and filled with a noisy mob, shouting, hissing, applauding as they liked. And all the while the presiding judge sat there impotent in, nay, accomplice of, that disorder. Finally, a verdict was pronounced, which, by its severity towards those in whose favour it was impossible not to admit extenuating grounds, proved that the passions of the street, not to mention certain considerations which had nothing to do with the case, had contaminated the minds of the jury."

Such is the opinion of the highest jurist in Russia. How can it be other in countries which have popular institutions? And yet it is almost too much to hope that these scenes will not be renewed in the fresh trial of Zola which impends at the end of this month of May.

It was expected that the French authorities would not risk another trial, because the first, in spite of the intimidation of witnesses and suppression of evidence, nevertheless direly compromised them, and sufficiently established the tale of their guilt, as in the preceding pages it has been outlined. It is known that the officers who last January acquitted the traitor Esterhazy to order were, when they were once more called together in the middle of this April, unwilling to prosecute Zola afresh. The War Office papers talked big about the moral effect of the sentence against Zola in a trial of which the French Court of Appeal had decreed the nullity, and deprecated a fresh prosecution which might let in more light. So the members of the Esterhazy court-martial met at nine to deliberate the point, and, after three hours, rose from their deliberations heated, angry, and depressed, having decided nothing. Now Zola, like the brave champion of right which in this matter he has shown himself to be, was determined to be prosecuted afresh, since it is the only way to proceed under a Government which is the accomplice in a great crime and is resolved to burk all enquiry. Accordingly, he had arranged that on the very morning of the meeting of the mock judges of Esterhazy, for the purpose of deciding whether they should resume a contest in which, thanks to the calm courage of the Court of Appeal, they had been so far worsted, there should appear in the columns of the *Siècle* that terrible indictment of Esterhazy which the military *attachés* of Germany and of Italy had communicated to the Count Casella as a deposition which he was to have made, had circumstances allowed, in the first Zola trial. This indictment Zola had held in reserve, and now he produced it, and it had the desired effect. It left the mock judges who had acquitted Esterhazy to order no choice but to proceed afresh against the

brave man who had in his letter *J'accuse* branded them with ignominy. General le Pellieux hurried to the *Invalides*, where they were conferring, with the *Siècle* in his hand; and when they emerged at mid-day, as described, from their deliberations, he read it out loud to them. They had to return to their deliberations, and, after three more hours of discussion, were at last and tardily brought to venture upon a renewal of a contest for which they have no stomach. However, all has been done which could be done to prevent the fresh trial from letting in fresh light. Zola's famous indictment, the letter beginning *J'accuse*, consisted of some 15,000 words, not too much in proportion to the magnitude of the conspiracy it laid bare. In their first prosecution of him the French Government selected some fifteen short lines on which to frame their indictment! in the hope of keeping out all allusion to the Dreyfus case. They also managed that a magistrate should preside who could be trusted to allow no awkward evidence to be given. Yet these fifteen lines proved to be all too much, and the judge could not bar the entire truth out. Accordingly, in the new indictment, about fifteen words alone are chosen, those only in which Zola accuses the Esterhazy court-martial of having acquitted the real traitor to order. Whether the Government will find another magistrate equally ready with M. Delegorgue, who presided in the first trial, to throttle justice remains to be seen. Even if they do, they still have to reckon with the Court of Appeal, before which M. Zola may carry his case. The judges of this Higher Court are irremovable by the Government, and have already, in the decree which annulled Zola's first trial, gone out of their way to intimate that they will also annul the illegally obtained sentence on Dreyfus whenever they get an opportunity. So there is still some hope for France. This Higher Court keeps the conscience of France alive; and every real friend of France hopes that the day will soon come when its voice and authority will be asserted, and the country forced to awake to the sense of right, throwing off the horrible *cauchemar* of crime which now broods over it.

HUGUENOT.

[NOTE.—Readers who desire a more thorough acquaintance with the history of the Dreyfus case can purchase, in two volumes, in 8vo, 1,100 pages, price 5 francs, the *Procès Verbal*, or shorthand report of the first Zola trial from Stock, Editeur, Paris. Also, from the same publisher, the works of Mm. Yves Guyot, and Bernard Lazar, and Vaucx on the same subject.]

THE INTERNATIONAL EXHIBITION OF ART AT KNIGHTSBRIDGE.

It takes us a monstrous time in England to admit that anything has happened. We are like the man in the Saga who contemptuously allowed the swordsman to slice him from top to toe, and sat on, affirming that he felt nothing, that it made no difference, that he was all right, that he was still the Royal Academy of Arts, a perfectly satisfactory national institution. Then at last he happened to stand up and shake himself, and fell apart in two pieces. We, the onlookers, have explained till we are tired that this operation has been performed, not once, but many times, in the case of our dear old friend, that one after another, the several arts have withdrawn and set up for themselves elsewhere, the water-colourists, the etchers, the pastellists, the designers for the crafts, the painters, *the portrait painters even.* Still she sits on in a fine Roman attitude, saying "It does not hurt," and bustles out her too capacious form with amateur work in all these branches.

There comes a time when it is wearisome to repeat all this, when we have only to wait in silence till the shaking comes for all the world to see, and for the daily papers to recognize it in obituary terms the morning after. But parallel with this decay of the official artistic institution as a force for collecting what is good into its exhibition rooms, another feature of the business has been ripening for recognition at the same slow but irresistible rate, and that is the arrangement of exhibition-places themselves. Here again, outside the Academy, the demand has been made, the problem posed, considered, put to experiment, solved, and settled a dozen times. This being so, it is almost the moment, without anything that can be called headlong rashness, to admit the fact, and even with a little prescience and intention to act upon it.

To look at pictures is no part of the duty of a good man; it may be even to a good man a pleasure, but we make it a penance. The voluptuary who, when the funeral went too fast, said "For God's sake do not let us make a toil of a pleasure," would have been answered, if he had addressed a company of picture-exhibi-

tion undertakers, "My dear sir, do not let us make a pleasure of a pleasure." Does any free human being treat himself when he takes his pleasure as he is treated by the Academy when he goes to look at pictures? Does he read books in that sort of way, with his literary sense exhausted, and all his other senses displeased? Does he listen to music in that way, if he can help it? I suppose no one, not even of those who like the sort of pictures shown at the Academy, enjoys the experience as a whole; to fight along through a crowd in stuffy, glaring galleries; to be faced, when tired and hungry, with the alternative of going down into a noisome underground eating-place, or travelling out into the streets to pay again when he returns. An exhibition, at the best, must be a damaging thing for the work of art that does not expend its energy in a single smack in the face to the spectator; and to get the best of the pictures we like in an exhibition we must be free to treat them as we should a picture in a private room or in a church, free to manage and nurse our visit a little, look and go away and rest and look again, ruminate over meat and drink among green things to rest the eyes, and flowers to smell.

All this, it may be said, is desirable but impossible. On the contrary, it has been done a score of times since the first International Exhibition, nearly fifty years ago. Something, at all events, very like it has been done every time that commodious sheds have been put up in a garden with restaurant and café at hand, and one or two of them devoted to painting. At Kensington, Earl's Court, Paris, Manchester, and Glasgow it has been done, and the revolution has not been understood, because it has been mixed up with a great deal of soap, sewing machines, Imre Kiralfy, and the rest. The picture-undertakers would never have thought of it themselves. They, for some unexplained reason, are stern, bloodless slave drivers, organizers of headache and *ennui*. But people of flesh and blood, soap-boilers, captive balloonists, sanitary engineers, believed that nobody could look at their wares without a growing appetite, and a cheerful contemplative spirit for sitting smoking under trees. They arranged matters accordingly. The painters doubtless shook their solemn heads over these meretricious proceedings, and regretted that the funeral was turned into a feast, but they accepted their pavilion in the garden, and no one has heard that they were the worse for it.

I am among those who have an imperfect sympathy for soap and machines and sanitary appliances as objects of pure contemplation; but I think the soap-boilers, as exhibition-mongers, are in the right. Of all picture-exhibitions there is none I enjoy so much as Hampton Court, not only because in that *débris* of royal collections we have the stuff almost to make a second National Gallery if the

other were burned, but because it is set in a garden, and in galleries that have a kinship with what we go to see in pictures. I rejoice over an ancient bed that looks like a Triumph of Sleep on my way to the Triumph of Cæsar, and the ancient hangings and mirrors and the glimpse of alleys and waters through the window, attune me to the mellow pictures on the walls. Some day, when a turn of the wheel brings us rulers penetrable to ideas of art, this is the model that will be acted on. Perhaps when Mr. John Burns becomes Prime Minister (he is the only man in the House who appears to be accessible to ideas of public amenity) each of our parks and gardens will have its picture-gallery (with restaurant and café at hand) as well as its band of music and little opera-house for morning performances. Something is blindly beginning at Kew and Kensington Palaces that may have a delightful issue. In such galleries I would have a small room reserved for modern work, open throughout the year, and re-filled from time to time; and I think the Academy exhibition, apart from the Schools, will ultimately be reorganized as a collection of the arts in such surroundings. I do not believe that its paltry Benefit Club constitution is proof for ever, or even for long, against this salutary change.

I loiter on the way to my immediate subject. The excuse is that the exhibition at Knightsbridge makes a long stride in the direction of amenity. I quarrel, indeed, with the Council for not having the courage to take an island up the Thames, and arrange there a paradise, where Londoners could go of a Sunday and see pictures as they ought to be seen; but they have done something to the good. The show is small, as shows are measured; it is not quite indiscriminate, there is air and space and tempered light; and the exhibition has been so badly advertised that there is no crowd. A man can spend a morning happily in loitering about, poring over the Manets, the Whistlers, the Degas, the Rodins, the Matthew Marises.

The exhibition, then, I think, is a good example to the undertakers generally, and it will also be useful in quite another way, and one that the promoters evidently did not realize. It will dispel a number of touching illusions about the stranger. When a foreign painter comes over here and visits our Academy for the first time, he is delighted with all he sees. He passes lightly over anything that reminds him of his own countrymen, but when he comes upon what he can regard as native British Art, he bows down and worships. To him all our flattest realists are fairy spirits weaving dreams that have no earthly dross, and our industrious practitioners of "imaginative Art" bother him so completely that he approaches them with apologetic trepidation, asking if the

world is really like that, and his own way of seeing things in need of fundamental revision. The same thing happens with ourselves when we cross the Channel. We are like all people abroad on a holiday, to whom the bread and butter, the grass and flowers, of foreign villages taste rare and sweet, look greener and more brightly dyed. Thus, for the last five or six years the Champ-de-Mars has had an awful prestige for holiday-making English painters, and those who have not been to see have been bullied by those who have. The organizers of the Knightsbridge exhibition are still under this pretty illusion. They have spared us, indeed, M. Dagnan-Bouveret, who has been a name to conjure with among Salon-pilgrims, and who is really Mr. Herbert Schmalz *de l'outre mer*. Over here the critics are very lofty about Mr. Schmalz and his "thought-inspiring" pictures, but they tumble down before the same thing with a French name to it. On the other hand, Mr. Aman-Jean has been brought over, a man who has done some prettyish work, but not prettier than our own Mr. Boughton's. Then there is M. Besnard, a much stronger man, but beaten out of the field by our own Mr. Sargent. I need not pursue the translation further in this direction, but there is another direction in which it is a comfort to have matters cleared up. There have been big words of late years about the German School, the names of Stuck, Thoma, and half a dozen more have been held *in terrorem* over those who had not been to spy out the land at Munich. Well, here is Stuck, here is Thoma, and we have at home plenty of painters as bad. Böcklin—they promised us Böcklin—why have they not showed us Böcklin?—till we have seen him there remains one formidable hash unsettled. Leibl they would have done well to invite; his colour is quite unusually good for a German, and Lenbach, for a kind of grim, schoolmaster's verdict in portrait.

Now let us run rapidly through the other nations represented. There are two Segantinis and the rest of Italy is negligible.

From Sweden there is M. Thaulow, a craftsman of extraordinary virtuosity in working out natural detail, and M. Zorn, a clumsier Sargent. From Holland the inevitable brown Mesdag.

From that obscure country, England, there are one or two pictures. Mr. James Charles is not a great artist, but the thing that is within his range, the rendering of bright, sunlit trees, he does better than almost any of his contemporaries. Mr. Muhrman is his complement, an artist who chooses his own pitch, not Nature's, in the matter of tone and colour, but in that voice of his own conveys matter of greater dignity. He is better seen here than for a long time past. Mr. Furse, from whose knowledge and capacity we have all expected so much, has not yet found his own

voice. Those big portraits are, in a sense, better made than most, but their expression, design, colour, are without personal conviction; they are like well drawn-up notices in *Men of the Time*. Mr. Rothenstein's little portrait has an arresting quality in its design. One marks it from the middle of the room, not for anything eccentric, but for this fundamental quality. Near at hand it has certain defects of a painter who is young at his trade. Messrs. Conder, Francis James, Bertram Priestman, and a few more are to be found, but it is clear that the Council has not been heartily backed by the younger English school.

Glasgow, of course, is in great force, for the exhibition, in its final state, was practically the exhibition of that school and their foreign friends. Mr. Lavery shows up as the most brilliant, but it should be noted that Mr. Guthrie has deliberately abjured that brilliance. He covers up a Lavery now in each of his portraits, and goes doggedly on trying for something solider. The immediate results are clogged and heavy, but something may come of it. Mr. Macaulay Stevenson had a much fresher, cleaner landscape at Venice than anything he has here. A landscape by Mr. Kerr Lawson is franker in its tones than most of the Glasgow work. Mr. Crawhall, who has had so much influence on the school, sends some interesting drawings.

America sends Mr. J. J. Shannon, Mr. Alexander, well known at the Champ-de-Mars for an effective kind of poster-portrait, and Miss Cecilia Beaux, a clever pupil of the Carolus Duran school.

And so we come round again to the Champ-de-Mars contingent. There are some big omissions here. There is no Cazin, no Raffaelli, no Carrière (the last was, perhaps, saving up for his own show in London). The most recent men who have shown promise, such as M. M. Cottet and Simon, are also wanting. M. Besnard is not well represented, M. Blanche, too meagrely, M. Helleu not at all. M. Anquetin is not here. The older Salon has not been drawn upon. Of outsiders there is one Monet, extremely fine in its notation of the tones of boats, and sky-reflecting river-water.

No, the interest of the show, as far as painting goes, centres in the work of an older and greater generation. Two early Whistlers, not shown at Messrs. Goupils', and the Leyland portrait, cleaned since it was seen at Christie's, these, "The Rose Corder," and "The Valparaiso Nocturne," along with some less important pieces, impel and reward a visit to one of the rooms. Opposite is a group of five Degas, three of them already shown at the New English Art Club, but they cannot be seen too often. In another room are two great Manets, in a third the lovely "Montmartre" of Matthew Maris. A few studies by Puvis de Chavannes may be added to this list; and sculpture by Rodin and Meunier.

Secondly, there is much of interest in the section of engravings, lithographs, and drawings. A generation not strong enough for painting will leave some exquisite work in these more modest arts. Unluckily the light of the vestibule is defective, and the frames are too thickly hung. Drawings on a small scale ought to be arranged for exhibition on sloping tables. There is a good collection here of drawings by Aubrey Beardsley, showing the richness of his later development; among other Englishmen are Messrs. Ravenhill and Edgar Willson, who sends some pretty colour, prints. Lantrec takes the prize for gaiety in coloured lithography, and among other French work the drawings of M. Milcendeau and the woodcuts of M. Valloton are admirable. But I have not had the time or the light to examine this section properly, and must bring these hasty notes to a close. The exhibition is one that all who are interested, whether in the survey of international art, or the development of groups and schools of our own nationality, ought to visit. And there is enough exquisite work included to draw the lover of good pictures, to whom these matters are secondary.

D. S. MacColl.



THE MONTH IN AMERICA.

Washington, May 15th, 1898.

THE month in America may be aptly described as thirty days of "extras" in poster type. The history of the past four weeks is told in the hysterical "head lines" of the newspapers, and the increase of their circulation. It has been a chronicle of feverish military and naval preparations ending with a glorious and decisive naval victory; a victory in which the Americans fought as gallantly and masterly as they always have on the water. It was a victory which once again demonstrated that on the sea—their native element—the men of Saxon blood remain supreme, and can bid defiance to the world. It is a victory which satisfies the country, which shows the race of naval heroes is not extinct, that the United States, like Great Britain, places its main reliance upon sea-power.

The result of the battle of Manila was not unexpected, the absence of all loss of life on the American side was a startling revelation of the inefficiency of the Spanish navy. It was too one-sided to be really called a battle. No one in America feared Commodore Dewey's defeat. His fleet, in number of guns and weight of metal thrown, was far superior to his antagonists, and his vessels had the immense advantage of greater speed, and, consequently, greater efficiency in manœuvring. These facts are not stated to detract one whit from Commodore Dewey's laurels. Had the forces been reversed, had the Spaniards possessed the more powerful fleet the result would still have been the same. The American commander displayed those qualities of courage, audacity, coolness, and ability which create victory and compel success. The man behind the gun has once more been heard from. The American sailor has lived up to his traditions and inscribed a new name on the scroll of great naval commanders.

The public, always very quick to praise or condemn, has elevated the hero of Manila—if Dewey were an Englishman one might guess the peerage he would select—to the highest pinnacle, largely influenced by sentimental considerations. In the first place it was the first victory of the war; more than that, it was the first

visible sign that the United States was able to do more than carry on a "pacific blockade." The investiture of Cuba had not aroused popular enthusiasm; on the contrary it was regarded as unworthy of a great Government waging war to relieve distress and starvation, to inflict distress and starvation as horrible almost as that which it proposed to remove. The war had failed to arouse the country; even the call for volunteers, the incessant naval and military activity, the extremely able and energetic work of the navy and war departments did not thrill the country. The *motif*, if one may so term it, was lacking. The victory at Manila came at a time when the country required something to stir its emotions, when it could render homage to a popular hero. The man was found in Dewey.

There were other reasons for gratification. The first battle of modern navies—excepting the battle of the Yalu which proved nothing—was fought by the American navy, and justified the confidence which the country placed in its ships and officers. It demonstrated the superiority of American ships and American seamen over those built in foreign yards and manned by Europeans. It proved that the navy was neither a toy nor an experiment —that it could be relied upon in the hour of need. And perhaps more than anything else, it has shown that long years of peace have not blunted the resourcefulness of American commanders or destroyed the efficiency of their men.

Supposing British ships to have gained a similar victory, we can appreciate what a wave of patriotic enthusiasm would have encircled the British Empire. We can readily understand why similar manifestations should be witnessed on this side of the Atlantic, and I think we can share in them and feel as great a pleasure in the victory as if we were celebrating our own prowess.

It is the irony of fate that while Europe for the past twenty years has been an armed camp, and peace has only been maintained by the weight of the sword, America, with practically no standing army and merely the germ of a navy, should be the one Power of all others to throw war into the world.

This war, which is over, no matter whether the treaty of peace is signed next week or six months hence, will have a great influence on the future of the country. It means as the first and most significant step the enlargement of the navy. The importance of the navy is realized as it never has been since the close of the Civil War, and having once started it is not the American fashion to turn back. I believe it is a safe prediction to make that a few years hence the United States will be one

of the great naval Powers of the world. When the American navy attains this position America can no longer be ignored in the settlement of world questions.

There is no reason why the United States should burden itself with the maintenance of a great standing army, but there is every reason, now that the value of a navy has been demonstrated, why the country should lay down a naval programme which will have significant results in the course of the next few years. I think you will find this to be the case. As yet they are not prepared to do in this country what England did when she suddenly awoke to the fact that unless her navy was immensely strengthened the control of the seas was lost. There are men in this country who would welcome a National Defence Act, who would rejoice in seeing Congress appropriate a hundred million dollars to be spent in the construction of battleships, cruisers, torpedo-boats and destroyers. Public opinion has not yet been educated to that level, but on a smaller scale we shall see the scheme carried out. With the vessels now in commission and provided for, the end of the century will see the United States in possession of a navy numerically respectable in size, formidable in the types of vessels and their high efficiency. More than thirty years of peace had made the service "soft"; there had been no opportunity for officers or men to realize the conditions which war would entail. The war has furnished this education; it has put new life into the navy; it has shown the country its weakness and strength. It has emphasized the fact that a navy is a necessity. America is not the country to ignore a warning of this kind.

Perhaps even more important in its consequences is the bringing of the United States for the first time in its history into the field of European politics. The victory of Manila entails responsibilities. What shall be done with the Philippines? To retain them is to reverse the traditions of more than a century; to ignore a policy more firmly entrenched than the constitution itself; to embark the United States on a policy revolutionary, almost, compared with what has gone before. And yet this country must either retain and administer the Philippines as a possession or present them to one of the friendly Powers. It would be chivalrous and impotent generosity to surrender to the enemy the spoils of war, nor would such a thing be permitted. Spain has lost her last remaining possessions east and west.

It is too violent a wrench for the traditions of a century to be disregarded without provoking at least some protest. Already those men who are guided by the past rather than seeking inspiration from the future denounce the mooted acquisition of the

Philippines. The United States, they say, do not want the islands and can find no profitable use for them. If motives of policy demand that they be not returned to Spain then let them govern themselves in their own way.

Admittedly such a thing is not possible. The Cubans may be capable of self-government—and even that is doubtful—but of the utter inability of the Philippine islanders to rule themselves there can be no question. Before they are fit for autonomy they must be prepared for it, and in the meantime a strong, civilized Power must undertake their education. Shall the United States or one of the European Powers carry on this work?

There is a strong sentiment against the United States relinquishing that which it has rightfully won. The modern school of American statesmen, the men who, like ex-Secretary of State Olney, realize and deplore the international isolation of their country, appreciate the importance of obtaining a foothold in the Far East in view of the incalculable value of Asiatic commerce during the next decade. I have more than once, in the pages of THE NATIONAL REVIEW, called attention to the desire to break down the Chinese wall which has for a century isolated the United States from international affairs. Recent events in China have convinced the Progressists that this country must either be a potential factor in Asiatic affairs or else forever abandon all thought of possessing its share of a commerce so great that its mere conception is dazzling. The ownership of the Philippines opens the way to the attainment of this end.

The prevailing sentiment, I believe, is admirably and conservatively voiced by the New York *Sun* in the following editorial written a few days after the announcement of Commodore Dewey's victory:—

"To-day the United States are living among an entirely different set of facts from that surrounding them when our fathers dreamed of living forever in comparative isolation, internationally undisturbed because undisturbing. A nation's power in the world at large, upon which rests to a great extent its trade, is itself now founded upon coal, and coal without an established source of supply where it is needed is always uncertain, and hence a factor of weakness.

"The Philippine Islands, through Spain's choice of war, are the rightful property of the United States, either in whole or at least in such part as may be necessary to give the base of supply that we require in Asiatic waters. Their conquest will be regarded as a new departure in American politics, but in the light of modern developments, in which our destiny, like that of other countries, is wrapped inextricably, it is at the very threshold of statesmanship.

"The Stars and Stripes should henceforth float for ever over the Philippines."

It is, perhaps, doubtful whether the United States will care to retain all of the Philippines and administer them as a possession; but that some part will be kept, to give, as the *Sun* says, "the base of supply that we require in Asiatic waters," may be regarded as certain. The remainder of the territory may be given to one of the friendly Powers for a fair equivalent. As matters stand to-day the Power to be selected is easily named. The United States feel the obligation they owe to England, and they know that British civilization and British rule will be for the benefit of the islanders as well as the world at large. "Our duty to the Philippines," says a leading Boston paper, "does not consist necessarily in handing them over to the Power that will give us the best bargain. It is rather to enquire which nation will do the most for their happiness, enlightenment, and general upbuilding. There is but one answer to that question. It is Great Britain. In spite of her exactions and her tyrannies at times, she has been the greatest and best colonizer in the world's history. She could, and would do better for the Philippines than France, or Russia, or Germany, or Japan. Then, as we should not wish to keep them, our duty would be to turn them over to the next best guardianship that the world affords." If it is any advantage to England to own a new Asiatic possession she can probably add to the Empire without much trouble.

It is easy enough to see what must inevitably follow after the United States have acquired their first colony or naval station. To stop there would be to pause irresolute on the threshold when the door stands invitingly open. The Philippines on the one side must be balanced by Porto Rico on the other. The insolent assumption of Germany or any other Power that the United States may not acquire territory as compensation for the war (does Germany forget Alsace-Lorraine?) cannot and will not be tolerated. With Porto Rico and the Philippines under the American flag the opposition to the acquisition of the Hawaiian islands will be much less marked. Spain, through her imbecility, has changed the whole course of American policies, and forced the Republic into its proper place as one of the factors of international politics.

The people of this country as yet only half realize the great debt they owe to England and the still greater obligations they are under to the British Ambassador at this capital. We are too near events now to see the proper perspective; a few years hence when history is written Sir Julian Pauncefote's services will be given

their true value. It would not be surprising if a grateful Congress should follow the example set by one of its predecessors and erect a statue to Pauncefote as it did to Lafayette. The Frenchman drew his sword to help the young Republic; the English diplomat prevented two and perhaps three swords from being turned against the country which he so genuinely admires.

This is no exaggeration. Sir Julian Pauncefote's diplomacy was not only far superior to that of President McKinley, but it was also far more effective. At the time just prior to the outbreak of the war, when Spain in her desperation turned to the Powers to save her from the effects of her own folly, the attitude of Sir Julian Pauncefote here and the representations he made to our Government prevented pressure being exercised on the United States. France and Austria were willing to support Spain; Germany was more than anxious to curb the growing power of the American Republic, for which it has no love; and Russia, despite the humbug of "traditional friendship," sulked. The attitude of Russia has not yet been fully explained, but I am warranted in making this statement. Russia was extremely angry at the understanding which existed between England and the United States over Chinese affairs, and the moral support given by this country to Great Britain. Had England shown any disposition to join with the Central European Powers in attempting to bring pressure upon the United States, Russia would have promptly come to the front in her old *rôle* of America's friend. Sir Julian's astute diplomacy checkmated the Russian game. It was only at the last, when England's position made coercion impossible, that Russia grudgingly joined in the joint note of "respectful regret."

Had Sir Julian given the Ambassadors of the other Powers the least encouragement, the greatest embarrassment, if not something more serious, would have been caused the Administration. The joint note presented to the President was a perfunctory document and meant nothing; it was the hope of the Ambassadors at their first meetings to serve formal notice upon the American Government calling a halt. England held the key to the situation. Sir Julian played his part with much skill, firmness, and tact. He was willing to do whatever was proper to prevent the horrors of war, but he would not tolerate any suggestion of coercion. Practically Sir Julian was given by Lord Salisbury *carte blanche* in the conduct of negotiations, and when it became known that England was the moral ally of the United States, prepared even to give more substantial proofs of friendship if needed, France, Germany, and Austria threw their cards on the table and left the game in disgust. The United States had no more to fear from the interference of the European Powers.

Sir Julian Pauncefote will shortly retire from active service. His diplomatic triumph is a fitting close to a long and successful career, the latter part of which has been spent in cementing the relations between the people of the United States and Great Britain. No man has done more to remove the cause of friction and promote friendship; no man, I believe, so fully realizes what benefits to both countries would follow from an Anglo-American alliance, and no men have done more to pave the way to bring about that consummation.

It is a pity that the editors of certain London newspapers cannot appreciate the situation. Granted that an editor may be prejudiced against America, why should he be so foolish as to render impossible an alliance which cannot injure England and may result in her incalculable good? Are we determined to make an enemy when with equal ease we can make a friend? Common sense dictates the answer.

The editor of *The St. James's Gazette* for reasons best known to himself, may be proud to know that he has destroyed much of the good work which Lord Salisbury has so consistently encouraged, and only *The Times*, through its New York correspondent, shares with him the dubious honour of having made more mischief and done greater harm.

It seems a work of superogation for *The St. James's Gazette* to say: "There is a great deal of billing and cooing among emotional Anglo-Saxons at present. In the United States there is a certain amount of gush, probably as sincere as the hysterical emotion excited by Bryan's flashy 'cross of gold' metaphor. Here there are always people who gush when America is concerned, but these waves of emotion come and go. Deep-rooted feelings of dislike and substantial interests don't."

Why, one may ask, should there be "deep-rooted feelings of dislike"? Why is this intelligent editor so purblind he cannot see that if there are deep-rooted feelings of dislike it is to his advantage as an Englishman, to the advantage of his country, not to cause them to sink still deeper and give off fresh tendrils, but to uproot them.*

As for *The Times* and its American correspondent, their case is apparently hopeless, but fortunately the dictum of *The Times* no more carries the weight it once did, although its influence is still

* It should be noted that the overwhelming majority of British newspapers, though exceedingly ill-informed on American affairs, have done justice to the Cuban policy of the American people in their editorial columns. This is true of *The Times* in spite of the copious and costly stream of misrepresentation with which its New York correspondent is permitted to stale its columns.—EDITOR, *N.R.*

harmful. "Mr. Smalley," as an American paper remarks, "has been busily engaged of late in heaping upon the Government and people of this country an abuse so vulgar and so insolent that, were he a person of more importance, he would be tabooed in all respectable and patriotic circles. It happens, however, that one can count upon his finger the persons who are interested in Mr. Smalley's opinions, or who feel for him anything save a good-humoured, if contemptuous, indifference. Public opinion has reconciled itself to the misfortune of the London *Times* in having on this side a representative so ignorant, so prejudiced, and so misleading. If the London *Times* and its readers can put up with the rubbish which Smalley sends to them in such nauseous abundance, that is their affair, not ours."

It is more pleasure to quote from the New York *Times*, which ignoring "deep-rooted feelings of dislike," truthfully says:—

"It is the prevalence in Great Britain of the commercial spirit that makes Englishmen so much more appreciative than Europeans of the Continent of what we are trying to do in Cuba. For it is exactly what England herself has had to do in many outlying parts of the world, and what she has lately been doing with conspicuous success in Egypt, and what she has been trying to do in the Far East. When we throw off the fetters of our political and commercial isolation we, too, will adopt the policy of 'the open door,' and take our share in the beneficent work of civilizing mankind by commerce. In that cause the Anglo-Saxon nations could well afford to face the world in arms. And in any case the better understanding which our intervention in Cuba has brought about between England and ourselves is worth all the sacrifices that the war has thus far required of us."

I have pointed out what may be the effect of the war on the international relations of the United States. Not less significant and important is it to observe that the firing of the first shot wiped out the last remaining trace of sectionalism. It was not so long ago that French newspapers seriously wrote about the impossibility of the United States going to war because the former Confederate States would seize the opportunity to declare their independence. Written seriously in France, this was read humorously in America, where everyone knows there is no more loyalty in any part of the country than in what was once the cradle of the lost cause. The world knows now how true this is. "We have to thank the Spaniards in Cuba," says a Northern Republican paper, "for proving that sectional lines have been wiped out in this country. When they jeered at General Lee, calling him Yankee, the world learned that Mason and Dixon's line had ceased to exist." It has

truly ceased when a Republican President commissions with the highest rank in the army General Lee and General Wheeler, two of the most noted names in the military history of the Confederacy. The New York *Sun's* editorial comment on the last act of reconstruction should be read and carefully preserved by editors, in Paris and elsewhere, who at some hysterical moment in the future may be affrighted by the spectacle of a new Southern Confederacy. Says the *Sun*:—

"In the harbour of Manila, half way around the globe, George Dewey, of Vermont, has completed the process of reconstruction which began at Appomattox thirty-three years earlier.

"For years the people of the old Confederate States, and the survivors of the Confederate army and navy have loyally and unreservedly accepted the flag of the United States as the flag of their undivided allegiance and their unalterable love. It has long been their flag again, and in times of national rejoicing or of national danger they have hailed it, and rallied around it with precisely the same sentiments as inspire their fellow-citizens of the North.

"Yet, until Sunday last, May 1st, 1898, the flag of the new Union had never been a battle flag. On that day it floated for the first time for fifty years above the smoke of a battle in which North and South were fighting for it side by side. The splendid victory won by Dewey and his men on the other face of the earth is the first victory on land or sea in which the Americans of the North and the Americans of the South have an equal share; for it is the first action since the end of the Mexican War, exactly half a century ago, in which they have fought together, as of old, against a common enemy.

"The glorious naval engagement in Manila Bay makes history, and marks an epoch in more ways than one. Not the least significant of its aspects is in the circumstance that, on that day, Commodore Dewey commanding, the final act of reconstruction was completed and the Union made perfect for all time, under the Stars and Stripes."

The war has brought a reorganization of the Cabinet. The retirement of Mr. Cary, the Postmaster-General, was not unexpected, and attracted little attention. He is a colourless, respectable old gentleman, who has amassed a great fortune and, like many other men of his stamp, eagerly sought a place in the American Peerage, the Cabinet. In a time of peace one nonentity is as good as another in the post office department, but when the country goes to war the position of a member of the Cabinet becomes of much greater importance. Mr. Cary was opposed to war, and unequal to the

physical strain which the changed conditions involved. He quietly dropped out and scarcely a ripple rose to the surface.

The retirement of John Sherman was the expected, but it was, nevertheless, dramatic and exceedingly pathetic. A once strong man, a great man, who was always a statesman first and a politician afterwards, who combined in a rare degree creative and administrative qualities, unfortunately lives a few years too long and blots his career through the remorseless cruelty of old age. John Russell Young, writing of the passing of John Sherman, likens his retirement to the departure of an old servant, who, having done his work, receives his character and goes home. But the simile is not a happy one. The old servant may be retired—honourably retired—after many years of faithful devotion and is regarded as a friend and not a servitor; he is not unfeelingly cast out. Sherman, on the other hand, was dismissed; and his "engagement" and dismissal constitute a chapter as brutal as any ever written in American politics—which know no sentiment and no remorse.

John Sherman, as the world knows now, as the readers of THE NATIONAL REVIEW knew then, was taken out of the Senate to make a place for Mr. Mark Hanna. Mr. Sherman was not considered in this arrangement. Had he not been senile, had he not lost his physical and mental powers, he would have contemptuously scorned the temptation. Led by false friends to believe he could not be returned to the Senate, and that he would add to his reputation by accepting the portfolio of Secretary of State, the old man, a memory of his once great personality, clutched at the offer. Mr. McKinley knew what would happen, Mr. Hanna knew, Sherman's friends and enemies knew; only Sherman was in ignorance. He left the Capitol, where he had been a potent figure for more than forty years, to enter the State Department, although he knew nothing of diplomacy, had no grasp of international questions and cared nothing for them. He was a great Finance Minister; his mastery of financial details was marvellous; his influence was always salutary, and on more than one occasion he showed his courage by going against public clamour. But he was out of his place in the State Department, as he would have been as the teacher of a young ladies' dancing class; and he failed as Secretary of State because he was no longer John Sherman, but merely a name.

All these things Mr. McKinley knew. He knew that before his administration had seen its second anniversary Sherman would no longer be a member of the Cabinet, but it made no difference to him. Once Mr. Hanna had the title to Sherman's former seat, Sherman could go or stay as he pleased. While he

remained he would be humoured as a child; a strong man would act as his guardian, and see that he injured neither himself nor anyone else. Month after month the old man enacted this pathetic farce of playing at being Secretary of State. A wreck mentally, forgetting the names and faces of his confidential assistants, oblivious to-day of what he had done yesterday, in ignorance of public questions, he went to his department, he signed his name to papers when instructed, and he believed himself to be a man of affairs, to be carrying on the diplomacy of his Government. Finally the situation became an impossible one. The old servant was in the way; he was getting officious, and proving a nuisance, and must be dismissed. He would not accept the hint to go; he could not understand that he was not wanted. His fears were worked upon. He was made to understand that his health was in danger, that it was imperatively necessary for him to be relieved from all exacting cares. Once again he fell into the trap—he was dismissed.

War's alarms have had an interest all their own for our great North American Empire. The Dominion military authorities have most carefully observed the efforts required to place the American army in the field, and now fear invasion from their southern neighbours less than they ever did before. Happily, the prospect of war between the United States and Great Britain is a contingency so remote as to be almost an impossibility, but it is nevertheless gratifying to know that an invasion of Canada would not be quite so easy as some people on this side of the line have so frequently predicted.

In the past, whenever there has been friction between the two countries—noticeably during the Venezuelan excitement—the newspapers, public men, and military officers have talked rather lightly about "throwing" an army of 100,000 men into Canada, capturing Montreal, Toronto, and Quebec, cutting off communication with the West, and generally holding the Dominion at their mercy. With that flambuoyancy which is such a national characteristic, it has been taken for granted that any army of 100,000 men, like Job's gourd, will spring from the ground overnight fully armed, fully equipped, disciplined and drilled, with all the necessary artillery, ammunition, and supplies. Judging from the time it has taken the Government to prepare a force of 5,000 or 6,000 regulars to hold a base of supplies in Cuba, and the much greater time it will require before the volunteer army of 125,000 men is equipped for service, Great Britain could send troops from England, Malta, Gibraltar, the West Indies, and India—picked troops, remember, who know what fighting means, and not raw levies—before the American

army had been mobilized. But the necessity of either country apprehending invasion from the other does not exist, and it will have disappeared entirely when Great Britain and the United States stand allied before all the world.

The Republican Party is a war party, and will profit by the present condition of affairs. A few months ago the chances of the Republicans carrying the House of Representatives this autumn were against them. I now believe they will retain their control, although the present majority may be somewhat reduced. Nor will it be surprising if Mr. Bryan is not heard of again as a Presidential candidate.

The times in the United States are improving; no one can question that assertion. Business shows marked vigour. War, instead of causing stagnation, is stimulating many lines of trade, and the expenditures of the Government are putting millions of pounds into circulation. The high prices for cereals make the farmers of the West rich, and when the West is prosperous the rest of the country is in the same condition. The dread of war, the unknown complications which might follow in its train, the fear of a possible defeat, served to unsettle business and depress values. Now that the worst is known, now that it is seen war is not so terrible as it appeared, confidence is returning and signs of a "boom" are apparent.

All these things mitigate against Mr. Bryan's hopes of again receiving the nomination. Believing, as I do, that the silver agitation of two years ago was more social than economic, and was the expression of discontent due to depressed industrial conditions, it follows that with these conditions reversed, the silver movement loses much of its force. If men are fairly satisfied with their surroundings, if they are earning good wages, and have no difficulty in finding employment, they will be less inclined to change their political masters. Mr. Bryan is too closely identified with silver to make it possible for him to take up any other issue, or to subordinate silver to any other cause. Provided conditions remain as they are, that trade continues to improve, and America finds a ready market for her surplus wheat, the Democratic Party two years hence must make its campaign on something else than silver, and someone else other than William Jennings Bryan must be its standard-bearer.

A war record, as a current writer remarks, is an enviable political possession, as many a poor, belated abolitionist and peace democrat found to his cost when seeking the suffrages of a free people. And a free people dearly love the man on horseback. Of the twenty elected Presidents, eleven were officers in the army before they

held the sceptre of power. It is perhaps with this knowledge in mind that Mr. Bryan sought to obtain a commission from President McKinley, and being refused has announced his intention of serving in the ranks. In every American soldier's knapsack may be found the key to the White House. Before the war was declared there were peace representatives and war representatives; now none are more anxious than the former men of peace to show their belief in the justice of war waged in the name of humanity. No wonder McKinley again thanks that lucky star which has so often brought him victory. His political opponents, as usual, have been acting foolishly. The Democratic Party is noted for the ease with which it blunders. The Democrats in Congress opposed the war revenue legislation, and at a most inopportune time attempted to secure a recognition for silver by having the seigniorage coined to provide revenue to carry on the war. Their folly will probably be rebuked by the country at the elections in November.

If one may dismiss the war for a moment, a curious discovery made by a Chicago newspaper is worthy of attention. In Kansas City an officer of the jail has reported that nine out of ten coloured persons committed to that institution can read and write, while only eight of ten white people are able to do so. There is no good reason why the proportion of illiteracy should be different in Kansas City than in any other northern city, and we are therefore confronted with the remarkable spectacle of the black race being better educated in the rudiments than the white, and if this exists among the criminal classes it should hold good in circles where the officer of the law is not a terror. Reports from Chicago and elsewhere show that it is easier to keep coloured boys in the public school than it is white, who lose no opportunity to play truant. The efforts made by the coloured people to secure a good education for their children, and the readiness with which they acquire knowledge are striking indications of the future of the race if intelligently directed. The Indian who is always a savage has been petted and sentimentalized and an effort made to gloss him over with the veneer of civilization which scratches off. The coloured man has been left pretty well to shift for himself and has worked out his own salvation.

A. Maurice Low.

A DESCENDANT OF THE PROPHET.

In Memoriam, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan Bahadur, K.C.S.I., L.L.D.

Among the nobles who at the beginning of this century still clung to the tottering fortunes of the Emperors of Delhi was an illustrious family which could trace its descent directly to the Prophet of Arabia. The family had come from Persia to India in the time of Akbar, and had served the house of Tamerlane during the hey-day of its splendour in the field and at the council-table.

Eighty-one years ago a son was born in this family who was called Syed Ahmad. In those days the great Moghul still sat in faded splendour on the throne of Delhi; his nominal suzerainty was still recognized by the East India Company, which had but recently became the dominant power in India.

Throughout the peninsula the Muhamadans had just begun to realize that the sceptre of Hindustan had passed from their hands for ever, and that the long warfare between themselves and the Christians had once again upon a fresh battle-field been decided against them. It is not surprising that they were sullenly hostile to the English, and that they refused to learn our language and the sciences of Europe.

We are apt, carelessly, to attribute their attitude to Muhamadan fanaticism, but it was in part due to a quasi-national pride with which we ought to be able to sympathize. It is true that in the Musalman world there has never been a definite territorial nationality, but there has been a Musalman civilization and a Musalman type of society which in different countries has been nourished largely on the same literature, followed the same social usages, and practised the same religion. This society has for centuries been in conflict with Christendom; and it is surely not discreditable to the Muhamadans that in the first bitterness of defeat they refused to surrender their own traditions and manners for the civilization of their conquerors. If Christendom were ever overwhelmed by a Mongolian invasion, I do not think that the English would be the first to adopt the pigtail of their conquerors or feed upon strange Celestial dishes. The Muhamadans saw with contempt the Hindus

who had been their subjects making haste to learn the manners of their new masters, but clung for their own part with more obstinate fondness to the memories of their past.

It was among these adherents of a lost cause that Syed Ahmad was brought up. His mother, who seems to have been a woman of remarkable intelligence and force of character, educated him with an austere strictness which was still a tradition among well-born Muhamadans. He has told me that on one occasion she turned him out of the house into the streets of Delhi for striking a servant, and would not receive him back until he had asked and obtained the forgiveness of the man he had struck.

In his boyhood he used to go freely in and out of the royal palace which still stood practically as it had been built in the palmy days of Shahjehan. His father was an intimate companion of the Emperor, and, as the boy grew up, Akbar Shah II. bestowed on him those resonant titles of dignity which were all he had left to give. We cannot now exactly tell the motives which induced him to break with the traditions of his family. I have heard only that he used to say that instead of wasting their lives in impotent regrets, his people ought to recognize the incontrovertible fact of British supremacy, and attempt under altered conditions to earn an honourable livelihood. It is certain that when he grew to be a man, he scandalized his relations by accepting service under the Company, and was nominated a subordinate judge.

When he was a man of forty, in the district of Bijnore the Mutiny broke out. Faithful to the salt he had eaten, he used the influence, which his personal character and noble lineage gave him, among Muhamadans, to support the Government, and risked his own life not once, but many times, to save Englishmen and women from death. Having discovered on one occasion that a band of Pathans were preparing to murder a number of English prisoners, he rushed into their midst, and, throwing aside his sword and pistols, and assuring them that they must kill him before they laid a finger on the English, he dared them to commit the sin of spilling the blood of the Prophet, and by pressing this religious scruple, and by his vehement entreaties, he was able to bring away the prisoners to a place of safety. For his services to Government he was rewarded with a pension, half of which was to descend to his son.

But it was upon native society, and especially upon the Muhamadans, that the misfortunes of the Mutiny fell most heavily. English historians have lost sight of this, and the most tragic page of the history of 1857-58 is still unwritten. Though Syed Ahmad was himself in Bijnore, his family still resided in Delhi. When the rebels seized that town they endured all the miseries that must fall

on the peaceful inhabitants of a besieged city garrisoned by a mutinous soldiery. When the English were forcing their way into the city, the terror-stricken inhabitants began to stream out on the opposite side; Syed Ahmad's mother called to the people of her own household, saying: "What are you running from now? The time to flee was when the rebels were in the city; now we are saved." Unfortunately, the English, in their eager desire for exemplary vengeance, took but little pains to distinguish the guilty from the innocent. When Syed Ahmad reached Delhi he found his home in ruins; many of the inmates were reduced to the last stage of exhaustion by want of food, and his mother had but a blanket left wherewith to cover herself; a few years afterwards she died from the privations she had then endured. It is a proof of Syed Ahmad's magnanimity that he was able to forgive the English the horrors of that time. He recognized that the passionate anger which was engendered by the massacre of women and children could not be discriminating in the hour of triumph. But those calamitous days made an indelible impression upon him.

In after years he used to tell how, when order had been restored, and he beheld the ruin of his own community, he determined to leave India and settle in Mecca. But then he reflected that very few Muhamadans were in a position to do likewise, and that he must leave his co-religionists behind him with no hope for the future. Was it possible for them, he used to ponder, to regain their material prosperity and social importance under the British Government?

Forgetful of the prejudices among which he had grown up, he believed that the English would fulfil the promises of the Queen's Proclamation, and would appoint even Muhamadans to positions of trust and dignity if they could prove themselves both capable and trustworthy. He recognized that as long as the Muhamadans refused to learn the sciences of Europe they were not the equals of the English servants of the Queen, and that no Government could trust them with power until they laid aside their hostility to the governing race. He asked himself, therefore, whether the religion of Islam did really forbid Muhamadans to learn from unbelievers and enjoin perpetual enmity to the Christians? And he became a theologian to answer these questions upon which the future of his people depended. He came to the conclusion that the original teaching of Islam had been distorted by prejudice and the accidents of history. According to tradition, Muhamad had said: "Go even to China to acquire learning!" And so far from sanctioning the hostility between the two creeds, God Himself had said in the Koran that the true believers would find their best friends among Christians. So he devoted himself to what was to

be the work of his life—to calling upon his people to lay aside their hatred of the English, and to take up English education.

It is not easy for us to realize the intensity of the opposition which his teaching aroused. Centuries of warfare between the two creeds had made Muhamadans believe that hatred of the Franks was a cardinal article of their faith. Islam in India, by contact with Hinduism, had acquired something of the peculiar exclusiveness of the Brahmans. Muhamadans had come to believe that their religion, as if it had been a matter of ceremonial purity, would be defiled if they ate or drank with Christians; the Maulvis, or Doctors of the Law, had acquired the authority of priests in direct opposition to the spirit of Islam, which recognizes no mediator between man and God; they had observed the simple theism of Islam beneath a cloud of glosses and interpretations, and, like the Scribes and Pharisees of old, had made the commandment of God of none effect by their traditions; they insisted on the precise observance of a trivial ceremonial, to the neglect of the spiritual life, and paid tithe of mint, anise, and cummin, while they omitted the weightier matters of the law.

When Syed Ahmad proclaimed his views he was received with the bitterness felt for one who has gone over to the enemy. When, to give a practical example of his own teaching, he had an awning erected in a public garden and under it took tea with an English magistrate, it is said that hundreds of people looked on horror-struck. But little by little he made converts, for he appealed to the life and teaching of Muhamad himself, and among Musalmans every man who can understand Arabic is a competent interpreter of the sacred text. He sent his own sons to an English Government school in Benares, and in 1871 went with them to England to place one of them at Cambridge. On his return he was tempted to stop at Mecca, but he abstained from doing so because he foresaw that it would be said that he had gone there to wash off the impurity of his visit to England. When he landed in Bombay he found that the leading Maulvis of Delhi had excommunicated him, and had declared that anybody who ate or drank with Syed Ahmad would thereby become a Kafir. In consequence, even his friends stood aloof from him, and, on his return to his native country, he was banished from domestic life and compelled to take all his meals at hotels and refreshment-rooms. When he reached Delhi he found that even his relations dared not eat with him. On one occasion, soon after his return, he met a lady of his family, and she said to him: "Cousin, you have returned from a long journey; to-night you must eat with me at my house." Syed Ahmad asked her whether she had not heard of the ban which the doctors of the law had laid upon him, and that she would become

a Kafir if she ate with him? She told him to come, notwithstanding, and at night sitting beside him in order that there might be no doubt but that she had come beneath the curse of the Maulvis, she helped herself to some food from his plate, dipping her hand with him in the dish after the immemorial custom of the East.

Before his voyage to England, Syed Ahmad had attempted to diffuse the learning of Europe through the medium of the vernacular, and with the help of those friends who had come to share his views he had established a society for the translation of English books into Hindustani. But in England his views had taken a wider scope. He determined to found a college similar to those he had seen at Cambridge, and remodel Muhamadan education on European lines. It was becoming only too clear that the Mutiny had shaken the crumbling fabric of Muhamadan society to pieces; a genuine reform of an Oriental character was no longer possible, and Syed Ahmad urged his people to adopt those methods of education for which he had conceived a profound respect in England. But though he continually lamented the degeneracy of the Muhamadans of India, he was far too proud a Moslem to wish to see his people altogether Anglicized. In founding a college for Muhamadans he wished, in the first place, to preserve religious instruction as an integral part of their education, and to enforce the particular ethics of Islam with all the weight of divine sanction. It has often been observed that the secular education of the Government schools undermines religious belief, and that the morality which a Government, which is impartial towards all religious systems, can teach, is so vague and neutral as to have no coercive power. The boarding-house which is attached to the college which Syed Ahmad eventually succeeded in founding, is directed on strictly denominational lines; prayers are repeated five times a day in the college Mosque, the students are expected to fast during the month of Ramazan, and are strictly forbidden to drink wine.

Even Syed Ahmad's personal friends and followers laughed at him when he first proposed to collect subscriptions from the Muhamadan community to build an English college. Undaunted by their remarks or the savage opposition which he encountered, he contributed largely from his own slender resources (for he was to the last a comparatively poor man) and forced somewhat reluctant contributions from his own relations and friends. He conducted a campaign throughout the North-West Provinces and the Punjaub, calling public meetings and explaining to the Muhamadans the absolute necessity of English education, unless their community was to sink into hopeless degradation and decay. In 1872 the first stone of the future college was laid in Aligarh.

The little band of reformers had at first to content themselves with a small school in a bungalow conducted by native masters; gradually their means expanded sufficiently to enable them to engage an English headmaster. In 1878 the school was converted into a college, and from that time to this it has been steadily growing in importance, and can now boast of as large a staff as any educational institution in the North-West Provinces, and before the recent famine it had more than 500 students in the school and college departments together.

It was in these latter years that the present writer, as a member of the English staff, came to know and revcrence Sir Syed. He was already an old man, and his labours on behalf of the Muhamadans were universally recognized. It is true that very few of them shared his religious views. In discarding the traditions which had obscured the true teaching of Islam and appealing to the sacred text against the commentators, Syed Ahmad had initiated a rationalistic movement which had carried him beyond the objects he primarily had in view. That he was right in contending that neither English education nor sincere friendship with Englishmen are forbidden by the religion of Islam, Muhamadans nowadays would generally concede, but they have not followed him in his more advanced opinions. To the value of his political and social labours, however, even those who thought his heresies most pernicious bear witness. He was admired and beloved because, in words often quoted, he had arrested the decline of the Muhamadan nation in India. In lines known to every educated Muhamadan, their nationol poet, Hali, has thus described the condition into which they had fallen :—

"Such is the plight in the world of this people ; their vessel has fallen into the whirlpool ; the shore is far off and the storm is lowering ; every moment it is thought that she will sink ; but the people of the vessel do not stir in their sleep ; the people of the vessel lie in heedless slumber.

"The clouds of misfortune are gathering above their heads, disaster is impending and sorrow is circling above them ; from all sides comes this cry : 'What were you yesterday, and what have you become to-day? Just now you were awake, and, behold, you are now sleeping.'

"But such is the indifference of this heedless people, so contented are they with their own disgrace, so stubborn are they though they are trampled in the mire, so fast are they asleep though the morn has come, that they neither regret their own dishonour nor wish to rival the glory of other peoples."*

And as Syed Ahmad had been the first to point out and deplore the decadence of the Muhamadans, so for many years he was the only man who could point to a remedy. Even more than by his passionate exhortations he had by his example inspired them to struggle against the process of decay. The college at Aligarh was not only the means of spreading education among a backward com-

* Maulvi Altef Hosain Hali. *Masaddas.*

munity, but it was a living proof that the Muhamadans were still capable of doing something great; it was an argument against the despair which was in all men's mouths.

Syed Ahmad's labours for his own people were hardly less valuable to the British Government. The English at first laid the whole blame of the Mutiny upon the Muhamadans, and they resolved to exact a signal retribution. Syed Ahmad alone dared to tell them the truth in the hour of their triumph, and stood between their wrath and his own people. His little pamphlet on *The Causes of the Indian Revolt* made many of the English very angry, and he well-nigh forfeited by it the good opinion which his loyalty had won; but time has largely confirmed the views he held in 1858, and the pamphlet remains one of the most interesting of contemporary documents. In this, and his subsequent controversy with Sir W. W. Hunter, and, indeed, throughout his life, he contended that so far from the Muhamadans of India being bound in conscience to rebel against the Queen, they were under the strongest religious obligations to be loyal to her Government, and he proved that even during the Mutiny the greatest Maulvis had interpreted the Islamic law in this sense. In one of his last political writings he maintained that the Sultan of Turkey could claim no spiritual authority over the Muhamadans of India, and that it was not to him but to the Queen of England that their loyalty and obedience were due according to the religious law; he acknowledged that he and all Muhamadans sympathized with the only remaining Musalman potentate, but that this sympathy could not cancel the obligation of loyalty to the Queen; the Muhamadan dislike and distrust of the English was due to historical accidents and to a prejudice which he spent his life in combating. Sir Auckland Colvin, formerly Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces, said that Sir Syed Ahmad had done more than any man, English or native, to strengthen the British Empire in India. He was for a long time a member of the Viceroy's Council, and for his conspicuous services to the Government he received the honour of knighthood.

No mere record of what he actually achieved can give an adequate conception of Sir Syed Ahmad's impressive personality. His whole conversation and character was marked with the unmistakable stamp of greatness. I think that this was partly due to the fact that, in spite of his strong feelings, he was able, apparently unconsciously, to approach every subject with an entire absence of personal prepossessions; for this reason his political opinions were singularly luminous. In India every political question is distorted by the cross-lights of innumerable racial or religious interests, and few of us can habitually disentangle the welfare of the small group to which we belong from the interests of the motley empire. But

Sir Syed's elevation of mind was equally conspicuous in those trivial matters for which we hardly think it worth while to assume the *rôle* of statesman-like disinterestedness. During the Famine of 1896-97, when he was an old man of nearly eighty, Sir Syed summoned a Muhamadan Educational Conference, for which temporary sheds and tents were erected at Meerut. Suddenly the rain came down and drowned us all out of our temporary structures and wrecked the large tent which served us for a hall. Though we all knew how valuable the rain was to the growing crops, most of us grumbled at our own discomfort and the interruption of business. But Sir Syed rose imperturbably amid the dripping ruins of our canvas hall, and serenely announced that, as God in his mercy had sent us the gift of rain, the meeting would be held in an adjoining building next day. But he was very far from being lowly and meek when his indignation was aroused; he dominated his own community, and even when he was asking them for subscriptions, and, as he used to say, begging from house to house, he rated them for their faults with terrible candour, and such was their reverence for him that it was never resented. I venture to give unaltered an extract from a private letter of my own, relating an incident at the same Educational Conference of which I was a witness :—

"In the semi-publicity in which he always lives, a delegation from a city in the Panjab came to visit him, and related their humble efforts in the direction of Muhamadan education; they had not done some of the things the Syed recommends, but I expected that they would have got patted on the back. Instead of this, however, the Syed rated them like dogs [for their short-comings] and, catching fire at his own anger, pitched into the Muhamadans generally for their prejudice against the English, and chaunted the praise of the English of his staff, asking where were Muhamadans like them who would do so much for their co-religionists as these Englishmen did. 'And these,' he said, 'are the people whom you call Kafirs, and won't sit by their side for fear the wind from an Englishman should contaminate you. If your religion is such a shaky frail thing that it can be lost so, let it go altogether; it's not worth keeping.' Then, furiously: 'I will believe in your honesty when I see you get on a public platform and dance before the people for the good of your nation; there is difference of heaven and earth between your words and deeds.' The poor delegation sat with bowed heads under the storm, and when they got up to leave, Sir Syed so far relented as to say that they must not take his frank speaking in bad part. To which they answered that it was to hear such words of wisdom that they had come."

It is impossible within the limits of an article to do justice to Sir Syed's extraordinary manysidedness. He was a theologian and a distinguished Oriental scholar, though he never knew more than a few words of English; he was a great statesman, and because he was a statesman he was an educationalist, and the college at Aligarh, which was deeply impressed with his personality, represents a conception of education of which there is no other example in India. He was, besides, an antiquarian, and himself the architect of the college which he built.

But those who were admitted to his intimacy will, above all, remember his impressive personality. The elevation of his mind, which was incapable of harbouring a mean or petty thought, was reflected in his proud eye and leonine forehead, but beneath his dignified bearing there beat a heart of singular warmth and simplicity. His personal affections were intensely strong, and when his friendship was once given he trusted without reserve; and when, as upon one notable occasion, his confidence was abused, he suffered bitterly in separating himself from a man whom, in spite of his ingratitude, he still loved. To the warmth of his heart was due the singularly captivating charm of his manner. Even in the East I have never seen anything to equal the dignified courtesy of Sir Syed; this may have been in part a surviving characteristic of the vanished Court of Delhi, but it was the genuine expression of a nature which had always remained generous and loving in spite of a lifetime of strife and bitter controversy. Sir Syed Ahmad died after a few days' illness, on the 28th March, 1898. As he was lowered into the grave one of the Muhamadans who was standing by, said: "This is the grave of our nation!"

THEODORE MORISON.

TWO FOREIGN CRITICISMS OF AUSTRALASIAN DEMOCRACY.*

DEMOCRACY in Australasia has not yet found its De Tocqueville or its Bryce. No doubt these will appear in good time, when the theatre of the Antipodes has grown large enough to attract amongst its audience some man of first-class calibre. Meantime the experiments of the young democracies by the Southern Ocean have been the subject of a very large number of more or less hasty impressionist sketches. Some of these have been brilliant, like Sir Charles Dilke's *Greater Britain*, or pleasant, like Mr. Davitt's recent book; most of them are neither literature nor serious contributions to political and economic knowledge. The greater part are, of course, written by British tourists for British readers. It is but rarely that a foreigner appears in this field. Within the last two years, however, there have been two exceptions to this. The first took the form of a series of amusingly slashing articles in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* by Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu; the other, a more sober and cautious estimate, was published in the *Atlantic Monthly* for March by Mr. E. L. Godkin. Mr. Leroy-Beaulieu has travelled through Australia and New Zealand, and Mr. Godkin has not. The advantages of writing after personal acquaintance with a country are admitted. Nevertheless, it is possible to see a country without studying it, just as it is possible to study a country without seeing it. Mr. Godkin has fallen into some natural mistakes as well as into some errors which he might have been expected to avoid; but, though the objections to be taken to his statements and deductions are neither few nor small, his criticism, however dry and unsympathetic, has at least the appearance of an attempt at a fair judgment. The impression, on the other hand, that the French indictment leaves upon the mind is that of being the work of one so completely prepossessed by certain economic theories and anticipations

* "The Australasian Democracy," by E. L. Godkin, *Atlantic Monthly*, March, 1898.

"L'Australie et La Nouvelle-Zélande," by Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu, *Revue des Deux Mondes*, June, August, and September, 1896.

as to view everything the writer met, saw, or heard through their medium. The American article is more valuable than the French, because the one, though its information be second-hand, is at least based upon books, and books are, on the whole, less violent, less jaundiced, and less unfair than the chatter of hotels, steamboats, and clubs, or after-dinner gossip and red-hot newspaper tirades. I am compelled to think that it is from such sources that M. Leroy-Beaulieu has drawn most of his information.

As I have said, Mr. Godkin's mistakes are not few. To begin with he is betrayed into writing in such a way as to lead his readers to suppose that the six Colonies of Australasia, with their social and political institutions, sprang from and had their origin in the bygone squatter-*cum*-convict community of New South Wales. This is but true to a very slight extent. Victoria in substance dates from the great gold "rushes" and the flood of gold-seekers which then streamed in from the Northern Hemisphere. South Australia's connection with New South Wales has always been of the slenderest, and New Zealand is a British colony the Australian element in which has ever been trifling. Nor were the political institutions or ideas of other Colonies borrowed from Sydney. Their Constitutions were England's gift, and were modelled in Downing Street with some assistance and suggestion from Viceroys like Sir George Grey.

Pace Mr. Godkin, it was the Colonial not the Foreign Office which governed the Colonies before the era of free institutions. Then he is wrong in writing on the Colonial Legislative Councils as though they are all elected. More than one are nominated. The suggestion that the tone of the Colonial Press was given to it by young men from the English Universities, whose style is still to be traced in Australasian journals, savours of the comic. It is contrary to fact to say that the Labour Party in the Colonies "exists and grows." For at least four years it has declined. Mr. Godkin is equally wrong when he describes the Elective Executive Bills which have lately been discussed, but not passed, in certain Colonies as Bills for the election of Ministers by popular suffrage. On the contrary they contemplate election by Parliament. Nor, as far as New Zealand is concerned, is it correct to say that the notion emanated from the Labour Party. It had been before Parliament before the Labour Party was born or thought of, and it only acquired importance some three years ago through being adopted by the Prohibitionist section, chiefly, I fancy, as a handy weapon wherewith to combat the present Premier. I do not think that Free-Traders are looked upon as "cranks" in most of the Colonies, as Mr. Godkin seems to suggest. They are numerous and influential throughout Australasia. Then the Labour Department

in New Zealand has nothing whatever to do with the system of State Insurance there, which was established years before the Labour Department was conceived of, and was founded by a Colonial politician who was so far from being a rash Socialist that he afterwards stood as a Conservative candidate for an English constituency. Nor is it accurate to say that the Colonies are only prevented from making wild experiments with currency through fear of irritating the London money-lenders. A glance at the Constitutions of the Colonies would show Mr. Godkin that they are virtually precluded from legislating on matters affecting the currency. All Colonial Bills attempting to deal with such a question must be reserved by the Viceroys for the consideration of the Imperial Government, and no Colonial statesman believes that any startling change would be permitted. An overwhelming majority of colonists are probably as little disposed to make rash experiments with paper money as their most cautious mentors could wish. Mr. Godkin, indeed, quotes a proposal once made by a Queensland Ministry to issue incontrovertible paper in order to tide over a financial crisis. He appears disposed to attribute the defeat of this to firmness on the part of the Viceroy. As a matter of fact the Viceroy had no choice in the matter. Had he not told his Ministers that he would reserve their Bill for the Queen's consideration he would assuredly have been recalled to London by the Colonial Office.

Most of the mistakes touched upon above are not perhaps important enough to vitiate a general political and social estimate; but one or two of Mr. Godkin's errors go to the root of things. Both he and M. Leroy-Beaulieu fall into the time-honoured mistake of regarding Colonial loans as mere sops doled out by vote-catching politicians to the working-classes. They connect the Labour movement and the Socialistic experiments of the Colonies since 1890 with their heavy public debt, and seem to consider that both have a common origin. M. Beaulieu, indeed, goes so far as to assert that the Labour movement sprang from discontent and discomfort consequent upon the collapse of the Melbourne boom and the banking crisis of 1893. As a matter of fact the Labour movement was in full operation, and was perhaps at its height before the banking crisis. It has been strongest and most successful in Colonies other than Victoria, and which were in no way affected by the Melbourne boom. So far from the Labour parties being the outcome of the banking crisis, it has been repeatedly asserted in the Colonies that the banking crisis was the disastrous outcome of the Labour movement. The one statement is not wilder than the other. The history of the public debts of Australia has yet to be written by some examiner with an impartial mind and a free

hand. As a rule, nearly all that we hear and read about them comes, on the one hand, from Ministers and officials whose business it is to show how valuable are the Colonial assets and the Colonial estate which are being improved by the expenditure of borrowed money, or, on the other hand, from politicians and newspapers temporarily opposed to the Treasurer of the moment and bent upon defeating his budget. But this may be truthfully said, that the Australasian borrowings of the last thirty years were neither chiefly instigated nor insisted on by the working-classes. The loan policies were brought forward by middle-class politicians, most of whom would be regarded by Australasian Progressives as Conservative and anti-Labour. They were supported by the middle class, by landowners, tradespeople, and genuine settlers, as well as by speculators. For the most part the money was borrowed in good faith, under the belief that it was better that the State should develop the public estate than that the railways, telegraphs, and, to a large extent, the public lands should fall into the hands and under the control of great syndicates and corporations as they have in America. With striking inconsistency Mr. Godkin sees and admits this in one part of his article while misstating the cause of it in another part. For instance, he says :—

"Every new country possessing a great body of undeveloped resources, like those of the North American continent and of Australia, must rely largely on foreign capital for the working of its mines and the making of its railroads. In this country (America) all that work has been left to private enterprise, or, in other words, to the activity of individuals and corporations."

This is quite true, and gives in a sentence almost the whole explanation of the public debt of Australasia. Individual colonists could not carry on the work of development because they did not possess the capital, and thirty years ago, or even much later, the rates of interest to private Colonial borrowers were prohibitive. The choice to the Colonies lay between carrying out their great works of transport and utility collectively by means of the money which their Governments, and their Governments only, could borrow at fairly cheap rates in England, and in handing over these undertakings to English syndicates able to command money at English rates. Such syndicates would, of course, have taken toll of the Colonial producers in the way in which the Trusts and Companies of America exploit the workers and producers there to-day. The public debt of Australasia may be a serious burden. I do not say that it is not. But most, though not all, of it has been well invested, and, at any rate, it has saved the Colonies from being the scenes of such gigantic commercial and financial iniquities and oppression as are scathingly exposed by Mr. Henry Lloyd in that remarkable book, *Wealth against Common-*

wealth. Of the two evils I, as a colonist, infinitely prefer the public debt.

Both the French and American critics, when discussing the Colonial Parliamentary system, also fall into the common error of supposing that Australasian Cabinets are much more ephemeral apparitions than they are. This arises from fancying that a complete change of Ministry and policy takes place whenever there is a change of Premier. There both have been grossly misled. It as often happens that a Ministry is rearranged from within as that it falls by attack from without. The position of a Colonial Premier is extremely harassing. He is expected to direct the general policy of his Party, to keep in constant touch with its rank and file, to be incessantly in evidence in debate or on the platform, and to take a heavy share of detail departmental work. In addition, he almost always has private affairs to attend to which are sometimes tormenting and nearly always exacting. Downright exhaustion or the claims of business frequently leads to his breakdown or retirement. But that does not mean that his Party goes out. Take, for example, the Ministerial changes of the last thirty years in New Zealand. We find that the same Party held office from 1869 to 1884 with but two intervals, one of a month, the other of two years. In August, 1884, came a moment of commotion which saw three Cabinets formed and dismissed within a fortnight. This simply meant that the leaders of neither side managed at the first attempt to form a Ministry which would please a Parliament elected with mandate for change. But in a fortnight all was over, a durable Ministry was installed in office, and from 1884 to 1898 there have been but three distinct Ministries. In Australia, too, the lives of Cabinets have, during the last decade, been distinctly longer than formerly. Western Australia has not yet known a Ministerial change. Sir John Forrest became Premier in 1890, and is Premier still. In Queensland Sir Hugh Nelson and Mr. Byrnes, or their friends, through various combinations have governed the colony for many years; in South Australia the Kingston-Cockburn Ministry has been in for more than five years; Mr. Reid, in New South Wales, for nearly as long; in Victoria the Turner Government for four; in Tasmania Sir Edward Braddon and Sir Phillip Fysh, after succeeding each other, are amicably sharing power.

Mr. Godkin is complimentary to the Australasian Press. He sees in it a "steadying influence;" it is "serious, earnest, and influential." For myself I should be inclined to say that it is business-like, decent, and read chiefly for the sake of its news. Colonial newspapers are not political oracles or chairs of ethics. Their readers do not go to them for moral stimulus and exhortation or for economic knowledge. They are commercial concerns which endea-

vour, with considerable energy and success, to provide the public with news. They are, to a large extent, written with scissors. But they admirably fulfil the end and aim of their existence. The proportion of newspapers to available readers is, in some places, extraordinary. In New Zealand, for instance, there is a newspaper of some description to about every 1,500 adults. Good writing for its own sake is valued by certain proprietors. But even these doubt whether it pays. The qualities they esteem most in an editor are ability to steer clear of the Law of Libel and to write nothing which will cause the monthly receipts to fall off, coupled with a keen instinct for news getting. Valuable, nay, indispensable, as these qualities unquestionably are, they do not of themselves tend to make newspapers politically influential. In consequence, some of the most interesting political movements in the Colonies have been in the face of the opposition of most of the best known and most widely circulated newspapers. In nearly every colony Protection fought its way to victory in the teeth of the denunciations of three out of four of the larger newspapers. Almost the same may be said of the Radical land legislation and of Progressive taxation. The Labour Party has never yet had an organ of acknowledged standing and commercial success. Generally speaking, the Socialistic legislation of the last seven years had either the bitter enmity or the lukewarm and very candid friendship of the Press. Exceptions there were, but they were very few.

Mr. Godkin is thankful that the Australasian Press has escaped the wave of triviality which has swept over the American. If he means that Australasian papers usually write on sport with a gravity worthy of affairs of State, while American journals usually discuss affairs of State in language more suited to sport, he is right. It may be said that, with certain exceptions, the Colonial newspaper writes in precisely the same style of Australian Federation, Stoddart's Cricket Eleven, the relations of Labour and Capital, and the necessity of repairing the nearest suburban road. But, after all, in doing so they merely reflect the public attitude. Of the three competing topics of discussion in Australia this summer, that is to say, the drought, the test cricket matches, and Federation, the last named came in a very bad third.

Both Mr. Godkin and M. Leroy-Beaulieu have detected that the colonists differ far more from the Mother Country in politics than in manners. In the matter of change, legislation has gone far ahead of social opinion and life. Women, for instance, may vote in New Zealand and South Australia, but they have scarcely begun to make an appearance amongst the learned professions. They may attend public meetings and choose Members of Parliament, but they must not ride bicycles in the costume so fashionable

in France, nor may they smoke the cigarette so often seen between woman's lips in London. In the reasons given for this close reproduction of social opinions and customs both critics seem, however, to miss two points. One is the unbroken continuance of friendly relations between the mother and daughter communities. The Colonies have not only never fought with England, but for more than forty years have had no serious grievance against her. The dull arrogance of English tourists and travellers, which, as late as twenty years ago, caused far more irritation and resentment than has ever been understood here, has been much softened of recent years. What tempted Englishmen, and especially young Englishmen, to despise and patronize the Colonies was chiefly their smallness, and they are now ceasing to be so small. The poorer classes in England have long been unaffectedly proud of the Colonies, as they frankly showed at the Jubilee; even the upper classes are becoming so. There is nothing now to clash with the intense feeling of affectionate veneration which colonists of all sorts and conditions have for the historic greatness of England. But beyond and above this is the potent fact that the English literature of the day is also the literature of the Colonies. The four and a half millions in Australasia are great readers, but are still almost utterly without a literature of their own. For economic reasons this want is not likely soon to be supplied from their side, The result is that not only their books, but also their magazines, and to a considerable extent their newspapers, come from England. Their purchases of certain English magazines and weekly newspapers must be more than respectable. Even the Colonial newspapers themselves are, to a certain extent, made up of extracts from their British contemporaries. The British who, in the ordinary way read nothing whatever that is written in the Colonies, probably scarcely realize the immense amount of British printed matter which is consumed in Australasia. It may be said with truth that English magazines and newspapers are as great an influence in the Colonies as are the Colonial newspapers. If this refers much more to social and ethical questions than to political, that is mainly because Colonial politics are very little written about in the Mother Country.

M. Leroy-Beaulieu shows colonists how much reason they have to be thankful to Mr. Godkin. The American writer is, indeed, the reverse of enthusiastic over the experiments of the Colonial Democracy. He commits himself to such sweeping statements as that public affairs throughout Australasia seem from first to last to have been managed for the benefit of the working-classes—a generalization which is at least as wrong as the cry which goes up every day from the Labour Party at the Antipodes that Govern-

ment in the Colonies has been simply a game played for the benefit of land monopolists and financial institutions. But Mr. Godkin is candid enough to confess that a very considerable measure of success has so far attended the work of Democracy in Australasia. It is true that he guards himself by attributing this largely to temporary causes, and sees difficulties and perplexities looming in the near future. But he is, at any rate, moderate and cautious in his judgments, and at least in one portion of his essay delivers himself of an acute, practical, and useful comparison between the Cabinet system of the Colonies and the fixed Executives of America. He points out, and I believe him to be right in doing so, that the practical activity of Colonial Democracy, as compared with the Conservative attitude of America in the matter of social and industrial change, is chiefly due to the ever present necessity which lies upon the Colonial Executive to justify its existence. Sever a Colonial Executive from the Legislature, or even give it a three or four years' tenure of office, and there seems every reason to suppose that nothing like the annual crop of experimental legislation which now comes up almost every year in the Colonies would appear, much less be reaped.

Unlike Mr. Godkin, M. Leroy-Beaulieu takes a side. But although he has chosen to play the part of *advocatus diaboli* in his review of the work of the Democracy in Australasia, it would be unfair to accuse him of being entirely blind to facts. At the outset he gives a picture of the progress and material achievements of the Colonies by the South Pacific which is fair and often complimentary. He calls Australasia the *chef d'œuvre* of British colonization, an edifice which, in spite of defects which he proposes to point out, is, he must admit, an astonishing testimony to the genius of the architect. Yet though his impressionist sketch of the physical and industrial features of the Colonies is spirited and graphic, though in describing what he actually sees he is far less inaccurate than in his deductions, it is impossible to compliment him upon carefulness in matters of detail. For one so versed in economics his smaller blunders are far too numerous. There is no reason, for example, why he should have troubled when speaking of New Zealand to refer to such points as the habitat of the *kauri* pine or the *kea* parrot. But having done so he should not have placed the southern limit of the tree two hundred miles too far north, or spoken of the *kea*, whose home lies amongst the rocks of the Southern Alps, as a bird of the forest. The mistakes in the spelling of New Zealand place-names may be mere printer's errors; but the statement that outside the *kauri* pine good building timber is rare in New Zealand is a blunder without excuse. What the authority was which induced him to describe the shearers of the Colonies as

workmen recruited from the lowest class of labour I should be curious to know. It would be truer to say that, physically and mentally, large numbers of the shearers are the aristocracy of Colonial labour. I do not think most observers would agree with him in considering Melbourne a badly situated city, or in attributing its greatness solely to the goldfields of Ballarat and Bendigo. Why ignore the noble stretch of fertile and accessible country which expands around the capital of Victoria for fully a hundred miles in every direction? Nor is M. Leroy-Beaulieu happy in his estimate of men. In order to belittle Mr. Reid, his *bête noire*, he exalts Sir Henry Parkes, in whom he sees a true statesman. Mr. Reid doubtless has his faults, and his work in New South Wales is still on its trial, but it is monstrous to compare him unfavourably with a politician who, at any rate during his latter period, was a lowering influence in Australian public life. Finally, it is contrary to fact to describe New Zealand as leading the way in instituting communal settlement and cultivation of the soil. New Zealand has never attempted any such experiment.

Now for wider questions. M. Leroy-Beaulieu's division of Australasian industrial society has at least the merit of simplicity. He sees amongst the colonists three classes. The first comprises the squatters, to whose beneficent enterprise he attributes any elements of success and stability which the Colonies contain. Not that he thinks they contain much of the kind; far from it. America, says our French critic, may contain mushroom cities, but Australia is one vast mushroom. Left alone, the squatters would have built up a permanent and well-defined society. Unfortunately, fifty years ago they were overwhelmed by a gigantic flood of gold-seekers whose chief characteristic was hostility to regular labour. Unlucky in their search for gold, or ruined after a short and feverish prosperity, these gold-seekers flocked into the Australian towns and became the dominating element of the working-classes. It is true that there are in Australasia such persons as agricultural farmers who compose, indeed, the second of M. Leroy-Beaulieu's industrial divisions. Of these undeserving cultivators he says that, as compared with the squatters, they are of little utility. The rest of the population appear to consist of workpeople less useful even than the farmers; nay, almost useless. "They contribute almost nothing to the prosperity of Australasia." But they are the most numerous class in the Colonies, and they govern them. For the squatter, and for the squatter alone, has M. Leroy-Beaulieu a word of kindness and admiration. He sees in the pastoral tenant a good man struggling with the storms of fate. But these malign influences are not chiefly—as commonplace people have hitherto imagined—such natural evils as floods, droughts, snowstorms, and wild animals, or

even low prices and high rates of interest. No, the worst of them come from the jealousy and bitterness of the greedy and lazy workpeople who are perpetually forcing through Colonial legislatures laws destined to harass, expropriate, or even extinguish the squatter! Proof? Of course M. Leroy-Beaulieu has ample proof. Was he not once told by a young squatter whom he met on board a steamboat that so frequent were the changes of Australian land laws that he was on his way to look at South Africa and, if he liked the land, to settle there? What more complete condemnation could be desired of fifty years of legislation in seven Colonies? It is true that the year in which the conversation on the steamboat took place was one of acute pastoral depression, the result, mainly, of low prices. But that does not weigh in the critic's mind. One can but hope that his young friend did not invest his capital in South African stock-farming just in time for the rinderpest. There are worse ills than Australasian land laws, in framing which, by the way, the squatters had the chief voice for many, many years. It is difficult to discuss this picture seriously. For the squatters as pioneer settlers many pleasant things may fairly be said. Nobody but must admit the pre-eminent importance in Colonial industry of, even now, wool, meat, and leather. But if M. Leroy-Beaulieu imagines that these are the unaided products of the squatters, or are even entirely produced on the large estates, he ought to give a few hours to the intelligent study of Australasian statistics. Even if wheat, oats, maize, wine, milk, cheese, butter, fruit, vegetables, pork, bacon, and timber were neglectable quantities amongst Colonial products, there is still the ample share in stock-farming which has to be credited to the small or moderate sized graziers. Then the colonists engaged in winning gold, coal, and copper are surely an industrial element which ought to be counted in. As to Colonial manufactures, it may be that to a large extent they owe their existence to protective tariffs, though in saying so broadly M. Leroy-Beaulieu differs *toto cœlo* from Sir Robert Giffen. But whatever it be that rears and nourishes them, they are not dwarfed, feeble, withering things which M. Leroy-Beaulieu hastily dismisses in a few contemptuous sentences.

Passing from the industries to the political experiments of the Democratic Colonies our critic fairly lets himself go. His basis of criticism is of the simplest. Where any enterprise, undertaking, or experiment is the work of the State it must be bad—because it is the work of the State. Either it is an admitted failure, or complaints are made of it which reveal ominous defects certain to be ruinous in the near future; or if there is nothing else to be said against it then, as its benefits are State-conferred, they must have an enervating and demoralizing effect. Entrenched behind this triple barricade of

prejudice, M. Leroy-Beaulieu is naturally not very easy to argue with. Amongst the very numerous reforms and trials and attempts made by the Colonies it is not difficult, of course, to point to certain failures. But the plan he adopts of picking out the failures and asking his readers to judge of everything by them is the crudest trick of the unfair controversialist. Take, for example, his description of the village settlements of Australia and New Zealand. He would have his reader infer that they have failed throughout the Colonies. In order to prove this he takes the report of a partisan Select Committee upon certain communal village settlements on the banks of the Murray in South Australia. He gives the effect of this report at considerable length, and then coolly suggests that, as these particular settlements are thus shown to have failed, so all other village settlements have failed. Now, to begin with, the communal and co-operative Murray settlements have not yet failed; they are on their trial. Some have achieved a remarkable measure of success; some have been abandoned; the outlook of others again is doubtful. But if all the Murray settlements were blotted out to-morrow, that would not prevent a great part of the village settlements of South Australia from being a success. The Murray communities do not comprise more than half of them. I have visited both the Murray settlements and the others, and can say without the smallest hesitation that M. Leroy-Beaulieu's generalities are as misleading as they are one-sided. Nor are all the State villages in Victoria failures; a number are, some are not. M. Leroy-Beaulieu might at least have paused before branding the Victorian villagers as persons who are regarded as thieves by *all* their neighbours. In New Zealand the village settlements are a striking and permanent success. They have been the means of attaching to the soil in hope and comfort some five thousand human beings, who have returned to the Treasury in rent, interest, and repayments of principal a greater sum in cash than the total amount advanced to them, and who have made improvements on their holdings of more than four times the value of the Government loans. Such are some of the settlements which M. Leroy-Beaulieu sweepingly condemns because he has found a committee report in a Blue Book damning the associations on the River Murray.

I may be excused for reminding the English reader that what are called village settlements are, after all, but one, and that a minor portion of the work of the State in settling the land throughout Australasia. The ordinary settler upon State lands in the Colonies is either the purchaser of a freehold or an individual tenant. M. Leroy-Beaulieu does, indeed, make reference to the Colonial farmer, but his reference is not hopeful. He speaks of the difficulties of

turning an artisan into a peasant farmer, particularly the Australasian artisan "*qu'hypnotise le dogme des huit heures de travail*"; and he compares these hypnotized workers to the French peasant much to the disadvantage of the former. But, unless Mulhall is utterly wrong, the Australian, so far from being hypnotized by the eight hours' system, is the hardest worker in the world. I really do not think that space need be wasted in discussing M. Leroy-Beaulieu's main conclusion and final summing-up of Colonial Land Laws. Not only does he think they have failed to put people on the land, but their changeableness and their hostility to ownership are driving from the Colonies that solitary element of salvation—the squatters. Enough be it to say, that the settlement of the soil in the Colonies goes steadily on, but the flight of the great proprietors exists up to the present only in our French critic's lively imagination.

Little as M. Leroy-Beaulieu hopes of the Australasian as a farmer, his contempt for him as a townsman is sovereign. He goes even so far as to say that the departure from Australasia of a few thousand squatters would do more harm than the exodus of half the 1,100,000 human beings who inhabit Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane, and Adelaide. Possibly if with the fugitive proprietors were taken their sheep, their fences, their improvements, and the State lands upon which their flocks graze, M. Leroy-Beaulieu's remark would be true enough.

Some of his finest fulminations are reserved for Female Suffrage. Here is his verdict:—"*Au fond, tout ce mouvement féministe n'est guère qu'un vaste* humbug, *imaginé par des politiciens en quête d'agitations toujours renouvelées, des déclassés, et des cerveaux brûlés.*" To the agitators thus unflatteringly described he adds the Labour Party and the Prohibitionists. In attributing to the latter an active support of the enfranchisement of women he is quite correct, and there is no doubt that the female vote has strengthened the Prohibitionist movement, though not to the extent anticipated by its leaders. But in attributing the granting of voting to women largely to the exertions of the Labour Party, swayed by purely electioneering motives, M. Leroy-Beaulieu is characteristically wrong. The true originators of the agitation were middle-class Radicals, students of Mill and the English doctrinaires. The Female Suffrage our critic, of course, thinks bad in itself, not only as tapping a new and exhaustless source of grandmotherly legislation, but as giving impetus to what he is pleased to call feminism. What this mysterious principle or process is it is difficult precisely to comprehend, but it appears to include the entrance of women into all the employments, and the extension of her influence into all departments of public affairs and national life. Already the

working of the evil process may be discerned—by the French eye. It appears that the statistics of New South Wales show a large and steady increase in the number of women engaged in the liberal professions. It is in that direction, remarks our critic, that feminism especially pushes them. An examination of the figures will, I think, show that for "liberal professions" may be read almost entirely "school-mistresses and governesses." The increase of females in these occupations is due, not to feminism, but chiefly to the discovery on the part of education authorities that, for various branches of teaching, educated women are as capable as men, and, I am sorry to say, will usually work for lower pay. More ominous still is our critic's discovery that, side by side with feminism, goes a steady rise of the age at which young women in the Colonies marry. He quotes figures which show indeed a remarkable decline during recent years in the number of marriages of women minors If the tendency of feminism were to reduce the number of girls who become wives and, possibly, mothers before they are twenty-one, I do not know that that would be to its blame. But there is a very simple explanation of the figures aforesaid which the writer of the articles in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* has, nevertheless, missed. It is, that in the earlier days of young Colonies the men are so much more numerous than the women that the latter may in most instances, marry if they choose as soon as they begin to be of marriageable age. As time goes on Nature gradually tends to equalize the number of the sexes, and marriages of female minors consequently lessen in number. Moreover, as the population increases, and the land becomes occupied and labour more plentiful, young men have to wait somewhat longer than in pioneer days before being able to support a wife in comfort.

I am still very far from having exhausted the catalogue of M. Leroy-Beaulieu's mistakes in matters of fact, to say nothing of what seem to me to be his utterly erroneous deductions. But I think I have expended enough space upon a writer whose unfortunate haste to verify preconceived notions has left him on the horns of an exceedingly uncomfortable dilemma. For, when he forgets economic and political theories, he recognizes that Australasia is a new but grand edifice, the construction of which is in every way creditable to the strength and energy of the Anglo-Saxon race. He admits the material progress and the general comfort and intelligence of the colonists. Yet, after finding fault with everything they have done, with everything they are trying to do, and with every class of them except one, he is driven to ask his readers to believe that the whole prosperity of the four and a quarter millions of Australasians has been built up and sustained by a tiny handful of large pastoral tenants.

Why he should have exempted these gentlemen from the contempt he pours upon the manufacturers, the farming, the urban population, and, above all, the workpeople of the Colonies, it is difficult to say, except that, for dramatic reasons, it was necessary for M. Leroy-Beaulieu to have some representatives of light and goodness in order to heighten the contrast with the grasping, indolent, reckless Democracy. As I have said, Mr. Godkin is not sympathetic, and does not seem to me to have looked very deeply into things. But he deserves gratitude, if only for one sentence. That is his observation that in Australia mutual helpfulness is the leading note of the community. That, one is glad to believe, is not only the case, but likely to be increasingly so as time goes on. The Democratic movement in Australasia is, after all, largely a process of co-operation by members of a young community who stand together in order to prevent their heritage being exploited by too powerful individuals or combinations. Moreover, though Mr. Godkin does not note it, and M. Leroy-Beaulieu would not believe it, the Democratic movement in Australasia is far from being the mere outcome of selfish personal greed. The percentage of Progressive voters who act as paid politicians, or are employed on Government works, or hope or expect to get some pecuniary advantage from the Government, is ludicrously small. They could not weigh in the scale at all against the mass of the people. The strength of the Democratic movement does not proceed from any such possibly interested handful. But there is in the Colonies a deep and growing desire and resolve to lay the foundations of a better, brighter, and more humane civilization than the old world has been able to show. The Australasians, as the owners of a vast and fair territory not yet half filled, and as the heirs of the knowledge and experience—often bitter experience—of older countries, know that they have great advantages, and that much may be fairly expected of them. It is not to be wondered at then, if, in no spirit of reckless empiricism, but in the main with a very creditable amount of practical sense, they address themselves to make use of the machinery which their Democratic institutions place in their hands. Had Republicanism-*cum*-Individualism—as given free play for the last century in the United States, where it is worked under extraordinarily favourable conditions—been more successful in solving social and industrial problems to the satisfaction of observant Colonists, I do not think that the tendency of Australasia would have gone in the direction of piecemeal socialistic experiments. But the cry of the mortgaged farmers of the Western States, of the great army of the nomadic workless, and of the masses who are daily exploited by the great

Trusts and Syndicates, has come across the Pacific from North America to the Colonies by the South Sea. The people there perceive that if their heritage is to be guarded they must be up and doing. They may well say with Marvell—

> "At my back I hear
> Time and his chariot hurrying near."

Those are indeed to be pitied who can see nothing but a mixture of the sordid and the flippant in a popular movement which is, after all, a rational and logical striving after a higher and better state. Better, far better, that young communities should make a few mistakes than that they should sit still in craven fear of utilizing their unequalled opportunity.

W. P. Reeves.

A COLONIAL CHRONICLE.

CANADA AND THE WAR.

Canada appears to have shared the common experience of other nations during the past month, for her internal affairs, though transacted as usual, have been completely overshadowed in the popular mind by the war between the United States and Spain. Of this she is, perhaps, the nearest and certainly not the least concerned observer. Canadian cablegrams would indeed indicate that her domestic politics, which were approaching a crisis, have remained in a condition of suspended animation, to be revived on the return of peace. This is a natural exaggeration, but for the moment it is difficult to concentrate attention on the many estimable legislative projects presented to the Ottawa Parliament. The fate of a Reform Bill, a Railway Bill, or a Plebiscite on Prohibition, though of vital consequence to the admirably disciplined and well led Parties fighting over them, do not loom large in any true political perspective, the one and only question of interest with regard to any nation being: "What is her attitude towards the war? Is she 'Spanish' or 'American'?" In order to give a true answer with regard to Canada it is necessary to discount a number of misrepresentations which the superficial news-gatherer has sought to disseminate either for his own or somebody else's purposes. It is worth glancing at a selection of these legends, some of which have given rise to no small surprise in this country. In the first place we were told that the people of Canada were rejoicing at the war, as the disturbance of business in the United States would necessarily divert business to the Dominion; moreover, that this "business" satisfaction was enhanced by the reflection that their neighbour in "taking on" Spain would get more than she bargained for, and that Canadians contemplated the "punishment" to be inflicted on the States as some satisfaction for the animosity with which the Republic had pursued the Dominion. Further, we had the spicy episode regarding the withdrawal of the Spanish Ambassador from the United States to Toronto, the citizens of which "were preparing a hearty welcome for their eminent guest." It subsequently transpired that the "demonstration" was only "discussed" by the handful of Spanish residents

at Toronto, and that the City Council disallowed it. Other conflicting information followed. On the one hand we were apprised of the eagerness of Canadians to serve in the United States Army, while prominent people made speeches breathing a racial patriotism and warmly approving the decision of their neighbour to terminate the most hideous colonial scandal the world has ever seen. As against this it was emphatically asserted by those admitting English-speaking Canada to be with the States, that the trend of feeling in French Canada, following the lead of France, was with Spain. *La Presse*, the leading French paper of Montreal, *e.g.*, declared "the war might have been avoided if the United States had chosen to exhibit its firmness without an offensive display of arrogance. For the first time in recent history, one civilized Power had said to another: 'You must quit instantly, or we shall turn you out.' Such language was simply an invitation to war, and a certain means of rendering a peaceful arrangement impossible. History will pronounce a severe condemnation on the conduct of the United States in this crisis." French history will undoubtedly condemn the conduct of the United States, but any impartial historian who gets at the facts will find that Spain brought this war on herself, and that the great Republic was neither precipitate nor self-seeking.

IN PARLIAMENT.

We believe the real attitude of the great majority of the Canadian people towards the war was declared in the discussion that took place in the Dominion House of Commons on May 18th, when Mr. Charlton addressed an interpellation to the Premier, Sir Wilfrid Laurier—a French-Canadian, be it remembered—calling attention to the newspaper reports that Señor Polo de Bernabe (the late Spanish Ambassador to Washington) was engaged, while in Canada, in carrying on business affairs in connection with the present war. Mr. Charlton feared that the Dominion might be compromised by the actions of this gentleman, and asked whether the attention of the Government had been called to the matter. Sir Wilfrid Laurier said that the Government's attention had not been called to the presence of Señor Polo de Bernabe in Canada. The British Empire had always been an asylum for refugees in any circumstances. As long as the Spanish Minister did not abuse the hospitality of Canada the Government did not conceive itself in any way bound to take notice of Señor Polo de Bernabe's presence. During the present unfortunate war it was the intention of the Dominion Government, not only by its own inclination, but also by the positive orders of the Imperial authorities, to keep absolute neutrality between the contending parties. "We are taking," he added, "every precaution possible so that the neutrality laws may

not be violated either in favour of the United States or of Spain." The subject then dropped, but, fortunately, Mr. McCleary, of Ontario, a Conservative Member, called attention to the harsh treatment by Americans of Canadian working-men along the frontier of the Niagara river, and urged that the Canadian law against aliens should be rigidly enforced. While hoping for the ultimate success of the Yankees, he should like to see them sustain some reverse. This gave Sir Wilfrid Laurier exactly the opening he required, and, as Premier, he emphatically repudiated Mr. McCleary's observations, which he considered very ill-timed. With due regard to their duty as neutrals, Canadians had a feeling of sympathy for their neighbours who shared the continent with them. Personally, he would submit to inconvenience just now from the operation of the American alien law rather than do anything to injure the good feeling at present existing between the Mother Country and the United States. It would be a deplorable thing if the Canadian Parliament did anything to mar that feeling. Sir Charles Tupper, the Conservative leader, who is supposed to be animated by an anti-American bias, immediately rose and expressed complete acquiescence in the Premier's remarks. The Americans, he added, constituted one great branch of the English-speaking family, and it was in the interests of peace and the interests of civilization that Great Britain and Canada should be on friendly terms with that great country.

RACE PATRIOTISM.

The editor of *The Canadian Magazine*, who is a sound exponent of Canadian sentiment, concludes a severe review of the United States treatment of Canada throughout the century with this statement:—"While feeling that if justice were done the United States deserves little consideration at our hands, yet we feel that Great Britain, Greater Britain, and the United States are the salt of the earth, the guardians of liberty, peace, and righteousness. The present misunderstandings must ultimately pass away, and to-day, if the United States was in danger of being obliterated from the map of the world, the first to stretch out a helping hand would be the million Canadians that are able to bear arms. We will wear no yoke, we will bend no knee, we will tolerate no insult, and we will ask no favour; but if a brother be in need our assistance is ready. Such sentiments as these have been expressed by others on previous occasions, and have been misinterpreted. An offer of friendship and an expression of sympathy do not mean that Canada has any desire for annexation to the United States. She is satisfied with Mother Britain, and she knows her position:—

"'She's daughter in her mother's house,
She's mistress in her own.'

The thought of making a change is seldom harboured by any citizen, and there is no prospect that a preference for either independence or annexation will ever be created." It is the present writer's lot to read an immense number of newspapers which pour in from all parts of Greater Britain, and if they truly represent the opinion of their several communities, there is a practically unanimous feeling that were the United States threatened by a foreign combination she should be supported by the resources of the British Empire. That this sentiment prevails in Canada—though she has special reasons to be cool—is shown by the passage we have quoted, and we could easily show that it is common to all communities of British stock. Without enlisting in the shrieking sisterhood of "Anglo-Saxon" gushers, who touch many subjects without adorning any, sober people may recognize this zeal for the race with keen satisfaction.

TWO RESIGNATIONS.

It is at last definitely announced that Lord Aberdeen will retire from the Governor-Generalship of the Dominion this year. He has discharged his functions in an unostentatious but thoroughly competent manner, and, so far as we can judge, has thoroughly commended himself to the Canadian people. During the political crisis of 1896, he came into somewhat sharp conflict with Sir Charles Tupper, the leader of the Conservative Party—who has borne malice ever since—but in his refusal to pack offices with the nominees of a moribund majority Lord Aberdeen was supported by the best opinion of the Dominion. Lord Salisbury will have no difficulty in finding a suitable successor. It would probably be advisable to send to Ottawa an experienced Member of the present Cabinet in touch with international affairs, for Canada has become a nation, and one of no little importance. Her able statesmen should welcome the assistance of a Governor-General who has had opportunities of studying the forces at work in European politics. Is such an one available, or do British public men retain insular ambitions at a time when the nation has become Imperial? Another retirement of a more significant character is that of Major-General Gascoigne, the Commander of the Dominion Militia, to which he was appointed only three years ago. There is little doubt as to the cause of this premature resignation of what is virtually the command in chief of the Canadian Army. *The Canadian Gazette* states the difficulty with some delicacy:—

"General Gascoigne's resignation of the command of the Canadian Militia has naturally evoked a good deal of comment; and there is much reason to regret that he, like several of his predecessors, should have found it impossible to continu to discharge for the full official term duties which in many ways he was specially qualified to perform. Under existing conditions, indeed, a certain

amount of friction and difficulty seem almost inevitable. The law stipulates that the position shall be filled by a colonel of the Imperial Army, and the advantages of this provision, in some respects, are patent enough. It places the command of the Canadian Militia in the hands of an officer who has been in direct contact with warfare, and who is, of course, well versed in and imbued with the methods of a regular army. But to these advantages there are equally obvious drawbacks. Difficulty is experienced in reconciling military ideas with the views and requirements of the political head of the Militia department; and the spirit which rules in relation to a purely volunteer force is inevitably very different from that to which a British officer at home has all his life been accustomed."

In plain language, an experienced and conscientious officer, finding himself in command of a "political" army, endeavours to make it military in the teeth of the politicians. These, however, prove too strong for him, so he retires rather than be responsible for a sham. An increasing number of Canadians are awaking to the importance of purging the Militia of politics. Their hands will be strengthened by General Gascoigne's action.

MR. D'ALTON MCCARTHY.

One of the most striking public men of Canada, Mr. D'Alton McCarthy, Q.C., M.P., has died of injuries received in a runaway accident. He was born sixty-two years ago, and, in early manhood, became a member of the Canadian Bar, of which he was subsequently one of the chief ornaments. He was considered to be the most thorough jurist in the Dominion, and his frequent appearances before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council successively increased his high reputation. "His style," says one of his biographers, "is sharp and decisive, his glance keen and searching, his summing-up a model of conciseness and lucidity. While not as subtle as Christopher Robinson, or as powerful as Edward Blake, he is not far behind either in substantial ability." He was elected to the Dominion House of Commons in 1876, after three unsuccessful attempts, and forthwith became a distinguished debater on the Conservative side. But he was a great deal more than a speaker, and Sir John Macdonald, the greatest political chief who has ever appeared in Canadian politics, described Mr. McCarthy as the "brains of the Party," and designated him as its future leader. However, in 1889, came the split in consequence of the position adopted by the Macdonald Cabinet on the Mercier Jesuit's Estates Act, which Mr. McCarthy's stern Protestant spirit could not brook. Henceforward he became an Independent, and, as head of the Equal Rights Movement, and as a champion of the Protestant Party on the Manitoba Schools Question, he was prepared to give battle to all comers. If disposed to run off the Canadian Party lines, like Lord Randolph Churchill in our home politics, Mr. D'Alton McCarthy was pronounced and unwavering in his attachment to

the British connection at a time when the Imperial faith of many of his parliamentary contemporaries was dim and fitful. His views on the true commercial policy of the Dominion are thus summarized in *Canadian Men and Women of the Time*:—"First, he had thought since 1891 that the time had come when, according to the policy laid down in 1877-78, sufficient opportunity had been afforded to manufacturers to establish their industries, and that a return should be had to the principle of a revenue tariff. Secondly, that he was opposed to any reciprocal relations with the United States which involved discrimination against Britain; short of that, he was prepared for the freest possible tariff regulations, not merely in natural products, but in manufactured articles as well. Thirdly, and chiefly, he was the advocate of the maximum and minimum tariff, giving Britain and the other Colonies the preference which, under the scheme of the preferential clause, has been embodied in law by the Laurier Administration. Touching the future of Canada, he long since reached the conclusion that Canada would find her truest and best development within as part of the British Empire, and that Canadians needed no higher aspiration than appertained to that position." As men judge public careers, Mr. McCarthy's must be pronounced a disappointment, for he failed to obtain positions to which his talents and opportunities entitled him. But it is better to be a man than an opportunist statesman, and he was distinctly a man, and both Dominion and Empire are poorer by his death.

AUSTRALIAN FEDERATION.

The Australian Colonies continue to maintain that sphinx-like reserve which may now be regarded as one of their chief characteristics, and we defy any Englishman to give a competent account of their affairs, either by exercising his intuition or industry. The latest developments in the Far East, where a New World Power has appeared on the scenes, ought to have given a great fillip to the Federal movement by bringing home to the Australian people the urgency of consolidating their scattered strength so that on Pacific questions they may speak with one voice, and not as a group of discordant provinces. The cable, however, evinces little or no evidence that the Chinese and Phillipine questions are receiving the attention they merit from the British communities most affected by them, and the Federal Party does not appear to have gathered strength since the close of the Convention. Rather does one note the growth of sectional hostility to the Commonwealth Bill which is to be submitted this month (June) to the electors of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia, and Tasmania —New Zealand having held aloof for geographical reasons, and

Queensland from inability to make up her mind. Mr. Byrnes, the new Premier of Queensland, has stated that:—"If New South Wales decided against the Federal Bill it would be idle for Queensland to trouble further. If New South Wales accepted the Bill, Federation would become a burning question for Queensland." One does not get a very hopeful impression of the prospect in New South Wales from a speech recently delivered by Mr. Reid, the Premier, who had hitherto been an active advocate of Federation. "In reply to questions as to the provisions of the Federal Bill, he spoke of the advantages of Federation. He had not shrunk from exposing himself to insults, but as Premier of New South Wales he was determined to risk his position in order to show the other Colonies that the Bill should have the fairest of fair chances of being adopted by the people of New South Wales. But there was one line across which he could not go. Much as he believed that no power on earth could stop Federal Union, yet he could not stand before the people and make a speech which would leave him conscious that he had not faithfully and fearlessly done his duty to the Colony. He would state frankly that under the Bill the people of New South Wales were called upon to make sacrifices such as no other Colony was asked to make. The citizens of Victoria, Tasmania, and South Australia would stump the country in favour of the Bill, but he, feeling that New South Wales was asked to sacrifice so much, could not take the responsibility of endeavouring to lead the people from a calm and impartial consideration of the whole matter. The strength begotten of union would make the Colonies prosper, but it was for the people of New South Wales to say whether they were prepared to make the sacrifices which he was prepared to make to secure the Bill. If the Bill was defeated he would not despair." When a British politician tells us that if "defeated" he "would not despair" it usually means that he expects defeat.

Doubtful Elements.

As to the remaining Colonies participating in the plebiscite, we are told that "it is doubtful whether Western Australia will enter the Federation because a majority in both Houses of Parliament apparently disapproves the Bill, and the Local Enabling Act provides that the Federation Bill must be passed by Parliament before being submitted to a *referendum* of electors." Victoria is usually enthusiastic in any cause in which New South Wales is cold, but even from Melbourne comes the discouraging information that "Sir George Turner (the Premier) has promised a deputation of persons opposed to Federation, to consult the other Colonies as to whether they would agree to a postponement of the *referendum* from June to September."

The encouraging elements in Victoria are the ardour of the powerful Australasian Natives Associations, the loyalty of the Labour Party under the able leadership of Mr. Trentwith, and the splendid enthusiasm of Mr. Alfred Deakim, who devotes all his spare energies and silver-tongued oratory to the cause of a Big Australia. But the Little Australians are numerous in his Colony. South Australia and Tasmania appear to be the only certain supporters of the Commonwealth Bill, and as it only becomes operative on the concurrence of three Colonies the reader can realize the doubtfulness of the general outlook. If the Mother Colony could only be relied upon, the friends of Australian unity would feel much happier. Her position and responsibility are well expressed in *The British Australasian*:—"What will New South Wales do? We should take very little account of Mr. J. H. Want and men of his kidney when Federation has the support of men like Mr. Barton, Mr. Wise, and Mr. McMillan, if only we could rely on Mr. Reid to give something more than a lethargic countenance to the movement. With him for the moment rest the future destinies of Australia, and as he is certain, if Federation is consummated now, to be the first Premier of United Australia, his personal ambitions lead him in the direction to which his public duty and political convictions point. The 80,000 vote is a serious stumbling-block, but we shall not believe it insurmountable until the numbers are up which demolish our hopes and with them the best aspirations of Australia." We fear, however, that the tone of Mr. Reid's latest declarations, of which we have quoted a sample, would constrain any judge of probabilities to class New South Wales among the opponents of Federation. Her Premier is the shrewdest politician in Australia, and if he regarded the Commonwealth Bill as a winning horse, he would be less ostentatious in riding for a fall.

A Forecast.

Assuming then that the *referendum* is held in June, and judging by such imperfect indications of the drift of public opinion as the last few months have afforded, the onlooker—without usurping the *rôle* of prophet—would be disposed to expect the Australian Colonies to vote thus:—

For the Commonwealth Bill.	Against.	Absent.
Victoria.	New South Wales.	Queensland.
South Australia.	West Australia.	New Zealand.
Tasmania.		

The Commonwealth Bill.

The Sydney Daily Telegraph has published a valuable synopsis of the Australian Commonwealth Bill. It is unquestionably the most important measure that has been drafted in Greater Britain since the Confederation of Canada. It consists of 121 clauses and

is divided into eight chapters. The preamble states that "the people of the Colonies, which subsequently adopt the constitution, humbly relying upon the blessing of Almighty God, have agreed to unite in one indissoluble Federal Commonwealth under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and under the constitution hereby established." The Federal Parliament, of which at least one session is to be held every year, is to consist of Queen, Senate, and a House of Representives; the Queen's representative will be a Governor-General with a salary of £10,000 a year. The Senate shall consist of Senators directly chosen by the people of each State voting as one electorate, each elector to have only one vote. Each original State is to have six Senators, "and though Parliament may increase and diminish the number of electors, no original State may have less than six." The Senatorial term is ultimately to be six years, but the first elected members will be divided by lot into two classes of equal number, those of the first class to retire at the expiration of the third year, and those of the second at the expiration of the ninth, and thereafter Senators will vacate their seats at the expiration of six years from election. Extraordinary vacancies in the Senate will be filled by the State Houses of Parliament sitting and voting together; during a Parliamentary recess the State Governor may nominate to the vacancy pending an ordinary election. The members of the House of Representatives will be chosen by the people of the Commonwealth in proportion to the State population, and the number of representatives is to be as nearly as possible twice the number of Senators. Each original State shall have not less than five members. The House is not to exist longer than three years. Electors' qualifications will be the same as those for the States Assemblies, and no elector shall have more than one vote. The salary of Senators and Representatives is given, subject to alteration by Parliament, at £400 per annum. The Powers of Parliament are set forth with extreme care and elaboration; the most noteworthy clauses deal with Money Bills which must originate in the House of Representatives; the Senate may not amend Money Bills, but may suggest amendments to the House of Representatives. Deadlocks between the Chambers are exhaustively provided for, in the first place by a simultaneous dissolution, and if further disagreement ensues the Governor-General may convene a joint sitting of the members of the two Chambers, and if the disputed Bill is affirmed therein by a majority of three-fifths of the members present, it is to be taken to have been duly passed by the Senate and House of Representatives, and will be presented to the Governor-General for the royal assent.

FEDERAL POWERS.

The Federal Executive is to consist of the Queen, represented by the Governor-General, and an Executive Council, (*i.e.*, a Cabinet as in England) "to hold office during his pleasure." Ministers must be capable of sitting either in the Senate or House of Representatives, and after the first general election no Minister can hold office beyond three months without becoming a member of the Legislature. Unless otherwise provided by Parliament, the number of Ministers shall not exceed seven, nor their joint salaries £12,000 per annum. The judicial power of the Commonwealth will be vested in a Supreme Court, consisting of a Chief Justice and not less than two other judges, called the High Court of Australia, and the Federal Parliament has power to create other Courts with Federal jurisdiction. The said jurisdiction covers matters arising under the constitution or under the laws of the Federal Parliament, or arising under treaties, &c., also to causes in which the Commonwealth, or a person suing or being sued on behalf of the Commonwealth, is a party, or to issues between States or between residents of different States, or between a State and a resident of another State, or where the subject matter is claimed under the laws of different States. The High Court will exercise appellate jurisdiction over the other Federal Courts and over the Supreme Court of any State or any other Court in any State from which an appeal now lies to the Queen in Council, also over the Interstate Commission. In the foregoing cases the judgment of the High Court shall be final. Extremely important clauses grant the right of appeal from the High Court to the Privy Council by royal permission, unless the Federal Parliament alters the law in this respect. No appeal, however, may be made from the High Court to the Privy Council in cases involving the interpretation of the Constitution of the Commonwealth or of any State. The Financial and Commercial clauses are the result of endless controversy, and have, probably, not yet reached their final shape. Customs and Excise Duties, and the payment of bounties, are necessarily Federal matters, but a State may grant bounties with the permission of the Federal Parliament. Uniform Customs' Duties must be imposed within two years, when all intercolonial trade will be absolutely free—a further temporary indulgence being extended to Western Australia. Provision is made that the Parliament may take over the whole or a rateable proportion of the State debts. An elaborate system of book-keeping is incorporated in the Bill, to secure a fair distribution of the revenue derived from Customs and Excise between the various States, among which equity and equality of trade relations are to be enforced.

AMENDMENTS.

The constitutions of the several States remain unaffected by the Federation, and all the powers of the States' Parliaments, except those specifically transferred to the Commonwealth, remain as heretofore. The more obvious provisions, such as that the Commonwealth must protect every State against invasion, need not be noticed. The creation of new States is entrusted to the Federal Parliament, which may admit them to the Commonwealth on any terms it thinks fit, and may make laws for the government of any territory acquired by the Commonwealth, and may allow the representation of such territory in either House of Parliament on such terms as it thinks fit. A new State may be formed by separation of territory from an old State, but only with the consent of the Parliament thereof; in like case, two or more States may combine and form one State. The seat of the new Government has not yet been fixed upon, and is to be determined by the Parliament which in the interval will sit at such place as a majority of the Governors of the States, and, in the event of an equal division of opinion amongst them, as the Governor-General shall direct. This clause will, perhaps, console unsuccessful aspirants to the Governor-Generalship. Another miscellaneous provision lays down that, "in reckoning the numbers of the people of a State or other part of the Commonwealth, aboriginal natives shall not be counted." Lastly, we reach the machinery for amending the Constitution, which is always the most interesting feature of a written Constitution. The proposed alteration must be passed by an absolute majority of the Senate and House of Representatives, and then not less than two nor more than six months later, must be submitted to a *referendum*. Until the qualification of electors of members of the House of Representatives is made uniform, only half the votes recorded on a *referendum* in any State where women suffrage prevails shall be counted. The proposed alteration must be approved by a majority of the electors in a majority of the States, and also by a majority of all the electors of the Commonwealth. Following the lucid analysis in *The Sydney Daily Telegraph*, we have given a bald outline of the Commonwealth Bill. We think that every serious student of political science should be able to gather, even from our exiguous epitome, that the measure to be submitted to the judgment of the Australian nation is instinct with sagacity and constructed with consummate skill.

AN AFRIKANDER.

We have received an exceedingly interesting letter from South Africa which we venture to print at the end of this number. It was not intended for publication, but as it may be taken to represent the views of an

influential section of Dutch Afrikanders—of which British readers are insufficiently informed—we hope the writer will pardon the use we have made of his statement. He commences with a comment on the account of the recent dismissal of Mr. Kotze from the Chief Justiceship of the Transvaal which appeared in the April NATIONAL REVIEW. "An Afrikander" considers that we exaggerated the support accorded to Mr. Kotze by his colleagues on the Bench of the South African Republic and the Orange Free State.* We are thoroughly aware that in the recent phases of the controversy Chief Justice Kotze has failed to secure the general approval of the judiciary in either of the Republics, who regard his letter accusing the President of breach of faith for not having already provided a new Grondwet (Constitution) as precipitate and uncalled for. We carefully abstained from suggesting that Mr. Kotze had a solid Bench behind him on this issue. On the other hand, when declaring the constitutional right of the Supreme Court to "test" the legislation of the Volksraad in the famous Brown case last year, he appeared to carry his colleagues with him. We are not aware that any dissentient judgment was recorded, while in the ensuing negotiations with the Executive, the Transvaal Bench bore the outward appearance of acting as a solid unit. In the eyes of the outside world Mr. Kotze had the benefit of their moral support, though some of the judges may have privately expressed their disagreement from his uncompromising position. We fully accept our correspondent's correction with regard to the attitude of the Chief Justice of the Orange Free State (Mr. de Villiers), though if that eminent lawyer holds the view, as we are now told, "that in all countries where a rigid written Constitution exists as well as a Republican form of Government, and where judicial functions have been entrusted exclusively to the courts of law, the testing right must necessarily exist," and if "he has advanced several reasons for considering it (the Constitution of the South African Republic) a rigid one," though "recognizing that the matter is not free from difficulty," we are cleared by our correspondent of any substantial misrepresentation of Mr. de Villiers' opinions. In effect he desires to see the Supreme Court of the Transvaal exercising the lofty functions of the Supreme Court of the United States—President Kruger and Dr. Leyds are hostile to such "pretensions."

* Our statement was as follows :—"It may be that, in claiming 'an American control over legislation,' the Chief Justice (Mr. Kotze) adopted a more advanced position for the High Court than it is entitled to under the Grondwet, but he was supported in his view by all his brethren on the Bench, and by the Chief Justice of the Orange Free State."

THE SUZERAINTY.

"An Afrikander" proceeds to combat the view that Great Britain occupies the position of suzerain towards the South African Republic. He tells us that "in South Africa we take a very different view of the Suzerainty question from that which you have adopted." We venture to doubt whether there is room for any material difference of opinion as to the relations between this country and the Transvaal, though it would be easy to quarrel over so ambiguous a word as Suzerainty. In the April NATIONAL REVIEW the relationship was thus analysed, and we abide by what we believe to be a sound view:—"The precise status of the Transvaal, is, indeed, not easy to define. In relation to Great Britain, its position is perhaps analogous to that of the great protected principalities of India, *e.g.*, Hyderabad, Baroda, or Mysore, though unlike them it enjoys separate diplomatic representation at foreign Courts. Its complete independence is indeed only limited by the very easy terms of the London Convention, to which both parties avow their adherence, while one of them is determined to maintain it at all costs. . . . That Convention specificially reserved to the British Government the right to veto any foreign treaty entered into by the Republic, except one with the Orange Free State. It thus practically reserved the control of the Transvaal's foreign relations to Her Majesty's Government, and if that does not constitute a suzerainty it is difficult to say what does." A State that is debarred from entering into any foreign engagements it may choose by the veto of another State ceases to be a Sovereign State, and becomes a semi-Sovereign State, while the over-ruling State occupies a superior or suzerain position. Let us take an illustration. Supposing that after the Franco-German War, France had signed a Convention of Paris, giving Germany control of her foreign relations, these nations would have been regarded by the world at large as having respectively adopted the relationship of suzerain and vassal. However, we agree with Mr. Balfour that the thing is more important than the name, and if the word suzerain is considered offensive by the Republic is it worth insisting upon it so long as there is frank and unqualified recognition of Great Britain's veto on treaties? But it is precisely this veto on foreign treaties which that born intriguer, Dr. Leyds, resents, and we may expect to see the Boer Government repudiating the London Convention if at any time Great Britain is deemed to be sufficiently occupied in other parts of the world. Mr. Chamberlain has repeatedly and explicitly disclaimed any right or intention of interfering in the internal affairs of the Transvaal. Can any defender of the Transvaal affirm that Pretoria has no designs upon Great Britain's prerogatives?

Arbitration.

Our correspondent is extremely indignant at the Colonial Secretary's refusal to submit breaches of the London Convention to arbitration. This is termed a "monstrous pretension" and an act of "gross unrighteousness." There is always a *prima facie* case for arbitration, but the working of arbitral machinery has been one of the greatest disappointments to mankind, and a satisfactory award is not easy to cite. Ask the Americans what they think of the Behring Sea award, or the British their opir ion of the Alabama case, or the Macmahon verdict on Delagoa Bay. Arbitration has, in a brief and active career, greatly aggravated international ill-will, and though it continues to be the universal panacea of lawyers, it has fallen into disfavour with the mass of mankind. If "an Afrikander" will turn up the discussion that took place in the United States on the abortive Arbitration Treaty, he will note the extraordinary anxiety which was then manifested, lest any national interest should be subjected to the wayward arbitrament of a foreign umpire. Above all other people, the Americans are associated with the cause of arbitration, but they shrink from risking anything they really care about on its behalf, and their action has dealt a damaging blow at its prospects. We do not feel that Great Britain is called upon to submit alleged breaches of the London Convention to a foreign tribunal which would import another element of friction into South Africa, but she is called upon to interpret that engagement as a statesman and not as a pettifogging attorney. The Colonial Secretary should never "nag" at the Transvaal over a technical or trivial breach, and should lose no opportunity of convincing the Pretorian Government, if it is open to conviction on any subject, that the spirit of the Convention is more important than the mere letter, and good faith in observing it more welcome than emphatic asseveration. We are not clear that Great Britain has done all that she ought in order to simplify the operation of the London Convention which is not an abstruse document. We are, unfortunately, unable to continue the controversy with our correspondent, and can only express our obligation to him for so frank a statement of South African opinion. He complains in one paragraph that he has been called an "extreme Afrikander," but surely vindicates that epithet in the next where he states that the Uitlander of the Transvaal has no real grievances! Mr. Hofmeyr, Sir Henry de Villiers, Mr. Merriman, Mr. Schreiner, and even President Kruger have all at different times recognized the Uitlander grievances. We believe, further, that the public opinion of the sister Dutch Republic—the Orange Free State—regards the perpetuation of present conditions in the Transvaal as a serious

political danger, and, by wise legislation, she has made their reproduction within her own borders impossible.

At Bloemfontein.

We refer those who, with our distinguished correspondent, suggest that Great Britain and Dutch Republics are necessarily antagonistic, to a significant and agreeable incident that occurred in the middle of April. Owing to the pressure of more sensational matter it has hitherto escaped the notice it merits in London, but it has evidently created a very favourable impression throughout political circles in South Africa, and no more encouraging episode has occurred since the Raid. We refer to the visit of Sir Alfred Milner, the symbol and mouthpiece of the British sovereignty in South Africa, to Bloemfontein, the capital of the Orange Free State. Such conflicting authorities as *The Cape Times* (Rhodesian) and the *Johannesburg Standard and Diggers' News* (anti-Rhodesian), are agreed as to the importance of this occurrence. The Cape Town correspondent of the latter tells us in "Table Mountain Topics" that

"Sir Alfred Milner ought to be immensely pleased with the reception accorded him, as representative of the Queen, by the Government and burghers of the Orange Free State at Bloemfontein this week. No welcome could have been more hearty or more spontaneous. The capital of the model little Republic was *en fête* in honour of the occasion. The High Commissioner was met at the border by prominent officials, and escorted in state to Bloemfontein, where he was welcomed by the President, the Mayor, the members of the Volksraad, and the people themselves, who cheered him loudly as he passed. The Union Jack and the flag of the Republic, in friendly juxtaposition, were to be found everywhere. The stay of Her Majesty's representative was necessarily short, but into the brief period at disposal were crowded a surprising number of functions, both public and private, with the inevitable banquet thrown in. It so happened that the opening of the annual session of the Volksraad coincided with the date of Sir Alfred's arrival, and the High Commissioner, who attended the opening ceremony, was given a place of honour on the dais, being seated on the right hand of the President. The British National Anthem was played by the band of the Staats Artillery immediately after the 'Volksleid' of the Free State. The President's official speech or message to the Volksraad specially referred to the High Commissioner's visit, and expressed the conviction that the members would join with His Honour in rejoicing over the event. Nor was that all. Immediately the necessary formal business had been transacted, the Volksraad passed a resolution heartily welcoming Sir Alfred, and then adjourned for the day in his honour. More the Free Staters could hardly have done."

The correspondent proceeds :—

"Now, it is to be hoped that the significance of this magnificent reception of the High Commissioner, of this demonstration of an earnest desire for friendship by the Free State Boer for England and the British States in South Africa, will not be missed. For there is a deep and significant meaning underlying it all, as can easily

be seen when we take it in conjunction with the famous anti-capitalist speech of President Steyn delivered a short time ago. Then Mr. Steyn spoke strongly and emphatically against the baneful influence of capitalism in South African politics, and in South African social development; and his scathing words were obviously directed particularly against Cecil Rhodes and the capitalist group—whose ramifications extend throughout Cape Colony, Charterland, and the Transvaal—of which Rhodes is the leader and directing spirit. The same President who denounced Rhodesism welcomes with outstretched arms the official representative of that Power of which Rhodes is held by many to be the unofficial instrument. A curious distinction, outwardly. But it was just this distinction which both President and people of the Free State sought to emphasize. Mr. Steyn condemned Rhodes and Rhodesism in unmeasured terms, but he declared it 'an honour to the Free State to have in their midst the representative of that mighty nation to which Sir Alfred belonged.' Then, he continued, speaking at the banquet in Sir Alfred's honour, 'Good fruits must and would arise from such meetings. They must get to know one another better, and when that happened it would be found that each would find the other not half so bad as he was painted.' He regretted Sir Alfred was not making a longer stay, but trusted his sojourn through the Free State would be a most enjoyable one."

THE "REAL" ENGLAND.

The correspondent we have quoted, who is an acute observer, and sufficiently sympathetic with the Dutch to appreciate their standpoint, draws a sound distinction between the real and the sham England:—"It was the *real* representative of the *real* England which President and burghers delighted in honouring; and it was with him and the Government he represented that they so earnestly desired to come to a harmonious understanding. This latter desire was given earnest expression to in all the speeches delivered by Free Staters at the banquet. Mr. Papenfus, the chairman, who is Landdrost (President Magistrate) of Bloemfontein, said he 'was sure of the kind feelings of Free Staters towards Sir Alfred personally, and they were feelings of respect to the Government which he so nobly represented in promoting the general welfare of the Colonists and States throughout South Africa. It was only by personal intercourse between the heads of the different Colonies and States that mutual confidence and good relationship could be established, and that the questions and differences which unfortunately might arise could be arranged to the satisfaction of all concerned. He hoped Sir Alfred would visit them again in the near future.' Again, Mr. Wessels, Chairman of the Volksraad, said he 'was sorry the High Commissioner's stay was such a short one, as he wished their distinguished visitor to learn more of the Boers of the country, the class of people whose fathers trekked into the land many years ago. He felt sure that if the high personages of Europe knew this class of man better, more conciliatory dealings would be the result.' There is no question about the temper and the intention of these utterances. They embody

an appeal to the British Government and the British people to speak to the Boer direct, to view him with the natural eye, and not through Rhodes-tinted glass. The Boer's desire is for friendship, and he tells us that the way in which that friendship and mutual good understanding can be arrived at is to deal with him directly. Rhodesian capitalism is the enemy in South Africa of Boer and Britain alike. It stands between the two, and is the cause of all the present disastrous discord and paralysing racial animosity. Let that appeal be listened to and given effect to, and I am confident that the bright day for which all of us are hoping and waiting shall have dawned on South Africa."

SIR ALFRED MILNER'S SPEECH.

Turning to *The Cape Times* (whose invaluable weekly edition we would commend as a model to other British communities which are, as a rule, deplorably deficient in weekly journalism), we find a report of Sir Alfred's Milner's speech at the Bloemfontein banquet. The High Commissioner makes no pretence of oratory, and has a sincere and praiseworthy dislike to the sound of his own voice, but he acquitted himself with conspicuous skill and sagacity, and struck exactly the right note. After a felicitous reference to his reception and the possible inconvenience he might have caused, he discussed the relations between the Orange Free State and Great Britain:—"Well, do not let any remarks I make give you the impression that the cordiality of the reception which I have experienced in Bloemfontein has by any means surprised me; in fact, I anticipated it confidently in view of the excellent relations which exist between the Government I have the honour to represent and the Government of this Republic—relations, unclouded in my experience at any rate, by a single disparaging element—and not less in view of the close relationship, of friendship, and of the common interests which unite the inhabitants of British South Africa—whether British or Dutch—with the citizens—whether Dutch or English—of the Orange Free State." Sir Alfred Milner spoke of "the dark cloud of material distress which has rained on this State, along with other portions of South Africa" and he congratulated his hearers on possessing "a large national balance," adding:—"Well, gentlemen, I am of an optimistic turn of mind, and I venture to hope that not only for the Orange Free State, but for South Africa generally, we may have reason to look forward to more prosperous times, and if these more prosperous times come to the country, then there can be no doubt that this State will participate in them in a very full, and I may also say very exceptional measure, and, for many reasons, but especially,

perhaps, because of its central position, its considerable natural advantages, and if I may be allowed to say so, sir, without the least suspicion of wishing to interfere with its internal affairs, on account of its good and progressive Government. That is the prospect before us. I can assure you that there will be no country in the world in which that prosperity of the Orange Free State will be regarded with more hearty good will than in those portions of South Africa which are under the British Crown." Sir Alfred Milner could have added that the respect for the Orange Free State, of which he spoke, extends beyond South Africa, and is entertained in Great Britain. It is gratifying that he should have made it clear that to work in harmony with that admirable Republic is a cardinal object of British policy.

LEARN DUTCH. Unlike the majority of his fellow-countrymen, Sir Alfred Milner is an accomplished and industrious linguist, and he was able to close his speech with a very graceful and popular allusion to his Dutch studies. Let us hope that his wise advice will be generally accepted by students of South African problems:—"Only one word in conclusion, sir, about a purely personal matter. It may appear trivial, and it is a subject which often rouses a smile. You have been good enough to refer to the fact that I am interested in acquiring a working knowledge of the Dutch language. You were far too complimentary to me when you said I knew it. I don't know it, but I begin to know something about it, and although it affords me great pleasure, I may say it affords me, as well as others, occasional amusement to watch my struggles in that direction. I regard it as part of my duty, because if I am never able to master it sufficiently to speak it with fluency, I shall master it sufficiently to understand and have appearance of understanding it, and I think it is of the most vital importance that any person who affects to deal with South African questions should understand the Dutch language. I think I should therefore understand, and it is not too much to ask that every educated man in this sub-continent should understand, both the Dutch and English languages. I venture to hope that my efforts in this direction may have some small influence in inducing other people to take that view, and that if it is worth my while—although I am only a sojourner in this country for a few years—to master the Dutch language, it may come to be regarded as worth the while of everybody who live in this country all their lives to master the languages of both the great nations, who are bound to go along side by side in South Africa, and upon whose harmony and good understanding

of one another the welfare of this sub-continent absolutely depends."

THE FATE OF NEWFOUNDLAND.

Newfoundland is not the most important member of the British Empire, but she is one of our eleven self-governing Colonies, and as the oldest English Colony has a special claim upon our sympathy and interest. How few of us realize the terrible humiliation that has befallen this ancient community, and, if she be not already past praying for, all who call themselves Imperialists should exercise what influence they can, even at the eleventh hour, to prevent the consummation of what we can only regard as a hideous political blunder and a shameful political crime. Stripped of all verbiage, Newfoundland has been sold by her Executive and Legislature, supported by a section of the Press, to a certain Mr. Reid, who is described as "a contractor," though he might be more appropriately designated an undertaker. We called attention to the Reid "deal," or "steal," as it has been termed locally, a couple of months ago, and have a special reason for recurring to it now. This odious transaction was thus reported by a news agency not unfriendly to the undertaker:—"'Mr. Reid, the Railway Contractor, has concluded an agreement with the Newfoundland Government to take over and operate the entire railway system of the Colony for fifty years for a subsidy of 2,500 acres (5,000 acres) of land per mile. Mr. Reid pays $1,000,000, which, at compound interest, in fifty years, amounts to $7,000,000. At the end of that period he will own the road. If he fails to fulfil the contract the money and road will be forfeited to the Colony. Mr. Reid buys the St. John's Dry Dock for $320,000, and brings his workshops and operates the Dock. He also builds a new railway to Topsail, a distance of fifteen (seven) miles for $100,000, and a terminus at the Dock. He builds seven new steamers, one to ply to Labrador and on the six largest bays of Newfoundland, at a subsidy of $90,000 per annum. He takes over the Government telegraph lines at a subsidy of $12,000 per annum, for six years, when the Anglo-American monopoly expires, then to operate free, and give a uniform tariff of 25 cents all over the island for ten words. He operates the new coal areas, and pays a royalty of ten cents per ton. He builds an electric railway in St. John's for $140,000, and repairs the Whitbourne railway for $100,000.' This offer was to have come before the Legislature on Tuesday last, and was expected to pass almost unanimously. It is regarded as highly calculated to promote the interests of the country, and to give a new impetus to industries and land settlement." It was subsequently announced that the Reid Railway Bill had passed the House of Assembly by twenty-

six votes to eight, and had been signed by the Governor, after some hesitation, while its completion was reported by Mr. Reid's newspaper friends to have caused "great rejoicings" in Newfoundland. We commented upon the news as follows—"But there is evidently a small minority which keenly feels the humiliation of making a contractor, Czar of Newfoundland, and would regard improved material conditions as dearly purchased by political enslavement. Those who are familiar with the rule of the Standard Oil Company in Pennsylvania must view this new departure with profound misgivings." It must be generally obvious that an arrangement which surrenders the railways, telegraph, coalfields, etc., of a comparatively poor community to an individual, places that community entirely at the monopolist's mercy. The forms of self-government will be preserved, but in practice the system will be steadily superseded by a commercial autocracy, enjoying power without responsibility. In other words, the State commits suicide.

Genesis of the Deal.

The primary question is, have the people of Newfoundland knowingly sold their birthright for a mess of pottage, or are they the victims of a huge political scandal. We have received a private letter from St. John's, the capital of Newfoundland, which states:—"The people here are hostile to the contract and are not without hope that the Imperial authorities will veto it or send it back for amendment, especially to make the contractor make some expenditure for settling agriculturists on his millions of acres, which by the contract he is not bound to do, and which I happen to know he does not intend to do. The contract is simply a political job." Our correspondent fortifies his statement by some extracts from the *Evening Telegram* of St. John's containing statements which "amazing as they are, are strictly true." They are certainly amazing and it may be hoped that they will be carefully investigated by all who care for the welfare and honour of British Colonies. The *Evening Telegram* attributes the passage of the Reid Bill to a corrupt Legislature, and gives us the genesis of the measure:—"Reid's railway deal was not made an issue by any candidate previously to the general election of October, 1897, nor at any other time. There was not one public meeting held to discuss it previously to its coming before the Legislature, nor after. It was not mentioned in the Speech with which the Governor opened Parliament; nor was there a single petition requesting it presented. It was not published; the electorate generally knew nothing of its details, and only three or four members of the

House of Assembly spoke in its favour. It was rushed through both branches of the Legislature with a haste unparalleled for its indecency, considering the magnitude and far-reaching consequences of the contract. A false alarm was raised, to wit, that the Colony would default in twenty-four hours unless the contractor's million of dollars were accepted to stave off Colonial bankruptcy. In the panicky state of feeling thus created, accompanied by an equally false glamour of promises of abundance of labour, the contract was railroaded through the Legislature before the sober, second thought of the public could be brought to bear upon its complex, mystifying, ill-advised, monopoly-grinding terms. It is an open secret that several members of the Government Party in the Lower House and a majority in the Upper Chamber were, in their hearts, opposed to the measure, and especially the way it was sprung upon the Legislature and the public. In the former, they were whipped into line in caucus, chiefly through treason in the ranks of the Opposition. In the latter, they were afraid of offending the contractor by voting against it; and in both Houses many of the members hoped the Governor would not be instructed by the Imperial authorities to give it his assent."

REID I.

A further article in the *Evening Telegram* contains a scathing indictment of the conduct of those who have "sold their country" and a searching analysis of the terms of the contract. Mr. Reid had acquired

"millions of acres of farming, mineral and lumber lands, and a railway costing $13,000,000 for less than a twelfth of what even the latter cost. That railway was undertaken in good faith by the Liberal Party, to make these lands accessible to the taxpayers of this colony, so that considerable numbers of the people in the congested fishing settlements, might be induced to settle in the interior of the country, and thus secure the means of earning a comfortable livelihood denied many of them on the seaboard. This statesmanlike dream was about being realized. On the completion of the railway this year colonization on an extensive scale would have been commenced. Now the whole of the lands ten miles deep along 640 miles of railway are to be ransacked by the contractor for three years—locked up against all settlement or enterprise other than his—and at the end of that period he becomes 'monarch' almost 'of all he surveys.' The taxpayers against whom these lands are thus locked up will have to bear the annual burthen of $500,000 for the interest to pay the bonds which the contractor secured for building the railway. Not satisfied with his bonds and two and a half millions of acres for 'operating the road,' he now owns the whole system and other millions of acres along the 640 miles. Portentously he plumes his vulture-like wings over the prostrate form of Terra Nova, and aims at becoming the greatest monopolist and land-grabber on earth. Like an octopus, he grasps at millions of acres—coal mines, pulp mills, dry docks, telegraphs, steamers, parcel post, carrying trade, flour trade and mails. Not the Czar of all the Russias, comparatively speaking, attempts to usurp so much power as our Czar would usurp over all the island of Newfoundland."

The writer concludes with a spirited vindication of the people of Newfoundland, and demands that they be dissociated from a transaction which was effected behind their backs by a handful of politicians:—

"Let not the blame for this wrong be placed upon the people of Newfoundland. We appeal to the British Press to set us right in this matter. We do not want to be regarded as a 'scandal to Constitutional Governments,' or to be held up to the scorn of lovers of free institutions. Not only a 'small minority,' but the great majority of the people of Newfoundland feel keenly the degradation of being bound to the feet of a grasping monopolist. It was not the natives but an alien Government that sold our country in the Black Winter of '98. In one of those periodic political changes which are apt to take place anywhere in depressed times, a number of those who actually, by over-speculating and reckless bank management brought it about, got temporary control of our public affairs. The Railway, Progressive, or really National Party, were defeated in 1897, after a term of eight years, before their policy was fully matured, by an anti-Railway, anti-Progressive, alien Party. With a few honourable exceptions they are somewhat similar to what is known in Japanese politics as a '*Soshi*,' described as a most adjustable animal, who frequently assumes to have principles of a loose kind, but who is only a poor ruffian who can be engaged to do almost anything for money."

An Appeal.

The *Evening Telegram* not unnaturally raises a very grave constitutional question in reference to the Reid scandal:—"If this or any other similar class of politicians happen to get control of the public affairs of a colony for a term, the Imperial veto upon their acts is an absolutely necessary check. If they have power to bind a colony by their legislation to barter away the rights of a people for generations, of what earthly use is the Imperial veto if not exercised to prevent infamy such as this?" It is, perhaps, natural that such a question should be asked, but is it reasonable to expect a satisfactory answer? We think there are some grounds for believing that a gross political miscarriage has occurred, and we readily grant that the Reid deal is a political disaster for the colony. At the same time, Newfoundland enjoys the privileges and responsibilities of self-government, and if there is one lesson above all others which has come home to the Colonial Office in recent years, it is the unwisdom of interfering in the internal affairs of a self-governing colony. So long as the people of Newfoundland elect to retain their present political status they must necessarily be bound by the action of those they return to power, and any Imperial interference with the policy of the local Executive and Legislature would be keenly resented by influential sections of public opinion, and might lead to the gravest complications. Where it exists the principle of self-government must be allowed free operation, for interference in one colony would be regarded as

a menace by all the others. This is one of a hundred reasons why the course suggested by the *Evening Telegram* cannot be pursued by the Imperial Government. The only contingency in which the Imperial veto could be successfully invoked would be on the hypothesis that the people of Newfoundland desired to revert to the position of a Crown Colony, but of such a desire there is no evidence, and it raises a fresh and exceedingly complicated question which we are not disposed to discuss here. We should have supposed it to be less humiliating to become a Crown Colony than a contractor's colony, but we have no means of enforcing our view upon Newfoundland, whose political funeral we witness with profound sorrow.

SIERRA LEONE.

News of native risings came from Sierra Leone in the early days of May which, though ugly, was hardly unexpected by those who had watched the recent development of unrest. The chief cause of the present outbreak, in the opinion of all the experts, is the imposition of a hut tax of five shillings a year upon the native population, who, not having been broken into the beauties of direct taxation, conceived the idea that their property was to be confiscated by the White Government. "They ought to have known better," say the officials, "for the hut tax is as convenient a way of raising revenue in Sierra Leone as the income tax in England. We do not rebel at the latter, why should the natives resent the former. They pay no other direct taxes, and they will hardly feel the new duty. Remember, too, that the present Governor, Sir F. Cardew, is fresh from South Africa, whence he has brought the idea of a hut tax, which has been successfully imposed on the Zulus." The obvious answer to this specious reasoning is, that because a tax is a success in one part of Africa, it is no reason for transplanting it to another, where the conditions are entirely different, and a cast-iron administration that is incapable of recognizing such differences, is bound to come to grief. The hut tax in Zululand was levied on a nation that the British had mastered in war, but in Sierra Leone we are dealing with an unconquered people, and the fact that everyone who knows anything about the country predicted trouble if the Zulu experiment were attempted, should have caused the authorities to hesitate. However, the Governor declined to hesitate, and the inevitable trouble has occurred. Let us, at any rate, hope that the Imperial Government will veto the extension of this impost to other parts of West Africa, otherwise we shall have a series of Sierra Leones on our hands. Desultory warfare has been waged in that Colony throughout the month of May, and though no full or clear record

of the fighting has yet appeared, there can be little doubt as to the loss of valuable lives. It should be recognized that the home protest against the hut tax does not come from ignorant and hysterical cockneys, but from such authorities as Miss Kingsley, who knows West Africa, and understands the natives very much better than anyone else. It is admitted that if Great Britain means business we can enforce this tax, but the cost of collection in money and lives would be enormous, while permanent damage would be inflicted upon British trade. We are convinced that Mr. Chamberlain will act with practical sagacity.

CORRESPONDENCE.

A Remonstrance.

South Africa,
April 22nd, 1898.

To the Editor of "The National Review."

Sir,

In your notes entitled "A Colonial Chronicle, which appeared in your current number (p. 305) it is stated that the Chief Justice of the Transvaal (Mr. Kotze) was supported in his view by all his brethren on the Bench and the Chief Justice of the Orange Free State. As a historical fact, you are mistaken in your assertion that the Chief Justice of the Transvaal was so supported by his brethren; the majority, I believe, dissented, and still dissent, from his view. That is a matter I touch upon merely for the sake of historical accuracy. You also misunderstand the avowed position of the Chief Justice of the Orange Free State, which has been merely this: That in all countries where a rigid written Constitution exists as well as a republican form of government, and where judicial functions have been entrusted exclusively to the courts of law, the testing-right must necessarily exist. (Cf. Bryce, *American Commonwealth*, chap. 23.) But it is a moot point whether, and in how far, the Constitution of the Transvaal has to be regarded as a rigid one. A great deal may be said on both sides; and Mr. de Villiers (the Chief Justice of the Orange Free State) has certainly advanced several reasons for considering it a rigid one, whilst at the same time admitting that the matter is not free from difficulty. He has never gone beyond this, though he has expressed the view that the Transvaal Constitution should be so amended that the judges shall have the testing-right; but naturally there is a difference between what is and what ought to be.

It may interest you to know that in South Africa we take a very different view of the suzerainty question from that which you have adopted.

Suzerainty, I take it, comprises the sum of a number of relations of a superior power to an inferior. Supposing that Article IV. of the London Convention (which really amounts to nothing more than this: That if the Transvaal enter into treaties or engagements with foreign powers that are detrimental to the interests of England, the latter country should have the right to object) constituted *one* of such relations—which is not necessarily the case and in this instance may be absolutely denied—then still all the other relations are yet wanting. Admit the existence of a suzerainty and

England would have the right to exercise all the powers which are comprised under that term. Mr. Chamberlain holds, or pretends to hold, that under the London Convention he has the right to refuse to go to arbitration with the Transvaal on alleged, or rather pretended, breaches of the Convention. Nothing more scandalous has, perhaps, ever happened in the history of South Africa, than this monstrous pretension of his. It would take too long to show how utterly untenable Mr. Chamberlain's contentions are, especially after having twice agreed to submitting certain questions to arbitration. The injustice, the gross unrighteousness, of the position thus taken up by him, *will never be forgotten in South Africa*, unless a different policy be adopted before it is too late.

I have been called an "extreme Afrikander." My own view is that right and justice, truth and honour, are matters of higher consequence than any mere questions of race, or country, or nationality. I side with England where England is right; I side against her when she is wrong. "Righteousness exalteth a nation" is my belief; if that be the creed of the "extreme Africander," I am proud to be such.

At the risk of being considered very lengthy in my communication, and of that communication being left unread, I may say that the wise policy for England to follow would be: do justice to and trust the Republics. The fiction of "German intrigues" in South Africa has been so long exploded that the policy initiated when that fiction was still in full vigour in England (as so many other fictions still are at this moment) may be safely abandoned. The policy stated at Port Elizabeth a short while ago by General Joubert, as representing the Transvaal, would then very speedily come into operation. It was this: that all the States and Colonies, under their respective flags, should, primarily, enter into a defensive bond against all enemies, and thus offer combined resistance should England ever go to war with any foreign Power. The artillery forces in both Republics are excellently equipped and drilled; and the burgher forces are by no means to be despised in warfare. The Jingoes are under the impression that England is invincible and invulnerable. Let us piously hope it is! But is it absolutely sure that England will never be obliged during time of war to withdraw her forces from South Africa? What folly, then, to persist in a policy of annoyance and irritation and injustice, when the Republics are only too willing to work in peace and harmony with the Colonies, under the hegemony of England.

A writer, on page 229 of your current number, shows the absurd nonsense which is retailed in England about the Transvaal. Here in South Africa we ask ourselves: What really have the so-called Uitlanders to complain of in the Transvaal? The sentimental grievance of the franchise? But any Uitlander may obtain the franchise after fifteen years' residence, if he will take the initial step towards naturalization by having himself enregistered. Although there is every reason to believe that this term will under certain conditions (to which I shall partly again refer) be materially reduced in time, yet how many have *taken that initial step?* Hardly any. One of these conditions, to which I may as well refer at once, is that England shall withdraw her suzerainty claim, and anything

looking like it. The reason is obvious. The Republics cannot allow a *dual allegiance.* They claim to have a right to exact from foreigners the same conditions that the United States require from them. One reads a great deal about the love of Englishmen for fair-play, but really when one comes to consider this matter it would appear that there is, as a rule, an entire absence on their part of the very least vestige of a sense of fair-play. I have long since come to the conclusion that it is absolutely useless and hopeless to discuss this matter with the generality of Englishmen; I shall, therefore, not go into further detail.

In the rest, Englishmen come from England, where they are heavily taxed, to a country where there is hardly any taxation. The mining industry (the "pampered industry" many here call it) exists under conditions, I am told, more favourable than in any other part of the world. Practically, Englishmen enjoy every liberty in the Transvaal that they do in England. Johannesburg is now in a depressed condition (a condition which was always foretold by those who had watched the results of over-trading, over-booming, and excessive Company-promoting in other parts of the world), and now the Transvaal Government is blamed! The conditions existing now are not less favourable than they were two or three years ago when the Rand was booming; and some of the mines are paying 100, 150, and 200 per cent. per annum and more. As matter of "fair-play," why are not Rhodesian conditions attacked?

However, I have been led away from writing a few lines, to correct your misinformation, to a somewhat long-winded discourse on affairs in South Africa in general, for which I have to apologize.

I beg to subscribe myself,

Your obedient servant,

AN AFRIKANDER.

NOTICE.

All communications to the Editor of THE NATIONAL REVIEW should be addressed to the care of Mr. EDWARD ARNOLD, 37, Bedford Street, Strand, W.C.

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THE

NATIONAL REVIEW.

No. 185.—JULY, 1898.

EPISODES OF THE MONTH.

THE INCUBATION OF THE PLOT.

When the history of a recent piece of diplomacy comes to be written it will be found that British statesmanship played a part with which the British people have every reason to be gratified. As the incident is now closed and is becoming encumbered with the interested misrepresentations circulated by those who were hoist with their own petard, it is as well that the ascertainable facts should be placed upon record—especially as they form an episode that may at any moment be repeated. When the Cuban crisis came to a head, and it at last became manifest even to the perverse and purblind statesmen of Continental Europe that a war between the United States and Spain was imminent, they resolved to make a European question of Cuba; in other words, to turn it, if possible, into a second Crete, and treat the States as they had treated Greece. France, followed for once by her consort, Russia, and eagerly seconded by Austria, took the lead in the preliminary *pourparlers*. The animating motive of the latter Power—apart from reactionary prejudices against America—was the respectable desire to protect an Austrian Princess in distress (the Queen Regent of Spain); the French Government was mainly impelled by less sentimental and more practical motives—the irresistible instinct of the investor. The French stake in Spain was estimated a few months ago at no less than £160,000,000, *i.e.*, £4 per head of the entire French popu-

lation, or four-fifths of the huge indemnity France paid to Germany after the Franco-German War. No French Government could afford to stand idly by when this vast mass of French wealth was in jeopardy. Moreover, the financial tie between France and Spain is strengthened by an ardent Latin patriotism and by the close political relations existing between the Governments. By her abstinence from the Triple Alliance the Monarchy has greatly strengthened the hands of the Republic, which otherwise would have been obliged to keep several Army Corps along the Pyrenees as she does along the Italian frontier. This well-known contingency has hitherto provided Spain with a powerful trump-card, held so long in reserve as to be now probably useless. Italy, we believe remained outside "the Cuban Concert"; at any rate, she had taken no active steps in the matter when the Triplice of France, Russia, and Austria were exchanging views with Germany. The Berlin Government not unnaturally responded most cordially to the proposals. The opportunity of setting the two great Republics by the ears and of humiliating one by the instrumentality of the other was not likely to be missed by the Kaiser and his astute advisers. Moreover, there were old scores to be paid off against a country which had attracted the flower of the German population, and which might, unless checked, cut Germany out in commerce, develop into a great sea Power, and insist on exercising democratic influence on questions which are only fit for the cognizance of autocrats. The accession of Germany to the new Concert was made contingent on the co-operation of Great Britain—a condition that was heartily assented to by the other Powers, who did not regard it as endangering the project. Indeed, these wiseacres regarded Great Britain's support as already assured. Had not Lord Salisbury declared himself an enthusiastic adherent of "the Federation of Europe" as the only hope of perpetuating peace, and what more suitable work could be found for it than the protection of a European nation? Again, were not the relations between the British and American Governments always more or less strained, and could Great Britain have forgotten or forgiven the Venezuelan Message and the Olney notice to quit the Western Hemisphere? Could she, finally, be so fatuous as not to recognize that as sure as *l'appétit vient en mangeant* the appropriation of Spanish Cuba by the States would lead to the appropriation of British Canada by the same aggressors? So they argued, and convinced themselves that it was reasonable to demand our concurrence. It was vital to obtain it for, in case those amazing and incalculable Americans should refuse to bow to the superior sagacity of European statesmanship and decline to permit the brilliant Cretan experiment to be repeated at their doors, John

Bull would be the very man to bell the cat. He could make himself useful in a naval demonstration off Boston and New York, and if that did not bring the States to their senses, the worst that could happen would be an American attack upon Canada. Then when those villainous Anglo-Saxons had got one another comfortably by the throat the Continental combination would be free to amuse themselves elsewhere, while Russia, *e.g.*, would be able to turn round, disclaim all connection with the alleged concert, and pose as the traditional friend of the great Republic. It was altogether the prettiest plot of modern times, and though the desire to uphold an European nation against America was at the bottom of it, the possible ulterior developments as indicated above added greatly to its merits in the eyes of its eminent engineers, M. Hanotaux and Count Muravieff.

THE PLOT THAT FAILED.

At the time when this delicate business was first mooted in London Lord Salisbury was abroad recruiting his health, though he still kept a general eye on the business of the Foreign Office. Mr. Arthur Balfour was acting as Foreign Secretary, and to him and Sir Julian Pauncefote primarily belongs the credit of appreciating the full proportions of this plan of "friendly mediation" which, if successful, could spell nothing but disaster for the English-speaking nations. Mr. Balfour's well-known sentiment towards the United States—which is perhaps his only political passion—reinforced his solicitude for British interests. So the attitude of this country intimated to all whom it might concern that Great Britain would under no circumstances be a party to anything that might be even constructed as unfriendly to the Washington Government, and it became tolerably apparent that the British dissented from the Continental view, that the American desire to suppress a hell in Cuba was a piece of wanton aggression. Possibly some of the "promoters of peace" would have proceeded in their beneficent purpose if they could have secured the benevolent neutrality of this country, but even this was seen to be out of the question, and the general expression of opinion in the British Press of all parties, headed by *The Times*, showed the "combine" that it would be dangerous for them to threaten the States. The "Cuban Concert" consequently collapsed and melted away like snow before the sun, leaving so few traces behind that its "organizers" have been emboldened to circulate semi-official *démentis* of its existence, and it is nowadays treated as "a malignant invention of the British," who wish to embroil France or Russia or Germany, as the case may be, with their dear friend the United States. The facts we have stated are, however, drawn from several

reliable sources—partly American. They are corroborated in a remarkable manner by the concerted menaces of the official Press of Paris, St. Petersburg, Berlin, and Vienna during the critical days in April, and by the extraordinary purchases of Spanish stock which were made by the great cosmopolitan financiers on the very verge of the war, which, they believed, would be prevented by European intervention, or, in other words, by the coercion of the United States. It is unnecessary to add that Mr. Chamberlain was not less decided than Mr. Balfour as to the duty of Great Britain, and that Lord Salisbury recognizes that the proper field for the operations of the Federation of Europe is Europe, and we are convinced that under no conceivable circumstances will he walk into any ingenious Franco-Russian snares laid in other parts of the globe. Surely in vain the net is spread in the sight of any bird; but the net continues to be spread, and at this very moment over the Philippines and other questions, a more or less solid group of Powers would be willing to act, if they had the requisite nerve, in the spirit of the pregnant speech delivered last November by Count Goluchowski (the Minister for Foreign affairs in Austria-Hungary). "They (the peoples of Europe) must fight shoulder to shoulder against the common danger (the United States), and must arm themselves for the struggle with all the means at their disposal. Just as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had been absorbed by religious wars, the eighteenth century was distinguished by the triumph of liberal ideas, and our own by the appearance of the nationality questions. In like manner the twentieth century would be for Europe a period marked by the struggle for existence in the politico-commercial sphere." European nations must close their ranks in order successfully to defend their existence. May this be realized everywhere (in Great Britain?) and may the epoch of peaceful development we now confidently anticipate be employed in collecting our strength and devoting it chiefly to this end." The crisis foreseen has come sooner than the speaker anticipated. But Europe is not united to confront "the common enemy," simply because Great Britain, who is the leading European Power whenever she chooses to play her proper *rôle*, does not regard the United States as her "enemy," though we believe that nine American schoolboys out of ten are brought up to regard Great Britain as their "hereditary enemy."

British Public Opinion.

While British policy in various quarters of the globe has been severely handled during the last few months, we have not yet read a single British speech on either side of politics or a serious leading article in any representative newspaper impugning the attitude adopted by this

country towards the United States during the last three months. Not the wildest of our Jingoes—not excluding Sir Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett—has taunted Lord Salisbury with kow-towing to the United States. Among Conservatives the doctrine laid down by Mr. Disraeli as long ago as 1856 is happily rehabilitated. That far-seeing statesman declared that the maintenance of friendly relations with the American Republic should be a cardinal object of Conservative policy; and although Mr. Gladstone and Sir William Harcourt have at different times and on various questions—particularly on the Silver question—said deplorable things which have given dire offence in the Western and Southern States, the Liberal Party is now effusive in applauding the present policy of the Government; and it is noteworthy that the peace-at-any-price Nonconformists have refrained from reproaching the Unionist Cabinet, as might have been expected, for refusing to co-operate with the other Powers in preserving "that greatest of British interests—peace," because they know that the Cuban Concert was unfriendly towards America and dishonest towards ourselves. As the story leaks out, English men of all classes will congratulate themselves that at a most critical moment in our history their Government abstained from making a hideous blunder, the folly and calamitousness of which we can now all see. The preliminaries were however presented in such innocent guise, and the plan was so craftily contrived, that our statesmen might have unwittingly committed this country to some perilous step "in the sacred interests of peace." Their intentions were always sound; but good intentions do not make a sure pavement for diplomacy, and they cannot be sufficiently commended on having exhibited what Mr. Curzon has pronounced to be an unstatesmanlike quality, viz., "the intelligent anticipation of events that have not yet occurred." The one entertaining feature of this profoundly interesting episode is that the only politicians in our midst to whom the British policy appears to have caused serious chagrin are the Irish Nationalists. Several of them, as devout Roman Catholics, have been, for religious reasons, heart and soul with Spain throughout her troubles, and careful readers of back numbers of *The Freeman's Journal* (Dublin), the official organ of the Dillonite Party, which is presumably financed with dollars though inspired by the priesthood, tell us that its columns have contained articles much less friendly to the Americans than those appearing on the same day in *The Times*. Another subsection of disgusted Nationalists, of whom Mr. Davitt is the spokesman, are furious at the turn of events, as their principal political capital and their entire material capital is supplied by American hostility towards England, which they, as

good men of business, have done so much to foment. For it is obvious even to those who have not enlisted in the noble army of gushers, and who are consequently unable to discover an arbitration treaty in every bush and an alliance treaty on every tree, that the American and British nations are on better terms to-day than at any time during the last 130 years. If only hysterical sentimentalists will leave well alone and drop their ridiculous crazes, there is no reason why this era of good feeling should be disturbed. Let the practical people in both countries resolve to perpetuate it, for in the coming century we ought to have much "use" for one another, as our American cousins would say.

THE MORAL.

The reader may well ask whether the line adopted by Great Britain in the face of Continental Europe has not greatly increased the tension between her and other Powers? Has it not greatly increased their ill-will against us? We are certainly not more loved than we were three months ago; but we make so bold as to say that our prestige has been appreciably augmented. The Powers were persuading themselves that Great Britain had become a *quantité négligeable* owing to her vacillation and nervelessness, also that she could be turned on to do any odd or disagreeable jobs which they desired done but did not care to do themselves, such as clearing up the Cretan mess, or threatening the Sultan. They have now learnt that when Great Britain cares to assert herself she carries the day, that she is capable of refusing to do the bidding of other nations, and has not lost the power of adopting and adhering to a definite policy. She can still see through their miserable plots and subterfuges, and has an eye to the higher interests of civilization with which the perpetuation of the Colonial rule of Spain in any part of the world is entirely incompatible. In another very practical respect the interests of Great Britain in Europe have been materially furthered by recent events. It had become an *idée fixe* in more than one Continental capital—you may almost call it a monomania—that in the event of any first-class European nation becoming embroiled in war with this country, the States might be relied upon to take us in the rear, on the principle that "England's difficulty is America's opportunity." We are not saying that it would have happened, but do affirm that it was recognized as a serious factor in Continental politics, and was perpetually in the mind of the foreign strategist. Some of our American friends, such as Senator Morgan, had said things which, if taken *au grand sérieux*, gave a colour to the calculation. It is now felt in Europe that, should Great Britain become involved in a fight for her existence, that the attack on

Canada would not occur; rather is it believed that this country would have the moral support of Washington. The lesson of this abortive Cuban Concert is writ so large that all who run may read it, and we devoutly hope it will be taken to heart by Her Majesty's Ministers. When Great Britain is true to her best traditions, takes a strong self-reliant line, and sticks to her guns, she strengthens her position throughout the world, and leads Europe. When she wobbles, shuffles, vacillates, and finally scuttles, she loses prestige everywhere, and Europe despises her.

PROBLEMS.

It is of the essence of the policy sketched in the preceding pages that it shall be persisted in to the end of the chapter. The United States are undertaking great responsibilities in different parts of the world. They are already launching three considerable expeditions destined to occupy and conquer Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines respectively. At this moment, and for the first time in their history, they have given hostages to fortune, and occupy a vulnerable position, to which the leading Russian paper, the *Novosti* (published in a country where nothing is published without authority), lately called attention, and quite in a friendly way proposed a bombardment of the American coasts by European fleets.* When Spain has surrendered her various Colonies, or they have been reduced by American arms, their fate will be in the hands of the American people, and it is by no means improbable that Imperialism will carry the day, which would involve the retention of all conquests. In any case there must be a prolonged military occupation which may give occasion for the formation of a further Concert to urge upon the United States the propriety of relinquishing Cuba, as they originally disclaimed all desire to annex it, and to surrender the Philippines as it is in the sphere of other Powers. The Americans will, however, determine all these great Colonial problems undisturbed by European jealousies and undeterred by European bluff. We believe that they have practically decided to annex Puerto Rico, and are already conscious that the gratuitous self-denying ordinance they imposed upon themselves

* Lest this should be supposed to be a malignant British fiction we quote from a telegram dated St. Petersburg, June 5th, appearing in the American Press:—"The *Novosti*, commenting to-day on the supposed intention of the Spanish Government to appeal to the Powers to intervene, says: 'It is full time to end a senseless and criminal war. Spain's appeal is a sort of capitulation, but, on the other hand, America must voluntarily submit her pretensions to a tribunal of the Powers. America cannot avoid doing this, as her position, with two long and exposed coast-lines, is not such as could withstand the combined fleets of two or three European Powers. Let Europe raise her mighty voice and restore that peace to which mankind looks for the only peaceful expansion and for the triumph of civilization."

with regard to Cuba may involve them in serious difficulties, for the insurgents appear to have been greatly overrated in numbers, and there are necessarily grave doubts as to their fitness to govern that splendid island after the expulsion of Spain. The Washington Administration would thus find themselves in the same awkward predicament as the English in Egypt and the French in Tunis. Both European nations opened their occupations with *bonâ fide* pledges to evacuate these countries on the restoration of order, and both have unceasingly regretted those pledges, and have been wholly unable to fulfil them, for the withdrawal of either would change order into anarchy. There will arise a similar situation in Cuba, and it may be that the United States will not abandon that island before we leave Egypt, or the French Tunis. Both Cuba and Puerto Rico are adjacent to the American coast and offer fairly simple problems. But what of the Philippines, which is 7,000 miles from San Francisco? This would become a magnificent possession if provided with a decent Government, but, so far as we can judge, public opinion in the States has not crystallized as to its future fate. Temporarily, the Americans must make themselves responsible, and they refuse to entertain the idea of restoring a country to Spain which she had both morally and practically lost even before Admiral Dewey entered the Bay of Manila. But there are certainly no materials for the creation of a native Republic, and one may hope that attachment to a mere form of Government will not lead to the creation of a quite unnecessary scandal in the Pacific.

A Free Hand.

While present appearances almost all indicate that the United States is no longer at the parting of the ways, but has definitely embarked on an Imperial career, things are not always what they seem, and of no country is this truer than of the Great Republic. It is universally assumed throughout Europe that America will speedily and inevitably become a great Power in the modern European sense, with a mighty fleet, a serious standing army, possessions, protectorates, and spheres of influence in remote regions of the planet. This view is fortified by the sudden withdrawal of the prolonged opposition offered by His Majesty Speaker Reid, the Czar of the House of Representatives, to the discussion of the annexation of the Sandwich Islands; the House having received gracious permission to vote on this question has approved annexation by a majority of more than two to one. This is pointed to as a sure indication of the coming expansion. The question is temporarily buried in the Senate, where the opponents of incorporating into the Union a "polyglot and leprous

group of islands 2,000 miles from the Pacific coast" are in a manifest minority, but they avow their intention of exhausting the resources of obstruction before permitting this "disastrous decision" to be made. Their stubbornness is not due to mean motives as their opponents pleasantly suggest, but to their sincere fear of abandoning the traditions of the fathers of the Constitution. To break out in colonies is, in their judgment, a revolutionary departure without justification, and they dread its effect upon American institutions which they regard as different from and superior to European institutions. The *rôle* of "Little Americans" is in war time arduous, and they encounter a good deal of unmerited obloquy; but lookers on, and especially Englishmen, should cultivate detachment in contemplating American affairs. Moreover, it is not absolutely certain that the "Big Americans" will carry the day, and tranform a peaceful Republic into a military, naval, and colonial empire. We are weary of reminding our readers that the oracle is not only to be consulted in the seaboard States of the East. The sceptre of political power passed finally away from New York nearly twenty years ago, and every intelligent New Yorker now recognizes that the Mississippi Valley has become, and will remain, the real seat of power. *The Daily Mail* has, with its usual intelligence, emphasized this fact. Its New York correspondent stated recently:—"It is unquestionably true that this war has widened the sentiment for a great navy, but only those who have short memories are hopeful. It was not many years ago that a Bill providing for ten battleships was cut down to provide for only one such ship by the votes of the Grangers—or representatives of the great grain-growing States between the Alleghanies and the Rockies. These are the votes that carry legislation, and these are the people who have always opposed the enlargement of the navy. They have opposed fraternization with England as well, and they, as much as anyone, brought on this war with Spain. Whoever thinks the people of the Granger States need not be reckoned with in peace or war or alliances, or, in fact, everything, is a person who does not know the States. New York is not the capital of American opinion, but Chicago is, and the worst of it is that Europe only hears from New York.

TWO UTTERANCES.

The reader has probably read two notable utterances on the question we have been discussing. Mr. Byran has pronounced himself emphatically against the expansion of America, and there is no public question upon which he has not a great—and a deservedly great—following. All impartial students of his remarkable career respect his judg-

ment, whether they agree with him or not, because he is a thoughtful and sincere man of conspicuous capacity and single-minded patriotism. Over 6,000,000 of his countrymen sought to confer upon him the highest office in their gift. This is his latest utterance on the policy attributed to the United States :—

"If a contest undertaken for the sake of humanity degenerates into a war of conquest we shall find it difficult to meet the charge of having added hypocrisy to greed. Is our national character so weak that we cannot withstand the temptation to appropriate the first piece of land that comes within our reach? Our guns destroyed a Spanish fleet, but can they destroy that self-evident truth that Governments derive their just powers, not from force, but from the consent of the governed? Shall we abandon a just resistance to European encroachment upon the western hemisphere, in order to mingle in the controversies of Europe and Asia? Nebraska will hold up the hands of the Government while the battle rages, and when the war clouds roll away her voice will be heard pleading for the maintenance of those ideas which inspired the founders of our Government, and gave the nation its proud eminence among the nations of the earth. If others turn to thoughts of aggrandisement, and yield allegiance to those who clothe land covetousness in the attractive garb of 'national destiny,' the people of Nebraska will, if I mistake not their sentiments, plant themselves upon the disclaimer entered by Congress, and expect that good faith shall characterize the making of peace as it did the beginning of war. Goldsmith calls upon statesmen

"'To judge how wide the limits stand,
Betwixt a splendid and a happy land.'

If some dream of the splendours of a heterogeneous empire encircling the globe, we shall be content to aid in bringing enduring happiness to a homogeneous people, consecrated to the purpose of maintaining 'a government of the people, by the people, and for the people.'"

You would hardly conceive it possible that Mr. Bryan and Mr. Cleveland—the one representing the masses of the people, the other the "Mugwumps"—should agree upon any public question, but one of the latest cablegrams (June 22nd) tells us :—

"Yesterday ex-President Cleveland delivered the Founders' Day address to the students of Lawrenceville School, New Jersey, his subject being 'Good Citizenship.' Incidentally he discussed the war, and its possible influence on the policy of the country. Mr. Cleveland condemned the prevalent warlike spirit, although intimating that the Spanish war was fully justified by reasons of national interest and humanity.

"He deprecated any departure from the traditional American policy of avoiding foreign entanglements, and said :—

"'The American people are tempted every day to abandon the accustomed way and enter upon a course of new and strange adventure.

"'Never before in our history have we been beset with temptations so dangerous as those which are now whispering in our ears the alluring words "Conquest" and "Expansion."

"'We are entitled to demand a conclusive explanation of the conditions which make our acquisition of new and distant territory justifiable, prudent, or necessary.

"'When the war is ended we shall need uncompromising moral courage to deal with the problems confronting us, and to demand the things which true American citizenship decrees to be just and safe.'"

There is a great deal to be said for and against an Imperial America, and the arguments on both sides will be thoroughly

exhausted before the matter is finally settled by the American people. Fortunately for themselves, foreigners are exempt from dealing with this prickly problem. Let us bear in mind that the formula, "a free hand for the Americans," which expresses the British attitude during the past and coming months, has a double meaning: firstly, that the United States be not interfered with by Continental "Concerts" should she elect to expand; secondly, that British opinion shall abstain from taking a side on the purely American question as to whether she would be wise to expand.

A Lost Legend.

The Washington Post has cruelly shattered the great Chauncey Depew legend which has exercised such a fascinating influence in Europe for about a generation. By virtue of this legend, so dear to countless editors and all the news agencies, Mr. Chauncey Depew has always been accepted abroad as the *alter ego* of the American people. He was not an individual, but a hemisphere. In an article entitled "Depew at large in France," the *Post* thus caustically disposes of that pleasing fiction:—

"'Our Chauncey,' as we love to call him, seems to be talking a great deal in France at this time. Not satisfied with the after-dinner gush for which he is justly famous in this country, and for which he has frequently received honourable mention in England, he has been talking to the Paris newspapers also. This gives him a larger circulation. Chauncey loves circulation, not only for himself, but his language, and *Le Matin* is giving it to him just now upon a large and lurid scale. What seems to trouble Chauncey most—while he remains in Paris, at least—is the proposition, generally accepted there, that the American people love the English better than they do the French. This puzzles Chauncey and will continue to puzzle him during the entire period of his Parisian sojourn. He explains his bewilderment to *Le Matin*:—

"'It is 250 years since my French ancestors established themselves in America Since that time I have lost somewhat the use of my maternal language.

"'My ancestors called themselves Depuy, a name which has been Americanized into Depew. But I have not forgotten my country or origin, and will speak to you with the freedom of a compatriot and a faithful friend of your country.'"

The *Post* adds:—

"No wonder Chauncey is astonished, even grieved. Two centuries and a half ago his ancestors left France and migrated to this country. In what capacity they came he does not tell. We smother our solicitude, and do not ask him. Far be it from us to embarrass so great and good a man. We can realize, however the pain it gives him to see that the nation which produced his ancestors and the nation which, with the assistance of his ancestors, produced him are on the brink of a misunderstanding. It is monstrous. He thinks it all over, and it seems to him that the Depuy transaction 250 years ago should have established an irrefragable bond of affection between the two nations. America is indebted to France for the original Depuys. France owes us much for having taken them off her hands. America and France should embrace on such a showing, and celebrate with tears and osculation. Then Chauncey proceeds to show the absurdity, the impossibility of a *rapprochement* between England and the United States:—

"'The sympathy of Republican France for Monarchical Spain astonished us. But all Continental Europe seemed at first hostile. One nation alone appeared to side with us—England.

"'You know from experience the sensitive condition of a people engaged in war. The friendship of England aroused enthusiasm in us, and we were more grateful because for a century the relations of the Union with Great Britain had been rather strained.

"'But these are the passing impressions of circumstances. We may arrive at an understanding with England on certain defined points, but from that to an alliance comparable to that between France and Russia or between Germany nd Austria there is an abyss, and that abyss we will never bridge—never.

"'Our heart is not on that side. It goes out toward France, drawn by the glorious memories of our history, by a community of democratic aspirations. The two great Republics cannot quarrel. On our side it cannot be, and neither, I am sure, on yours.'"

The *Post*, which has never been ranked among the Anglophiles, appends its own view of these high matters:—

"Of course, he knows, when he doesn't forget it, that there is no more 'community of democratic aspirations' between France and the United States than there is resemblance between our respective methods and ideas of government. He knows that France, calling itself a Republic, is, in fact, a bureaucracy of the narrowest and most tyrannical description, whereas England, calling itself a Monarchy, is a thousand times more like the United States in everything that involves personal liberty and free self-government. He explains his present condition of mind when he tells *Le Matin* that: 'From the outset of our differences with Spain the attitude of a portion of your Press has stupefied us.' That's it. Chauncey was stupefied, and he has remained in that condition ever since. But we feel quite sure that this little outburst on Chauncey's part will delude no thoughtful person in France, in England, or in the United States. In this country we are not gulping over those 'glorious memories of our history,' for we know that American gratitude for France's action in 1776 is due not to the bourgeois dispensation of to-day, but to the French Monarchy and aristocracy of that time which Bonhomme Jacques hated and destroyed. Paris will sneer at our Chauncey, and England, if she considers the matter at all, will tell herself that it is only another of his delightful, if unintelligible, jokes. We shall hear from Chauncey again, no doubt, and be further impressed with his humour and his versatility. He is still at large, you know."

ANOTHER PORT ARTHUR.

Intelligent Englishmen are very much alive to the significance of the Chinese question, which they feel to be as important as any issue that has been raised this century. The policy of the Cabinet will be very narrowly watched, and if they show signs of evading, repudiating, or running away from their avowed policy, they will need all the assistance they can get from the Opposition Front Bench to protect them from the resentment of their own supporters. At the present moment a crisis has arisen not dissimilar in kind to that of Port Arthur, and Ministers have an opportunity of retrieving our prestige in the Far East, which was seriously compromised by that deplorable episode. Great Britain has declared for "equality of opportunity" and the "open door," and against "spheres of influence," and Ministers have affirmed their intention to go all lengths, sooner than sacrifice the vital British interests which are covered by these phrases. They express high indigna-

tion with those who have dared to suggest that the fundamental principle of "equality of opportunity" is less assured in Manchuria than in Lancashire, or that the "open door" of Talienwan is less open than that of Hull. They have a conspicuous opportunity of confounding their critics. The Chinese Government desire to extend the only railway system at present existing in China to Neuchwang, which the reader will see from a map is north of Talienwan. For this undertaking they require money, to raise which they approached the Russo-Chinese Bank—an institution more Russian than Chinese. Owing to the unfavourable terms offered, the Chinese turned to the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, which is mainly a British concern. The unerring *Times* correspondent in Peking was able to announce in the middle of June what no one has yet been able to contradict, viz., that M. Pavloff, the Russian representative in Peking, had actually handed in a written protest to the Tsang-li-Yâmen (Foreign Affairs Board) against the proposed loan, alleging that a Russo-Chinese Convention existed binding China to obtain no foreign loan on the security of any railway north of Peking except from Russia! The Chinese replied denying the alleged terms, and stated that a preliminary contract had been already signed with the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank for a loan of 16,000,000 taels for the extension of the Shan-hai-Kwan Railway to Neuchwang, on the security of the existing railways and the new line.

A Plea for Candour.

The Chinese Government have subsequently informed the British Government that they desire to carry out their part of the contract with the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, but that they will be unable to do so in the face of Russia's threats without the British Government's support. The British Government are, at the time of writing, understood to be rejoicing at this unexpected opportunity of vindicating the principle of "equality of opportunity," the future of which is at stake. This is no platform affair. There is no occasion for resounding rhetoric or insulting invective. All that is required is that the Tsang-li-Yâmen shall be officially informed by the British Minister at Peking, Sir Claude Macdonald, that they may proceed with their contract in full reliance on Great Britain. The only serious alternative would be for the British Government, while informing China that Great Britain's support cannot be counted upon, to tell the British nation candidly that British interests in the Far East, as defined in January of this year, cannot be maintained, and that the policy then laid down must be reconsidered. If China is being practically parcelled out in spheres of influence by Russia, Germany, or France, we have either to resist or recognize this process. We shall only heap humiliation on humiliation

if we allow ourselves to be governed by phrases without meaning, and continue to deny the existence of what is patent to the rest of mankind. If we have no intention of kicking open doors that have been shut in our face, and of insisting that contracts shall not be torn up because Englishmen are parties to them, let us be sufficiently candid and courageous to say so. After all, Lord Salisbury has secured the safety of Hong Kong, by obtaining a lease of territory that commands it; he has earmarked a magnificent group of provinces as not alienable; he has discussed the organization of a Chinese Sepoy Army to protect them. If the sphere of influence carries the day probably the Court will migrate from Peking into the British sphere, and we may eventually recover our former position in the Far East, as the protectors of an empire which will still number 200,000,000 of people. But we shall do nothing if we feed on phrases and refuse to realize facts. Does "equality of opportunity" still hold the field, and will the Hong Kong Bank's contract be carried through, or have we fallen back upon "a sphere of influence" involving the recognition of other spheres of influence in China? The country is entitled to know.

THE WEST AFRICAN SETTLEMENT.

The present Government deserves to be congratulated upon the settlement of the Niger question, which formed the greater part of the West African question. Mr. Chamberlain, in whose department it fell, has acted throughout with firmness and conciliation. He has not attempted to bluff, but has insisted where our rights have been indisputable, and he has yielded (as in the case of the Mossi country) where they were disputable. The question has been a much more alarming one than the general public has any idea of. Now that the danger has passed away, for the ratification of the Convention by the Chamber is a mere form, and we can no longer be accused of indulging in "menace," it may just as well be known that if the French Government had not agreed to evacuate the territory filibustered by Lieutenant Bretonnet, under the direction of Governor Ballot, there must have been war between France and England. Neither country would have desired it; but, on the other hand, neither could have submitted peacefully to a humiliating affront. Great Britain could not have submitted to the affront of having her territory raided and occupied, as had been done in the Borgu country. The Ballot-Bretonnet expedition was tantamount to an act of war. The French were not in the least excited over it, because they were the aggressors and held the spoils of their aggression. There was not a symptom of disquietude on their part or of an intention to relinquish what they had seized. There were protracted negotiations and abortive conferences. Commission after

commission met in vain. The French Government, egged on by the French Colonial Party, remained obdurate. Lieutenant Bretonnet was fêted as a conquering hero. The West bank of the Niger, from Say to Boussa, which had been coolly sliced out of a British Protectorate, was considered annexed. Monsieur de Presensée, who is the Press ally of the French Foreign Office, persistently misrepresented the case in the *Temps*, and did so also in organs of the British Press. The *Journal des Débats* and the *Figaro* joined in the game of bluff, and denounced the claims of England as intolerable. They were a sample of our arrogance and cupidity. We are accustomed to this. Fortunately for both countries, a French General Election took place, and the Colonial Party was routed. The French Colonial Minister, Monsieur André Lebon, and Messieurs Deloncle, de Mahy, Charmès, Monteil, and Delafosse disappeared. They had no France behind them. The mass of the French electors are profoundly indifferent to West Africa, and had no desire to quarrel with England on the subject.

THE BALLOT-BRETONNET EXPEDITION DISAVOWED.

Monsieur Hanotaux suddenly found himself released, by the dispersal of the Colonial Anglophobes, and able to act on his own judgment. He had long perceived the justice of the British demands, and Baron de Courcel, who has always done his best to keep England and France on good terms, was aware of the gravity of the question, and advised concession. A convention was signed on June 14th by the Commissioners of the two Governments under which the annexation carried out by the Ballot-Bretonnet expedition was relinquished, and both banks of the Niger, from Boussa up to, and including, Ilo, were recognized as British. Nikki, an inland town which lies within the theoretical Hinterland of Lagos, is the sole trophy which rests with the French as the result of their invasion. On the east bank of the Niger, well up in the north and above Ilo, a triangular piece of territory is ceded to France, to which she attached value on account of its contiguity to Say, and we receive in exchange a zone of territory extending a hundred miles round Sokoto. The essence of the Niger settlement is, however, in the withdrawal of the French from Ilo, Gomba, Lafagon, Bussa, Kishi, Borea, and Ashigire. Nothing led us to suppose the surrender would be made. It was, however, an indispensable reparation for the outrage which had been inflicted. Mr. Chamberlain and Sir George Goldie have, during the negotiations, been the *bêtes noirs* of the Paris journals; everything was said to disparage them. There were ridiculous misrepresentations of Sir George Goldie's conduct, and Mr. Chamberlain was declared to be in opposition

to Lord Salisbury. Of course, this was trumpery fiction. Mr. Chamberlain's crime consisted in being, as the British Colonial Minister, firm to the needed extent.

THE SETTLEMENT OUTSIDE NIGERLAND.

The settlement outside Nigerland is less favourable to us. True, we run the Hinterland of the Gold Coast up to the 11th degree of latitude, and this obliges the French to evacuate Wa, in the neighbourhood of which, it will be remembered, there is a rival occupation; but Leo, which is just above the 11th parallel, remains French, and we abandon our claims to Wagadugu and to the promising country of Mossi. We say this with great regret; it is difficult, however, to blame the Government for having given way here, as our claims were disputable, and the French have been in occupation of the Mossi country for more than eighteen months. There is also a delimitation of the boundary between the British Gold Coast and the French Ivory Colony. The course of a river is taken as the dividing line instead of a meridian. We evacuate Bona and Dokta in consequence of this. Locally the French may be said to have as much claim to them as we have, as they are on the very border of an unsettled boundary. An important concession on our part is that two bonded areas are leased to the French Government for thirty years. They are on the navigable portion of the Niger, one being on the right bank between Leaba and Fort Goldie, and the other at the mouth of the Niger. Of course these Custom Depôts are subject to English law, and there are careful regulations concerning the transit of bonded goods across our territory. The return for this concession is the grant for an equivalent period of thirty years of equal terms for French and British trade in all the French West Coast Colonies from the Liberian frontier to the Niger. It is a great satisfaction that our dispute with France in West Africa is so far settled. If we do not come out better it is only because we have woke up so late to the encroachments of the French. While we have slept they have created an empire by appropriating the Hinterlands of West Coast Colonies which belonged to other Powers, until, to quote the French Foreign Office declaration with which it endeavours to gild the present settlement, "French rule has been established over the immense regions extending from Algeria to the Congo, passing by Lake Chad, and from Senegal to the Nile Basin."

OUR CLAIMS ON THE WAIMA DISASTER.

There is another question which presses for settlement; that is the question of compensation by the French Government to the relatives of the British officers and men who were slain by a French force at Waima (Sierra Leone) upon British territory. It is as well to

rendered the Premiership of the Marquis Rudini untenable. As his Ministry relies to some extent on Radical support he is clearly not the man to revive the Crispi tradition. After the usual rumours and denials, it is finally announced that General Pelloux has become Premier of disturbed Italy. This solution sounds martial, and we may expect further troubles. The Radicals intend to fight the Dynasty in the open, the Vatican to stab it in the back.

FRENCH POLITICS.

The first thing the new French Chamber did after the General Election was to elect a President. Its character was to some extent indicated by the election of Monsieur Paul Deschanel by 287 votes as against 277 for Monsieur Brisson, the old Radical President. This was supposed to be a triumph for Monsieur Méline, but it was a very feeble triumph, and preserved him in power but a few days longer. On the 14th the Government was required by a foolish vote of the Chamber to look for the support "to a majority exclusively Republican." Monsieur Méline resisted this, in the first instance, and was beaten. He then turned round and, in rather an undignified manner, accepted the resolution. He did not, however, receive sufficient support, and on the following day he resigned, after having held power for a little over two years. Thereupon the President invited Monsieur Ribot to form a Ministry; he was, however, as a Moderate, obliged to resign the task because the Radicals claimed too many portfolios. Monsieur Sarrien was then commissioned to form a Cabinet. It is difficult to know what a Radical means in France nowadays; but Monsieur Sarrien bears the label of one. Notwithstanding this badge, he also was obliged to declare his inability to form a Ministry. Monsieur Peytral, a Senator with a Radical tinge, was then employed. His effort was to create a "Cabinet of Union"—the French have a passion for terms, and that of "concentration" has lost its charm, especially when no one will concentrate. It is probable that out of the conflicting forces in the French Chamber a Cabinet of sufficient equilibrium will be formed, whatsoever may be its designation. The services of Monsieur Hanotaux will be lost for a while; and this is a loss to France, though it may be noted that amid the ephemeral Ministries which have succeeded each other—no less than thirty-five have passed during the last twenty-eight years—there has been a strict continuity in French foreign policy. We wish we could say it had been one favourable to England. There is, however, no danger to France from abroad—unless she persists in picking a quarrel. The real danger is in her domestic condition and in the symptoms of decadence which have been so manifest in the conduct of her

shrewdness and prescience, as well as energy and determination, who looks a generation ahead, and acts as he sees? The main moral of these elections is that the Germans are discovering their Emperor, and that is a considerable international event.

LATIN EMBARRASSMENTS

The Latin nations have all caught the world-wide epidemic of "crises" in a virulent form. Of unhappy Spain it is unnecessary to say anything. She is in an altogether pitiable condition, being engaged in a war from which she can only emerge as a battered wreck, and from which all her responsible politicians—she is without a single statesman—would withdraw to-morrow if they dared face the military fury and broach the forbidden topic of peace. One province of Spain, Catalonia, which bears the same relation to Madrid as Ulster would to Dublin, if Ireland were independent, and—as Ulster would—suffers more from the stupendous folly and incompetence of the metropolitan politicians than the slacker parts of Spain, is exhibiting some symptoms of restiveness, at the continuance of conditions which involve her once flourishing industries in dire ruin. Were it not for the Spanish Army, Barcelona—the Belfast of Spain—would probably take this opportunity of repudiating a Government which drifted into an inevitable war without making any serious preparations for it. As it is, the only progressive province in Spain has to grin and bear an appalling fate and bide its time, though there is little enough to look forward to. Amidst the *cacoëthes loquendi* of the Cortes is to be found one sensible remark—that of Señor Romero Robledo, "when the moment for making peace arrives, Spain ought to make proposals to the United States directly, and avoid using the good offices of the neutral Powers, who would make her pay dearly for any services rendered." The second Latin nation in serious trouble is France, but enough is said of her astounding condition farther on in this number. Italy is likewise in difficulties, and shows an ominous inability to pull herself together. The Leiter wheat gamble in Chicago (which inflicted the maximum amount of injury on the civilized world, while conferring a minimum of benefit on the actual farmer) was both the cause and the occasion of the latest Italian developments. For while the rise in the price of bread endangered the subsistence of the half-famished masses in Southern Italy, it gave an opportunity to the comparatively well-to-do artisans of Milan to make "a demonstration." They were mercilessly shot down in the streets, but they meant mischief, and were given fair warning. This severity, which was followed by the announcement of a drastic policy of repression, occurred some weeks ago, and seems ultimately to have

which, whatever our opinion may be upon them, at any rate represent sacred truths."

General Election in Germany.

Germany seems to have borne her General Election with considerable equanimity. The first and second ballots are over at the time of writing, but completed returns are not to hand, though it seems unlikely that those outstanding will affect the general result. In which case the new Reichstag should not be very unlike the old one, as shown by the approximate analysis of *The Times* Berlin correspondent, the strength of parties in the old Reichstag being given in brackets:—Conservatives, 62 (57); Free Conservatives, 22 (25); National Liberals, 47 (50); Anti-Semites, 12 (12); Clericals, 101 (101); Poles, 14 (20); Radical Left, 30 (28); Moderate Radicals, 14 (13); South German Democrats, 8 (12); Socialists, 55 (48); Alsatians, 8 (9); Dane, 1 (1); Unattached, 2; Agrarian League, 3. The foregoing figures account for 379 members out of the full complement of 397, so the reader can fill in the remaining eighteen when the official returns are made. The Socialists will be stronger in this House than the last by some eight or ten seats, and we learn with unmixed satisfaction that the Bimetallists, whom their opponents expected, as usual, to "wipe out," occupy a distinctly improved Parliamentary position. They are not likely to let the grass grow under their feet. While the increase of the Socialistic vote is substantial it is not as great as was expected, considering that in Germany men vote Socialist as the most effective way of expressing their disgust with the Imperial Government, and not necessarily as indicating their adherence to the Collectivist creed. In the towns, notably Berlin, the Socialists have had striking reverses, and seek to console themselves with rural victories. It is, in fact, generally recognized that the Emperor has been steadily gaining ground with the German masses, and occupies a stronger position to-day than at any time since he succeeded his father. His Chinese, naval, and Colonial policy are incomparably more popular to-day than could have been foreseen a few months ago, and his projected journey to Palestine appeals to the religious imagination, as well as the practical instincts of the Germans. Even the *Berliner Tageblatt*, representing "Manchester Radicalism," concedes that "there are not a few politicians who would maintain that the period of our trans-oceanic acquisition is by no means closed." Educated opinion outside Germany is also modifying its harsh attitude towards the Emperor. Being a rhetorician he necessarily says unwise things; but does he say more unwise things than other statesmen? Is he not a man of remarkable

agree to the neutralization of the Valley of the Menam. But the Valley of the Menam was Siam—its bones, flesh, and very vitals, whereas, on the other hand, the Valley of the Mekong was a pestiferous region where nothing reigned but mosquitoes and malaria, and bordered on the other side by territories of very little value. Moreover, it must always be remembered that the rights of sovereignty of Siam up to the right bank of the Mekong and over the provinces of Battambang and Angkor still remained intact and absolutely secure by that treaty so far as the loyal observance of any treaty was a security in these days when the long spoon played such a considerable part at the diplomatic banquet."

"No Popery."

Our domestic politics continue to slumber. The only episode that excited any interest during the past month was Sir William Harcourt's endeavour to raise a No-Popery agitation which he subsequently dropped like a hot potato. He is not generally credited with deep religious fervour any more than with profound political principles, but when that useful if modest measure the Benefices Bill—which aims at preventing unfit incumbents from retaining livings—went into Committee in the House of Commons Sir William Harcourt burst into a fine Protestant frenzy against the admitted excesses of the extreme Ritualists—in the Church of England—and, having no feeling for sacred things himself, he commented on religious services in a vulgar and repulsive manner. The noisy Nonconformists in the House were delighted, but the majority of members were indignant, while Sir William Harcourt's Irish allies regarded the speech as a wanton outrage. The speaker remained on the rampage for half an hour, at the end of which he subsided, having materially augmented the number of people who desire that he should retire from politics. Mr. Balfour replied in moderate and crushing terms. The most striking effect of his speech was on the Front Opposition Bench, where it produced a unique Parliamentary incident. Mr. John Morley, a man of profound sympathy with the religious feelings of others, had been not the least disgusted auditor of his chief's diatribe. It was noted by old Parliamentary hands that he—sitting by Sir William Harcourt—continually applauded Mr. Balfour's reply. That kind of episode interests the House of Commons. The best passage in Mr. Balfour's speech was the following:—"Profoundly as I disapprove of the kind of ceremony of which the right honourable gentleman read us a detailed account as having taken place in a church in South London, I confess that to see them tossed across the floor of this House and made the subject of laughter, and made to give point to some Parliamentary retort, offends myself to a degree which I do not find easy to express and which absolutely prevents my following, at all events, in the wake of the right honourable gentleman in dealing with matters

THE TRUTH ABOUT SIAM.

It has always appeared to us that the critics of the Foreign Office systematically overstate their case by including Siam in the catalogue of Lord Salisbury's supposed "surrenders" to France. Six months ago we pointed out that "the question of Siam arose during Mr. Gladstone's administration, when the French forced a series of ultimatums on that helpless country without, so far as is known, any protest from the then Foreign Minister, Lord Rosebery. Ultimately Siam was compelled to transfer a large portion of her territory to France, without apparent remonstrance from Lord Rosebery, though the effect of this operation was to bring the French into unpleasant contiguity to Burma. Lord Salisbury was necessarily bound by the supineness of his predecessor, but he succeeded in arranging an agreement with France which protected the vitals of Siam, and for which the Siamese Government is known to have expressed its gratitude. As part of this settlement, a remote and inaccessible district, consisting of 1,200 square miles and containing 3,000 inhabitants, which we claimed on behalf of Burma and the French on behalf of Anam, was 'conceded' by Great Britain to France." However, from a thousand platforms Radical orators, who have probably never even seen a map of Siam, continued to denounce this provident transaction as "a humiliating capitulation." Lord Dufferin — our late Ambassador in Paris, —who occupies an entirely independent political position, has now come forward with a conclusive vindication of Lord Salisbury's diplomacy in this matter, and sincere critics will henceforward drop "Siam" from their indictment. In speaking at the annual Burma dinner on 16th June (see *Daily Chronicle* of following day) Lord Dufferin said that "considerable misapprehension" seemed to exist with regard to the Siamese question, and gave his audience the following lucid recital:—

"With a folly which sometimes seemed to take possession of these Eastern people, the Siamese began pushing some of the troops over which they exercised a certain amount of influence up the valleys of the mountain range which flanks the settlement in Anam, so that when once they had arrived at the tops of the pass they were able to look down the chimneys of the houses of the French settlement. As a result, a treaty was imposed upon Siam which gave to France very considerable and very dangerous concessions on the other bank of the Mekong. And, as always happened when a weak Power was dealing with a strong Power, these concessions were subsequently inflated and extended in a manner which, at the Court of Bangkok, was considered very unjustifiable, and entirely unwarranted by the words of the document. But the worst feature of the case was that, under the treaty, France obtained a 'jumping off' ground, which would have enabled her at any time completely to strangle Siam if a less just or less generous Foreign Minister than M. Hanotaux ever sat within the walls of the Quay d'Orsay. It was at this juncture that Lord Salisbury intervened, and by a very slight sacrifice of a single district on the other side of the Mekong, over which we exercised very shadowy rights, he induced the French Government to

to the Khalifa but a stubborn fight. We do not know what forces he can rely on to be loyal—the amount has been estimated at 20,000. Our own force will consist of 15,000 infantry, 1,500 cavalry, 38 guns, 12 Maxims, and 700 mounted men on camels and horses.

MAHMOUD'S PERPLEXITY.

It will be remembered that Mahmoud, Commander of the Dervish Army at the Battle of Atbara, and a relation of the Khalifa, was made a prisoner of war and sent down to Wady Halfa. He has been well treated, and during his constitutional walks with the Egyptian officer in charge of him, who is a Mahommedan, has delivered himself of some bewildered reflections which have got about. He said that he knew he was not quite a "civilized" man, having been all his life (he is but 28 now) fighting and governing in Darfur; that was perhaps why he was perplexed. He had for some years been reading the Cairo (Arabic) newspapers, which are regularly sent up to Omdurman. From them he and other Dervishes became convinced that all the Egyptians were groaning under the despotism of the English, and that they only awaited a favourable opportunity to rise and kill their oppressors. He had gathered that the Egyptian officers in particular hated the "Christian dogs" who commanded in the army, and occupied the most lucrative posts, and tyrannized over the whole community. He and his friends, therefore, naturally expected that when this discontented army had got far into the Sudan, and when its Mahommedan co-religionists (the Dervishes) were near, it would revolt against a handful of British officers and come over to their friends. But what did he see? All the way down to Halfa, whether in a steamer, on the railway, or on a camel, everywhere he saw a solitary Englishman, sometimes miles away from any other Englishman, managing and commanding all things. "You Egyptian officers can do nothing without going to a Christian dog to be told what to do. You are a pack of slaves, more servile than my body-guard. You are compelled to work all day at the bidding of those English! How do you explain it, while every Arabic newspaper tells us that you are only waiting for an opportunity to regain your liberty?" The Egyptian officer had never looked at things in this light. He only knew that he and his brother officers had the most implicit confidence in the English officers they served under. Mahmoud is doubtless having his eyes opened; he is not, however, a promising type even for a Baggara, having a low forehead and rather repellent features. The question arises again as to whether native Anglophobist journals should be tolerated at Cairo?

We have always been brought up from childhood to regard Lord Dufferin as a sort of Heaven-born official, incapable of erring; nevertheless, we commit the sacrilege of declaring that on this occasion he blundered most palpably. He failed to inform himself of the strength of the British case. Its impregnable position rested on the fact that it was the French who committed the aggression, and were therefore responsible for all the consequences. That they suffered themselves does not affect our claim in the least. The following extract from a letter written by Lord Dufferin to Mrs. Liston on September 14th, 1895, shows how he allowed himself to be foiled, and also that he had already given the case away in his own mind:—"I have taken an opportunity of speaking to the French Foreign Minister about your petition, but, *as I was certain would be the case*, he said that as they had made no claim on behalf of the widows and children of their officers they could not entertain any claim on behalf of ours." And this declaration sufficed for our astute diplomatist. He could not see through the pretext which assumed that the French claims rested on a similar footing to our own, but drove complacently away in his brougham from the Quai d'Orsay considering his mission terminated. It has taken some time to recover from the effect of this error. The Waima claims have stood over, to be settled amid other negotiations. This is unfortunate for the widows and relatives of the slain victims of the French assault. It has, however, taken us six years to satisfy the claims made on behalf of the French missionaries in Uganda, which were met in March last by a payment of £10,000. The incidents which gave rise to them occurred in the early part of 1892. There is no reason to suppose the French Government will behave less honourably than we have done, but they certainly require to be pressed for compensation. It is regrettable that these claims have been allowed to fall into "general negotiations."

THE NILE CAMPAIGN.

The newspapers are rather premature in announcing an immediate advance on Khartoum. The expedition is preparing, and the Sirdar always makes careful arrangements before he strikes. The Second British Brigade can hardly be at Berber before the middle of August. The Khalifa in the meantime is fortifying Omdurman, and there he will make his stand. There is every reason why he should do this. He will not care to fall back on his own country without an effort, for in his own country his family is of no account. He has a young son of twenty of some spirit, to whom he has given over the command of the whole of the fighting men: there is no alternative

recall what happened. The following is an extract from the despatch written by Colonel Ellis, the officer commanding the British troops on the West Coast of Africa, dated December 25th, 1893, and addressed to the Secretary of State for War:—"It is with the greatest regret that I have the honour to inform you that, by a most deplorable mischance, an attack was made upon us at this place (Waima, Konno country) before daybreak on the 23rd by a party of French native troops and a large body of native allies, under command of Lieutenant Maritz, of the French Army, who had been led to believe that we were the Sofas, under Perokerri, endeavouring to escape from the sphere of British influence and join Samadu." The British vigorously repulsed their assailants. "At 11 a.m.," continues the despatch, "Lieutenant Maritz was brought in; he had been found mortally wounded in the cane-grass. He was conscious and able to speak, and made a statement to Surgeon-Major Morgan to the effect that he had come from Undu (Kundu); that he had not known he was attacking the English, and had not heard our bugle calls. Lieutenant Maritz received every possible attention; but his case was hopeless from the first, and he expired a few minutes after noon." On our side we lost Captain Lendy, D.S.O., a young officer of brilliant promise, as also Lieutenants Liston and Wroughton, with one Sergeant-Major and six privates. Besides this list of killed, fourteen non-commissioned officers and men were severely wounded. Here was clearly a case for reparation as far as reparation could be made by a chivalrous and repentant Government. Granted that the French were unintentional aggressors, and that their commander paid the penalty of his mistake with his life, that does not affect the question. The whole onus of the egregious and culpable blunder rests with the French Government. Their force suddenly attacked a British force that was encamped on British territory. Lieutenant Maritz admitted his terrible mistake before he died. The motive of his attack is not cleared by his statement. He may have been attempting "effective occupation." Captain Lendy wrote to his mother just before starting:—"The French wish to fight the Sofas, and so claim more land 'by right of conquest.'" It was proved afterwards that Waima was well within the British sphere.

LORD DUFFERIN'S BLUNDER.

Lord Rosebery was then head of the Foreign Office. He wrote at the time a sympathetic letter to Mrs. Wroughton, the widow of Lieutenant Wroughton, in which he undertook that the catastrophe "should be probed and examined to the uttermost." Has this been done? What happened? Lord Dufferin, then our Ambassador in Paris, had an interview with the French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

statesmen, politicians, and journalists in the Dreyfus case. At the time of going to press the political crisis appears to be solved by M. Brisson's acceptance of the Premiership.

THE AUSTRIAN PERIL.

The congeries of irreconcilable communities comprising the Austro-Hungarian Empire continues to excite grave anxiety in every other country in Europe. An eminent diplomatist has been heard to say that "war is the only medicine that can save Austria," and it is noted that she is spending a lot of money on gunpowder. May not this, however, be on account of Spain, for the illustrious ruler of the Dual Monarchy, though despairing of the future of his kingdoms, will never play the firebrand. But the discussion even of his abdication gives us some measure of the hopelessness of the outlook. Not only are the two halves of the Monarchy—Austria and Hungary—at loggerheads, but individually they are riven with dissensions which have got beyond the reach of reason. Meanwhile the chronic unrest in the Balkans has become accentuated, and the declining prestige of Austria cannot fail to react upon the minor Powers she is supposed to be responsible for. The most pressing of her own feuds is probably that between Slavs and Germans in Bohemia. The former outnumber the latter and are striving for "equality of opportunity," as represented by the Language Ordinance. The Germans are struggling—fighting would be hardly too strong a term—to retain their ascendency, and so far the hated Ordinance has been a dead letter. It is now said that the Austrian Parliament having been prorogued, the Emperor will seek to conciliate the menacing German minority by revoking the Ordinance, as he believes the Slavs are not prepared to go to such lengths as their opponents. Austria, like more than one other nation, is in a distinctly dangerous condition, and is a constant peril to the peace of Europe. She must break up before long, and can't well break up peacefully. Everyone seems to have forgotten the very significant speech delivered in Paris some months ago by M. Deschanel (now President of the French Chamber), in which he stated that one of the objects the Franco-Russian Alliance had in view was the fair distribution of the Austrian Empire when the inevitable catastrophe comes. In other words, the aggrandisement of Germany must be checked.

OUR FUTURE POLICY IN CHINA.

HER MAJESTY'S Ministers having expounded and defended their Far Eastern policy in Parliament, on the platform, and in the Press, and critics having had their say, the residuum of the discussion may be taken as a provisional base for our future policy in the Eastern seas. The most recent, and, therefore, the most authoritative version of the share of the spoil which has fallen to us out of the Chinese scramble is that given in an admittedly inspired article in *The Fortnightly Review* for June. (On the form of vindication adopted in that article, the putting glosses on documents or speeches which are not given to the public, we would remark that it is a questionable expedient, as the argument cuts both ways, for the complete *dossier* would be as likely to place the Government in an even less favourable light than the printed despatches do.) This inspired writer sums up the results of our diplomacy during the past six months as follows :—

Wei-hai-wei leased to us as a set-off for the Russian occupation of Port Arthur, "for all political purposes, at any rate, its equivalent."

The opening of new ports.

Permission to use the Chinese water-ways.

The permanent appointment of an Englishman as Inspector-General of Customs.

The promise that the Chinese Government shall not alienate the Yang-tsze Valley.

Since the article in question was written, the announcement has been made that the strategic area around Hong-Kong has been leased by China to Great Britain, a real concession absolutely necessary to the defence of the Colony, and highly beneficial to the inhabitants.

Let us endeavour to appraise these various concessions, omitting the last, whose value is self-evident.

PORT ARTHUR AND WEI-HAI-WEI.

We know the military importance of Port Arthur as an outpost of the Russian Empire, and the power it gives to the rulers of that Empire over China. We know precisely how that power may be

and is every day being exercised. But nobody has yet attempted to show in what manner Wei-hai-wei is its equivalent, and the phrase "for political purposes" is too vague and elastic to satisfy an enquiring mind.

New Ports.

None of those opened have been shown to be of any advantage commercially. For trading purposes there are already enough, if not more than enough, open ports. These additional ones do not appear to have been asked for by any representative commercial body, while those that were asked for are not opened: namely, Hsiangtan, or one of the marts in Central Hunan, and Nanning, on the West River. The reasons why the two ports have been opened on the coast are, of course, plain enough and good enough; it is to prevent their being "leased" by some aggressive Power. Their opening imposes on us the tax of keeping up establishments there with only a problematical advantage. The reason why Yo-chau, on the Yang-tsze, has been opened is that it belongs technically to Hunan province, is *in* Hunan as Penzance is in England, but it is useless as a means of tapping its trade. To concede Yo-chau to a demand "for a port in Hunan," therefore, is to keep the word of promise to the ear and break it to the hope. Government have no right to count any of these open ports as concessions.

Chinese Water-ways.

This is quite another affair; a most important concession, whose value, however, must depend on the conditions attached to its exercise, which are still *sub judice*. All we know is that the regulations prepared by the Inspector-General of Customs, and modified by the Chinese Government, were not acceptable to Her Majesty's representative, who has protested against their promulgation.

The Permanent Appointment of a British Subject as Head of the Customs.

This is one of those concessions which Mr. Morley referred to as partaking rather of the character of an obligation assumed by Great Britain: possibly a wise and even a necessary obligation under the circumstances, but one requiring much tact and foresight to prevent its becoming embarrassing. It makes Her Majesty's Government responsible for the administration of the Chinese Customs, and, as the only Power possessing a lien over that portion of the revenue happens to be Russia, it is not difficult to imagine a contingency in which Mr. Chamberlain's long spoon may come into play in connection with this service. We have seen what importance Russia attaches to her lien on the Chinese

revenues. It was to obtain that that she interposed in 1895 between the Chinese Government and certain English bankers, who were negotiating a loan through the agency of the Inspector-General of Customs, the first of the *post bellum* series, and compelled China to borrow from France under the guarantee of Russia. We saw for the second time what value Russia attached to her being the sole guarantor of China by the violent methods she employed, and successfully, as late as last January, to prevent the conclusion of a loan for which Great Britain would have been the sponsor. We do not know, though we can surmise, what ulterior designs Russia may have in all this; or rather, we do know the ulterior, but not the immediate intention, that being variable according to circumstances. Meantime, our English Inspector-General of Customs stands unavoidably as a hostage to Russia, a situation which without the greatest circumspection may one day be turned to our disadvantage as well as that of the Customs service itself. Only, therefore, as a choice of evils could such an arrangement be justified, and time only will show which was the greater. Finally, there is

The Yang-tsze Valley.

So far as paper or the breath of the mouth can prevent it, this area is not to be alienated by China. That is China's promise. But who is China, and what will happen if by favour, force, or fraud she should be induced to forget her promise? And in what manner is the non-alienation of that indefinite tract of country to benefit Great Britain? On that point our Government and their spokesmen have been as silent as the Sphinx, and yet it is the kernel of the China question. The simple truth is, would they but confess it, the concession of the Yang-tsze Valley was the work of an idle moment, ill-considered, hasty, and the Government has not from the first known what they meant by it. No promise and no formula could have served us, but least of all the particular one chosen. For we had the most refreshing expositions from Russians in the English Press of what Russia's *modus operandi* was to be, and we had had practical illustration of it in Korea. The word "alienation" will, of course, never be so much as spoken, but nevertheless the effective control of the Yang-tsze Valley is passing into the power of Russia and France without our being able to utter a word of protest. The process was clear to the dullest comprehension, and there was no excuse whatever for either our Government or their representative landing themselves in that *galère*. They should have done nothing, or done more.

If then these were really all the crumbs that it was possible for Her Majesty's Government to carry away from the table it would

be unreasonable to blame them for taking what they could get, though if they gave more in the form of obligation than they received in the form of concession they might still be held to account for the balance. They are not, however, content with such faint praise, but keep telling the country that they have obtained valuable concessions, and have rewarded their Minister with such honours and thanks as are usually reserved for some signal service to the Empire. Therefore we are justified in examining the grounds of the Government's self-approval, and in discovering, if we can, how the interests of the country are to be advanced by the new arrangements in China.

And we may be pardoned for saying at the outset that if the country suffers by these new arrangements it must take a good share of the blame on itself for its long and persistent indifference to its Far Eastern interests; moreover, that if it does not in the future take a more active interest in them than hitherto, it will suffer more egregiously than it has yet done, or is yet conscious of. For we now know what previously we could only suspect, how little the Government will do *proprio motu* to safeguard the national interests so long as the nation itself is asleep. One of the most triumphant and, no doubt, *bonâ fide* defences of the Government has been that their policy had the tacit approval of the sleeping nation! It is plain, therefore, that Government hold themselves exempt from exercising vigilance as long as the country remains quiet; and, consequently, it becomes the duty of the country not to remain quiet. If the estate is not to be wrecked the *cestui que trust* must jog the somnolent trustee, which is the point at which we have actually arrived. The glamour of inscrutable high policy has passed away. The mystery of "Sovereigns and Statesmen" is dispelled; *The Fortnightly Review* has killed that superstition. Henceforth, when we are counselled to trust implicitly to the foresight of responsible Ministers, so much better informed than outsiders can possibly be, we shall take the liberty of withholding unconditional confidence in the wisdom that sits veiled behind the cloud. We shall prefer to judge by results, not phraseological or hypothetical, but concrete results such as can be described in the language of the market-place, and may be apprehended by the unsophisticated layman. It is from this point of view that we propose to consider our national position and prospects in China as they stand now after the hurricane.

We mention merely to eliminate from further consideration the four pillars of policy which were enunciated by Members of the Government in January last: the favoured nation, the open door, equality of opportunity, and treaty rights. They were only empty words. The first three are definitively gone, while the fourth has

lost its efficacy and its significance through the action of the Powers which have assumed the ascendant over China. We have thus to consider the problem of defending and promoting our interests in China under wholly changed conditions, such conditions as can hardly ever have existed elsewhere, which render precedents nugatory, but which nevertheless call for plans both far-reaching and strenuously sustained. We have, in short, to begin all over again, with modified ideas and a new equipment.

British interests in China resolve themselves into two great branches, the purely commercial and the high political. The former has proved sufficient for us in the past, and we might well have been content to glide quietly with our China trade down the stream of time, in blessed unconsciousness of danger, only the world would not let us. The position was indeed so easy, and apparently so safe, that the temptation to accept the ideal for the real was strong, and we fell before it. Our policy was based on the delusion, which still envelopes us like an ancestral faith which has been outgrown by the events of history; our international machinery was, and still is, adapted to the ideal and not to the real, and is as obsolete as wooden walls and arquebuses. Our commercial paradise has been overtaken and swamped by a political tidal wave, for which we had made no preparations. We refused to listen to its approach, or make terms with it when it came; and so, instead of our dealing with it, it deals with us at its pleasure. Against our will our China trade interests have become involved in perhaps the greatest international whirlpool of this century, and we have no choice between working our way through it and retiring from our place among the nations.

It is necessary to insist on the change which has come over our position in the Far East as there are many among us who cling fondly to the belief that commerce can still be isolated from politics in that part of the world, and treated on its own merits. Such isolation is no longer possible; the marriage has been consummated, and henceforth the two national interests must stand or fall together. Those who have tried to keep them separate have been fighting against fate. What were the cries we used to hear a generation ago? "Choke off Macdonald Stephenson" (the railway projector), said Sir Frederick Bruce. "Diminish as much as possible our points of contact," said Lord John Russell. "Withdraw from the mainland" (where politics might creep in), said Mr. Cobden, and "get an island" where you may carry on your paltry trade—which he was sure would never increase. Might not the vain attempt of these Canutes—and many more—to arrest the rising tide of even our own modest progress serve as a lesson to the minimizing, circumscribing, retreating apostles of our own

time if their minds were but large enough to entertain experience as well as doctrine?

But though the two streams fill one channel their waters remain as distinct as those of the Rhône and the Saône after their confluence at Lyons. The clear emerald does not mingle with the alluvium-laden current, but both flow side by side until obstruction forces complete union. So the two elements in our Chinese problem may for convenience be still considered separately, especially as the one is more intelligible than the other. The commercial question is transparent, the political clouded and opaque.

The political issues involved in the revolution in China are indeed so profound that there is a very general disposition to put the whole question entirely aside, to relegate it with Lord Rosebery to the dim and distant future.* There is in our generation an apparent reluctance in this country to provide for the well-being of those who are to come after us, outside the private family. We have carried our isolation craze to such a pitch that, beyond a certain luxurious æsthetic recognition, we cut ourselves off morally from both the past and the future, and act as if we owed little to our ancestry and nothing at all to our posterity. Hence historical movements do not impress us. We live for the day only, and in this relation to the world around us we stand isolated from the great Continental nations, and at a consequent disadvantage in appreciating sequences.

The significance of the Russian movement in China is written indelibly in the history of the two Powers during the past 200 years; and none of the secular processes of nature can be calculated with greater ultimate certainty—we say "ultimate" only because the rate of progress cannot be reckoned—than the overflow of the Russian domination over the Empire of China unless it be arrested by an adequate barrier. This prospect seems to be cheerfully accepted by serious English writers, by some as if it did not concern us, and by others as if the prospect were rather to be welcomed on the ground that an organized China would consume more calico than a disorganized one. But what would or could Russia do when she had rolled in the huge soft Chinese nation into her snowball but go on rolling? And whither then? Surely in the same old direction, southward and sea-ward by the line of least resistance. There are some, no doubt, who think that vast China would satiate the most voracious appetite; but it was not so even in the case of the Manchu conquerors. Though a comparatively small tribe, not to be named in the same day with Russia, they not only succeeded in occupying the throne of the Emperors,

* We understand that Lord Rosebery has recently affirmed that his actual words were "to *no* dim and distant future" (Editor *N. R.*)

which they have kept for some 250 years, but they had no sooner consolidated their power than they used it for the further conquest of neighbouring states, including the Island of Formosa. There are philosophic Russians who look forward with grave apprehension to such eventualities; and for sound reasons too. But when did thoughtful minds hinder the natural progress of any people? There is an ethnic as well as a terrestrial gravitation; nations move by inherent forces of which they are not always conscious, and it requires a credulity equal to the moving of mountains to believe that a point or a line could ever be reached where a nation will spontaneously call a halt to its own expansion. If any exception to this rule can be imagined, do her antecedents point to Russia as the one Power likely to apply to itself such a self-denying ordinance?

In face of these obvious considerations, we find the idea propounded in organs of the Press which we have been accustomed to hold in respect, that the irruption or infiltration of Russia into China would relieve the pressure on India, while among those of less repute all thought of that, or of anything that may happen the day after to-morrow, is flouted, and those who would look forward a matter of fifty years—what a brief period to look back upon!—are branded with lunacy. Responsible statesmen wisely keep their own counsel as to how they really regard the outlook, but if there be any considerable body of our people who are disposed to let the future take care of itself, it were worse than useless to disturb either the pleasures of the idle or the cares of the busy with warnings of what may be in store for their posterity.

But the practical question is sometimes put: Supposing the advance of Russia to be pregnant with menace to the British Empire, how would you propose to stop it? Not certainly by protocols, nor understandings, nor assurances. By making war then on Russia? Not that either; but by taking some precautions analogous, in another sphere, to those by which the Dutch keep the sea out of Holland. A common dialectical trick resorted to by the Apologists for backing down before every assailant is to assume that the only alternative is war. This is not so at all. Russia, though a military, is not a warlike Power, and will in most cases do as much as we ourselves to avoid it. In the recent China episode she would have been obliged to do whatever was necessary to evade such an issue, for she was unprepared, while the power lay with us. It was only needful for us to be clear, firm, and consistent; and we failed in all three. In plain truth, we allowed ourselves to be bluffed with the game in our hands. But it is a very fatal thing for a state with such complex responsibilities as

ours to allow it to be seen that we can be bluffed. And politicians claiming to rank as statesmen, and publicists of good standing, who proclaim to the world that all the nation requires of its Government is that it shall keep the peace unbroken, are doing greater hurt to the cause of peace than all the Jingoes within the country and all our enemies without. There is no difficulty in keeping the peace, as there is none in avoiding litigation, but the man who pledged himself at all risks to eschew the Law Courts would soon discover that his worldly estate was held by a precarious tenure.

It is, however, the commercial side of our Far Eastern interests which may be expected to command the most attention, at least as regards the object to be sought. Few are disposed to openly dispute the necessity of commerce to the existence of the British people. Differences of opinion, however, arise in discussing the methods to be pursued. There are some who talk and write in the dialect of fifty years ago, as if trade were self-existing and self-protecting; as if it were only necessary to exhibit your calicoes for them to flow into consumption like water finding its level. That is the language of an age of monopoly carried into an age of competition; it is archaic, obsolete. We shall soon discover in China that even in commerce old things have passed away, and that the maintenance of our position there depends on our capacity for adapting ourselves to those new conditions which the energy of other nations has forced upon us. Till recently we had China in our own hands, with all its resources and potentialities, and it cannot be said that we have made the most of it. We have been occupied for thirty years "choking off" Macdonald Stephenson, and have choked *him* off so effectually that the course has been cleared for Pokitiloff, Jaquemot, and Meyerstein, who rush in where our intimidated angels fear to tread.

The China trade of the future is not to be confined to the exchange of commodities at the sea-ports or even in the rivers. It must permeate the interior of the country and concern itself with the working of minerals, the construction and running of railways, steam navigation on all suitable channels, factories of various kinds—in a word, general exploitation. In such new openings we shall be exposed to the severest competition without the advantage of the start we had in simple traffic. Hitherto we have been content to rest on our past achievements. Eighty or seventy per cent. of the sea-borne trade being ours, we have reckoned our position to be unassailable. Few have been willing to recognize that our success in the past constitutes our relative weakness in the present; that it makes us the butt for general attack, excites envy and emulation in our neighbours, and inspires

them with a common resolution to push us off our perch. And our neighbours must be given the credit for far-seeing and comprehensive plans. Leaving us to our ginghams and our sea-borne customs, they have boldly struck in behind us and around us, with the fixed determination to forestall us in those new enterprises on which the future of our position in China depends. The parcelling out of China has already proceeded so far that, notwithstanding official denials of spheres of influence, British adventurers have been long ago warned off enterprises in the North of China because that was reserved for the Russian sphere. Germany has since then effectually warned them off the immense tract of which she has taken forcible possession. France has been permitted to assume a quasi-suzerainty over all Southern China, in the teeth of a recent treaty with ourselves. She has taken it on herself to forbid the opening of the city of Nanning, on the West River, because she wishes to divert the traffic to the Tong-king route, where she can tax it; and she has followed up that vigorous policy by forcing from China the concession for a French railway to that same Nanning, which she will not allow China to open for traffic. These Powers are rigidly exclusive, and we may be sure that not a piece of cloth from an English loom will ever pass their Custom Houses without very severe handling.

Against exclusive territorial appropriation we have, of course, nothing to set, since it is contrary to our traditions to be exclusive. The question for us is not what advantages we possess anywhere, but from what sections of the Chinese territory are we excluded, and within what sections have we the liberty of competition. Though the zones have not been officially demarcated it has been vaguely stated that Her Majesty's Government will not lend much countenance to British adventure north of the Yang-tsze, though the Shan-si and Ho-nan concessions give us some encouragement; how far south of that stream they shall be free to go they will, perhaps, only learn by experience. But at any rate the conditions of the new struggle are sufficiently outlined to allow us to perceive how cruelly our countrymen are handicapped in the race; for while they are discouraged in the immense areas dominated by other Powers, they, like the Jews, are landless, and even in the sphere in some mystic sense assigned to them they are exposed to the competition of the whole world.

Ours being a country of private enterprise, individual initiative, and all that, it is a question how far capitalists and adventurers may be willing to enter on the unequal struggle with heavily protected rivals. Our Government has so far given little sign of encouragement to such adventure, and no sane man would risk his money and his life in a struggle in which he would have not only

all his natural enemies to fight but his own Government as well. Even neutrality on the part of the Government would hardly be sufficient to attract adventurers to such distant undertakings in which they would encounter the whole strength of the Governments of their competitors which are not neutral but ardent and active partisans of their nationals.

The result of the deputation from the Chambers of Commerce to Lord Salisbury, on 14th June, can hardly be said to throw much new light on the attitude of Her Majesty's Government towards the mercantile and industrial communities, or towards the problems of the Far East in general. The Prime Minister threw a wet blanket of the thickest official texture over nascent enterprise. The conventional expression of sympathy and conventional promises of support were unrelieved by a single ray of hope of any other help than that to which we have so long been accustomed, and of which the results have been so deplorable. Or are we at liberty to interpret this latest utterance rather as a warning off of deputations than as a revelation of the mind of the Government? If taken in the latter sense, it would knock the bottom out of all policy whatsoever, and render the future as hopeless as the past has been disastrous.

His lordship began by excusing himself from discussing the right and wrong, the ought and ought not of other Powers, which we can hardly suppose the deputation expected or desired, and which would have been an idle and irrelevant topic. We have enough to do with our own "oughts" and "ought nots"; and we shall make more speed by keeping our attention to our domestic shortcomings, which may be remediable, than by playing censor over the faults of our neighbours which, so far as we are concerned, are not remediable.

The Premier wound up by the retort courteous, an exhortation —as he expressed it—to the merchants themselves, an appeal for the renewal and increase of the splendid efforts of our fathers. With such an exhortation *per se* we have no fault to find. It is right to invoke the spirit of our fathers. Their individual initiative did them and us magnificent service, enriched the nation, developed its manhood, and built up the Empire, mostly in face of the obstruction of our governing machine. But it could have done nothing without a theatre of operation. A fair field and no favour has been the single petition of the British merchant of the past as it is of the present generation. But in China the fair field is shrinking like the *peau de chagrin*. That commercial prairie, the happy hunting-ground of "equal opportunity," is being rapidly fenced in by violent aggressors, while our common rights have not even a "society" to make a stand in their defence.

Lord Salisbury modestly observed that the Government is the instrument of the country. "You but do your duty," he said, "in criticizing its proceedings and urging improvement in its conduct." This duty the country can no longer afford to neglect; indeed, it is becoming every day more necessary that the country should assume a practical concern in the great problems that now lie before it. Those who see hanging on the horizon a political meteor of portentous aspect, and those whose solicitude extends no further than the exercise of the national industries, may find common ground in the proposition that the Chinese field must be either occupied or abandoned. Our neighbours are all working on matured plans, and some of them in compact alliance, while we alone are without plan or alliance. According to Lord Salisbury, we only profit by the demands and action and language of other Powers. We glean after the reapers. He warns us that we cannot always rely on the action of these pioneering Powers, though, as *The Times*, echoed by Lord Kimberley, rather pertinently interpolated, there is as yet no appearance of slackening in the activity of these providential forces. But as the improvements in agricultural machinery have encroached almost to extinction on the perquisites of gleaners, so we may find that the unchecked advances of the organized Powers into regions only passively occupied will render our pickings in the field too poor to be profitable.

The schemes of France and Russia, though vast, are not chimerical, and they fit into each other like hand in glove. It is a noteworthy fact that, despite the ephemeral character of her Governments, the secular aims of France remain as steady and as calculable as those of Russia herself. Nor is her plan for reaching those aims more variable. As the habits of every animal are assigned to it by nature, and each species has its hereditary manner of attack and defence, and as every human tribe has its peculiar military strategy, so France has one traditional method of aggrandizing herself at the cost of England, a method which she pursues instinctively through centuries and through continents. There is no national aim to which French politicians are so true as to the pulling down of British influence in the world by destroying British commerce. And their familiar method of achieving this is to cut off our hinterlands. Such was the system pursued in the last century in America, which has been systematically pursued with considerable success in Africa, which has been laboriously employed against Egypt, which is making such wonderful progress in Indo-China. The country has practically forgotten how, in pursuit of this system, France was on the very point of cutting us off from Upper Burma not many years

ago, forcing us for self-preservation to annex that territory. Well, France is equally unresting in her endeavour to cut off our land communication with China, in which she enjoys the powerful co-operation of Russia. The two Powers are working as strenuously on this problem as if their own existence depended on their success in occupying Central China. They are absolutely resolved on creating and establishing rights there which will reduce to nullity all rights of ours. By connecting the Russo-Chinese with the Franco-Chinese railway schemes they intend to gain effective possession of every strategical highway of China in order to set up an impassable barrier to our commercial and political development. Not only will the accomplishment of this design blight the growth of our trade, but it will place the avenue to India in the possession of Powers who certainly cannot always be trusted to be friendly to our rule there. And the allies are making desperate haste to complete the scheme before the British people awake to the seriousness of the danger. Of the British Government the allies seem to have no apprehensions whatsoever.

There is no mystery about these hostile proceedings. French and Russian writers of the highest authority have been unanimously outspoken for many years past on this subject, and the sum of it was tersely put by one who is neither Chauvinist nor Anglophobe, several years ago, in the phrase that "France and Russia ought between them to direct the destinies of China." The cross-fire from these two formidable assailants now converges on the weakest point in our position—the defenceless Yang-tsze Valley. Russia is reported by the faithful and true correspondent of *The Times* to be more energetic than ever in Peking. In combination with France and Belgium, she has concluded a railway contract which will enthrone her in the vital centre of the Yang-tsze Valley, where British interests were supposed to be acknowledged as supreme. Thus, without any breach of treaty or alienation of territory, but by dexterous adaptation of means to ends, organized appreciation of the natural and actual circumstances—in a word, *savoir faire* on the part of our opponents—we poor English are ejected from our reservations as if we were a tribe of outlawed red-skins.

In face of these grandiose, yet all too solid schemes, it is cold comfort to be told by Mr. Curzon that should Russia pour troops down into the Yang-tsze Basin without the consent of China it would be an act of war, or that, if British rights were attacked, they would be defended. British rights will not be attacked, but superseded and undermined; and as for pouring troops down, with or without China's consent, it would be a gratuitous expense. It is said also that the control of the Hankau railway would remain

with the Chinese Director, but as he is in the pay of Russia he will be faithful to his salt. Equally little consolation is to be derived from Lord Salisbury's deprecating jealousy of the successes of other nations in the increase of their trade by saying, "he believed our trade and commerce were still increasing in spite of adverse tariffs." It is amazing how both the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary manage always to give a wide berth to every direct issue, to everything that is practical. And we cannot but admire their skill, for the outlook is so serious that there is not a man in the Cabinet who dares to face it squarely. They remind us of the directors of a company who have to keep up appearances and cover the naked truth.

But what, after all, should be our future policy in China? If, after the Premier's speech, it is thought worth while to have a policy at all, then it seems clear that it should be modelled, not necessarily on that of Russia and her allies, but on some system adapted to form a defensive counterpoise to their proceedings. It may be humiliating to learn from our enemies, but it might be wholesome, even as a discipline; and as the Russians have seized on that most vital element of success, Chinese combination, which our representatives have always discouraged and trampled out, there would be some penitential discipline in retracing our steps. But there is no chance of our doing any good in China without an absolute reversal of our previous policy. Only in proportion as that change may take place can any hope be entertained of future success. Of such a change of policy, however, we find no trace in Lord Salisbury's recent speeches. There was nothing said to the deputation of the Chamber of Commerce that might not be interpreted as the re-embodiment of the old traditional policy. The ruling motive of that policy has been indifference. No Government for over thirty years has given even decent attention to our interests in China, though the Foreign Office, with the Treasury, has managed the *personnel* of the service with every care for detail. But the staff has exacted so much as to leave the department no thought to expend on the subject-matter for which the staff existed. China was remote, was unrepresented; and all Governments since 1866, or thereabouts, have been too ready to turn over their responsibilities to anyone who would relieve them. Details would take up too much space, but one obvious result of the policy of neglect has been the difficulty in filling the post of Minister since the stock of locally-trained men became exhausted in 1885. On whichever side the blame lies, that of Government not daring to send a good man, or a good man not caring to go, or whether it be a little of both, we do not stop to enquire; but the straits in which the Government were placed could not have

been better exemplified than when, in 1895, Lord Salisbury had to go to the Gold Coast to find a representative for Peking. It is to the personal credit of Sir Claude Macdonald that he has done so well. Like his predecessors, he has all through been better than the Government whom he served; but far greater successes than he has yet achieved will be required to justify the rash experiment of thrusting a man who has to learn the A B C of his business into a conflict with the studiously trained chancelleries of the league.

If, therefore, we are to have a new policy we must have a more practical system for choosing our instruments, and the Government must give them, not the assurance, but the reality of a loyal support. A man of the weight and experience of Lord Cromer would not be thrown away on our important interests in China. And whoever is in charge should at least have the ordinary means of gathering information, and not be dependent on amateur and not always disinterested gossip.

So much for the means; now for the method of conducting our intercourse in China. Our attitude towards the Chinese needs to be revised from the bottom, for it has been based on gross fictions. This has been stated in many ways during many years, but the most recent account of it will serve as well as any other, and perhaps better, as having the *imprimatur* of the Foreign Office itself. Mr. Bourne, in his report on the trade of Central and Southern China, says:—"Since the later 'sixties, until quite recently, there has been a tendency on the part of British statesmen to take a sanguine view as to the future of the Chinese Government, to bring that Government as far as possible within the pale of the *jus gentium*, and to be indulgent in respect to its failures to act up to the treaties." The date, "since the later 'sixties," is interesting, for it means since the decay of the Palmerston tradition and the mission of a certain Mr. Burlingame, who successfully persuaded Lord Clarendon to condone Chinese bad faith, which has continued to be the practice of the Foreign Office ever since. But the attempt to reduce this practice to a principle, as is done by the official writer, is sufficient to expose the falseness of the position, for how was China to be brought within the *jus gentium* while yet she was to be absolved from her obligations under treaty? Yet that is the very contradiction which underlies thirty years of unbroken failure, and from whose meshes even the clear intellect of Lord Salisbury has not been able to extricate him. "If we can induce China to give us our treaty rights," says Mr. Bourne. "We have not surrendered, and do not mean to surrender, any of our rights under the Treaty of Tientsin," says Lord

Salisbury. The truth is, swearing we would ne'er surrender, we surrender, while rights expressed in the same terms as ours are enforced with the greatest ease by other Powers, or, to speak more accurately, are enjoyed without the necessity of enforcement. In their case there is not even a difficulty, in ours a chronic impossibility. This is the result of our treating China as a spoiled child, and to this false policy may even be traced the principal disasters which have overtaken that Empire. And there is another unpleasant consequence to ourselves as well as to her. If we have not been able to enforce our treaty rights as against weak and yielding China, what terror can our professions and public speeches create in the minds of observant European Governments? Truly this is a matter which must be reformed altogether as a step preliminary to any successful *régime* in the Far East.

Passing now from the means and the methods to the substance of our future policy, there is no disputing what the interest of the nation demands. Put into the simplest form of words, it is the expansion of our commerce in its widest sense. We must have the freedom of the interior, the right to carry on every kind of industry, to engage in the exploitation of minerals, and to utilize the resources of China for the joint benefit of our own people and of the people of China. Our Government do not actually gainsay this; on the contrary, the concessions which they take credit for have no meaning, except as subservient to such a policy of commercial expansion. But there is a very important step between the general conception of what is desirable and the appropriate measures for its attainment. This is the step which divides the theoretical from the practical, the successful from the unsuccessful through all human life. And Lord Salisbury seems to miss the mark in throwing the whole responsibility for giving effect to these national aspirations on the splendid individual qualities on which British commerce has been built up. These qualities no doubt exist, and are always needed, but it must be recognized that the circumstances of China, as of other countries, are not what they were in the days of our fathers. The world is no longer ours to bustle in at our will, and, like the rest of the sentient creation, we must adapt ourselves to our new environment, or perish. There was a time when personal power was all-sufficient for defence, but civilization has carried us beyond that stage. Organization, scientific armament, and training are now essential to the existence of a nation. Without them the largest empire in the world is at the mercy of the smallest. But organization, which on the grand scale was erewhile confined to military and naval force, has, in our day, been extended to the commercial and industrial forces.

The great States of Europe have entered into partnership with their merchants and manufacturers, contributing to the joint capital all their diplomatic skill, all their national prestige, and, in the last resort, all their militant strength. It would seem, therefore, as much a mockery to meet these formidable corporations by a call for individual enterprise as it would be to summon a band of yokels with hay forks to meet a new Arma[redacted] There may still be a question whether in the sphere of common trading individual effort may not be able to hold its own against disciplined organizations; but common trading is no longer sufficient to satisfy our interests and establish our position in China. There is an immense field for capital in that country, and capital happens to be the commodity of which Great Britain has enough and to spare. But neither capital nor enterprise will seek its way thither to be engulfed. Without some reasonable assurance of protection British money will not irrigate those arid fields where irrigation would be so fruitful. And if the Government continues to refuse this reasonable guarantee, while competing Governments furnish it in abundance to their adventurers, whom they, at the same time, stimulate to the utmost, what must the result be? Can there be any doubt under such circumstances who will eventually possess and who will be excluded from China? There is no need for our Government to go to the lengths which other Powers do; no need, for example, for an Anglo-Chinese Bank with the Imperial Treasury at its back. What the country wants is confidence in the Government protecting national interests from pillage and confiscation so long as they are found in the way of legality. What it does not want is that every point of legality should be strained against those interests, as has been the practice of Governments and their agents hitherto.

We cordially join in the homage which is being paid to Lord Salisbury for patience and temper in dealing with difficult Imperial questions, and would not bate a jot from the legitimate satisfaction which must accrue from the public recognition of the happy results which sometimes wait upon long-suffering. But there is a time and a place for everything, and to draw false analogies between the relations of Great Britain to the United States on the one hand and to China on the other, swooped down upon by the beaks and talons of Europe, is to blind ourselves to obdurate facts. For it must be obvious to the plainest understanding that patience in China will see that country dismembered, perhaps reduced to anarchy and general bloodshed, and where then would our gain come in? Is there a second China waiting to reward our patience?

No; it was not patience which built up the British Empire. It is active energy, youthful energy, even though accompanied by an

occasional indiscretion, that must save the future of our people, the very qualities to which Lord Salisbury himself appeals. Only he would leave them to fight like naked Zulus against solid battalions with Maxim guns. Of the true and vital co-ordination between the Government and the industrial forces which constitute the strength of our rivals we find not a trace in Lord Salisbury's speech, ra[illegible] a kind of *tu quoque* antagonism mutually destructive. It is easy to fence with the question of railways in China by gibes at native management, and it is not difficult to evade the Imperial question of connecting that country with our own dominions by taking your stand on the sound financial doctrine that the House of Commons would not vote the money. This may be true. And yet there is a danger of our placing fetters on the national progress by the idolatry of doctrines of our own making, which have no authority whatever, except so far as they are the expression of the will of the nation for the time being. The House of Commons, we take it, was made for the people, and not the people for the House, and neither Government nor Parliament can stand like the Caisse de la Dette and suppress progress by refusing the people the right to dispose of its own money for its own advancement. If we declare it to be impossible to connect Burma with China by rail as we declared it to be impossible to connect the Red Sea with the Mediterranean by water, and if we thereby allow our communication by land to be blocked by rival Powers, who will then settle themselves solidly and in force on the North-East Frontier of India, can we feel sure that—as in the case of the transit dues on merchandise—what is impossible to our terror-stricken imaginations will not be found practicable by those more courageous Powers? And how then will the orthodoxy of the House of Commons look and the prudence of our Government?

A. Michie.

THE TRUTH ABOUT THE "MAINE" DISASTER.

In the annals of naval history the destruction of the American armoured cruiser *Maine* stands almost without precedent. In itself it is an event worth studying, whilst its consequences have been of the most far-reaching importance. It was the conviction generally prevalent in the United States that the *Maine* had been destroyed by an act of Spanish treachery, which led to the war with Spain. The battle-cry, "Remember the *Maine*," appealed to the American people more strongly than even the woes of the "reconcentrados" or the misgovernment of Cuba by Spain.

The question has, however, been raised in England whether United States' opinion is correct in attributing the destruction of this ship to an external cause—to a mine or torpedo, that is to say. The writer has no pretence to be considered an expert, but would dispassionately consider the facts, and the deductions based upon them, from a common-sense standpoint.

In the middle of January there were riots in Havana. The American Government thereupon determined "to resume the friendly naval visits at Cuban ports," and selected the *Maine* for that purpose. On January 24th, General Fitzhugh Lee, the United States Consul at Havana, was notified that this ship would arrive "in a day or two." At 9.30 a.m. of the 25th she put in her appearance, though General Lee had prudently advised the postponement of the visit for some days. The Spanish authorities strongly urged that "if for friendly offices, as claimed, delay [was] unimportant" (*sic*). Obviously from the context of the telegram, which is given in full on p. 246 of the *Maine* Court of Enquiry's Report, "unimportant" is a misprint or verbal error for "important." The *Maine* appears to have been selected for this mission as her discipline was exceptionally good, and her captain, Sigsbee, a man of great tact. She was a ship of 6,600 tons, launched in 1890, and carried 374 officers and men.

On reaching Havana an official Spanish pilot was sent on board the *Maine*. He conducted her to her berth at Buoy No. 4. It was noted, when her bearings had been accurately determined,

that Buoy No. 4 was not quite in its charted position, and it was stated by Captain Stevens, of the American mail steamer *City of Washington*, but after the explosion, that he had never known a man-of-war to be anchored at this buoy, and that it was the least used one in the harbour. Curiously enough, though Captain Stevens appeared before the court-martial, he was not examined on this very important point under oath. We have therefore to rely upon his statement in conversation with Captain Sigsbee, as given by the latter. Captain Stevens, who has for the last five or six years been constantly going backwards and forwards between Havana and the United States, could doubtless have given a great deal of valuable information, and therefore the omission to procure his evidence is very extraordinary. The *Maine* was placed 250 yards from the Spanish cruiser *Alfonso XII.*, 400 yards from the German *Gneisenau*, and about 400 to 500 feet from the *City of Washington*, which arrived on the evening of the explosion. The American officers maintained fairly friendly relations with the autonomist government, then recently established at Havana, but were very coldly received by the Spanish officers. Only five or six of these visited the ship, and they showed no cordiality.

As relations between Spain and the United States were exceedingly strained—almost to the point of rupture—great precautions were taken on board the *Maine* to prevent an external attack or surprise. Extra sentries were placed on the forecastle and poop with loaded rifles; one fourth of the watch was kept on deck ready to go to quarters, and a small quantity of ammunition for the quick-firers was stored in the chart-house. Steam was kept up to work the turret guns in case they should be required. The sentries were directed to warn off all unauthorized boats approaching the ship. To prevent infernal machines being placed on board by visitors, all persons who came over the ship's side were carefully watched, especially when they had packages; they were accompanied below, if they went below, and after they had gone the places where they had been were examined. Extreme vigilance was required of the ship's company, and no untoward incident occurred till 9.40 p.m. of February 15th, when the ship was destroyed by a violent explosion.

The night was a calm and still one, very dark. All the evening the *Maine* had swung steadily in one direction, and that a somewhat unusual direction. The sentries noticed no boats, and there had been nothing to cause any suspicion of foul play. The officer of the watch was on deck; Captain Sigsbee was in his cabin letter-writing; the other officers were either sitting on deck, in the ward-room, or in their cabins when the catastrophe occurred. From the evidence it appears that there was first a report, something like

that of a gun, accompanied by a flash and heavy concussion.* Some witnesses thought a 6-pounder had gone off, others a 10-inch gun, others again held that the report and shock were more violent than even that of the 10-inch weapon. Almost immediately after, at an interval which is variously placed from one to three seconds,† came a heavy, booming, continuous explosion. The fore part of the ship was almost completely destroyed. The *Maine* listed and sank rapidly, but was not entirely submerged, as she was lying in shallow water—33 to 36 feet, on a very soft mud bottom. The general impression amongst her officers and seamen was that she had first been torpedoed by the Spanish cruiser *Alfonso XII.*, and then fired into with a very heavy gun, or that a mine had been exploded under her. After the great explosion, which was accompanied by a tremendous uprush of flame, smoke, and *débris*, the wreckage caught fire, and several minor detonations followed as the flames reached and involved the store of quick-firing ammunition in the chart-house.

Attention must be drawn to one or two points in the narratives of the survivors. The first explosion was to port, and caused a shiver throughout the ship. In the opinion of one of the officers on deck at the time, the ship's deck forward flew back at the first explosion,‡ when the second and more terrible explosion followed, rather to starboard, opening up the ship like the crater of a volcano. After, or simultaneously with, the first explosion the *Maine* rose in the water, and yet no column of spray was thrown up. The electric lights in the ship had burnt steadily all the evening, and did not flare up before the explosion. The first report did not affect them, but at the second all went out. Thus it is clear that the dynamo escaped injury in the first explosion, and was destroyed by the second. This is a very important matter, as it helps to fix the place and cause of the two explosions. The witnesses nearest to the centre of the catastrophe hardly distinguish between the two explosions. For the most part they were conscious of a red flame, a smell of burning cloth—which at once suggests a nitro-glycerine or gun-cotton explosive—and a tremendous shock, which flung them through the air. The boatswain's mate, Bergman, berthed well forward, "heard a terrible crash, an explosion I suppose that was. Something fell, and then after that I got thrown somewhere in a hot place. . . . I got burned on my

* Witnesses not in the ship speak of "a rumble" (p. 51), "a sharp report," and "a shot" (p. 58) as the impression made by this first explosion. Lieutenant Holman, in the ship, calls it "a low and heavy grumbling."

† The difficulty of judging the length of an interval under such circumstances, and the tendency to suppose it longer than it was, must be taken into account.

‡ *Maine* Report, pp. 123-4, corroborated by p. 171, 219.

legs and arms, and I got my mouth full of ashes and one thing and another. Then the next thing I was in the water." The two men swinging in their hammocks below him were both killed. Landsman Lanahan, who was blown clean through the deck above him without injury, felt only "a jar, and that is all I remember." As we should expect, the evidence of witnesses who had passed through such an extraordinary trial of the nerves, shows many discrepancies. Yet the officers displayed marked coolness and courage, even when it was realized that the ship was gone; and, unquestionably, their bearing reflects the greatest glory upon the United States' Navy. It is worthy of comparison with the divine heroism of the *Victoria's* crew on that dreadful June afternoon of 1893. The *Maine's* officers and men had learnt the great rule of honour and self-sacrifice, which service in any military force tends to strengthen. Without exception, they thought first, not of their own safety, but of the wounded, dying, and drowning, and went to their rescue.

The position of the two explosions is fairly clearly determined. The first was, as we have seen, well forward, rather to port. The second was more astern, and to starboard, under or near the turret. It is noteworthy that several of the witnesses consider that one of the magazines, if not more, must have been involved in the second explosion. Then Lieutenant Jungen, in his evidence states: the second explosion "was more violent than any explosion I had heard, that I could not liken to anything, except possibly the explosion of a magazine."

The forward part of the ship, taking the usual convenient means of fixing positions by the number of frames, includes frames No. 1 to 30. The turret is over frames 26-30, with the forward 10-inch and 6-inch magazines beneath it.* Frames 26 to 18 have above them two other magazines, containing quick-firing and 6-inch ammunition. Forward of frame 18 are no magazines, and that the centre of the explosion was not here is indicated by the fact that Bergman, whose evidence has been quoted above, was sleeping forward of frame 12 and escaped with several others. No one, so far as I can discover, escaped who was anywhere between frames 16 or 17 and frames 32 or 33, and therefore the presumption is that this was the centre of the explosion.

The wreckage of the *Maine* was, after the disaster, examined and photographed above water, and carefully examined by divers below the water-line. Above water the after part of the ship's superstructure and the after-mast are left nearly intact. The destruction begins just between the funnels, about the middle of the ship. Forward of this point the superstructure and deck are torn up

* See diagram on which the frames are marked.

and folded back. Well forward three portions of wreckage show above water, and these have been identified by officers of the *Maine* as parts of the berth deck, of the protected deck, and of the bottom of the ship at frame 17. It is to be regretted that the official report of the Court of Enquiry does not mark and distinguish these portions of wreckage on the photographs appended, and that it fails to give clear plans and sections of the lower part of the ship. For want of these a good deal of guess-work has to be employed.* The report contrasts unfavourably with our *Victoria* court-martial.



The line marks the limit of injury to the hull, going aft: the two crosses, the centres of the explosions.



* The coal bunkers on the diagram with this article have been inserted from evidence, and are not shown in the plan appended to the report.

Under water the divers have to face great difficulties. The wreck lies in soft, deep mud, which is stirred up by the diver's movements, and renders the water so thick that the men have to rely mainly upon the sense of touch, and can see little. There must also be some very natural anxiety lest the air-pipe and life-line should foul the wreckage. The divers are seamen or petty-officers, and have not much technical knowledge, which makes their reports all the harder to understand, though it does not, as has been suggested, make them altogether fallacious and untrustworthy. On examination they found the part of the ship between frames 23-30 almost completely destroyed. The keel emerges from a heap of *débris* about frame 23, and bends sharply upwards to frame 17 or 18. Then it drops again, making thus an inverted V, to the ram and forward part of the ship, which is nearly intact, but bent sharply down and sunk in the mud. At the port side of the ship, abreast of the apex of the inverted V in the keel, is a hole 7 feet deep and about 15 feet in diameter. The bottom in this hole is harder mud than is found elsewhere. The stem of the ship is turned almost at right angles to the rest of the hull, and the ram lies in this hole, or near it—for the evidence is not clear on this point. Thus, appearances indicate that some force drove up the keel at this point, scooped a deep hole in the mud, and broke the ship's back.* In settling, after the explosion, the hull might move some little distance, which may account for the hole not being immediately under the ship. The side-plating of the ship on the port side forward for some distance is gone, and the edges are blown in and ragged. The hole extends about 30 feet. The turret to starboard cannot be recovered or identified; and from the general appearance it looked as though this side of the ship had been blown out with great violence. To port the armour near the gap appears to have been driven in, as the backing is splintered, and the splinters point inboard. Some indications were found that the 10-inch magazine had exploded, since its starboard bulkhead was bent over till it was nearly horizontal, but, curiously enough, an electric light-box in it was in good shape and the gasket unburnt, whilst, generally, the fittings to starboard were less injured than those to port. There was a big opening in the magazine floor, the edges bent neither in nor out, but apparently cut clean. Powder cases from the 10-inch magazine were found on the bottom; in some instances the charges had possibly exploded; in other instances the cases contained the cloth in which the powder is packed; and a dark deposit was noticed in the mud, and a little of it sent up, dried, and examined. It was evidently

* No such suspicious indentation in the ship's bottom could be proved in the case of the *Dotterel*.

powder sediment, and thus it is clear that if the magazines did explode all the powder in them was not involved. As each charge is isolated from the others and in a separate metal case it is quite possible for a few charges only to explode. Scattered about were 10-inch shells, 6-inch shells, and 6-pounder cartridge cases—some exploded—and projectiles in the wildest confusion.

An American Court of Enquiry, composed of three able and impartial officers of the United States Navy, Captains Sampson and Chadwick and Lieutenant-Commander Potter, held a prolonged and careful investigation into the cause of the explosion. All three are officers whose honour, veracity, and freedom from bias stand unquestioned, and certainly no one of them would be guilty of a crime so shameful or so far-reaching in its consequences as pronouncing a verdict which the facts did not justify. Even as we should feel absolute, implicit confidence in the decision of British experts under similar circumstances, so the people of the United States are justified in believing that Captain Sampson and his brother officers are correct in their conclusions. In every page of the official report their care and impartiality are manifested. They cross-examined on every doubtful point, and took pains to bring out the inevitable contradictions which will exist in all human evidence. They decided that a mine had been exploded under the bottom of the ship, about frame 18, somewhat to port, and that this had involved the partial explosion of two or more of the *Maine's* forward magazines. They did not attempt to fix the guilt or determine the agent.

Putting aside this verdict, which must carry immense weight with the unprejudiced, let us consider whether any internal cause could have brought about such an explosion. The only possible internal causes are these :—

1. Spontaneous combustion or generation of gas in the bunkers.

2. Spontaneous explosion of the magazines, or explosion due to carelessness. The causes of such an explosion might be—

(*a*) High explosives in or near the magazines.

(*b*) Steam pipes causing excessive heat.

(*c*) Badly-fitted electric light.

(*d*) Men working in the magazine in unsuitable shoes.

(*e*) Some unknown cause as in the *Dotterel's* case.

3. Boiler explosion, including coal torpedoes.

4. Inflammable vapour given off by preparations such as xerotine siccative, spirits, naphtha, &c.

5. Deliberate treachery on the part of some of the officers or crew.

1. The magazines near the scene of the explosion were these: to starboard the 10-inch, with about 9 tons of powder in separate

tanks; to port the 6-inch reserve magazine with 400 or 500 lb. of powder in tanks; forward of these the 6-pounder magazine with but a small amount of powder; and forward again of this another 6-inch magazine. This could hardly have exploded, for reasons which have already been given. On the outboard side of the 6-inch reserve magazine were three bunkers, B4, B6, and A16; on the outboard side of the 10-inch magazine were three more, B3, B5, and A15. Round the other magazines were no bunkers. B3, 4, 5, and 6 were all empty; apparently it was impossible to get at A15 and 16 without going through them. B3 to 6 had been painted in the fortnight or ten days before the explosion, had been thoroughly ventilated, and were inspected the morning of the explosion. We are then left with bunkers A15 and 16. A15 was half full, and in use; therefore could not have produced the explosion. A16 was full, containing 40 tons of soft Pocahontas coal, but had been inspected the morning of the explosion. The bulkheads surrounding it on three sides could be felt by the hand. Moreover the bunker was fitted with thermostats, which, though they were liable to give false alarms, would have given warning of any undue heat. No case of spontaneous combustion had ever occurred on board. I have asked naval officers whether it would be possible for a bunker to generate enough gas to cause an explosion, or to develop sufficient heat to fire a magazine, in a few hours, and all with one accord have answered, No. Bunker and gas explosions must therefore be eliminated.

2.—(*a*) There were no high explosives in or near the magazines involved. No smokeless powder, no high explosive shells were in the magazines. The torpedo war-heads, primers, and detonators were in the ship's stern, and certainly did not explode, else no officers would have lived to tell the tale. The powder stored was the ordinary brown explosive, which is stable and trustworthy.

(*b*) On board the French battleship *Duperré* a dangerous explosion, details of which have been suppressed, occurred through the heating of a magazine by a steam pipe. There were no steam pipes in any of the *Maine's* forward magazines. The temperature was duly recorded and the magazines regularly inspected. In hot weather the after 10-inch magazine, which did not explode, had at times shown a temperature of 112 degrees. If I am not mistaken, this is nothing very abnormal, and certainly not dangerous, where there are no high explosives. The forward magazines were cooler.

(*c*) The magazines were properly lighted, and there were no dangerous wires. The electric lights were in light-boxes, and they and the wire supplying the current were separated from the magazines by a double plating of glass.

(*d*) There were no men working at the time in the magazines, which were locked and the keys in Captain Sigsbee's state-room. There was no loose powder about, and proper shoes were always worn by working-parties in the magazines. The gunner was an exceptionally careful officer.

(*e*) An unknown cause is, of course, an explanation, if not a satisfactory one. But the indentation in the ship's bottom is one suspicious circumstance, and the fact that the *Maine* was destroyed in Havana harbour — in an enemy's harbour—is another.

3. The boilers in use at the time of the explosion were the after pair, far away from the magazines. They were in good condition and were working at relatively low pressure. If they exploded, how is it that they did not set off the after magazines? There is only one piece of evidence in the report which lends the slightest colour to this supposition. Fireman Gartrell, in the stern-steering engine-room, which is well astern, was talking to another man in full view of the engine-room door. "Just then," he says, "a flash came. It was a blue flash. It seemed to me like it was right by the lamp in the engine-room . . . it came all at once. It was accompanied by a waving, quaking motion, and followed by a terrible report . . . like the whole earth had opened up." There is no corroboration of this evidence. It is possible that the force of the second explosion, extinguishing the electric light, might have caused a momentary flashing. Had the first explosion occurred in the boiler-room, the dynamo would have ceased working and the lights have gone out at once, whereas we have seen that they were extinguished only at the second explosion. These reasons preclude the idea of a coal-torpedo, or mine, made to look like a lump of coal, charged with high explosive, and fired by the heat of the boiler furnaces. It is not likely that such a coal torpedo could have been in bunker A16, as this had been filled some time before—it would seem from the evidence a month—and properly inspected. A large torpedo, containing a charge sufficiently powerful to explode the magazines, would almost certainly have attracted the men's notice in coaling. The coal at Key West was examined for such machines immediately after the catastrophe and was found to contain none. Moreover, if an infernal machine of this type was employed it was probably employed by Spanish agency, though no one would accuse the Spanish Government of complicity, and therefore little is gained by advocates who insist upon the internal torpedo theory.

4. Inflammable vapour.—All driers of the xerotine siccative type were in proper tanks on deck. Alcohol, whiskies, and all inflammable surgeon's stores, with the exception of a bottle or two,

were aft, under the ward-room. Oily cotton waste, which has been known to take fire spontaneously—though not to explode—was kept in a metal case and thrown overboard regularly.

5. The supposition that a criminal lunatic was to be found amongst the officers and men of the *Maine*, and that such a lunatic would be allowed by his shipmates to explode one of the magazines and destroy the ship, is so improbable that it may be dismissed. It belongs to the same limbo of extravagant imaginations as a French admiral's statement that all American officers are liars, and that the *Maine* Court of Enquiry was a deliberate attempt to establish a falsehood. But the idea that men of Captains Sampson and Chadwick's calibre would assist in such a misprision of justice, and that officer after officer of the *Maine* would appear before the Court and lie and misrepresent, is one which would not commend itself to the British public. We have a belief in the truthfulness and honour of the Anglo-American.

Spanish stories of American indiscipline and tales that all the officers were dining on board the *City of Washington* are the most impudent and idle fabrications. American ideas of discipline are not altogether our ideas, but there is every reason for believing the statement of Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright—a well-known and able officer—that the crew were good and obedient. Moreover, the general behaviour after the explosion corroborates his testimony on this point.

Supposing that the source of the explosion was internal, and internal only, it has yet to be explained how frame 18 could be lifted 34 feet or more out of the water; how the ship's bottom could have been driven up in this extraordinary inverted V; and how the hole to port with edges bent inwards could have been made. The pit in the mud has also to be explained. It will not escape the reader that this inverted V is some distance away from the magazines which probably did explode. We should expect a large charge of powder, going off in the ship's hull, to force the bottom down and not to draw it up. Of course, we can say that all the divers are lying or that they could not see, and therefore drew upon their imagination. But if we read the report and note how in general facts one man corroborates another, with small contradictions, such as we must always expect, we shall rather conclude that they are telling the truth, and not simply inventing.

On the other hand, there are some very strong arguments against the mine theory. In weighing these, we have to decide between two theories, for and against each of which there is much to be said. We have to adopt that which involves the least difficulty and the least amount of explaining away. Nothing, it appears to me, can explain away the inverted V in the *Maine's* wreck, and hence I am

forced to accept the mine theory. But in this case how is the absence of any upheaval of water to be explained? How the absence of dead fish in the harbour, after the explosion? How the failure of the Americans to find any wires or connections in the harbour? And how or when was the mine placed in position? The presence of a submarine boat at Havana might explain away some of these difficulties, but though Spain has one or two submarine boats we do not know that one was present at Havana in January, and, indeed, we have negative evidence to the contrary in the fact that no attempt has been made to annoy the American blockaders with such a boat. Moreover, if such a boat had been employed there must have been many accomplices in the plot. This is difficult to believe; the act looks like the act of some violent and hot-headed fanatic.

On the fish question, which will seem to those who have watched the explosion of submarine mines one of the most important arguments, I have two pieces of rather contradictory evidence to offer. The first is a letter to a great English newspaper proprietor, which I have seen, written by a British resident in Havana, who was quite ignorant that the matter was agitating the universe, and noting as remarkable the fact that so many dead fish had been found in the harbour after February 15th. The second is Admiral Irwin's (U.S.N.) testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations*:—"In four weeks' work [with submarine mines] in Mobile Bay, a fine fish-producing water, Admiral Irwin did not see one dead fish. In the firing of bomb torpedoes in the Mare Island Straits, in California, he never saw one. As to the absence of a column of water, Admiral Irwin testified that while the explosion of a mine at less than six feet from the surface will throw up a noticeable column of water, at fifteen feet or more there will be hardly a bubbling on the surface." The latter portion of his evidence would hardly be borne out by British officers. But if a column of water was thrown up by the first explosion in the *Maine*, it might have been hidden from view by the dense cloud of fire and smoke which followed almost immediately with the second explosion. It is also possible, as has been suggested, that the mine, if placed in close contact with the ship's bottom, would expend all its energy on driving up the hull and none in throwing water about.

There is no instance known in which an external mine or torpedo has exploded a ship's magazine. This may be because the crucial experiment of firing a very heavy mine right under a ship's magazine has never been tried, in peace or war. We have,

* *Army and Navy Journal*, New York, April 23rd, 650.

to a great extent, to depend upon guess-work and induction. A 500 lb. mine might, and probably would, have quite different effects from a 200 lb. or 50 lb. mine. And if it be said that the explosion of the *Maine's* magazines by a mine reveals to us startling dangers, hitherto undreamed of, we may reply that their explosion by an undiscoverable internal cause would be even more alarming. No warship would be safe, even in time of peace.

That no wires or connections were discovered may, perhaps, be explained by the softness of the mud in the harbour. Two experts whom I have questioned, give diametrically opposite answers on this point, one holding that the cable would not sink, and the other that it would. It, therefore, seems safe to consider that such a thing is, if unlikely, not impossible. If a drifting mine were used there would be less difficulty, but in such a harbour as Havana, where there is practically no tide and much shipping, it does not seem probable that a drifting mine could be employed. We are, therefore, driven back to the electro-contact mine as the type used. To explode this two conditions are necessary—contact with the ship to be destroyed, and an operator on shore to put the mine into action. Such mines are almost certain to have been in the hands of the authorities at Havana, and could have been laid down near Buoy No. 4 rapidly, and without attracting attention. Or Buoy No. 4 may have been moved so as to bring a ship swinging at it over an already-existing mine. It would be interesting to know if any boats were seen near Buoy No. 4 during January 24th and the night and early morning of the 24th—25th.

A little consideration will show that Spanish authorities might have been justified in placing such a safe form of mine at the berth to be occupied by the *Maine*. War was quite possible, and if war came this powerful armoured cruiser inside the harbour must have been the most dangerous of enemies. I do not suppose that the American Government had the remotest intention of acting in a treacherous manner, but the Spaniard, naturally enough, would not see with British and American eyes. With a mine, the *Maine* could, on the outbreak of war, be disabled, if she did not withdraw. It seems probable that some unauthorized person gained access to the shore-key, and connected up the firing battery, whence the catastrophe.* But the whole truth will never be known till the Judgment day, though there can be little doubt, in my mind, at least, that there was a mine.

H. W. Wilson.

* American opinion exculpates General Blanco.

THE UNREADINESS OF THE VOLUNTEERS.

For those who desire that the reserve forces shall be really efficient for home defence, the outlook as regards that branch—the Volunteer Force—which contributes to the total little short of a quarter of a million of men is decidedly more promising than it has been for years past. In the opinion of many competent judges, the actual value of those 250,000 men, as reliable soldiers, is absurdly small in proportion to the numerical strength. The good promise for the future is that this fact is now being openly acknowledged within as well as outside the force itself; and recognition of a defect is the necessary and first step to its removal. Up to the present time, the maintenance of the numerical strength of the force, and even its increase, has been the first article of faith in the creed of many of its prominent and influential officers; and this consideration would seem to have dulled their sense of proportion in estimating the value of the other factors which, with numbers, combine to produce a really efficient body of soldiers. But a mere credulity in the value of numbers has played but a small part in the matter; it is the potent influence of pounds, shillings, and pence which has relegated efficiency to the background, and has kept numerical strength well to the front. The reason for this is, that whilst the standard of efficiency on which depends the granting or the withholding of the money subsidy given by the country to the force is so low, that with very slight effort, any civilian who desires to wear a uniform and wield a sword or rifle can be certified an "efficient" volunteer, the total sum granted annually to each corps is in proportion to, and depends on, the number of individual "efficient" volunteers in the corps. Lieutenant-Colonel Balfour, who commands the London Scottish, said, when speaking at the Royal United Service Institution in November, 1895: "Moreover, I know that anything approaching further compulsory sacrifices" (*i.e.* of time) "would tend to increase the dearth of officers"; and he might have added, with equal truth, the words, "would diminish the number of men, and will, in both cases, lessen the money subsidy." To some few corps which are strongly and liberally supported by the purses of

their officers and their friends, such as one I know, and in which the commanding officer contributes some hundreds a year to its maintenance, the money subsidy is not so important as it is to corps generally; but in the great majority of cases this money is the first consideration; and the money being dependent on the numbers, it therefore blocks the way to military efficiency taking its rightful place among the elements which combine to produce a reliable military unit. Hence the prominence hitherto assigned to the numerical strength of the force.

Until very lately we have been accustomed to hear the 250,000 volunteers loudly advertised as one of the principal items in our insurance against invasion. But suddenly, and most unexpectedly, a change seems to have arisen in the estimate of the real value of this particular item. Secretaries of State for War and Under Secretaries have, as a rule, been profuse in adulations of the force on those occasions when they have been called upon to preside at shooting-prize gatherings and the like, in connection with corps in which they were more or less personally interested. And it so happens that the principal Military Question before the Government and the Legislature this year has been the organization of the Land Forces and putting straight the Military Forces of the Empire. Now was the time for these officials to assign in the scheme to the force which they have delighted to honour a position adequate to its value, and for showing that that value justified the annual expenditure of one million of pounds on the force. Yet, strange to say, there was not in the brilliant and exhaustive speech delivered by Mr. Brodrick, when introducing in the House of Commons this subject of Army Expenditure and Army Organization, any mention whatever of this quarter of a million soldiers. As regards the Volunteer Force there was an ominous silence.

Was it that the severe critics whom Mr. Brodrick had to meet were terribly in earnest, and, therefore, the Under Secretary of State for War had to be dreadfully in earnest also? The official statistics dealing with the regular army had been mercilessly overhauled, and their worth and reliability tested by Mr. Arnold Forster and other powerful writers in the leading journal. It would have hardly been wise, therefore, at this moment, to refer in congratulatory terms to that portion of the reserve forces which boasts that it numbers a quarter of a million "efficients"; for, in sheer consistency, these critics would have been bound to put these figures into the same crucible. They had told us that the analysis of the numbers of the regular forces yielded a far too high percentage of untrained, and therefore inefficient, regular soldiers, both horse and foot. If the 250,000 "efficients" of the

reserve forces had been subjected to a similar ordeal, the result would have been far more unsatisfactory; so it was just as well to let the sleeping dogs lie.

Then must be taken into account certain minor incidents which, like straws, serve the purpose of showing the general direction of the current of public sentiment and opinion. There has been in the public Press a complete lull of the hitherto very wide advertisement of the peace deeds and doings of the Volunteer Force. Next, at the Royal United Service Institution, on the 27th April last, a lecture, to which reference will be made again in this paper, and which was entitled "Compulsory Service for Home Defence," was delivered by Lieutenant-Colonel Boyes, London Rifle Brigade. Lieutenant-Colonel Boyes is one of those officers of the Volunteer Force who, for many years, have spent money freely, and have given much time and labour to the improvement of the force; and yet he now comes forward and tells us that the Volunteer Force, as it exists, is inadequate to the requirements of the country, and he proposes something in lieu of it. A year ago a storm of virtuous indignation would have burst over Lieutenant-Colonel Boyes' head. To-day there is no indication of the existence of any such feeling. In the May number of *Blackwood's Magazine*, Captain C. P. Lynden-Bell, East Surrey Regiment, writes as an ex-adjutant of a volunteer corps, and he portrays the volunteers as they appear to an officer of the regulars thrown into close contact with them. The portraiture is not flattering and does not inspire confidence in the military worth of the quarter of million men; yet his candour does not draw on him any wordy censure or indignant denial of the accuracy of his drawing. That prominent volunteer officer Colonel Alt, commanding the Central London Rangers, is reported to have said that "the Volunteers were standing in the way of a proper military weapon for national defence." And last, and very much by no means least, Colonel Sir Howard Vincent, commanding the Queen's Westminster, admits, in *The United Service Magazine* of last month, that the condition of affairs is not satisfactory. A year ago many of the officers of the force would have been at once up in arms, and would have done their best to repel these assaults on the position the force has held in public estimation. To what is due then this change of sentiment, not only without but within the Volunteer Force?

Personally, I believe that the cause will be found in that complete change in the political aspect of the relations between this country and the other countries of Europe that has taken place in the short period which has elapsed since the Jubilee celebration, and in the necessarily corresponding change in the views held with regard to our National Defences. We all, whether volunteers or

non-volunteers, see that in every quarter of the globe the horizon is darkening with dangers threatening our Empire; among all of us is there the belief that some hostility may manifest itself in active and practical shape, near or far away, at any moment; we all know that the services of every man in the Land Forces will be required to render that hostility harmless, but that owing to the probable suddenness with which the blow will be delivered, there will not be any time for making preparations to receive it; and hence arises the feeling entertained by all British subjects, that it is on our readiness for immediate action that depends whether disaster and possible ruin shall follow. Be ready, be ready, be ready, is the demand pressed on the Government from every quarter. How, then, does this affect the Volunteer Force? It affects it, and vitally, inasmuch as unreadiness for immediate action is a universally admitted characteristic and weakness of the corps of the Volunteer Force. Hitherto the answer has been certain erudite and empirical calculations, showing the time which, under ordinary circumstances, will be available for getting the Volunteer Force into shape to take the field after the danger is sufficiently apparent to show the need for its services. But now, when hostile acts, almost equivalent to a *casus belli*, are suddenly sprung upon us in another continent without the slightest previous warning, and when hostilities, without any formal declaration of war, break out between countries, it is impossible to number among our trustworthy defenders any but those who are prepared to take their places in the ranks as efficient, each in his own degree, on the utterance of that word so pregnant with meaning and consequences, "Mobilize." It is this need for immediate readiness, and the realization of this need not only by the public, but among the volunteers themselves, and the hopelessness of attaining immediate readiness of the Volunteer Force, so long as it is allowed to exist under its present conditions, that are, I believe, bringing rapidly within the sphere of practical politics either the complete reorganization of the force or its extinction. But this reorganization cannot come from within; for not only does finance prevent the force being capable of self-reform, but the divergence of views as to the form the reorganization should take, and as to the extent to which it should be carried in each corps, would render self-reform impracticable. Further, the reorganization question is not a question for a soldier only; it is one for a statesman as well, because it is the Government, or rather the nation, that has allowed the force to drift into a condition of veritable entanglement of interests, which meshes round the force, and would impede its efforts even if it wished to reorganize; for corps have been allowed, and, sometimes, have even been obliged by their own military needs, to make

large outlays of capital and to incur large pecuniary obligations. To ignore those expenditures which, at the time they were made, were legitimate and justifiable, and to give no compensation, would be something very like repudiating a public debt.

For the present inefficiency the melancholy weakness of the authorities since 1862, when sat the only Royal Commission that ever enquired into the condition of the force, and which was singularly short-sighted on the subject, is mainly responsible. The Volunteer Force has been more sinned against than sinning. It is now nearly forty years of age. Forty years old, and not yet able to do much! It tumbled into the world somehow or other in 1859, and was regarded by the Government of the day as a sort of foundling prodigy deposited at their feet by a Providence apparently wiser than themselves; they took it up in their arms and shook it threateningly at our neighbours over the way to frighten them with it by its extraordinary aspect: that of real, honest, *bona-fide* patriotism. And, the alarm over, they put it down. In 1862 the question came what to do with this remarkable phenomenon. Should it live or shouldn't it live? If the former, it must cease to be truly volunteer, and must receive, like all soldiers pay of some kind to keep it alive. So they gave a dole, and have been giving increasing doles ever since, but letting it slide along much as it liked and much as suited itself. Imagine the condition of a son at the age of forty years brought up under similar conditions: sometimes petted, sometimes neglected; sometimes praised, sometimes scolded; sometimes given a little pocket-money, sometimes denied what it really needed. We have only to thank ourselves for the fact that the Volunteer Force is not up to the needs of the day, and is unready to take its place among our Land Forces.

But what Colonel Boyes says about the force deserves reproduction:—

"The first essential in an army, even for home defence, is organization. But, besides organization, there are a few other somewhat important matters, such as discipline and training, the knowledge of and practice in the use of arms, a staff the brains of an army, skilled officers and non-commissioned officers, particularly commanding officers. Will anyone assert that the condition of our Auxiliary Forces is satisfactory in respect of all these? That discipline and military skill do exist in them, perhaps to an extent greater than is generally supposed amongst professional soldiers, cannot be denied; but, in the absence of organization, such good military qualities as do exist are more or less wasted. Again, it is difficult to over-estimate the extraordinary differences and varieties of military efficiency existing throughout these forces, even among regiments supposed to be brigaded together and parading side by side. The difference between a really good volunteer regiment—and there are many such—and a really bad one—of which, alas, there are many more—is not one merely of degree but of kind. In all essentials the first is a surprizingly good military engine; the second, a worse than worthless one. . . . On the whole, the present home defence army may be said to be a mass of most valuable material, practically almost unwrought and undeveloped."

And again:—

"If we as volunteers could really think that the force, as at present constituted, was a sufficient provision for the national safety, we should be only too proud to think that our unpaid services were of such vital importance in maintaining the safety, honour, and welfare of our Sovereign and her dominions. But can anyone who really knows what the force is at the present moment—vastly different as it was at its formation, superior as it is in most respects to what it was a quarter of a century ago—really satisfy himself that it is a sufficient force for home defence? If not, . . . however much we may appreciate what volunteering has done, we had better see it swept away to-morrow and a new system organized than that its existence should lead to a delusive false confidence as to our national safety."

These words which I have quoted have the ring of true patriotic self-abnegation, and they are weighty words. That they are weighty is due to the fact that they come from a volunteer officer for whose study and knowledge of his work as a soldier many of us can personally vouch, and who has devoted the spare hours of the best of his life to the improvement and advancement of the efficiency of the Volunteer Force. And now, broad-minded enough to rise above personal considerations, he comes forward and declares that he has weighed the force in the balance to test its value under the military and political conditions existing at the close of the nineteenth century, and he finds it wanting.

One of the grounds brought forward by Colonel Boyes for the substitution of compulsory service for home defence, in lieu of a voluntary system, is that "the voluntary system, which forms the basis of the whole structure of our army, has broken down." This may be true, as most certainly it is with regard to the Volunteer Force. When we contrast with the actual worth of the article produced, and as it stands before us to-day, the length of time the force has been in existence, the vast sums of money out of private pockets which have supplemented the not insignificant amount contributed from the national Exchequer, and the immensity of the zeal, energy, and devotion displayed by so many of its members, we are reluctantly compelled to admit that, so far as concerns this item of insurance for home defence, the ultimate result has been failure to produce, as had been intended, a reliable force for home defence, and that the voluntary system has broken down. Yet, as we are not setting to work to produce a force for home defence on a *tabula rasa*, would it not be well to give to that spirit which presided at the birth of the force, and which called it into existence, namely, the spirit of real patriotism, yet another trial, but under conditions which, if accepted, must ensure a satisfactory result. Owing to certain circumstances, it happens that I have acquired a personal knowledge of the condition, virtues, and shortcomings of a large number of volunteer corps in many parts of Great Britain, and including many varieties of the genus "volunteer corps"; and whilst I avow my wish that the force had not survived the Royal

Commission of 1862, but that compulsory service had been then substituted for it, yet I cannot think it would be good policy in any way to ignore the actual presence in the force of those valuable elements which, although small in proportion to the whole, are there nevertheless, and not to utilize them to the national advantage. Taking the Volunteer Force as a whole, and comparing it with the regular army, there will be found in the former a certain, though perhaps not very large, number of officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates who, saving that lack of knowledge and experience which is acquired by professional soldiers only, could now take their places side by side with men of corresponding rank in the regular army; but when these are separated from the rest of the force, the volunteers they leave behind them are of little or no good compared to the regulars. It is for the sake of, and owing to the existence of, the former that I would give to the force yet another chance of showing its patriotism, and of proving that the breakdown of the volunteer system is not complete. In carrying this proposal into effect a sifting process will inevitably result, and on the numerical result of that process the future of the force mainly depends.

For the production of any force ready to take part in national defence, time is, of course, required; so the reorganizing of the Volunteer Force can give us, not in the immediate, but only in the near future, what we require. But time must elapse even under compulsory service before an efficient force is available. It is unreadiness for immediate action which is, I have said, the radical weakness of the force. The first thing to be done is, then, to ascertain in what matters and with regard to what requirements the force is unready. There are volunteer officers who maintain that the cause of the unreadiness is the absence of organization; their remedy lies in the immediate combination of brigades into divisions, of divisions into army corps, fully provided with staffs administrative services, and transport. Give us these, they say, and we shall be ready when the call for our services comes. But they would not be ready then, even were all these demands granted. They would be like a contractor who, having undertaken to build a modern luxuriously-furnished hotel, has spent his money or that of the shareholders on buying joists, planks, staircases, window-frames, lifts, carpets, sofas, spring mattresses, ranges, kettles, pots and pans, and meat-hooks for the larder, and who, when the time fixed for the completion of the contract arrives, finds himself without the bricks to build the very walls, or the bricklayers to lay them. The bricks and the bricklayers are the necessary preliminaries to the building of an edifice for the reception of the articles enumerated; men fashioned into soldiers and men

capable of placing those soldiers where they are wanted are the necessary preliminaries for the formation of military units, small or large. The Volunteer Force is not yet ready even for the building up into stable walls; and anyone who would learn what are the elements of its unreadiness cannot do better than carefully read the very temperate and very able article written by Captain Lynden-Bell. It is the adjutants and the ex-adjutants of the Volunteer Force who, from constant personal association with the force, know its military value, and who, being regular officers, are able to compare that value with the standard of real efficiency. Captain Lynden-Bell has put very clearly the difference between the trainings of the volunteer and those of the regular soldier, the trainings bearing nominally the same names, drill, discipline, musketry instruction, exercise of command, &c., but being in reality things very different, and sometimes hardly comparable at all. He tells us wherein the unreadiness lies:—

"One of the most common mistakes that the public make in connection with the volunteers is to attribute to them a far higher degree of proficiency with the rifle than facts warrant. This arises, no doubt, from the fact that there are in the force a considerable number of marksmen of the first rank; but the general level of musketry in the volunteers is anything but satisfactory, owing to the lack of interest that the majority of men take in shooting."

No doubt, the volunteer encounters in his musketry practice difficulties, such as distance away from ranges, expense of travelling, and loss of time in getting to and from the ranges, &c., which are absent from the musketry training of a regular soldier; but I have been more than once told by volunteer officers that their men take no interest in shooting. And yet these men are "efficients," and regarded as of use in battle!

Again, as regards discipline, "It has been asserted that the discipline of the Volunteer Force is very satisfactory." "The real test is applied when the will of a commander is opposed to the desires of his men and when it overcomes them." "It is not sought to show that the discipline of the force is bad, but to prove that it is hardly possible to discover whether it possesses any discipline at all, since the necessary tests have never been applied."

I know of the existence of grave and gross indiscipline in certain instances in the Volunteer Force, equalling those which came to notice among certain regular battalions at the New Forest manœuvres two years ago; but the difference between the presence of indiscipline in the two forces is, that whereas when the indiscipline in the regulars makes itself manifest, measures are taken to crush it out and prevent its recurrence, the indiscipline in the volunteers may receive but a passing notice, if it receives any at all, and it remains latent in the corps.

Then how about drill, the very foundation of all training for

the field. This drill is mere patchwork drill, and of it Captain Lynden-Bell says that "it is the weakest part of the whole volunteer system." Here is then unreadiness in the very elements of soldiering. As regards the officers, this close observer tells us: "The absolute necessity for training is very imperfectly, if at all, understood by the bulk of the Volunteer Force, or even by the majority of the officers. To be willing to turn out in case of invasion, as they would doubtless do, is considered to be all that is necessary." The officer "can hardly be said, as a general rule, to have any but the slightest knowledge of the elements of military science. It is in his ability to command men that he chiefly falls short. Practice is needed. His latent powers of command have not been called out. Why is this? Simply because the total amount of drill done by the volunteers is so small that the necessities of the case require that the adjutant, the only professional soldier with the battalion, shall do most of the drilling." "Now it has been already shown that the majority of volunteer officers have no acquaintance with the elements of military science, and if it be remembered that very few indeed have had any practical experience of command of troops in the field, it is hardly reasonable to expect that their decisions, unaided by the light of study and experience, will always commend themselves to the men under their command. The advance of education in the masses tends therefore only to weaken the power of the volunteer officer so long as he remains as he is." Here, then, is another and vital unreadiness. Similarly as regards the non-commissioned officers. In all these matters the force is unready.

Now, it would be absolutely beside the mark for certain well-known corps, in reply to Captain Lynden-Bell, to produce returns showing that their particular corps carry out exercises far beyond the minimum required; for this does not alter the fact that it is to the minimum of efficiency a very large proportion of the force is contented to attain and that it is there they are contented to remain; and with the result that the force as a whole is not up to the requirements of the year of grace 1898. A very weak point in the force is the absence of any real company training—in modern war it is the companies that are the fighting units. Under fire, or on outposts or elsewhere, a battalion soon resolves itself into eight bodies, gradually slipping out of the control of the commander, being despatched by him out of his own reach; and I am sure that the number of trained companies in the force, and effectively commanded, is insignificant. Sir Howard Vincent's remedy for the force, viz., fewer battalions, does not touch this form of unreadiness.

It has always been obvious to regular soldiers, and must by this

time be equally obvious to the volunteers, that readiness for war cannot be attained without steady, thorough, systematic, and continuous training, carried out under the supervision of competent trainers, at times and places determined by the authorities, and not left to selection by individuals to suit their own convenience. And in not one of the matters in which Captain Lynden-Bell has shown the unreadiness of the volunteers to lie, can readiness take its place without a complete change in the conditions under which the training shall be carried out. The conditions will necessarily demand a far greater sacrifice of time on the part of the volunteers, but money, so far as the soldiering is concerned, will not enter into the question, for, with the nation, these labourers will be well worthy of hire on good terms. That for many and very various reasons the new conditions will be declined by a very large number of the present members of the force is certain ; and among them will be included, I regret to think, many excellent officers who, busily employed in civil occupations, cannot afford to give to soldiering more time than they have hitherto placed at the service of the force. What those conditions and terms of service shall be, and their most advantageous adaptation to localities, will demand most careful thought and consideration in their initiation, most careful watching in their working, and will require the whole time and the undivided attention of some one superior authority. That the official entrusted with this duty will be able to conduct at the same time that little business known as "recruiting" presupposes the existence not of a mundane, but of a supernatural superior staff officer. I thoroughly agree in the opinion held by the officers of the Volunteer Force that, even under the present system, it is beyond the capacity of any one human being to properly look after both recruiting and the reserve forces.

And now as to the result of the imposition of new and more onerous terms of service on the members of the Volunteer Force. If the number accepting them be but few, then I see nothing before the force but extinction, for the country cannot afford, for the sake of 250,000 of its citizens, to be unprepared in national defence. Readiness must at any price or sacrifice be substituted for unreadiness. The money thus saved must be expended in procuring something more serviceable. But if a fair proportion do accept the terms, how about the remainder ? I do not see that their immediate extinction necessarily follows. It would not be right to continue to give them so high a subsidy as that which they have hitherto received owing to too high an estimate having been put on their value ; but the younger and more active element may find its use when the hour of danger comes, and it may be left, not to increase, but to "'bide a wee."

In conclusion, I would counsel the volunteers to lay to heart the following words of Colonel Boyes :—"In urging, then, a scheme which will supersede volunteering, I do not wish to be thought for one moment to turn my back on what for so many years of service has been to me a source of the highest pleasure, and I may say pride. Far be it from me to 'despise the day of small things,' but 'day of small things,' after all, it has been in comparison to that which may come."

LONSDALE HALE.

MR. KENSIT—AND AFTER.

CAREFUL observers of events have for some while feared an explosion of Protestant fanaticism in this country. The materials for an outbreak have been long accumulating, but latterly at so rapid a pace that a crisis has been precipitated. The failure of the prosecutions under the Public Worship Regulation Act, and the subsequent determination of the Bishops to steadily veto prosecutions for Ritual offences, have induced among the more violent section of Protestants a deep sense of injury. They have watched with helpless rage the triumph of their victims. The character of the Episcopal Bench prohibits the hope that a Protestant Crusade will ever again be led by the Bishops. Without the moral support of the Bench, the method of legal suppression is really impracticable. Meanwhile events have moved quickly, and always in the wrong direction for the Protestants. The late Archbishop "gave away" the Protestant position in the Lambeth Judgment. The present Primates met the new Papal aggression by a careful, reasoned, and learned repudiation of the leading Protestant dogma. The outburst of delight with which this "Responsio" was received among High Churchmen did not tend to mitigate the indignant amazement which it produced among their rivals. The interchange of civilities between the Churches of England and Russia, which reached a climax in the mission of Bishop Creighton to Moscow, as representative of the English Church at the Czar's coronation, did not have a reassuring effect upon those who regard the religion of all Eastern Churches as a lethargic idolatry only one degree less odious than the more energetic idolatry of Rome. The curious attempt on the part of some well-known Anglicans to induce a Papal recognition of Anglican Orders produced widespread alarm; the vigorous Papal aggression which has since followed has provoked fears and resentments which had long slumbered; the Protestant fanatic again obtained a hearing when he thundered against Popery; and, for the first time, many clergy learned how powerful a hold on the people of England is yet retained by the tradition of the Reformation. Most exasperating of all has been the conduct of the Ritualist clergy. In some cases—not many, but more than optimists com-

monly admit—the law has been ostentatiously broken, the letter and the spirit of the Prayer-book openly repudiated, and the characteristic practices and expressions of Romanism introduced with an enthusiasm of servile mimicry which provokes the fury of fanatics and the scornful wonder of ordinary Englishmen.

That a "Protestant reaction" had set in has been matter of comment among observant English Churchmen for some years past: they have wondered in what particular form the incessant domestic conflict of the National Church would again become acute, and where the crisis would first reveal itself. Some steps were being quietly taken to mitigate the most provocative excesses of Ritualism, and in some quarters the sanguine expectation was expressed that Catholicism in the English Church might finally establish itself without public disturbance.

Mr. Kensit has pricked the bubble of ecclesiastical optimism. The man himself has none of the admitted qualifications for religious leadership. He has for some years been a familiar comic figure at Church Congresses and such assemblies, where he has fulminated to the public amusement against "things in general" and Ritualists in particular. His "principles" are obsolete; his manner of expressing them offensive. Yet this strange blend of the rowdy and the fanatic has succeeded in bringing about a grave ecclesiastical crisis. The Bishop of London is reduced to the indignity of suing for a brief "cessation of hostilities" at the hands of a convicted Church-brawler; and half the metropolitan clergy are quaking in their shoes lest the terrible printer from Paternoster Row shall elect to exercise his *episcopal* functions in their churches. Five parishes have already been visited, and when the two-months' truce is expired we may expect a general visitation.

What is the explanation of Mr. Kensit's astonishing success? and what will be its probable result? To the first question we have already replied. The Protestant Reaction which has been provoked by the whole course of ecclesiastical politics during the last twenty-five years, and raised to fever-heat by recent events, has rallied to the first successful resistance to Ritualism which this generation has witnessed. The pent up forces of baffled pride, of rivalry, of fierce partisanship, of ignorant zeal, have broken loose, and for the moment have wholly swept from mind that devotion to law which was the special boast of the Protestant Party at an earlier period.

That the zealots of Protestantism should condone Mr. Kensit's breaches of the law and outrages of religion is, therefore, not matter for astonishment; but the serious element in the present situation is the fact that among the general body of law-abiding citizens, who are by no means enamoured of the obsolete dogmas

of Protestantism, and, for the most part, not naturally disposed to take a severe view of clerical delinquencies, there is manifested a disposition to extenuate and even excuse the recent disturbances in churches. Men who smile at Mr. Kensit's anti-Popery tirades are justly scandalized at the spectacle of ecclesiastical anarchy which he has unmasked. Men who have no sympathy with ritual prosecutions are justly incensed at the bad faith revealed in those clergymen who tacitly repudiate their Ordination Vows by their contempt of law, rubric, and ordinary. Men who have no desire to impose on their Roman Catholic neighbours any legal disabilities are justly resentful against Anglican clergymen who, under the name and shelter of the National Church, disseminate Roman doctrines and multiply Roman proselytes.

These men, including, as we believe, the majority of English lay Churchmen, decline to censure Mr. Kensit until they receive from the Church authorities some satisfactory assurance that the individualism of the Ritualists shall be effectually restrained. The mass of the clergy are not indisposed to accept some such restraint at the hands of the Bishops. A considerable assembly of well-known High Churchmen, convened by the venerable Canon Carter, has agreed to recognize the plenary authority of the Bishops in permitting or prohibiting services not contained in the Book of Common Prayer. The Bishops have debated the subject in their Convocation and assured the country, with almost pathetic earnestness, that they will do what they can. Unfortunately, some of their lordships have interposed a new and formidable obstacle in the way of the restoration of peace. The Bishop of Hereford has seized the moment in order to declare war against the whole High Church Party. The Bishop of Sodor and Man has done the same with less learning and more violence, after his kind. The Bishop of Southwell, after a correspondence with Mr. Westall, the Vicar of S. Cuthbert's, in which his lordship suffered from his strange inability to write intelligible English, has excited the public apprehension by vague talk about secret societies in the Church.

All this is purely unfortunate. It is also extremely curious. For Bishop Perceval cannot be ignorant of the fact that when he denounces what he describes as "sacerdotal claims," assumes that Dr. Hort's posthumous volume on the Christian Ecclesia is the last word on the subject, and provides a brand-new definition of sacramental doctrine, he in no respect represents either the traditional Anglican position or the majority of his Episcopal Brethren. It may be securely affirmed that of the thirty-five Bishops of English and Welsh dioceses not more than half a dozen at most would endorse the arrogant assumptions of the Hereford Charge, or subscribe to its version of Anglican belief. *The Guardian* comments with

no excessive severity on the singular lack of practical wisdom which has dictated the publication of "an attack upon the whole body of doctrine and practice which is distinctive of the High Church Party," at a juncture when it seems the vital condition of any escape from ecclesiastical disruption that the impartiality of the Bishops should be above question.

So long as Mr. Kensit represented the legitimate demand of the parishioner that his parish priest should not ignore his legal securities in the interest of his own private beliefs he stood on firm ground. When, though by regrettable and disgraceful methods, he forced into public view practices and teachings in some metropolitan churches which are plainly incompatible with the system of the National Church, and repugnant to the general opinion of Churchmen, he occupied a position of great strength, from which the Ritualists, from whom he took his anarchic precedents, had no means of dislodging him. But when he widened his protest into an assault on the whole High Church Party, and claimed to be the true exponent of Anglican principles, then he became ludicrous, and his movement purely mischievous. For, when all is said, Mr. Kensit and the disorderly gangs which accompany him are even less representative of the Church of England than the false and foolish clergymen whom they molest. Their ecclesiastical progenitors are the marprelates of the sixteenth century; and the sources of their theology must be found in the period of the Commonwealth.

It is quite possible, perhaps even probable, that the agitation to which the Bishop of Hereford gives his patronage may attain formidable dimensions. The nation is certainly Protestant to the core; though the National Church, which—it must always be remembered—includes among her regular and attached members a mere fraction of the people, has never been frankly Protestant, and is now, for good or for evil, decidedly, in the widest and highest sense of the word, Catholic. The agitators can, therefore, command the enthusiastic support of vast multitudes of non-churchmen. The powerful anti-Popery sentiment has been quickened to new life by the violent and fatuous policy of the Vatican. The political Dissenters, still smarting under their great defeat at the polls in 1895, are watching Mr. Kensit's proceedings with eager interest and waxing hope. There are sections of society, neither small nor powerless, who may always be counted on for an essay at parson-baiting. And, to give a respectable appearance to the whole, there is a large body of genuine and legitimate indignation among moderate Churchmen against the ritual extravagances and doctrinal disloyalties of a handful of extreme Ritualists, not one of whom is even creditably known in the intellectual world.

The victory of a Protestant agitation can only mean disestablishment and disruption. To those who, with the present writer, feel that the National Church is worth preserving, not only as the greatest organized moral force in the community, but also as the best security left to us against the final severance of Religion and educated thought, to whom, therefore, the contingency of Disestablishment takes shape as a grave national disaster, and who contemplate disruption as the triumph of obscurantism, Protestant and Papal, the present crisis has an anxious aspect. The paramount consideration for such is how best to hold the Church together.

Two things seem evident. On the one hand, some effectual restraint must be imposed on the ritual vagaries of the parochial clergy. It is intolerable in the present state of public opinion, it is utterly irrational in itself, it is irreconcilable with all known Catholic precedents, that every parish priest should be a law to himself. If the existing anarchy is to be perpetuated, whatever Mr. Kensit's fate may be, the National Church cannot, and ought not to be maintained. On the other hand, while the Prayer-book must remain the standard of doctrine and ritual, while the liturgical forms therein provided must be used, and, for their proper purposes, exclusively used, yet it must be frankly recognized that the Prayer-book, for all its incomparable excellencies is not adequate to the actual needs of the modern Church. It is vain and worse to speak and write and agitate on the contrary assumption. It is no question here of High Churchmen and Low Churchmen. All clergymen are in this particular equally guilty and equally guiltless. There is not a well-worked parish in the country which does not necessarily go outside the Prayer-book for many wholesome and necessary purposes. Where law is plainly unworkable, it must inevitably fall into desuetude. This is the present position of the Act of Uniformity, and its later amendments. It is not honest to insist on a rigid obedience to the Prayer-book in the case of the Ritualists, when it is notorious that no clergy whatever can now reasonably be held to the letter of their statutory obligations in respect to the Prayer-book.

Restraint and relaxation equally require authority. The future of the National Church depends on the issue whether or not any sufficient authority exists or can be provided. The Courts of Law are, it is to be feared, irreparably discredited by contradictory and partial judgments; they are not accepted by a large section of the clergy and no inconsiderable number of laymen on grounds of ecclesiastical theory, which, whatever may be their actual worth, clearly lie outside the range of useful argument; even if it were not so, the method of prosecutions involves the maximum of exasperation

and expense: it is cumbrous, dilatory, and doubtful. Repressive legislation has been tried, and no one seriously wishes to repeat the experiment. There remain the authority of the Bishop in his own diocese, and that of the Bishops in Convocation. It is easy to see the defects of episcopal supremacy, and Mr. G. W. E. Russell has already declared against "a free hand for the Bishops," but really there is no alternative. In process of time some better system might be provided; but for the present, and in view of the existing agitation, nothing but the Episcopate stands between the Church and disaster. The clergy, at least those who may be thought most immediately concerned, have volunteered the profession of their willingness to accept the ruling of the Bishops; it remains for the laity of the Church to express their opinion. They are at the parting of the ways. They must choose the direction in which they will seek the pacification of the Church. On the one hand, they may suffer themselves to be led by Mr. Kensit and the Bishop of Hereford into repeating the old disastrous blunder of attempting to banish from the National Church its *characteristic* elements, those by which it stands distinguished from the Protestant bodies, and vindicates successfully in the teeth of the aggressive despotism of Rome the claim to be Catholic, or they may follow the worthier leading of the Archbishop of Canterbury and most of the Bishops, and strengthen by patience, self-restraint, and loyalty their Lordships' hands in dealing with a sudden and difficult emergency. The High Church clergy have disavowed promptly and frankly the excesses of Ritualism; it remains for the general body of Churchmen to dissociate themselves finally and sharply from Mr. Kensit's methods and ideals.

To the present writer this seems the only direction in which an escape from the present troubles can be found; but when he recalls the obstinacy and unreasonableness of fanatics, clerical and lay, and considers the exasperation of public opinion, and the deep suspicion, but too well founded, with which the Ritualists are regarded; when, finally, he notes the evidences of impracticable partisanship even among the members of that Episcopal Bench on which he is constrained to depend, he finds himself compelled to face an outlook which only a robust confidence can describe as other than hopeless.

H. Hensley Henson.

IS CRICKET DEGENERATING?

The putting of a question of so heretical a nature instantly conveys a suspicion to the minds of those to whom the question is put that the questioner has already an affirmative answer ready. Or it may be that in reality he is not yet convinced, that he has his doubts about the character of the little cloud on the horizon, and that he is merely, in his great love for the game, anxious that somebody more experienced and better-informed than himself should instruct, and, if possible, relieve him of his anxiety.

This is the writer's position; and in this reasoning and reasonable age, when the mere fact that a man says that he can see a cloud does not stamp him at once as a cross-eyed idiot, it is hoped that attention will be accorded by cricketers of that great majority which has become so accustomed to fair sunlit skies that no suspicion that a cloud could darken them has ever suggested itself.

To put the subject into a nutshell I would describe the cloud, to me so painfully visible, as being composed of the tendency in modern cricket—

(*a*) To invest the game with a drawing-room character.
(*b*) To make it a selfish pursuit.

The first tendency is developed by the three following causes:—

1. The abuse of the boundary system.
2. The abuse of the practice-net system.
3. The wasting of time.

1.—The Abuse of the Boundary System.

This is an evil in modern cricket which must be immediately and drastically dealt with if the game is not to be robbed of its virtue as a test of physical pluck and endurance.

The institution of the boundary was a necessary outcome of circumstances. Cricket grounds situated in towns must have boundaries; and as great matches are always played in or near towns, great matches must always be played between boundaries, and no objection can be made, except, perhaps, to the ridiculous value sometimes given to a boundary hit in a small ground. In a country, too, where level spaces are rare, and wherever such

obstacles as woods, cliffs, and ravines are present, boundaries are necessary. But the growing evil is that boundaries are marked out on all sorts of grounds where none but natural ones are required—on commons and open-field lands, in places where a ball might travel for a couple of hundred yards without let or hindrance.

For this there is no excuse; and when, as is too often the case, the boundaries are at an absurdly short distance from the wicket, not only is the offence inexcusable, but contemptible.

The effect of the modern popular close boundary is demoralising both upon batsmen and fieldsmen. The batsman makes his runs at the smallest possible expense of exertion. In a match played by the writer recently, on a well-known Kentish ground, one individual score of 146 runs included no less than twenty-six "fours"—boundary hits. Of these, twenty did not oblige the batsman to stir beyond his crease, and for the remaining six he did not run half a dozen times down the wicket. Of course he was enthusiastically applauded for his exhibition, but there were one or two of us fossils who wondered in what sort of condition would he have walked back to the pavilion, had he been compelled to play real cricket, and run out these twenty "fours"—in other words, about sixteen hundred yards at top speed!

The one-sided character of this arrangement is palpable. Bowlers have to work hard, so have fieldsmen, for they often must exert themselves to save the "four," and in any case must go after the ball, whilst Mr. Batsman alone is cool and fresh, and simply needs to stand and smack. He becomes demoralized, for he gets out of the habit of running hard and keeping it up, and finds century-making on a non-boundary ground an affliction. The fieldsmen become demoralized, for no man with a boundary behind him will put himself to so much trouble to stop a ball, as he would with the knowledge that if he missed it he would have to go after it. Finally, every boundary hit means a chance taken from the fielding side of getting rid of the batsman by running him out. All this seems to have been overlooked when, a year or two back, the outcry was raised, that the bat had so far mastered the ball that the chances had ceased to be even, and the suggestion was seriously made that the bat should be narrowed or the wicket widened. The fact never seems to have been grasped, that cricketers themselves had brought about the uneven state of affairs, by giving batsmen advantages which were not counterbalanced on the other side. But there was something more than the boundary system which was at the root of this unfairness, and with this I shall deal presently.

Why should an arbitrary boundary be fixed where the character of the ground's surroundings do not demand other than the natural

boundary of a hedge, a ditch, or a road? Indeed there is no reason why even these, if they are not actually obstacles, should be regarded as limits. Let it be part of a successful batsman's triumph not only that he has kept up his wicket, and that he has hit well, but that he has run his runs. The young fellow who swaggers home on Saturday evening, full of pride at having made his seventy or eighty runs, requires to be reminded that, so far from having made the runs himself, they have been made for him. Many a man runs up a respectable score like five-and-twenty with no more risk or exertion than if he were in an arm-chair.

Surely this is not consonant with the old spirit of our great game—the spirit which decreed that demands should be made upon a batsman's agility and powers of endurance, as well as upon his judgment and skill. Without being *laudatores temporis acti*, we may thoroughly believe that when Alfred Mynn or Squire Osbaldistone, or even the Royal Fred, "who was alive and is dead," boasted of having made a hit for six, they ran every yard of that six, and would have scouted as un-English and unsportsmanlike the idea that they should sit on their bats whilst a little boy went to fetch the ball, and the scorer quietly credited them with half-a-dozen notches.

If this labour-shirking spirit is to be recognized in our national



game, let the powers that be at once assemble in solemn conclave, and arrange that cricket shall be played as it is on board ship,—that a ball hit beyond a certain line should count for so much. The difference would be, of course, that on land the value-lines should be drawn in squares around the wicket, each square after that nearest the wicket being larger than it, but smaller than its next further neighbour.

By this arrangement the field might be placed as usual, but the batsman would merely be required to stand still, keep his wicket up, and hit away. Running out and its inevitable disagreeable consequences would be done away with; the fieldsmen need only exert themselves so as to prevent the ball passing their lines, and the game would at once be placed within the reach of the puniest and most chicken-hearted of Britons.

2.—The Abuse of the Practice Net System.

This is perhaps the most malignant canker of modern cricket, approached only in its evil consequence by the Juggernaut of "My Average." Like the boundary, there is a sufficient *raison d'être* for the practice net. In pre-net days it was impossible for three men to get a practice, and even with four men it was hard work. So the net was invented, and if the net had not become nets we might have allowed it to pass, for it enabled one man to practice his batting and a couple of others their bowling. Of course, nobody need learn to field. The cricketer of to-day sees no more necessity for wasting time in learning what comes by intuition, than the majority of Church of England curates see the necessity for learning how to preach. Results: The fielding exhibitions all round London on Saturdays, and the sermons dribbled out to us on Sundays. However, the back net became an institution, and if the business had stopped there, it might have remained tolerable. But it didn't.

The evident worry and fatigue suffered by men having to run after leg and square leg hits inspired some short-sighted but, doubtless, kindly-minded genius, to invent the leg net, whilst the vexatious exertion of being obliged to chase slip strokes and point cuts brought about the introduction of the off net. Then long-on growled at being obliged to stir himself, and as long-off didn't see the fun of being the only man left in the field, another net each side was added, and all that was needed was the stretching of nets overhead to make batsmen and everybody else as snug and comfortable as indoors.

Yes: I know what is coming. "Side nets were really introduced so that two or three sets of men could practice alongside without breaking each others' heads."

Practising what?

Why, the only thing worth practising—batting, and to some degree bowling.

Then they have no business to do any such thing. If there are enough men on a club ground to occupy three sets of wickets, a captain who really had the interest of his club at heart, and had sufficient pluck, should have *all* the nets taken down, and let there be a general practice of certain departments of the game, which are believed to come by intuition, but upon which really depends the fate of a match just as much as upon batting. As it is, practice with five nets means that practically the only fieldsmen who ever gets a chance of a ball, is the occasional man placed over bowler's head.

Moreover, the system is the very best that could have been invented for making a good batsman bad, and a poor batsman worse. The good player forgets the sciences of placing balls and of keeping balls down, the youngster never learns them. Both simply go in for slogging, and the very ground-man feels that it is not worth his while to bowl his best when faced by such careless batsmen.

Consequently, the net system reduces cricket practice to batting and bowling—and this is, if we concede the usual batting and bowling on practice nights to be worthy of their names—a state of affairs so serious, that it is hard to write calmly about it.

The introduction of the triple net simply destroyed all chance of men practising posts in the field, including that, most important and rarely excelled in, of wicket-keeper. The addition of a net on each side knocked cover-point, mid-on and mid-off out of the field—with the bowler, the whole eleven are thus accounted for.

Consequently, what do we see? Slatternly fielding in many a first-class match, and absolutely ridiculous exhibitions at all others except, perhaps, school games. The majority of ordinary cricketers evidently do not know what really good fielding is, for they applaud catches and stoppings to miss or fumble which would have, in the old pre-net days, been the stamp of sheer incapacity.

Let us take wicket-keeping as an instance. It will be conceded that the post of wicket-keeper is the most arduous and responsible in the field, and that the number of really first-class wicket-keepers in the entire cricketing world, can be told on the two hands. Good wicket-keepers are rare birds, whilst the average Saturday [illegible] pant of this post is simply a caricature.

Yet who ever saw a man practice wicket-keeping, and [illegible] should not a man practice wicket-keeping with a view to nan[illegible] fame, just as much as batting? Yet another instance. W[illegible] the matter with long-stopping, that we rarely see or hear [illegible] nowadays? Assuredly long-stop has not been abolishe[illegible]

account of the pitch of perfection attained in wicket-keeping. What is the cause of his disappearance? Merely that it is the "proper thing" to do without him.

First-class teams with good wicket-keepers, who stand back and take balls, can afford to put an extra man into the field, and they do so rightly. So all the second-class teams, and the Saturday teams, and Muggleton and Dingley Dell must go and do likewise, with the result that the number of byes given away in the course of a season, usually amounts to the score of a goodly innings. The poor wicket-keeper is not to be blamed. Standing back as he often is obliged to do, almost where long-stop of old stood, and being provided with but a single pair of arms, legs, and eyes, how can he be in two places at once, and act the parts of "two single gentlemen rolled into one," look after the wicket and the batsman at it, and the byes at the same time?

It would be trite to remark that matches are won and lost, quite as much by the field as by batsmen and bowlers, if it was not palpable that the truth is a forgotten one.

A poor bowler backed by a good field is assuredly to be preferred to a fair bowler with a bad field, for unquestionably the fair bowler who finds his exertions rewarded by numerous byes, dropped catches, stumping chances thrown away, misfielding, and overthrows, loses heart and becomes a bad bowler, whilst on the other hand many a poor bowler is incited to excel himself by the support of an active, sure, ready, and willing field.

Briefly, here are the two fatal results from the abuse of the practice net system:—

1. It is a direct encouragement to laziness, as anybody may see who visits any of our London suburban grounds on a practice night, and notes the club members who are loafing about, simply because until their turn for innings comes they have nothing to do.

2. It is bringing about the disappearance of one of the most attractive and valuable features of cricket—smart all-round fielding.

A parallel drawn between cricket and other sports conveniently exemplifies the danger which, to my humble mind, threatens our game. Do we account that man a good swimmer who can only take a good header? Or that man a good rider who cannot take a fence? Or that man a good footballer whose sole distinction is drop kicking? Certainly not. But a good batsman may make a veritable goat of himself in the field and be spoken of as a good cricketer!

3.—The Waste of Time at Cricket Matches.

This is another lamentable drawing-room feature of the game as it is now too often played. A day's cricket has come to mean a

holiday. It does *not* mean a day's cricket, or anything like it. Indeed, a day's cricket in the old and literal sense of the word, would be anything but a holiday to the modern cricketer, and he would allude to it afterwards as a never-to-be-forgotten period of trial and tribulation.

Cricket, it must be premised, is not a game in the sense that it is merely a wholesome method of utilizing spare time. None of our typically national pastimes—neither cricket, nor golf, nor football, nor rackets, are pastimes for triflers or dawdlers, and were never intended to be. Recreations, yes, in the sense that they lift a man for the while out of his everyday groove, but none the less to be seriously studied and systematically practised. If they had not this character, they would not be British. Rowing, cycling, tennis, may be followed in a dilettante fashion and yet be productive of health and enjoyment, but not so the others. Hence, waste of time in the cricket-field is as unpardonable as waste of time in the shop or counting-house.

Let us take an average Saturday "whole-day match" as an instance of this creeping evil.

"All matches to commence at eleven o'clock," says the rule card of most ordinary clubs. So far, pretty good, although why, when summer days are long, in a country where locomotion is easy and rapid, a country town or London suburban match should not begin at ten o'clock is a riddle. At any rate, let it stand—"All matches to begin at eleven o'clock."

Without the smallest fear of contradiction it may be said, that out of a hundred matches played every Saturday in the home counties and the suburbs of London, *not one* begins at eleven o'clock, and not one half very much before mid-day.

Smith, engaged in the city, accepts a place for a whole day match. He breakfasts at his usual time, and he goes up to his office to see his letters and to answer them—a duty which may reasonably be considered to occupy him until eleven o'clock. He reaches the ground at about half-past-eleven, has to get into flannels, perhaps to wait until a sufficient number of men are present, for other men, who do not go up to town, know that it is of no earthly good for them to put in an early appearance, and saunters out to the wicket at about mid-day.

At two o'clock the luncheon bell goes, and twenty-two young men who, on tramping tours or climbing excursions, or even on their working days, find it not merely possible, but advantageous, to get on with very light refreshment, are seated down to a more or less elaborate repast which occupies them for, at least, three quarters of an hour. The smoking of a cigarette, and a little desultory slogging brings the wasted time to close upon an hour,

and at three o'clock the serious part of a so-called whole-day match begins.

Particular result:—Six hours' cricket, including waits between the innings, the observance of that ridiculous unwritten law of etiquette, that an out-coming batsman should reach the pavilion or tent before his successor starts therefrom, sundry exhibitions of agony after receiving smacks at which a man would be ashamed to wince in his own house, when ten hours might be, and used to be, profitably employed.

General result:—A plethora of so-called drawn games, which are really games that cannot be played out from waste of time.

Now, be it understood, we are not dealing with first-class matches. A first-class match has important pecuniary considerations hanging on to it. Gate-money has to be secured, and economy of time would mean the forfeiture of much gate-money. We are speaking of ordinary inter-club matches, in which gentlemen engage for the simple honour of the game. "Yes," it may be said, "but the majority of players in matches of this kind are men who have business interests to which cricket must be subservient." Very well, then don't have whole-day matches. Call them what they are—half-day matches. Let it be understood that there will be no lunch farce; that the game will begin at mid-day, and if two-and-twenty strong young men can't get a snack of something to eat before that time upon one day of the week, they are not very worthy descendants of the sturdy cricketers of old time, who thought nothing of getting up at day-break and driving a score of miles to play a game.

(*b.*) I come to the selfishness too evident in the pursuit of cricket nowadays.

It is of no use to appear pleasant and kindly-minded, and say that the majority of modern cricketers are unselfish in their study of the game, when the fact is made patent every day that such is not the case.

I have tried to show how, in the abuses of the boundary and practice net systems, it is the batsman who has been forked into the pre-eminent place in the cricket-field. With such advantages offered him, it is therefore not to be wondered at that the budding cricketer should aspire to be a batsman and nothing else in nine cases out of ten.

But how absolutely contrary to the rightfully governing principle, that in the world of cricket a man should work for a common and not an individual cause! It is the wholesome bearing of this principle of absolute unselfishness in mind, which makes the grandeur of cricket, and, in justice be it said, of football. The goal of the rowing-man, of the golfer, of the racket-player, of

the cyclist, may justly and praiseworthily be personal distinction, but never should it be that of the cricketer.

The cricketing Sinbad, whose old man of the sea is his average, is like the clever piston-maker or wheel-maker who calls himself an engineer. This average cult is one of the curses of modern cricket. If two cricketers meet each other, let us say on the Sunday after a cricket Saturday, the conversation is pretty sure to go somewhat like this :

"Playing yesterday?"

"Yes."

"How did you come off?"

"Oh—five-and-twenty!" or "Beastly duck. How many did you make?"

Never, hardly ever, does a man ask another how his *side* got on, and really never does a man very much care. At any rate, during a suburban club experience of more than twenty years, I never knew a member half so much affected at a disastrous beating administered to the club, as at his own failure to make runs, and I never heard a man use one quarter of the language at missing a catch, or at giving our opponents a lot of runs by misfielding, as at getting out first ball or being given out leg before.

Let me be just, however, and say that this selfish subordination of side to self is as yet absent from school and rustic cricket. The feeling of generous rivalry between our Kentish villages, for instance, has a wholesome old-time flavour about it, to foster and preserve which should be the careful duty of every patron and captain. Only in metropolitanized country towns does one hear much about individual averages, and the willingness with which village players risk their wickets for the sake of pulling a match out of the fire, and in the task of making runs against time, is too common to be remarkable.

In the eyes of an old cricketer a fair batting display by no means atones for a weak fielding exhibition, but fair batting displays are as common as fair fielding displays are the reverse. There are clubs around London which rank themselves well up in the second-class,—clubs, I mean, with a county man or two belonging to them—whose representative members are apparently ignorant of the very elements of fielding—that is, they try to stop balls with their legs wide apart, they never fail to miss the spin of a ball, they can't throw in decently to the wicket (in fact, many of them can't throw at all), and they can't catch. They *must* be conscious of their ignorance, and yet, sensible young Englishmen as they are in the ordinary affairs of life, they not only never strive to lighten their darkness, but they don't seem ashamed of it. *That's* what puzzles us old cricketers. As a rule, when a Briton

makes a mistake he is ludicrously anxious to correct it; the sense of being singular or ridiculous affects him most keenly, and he would no more walk down Piccadilly in a green neck-tie than without any at all; he puts himself to any trouble to remedy a mistake.

When an American base-ball team came over here a few years ago, unqualified admiration was expressed by the cricketing world at their precise and smart catching, fielding, and throwing in, although in the eyes of players of the pre-net and pre-average era, there was nothing remarkable about it. If English cricketers practised these departments only half as much as they are practised by a fifth-rate American nine, there would be very much less of that silly, irrational bleating about the mastery of the bat over the ball.

Summing up this particular *casus belli* it may be said, that nine men out of every dozen play cricket simply and solely for their batting average, that two men play for their bowling average, and that one man is a real cricketer, sinking self in his love for the grand old game in general, and his zeal for his side in particular. And the granting that one man in a dozen is thus virtuously constituted is very liberal.

I urge, again, that there is something very un-English in the attempt of a man to condone for childish behaviour in the field by saying that he has made a few runs. If you give a boy a thrashing for stealing your plums you don't lay it on any the gentler upon his representation that he didn't swallow the stones. If you tell your correspondence clerk to write and tell John Smith that he must pay up what he owes you by Tuesday, and the clerk puts Wednesday, you are not consoled by the clerk's plea that he didn't make any mistake in his spelling. In the present rotten condition of club fielding, there is very little credit in making a long score, for boundary hits, misfielded balls, badly thrown in or overthrown balls, poor wicket-keeping, and dropped catches are so many points in the batsman's favour, so that the average cricketer only knows what run *earning* means when he meets a school team, or goes to India and plays against Parsees.

The remedy of these abuses, of course, is in the hands of cricketers themselves, and as, out of accordance with the adage that desperate diseases require desperate remedies, the cures are as simple as can be, there is no reason why, with a little cohesion and determination, cricket should not be delivered from the fate which assuredly awaits it if these cankers are not dealt with immediately and with vigour. No legislation can help in the matter; no amount of committee meeting will knock laziness and selfishness on the head; we must do it ourselves.

H. F. Abell.

THE MONTH IN AMERICA.

Washington, June 15th, 1898.

The war drags. The campaign which was to be commenced and finished in thirty days is as yet in its initial stages. Over Morro Castle the flag of Spain still floats in defiance, and the waves in front of Havana sport with American vessels wearily performing blockade duty.

When a non-military people go to war they are apt to make many unpleasant discoveries. The United States have been learning this lesson. It has been the accepted belief in this country that a standing army was dangerous to the rights and liberties of a free people, a menace to popular institutions and a useless expense. It is curious the dread and prejudice which the mere mention of the word army arouses. The army is not a popular institution. Congress grudgingly votes it supplies, but takes care that they shall be kept down to the minimum. During the last quarter of a century the hardest fighting the army has had to do has been to fight for its existence. The recommendations of military chiefs have been treated with contempt. Time and time again Secretaries of War and Commanding Generals have impressed upon Congress the necessity of strengthening coast defences, of increasing the ranks, of providing better weapons, of being prepared for an emergency. Congress has answered these recommendations by a sneer at the "army dudes." The Congressman from the middle west, whose district is safe against hostile bombardment, and whose constituents have no fear of Indians, has been most violent in his opposition to the "army aristocrats." The army has been a thing to tolerate, but not encourage. It is perhaps because the army is the nearest approach to "aristocracy" the American knows of—or rather, to put it more correctly, it seems to him like an aristocratic class—that he antagonizes the professional soldier. In the popular mind an army officer is one of Fortune's favourites. He is educated at the Government's expense; he has nothing to do except wear a pretty uniform, bully his men, and draw a comfortable salary; and when he gets too old to be of any use to himself or anyone else a generous country

comes to his relief and pensions him for the rest of his natural days. He is of the "aristocracy" in contradistinction to the all-pervading democracy; his is of a caste by himself. The fact that the average army officer spends the best years of his manhood on the alkali plains, that at a time when most men are earning good incomes he is still a captain drawing £300 or £400 a year, while his work is hard and incessant, is forgotten. In this country the army is the last profession a bright lad should select.

Acting on the principle that a large standing army threatens the sanctity of Republican institutions, the regular armed force of the United States in times of peace consists of nominally 25,000 men. Prone as the American is to relying on his own creative abilities and power to originate the weapon to suit any emergency, he has encouraged himself to believe that an army is the creature of legislative enactment. If the necessity arises for an army—a hundred thousand men, or a million, it makes no difference which—it can be obtained by the mere formality of Congress passing the necessary Act and the President issuing his Proclamation. A President's Proclamation is supposed to have all the virtue of a magician's wand.

During the past two months the American people have found out what they never knew before, what they never even suspected. They have honestly believed that with 10,000,000 men capable of bearing arms an army could be drilled, equipped, and placed in the field within a week after the declaration of hostilities. Seemingly it has never occurred to them that there is a tremendous gulf between *men* and *soldiers*, a gulf so wide that it cannot be bridged over by a mere paper proclamation. Europe knows what it means to convert untrained men into soldiers, but America has yet to learn the lesson.

It is remarkable that this country has never profited by the great moral of the Civil War. It cost the people of North and South enough both in blood and treasure to have left, one would think, a memory never to have been forgotten, but Republics forget as easily as they create. Because the North sent its raw levies against the equally untrained and undisciplined armies of the South; because neither side was ready when hostilities were declared; because the military blunders of the Union Army were only equalled by those of the Confederacy; because after mistake had been piled on mistake both armies at last became soldiers—soldiers as fine as any the world has ever known—because all these things happened, the North triumphed, and when Lee surrendered to Grant at Appomattox there were more than a million well-trained and hardy soldiers in the field, the American people have

always proceeded on the assumption that a foreign foe would be equally as unprepared as the South was, and equally as accommodating in permitting their opponent to tardily inaugurate after the declaration of war what every other nation had sensibly accomplished months and years before.

Politics is the incubus hanging over the American Army. Unlike the organization of our own army there are permanent staff corps to which men are appointed from civil life, without any previous training or qualifications for the very important duties they are called upon to perform, but solely because they have the required political influence. Naturally what might be expected follows. The staff departments are incompetent, and go to pieces whenever the slightest additional strain is placed upon them. The best fighters in the world are useless unless they can be transported, fed, and clothed. In times of peace, quartermasters and commissary officers get along in some sort of a fashion, when the emergency comes they obstruct instead of facilitating operations. These officers never have an opportunity to test the resources of their departments. The army is too small and too widely scattered for more than a few hundred men to be "mobilized" at any one time. When regiments are moved from one station to another the quartermaster instructs his chief clerk to make the necessary arrangements with the railroad companies, who "handle" troops just as they do live stock or perishable freight. If troops go by one route and their impedimenta by another, resulting in the men being without tents and baggage for a day or two, it makes very little difference. Soldiering is another name for discomfort. Who cares whether Tommy Atkins has a little more or a little less of it.

This being largely a political war the politicians are very naturally and very properly enjoying their own. The disgraceful spectacle of the early days of the Civil War has been on exhibition in Washington during the past month. In 1861 Mr. Lincoln appointed men to high command because of political influence. But Mr. Lincoln was excusable. He was fighting not only revolution in the field but rebellion in his party. He was frequently antagonized by Party leaders in Congress; to carry on the war he was driven to truckle to the politicians. Mr. McKinley has no such excuse. Behind him stands a united country; Congress stands ready to vote all the men and money needed to prosecute the war to a successful conclusion. Only his own inherent weakness makes him feebly surrender to the demands of political cormorants.

The sudden expansion of the army has necessitated a large

increase of the staff departments. Instead of selecting for these appointments, men of proved fitness, the commissions have been given to men whose sole claim to recognition, is that they are lucky enough to be the sons, relatives, or protégés of influential politicians. The sons of Senators, who have for many years gone the pace in Washington, who have led cotillons but not troops, who have won national reputations for gallantry, but not on the field of battle, have been made captains, majors, and colonels. On the other hand, men of high professional attainments, graduates of the military academy, who have served their apprenticeship on the plains, are still subalterns and junior to these political appointees whose military education has not progressed far enough to teach them how to salute properly. Is it any wonder officers of the regular army are indignant, and that the *esprit de corps* which is so essential to the welfare of an army is absent?

A few days ago the following telegram appeared in a New York paper, having been sent from Washington:—

"The House Committee on Military Affairs to-day agreed to report favourably the Bill reviving the place of storekeeper in the Quartermaster's Bureau, with the rank of captain. The measure is intended for the benefit of 'Charlie' Loeffler, the veteran door-keeper of the President's room at the White House, who has been on duty there since President Grant's first term. His military leanings have doubtless been encouraged by his indulgence in the shooting habit while accompanying Presidents Cleveland and Harrison on their hunting expeditions. President McKinley desires to satisfy his longings in this direction, and Democratic Members of the House and Senate who have been spoken to about it by Mr. McKinley or Mr. Loeffler have expressed their willingness to vote for the Bill."

Can one imagine a more pitiable and disgraceful state of affairs, than the President of a great nation in the midst of war, importuning Members of Congress to create a paltry office for his door-keeper?

Political considerations have influenced the President in ordering an advance into Cuba in opposition to his military advisers. The politicians have clamoured for action, fearing that a campaign of inactivity and the maintenance of a peaceful blockade, would injuriously affect the fortunes of the Republican Party in the Congressional elections of this autumn. The military commanders, who are not politicians, have told the President that time was necessary to drill and equip the volunteers, to transmute units into soldiers. The wisdom of this advice was so apparent that it seems strange that a man who has had the slightest military experience should not have heeded it. Mr. McKinley knows what soldiering means and the time required to make a soldier out of a recruit.

At the time when the First Army Corps was sent to Cuba the

army, nominally 125,000 strong, consisted of about 15,000 well-trained and well-disciplined regulars, about the same number of effective volunteers, and a hundred thousand or so recruits who could neither drill nor shoot. Mr. McKinley has been told that at least a month should be utilized in hardening the volunteers; that to send them to Cuba in the condition they then were was folly. He was told it was murder almost to send men to Cuba at the commencement of the rainy season, and, if sent, they should at least be properly clothed and equipped; they should not be expected to serve in a tropical climate wearing the same heavy cloth uniforms suitable in the West, where the thermometer goes below zero. No attention was paid to these appeals. The lives of American soldiers counted as nothing, weighed against political advantage.

Already, too, the yellow fever has broken out in the United States to threaten the troops now encamped in the south, to say nothing of those *en route* to Cuba, with a danger more fatal than Spanish bullets. The appearance of the scourge at this early date has excited apprehension, and the Health Bureaus of the Government are inaugurating the most rigid precautionary and preventive measures. At the same time, it is easy to believe that the few cases that have appeared in Mississippi, are but the forerunners of a general epidemic, and one shudders at the thought of the risks which the unacclimatised volunteers from the north have been forced to encounter because the politicians will not brook delay until fall.

Already the war has cost about £65,000,000, how much more it will involve before peace is concluded no one ventures to predict. If the public did not have such a very short memory one might venture to hope the money would be well spent. It might convince the country that an army is a necessity and that the present organization is worthless. Just now we hear much of congress profiting by the lesson, but it's too much the case of the devil turning saint when a physician is needed. Undoubtedly, as a result of the war, the navy will be increased, although a cry will go up for economy, and once more "retrenchment?" will be a political slogan.

Not in many years has the country been so profoundly stirred as by the speech delivered by Mr. Chamberlain at Birmingham in which he advocated an Anglo-American alliance. It met with instant response. Public men who, three months ago, would have scouted the idea of an entangling foreign alliance or who would have evaded directly committing themselves on the question, have to-day no hesitation in publicly supporting the alliance and declaring it to be even more advantageous to their country than to England. One does not ordinarily look to that Anglophob

Senator, Mr. Frye of Maine, for commendation of the British, and yet Mr. Frye is induced to make this public utterance :—

"England's conduct toward our country in the past has not inclined me to be especially friendly, but she has the same blood, a like civilization and language with us, and all the while I have had an inner conciousness, that if trouble should come to her, my sympathies would be with her. In our present war evidently she is our friend, and this fact has made me just now specially friendly to her. I am satisfied that the peace, prosperity and advancement of the world, would be promoted by an alliance of the English-speaking nations."

Other senators whose opinions carry weight have been equally pronounced in favour of an Anglo-American pact.

The leading newspapers have ranged themselves on the same side. The *New York Herald* says :—

"The treaty of arbitration which our foolish politicians threw away a few months since was the forecast of Mr. Chamberlain's remarkable speech. It was the incipient recognition of the momentous fact that two nations—through the innocent, strenuous processes of civilization, by the influences of language, tradition, religion and interest—were coming together. That is to say, however we may value the good will, for instance, of Russia and of France, or the memories of what was done for us in the stress of our war for independence and our struggle for the Union, the ties are a hundredfold stronger which draw us to Great Britain."

In the same strain the *New York Times* says :—

"Another speech, this time from Birmingham, England, has powerfully moved this people. Seldom, since the days of John Bright in that city has such cheering been heard as greeted Chamberlain's expression of hope that in some great and noble cause the Stars and Stripes and the English flag could wave together over an Anglo-Saxon alliance. These cheers should answer Davitt's imaginings, if, indeed, after all that has passed Davitt's unproved assertions need any answer now."

"Should the result of the present war force us into the adoption of a vigorous foreign policy and the retention of the captured Spanish colonies," says the *New Orleans Picayune*, the leading paper of that city, "an alliance with Great Britain would promptly become as necessary to us as it is admitted to be to Great Britain. Combined Europe could probably greatly damage both the United States and Great Britain if acting independently; but all the forces of Europe and Asia combined could not hope to prevail against the combination of all the English-speaking peoples."

A hundred more similar extracts might be given if necessary.

Events have forced this alliance. The United States went into this war with as little understanding of the far-reaching results and consequences as a child who lightly starts out to chase a butterfly. There is only one end in sight—Havana. Morro Castle blocked the vision of every statesman. That war means something more than the bombardment of a city, or the capture of a port, apparently occurred to no one in Washington. So short sighted was the policy of the Administration, that the Government was amazed when Admiral Dewey calmly announced he was blockading Manila. In doing so, Dewey far exceeded his instruc-

tions. That officer was ordered to capture or destroy the Spanish Fleet, and having done so, it was the belief of the Administration that Dewey would leisurely steam across the Pacific. Fortunately the Admiral was made of different stuff. He cut the cable so as to be unhampered by Washington instructions, and proceeded to act as his judgment dictated.

Dewey took desperate chances—and won. Had the country repudiated the gift of the Philippines, the Administration would have promptly offered him up as a vicarious sacrifice. Dewey's *élan* and overwhelming victory caught the public fancy. The country decided that the first-fruits of victory should not be lightly tossed aside.

Before the first of May the war with Spain was partly sentimental, partly the result of circumstances. The country had drifted into war, rather than deliberately sailed in. The battle of Manila Bay changed all this; it overturned the traditions of a century. Dewey, when he stripped his ships for action, had possibly no thought that he was a pioneer of trade; that his bold stroke had created a new power in the East. The country was not slow to appreciate that the possession of the Philippines meant an opportunity to obtain a share of the riches of Asia, a commerce which the United States has always carefully cultivated, and in which, next to England, she has the greatest interest. "The daring conqueror of Manila," says an Alabama paper, "has done his part, and if the Administration fritters away his victory, it will be held responsible for its unwise action by the people. Upon the use made of Dewey's victory depends to a great extent the development of the cotton spinning industry. If a fair share of the trade of the Pacific can be gathered in, the entire cotton crop of the country may yet be spun and woven in the South, and the goods sent *viâ* a Pacific canal to untold millions in Asia."

On a great many questions men may differ, but on the vital question of retaining the Philippines there is practically unanimity of sentiment. And when that conclusion was reached there came with it the knowledge, that if the United States were to have and to hold, they must at least possess the moral support of a great Power, perhaps its physical assistance. England had shown her friendliness and her desire to help the United States. Before Mr. Chamberlain had spoken she had been practically recognized as an ally.

It is due to circumstances more than anything else that the present *entente* exists; it is due to the circumstances that the United States must be reckoned with in future great political combinations. Make no mistake. This Republic will not relinquish the Philippines. Its flag once unfurled over foreign terri-

tory has never yet been lowered, and that tradition will not be disturbed.

The policy of expansion is not the terrifying thing it once was. The United States is to-day the United States, because its earlier statesmen were wise enough to purchase or conquer territory whenever the opportunity presented itself. In a very striking article in the *Post* of this city Mr. Henry Litchfield West graphically shows how the action of to-day is in harmony with that of the past :—

"Timorous minds are disposed to shrink at the enlargement of the United States. Empire is not a dream to them, but a nightmare.

"This fear is not a new thing in our history. If Timothy Pickering could have prevailed, Louisiana would never have been purchased. There were men in 1803 who thought that the United States was large enough, who saw in the acquisition of more territory the disruption of the Republic, who fancied that the Constitution was being violated, who thought $15,000,000 an extravagant price to pay for a wilderness. Nearly a century has elapsed since the grave closed upon these fearful souls and their forebodings, and we remember them only in pity. Time has proven the wisdom of Thomas Jefferson and the statesmen who supported him. Out of the Louisiana purchase we have carved some fifteen States, whose population and wealth to-day constitute an Empire.

"Since 1852, when we secured the last of the Mexican cessions, the spirit of acquisition has been dormant, though not dead, in the minds of the American people, save when Seward bought Alaska and was popularly supposed to have been swindled into a senseless purchase. Our territory touched the ocean on each side, hemmed in by a natural boundary, and we rested satisfied. Canada on the north, and Mexico on the south, were equally inaccessible as additions to our domain. In thirty years a new generation has grown up, knowing not of conquest or enlargement, and fondly believing that the limit had been reached for all time to come.

"But now the American flag floats over new possessions. The American Colossus stands with one foot on the Pacific slope and the other on the Philippines, looking calmly down upon Hawaii beneath. It is a new and inspiring figure outlined against the horizon. Shall it remain?"

Mr. West tells the American public what the readers of THE NATIONAL REVIEW already know of the great services of Sir Julian Pauncefote. "No one will ever know," he says, "until the inside history of the present war is written how much we owe to the sturdy support of the British Ambassador in Washington, Sir Julian Pauncefote. When the representatives of the Powers in Washington had combined to submit a threatening protest against our proposed interference with Spain's misgovernment in Cuba, it was England who raised the hand of opposition and refused to countenance the hostile scheme. When Austria was bitterly hostile and France was scornful, when Germany sought to threaten and Russia strangely sulked, Great Britain, with kindly sympathy and courageous tact, stood between us and the Powers and nullified the whole proceeding by refusing to become a party to it. Instead of angry and menacing protest, therefore, a note of springtime

mildness was presented, and the President was rescued from an embarrassing position."

Like other intelligent men, Mr. West foresees that the jealousy of the European Powers will be aroused by the United States entering the Asiatic concert, and that England's help is absolutely essential. "England alone is friendly," he says. "Ties of kindred, of common purpose and characteristics, lead to an Anglo-American Alliance. Against such a combination the rest of the world would be powerless. Of the European nations, Spain is no longer a factor; Austria and Italy are almost equally impotent; France and Germany are at enmity; and Russia could not find in one or all of these an ally of sufficient strength to warrant aggressive action. England and the United States together could dominate the earth in commerce, and in military and in naval power. More than all, under the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack, religious and political liberty would blossom in desert places, and gladden the weary hearts of oppressed mankind."

There is very little evidence to show that the United States is disposed to shirk the responsibility which has been thrust upon it; on the contrary, there is testimony enough from all sides to prove that the new policy is distinctly acceptable. "At first it made men stare and gasp," one newspaper remarks. It violated sacred traditions; it brushed away a lot of musty cobwebs; it smashed things generally. But now? "The belief seems to us," the New York *Times* remarks, "to be gaining ground rather rapidly that it would be a bold but wise stroke to retain Manila as a great outpost of our commerce, and thus to establish ourselves on a firm footing in that eastern world where history is now making so rapidly, and rival nations are striving to secure the largest guarantees of future expansion."

It has been said that the Administration has no policy in regard to the Philippines and Cuba, and will let events shape their course. This may be true in so far as it applies to the Administration, but it is not true of the country. The President and his Cabinet have shown that they are wanting in power to originate, but they are quickly responsive to public opinion. The same inability to withstand pressure which was exhibited when war against Spain was demanded, will be seen should the President be disposed to surrender the Philippines. No one believes he will.

With the Philippines the United States can do as they please; they are not embarrassed by any *ante bellum* declarations. In Cuba it is different. When Congress declared for war against Spain it also declared in a spasm of emotional generosity that its

purpose was simply humane, and it had no intention of territorial aggrandizement. That assertion was made in good faith; but Congress gave the Cubans credit for more virtues than they possess. The men who preached this holy war represented the Cubans as brave, intelligent, docile, and benevolent. Enough has been learned to prove that their bravery is a doubtful quality, and on the same plane with their intelligence, and that instead of benevolence they are full of passionate resentment.

In Tampa, Florida, where I have been for some time, the headquarters of the army of invasion, the Cubans are gathered in large numbers waiting until the day of liberation shall place them in possession. It is, perhaps, only natural that the Cubans should be anxious to even up old scores, but it is somewhat of a shock to hear of the means they propose to employ. It has opened the eyes of army officers to the real characters of their allies. It is the general belief that the island will have to be placed under a military dictatorship, and that inside of a year the United States will be engaged in fighting the Cubans. Without doubt, the American Government will have to maintain a large force in Cuba to preserve order and prevent the wholesale destruction of those Spaniards who, through inclination or circumstance, remain on the island after it has ceased to be a Spanish colony. It has frequently been asserted in this correspondence that annexation by the United States was the only real solution of the Cuban problem. Events of the past month tend to strengthen that belief. The annexationists are stronger to-day than they were before war was declared. The opponents of annexation will be forced to surrender their convictions when they are convinced that the alternative lies between the strong, wise, and just government of the United States and Cuban anarchy and bloodshed.

The great objection to the acquisition of the Philippines, as well as Cuba, is that the American Union is a confederation of States—of equal political rights and privileges—and that to admit territory which is not destined soon to be invested with the full political rights of statehood, contravenes not only the spirit but the letter of the Constitution. Nothing could be more fallacious or in opposition to past history. A Territory may become a State when in the opinion of Congress it is fit to become so—not before. Congress is sole judge. For more than thirty years Alaska has been a Territory, and no one has claimed that the Constitution has been violated in consequence. New Mexico has been a part of the American Union for more than half a century; yet it is still in leading strings as a Territory, regarded as a minor whose affairs are administered by a political trustee. There has never been

a time when territories have not been part of the American Union.

Both the Philippines and Cuba can be ruled, in the first instance, by military governors. Later, the military can give way to civil, and under a territorial form of government the islanders will enjoy all the rights and liberties accorded to the people of New York and Massachusetts, with the exception of having no voice in the election of a President and being without representation in the Upper House of Congress. The future may be safely permitted to take care of itself. If the Phillippine islanders and the Cubans show capacity for self-government, new States will be admitted.

In the midst of war Congress found an opportunity to enact a measure of peace. The passage by that body of the Railway Arbitration Bill marks a distinct advance in the treatment of labour, and for the first time in this country the legality of Labour Unions is recognized. The Bill provides a mode of conciliation, mediation, and arbitration in the disputes between railroad corporations and their employés. The arbitration provided for is wholly voluntary, and great care has been exercised to make any compulsory performance of personal service absolutely impossible. Receivers of railroads appointed by Federal Courts are forbidden by the Bill to reduce the wages of any class of employés without the direct order of the Court, and such order is not to be issued until after notice of the intention of the Receiver to apply for its issue has been posted on the bulletin board in every station on the road for twenty days, and opportunity given by the Court for the representative of the employés to be affected to be fully heard. It is made a misdemeanour for railroad officials to discriminate against employés because they belong to Labour Unions; blacklisting of discharged employés is forbidden, and no employé can be compelled to contribute to a relief organization, nor to make an agreement that, in case of injury, his damages shall be measured by the amount of money that is to his credit in such relief organization.

The railroad strikes of this country have been among the most sanguinary on record. They have always been attended by loss of life and enormous destruction of property, and in nearly every case the riots have only been suppressed after the troops fired ball cartridges. The suffering and misery to the employés as a result of a strike have been terrible. If the new law prevents strikes or reduces their severity the country may well congratulate Congress on having done an admirable stroke of work.

A. Maurice Low.

INDIA IN DEEP WATERS.

The Bank Rate previous to 1893 was about 6 per cent. It is now nominally from 10 to 15 per cent., but practically from 18 to 20 per cent., and 2 per cent. per month had been a common rate last winter, while money was often not procurable on any terms, and for a whole month Calcutta was on the verge of a commercial crisis. So much active capital has fled, and no new capital is coming in. All businesses are more or less hampered, and at least one important industry has already been seriously injured. Confidence has gone, and, of course, credit too, and the state of things is generally and truthfully described as "intolerable." As a necessary consequence, a reduction in the demand for labour has begun, and to such an extent that certain employers, of whom I am one, have arranged to reduce the wages of men 25 per cent., and the wages of women 33⅓ per cent., from July 1. For the first time in the history of our rule in India the agitators have been furnished with a well-founded means for setting the people against the Government. With a rapidly increasing population we have diminishing means of employment. The severity of famines and scarcities must therefore increase in the future, and add to the financial difficulties of the Government. Export taxes of a most onerous and destructive kind have been levied on the producers of India under the thin disguise of the present currency measure. A bounty of about 50 per cent. has practically been given to all those silver-using countries whose productions compete with those of India. Look where you will, and you will find evidence of decay and causes surely leading to ruin throughout the length and breadth of the land. And yet for the twenty years previous to 1893 the condition of India was full of hope; for capital was pouring into the country, progress had declared itself all along the line, and industries were increasing and finding employment for the people. But now the country is setting out on a road which must surely lead to an appalling ruin unless vigorous efforts are at once made to retrieve that desperate plunge into the to them unknown future, which was made by the members of the Indian Government in 1893. And I say "the to them unknown future" because in a chapter on the Silver Question which

I wrote in 1893* all of the evils which have since occurred were predicted, and they were as plainly visible to me as they were to others who had practical, general and local knowledge of Indian affairs. And this statement is proved by the fact that all independent opinion in India, except that of a few merchants in Calcutta and occasional individuals elsewhere, was against the measure, while of the witnesses examined by the Herschell Committee only six were in favour of it, four of whom were Government servants, and of the remaining two one, I am informed on excellent authority, has since completely changed his views. But, before proceeding further, I must not forget that my purpose here is to write, not for those who are fully informed on Indian affairs, but for those who are absolutely ignorant of them. It will be necessary therefore to give a clear account of the subject from the beginning.

What, then, was the cause of the passing of the currency measure? For an Act which has entailed such terrible consequences, and which, as we shall afterwards more fully see, is so permeated with harmonious rottenness that it is equally unsound from economical, political and financial points of view, evidently requires some explanation, and the need for such explanation is not diminished when we come to consider that India's greatest prosperity was in the years of "cheap" silver, and that the largest revenue she ever collected was in the year when exchange was lowest. Was that the time to set out on a course of currency experiments, and to carry them out in opposition to all the valuable opinions of those who had the most thorough and practical acquaintance with Indian affairs? But the explanations for this astounding policy are easily apparent to those who have any acquaintance with the subject. The first is that the Indian services wanted to get their savings and the remittances for their families sent home at as favourable a rate of exchange as possible; and the second, that it was supposed, and most erroneously supposed, as I shall show, that the financial condition and prospects were such that the currency measure was absolutely necessary in order to save India from bankruptcy. On both these causes for the action of the Government it is necessary to comment.

As to the first, there can be no doubt whatever that, as Sir Frank Forbes Adam (formerly President of the Chamber of Commerce,

* *Gold, Sport, and Coffee Planting in Mysore.* Archibald Constable & Co. 1894. I would ask those interested in the subject to read the short chapter on "The Indian Silver Question." It was written after much study and consultation with others, and I have since repeatedly asked men well competent to judge to point out any statements in it which were incorrect or unjustifiable, seeing that the whole subject is one of such serious importance; and I feel now quite confident that the views expressed in the chapter are correct. It may be as well to add that I have no pecuniary interest in the book.

Bombay) told the Herschell Committee, "Though there is undoubtedly dissatisfaction existing amongst a certain number of those carrying on foreign trade, really *the origin of the movement and its true force proceed from the servants of Government.*" The italics are mine, and I have used them because those who have paid but a partial attention to the subject naturally conclude that such a serious step could only have been taken in consequence of a general demand for it, and it is therefore of importance clearly to point out that the currency policy did not originate from complaints or wishes expressed directly or indirectly by the people, merchants, manufacturers, or planters of India, but from the servants of Government. Nor can we be surprised that it did originate with them, for they had a great and legitimate grievance, because they found that, though rupee prices in India were not to be complained of, they experienced a serious loss on their home remittances, and it was their persistent agitation which created and maintained the force of the movement. And their force was, of course, enormous, because unless there should happen to be, which now is rarely the case, a powerful will and well-informed head at the India Office and in India, the Indian Government is simply another name for Indian officials, who equally rule both in India and at the India Office, where they are represented by the Indian Council. All their sympathies, then, being naturally in favour of themselves and their caste, it is easy to see how favourable they would be to any policy that would enhance the gold value of the rupee, and how, further, by an act of unconscious cerebration, they would readily find some plea of urgent necessity. And this was found by freely encouraging the idea that, unless the rupee were forced up and maintained at an artificial level, the bankruptcy of India was inevitable.

But if we examine this idea we shall find (1) that the weakness of the financial position at the time the Act was passed has been much exaggerated, and (2) that, even if we admit the assertions of the officials as to financial weakness, it is, as has been well expressed in a recent *Times* leading article, "A most perilous and, indeed, quite inexcusable policy to tamper with the currency of a country in order to escape from financial difficulties." As to the first point, if we turn to page 40 of "The Report of the Currency Committee," we shall find a series of facts which, taking into consideration the whole circumstances of India, give rather a cheering than a desponding view of India's general progress and financial position; for while many large and costly defensive works had been constructed, both on the North-West Frontier and on the coast, and in recent years there had been a general construction of public buildings on a large scale, the public debt of India, in 1889,

exclusive of capital invested in railways, showed a reduction since the Mutiny period of Rx. 26,000,000. The revenue of India, too, had grown from Rx. 33,500,000 in 1856-7 to Rx. 64,000,000 in 1891, and this increase was due to the growth of old revenue rather than to new taxation. And, further, the Indian exports and imports, which in 1858 were Rx. 40,000,000, amounted in 1891 to about Rx. 200,000,000. The railway returns and irrigation receipts also showed signs of an immense progress. Then, and this is a most important point, notwithstanding that immense sums were paid out of current revenues which other Governments would certainly have treated as sums to be gradually repaid during a long series of years, we find that during the twenty-five years which followed 1862 there was a net surplus on the whole period of Rx. 4,000,000. And yet we find the Viceroy declaring in his speech in Council of June 26th, 1893, in justification of his astounding currency measure, that "to leave matters as they were meant for the country, as a whole, a fatal and stunting arrestation (*sic*) of its development." So far then as the Viceroy was concerned, the measure was really proposed under the delusion that India never had prospered in the days of "cheap" silver, and that it never would prosper till the gold value of silver was artificially raised. But, as we have seen, the financial capacity and material prospects of the country were by no means in a desponding condition, and even with a shilling rate of exchange the Government would only have had Rx. 7,748,000 additional to pay for its home charges, while the producers of India would have gained more than three times that amount on their exports. For it is hardly necessary to point out that, when the Government loses more on its home remittances, the people must gain proportionately on their exports; and the producers of the articles exported, it must be remembered, consume very little of any imported article, so that to them (and they, it must be again remembered, are the pillars of the Empire) a low rate of exchange is nearly all pure gain. And the additional loss on the home charges could have been made up partly by import duties and other taxational resources which I have no space to detail here.

And, besides this, much relief might be obtained were India to be given a British guarantee for her liabilities.

This is a point of great importance; for with such a guarantee not only could a reduction be effected on existing debts, but money could be borrowed on favourable terms to push forward the progress of India. And by granting this we should really be conceding nothing; for who can possibly suppose that England could ever repudiate her moral responsibility for the liabilities of India? For, though it is enacted (Vic. 21 & 22, the Act of Transfer, 1858) that (when the

country was taken over from the Company to the direct management of the Crown) "all expenses, debts, and liabilities of the Government of India, and all payments under the Act shall be charged and chargeable upon the revenues of India alone, as the same would have been had this Act not been passed," the practical and correct view held by our statesmen is, that if things go wrong in India, England must come to the rescue. And this view was expressed by Sir Robert Peel in 1842; by Mr. Bright, who quoted his opinions without one word of dissent; by Sir Charles Wood (Lord Halifax), who, in 1859, said that "if we take away Indian revenues, we incur not merely a moral, but a positive liability"; by Lord Stanley on the same occasion, who asked whether "it would be morally possible for this country to repudiate the debt of India without shaking its own credit"; and by Lord Salisbury, who said that "the question of a guarantee was a question rather of words, because he had never been able to contemplate a state of things in which the credit of England could exist after the debt of India was repudiated." It is perfectly clear then that we are practically responsible for the liabilities of India, and if we considered further the many hundreds of millions of British capital invested in the country, it is evident that India must be aided by all the means in our power. And I have dwelt on the great advisability of granting a formal Imperial guarantee for the liabilities of India because, while this will not add one farthing to the risks we have incurred, it will tend to diminish those risks; for it will aid the finances, and advance the material interests of India by enabling her to borrow on the most advantageous terms for irrigation and other productive works.

We have now seen that Indian finances are by no means in as weak a condition as is generally supposed, and that her taxational resources are by no means exhausted, while, at no loss to England, relief might be afforded to India by granting an Imperial guarantee for Indian liabilities. To hold up India, then, as a country that will probably become bankrupt unless a measure tampering with her currency can be successfully carried out is simply ridiculous. And in a very few words may be dismissed the idea that to tamper with her currency can ever enable us to escape from those financial difficulties which, in the opinion of many ill-informed persons, must otherwise overwhelm the country. For, by closing the mints and borrowing in England, the Government has come near its ideal rate of exchange—1s. 4d.—at which, according to the theory of the Government, capital was to flow freely into the country; while, instead of that, capital of course flowed out of India with great rapidity. As I and others saw clearly when the Act was passed, it was sure to destroy confidence and repel capital; for

who would be likely to send capital to a country, or retain it there a day longer than he could help, when the currency was being tampered with by a dozen officials of no experience in currency affairs, and liable to be replaced by a dozen more who might commence a fresh course of currency experiments?

We are told, of course, "Oh, this is merely a period of transition, when some inconveniences must take place. Give us time, and we shall soon reach the golden shores; and all will then be well, and India will be able proudly to take her place amongst the gold-using countries of the world." And all the time these simple gentlemen quite forget that the future prosperity of India depends upon her being able to contend with the silver-using countries of the world, who compete with her in agricultural, planting and manufacturing productions. They are quite forgetting, or rather ignoring, the fact that no currency system can be suitable to India which does not place her on a level with other silver-using countries. And how can this be attained with a gold standard, or any other form of currency, as long as the Indian producers of articles for export are obliged to pay 1s. 4d. for a rupee, while their competitors in other countries can purchase one at a shilling or less? And is it not obvious that the administrators who passed the currency measure, and those who are now maintaining it, are simply sapping the foundation of the Empire by giving an enormous bounty, now 50 per cent., to India's silver competitors, and levying a corresponding export tax on Indian products? The evil of offering a bounty, or leaving one in existence from which the inhabitants of a country suffer, is so obvious that I am unwilling to remark further on the point; but I think it useful to give one illustration in confirmation of the views I have expressed; and I take that from Mr. Chamberlain's speech, delivered at Liverpool on January 18th, 1898. After alluding to the question of the Sugar Bounties, from which the West Indies have so heavily suffered, he continues thus:—

"But so far as the low price of sugar is due to the abnormal and artificial effect of the bounty system, that is beyond the energy, skill, and industry of the planters or anyone concerned in the trade. It is an evil which, if it be left without a remedy, must infallibly bring them to ruin. And bear in mind that the effect of these bounties is not confined to the direct pecuniary loss. That is important, but it is not all-important. What is really serious is the uncertainty into which it throws the trade, the utter destruction of confidence and of all credit, and the impossibility of finding capital any longer in order to make improvements which are necessary in a great industry. Suppose these Colonies were German, suppose they were French, suppose they belonged to the United States, is there any human being who doubts that these Colonies would be

protected in their natural industry, and allowed and encouraged to carry it on under conditions of fair competition ?"

And here I may pause for one moment to remark that we are confronted with the interesting phenomenon that Lord George Hamilton—a Member of the same Cabinet, and therefore a supporter of the view that aid in some shape or other should be given to the unfairly handicapped industry of the West Indies—has for the last four years been obstinately maintaining a currency measure which must always continue to inflict on India the same kind of evils as those from which the West Indies now suffer, and for which it is generally admitted that some remedy should be found. And from Mr. Balfour's recent public utterances on the subject we see that the whole Cabinet is evidently warmly in favour of what I may call the West Indian support principle. But the same Cabinet have been for the last four years equally in favour of the East Indian depression principle; for whether you suffer from what is in effect a bounty by offering it to your competitors, as we have in the case of India, or whether the bounty is forced on you, as is the case with the West Indian sugar industry, the result is the same. The whole Cabinet has thus landed itself into this ludicrous position, that what is sauce for the West Indian goose is not sauce for the East Indian gander. And this absurd position is by no means improved by Lord George Hamilton's speech of June 7th, in which he told the House that "If the Indian Government had stood still and done nothing (*i.e.*, passed no currency measure), they would have gradually drifted into a position in which they would not have been able to meet their obligations"; while in another part of his speech, after reviewing the results of the capital expenditure of the last twenty years with the aid of Sir James Westland's figures and statements, he more than supports the views which Sir William Hunter and others have expressed, that the condition and prospects of India are really more favourable than is generally supposed. For Lord George assured the House, after referring to the statements in question, that "this is an immensely satisfactory account," and subsequently, and in a still more exultant view, when estimating the assets of the Indian Government, he says: "I doubt if any Government can show a more satisfactory balance-sheet than that I have just indicated." The earlier part of his speech, then, proves that he has adopted what *The Times* well calls "the quite inexcusable policy of tampering with the currency of a country in order to escape from financial difficulties"; while the latter part of it proves that no such policy was needed in order to cure the temporary financial difficulties of the situation. So that in the face of a financial position which, from his account of the prospects of the Empire, must right itself in the end, he is supporting a policy

which has entailed the terrible confusion and gloomy prospects which have been briefly indicated at the beginning of my paper. But it is time now to resume the main line of my subject.

As the currency measure acts as a heavy export duty of about 50 per cent. on Indian goods in competition with the products of silver-using countries, it may be said that there is no occasion to dwell on the fact that it also acts as an adverse bounty of similar amount; but it must be remembered that when it acts as the latter it operates very powerfully through two altogether immeasurable principles of the human mind—hope and fear. The man who benefits by the bounty is inspired by the former, while he who suffers from it is, of course, heavily oppressed by the latter. For the man who benefits by the bounty says: "We may over-produce to any amount, and it will not matter, as we shall run our competitors, who are suffering from the bounty, off the rails, and then prices will rise again"; while those who suffer from the bounty, and the capitalists working in conjunction with them, are in a state of constant apprehension. The springs of commerce are thus dried up, the energies of the people are fatally undermined, and a general enervation of that intellectual activity which stimulates and directs material progress must assuredly ensue. Can anyone wonder, then, that loanable capital has fled from the land of heavily handicapped industries, and that no new capital is coming in? And the capital, too, in the shape of mills and plantations would depart too if it only had legs. But that must stay and struggle on as best it can, while much of it will be gradually destroyed. And this has already begun to happen on a considerable scale. In my opening remarks I mentioned that, owing to the currency measure, a decline in the employment of the people had taken place, and to such an extent that on the group of estates around mine in Mysore it has been determined to reduce the men's wages by 25 per cent., and those of women by $33\frac{1}{3}$ per cent. But how comes it that such a step is possible, while previous to 1893 labour had much risen and was often very difficult to obtain? It is simply owing to the absolute ruin of many of the native plantations, and the limitation of employment in the case of the poorer European estates. And in both cases the diminution was mainly caused by that general loss of confidence and suspension of credit which, in consequence of the currency measure, have operated all over India and Ceylon. And the situation was much aggravated by a sudden fall in the prices of inferior coffee (such as is produced by the Mysore native planters), owing to over-production in South America; and this over-production exactly synchronizes with the passing of the currency measure, which, acting as a bounty to the planters of South America, stimulated,

if indeed it did not entirely cause, the over-production in question. The result of these causes has been that money could not be obtained to carry on the cultivation, and thus much valuable fixed capital in the shape of plantations has been absolutely destroyed, and, from circumstances connected with the cultivation which I have no space to explain, can never be revived.

But there is another point connected with the subject of hardly less importance, which demands deep and immediate attention, and which those who have any practical experience of India must regard with the gravest apprehension, though they may not have sufficient moral courage to express their fears. For the weakest point in the character of Englishmen is that they are afraid to appear to be afraid—afraid to point in good time to the most obvious perils because they are afraid of being considered mere cowardly alarmists. The consequence is that they generally, and quite in opposition to their real opinions, keep calling out "Don't be alarmed; it is all right," till they are actually shot down, as they were in the days of the Indian Mutiny, and thus perish with a pretended belief on their lips. And yet what says the native proverb with significant warning? "Strike me on the back if you like, but do not strike me on the belly." What would happen in this country if the Government, supposing, for instance, it had the power and were as foolish as the Indian Administration, went practically into the house of every man who had been storing up values in melted-down gold, and through the agency of some currency manipulation cut off and absolutely destroyed about 30 per cent. of these values? Why, there would be a revolution. And yet this is exactly what the Government of India, in the height of its amazing folly, has done in India. Immense quantities of rupees have in years past been melted down and converted into silver ornaments, and, in time of need, these could be taken to the mints and coined into rupees, or, what was practically the same thing, money could be borrowed on them at their rupee value, which was approximately their weight in rupees, or else, to make ornaments, silver was bought and paid for in rupees in the days when silver was far more valuable in rupees than it is now, and the full value originally given could again be obtained. But the closing of the mints changed all that, and at the same time changed all the feelings of all India that had anything to lose—and in what house were there not silver ornaments? In every house was previously planted a sense of English justice and honesty, and now it is hardly too much to say that we have created a mutiny, or, at least, a discontented and rebellious spirit in every house. "Strike me on the back if you like, but do not strike me on the belly."

What do the officials deserve, or rather what do they not deserve, who have forced this cruel and foolish measure on 300 millions of people—forced it on the people, and that too against the declared wishes of nearly all the independent Englishmen who had practical knowledge of India? And I say the officials, solely because they grossly deceived the House of Commons, which had neither time nor ability to look into the matter, and who naturally concluded when they passed the measure that the decision of the Indian Government was in accordance with the main weight of the evidence taken by the Herschell Committee. And this piece of deception, for it was nothing else in practice, was maintained in the Secretary of State's letter of instruction to Sir Henry Fowler (Chairman of the Enquiry Committee now sitting), which sets forth that the currency measure "followed on a full and impartial investigation by the Committee presided over by Lord Herschell." Yes, it may have in point of time; but to every uninformed person the statement was as fully calculated to deceive as if the Secretary of State had said that the currency measure had been passed with the concurrence of the great body of witnesses examined before the Herschell Committee, whereas only six of the witnesses were in favour of it, and of these four were servants of the Government.

We have now seen that the economical and political results of the currency measure can only lead to ruin, and also to rebellion in the minds of our Indian subjects; and in order to appreciate its harmonious rottenness it is only necessary to observe how the financial position of the country must be ultimately injured by the fatuous policy that has been adopted. For it is needless to say that whatever discourages exports discourages imports (and a beginning has been made, as we have seen, as regards coffee); that whatever discourages exports must eventually lower the exchange; and that whatever discourages exports must injure the taxpaying capabilities of the country by diminishing productions of all kinds. Much more, of course, might be written on this point; but I must not forget that the more one writes about an Indian subject the less is one likely to be read, and I therefore conclude my paper by laying down certain points which must be attained if we desire to retain possession of a prosperous and contented India.

I. We must have a currency which will place India on an equal footing with the other silver-using countries whose productions compete with those of India.

II. This can only be attained by gradually opening the mints in whatever way may seem judicious.

III. The finances must be aided, and the condition of the country improved, by granting a British guarantee for all the existing and all the future liabilities of India; and the losses in exchange to the

Government must be recouped by import duties and other forms of taxation.

Though my paper thus stands concluded so far as the immediate perils of the Indian Empire are concerned, and the remedies which should be at once adopted, I may say a word about the Committee of Enquiry now sitting, and the method of its appointment.

There can be no doubt that the landed and producing interests of India, interests on which the very existence of the Empire ultimately rests, have been abominably treated—treated in a way that would have provoked a rebellion in any other country. They have not only not been called upon, as they should have been, to represent their views, but when they desired to do so have been hustled out of court, and on one occasion were addressed in such a tone and manner by the Viceroy that one of the memorialists said nothing would ever induce him to join again in presenting a petition to the Governor-General. Though repeated representations have both privately and publicly been made—made in *The Times* and by influential memorials, or what would have been so on any other subject, from Manchester and the City—the Government has obstinately refused a single seat on the present Committee of Enquiry to anyone of practical local experience of the vast producing and the large manufacturing interests of India. And the Committee is to sit with closed doors, so that (and with the experience of the Herschell Committee before us this is a reasonable assumption) we have not the slightest security that our views will be adequately noticed, which we obviously should have if we were represented on the Committee, or had the protection of the Press while the enquiry was proceeding. And the sole reason for excluding the Press was obviously to prevent criticism at the only time that it could be of real value. The natives of India, and the numerous Europeans who have interests in that country, are now, as regards those interests, entirely at the mercy of the crude and foggy currency notions of partially informed officials; and these, as we have seen, though they are now up to the neck in a bog of their own creation, are clinging with all the force of a one-idea-obstinacy to their first currency experiments, though the Empire has begun economically to crumble around them. And they have done so simply because they had not knowledge enough to enable them to foresee the consequences of events that had not occurred, consequences of which they were fully warned by Sir Frank Forbes Adam and others who had great and local experience of Indian affairs.

And not only have the producers of India been denied direct representation, but the British Government has taken pains to provide against our being even indirectly represented by an

effective agent, which we should have been had Ceylon been allowed to have a representative on the Committee; for the position of that Island, though a Crown Colony, is identical with that of India so far as currency is concerned. This, indeed, was almost secured; for Mr. Christie, who was named by the Ceylon Government and people to represent the interests of the Island, and whose appointment was supported by the Governor, was suggested by Mr. Chamberlain as a fit and proper person to sit on the Committee. But the India Office was too sharp for us, and, it is clear from the correspondence on the subject, brought its adverse influence to bear on Mr. Chamberlain. The result was that, without any intimation to those interested, he withdrew his suggestion and proposed Sir Alfred Dent, whose interests and experience are more closely associated with the Far East than Ceylon, and in reply to the urgent solicitations of the "Ceylon Association in London," either to reconsider his recommendation or to advise that a separate committee should be formed to discuss the currency question so far as it affects Ceylon, Mr. Chamberlain declined to do either. One cannot help admiring the cleverness of the India Office; for, reading between the lines of the correspondence, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that Mr. Chamberlain had been caught and made the means, under Providence, of not only shutting the door in the face of the people of Ceylon, but at the same time shutting out the last hope of effective representation so far as the 300 millions of India are concerned. A grosser political blunder was never made; and what makes matters worse is that Lord George Hamilton not only, as we have seen, led the public to suppose that the decision of the Herschell Committee was in accordance with the weight of the evidence taken before them, but had the audacity to state in his reply to the Bankers' Memorial as regards the constitution of the Committee, that he had endeavoured to find members for it "who were not likely to be hindered, either by commercial interests or by previous utterances of their own, from forming an unbiassed opinion." And Lord George also made a statement in the House of Commons to the same effect when he defended the composition of the Committee. And yet, of the members he appointed, Sir David Barbour and Sir Charles Crosthwaite are committed to the hilt by the active part they took in closing the mints, both being on the Indian Council, and both in despatch after despatch having urged the adoption of the present currency policy. Lord George, it is hardly necessary to add, has secured on the Committee a majority of officials and ex-officials—the very class which has brought all the trouble on our Indian Empire. So, with the precedent of the Herschell Committee before them, Indian producers and also Lombard Street (now

largely concerned in the matter) have good reason to apprehend a report in opposition to the weight of evidence taken. Can we wonder that the Committee has been spoken of in the City as a packed jury?

One word more. It is absolutely certain that, had the servants of Government been properly treated and the losses on their home remittances made up to them, the question never would have been heard of. For who would have raised it? They certainly would not have, and they are, as we have seen, masters of the situation; and Lombard Street would not have, as we see from existing evidences. The Government would simply have raised more taxes and sought relief through a British guarantee for Indian liabilities, and, in the event of not being able to raise enough money, would have called upon the Home Government for a contribution to the finances of India, and the country, instead of being disturbed as it now is from one end to the other, would at this moment have been pursuing that placid career of progress which it enjoyed previous to the passing of the disastrous currency measure.

And there is no time to be lost. For "the fire is on the hills," as it was in the days of the Indian Mutiny, and it must be put out at once, in the only way it can be put out. For the Mutiny may turn out to have been mere child's play to the conflagration for which almost every house already furnishes materials. "Strike me on the back if you like, but do not strike me on the belly." And all the time, and for the last five years, our Indian rulers at both ends of the line have been complacently playing a duet on the gold standard violin, quite oblivious of, or indifferent to, the flames rising around them.

ROBERT H. ELLIOT.

THE STREET MUSIC QUESTION.

For many years Londoners have helplessly groaned under an infliction such as is not to be met with, in anything like the same intensity, and would not be tolerated by public opinion or official authority, in any other capital in Europe. The question of the right of itinerant musicians to make use of the public streets as an arena for their performances, to the disturbance and annoyance of the residents and the serious interference with the occupations of those who are lawfully engaged, in their own houses or offices, on work requiring undisturbed study and concentration of thought, is one which of course concerns, in its general principle, all those who are compelled to live in cities. But practically it is a London question more especially. As in the case of many other callings, honest or the reverse, the thickly populated area of London is a gathering ground towards which those who are reduced to the ambition of picking up a living anyhow naturally gravitate. There they find a wider area for their operations, while the very multiplicity of London life leaves them more chance of eluding control than elsewhere. But, over and above this general reason, the itinerant musician receives a passive support in London which he would not find elsewhere, arising from the tone and temper of the average middle-class Londoner. To this class of persons, formerly classified and labelled as "cockneys," whatever is (in London) is right. However objectionable or old-fashioned an institution may be, it is sacred to the mind of the true cockney on the mere ground that he has always been used to it, and that it is a feature of London life. It was under this influence that we for many years put up with an omnibus service that was a disgrace to a capital city, and that we still accept the ramshackle "growler" as the only kind of four-wheeled vehicle available for hire by the public, while the inhabitants of Manchester or Liverpool can summon off a cabstand a vehicle almost as roomy and comfortable as a private brougham. This same cockney prejudice operates to the benefit of the street organ-grinder. He is to be found in every street; he is an institution of London life; and that is sufficient to the thoroughbred Londoner. The late Mr. Bass organized a small society, a good

many years ago, of which the present writer was a member, for the purpose of bringing about the suppression or amelioration of this intolerable nuisance. But the society had to acknowledge itself beaten by the *force majeure* of London stupidity and conservatism. Its agents, who visited or wrote to people for the purpose of asking for support and subscriptions towards the object in view, reported that in the majority of cases their appeal was met by a direct negative, frequently accompanied by expressions of contempt and insult, and the society disbanded under the conviction of the sheer hopelessness of producing any practical effect upon public opinion.

The better educated or less patient minority did nevertheless once obtain a definite hearing with a definite result. In 1864 was passed, after a storm of opposition from fools and Philistines of various ranks (the organ-grinders could boast at least one coronetted champion), the Act by which it was provided that "any householder within the Metropolitan Police District may require any street musician to depart from the neighbourhood of the house on account of illness or interruption of the ordinary occupations of the inmates, or for any other sufficient cause"; and the penalty for refusing to leave when required is fixed at a maximum of 40s. fine or three days' imprisonment. The penalty is in itself quite a sufficient deterrent for the class of persons it is aimed at, but it will be observed that the Act is worded as if the street musicians were within their recognized rights in making a noise in the streets; they are evidently the principal persons to be considered; we are, according to the letter of the law, bound to put up with them except on account of illness or interference with our necessary occupations, "or other reasonable cause." It does not appear that the mere disgust of cultivated persons at the rattling off of vulgar and hackneyed tunes in their ears by machinery was intended to be taken into account at all as a "reasonable cause"; nevertheless, let us bless the memory of the draftsman who inserted a clause capable at least of a wide and liberal interpretation, and which has practically left us at liberty to send away the organ-grinder when we do not like him. But even thus it will be observed that we have to be thankful for very small mercies. The organ-grinder has a right to commence his ministrations before the same house as often as he pleases; to put yourself on the right side of the law you have to order him to go, and, though he must move off when ordered, there is nothing to prevent him coming again the next day, or even the next hour, and, of course, nothing to prevent another taking his place ten minutes after, and requiring the same order to go. The police have no power to take a general order from anyone that organ-grinders are to be sent away from before his house; each

man, every time he appears, must be ordered off, or (if recusant) given in charge separately.

Fortunately the added trouble of giving the man in charge and appearing against him in court is not often inflicted on the householder, for it is to the credit of the London magistrates that they have in general shown common-sense and decision in regard to this matter, and seldom fail to convict and fine in any case where there is clear evidence of the order to "move on" being disobeyed; and the readiness with which the men do move on when ordered, even while abusing and cursing the person who orders them, is a proof that they know this, and that they have the wholesome fear of the magistrate before their eyes.* But even thus the householder is exposed to an almost intolerable nuisance, as the writer at least can testify from personal experience. When I went into my present house some years ago the street in which it is situated enjoyed a constant procession of organ-grinders. My study is necessarily in a front room, and as I do not keep a man-servant, and do not think it right to send out women servants to be exposed to the amenities of language and manner of the organ-grinder who is "moved on," I had to do my own "moving" in person, during the portion of the day when I was usually at home. I have not infrequently had to leave my work three times within an hour to send away these pests, one of them sometimes appearing on the scene only a few minutes after I had got rid of another. At one time some of them found out that I was always out on a particular day of the week, and selected that day to give us their attentions; one of them one morning "ground" before the house for half an hour out of sheer spite, and on catching sight of the lady of the house at the window shook his fist at her. This is the kind of thing to which residents in London are subject under the present law. By dint, however, of perseverance in rigorously and immediately ordering off every organ-man the moment he began, at whatever time of day or night,† when I happened to be in the way to do it, I have succeeded in diminishing their number very materially; but it is at the cost of an infinity of annoyance and worry, which to a certain extent is always recurring.

* I regret to say that one magistrate, in an East London district, has recently made himself a dishonourable exception to this rule, and refused to listen to the prayers of an unfortunate restaurant-keeper, who complained that his guests were annoyed and his business spoiled by the intolerable noise of the organ-grinders who persisted in playing before his door, but received not only no sympathy, but even rudeness and contempt, from the magistrate who should have protected him. I omitted to make a note of the name and the court of this magistrate, or he should be gibbeted here.

† I have had organs commencing work before the house as late as eleven o'clock at night.

Four or five years ago we seemed on the eve of a further amelioration of our annoyances by the proposed Bill of Mr. Jacoby, which was to provide that any householder may require any person grinding or playing on any street organ or other instrument of music in front of or near his house "to desist and refrain from further or again performing within a quarter of a mile thereof," and also to restrict all street music everywhere to the hours between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m. This latter proviso, however, was hardly necessary, for the main clause is drastic enough, and in its practical operation would soon have exterminated the organ-grinder; and probably the intention was to bring about this result without directly or openly forbidding his ministrations. This was probably a mistake both in principle and in policy; it would have been far better to have openly taken the ground that the public streets were not the place for musical performances, good or bad; and, though many persons would have been thankful to see such a Bill passed, I suspect that the violent opposition which it aroused was in part owing to this diplomatic adroitness whereby it was attempted to carry an extermination clause under the guise of a mere extension of the existing legislation. At all events, it was obvious that no adequate support was to be expected for the measure; *The Times* endeavoured to further injure and discredit it by printing a letter insinuating, without the least possible excuse, that the proposed Bill was only a political move, and Mr. Jacoby had to withdraw it, with no result but to have earned the thanks and good wishes of all reasonable people for what was at least a well-meant effort.

It is gratifying to note, however, that the subject was not allowed to drop out of notice in consequence of this failure. A year or two later the Vestry of Kensington honourably distinguished themselves by addressing to the London County Council what was, I believe, the first formal and definite protest which any official body has made on the subject. The following paragraphs from their memorial put the case in a plain, moderate, and sensible manner:—

"That the Parish of Kensington includes among its inhabitants an unusually large number of artists, musicians, literary men, and persons of a kindred profession, whose occupations are carried on at their own residences.

"That your memorialists have received numerous complaints, from resident ratepayers in their parish of the description lastly before mentioned, of the annoyance to which they are subjected at the hands of the large and ever-increasing number of organ-grinders and other itinerant street musicians, who are permitted, without licence or any due and efficient regulation, to perform at all hours of the day in the streets of the Metropolis.

"That the complaints which have reached your memorialists upon the subject have not, it may be stated, been received exclusively from the professional residents within their district, evidence having been forthcoming to show that the nuisance is one which is recognized and felt by the general body of ratepayers."

It was impossible that the County Council could refuse to recognize the reasonableness of this appeal; but the plea upon which they shirked their obvious duty to the public in regard to such a complaint is one of the most foolish and disingenuous that could well be imagined, and one utterly discreditable to their common-sense as a governing body. Their answer was that "it was not expedient for the Council to make a by-law for the suppression of street cries and similar nuisances, inasmuch as the Council had no means at its command to enforce the observance of such a by-law when made." The real point of this diplomatic sentence would hardly be apparent to anyone unacquainted with the policy and aims of the London County Council. It is one of the numerous crazes of a large proportion of that body that it ought to have the control of the Metropolitan Police—a matter on which I do not offer any opinion. What I do know, and what every person of any common-sense must know, is that if the County Council had passed any by-laws to regulate and control the nuisance of street noises the police authorities would unquestionably have co-operated in enforcing them. The County Council knew that perfectly well, but they deliberately turned a deaf ear to a reasonable complaint, and refused to do their duty to the public, from a dogged adherence to a doctrinaire theory about police control. The County Council, it may be added, while refusing to act themselves, refused also to memorialize the Home Office on the subject, on the ground that they had themselves power to act, though they would not make use of it.* It is really difficult to understand how any public body could have the effrontery to give such a reply to an appeal for protection from an acknowledged public nuisance.

At that point things have since remained. But Mr. Jacoby, though he failed in carrying his Bill, at least secured one useful practical argument for those who want to see this nuisance of the London streets put down. He moved for and obtained a series of reports from our representatives in the principal foreign capitals, showing the conditions under which street musicians are allowed to ply their trade elsewhere; and these reports contain enough to convince the most sceptical that the state of things in London in this respect is entirely exceptional, and such as would be tolerated nowhere else. These reports, presented to the House of Lords in August, 1891, were from our representatives at Paris, Berlin, Rome, Madrid, Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Washington. It will be sufficient here to briefly summarize their purport.

* "In view of the statutory power possessed by the Council, *a power which, however, the Council is not prepared to exercise*, it is not considered expedient that the Council should make any representation to the Home Office to support the views of the Vestry of Kensington" (!).

In Vienna licences to itinerant musicians are granted by the police "only to persons who are unable to earn their livelihood by any other means" (a most illogical position certainly); they are only valid for one year, and proof of the continuance of the same conditions must be given as a condition of renewal. The holders of such licences are only allowed to perform in courtyards and public-houses, and not in open streets; on week-days only from mid-day, on Sundays only from 4 p.m., till sunset.

In Paris licences for street musicians are granted only to those who are of French nationality, and who have been living within the jurisdiction of the Prefect of Police for one year.* They must wear a conspicuous badge, and only perform at the places mentioned in their licence, which is to be shown at the police office every three months; and they are not allowed to play in the public thoroughfares at all, except on public holidays and after special permission obtained.

In Berlin those persons who "as a means of livelihood *and not in the interests of Art*" perform on musical instruments in public places and in the open streets must apply for a licence from the police authorities, who can exercise their own judgment as to granting it. But there is a significant rider to the effect that, in fact, such licences are at present refused. Before the passing of the present Act, which came into operation on January 1, 1884, a special licence was not required, and those persons who had pursued the calling of street musicians before that date were not disturbed; but, adds the report—

"As the number of such persons was considerable, and as the public, through the Press as well as by numerous applications to the public authorities, complained of the nuisance of the street musicians, new licences for the performance of street music in the courtyards were not granted. For the future all licences will be refused, as the public demand for such performances is not likely to increase for many years to come."

Let me particularly draw the reader's attention to the words italicized above—"and not in the interests of Art," which are characteristic of a country where people understand what music means. In this country, as we shall have occasion to notice, there are a large number of persons who think that barrel-organ music is "Art."

In Italy generally, various classes of itinerants, including street musicians, are required to procure a licence from the police of the district, which has to be renewed annually; and no such licence is given to foreigners.

From St. Petersburg the reply is curt and concise: "Itinerant

* The significance of this regulation need hardly be pointed out to dwellers in London, where our streets are inundated by needy foreigners with hand-organs, who come over here to prey upon us.

musicians are not allowed to sojourn in the capital, and those who are of foreign nationality are not permitted to pass the frontiers of the Empire."

In Madrid the control of street musicians is entirely in the hands of the municipality, and they are considered under two classes, guitar-players and organ-grinders. No special regulations exist as to the former class, except that they are obliged to apply for a licence to the mayor, who has power to grant or refuse it. The licence is mostly granted on grounds of charity, generally to the blind, who are thus enabled to earn a small livelihood. "*Grinding organs have for the present been altogether suppressed*, owing to the number of complaints which have been addressed to the municipality by persons who regard them as an intolerable nuisance." This passage is interesting as showing that in Spain the authorities and the public have sense enough to understand the distinction between playing, even with a limited amount of skill, on an instrument of expression, and grinding a mechanical instrument. The mass of the English public are still too ignorant of music even to understand the distinction.

The report from Washington was a long and complicated one, as all regulations on such a subject are carried out by the municipality of each State capital at their own pleasure, and Sir Julian Pauncefote therefore thought it better to obtain separate reports from the mayors of the principal cities in the States. In some places there are no restrictions, in some there are very stringent ones ; but it appears that public feeling generally in the States is strongly against itinerant musicians. In New York and Buffalo they are required to apply for a licence, which in the latter city is seldom given ; in various other cities we find a licence is required ; in Providence there is no actual law on the subject, "but the police prohibit the playing of hand-organs"; in Illinois street music is entirely prohibited, "having been found an intolerable nuisance"; in Missouri no licences are granted, and to go abroad with a hand-organ is "a misdemeanour"; in Philadelphia an order was some years ago issued to the police to suppress all itinerant musicians, on the ground that they were a public nuisance. In a good many other cities in the States they are controlled by licence and by the limiting of the times and places of performance. The States, however, are in general behind the European cities in their ideas on this subject.

It is thus evident that we in London are allowed to suffer under a nuisance, practically unchecked in any way, which in every other civilized capital is at least under restriction and control, and in some is disallowed altogether. Those who are demanding its restriction, therefore, so far from being eccentric and captious in

their ideas, are merely demanding a reform which has already been carried out in every other country.

Let us consider, in conclusion, what should be the line taken by any legislation on this subject. In the first place, all measures for merely checking the performance of street music, or giving the householder greater facilities for getting rid of it if he wishes, are merely illogical half-measures. The principle should be recognized once for all, that no unlicensed performers, good or bad, should ever be allowed in the public streets at all. The public streets are not the place for them. One of the great *desiderata* in city life is quiet—as much quiet as we can get. The noise of traffic is unavoidable, and is a great worry and irritation to the brain; let us at least get rid of unnecessary noises. Secondly, all grinding organs and other mechanical methods of producing what is absurdly called "music" should be peremptorily and entirely stopped, for a reason which it is unfortunately exceedingly difficult to get the average Englishman to understand at all. I am speaking as a man with a passionate love of music and sufficient special knowledge of it to give me some right to speak on the subject, and I wish to endeavour to make it clear to the non-musical reader that all music is a matter of *expression* in sounds, whether by voice or instrument, and that nothing deserving the name of music can possibly be produced by ignorant people grinding out sounds by mechanical means. Every time this subject is discussed in the public Press, there are some dunces ready to come forward and assert, with a show of virtuous indignation, that we "are trying to deprive the poor of their music"; and in one of the London Vestries, when it was proposed to support the Kensington Vestry in their sensible protest, already referred to, against the street organs, a wiseacre got up and moved an amendment that the Vestry should encourage the barrel-organs "on account of their educational influence," and the amendment was only lost by one vote; that is to say, that one half of the members of the said Vestry (St. Giles-in-the-Fields it was) were so ignorant as to imagine that the grinding of a mechanical organ was a means of educating the ear. The fact is that no influence could be more vulgarizing and more vitiating to the public taste than the grinding of commonplace and threadbare tunes on a barrel-organ. It can have no educational effect but in the wrong direction; our public is one of the most unmusical in the world by nature, and the barrel-organs can have no effect but to aid in keeping this taste at its present contemptible level. Secondly, the system encourages and keeps among us a set of men who are merely idle loafers and vagabonds; common beggars, with the additional power of creating an intolerable nuisance. A man who plays a clarionet or a cornet-

à-piston in a wind band, though he may not play very well, must nevertheless have acquired some small modicum of musical knowledge, and have given some little pains to learn the manipulation of his instrument; he is therefore in quite a different position, in principle, from an ignorant boor who merely turns a handle to produce mechanical noises; he is, in a humble and imperfect way, exercising a craft. The organ-grinder is not; he is a lazy and ignorant fellow who prefers to be lazy and ignorant, and who takes to this handle-turning rather than apply himself to honest and useful labour. In regard to this point let me draw attention to the following judgment of a London magistrate, which I cut from a report in *The Times* some little time since:—

"At Westminster, a very decrepit old man named Charles Martin, described as a shoemaker, having no home, was charged on remand before Mr. Sheil with begging in the Pimlico Road. The defendant, who is 85 years old, gets a precarious livelihood by singing nautical songs outside public-houses. In a weak treble voice he told Mr. Sheil that his *repertoire* included 'Tom Bowling,' 'Wapping Old Stairs,' and 'The Death of Nelson.' Mr. Sheil.—You mustn't do it. It's begging, and you have been told so here before. Defendant.—I have lost my sight, sir. 'Your humble prisoner' can only sing for a few coppers. I can sing Miss Eliza Cook's 'Old Arm Chair.' I am appreciated by some people. Mr. Sheil.—That may be, but it is not allowed. Defendant.—Not for a poor old man like me to collect a few coppers in my hat? Oh, dear! The Magistrate.—No. You must go into the workhouse. Will you go there if I let you off this time? Defendant.—Yes, sir; I will be off to St. James's. I won't come back here. Mr. Sheil.—If you do I shall have to send you to prison for a month."

I do not mean to contend that Mr. Sheil was not right in his decision, but I want to know why the same logic is not applied to the organ-grinders. This poor old man was deserving of more sympathy than they can claim, for two reasons: he made much less noise in the street than an organ-grinder, and he was, in a very humble way, exercising the art of music. If Mr. Sheil will cause the organ-grinders to be brought before him and serve them with the same sentence, well and good; but if not, why in the name of common-sense and logic is the man who sings in the street to be committed as a beggar, and the organ-grinder, who is a common beggar in just the same sense, and a ten-fold worse nuisance, to go scot-free?

So far, however, from wishing to "deprive the poor of their music," I would rather wish to see something worth calling music given to them in place of the barrel-organ or the mechanical piano, so far as it can be done without interfering with the rights of others. And having adopted the two principles before enunciated—first, that no unlicensed performers be allowed within the London district (or within any municipal district, if we choose to apply the legislation generally), and second, that no mechanical organs be licensed at all—I would offer two suggestions for meeti

the wants of the poorer classes for cheap music. The first is, that a competent licensing authority be appointed, to whom any persons wishing to perform music in the open-air as a means of livelihood should have to apply for permission, which should be granted only for a limited number of places, to be specified on the license, for limited hours, and to players who were up to a certain minimum standard of musical competency. The places to be licensed for should be selected as those in which the performances would not be likely to interfere materially with the studies and tastes of the upper class of residents; or in the case of squares, terraces, or gardens of the better class, a majority vote of the residents might be taken as to whether they would or would not wish a band to be admitted to play there at certain hours on certain days (or a one-third minority might have power to veto it), and only at those times. The weak point of this system would be, of course, that the restriction of the license mainly to the poorer districts, where the entertainment is most wanted, might render it difficult for the players to make the trade a paying one. This consideration suggests the far preferable system, that municipal authorities should subsidize such licensed performers out of the public funds, to play at stated times and places where the people could collect to hear the music. They would then be really doing something for the musical education of the masses, and giving them a pleasure worth having, and the necessary charge on the rates for the purpose could not be a very heavy one.*

But, at all events, we must see London rid of this curse of grinding organs. The argument that it is only a minority who are annoyed by them (which may or may not be true) is nothing to the purpose. That minority unquestionably includes the best educated and most studious portion of the community, who have the strongest claim to be heard; and even if it were not so, to the people whose taste is not outraged or their work interrupted by the grinding organs it can at least be no injury to lose them, while, to the remainder, the positive injury and annoyance caused by them is literally embittering the lives of many London residents.† I only wish that those, perhaps, fortunate persons of

* Of course I am not forgetting what the London County Council are doing in this way with the bands in the parks; what is here suggested is a further extension of the system, applicable to small groups of competent and licensed performers, as well as to large bands.

† I know one very able professional musician who has literally been driven out of London, and his whole career altered, and perhaps irretrievably injured, by the street-organs. This gentleman, after changing his London residence once or twice, in the hope of getting to a quarter less infested by barrel-organs, eventually accepted a country appointment in connection with a large college, and he told me that he had done so because life in London was impossible to him under the torture that he suffered from the street-organs.

coarser fibre and duller ear, who may be inclined to think such expressions overcharged, could be got to understand for five minutes what it is like to a man of sensitive temperament and musical education, to come back to London after the blessed escape from these noises during the autumn holiday, and to hear again, as he drives from the railway station to his house, in every street, the horrible clatter and jingle of melodic banalities on these infernal machines, and to feel that he has to be subject to this infliction for another eleven months. It is not too much to say that there are many hundreds of people in London to whom the announcement that these things were to be stopped by law on and after a certain date would seem like a kind of millennium—a piece of news almost too good to be true. There are some drawbacks inseparable from London life; this, at least, is one that we might be relieved from; and if the County Council will not move in the matter, some organized pressure of public opinion must be brought to bear either on that body or on Parliament, such as will compel the performance of a public duty so long and so discreditably neglected.

H. Heathcote Statham.

THE MILITARY TERROR IN FRANCE.

I DESIRE to present the readers of this Review with a connected account of one of the most amazing episodes of the day. With the gist of it many of them are already acquainted; but the whole transaction, so far as it is completed at the time of writing, may be deemed worthy of full record. It possesses general interest, as it embraces political and even international issues, which, without exaggeration, may be termed momentous. The bald facts of the narrative are, however, so convincing and suggestive that they shall be allowed to speak for themselves. The writer will endeavour to abstain from inflaming a painful controversy by the employment of tempting epithets, and also from what is known as "improving the occasion," which is supposed to be a disagreeable peculiarity of Englishmen when discussing the affairs of other nations. To thank God we are not as France is at this moment will not help to solve the present problem. Moreover, we owe a duty to the forlorn and gallant band of Frenchmen who, in spite of every form of persecution which ingenuity can invent and malignity inflict, continue to hope against hope that the conscience of their country may be moved before the twelfth hour to right a great wrong. They are vilified daily by a venal and fœtid Press; socially they are boycotted; nor are they entirely safe in the streets of Paris, being liable to mob attack when recognized; detectives are set to watch them; their private correspondence is opened in the Post Office; professional duellists are told off to pick quarrels with them, &c. Lepers are at any rate let alone; but the Frenchman branded as a "Dreyfusard" is continually molested. His position is sufficiently intolerable. Let us not aggravate it by affecting to treat his country as a criminal. It is plain that there is something rotten in the state of France, but France, as a whole, is not rotten. She is simply passing through a bad dream.

I.—"THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DREYFUS CASE."

The June number of THE NATIONAL REVIEW contained an article entitled "The Truth about the Dreyfus Case," signed "Huguenot,"

consisting of a sketch of the salient features of that *cause célèbre*, and calling attention to certain consequences that flow from them. In form it was addressed to "the English friends of France," in substance it was an appeal to "the War Office and Government of that country to retreat from a position which, if adhered to, will assuredly render them of ill report in the eyes of posterity." It was based upon documentary evidence accessible to everyone familiar with the French language, though the sure and skilful handling of those documents was due to the writer having made an unusually close study of the subject, and to his having had access to unimpeachable information. The paper was generally pronounced to be convincing by those who approached the Dreyfus question for the first time, as was the case with a large number of English readers, while those who had already looked into the matter sufficiently to feel uncomfortable about it, were confirmed in their disquieting impression by "Huguenot's" masterly analysis. As the article only appeared last month, the reader is referred to the original, of which the following is the baldest outline :—

Commandant Esterhazy, the hero or villain of the piece, is animated by a profound hatred of France and her army, which may be due to his Austrian extraction, or to his German education, or to his service in the Papal Zouaves. He has expressed this antipathy in violent and graphic terms in his private correspondence with a former mistress, which can be purchased in a separate pamphlet for a penny. One extract runs thus : "Look at this precious French Army. It is disgraceful. If my position were not at stake I would be off to-morrow. I have written to Constantinople. If they there offer me a suitable commission I will go there. However, I do not mean to quit this before I have played such a trick on these blackguards as I know how to play." Another runs : "If this very evening someone came and told me that I should be slain to-morrow as a Captain of Uhlans cutting Frenchmen down I should assuredly be perfectly happy. . . . Paris taken by assault and handed over to be pillaged by a hundred thousand drunken soldiers—there you have the feast of which I dream. Pray that it be so ! " Eight years ago the author of these sentiments not unnaturally became a traitor to the country of his hatred. He engaged himself to Colonel Schwartzkoppen, then German military attaché in Paris, to whom he has sold altogether 162 documents, mostly in his own handwriting. The originals are now in Berlin, while facsimiles exist at another Continental capital. In September, 1894, the Alsatian porter at Colonel Schwartzkoppen's lodgings in Paris, either from patriotism or in the hope of reward appropriated a memorandum (the *bordereau*) addressed to hi

master, and brought it to the French War Office. It was unsigned, and consisted of a schedule of five secret pieces which Esterhazy was sending to his paymaster, *who duly received them*, though not the *bordereau*. At the time the latter was impounded by the War Office, there was attached to the Military Staff a Jewish officer, Alfred Dreyfus, belonging to a wealthy Alsatian family. He and his brothers had abandoned parents and home in order to remain French subjects after the *débâcle* and annexation of 1870-71. Alfred Dreyfus was rich, reserved, and unpopular. He owed his advancement to sheer ability, and is said to be the first Jew to get into the *État Majeur*. A certain Commandant du Patey de Clam, who was considered a judge of handwriting, was consulted as to the authorship of the *bordereau*, and having fastened on the unpopular Jew, was forthwith appointed to preside over the preliminary inquisition. Two experts were consulted, one of whom could discover no resemblance between the handwriting of the *bordereau* and that of Dreyfus, but the subtle Bertillon declared that Dreyfus had disguised his handwriting, and so the otherwise unaccountable dissimilarities were accounted for.

Dreyfus was arrested and tried *in camera* before seven officers, to whom General Mercier, then Minister of War, refused to reveal the origin of the incriminating *bordereau*; they had to rest satisfied with the floating suggestion that it had been picked out of the waste-paper basket of the German Embassy. Of the five experts now consulted two denied that Dreyfus was the writer of the *bordereau*, while the other three, including the infallible Bertillon, and a nominee of his own, pronounced against the accused. The court hesitated to condemn, whereupon General Mercier took them aside and, behind the backs of the prisoner and his counsel, *read* the court a document alleged to contain the words, "Ce canaille de Dreyfus devient trop exigeant." Dreyfus was unanimously condemned by a court-martial which did not know that the sentence in the document which sealed the prisoner's fate had been tampered with, for the original ran thus, "Ce canaille de D—— devient trop exigeant." Dreyfus' name was inserted in order to secure the conviction of an unpopular Jew. The unheard-of illegalities at this court-martial—the employment of a secret and fraudulent document—explain the mysterious veneration developed by the French authorities for the *chose jugée*. They have not the moral courage to face the skeleton in their cupboard.

A year and a half later, in May, 1896, the same Alsatian porter at Colonel Schwartzkoppen's lodgings brought another document to the French War Office, consisting of a letter-card—*le petit bleu*—formally addressed to Esterhazy, in Schwartzkoppen's handwriting. It requested "a more detailed explanation than that

which you gave me the other day on the question at issue." The Chief of the Intelligence Department at that time was Colonel Picquart. On receiving the letter-card his suspicions were aroused as to the possible relations between Esterhazy and the German military attaché, and on enquiry he learnt that Esterhazy habitually neglected his regimental duties, but was insatiably curious as to other branches of the service. On receiving specimens of Esterhazy's handwriting Colonel Picquart recognized it as familiar. On comparing it with the famous *bordereau* which was in his desk he at once saw that Esterhazy had written that for which Dreyfus had been transported. But for many months he told no one of his discovery except his official superior, General Gonze, though, without revealing the authorship, he submitted the Esterhazy handwriting to M. Bertillon, among others, who exclaimed, "It is the writing of the *bordereau*." The French War Office eventually refused to move in the matter, and Colonel Picquart was sent to Sahara, and finally expelled from the army without pension.*

In November, 1896, General Mercier, to silence growing doubts as to Dreyfus' guilt, caused a facsimile of the *bordereau* to be published in the *Matin*. Dreyfus' friends submitted it to the nine leading experts of Europe and America, who unanimously decided that it could not possibly have been written by Dreyfus. Of course, they knew nothing of Esterhazy, whose guilt was at this time only known to Colonel Picquart. A year later (October, 1897) this same facsimile was being hawked along the Boulevard, and caught the eye of a broker, de Castro, who had business relations with Esterhazy. He had not previously seen the facsimile, but he subsequently stated: "I was struck aghast when I saw that writing, for I seemed to see in it a letter of the Commandant Esterhazy. I went home in a state of perturbation. Next morning I went with my brother-in-law and looked up the letters of Esterhazy which we had on our files. I even made some comparison of the handwriting, with the result that I found a perfect resemblance, I may say a striking identity." The Dreyfus family were communicated with, and on November 15th, 1897, Esterhazy was denounced to General Billot, the Minister of War, as the real author of the *bordereau* by Matthieu Dreyfus, the brother of the unfortunate prisoner. Esterhazy had already bolted into Belgium, believing that otherwise he would replace Dreyfus in *Ile du Diable*. But the War Office had not the nerve to face the music, and sent to assure the fugitive of their powerful protection if he would return, for

* During the last few weeks he has been awarded a pittance of £80 a year, after twenty-five years' service, during part of which he had occupied the distinguished and responsible position of Chief of the Intelligence Department.

his absence was as damaging to his superiors as to himself. He accordingly returned, and Colonel du Patey de Clam, who was up to his neck in the conviction of Dreyfus, was told off to meet him near the Arc de Triomphe with the *Document Libérateur* or written pledge that the War Office would shield him. This was on the eve of Matthieu Dreyfus' denunciation. The doctrine of the *chose jugée* had now received its consecration; Matthieu Dreyfus could not get a hearing; and Esterhazy was formally whitewashed by a court-martial inspired by the *Document Libérateur*. To this friendly tribunal he admitted that there was a "shocking resemblance" between his own handwriting and that of the *bordereau*, which he explained by the startling statement, that Dreyfus had imitated his handwriting to shield himself. There was no evidence that Dreyfus had ever known Esterhazy, nor did the court pause to consider that Dreyfus had never defended himself by accusing Esterhazy of having written the *bordereau*, which he obviously would have done on the assumption that he had adopted Esterhazy's handwriting to divert suspicion from himself. The assurance which Esterhazy had already received, October 29th, 1897, of protection by the War Office, made it altogether superfluous for him to seriously defend himself in the court-martial of January, 1898.

Passing over "the many minor infamies that have followed in the wake of this great crime," "Huguenot" proceeded to make "some concluding reflections on the general situation as it presents itself to the eyes of a minority of loyal but despairing Frenchmen." These were fortified by a remarkable extract from an article in the *Law Journal* of St. Petersburg, from the pen of M. Ignatius Zakrewski, President of the Russian Court of Appeal, to whom one would imagine the French would listen if they can tolerate any foreign opinion:—

"The trials of Dreyfus and Zola could not otherwise than deeply distress the true friends of France. The first of these trials presented a variety of improbabilities and irregularities, of which the most flagrant was the production before the judges alone in the court-martial itself of a secret document by order of the military authorities. This astonishing infraction of the rules of all correct procedure renders the condemnation of Dreyfus null and void. Guilty or not guilty, he has not been fairly tried. They have simply deported and imprisoned him according to administrative procedure in countries where despotism reigns. It is the bringing back again of *lettres de cachet* and of the Bastille under the pretext, it is true, of subserving reasons of State, as if that was not the pretext which shielded the most iniquitous acts of the ancient *régime*."

But the passages in "Huguenot's" article to which attention is principally directed are the following, which the reader should bear in mind as they have borne surprising fruit:—

"The affection of the French for their army is as ardent and romantic as that of a woman for her lover. But what if by a sudden revelation it were brought

home to the masses, who now parade the streets, crying '*Vive l'Armée, mort aux Juifs !*' that their confidence has been betrayed, that the swaggering officers whom they cheered so madly at the trial of M. Zola are the real traitors to France, and that Dreyfus is the victim of their base conspiracy? For the Emperor William holds in his hands a weapon with which, when the occasion arises, he can smite the entire *Etat Majeur* and destroy the confidence of the French people in their army for at least a generation. The series of secret documents sold by Esterhazy does not stop in October, 1894, the date of Dreyfus' arrest, but extends on into the year 1896. (It included many important documents of later origin than October, 1894, all in the handwriting of the *bordereau*. Dreyfus cannot have written these, for he was already in prison. The defenders of Dreyfus have themselves a list of these documents, obtained evidently through some well-informed person ; for in the middle of April the *Siècle*, in an open letter to General Billot, gave details of several of them, among others signalizing the plan of mobilization of the Third Army Corps of Rouen, to which Esterhazy was attached in 1896, when he communicated the plan to Schwartzkoppen.) Now the Emperor William, by communicating to the French or European Press in facsimile any one of these documents of origin later than 1894, can, whenever he likes, tear across the web of lies with which the French War Office is now striving to hide its misdeeds. Perhaps the *dénoûment* will come in this way ; for the Emperor has, it appears, already authorized Schwartzkoppen, at the close of the last year, to communicate to Count Casella, for publication in the *Siècle*, on April 8th last, many hints of the truth (and these hints were enough, in the elegant phrase of the Socialist paper, *Les Droits de l'Homme*, to cause the members of the *Etat Majeur* to 'sweat with fear.') How long will it be before William II. draws tight the noose into which all the leading French generals and colonels and nearly all the leading politicians of every party, save the Socialists, have so obligingly adjusted their necks. Happy for the French if, without such intervention, they can recover their own self-respect and the regard of the civilized world. . . . The judges of this Higher Court (Court of Cassation) are irremovable by the Government, and have already, in the decree which annulled Zola's first trial, gone out of their way to intimate that they will also annul the illegally obtained sentence on Dreyfus whenever they get an opportunity. So there is still some hope for France. This Higher Court keeps the conscience of France alive ; and every real friend of France hopes that the day will soon come when its voice and authority will be asserted, and the country forced to awake to the sense of right, throwing off the horrible *cauchemar* of crime which now broods over it."

The prominent points of the article may thus be summarized :—

1. In 1894 Captain Dreyfus, an unpopular Jew, was rashly assumed to be the traitorous author of the *bordereau*, and illegally convicted by means of a trick.

2. In 1897 the French War Office realized that Esterhazy had written the document for which Dreyfus had been transported, but elected to protect the traitor rather than confess their own crime.

3. That the German Government possesses documents (in the handwriting of the *bordereau*, delivered to the German Military Attaché in Paris, by Esterhazy, after Dreyfus was transported) which will enable the Germans, at their own convenience, to ruin the reputation of the French headquarter staff by showing that for their own interests they kept an innocent man in prison after they became aware of his innocence.

4. An urgent appeal to the French to undo a great wrong of their own motion, and in their own interests.

II.—"Les Enseignements de l'Histoire."

On 4th June, 1898, there appeared a long article of three columns in the French paper *Le Siècle*, entitled "Les Enseignements de l'Histoire," from the pen of that able and brilliant Frenchman, M. Joseph Reinach, whose devotion to the cause of justice cost him his seat at the recent elections. He commenced by contrasting the dictum that "the Prussian schoolmaster won the Battle of Sadowa" with the rival view that "victory goes to the big battalions," with which, as a keen soldier, he agreed, adding:—"Nevertheless material force is not everything; moral force counts for something, and the country which on the opening of a war is frowned upon by the public opinion of the civilized world is placed at a dangerous disadvantage." He enforced this doctrine by recalling the moral damage inflicted upon France when Bismarck published the famous circular of 29th July, 1870, and thus at a critical moment rallied the wavering verdict of Europe in favour of Germany at the outset of the war.

This revelation certainly placed France in a disagreeable light, and was of the utmost value to her enemy. For it appeared that after the Battle of Sadowa (1866), which had smashed Austria and exalted Prussia into a first-class military and political Power, the Emperor Napoleon III. had addressed demands for "compensation" to the victorious King William who had recently acquired the Danish Duchies, the Kingdom of Hanover, Frankfort, Hesse, and Nassau. As the author of the Prussian-Italian Alliance, Louis Napoleon claimed as a reward or set-off "la rive gauche du Rhin jusqu'a et y compris Mayence." This proposal was promptly declined in Berlin. Whereupon the French Emperor offered the Prussian King an offensive and defensive alliance on the following terms:—That recent Prussian conquests should be recognized, that the Emperor should not oppose the federation of Northern and Southern Germany, that in return Prussia should use her good offices to facilitate the acquisition of Luxembourg by France, and should aid the latter with arms to conquer Belgium. When these cynical overtures were made to Prussia, France was in friendly relations with Belgium, whose neutrality and independence she had solemnly guaranteed, and had promised her protection to the Southern States of Germany.

French policy was at this time imprudent as well as unscrupulous. When Count Benedetti, the French Minister in Berlin, proposed the alliance to Prince Bismarck (20th August, 1866), and broached the secret terms, he was actually induced to transcribe

the latter on a sheet of Embassy paper, which with child-like faith he entrusted to Bismarck. A few days later, having effected an understanding with Russia, Bismarck abruptly broke off the *pourparler* with Benedetti; Prussia kept all her conquests without offering France a square yard of compensation; and Bismarck's personal prize was the *bordereau* signed by the French Ambassador.

In 1870 Bismarck had this document photographed, and on the outbreak of war with France he submitted it to the foreign diplomatists in Berlin. He caused it to be published in *The Times* on 25th July, and annexed it to his circular of 29th July, which contained the following declaration :—

"These proposals are from beginning to end in the handwriting of Count Benedetti, on the official paper of the French Embassy; the Ambassadors of Austria, England, Russia, Baden, Bavaria, Belgium, Hesse, Italy, Saxony, Turkey, and Würtemburg have seen the original and recognize the handwriting." The effect of this disclosure was electrical and stupefying, and France found herself confronting not only Prussia, armed to the teeth, but the fury of united Germany, while Russia, Austria, and England became suspicious or unfriendly. The public opinion of solid Europe crystallized in favour of Bismarck and his master.

After recalling this "desolating" incident, Mr. Reinach turns to the future and avows his anxiety, lest history may repeat itself, and in the crisis of her fate France may again have to face the production of equally damaging documents. He points out that the late German military attaché in Paris, Colonel Schwartzkoppen, had bought over 150 papers from a man who still wears the Legion of Honour and the French uniform. What is still more terrible is that these documents contain the overwhelming, irrefutable proof that an innocent man is expiating another's crime, and that the guilty party is protected against the evidence by those whom he has had the audacity to term his "equals." The Court that condemned Dreyfus had acted in good faith but under constraint. The fact remained that the very man Colonel Schwatzkoppen had described to Colonel Panizzardi (the late Italian military attaché in Paris) as "my man" (Esterhazy) was the same whose acquittal (by the bogus court-martial) General Pellieux had congratulated himself on securing, and against whom General Billot, the Minister of War, had not dared to proceed even after the avowal of the letters to Madame de Boulaney, and whom the officers of the headquarter staff had been compelled to shake hands with during the Zola trial:—"One of these days—*Di tale avertite*—when war breaks out between France and Germany, these documents, having been photographed like the Benedetti Note,

will appear in facsimile throughout the Press. A successor of Bismarck will attach them to a diplomatic circular, and before the entire world the chiefs of one of the contending armies will find themselves charged with imposture and felony, and in any case convicted of the most unjustifiable blunder."

The writer enquires "Who will not groan at the thought of a moral Sedan lost before the first shot is fired?" rejects "the policy of the ostrich," which buries its head in the sand to avoid approaching dangers, and claims that patriotic men owe more than their life to their country. They owe the truth at all costs; happily there is still time to parry the risk of an "abominable humiliation." *Liberavi animam meam.* M. Reinach then turns to "Huguenot's" article in THE NATIONAL REVIEW, and quotes translations of the passages in small print which I have given on a preceding page omitting the two or three sentences enclosed in brackets, and emphasizing a few others by italics. For the sake of clearness I append these translations as they appeared in *Le Siècle*:—

"L'amour de la nation française pour son armée est aussi ardent, aussi romanesque que celui d'une femme pour son amant. Hélas! que se passerait-il le jour où ces foules qui s'en vont criant à travers les rues: 'Vive l'armée! Mort aux Juifs!' apprendraient, à n'en pouvoir plus douter, par une déclaration venant du dehors, que leur confiance a été trompée, que ces chefs qu'elles acclamaient si follement au procès Zola ne lui ont pas dit la vérité, que Dreyfus est une innocente victime? L'empereur Guillaume tient, en effet, entre ses mains une arme avec laquelle, *quand il trouvera une occasion favorable*, il pourra briser l'Etat-Major et détruire, pour une génération, la foi du peuple français dans les chefs de son armée."

"La série des documents secrets vendus par Esterhazy ne cesse pas avec le mois d'octobre 1894, date de l'arrestation de Dreyfus; elle s'étend jusqu'en 1896, comprenant nombre de documents importants, d'une date postérieure à celle d'octobre 1894, *tous de la même écriture que le bordereau.* Dreyfus n'a pu les écrire, puisqu'il était déjà en prison. . . . Eh bien! l'empereur Guillaume n'a qu'à communiquer à la presse française ou européenne quelques-uns de ces documents, pour pouvoir, *quand il lui plaira*, rompre et déchirer le tissue de mensonges sous lequel l'Etat-Major cherche à cacher ses méfaits. Le dénouement viendra probablement de cette façon. Il paraîtrait que Schwartzkoppen était déjà autorisé par l'Empereur, quand il communiqua au comte Casella les quelques bribes de vérite qui ont paru dans le *Siècle* du 8 avril. A quel moment Guillaume II tirera-t-il le lacet où tant de généraux et d'officiers français, où presque tous les chefs des partis politiques, à l'exception des socialistes, ont si complaisamment enfermé leurs cous?"

M. Reinach pointed out that the author of these passages "is not an enemy of France." He is a friend for showing us the cloud on the horizon and for exclaiming after uttering his warning:—

"'Heureux les Français s'ils peuvent faire justice *sans une pareille intervention!*' Et plus loin: Les juges de la Cour de cassation, en annulant le jugement qui a condamné Zola, ont indiqué clairement qu'ils attendant que l'occasion leur soit donnée d'annuler également la sentence illégale qui a frappé Dreyfus. Il y a donc encore quelque espoir pour la France. La Cour suprême garde en vie la conscience française. Tous les vrais amis de la France souhaitent que le

jour soit proche où l'on entendra la voix de ces magistrats, où le pays sera forcé de s'éveiller au sentiment de la justice, échappant à l'horrible cauchemar qui pèse maintenant sur lui."

After quoting "Huguenot's" earnest appeal to the conscience-keepers of France, M. Reinach closes his striking article on "Les Enseignements de l'Histoire" in the following words: "That is the solution that I have always indicated. Dreyfus was not only unjustly condemned; he was also irregularly condemned. The interests of Law precede all others. Moreover, the Government alone can ask for revision in the interests of Law. No doubt many will have to unsay their declarations that Dreyfus was justly and regularly condemned. But what is more honourable than the loyal admission of a blunder? And is not anything better than that blunder? Nothing but the winds of Justice sweeping through the Heavens can scatter the rising clouds."

III.—The Prosecution.

M. Reinach's article appeared in the *Siècle* of June 4th, and, forthwith, all the machinery of the Anti-Semitic fury was set in motion to compel the moribund Méline Cabinet to proceed against the audacious author. Finally, to the delight of the Rochefort-cum-Drumont combination, and to the bewilderment of the world at large, it was announced that M. Reinach was actually to be tried by a military Court of Enquiry—a tribunal not easily distinguishable to the lay mind from a court-martial. With the vast majority of Frenchmen under the age of forty-five, he belongs to the army, being in the Reserve. On Wednesday, June 15th, M. Reinach received the following letter translated in *The Standard*:—

"Paris, 14th June, 1898.

"General Zurlinden, Military Governor of Paris, to Captain Reinach, of the Territorial Cavalry, Staff Service, Paris.

"Capitaine, I have the honour to inform you that, in conformity with the Decree of June 22nd, 1878, you are invited to present yourself before a District Court of Enquiry, which, by order of the Minister of War, will assemble on the 24th June, 1898, at the Ecole Militaire, under the presidency of General Kisgener, Baron de Planta, commanding the 5th Brigade of Dragoons, to give its opinion on the following question:—'Is M. Joseph Reinach, Staff Captain of Territorial Cavalry, liable to be dismissed the Service for a gross breach of discipline?' The reporter of the Court of Enquiry is *Chef d'Escadrons de Carbonnieres*, of the 2nd Regiment of Cuirassiers, who will acquaint you with the object of the Enquiry.

"By order, (Signed) The Chief of the Staff,

"Aurele Guerin."

According to the *Gazette des Tribunaux* the indictment had been drawn up by General Billot, Minister of War, and sent to the military Governor of Paris on June 12th. General Billot referred to the article in the *Siècle* ("Les Enseignements de l'Histoire") as

constituting the "gross breach of discipline." He particularized the following passages* :—

"Mais ces papiers, qui sont â Berlin, sont la preuve éclatante, irrécusable, qu'un innocent expie le crime d'un autre et que cet autre est protégé contre l'évidence par ceux qu'il a eu l'atroce audace d'appeler ces pairs."

"Celui qui a été condamné l'a été par des juges de bonne foi—je le dis comme je le crois—et je n'aurais pas écrit de ceux qui ont acquitté l'autre qu'ils l'ont acquitté 'par ordre.' N'étant pas romantique comme l'illustre poète de *Germinal*, j'eusse écrit, dans la vieille langue classique, 'comme par ordre.' Ce petit mot de plus, c'était toute la vérité, l'incontestable vérité."

"Il n'en reste pas moins que l'homme dont le Colonel de Schwartzkoppen disait au colonel Panizzardi 'C'est mon homme!' c'est le même dont le général de Pellieux se félicitait d'avoir provoqué l'acquittement, contre lequel le général Billot, ministre de la guerre, n'a pas osé sévir, même aprés l'aveu des lettres â Mme. de Boulancy, et à qui les officiers de l'état-major, témoins à la Cour d'assises, ont été condamnés, par ordre cette fois, a donner la main."

"Alors, qu'un jour ou l'autre, que demain—*Di tale avertite*...—un conflit éclate entre la France et l'Allemagne. Ces papiers ont été photographiés comme l'avait été la note de M. Benedetti sur la Belgique. Ils paraissent en fac-similés dans tous les journaux. Un successeur de M. de Bismarck les annexe a quelque circulaire diplomatique. Et voilà, devant le monde entier, accusés d'imposture et de félonie, convaincus en tous cas de la plus injustifiable des erreurs, les chefs mêmes de cette armée qui va se battre."

The Minister of War also selected the following extract that M. Reinach had translated from "Huguenots" article in THE NATIONAL REVIEW :—

"L'empereur Guillaume tient, en effet, entre ses mains une arme avec laquelle quand il trouvera une occasion favorable, il pourra briser l'état-major et détruire pour une génération, la foi du peuple français dans les chefs de son armée.

"Eh bien! l'empereur Guillaume n'a qu'a communiquer à la presse française ou européenne quelques uns de ces documents pour pouvoir, quand il lui plaira, rompre et déchirer le tissu de mensonges sous lequel l'état-major cherche à cacher ces méfaits. Le denouement viendra probablement de cette façon."

The court-martial was held *in camera* on 24th June. Of its proceedings we know nothing except that M. Reinach had been furnished with the following remarkable letter from "Huguenot," which he read to the Court.

"Oxford, June 23. Sir,—I learn by the papers that you are suspected in Paris of being the author of the article I published in the June number of THE NATIONAL REVIEW, a few lines of which you translated in the *Siècle*. I have not the pleasure of knowing you. Nevertheless, as an honest man, I deem it my duty to declare by these presents that I am the sole author of the article in THE NATIONAL REVIEW. I am a friend of France, and have always wished her prosperous and great. That is why I thought it useful to publish the information I had gathered as concerns the Dreyfus affair, from the most trustworthy and authentic sources. No authorized denial will controvert the facts I have established on the evidence of the most unquestionable authorities. Thus I am assured

* The English substance may be found on a preceding page.

that Colonel Schwartzkoppen will not deny that he made a monthly allowance of two thousand francs to his usual informer, Commandant Esterhazy. I can assure you that the French Staff is threatened with the publication by foreign newspapers, of the facsimile of the documents sold by Esterhazy to Colonel Schwartzkoppen, and which are all in his own handwriting. I assure you that this contingency nearly came about in the month of February of the present year, and that the sword of Damocles is still suspended over the head of the Staff. A sincere friend of France, I pray God that the officers of the Staff may act wisely, while it is yet time, and give proof of the qualities of justice and courage which have ever been the eminent traits of the French Army. I authorize you to publish my letter in the newspapers, and communicate it to the Judges of the Military Court.

"Believe me, Sir, your obedient servant,

"FREDERICK CORNWALLIS CONYBEARE."

Two days later this semi-official note was issued:—

"In consequence of the opinion unanimously expressed by the Court of Enquiry charged to decide the case of M. Joseph Reinach, and on the proposal of General Billot, Minister of War, M. Reinach, captain of the general staff in the territorial army, is from this date deprived of his rank, in accordance with the decision of the President of the Republic."

Does not the operation of this court-martial—if finally sustained—establish a new form of Government in France? Does it not make the military a law unto themselves? Does it not give them a censorship over the civil population until the latter has attained middle age? Practically, every able-bodied Frenchman enters the army, and is subsequently drafted into the Reserve, where he remains until he reaches forty-five. That the Reservist should be amenable to military discipline whenever he is on service is not only natural, but inevitable.

The Reinach case proves, however, that he can be followed into civil life and subjected to the military code should he at any time render himself distasteful to the military authorities. He can be haled before a purely military "Court of Enquiry" for "a gross breach of discipline," and tried *in camera*. He can be deprived of his rank, dismissed with dishonour from the service, and held up to public obloquy.

Without serious remonstrance the landmarks of the Republic are being systematically swept away one by one. Is France drifting into a Military Terror? That would, indeed, be a heavy price to pay, in order that a palpably innocent man may perish on the Devil's Island, while the real criminal flaunts it in Paris?

L. J. MAXSE.

MECHANICS INSTITUTE

A COLONIAL CHRONICLE.

CANADA.

The internal affairs of the Canadian Dominion during the past month contain no special or sensational features. Her material record is one of continued and growing prosperity, and it is, perhaps, not over sanguine to hope that she may be in for a spell of fortune's favours, which have never been lavished on her with a liberal hand during the past 100 years. Those who have a passion for returns will be edified by the latest statistics of Canada's trade, which show a most welcome improvement over last year's figures. For the ten months of the fiscal year ending April 30th the total trade amounted to $244,451,000 as compared with $204,435,000 the previous year, an increase of $40,000,000. The imports entered for consumption, compared with the previous year, are as follows :—

1898	$106,286,484
1897	93,498,952

This is exclusive, in both cases, of coin and bullion. The exports of Canada for the ten months, exclusive of coin and bullion, amounted to $130,090,077, compared with $102,943,632 for the same period in 1897, an increase of something like $27,000,000. Of the produce of Canada, the increases in the exports were principally in produce of the mine, $3,000,000; agricultural products, $15,000,000; animals and their products, $6,000,000; and manufactures, $1,164,000. The increase in the value of agricultural products exported is remarkable, the figures for the produce of Canada being $13,668,000 for the ten months of 1897, and $28,774,000 for the ten months of 1898. The suddenly enhanced price of wheat which swells these figures has produced misfortunes in other communities, and is partly attributable to the Leiter gamble, which has now collapsed. In the long run it will probably inflict far more harm than good upon all the farmers throughout the world, and the name of Leiter will not long remain blessed, even in agricultural circles. However, is has put sorely needed funds into the pockets of a deserving and long-suffering class, and, for the present, the Chicago plunger figures as the farmer's friend. He has helped the Canadian export trade, and we must be thankful

for such mercies, though we believe them to be dearly bought. Perhaps it is owing to the general prosperity of Canada that the Dominion Parliament—which opened at about the same time as the British Parliament—was prorogued in the middle of June, thereby setting an excellent example to Westminster which has no chance of being followed. The chief work of the Session has been the completion of the preferential fiscal arrangements, which were conceived and initiated last year amid the general applause of the whole British Empire. The 12½ per cent. abatement on the "special tariff" in favour of the Mother Country and those communities prepared to deal favourably by Canada, has become 25 per cent., as originally arranged, and by a very liberal interpretation of the preferential principle, it has been extended and amplified for the benefit of our stricken colonies in the West Indies. Finally, it has been decided to admit raw sugar from every part of the British Empire at a preferential rate, and Canada is looking forward to the consumption of sugar from Queensland, Fiji, and the Mauritius. She has also secured the honour of retaliation at the hands of Germany, whose nose was sadly put out of joint by the Jubilee preferential tariff, and the consequent denunciation of the Anglo-German Commercial Treaty. Germany officially announces that for the future she will accord most-favoured-nation treatment to imports from all parts of the British Empire except Canada. This is taken with much serenity in Ottawa, Sir Richard Cartwright, the Minister of Trade and Commerce, remarking:—"It was only what we might expect. If Canada did not give Germany the benefit of the most-favoured-nation clause, Canada could not expect her to give preference to Canadian trade with Germany. The loss will be all on one side, and will not hurt Canada. In 1897 Canada bought from Germany direct, exclusive of what came through Britain, which was a considerable amount, goods to the value of £1,298,600, while Canadian sales to Germany were only a little over £200,000, principally fruit and breadstuffs. The most-favoured-nation clause never was any benefit to Canada, and, as far as she is concerned, she will certainly make no complaint at Germany's present action."

A Triangular Duel.

In some respects the record of the past Session is disappointing. The Imperial projects entertained in Canada for a Pacific cable, a Fast Atlantic Service, and a great Postal Reform, though keenly supported have not materialized. Again, the long postponed Insolvency Law, which is a matter of semi-Imperial interest—as it deeply concerns trade—continues to be postponed. The Pacific Cable Scheme has developed into a sort of triangular duel between

Great Britain, Canada, and Australia; each blaming the other for apathy, and refusing to lead the way herself. But has not this duel lasted long enough? It benefits no one except the directors and shareholders in an existing company, which would have to reduce rates that are only maintainable under a monopoly. The delay on a question of vital importance to the whole Empire is rapidly becoming a public scandal. There are powerful influences at work to perpetuate it, but all that is required to overcome them is a concerted effort here and in the Colonies. Australia should see to it that her national interests are no longer paralyzed for the benefit of a single company, whose charges keep the rest of the world in outer darkness as to her doings. There is no great Imperial event booked for 1899. May we not anticipate the commencement of the Pacific cable? The chief domestic event of the recent Session was unquestionably the passage of the famous Yukon Railway Bill through a Liberal House of Commons at Ottawa to be summarily rejected by a large majority in the Conservative Senate. An "effete" second Chamber, based on the "oligarchic" principle of nomination, actually dared to brave a People's wrath—with a capital P—by throwing out a measure that had received the sacred imprimatur of the "popular, because elected," Chamber. The Liberal Party indulged in the usual denunciations and menaces such as we are furnished with in this country when the "hereditary enemies of the people" discharge their Constitutional duties by rejecting a mere Party Bill, which they have good ground for believing the nation does not support. We were promised "a Constitutional crisis" in Canada of the approved pattern, and the "ending or mending" of the Senate seemed at hand. The movement has, however, vanished into thin air. The ticket-of-leave man is still at large until he shall further misconduct himself.

THE COMMISSION. It is not necessary for us to further recapitulate the legislation of a Session comparatively uneventful as regards internal questions, though the Franchise Bill designed to simplify and cheapen Federal elections and the proposed Plebiscite on Prohibition, excited a good deal of attention in Canada. All these measures, as well as the other matters we have alluded to, were, however, completely overshadowed by the welcome improvement that seems to have taken place in the relations of every member of the British Empire and every State in the American Union. In its general aspects it has been sufficiently discussed in other parts of this Review, and we need only say here that recent events have demonstrated beyond a doubt that though there has been serious friction in the past, and may be again

between the English-speaking Republic and the English-speaking Monarchy, they have some common element which enables them to appreciate one another's action when the rest of the world can only depreciate and vilify it. This secret—whatever it may be—was the enthusiasm of a handful of people, and it has now been disclosed to an unascertainable but very large number of American citizens and British subjects. It does not encourage the two nations to enter the gusher's millennium, but it does enable them to come down to business with a fair prospect of a reasonable settlement. In this spirit Canada is entering into negotiations with her great neighbour, and a joint Commission has been appointed with a mandate to deal with the outstanding questions between them. The particulars of the composition of, and reference to, this Commission are embodied in a protocol which at the moment of writing has not been made public, but it is understood that Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Sir Louis Davies, Sir Richard Cartwright, and the British Ambassador at Washington (Sir Julian Pauncefote) will represent Canada, and that the reference will be wide enough to include every source of friction from seals to tariffs. To agree to discuss a settlement is not the same thing as to effect one, but it is generally recognized that for the first time during thirty years the parties are approaching one another with amicable intentions. The Commission will not consist of provincial attorneys anxious to keep open the quarrel, but of statesmen anxious to close it. That its labours have the hearty goodwill of every inhabitant of the old country goes without saying. Let us hope that Lord Aberdeen's farewell speech from the Throne on the prorogation of the Ottawa Parliament may prove to have been prophetic:—"I rejoice that during my term of office it has been my good fortune to witness the improved relations that have grown up between Canada and the neighbouring Republic, and I look forward with much satisfaction to the great benefits which will flow from the settlement of the many questions that have caused irritation in the past."

AUSTRALIAN FEDERATION.

The poll on the Australian Commonwealth Bill took place in the early days of June in the following colonies:—New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, and Tasmania. New Zealand has always held aloof, Queensland waited to see what New South Wales would do, and Western Australia decided to withdraw on the declaration of the decisions in the other Colonies. The future of federation, therefore, rested with the four first-mentioned members of the group. Latterly there had been very little doubt as to their probable action, and we indicated last month that Victoria, South Australia, and Tasmania might be expected to vote Aye, and New South Wale

an effective No. This is what has occurred, though few people in England were prepared for the handsome majorities recorded in the assenting Colonies, particularly Victoria. The opposition to federation in all three communities was, so to speak, "snowed under." Another feature of the figures is somewhat discouraging, for it shows that a substantial majority of the duly qualified electors of Australia are not sufficiently interested in the Federation question to go to the polling booth. This lethargy bears out the theory of Professor Freeman, viz., that federal problems do not interest the mass of mankind, and are only appreciated by a minority. The total number of electors entitled to vote was:— Victoria, 252,000; New South Wales, 293,000; South Australia 80,000 (*circa*); Tasmania, 31,000. According to the cables, some 114,000 votes were recorded in Victoria, 137,000 in New South Wales, 40,000 in South Australia, and 17,000 in Tasmania, *i.e.*, only in the two smaller Colonies did 50 per cent. of the electors participate in the plebiscite. Like all other Australian news the returns have dribbled in in the most confusing manner, and we cannot vouch for the accuracy of this record:—

	Ayes.	Noes.	Majority for.
Victoria	100,520	22,099	78,421
New South Wales ...	70,990	65,619	5,371
South Australia ...	25,659	15,121	10,538
Tasmania	13,496	2,900	10,596
Totals (*circa*) ...	210,000	106,000	105,000

Our readers are aware that although these four Colonies approve of federation by casting a majority of Ayes, the Bill is lost in New South Wales, where the enemies of a united Australia, who are vigilant and shrewd, had succeeded in carrying an amendment to the Federal Enabling Act, raising the necessary minimum of Ayes to 80,000, so instead of being carried by a majority of 5,000 this great measure has been defeated in the parent Colony by a shortage of about 10,000 votes. This is a heavy, but hardly an unexpected blow to those who have watched recent events.

Chaos.

As three colonies (Victoria, South Australia, and Tasmania) have carried the Commonwealth Bill they can, under its terms, proceed to form a federation if they choose; but it is doubtful whether they will. It is evident that they are seriously chagrined at the action of New South Wales, and there appears to be a feeling that Mr. Reid, the Premier of that Colony, though affecting to be a friend of federation, did not act the part of an ardent friend, but rather encouraged his supporters to vote against the Bill. Had he seriously devoted himself

to the cause he could, undoubtedly, have secured its triumph; and he certainly incurs a grave responsibility by his lukewarmness, during the closing stages of the campaign. The general impression is that it will be at least a decade before the question is seriously taken in hand again, unless some catastrophe brings home to our disunited fellow subjects the wisdom of the fable of the bundle of sticks. Mr. Reid is evidently a little conscience-stricken, for after the declaration of the poll he telegraphed to the other Premiers proposing a fresh conference to consider a modification of the Bill, so as to make it acceptable to New South Wales. Considering there have already been three prolonged conferences, extending over a year, this is not a particularly seductive offer. Mr. Kingston, Premier of South Australia, replied that his Colony definitely declined to join in an attempt to reject a constitution which had been accepted by the direct vote of the majority of the people in all the voting States, and to substitute for it another constitution more favourable to one State, on which the people have not had an opportunity of voting. Sir J. W. Downer, the leader of the Opposition in South Australia, emphatically endorsed Mr. Kingston's refusal. Sir E. Braddon, the Premier of Tasmania, curtly declined Mr. Reid's "subversive" proposal, and Sir John Forrest, the Premier of Western Australia, also sent a refusal. The Premier of Queensland—a Colony that has so far contributed nothing to the cause of federation—agreed to the proposed conference of Premiers. Sir George Turner, the Premier of Victoria, urged that before there was any conference Mr. Reid should tabulate his proposed amendments to the Commonwealth Bill, and that it should be understood that if they were entertained by the other Colonies the electors of New South Wales should accept the amended Bill before other electorates were troubled to vote.

PRODIGIOUS! Subsequently the nimble-minded Premier of New South Wales seems to have started on a fresh tack, by declaring that it would be "lame" to federate without Queensland. He appears to favour a Triple Alliance, comprising New South Wales, Queensland, and Victoria, omitting the other Colonies, a policy that leads them to enquire why they have been allowed to exhaust their political energies at federal conferences during an entire year if Australia can federate without them, and why they have been put to the trouble and expense of a plebiscite if the assent of the absent Queensland is vital to the creation of the Commonwealth? The whole political position at the Antipodes seems to be at sixes and sevens, and had the graceful greeting of Sir Wilfrid Laurier been penned in irony it would hardly seem

more cruel:—"Confederated Canada sends greetings and heartfelt wishes for the success of the cause of Federated Australia." The latest news to hand is that Mr. Reid, in response to Sir George Turner's request for the amendments that would make the Commonwealth Bill palatable to New South Wales, has brought forward what is practically a new Bill. The vital principles of the old Bill, which was framed with extraordinary care and skill, and has won the encomiums of educated opinion in all English-speaking communities, are to be discarded. Under the Reid dispensation there is practically to be no equality of representation in the Senate, the Senate is to have no voice in Money Bills, the Financial Clauses are to be recast, while, according to one cabled epitome of the "amendments," the Federal capital is to be confined to New South Wales, but this must be a joke. Apparently, Mr. Reid seriously asks that the whole work of the conferences shall be over-ridden and New South Wales shall be permitted to dictate the very terms that were rejected when the question was threshed out by the Colonies in council. It is really prodigious, but it can hardly be *bonâ fide.*

A Common-sense View.

It is surely common ground and common-sense that public opinion in the Mother Country should refrain from adopting a partisan view of the political controversies and struggles in a self-governing Colony. We may, therefore, view the impending contest in Cape Colony with equanimity, though if the sensation mongers had their way the fortunes of the Empire would be considered as inextricably bound up with those of Sir Gordon Sprigg. Happily, the British Empire is very much larger than this highly estimable Premier, and whether he remains where he is or is replaced by another, things will go on very much as they are, always provided that we at home do not lose our heads and heavily back what may turn out to be the wrong horse, which in such a case means the losing horse. If, *e.g.*, we declared *urbi et orbi* that Sir Gordon Sprigg and his Party alone carried the Imperial banner and that his opponents were "disloyal," &c., what unimperial fools we should all look and feel if the "disloyal" carried the day, and how sore they would feel with us and how delicate their relations with the Home Government would necessarily be. Let us, therefore, be careful not to commit ourselves to one side or the other, and let us be ready to welcome the winner, whoever he may be, in accordance with our principles and practice towards all great Colonies. Shrewdness enjoins this course, if only for the reason that political prophecy is such an uncertain business, and we can have no influence on the results.

We are, therefore, academic spectators of the extremely interesting struggle which commenced on June 14th, when Mr. Schreiner, a former Attorney-General in Mr. Rhodes' Ministry, but opposed to Mr. Rhodes since the Raid, moved a vote of want of confidence in the Cape Assembly in the present (Sprigg) Government. According to the meagre cablegrams, he complained of the famous whitewashing letter which Sir Gordon Sprigg addressed to Mr. Chamberlain last year on the subject of Mr. Rhodes as misrepresenting the people of the Colony, and he charged the Ministry with not cultivating cordial relations with the Dutch Republics. Mr. Schreiner is admittedly an able, conscientious man who used to have unbounded confidence in the "Colossus." Sir J. Sivewright, in replying for the Ministry, deplored Mr. Schreiner's changed attitude towards Mr. Rhodes, which he credited to his cross-examination by the South Africa Committee of the House of Commons. The stupid and brutal treatment of Mr. Schreiner by that singularly inept body no doubt nettled him, but he is not a small enough man to have been transformed by it. The speaker added that he had been friendly to the South African Republic so long as his patience lasted, but without obtaining anything in return. That is a strong but natural criticism.

A Cross-Bench Speech.

Later in the same debate there was a speech of great significance, which the hot heads should take to heart, owing to the speaker's record. By general consent Mr. Rose-Innes is the most universally respected man in Cape politics, in which he occupies the position of *vir pietate gravis*. He is unalterably attached to his British nationality and to the British connection, which his prudence and sagacity during stormy periods have done so much to strengthen. "When in doubt, follow Rose-Innes," is a good working maxim for the chronicler of South African affairs, and all parties make desperate efforts to capture him. We learn that:—"Mr. Innes, who now sits on the Cross Benches, said that he would vote for the Ministry because the Redistribution Bill must pass now or never. If the Ministry fell on a vote of want of confidence the Bill would be lost. He requested that Mr. Rhodes should abstain from taking a leading part in affairs for the present, as his influence was dividing the Colony itself upon the same lines as, unhappily, divided the Colony from the Republics. At the same time, he should not refrain from supporting progressive measures because Mr. Rhodes approved them. Moderate men were being driven between the anvil and the hammer, but he believed his own Party would become of great weight." That is a very sage reflection. There is no country

the world so greatly in need of moderation as this Colony, and, to a large extent, the future of South Africa depends on the influence that may accrue to this distinguished occupant of the Cross Benches. We trust he is justified in expecting to see the rise of a great Cross-Bench Party, which shall hold the balance even between the howling Jingo and the irreconcilable Afrikander.

THE CRISIS AT THE CAPE.

Since the preceding passages were written a political crisis has culminated in Cape Colony which emphasizes the soundness of the view that public opinion in the Mother Country should cultivate an impartial attitude towards the party conflicts of British Colonies enjoying responsible Government. So far, we have had no coherent account of this crisis, but the following facts emerge. The Sprigg Ministry desired to postpone the discussion of Mr. Schreiner's motion of No-confidence in order to take up the Redistribution of Seats Bill, for which they could rely on the assistance of the detached Progressive vote. The Opposition—like all Oppositions outside Great Britain—desired to proceed with their attack on the Government. Ultimately a compromise was arranged whereby the Second Reading of the Reform Bill obtained precedence on the understanding that facilities should be granted for the resumption of the Censure Debate. Thereupon the Assembly took up the Bill, and its Second Reading was carried against the previous question by forty-two votes to thirty-five, and Spriggites in all parts of the world were in high feather. This victory for the Government was accompanied by the announcement that "the debate on the motion of want of confidence will begin to-morrow, and will be continued from day to day till a vote is reached." We seemed to be in for a tremendous debate, but on the following day (June 22nd) London learnt, with manifest surprise, that Mr. Schreiner's motion had been carried by forty-one votes to thirty-six, owing, it is said, "to the defection of a few Progressives who refused to follow Mr. Rose-Innes' lead in rallying to Ministers, although they had supported the Redistribution Bill." Sir J. Gordon Sprigg appears to have wound up the debate in a speech adhering to his "Jubilee" letter, in which he declared that the people of the Cape were behind Mr. Rhodes. Now, as Mr. Rhodes is admittedly behind Sir Gordon Sprigg, and the Colony *ex hypothesi* behind Mr. Rhodes, Sir Gordon Sprigg ought invariably to outvote his opponents instead of being outvoted by them on this critical occasion. There must be a hiatus somewhere which we are not expert enough to indicate. The mystery is not cleared up by the laconic and bewildering sentence in *The Times*, "Mr. Rhodes did not speak in the debate except casually." One

would have expected that a single syllable from a man with a solid community behind him would decide any division, but the event only demonstrates how dangerous it is to speculate on South African politics. The Premier accepted his defeat, and immediately announced a dissolution. So the inevitable General Election will be anticipated by a few months, and the Redistribution Bill falls to the ground. Spriggites seem confident that, as the recent election of the Legislative Council went in their favour, so the new House of Assembly will be of the same colour. We prefer to abstain from prophecy.

A Gentle Remonstrance.

We desire to enter a mild protest against the ferocious cablegrams from Cape Town to *The Daily Mail*, which is a paper of great intelligence, real patriotism, and immense circulation, otherwise remonstrance would be wasted. Take the following sentences from its account of the foregoing proceedings:—"In the Cape Parliament to-day Mr. Schreiner's motion of want of confidence in the Government was carried by forty-one to thirty-six votes. The defeat of the Government, which was foreseen, is the expression of the hatred of the Afrikander Bond of the Redistribution Bill. The Bond members were assisted by the 'mugwump' English. Mr. Schreiner's party is amazed at the intention of the Government to dissolve Parliament, and they strongly resent the loss of their Parliamentary pay. The Transvaal Government is greatly exercised concerning the situation, viewing with great alarm the possible defeat of the Hofmeyr division. It is generally admitted that the Transvaal Secret Service fund is placed at the disposal of the agents of the party opposed to the Sprigg Government." Is this a fair or sensible account to present to the British public? The Afrikander opposition to the Redistribution Bill may be wrong-headed, but it is due to motives common to every party confronted with a measure which they believe will injure their interests. The Redistribution Bill is, in Afrikander eyes, an ingenious political gerrymander for the purpose of transferring power from themselves to their opponents, and to accept it would, in their judgment, be equivalent to a political suicide. We had a similar phenomenon in England in 1884, when the Radical Party sought, by a skilful manipulation of boundaries and other subtle devices, to enable Radicals to occupy what had been safe Conservative seats. We are not concerned to vote either for or against this Bill, or to vindicate the wisdom of the Afrikander view of what may be an admirable Bill. Some Bill was admittedly required, and the Second Reading of this one was carried; but here

is the view of one of its critics which tends to explain that "hatred" of which *The Daily Mail* correspondent complains:—

"On the surface the measure appears to be eminently reasonable and just. It is admitted on all hands that the urban centres of the Colony and some of the larger country divisions are greatly under-represented in Parliament, and the Bill appears to do a great deal towards removing this inequality. It gives to Cape Town five members instead of four, to the Cape Division five members instead of two, to Port Elizabeth four members instead of two, whilst nine single-membered constituencies are carved out of the larger country divisions, one member is allotted to the Cape University, and two additional members to the native territories on the Eastern border. What, it may reasonably be asked, could be fairer or more just?

"And yet a more dishonest Bill never yet was drawn up. No objection, it is true, can be taken to the increased representation given to Cape Town, the Cape Division, and Port Elizabeth. These are fully entitled to the concessions granted. Neither can grave objection be taken to the allocation of a member to the University, though it is debatable whether it is a good thing to strengthen the coloured vote by giving two additional members to the native border territories. And it is but just that the larger country constituencies should also have increased representation, whether by the splitting up of existing divisions or otherwise. All that being so, it may again be asked, where does the injustice come in? I shall explain. It lies in the *manner* in which it is proposed to grant nine additional members to the under-represented country divisions—not in the actual splitting up of the constituencies, but in the particular way in which the Bill splits them up. It is, in fact, a most audacious attempt at gerrymandering the constituencies. And an extremely clever effort it is, too. To outward appearance the country party are given a present of some seven seats; actually they lose double that number."

"Parliamentary Pay."

The Daily Mail correspondent further tells us that "Mr. Schreiner's party is amazed at the intention of the Government to dissolve Parliament, and they strongly resent the loss of their Parliamentary pay." In that case they must be singularly guileless people—and it is out of the question that they should harbour the crafty designs of which we have heard so much—to bring forward a vote of censure on a Government, which they were likely to carry, if all their plans could be upset by the Government's decision to dissolve a Parliament, which, in any case, would be dissolved this year by effluxion of time! The loss of "Parliamentary pay" may be inconvenient to some members of the Cape House, but why should it afflict Mr. Schreiner's followers more than those of Sir Gordon Sprigg? After all, a General Election is only a temporary hardship, which was bound to come some time this year. Finally, *The Daily Mail* correspondent declares that "It is generally admitted that the Transvaal Secret Service Fund is placed at the disposal of the agents of the party opposed to the Sprigg Government." We should imagine these "admissions" to be confined to the opponents of the Opposition, that is, the Sprigg supporters; they can hardly be "general" in the ranks of the Opposition.

Charges of corruption are not uncommon in South Africa, where impious people have the effrontery to assert that even the pure and immaculate Mr. Rhodes spends a princely fortune in buying up those electors and elected of Cape Colony who are for sale, while rasher persons have actually insinuated that in past times he has spent money in a neighbouring State in inducing its residents to rebel. We are not concerned with these charges and counter-charges, and they are certainly unworthy of continuous prominence in a London paper. If the "Transvaal Secret Service Fund" has been devoted to one in a thousand of the enterprises it is credited with having financed there cannot be much of it left for the coming election. Seriously, is it wise to put all the Imperial eggs into one South African basket? Is it a British interest to heap obloquy upon all and sundry who refuse to bow the knee to Sir Gordon Sprigg? Think how grievously that distinguished statesman has already let us in over that Jubilee battleship which he presented to the British Navy from Cape Colony last year, amid the delirious enthusiasm of the whole Empire. It was a definite promise for which, unfortunately, he had no authority. It made him the hero of the hour, but it has not strengthened the navy, and there are no signs of it on the horizon. Happily the British position in South Africa is not so parlous as to be dependent on his perpetual victory, or jeopardized by his failure. Let us look to the future and prepare our minds for the possible Premiership of any of the following, and a few others:—Sir Gordon Sprigg, Mr. Rhodes, Mr. Schreiner, Mr. Rose-Innes, Mr. Hofmeyr, Mr. Merriman, or Sir Henry de Villiers. The relations between the Imperial Government and the Cape Government will be rendered difficult if we all go blindly plunging on one man who may be defeated. Any of those above mentioned would, in different ways, make excellent Premiers of Cape Colony. They are all entitled to a fair field and no favour.

IN THE TRANSVAAL.

It hardly seems to be worth while to enter upon an elaborate discussion of the other South African topics which were to the fore until Cape Colony entered on her present crisis. Dr. Leyds has written a long and able reply to Mr. Chamberlain's recent despatch. Dr. Leyds contends that Great Britain is not the suzerain of the South African Republic. It is clear that the Boers are quite honestly convinced that this vague and indefinite term, which they seem to resent with a quite peculiar indignation, is not applicable to their *status*. At the same time, Dr. Leyds explicitly and unreservedly affirms the desire and intention of his Government to observe the terms of the London Convention, which is the basis of the British position.

If each Government were convinced of the good faith of the other upon this point, their relations would be considerably eased. But the Transvaalers have persuaded themselves that Mr. Chamberlain has imported the word suzerainty into the controversy, not as a mere definition of the relationship established by the convention, but as a *point d'appui* for further encroachments, although he has repeatedly disclaimed all title or wish to interfere in their internal affairs. On the other hand, the British believe that the Boers are only waiting for a favourable opportunity to repudiate the London Convention altogether—the opportunity being furnished by foreign complications. This mutual distrust may be mitigated by the departure of Dr. Leyds from South Africa for Europe, where he will act as Minister-Plenipotentiary for the Transvaal. His successor in the Secretaryship of State is Dr. Reitz, the well-known ex-President of the Orange Free State, of whom all men speak well. He is expected to take a far more liberal view than the retiring Hollander of the position of the Uitlanders, and he will conduct negotiations in a less rasping manner. He is credited with the desire to maintain friendly relations with other States of South Africa as well as with Great Britain, and we may hope that his work will not be hampered by the restlessness of Dr. Leyds in Europe. We must discount what we read in the papers about the latter's "intrigues" with this nation or the other. He has an unhappy faculty of exciting suspicion, and he is certainly not a soothing personality. Perhaps he will endeavour to influence the much talked of marriage between the young Queen of Holland and a Prince of the House of Baden, and so bring the German Emperor into South African politics, as a sort of moral Lord High Suzerain of the Transvaal. That would settle many difficulties, for the Prussian jack boot is not more popular with the Dutch Afrikanders than with the British. Dr. Leyds would probably not understand this, as he is not an Afrikander, but a Hollander.

THE CUSTOMS UNION.

The Customs Union, which has been agreed to by the delegates of Cape Colony, Natal, and the Orange Free State, is an event of no little importance as indicating a *rapprochement* between communities whose material interests have kept them at arm's length. As it requires Parliamentary ratification, its consideration may be postponed until it becomes operative. It seems, on the whole, to have been framed with considerable ability, and to effect a just compromise between the varied objects of the countries participating in it. But it appears to excite great local opposition, and as a specimen we give an extract from a speech delivered in the Natal

Assembly by Mr. Morcom, who was Attorney-General of the Colony under the Crown :—

"He said that there could be no doubt that the operation of that Convention, if ever it came into force, would be most far-reaching. He understood that the main grounds on which the Premier relied to give effect to the Convention and to promote the confederation of South Africa were of two kinds: There was the union political in character, and the other was the union commercial in character. For himself, he thought the idea of union was impracticable, and consequently it was impolitic under the present circumstances of the country. The question of federation had been considered years and years ago. It would require peculiar legislation to bring about any federation of South African States at the present time. South Africa was not ripe for the consideration of the question. The Transvaal was annexed with the view of federation, but these hopes were at an end. The extent of Natal's territory and other reasons would deal very adversely against any scheme for federation. Cape Colony, with its large population, would tell very heavily against Natal in any considerations which would have to be taken into account, but there was one ground upon which Natal could always take stand in discussing a federation scheme in reference to its Customs, its railways, and its Excise revenues. The Cape, year after year, had been adding to its territory, while only the small addition of Alfred County, and later Zululand, had been made to Natal. Natal could not by any possibility hope to enter into any federation upon any fair terms. The most important State, from the commercial point of view, the South African Republic, was not a party to the Convention.

"Any commercial federation of these various States was impossible and impolitic, unless the Transvaal, which was so largely interested in the question of trade with the Cape and Natal, was a party to the Convention. In case of any political federation Imperial legislation would be necessary, and that legislation could only be asked for when there was an irresistible public impulse for union, and that would not be brought about by any scheme which did not commend itself warmly to the hearts of the people. The Convention had alienated a certain portion of the people of the Cape Colony. There was and there had been for a considerable time a desire on the part of consumers in the Cape Colony for a reduction of the duties on food-stuffs. The people of the Cape Colony looked to Natal, when Natal was asked to join the Convention, to oppose these duties, and they hoped they would be assisted in seeking to remove those duties. But instead, the Cape fetters had been strengthened, and the burdens of the people made heavier, and by joining the Convention Natal had also taken those burdens upon her own shoulders. Then there was to be considered the loss of control over the taxation of the people. Should at any future time there be a shortfall, it would have to be made up by direct taxation, and they would have to adopt taxation of land. One could not but admire the ingenuity which had been exerted in the preparation of that Convention, the way in which interest had been set against interest. They were asked to adopt a Convention in the general interests of this colony, which, when it was examined, might possibly be found to be of advantage to one or two sections of the community, but which as a whole could not fail to be objectionable to the whole colony, prejudicial to its trade, and a thorough subversion of its fiscal system."

NATAL.

Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson, who has held the Governorship of Natal for the last four and a half years, delivered an exceedingly interesting lecture at the London Chamber of Commerce, on June 6th, on the resources and capabi-

lities of that Colony. Those who follow the fortunes of Great Britain, as we endeavour to do, could not but be gratified at observing that a large and interested audience could be assembled in the heart of the City of London at the busiest time of a year, crowded with sensations, to receive instruction in the affairs of a community which has never cultivated the vulgar art of advertisement. Natal is really very little known in England. It has escaped the curse of goldmines, millionaires, and raids, and has consequently been neglected by the boomster who only cares for sensations. However, she has thriven without journalistic attentions, and there is no reason she should not continue to do so. The Governor's address gives us in a concise and attractive form exactly the information that is wanted. He traced the history of the Colony from the time it was sighted by Vasco da Gama on Christmas Day, 1497, and named by him "Terra Natalis," through the preliminary colonizing efforts of Lieutenant Farewell of the British Navy and others at Durban in 1823 and 1824, to 1837, when the Dutch "voortrekken" under Retief came over the Berg, defeated Dinguan, the Zulu chief, and founded Pietermaritzburg. In 1843 Natal was proclaimed a dependency of the Crown, and in 1845 it became a province of Cape Colony. In 1856 it was constituted a separate Colony. In 1893 it was granted responsible government,* and in 1897—400 years after its discovery—Zululand was annexed to Natal. The following figures give a graphic picture of the development of the Colony :—"In 1837, when the Dutchmen came over the Drakensberg, the population of Natal consisted of probably 40,000 Kaffirs mainly of Zulu descent. To-day the population consists, probably, of between 50,000 and 60,000 Europeans, of whom perhaps about 5,000 are Dutch, the rest mostly British, about 50,000 persons of Asiatic descent, and 650,000 or 700,000 Kaffirs.† And by the addition of Zululand the acreage of the Colony has been increased from about 20,000 to about 35,000 square miles. The imports, which, in 1843, were valued at £11,712, rose in 1897 to £5,983,589. The exports, in 1843 £1,348, were valued at £1,621,932 in 1897. The revenue for the year ended 30th June,

* There is a responsible Ministry, consisting at present of six persons :—The Colonial Secretary, who is also Prime Minister ; the Attorney-General, who is also Minister for Education ; the Minister for Lands and Works, who is also Minister of Defence ; the Treasurer ; the Secretary for Native Affairs, and the Minister of Agriculture. There is a Legislative Council, consisting of a President and ten other members, nominated for ten years ; and an elected House of Assembly of thirty-seven members, including the Speaker, elected for four years, with a constituency of about 10,000 voters.

† These figures give us an opportunity of correcting a clerical error made in May NATIONAL REVIEW, when we inadvertently doubled the native population. —EDITOR, N.R.

1897, was £2,213,074, and the expenditure for the same period £1,624,957. . . . It would appear that the Natal railways in 1897 contributed £208,271 in reduction of taxation; or, taking the total Public Debt of Natal at £8,020,000, and the average interest at 4 per cent., it appears that in 1897 the Natal railways paid the interest on the whole Public Debt of the Colony, and about £147,000 over—a sum sufficient to pay the interest at 3½ per cent. (Natal 3½ per Cents., be it remembered, are at 106) on £4,200,000."

Coal.

After particularizing the other resources of Natal, such as sugar, tea, maize, cattle, sheep, horses, goats, and pigs, &c.—which make one realize what a keen interest this producing community should take in the question of bimetallism, which is the only mode of arresting the cruel fall in the general level of prices which gold monometallism has caused, is causing, and will continue to cause—Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson came to the great question of coal, of which the output was 243,807 tons in 1897. For strategic reasons the coal of Natal is an Imperial factor which might become momentous in war time, and in their determination to make it accessible to the British Navy the people of Natal are discharging a duty for which they cannot be sufficiently thanked. The supply is believed to be practically inexhaustible, and the quality of the steam coal is said to be hardly inferior to that of Wales. When all doubts are removed as to the suitability of Durban for a naval coaling-station by the removal of the bar of sand across the entrance of the harbour, this port will become one of the most important in the British Empire. The Governor was able to announce, on the request of the Premier of Natal, that the Government intend "to act promptly on the recommendation of the Hartley-Barry report and carry out the necessary improvements," a decision of which the Natal Assembly has just approved by a large majority. It is earnestly to be hoped that there may be no further delay in this matter. The speaker concluded this section of his address by a reference to the recent action of the Colony which has met with such a warm response throughout the Queen's dominions:—"That the difficulty which, as I have already told you, has been minimized, will eventually be overcome, I feel no doubt whatever; and when it is overcome, or perhaps before, we may hope that the proposal to establish a naval coaling-station at Durban may be reconsidered. In the meanwhile Natal may congratulate herself on having been mindful of her obligations as a member of the Empire. I am free to speak, in terms of praise, of her voluntary contribution of 12,000 tons of her coal annually to

the Imperial Navy, for it was the spontaneous act of the present Natal Ministers—an act which had been acclaimed by her citizens. Moreover, that contribution represents, in value, about three-fifths of one per cent. of Natal's total annual revenue—about fourpence per head of her total population—about four shillings per head of her white population. But it is not by the money cost of the contribution that its value should be measured; it is by the evidence which it affords of brotherly feeling, of recognition of unity of interest—of readiness to share in the responsibilities, as well as in the advantages, of Empire."

BRAIN AND MUSCLE.

The Governor of Natal—a community in which since the recent annexation of Zululand, the whites are to the blacks as 1 is to 13½—naturally did not omit to enforce attention to the relations between these races. This, indeed, is the real problem for South Africa to solve—the friction between the white races is a transient episode. What future is in store for a fragment of whites surrounded by a great black race? Will the whites become elevated into a real aristocracy such as existed in the Southern States of the United States in former times, or will they deteriorate into mere slave-drivers, such as the Southerners were represented by their enemies to be. The lecturer was necessarily guarded in discussing this matter:—"I have said that the labour suitable for a sugar plantation has to be imported. You will say, What about the 700,000 Kaffirs who, as you told us, populate Natal? I can only tell you that, as regards sugar cultivation and manufacture, a man must be able to rely on his labourers staying with him. A Kaffir, as a rule, will not work for more than six months or so at a time, and the sugar-planter is therefore obliged to obtain indentured labour from India. It is the same with the tea-planter. As to the labour question generally, it is a question which continually engages the attention of the various Governments in South Africa. If I were to discuss it in detail, I should keep you here much longer than you would like to stay, besides trenching on subjects on which, in South Africa, differences of political opinion exist. I will only repeat, therefore, what I have said in public before, that in South Africa, the brain is white, but the muscle for the most part is black. In Natal, there is no white labouring class in the sense that the term is understood here. The white working-men are almost without exception skilled artizans—masons, bricklayers, carpenters, coopers, fitters, and so forth. The heavy work, which does not require much skill, is done by the natives, who also share most of the domestic service with the Indian immigrants. There seems no prospect of a change in this state of affairs; and looking

to the fact that the realization of the projects formed by the brain of the white man must, therefore, in great measure, depend on their faithful execution by the muscle of the black man, you can understand how nearly this labour question (which is, after all, but a branch of what is known as the 'native question') affects the general welfare of the community, and how it continually demands and receives the careful attention of the Government."

THE NEWFOUNDLAND SCANDAL.

We have spoken strongly in previous numbers of this Review of the deplorable transaction whereby the Colony of Newfoundland has delivered herself into the hands of a contractor—a certain Mr. Reid. He may have all the good qualities in the world. We know nothing either for or against him. He is, so far as we are concerned, simply a contractor who is acquiring control of what is nominally a self-governing Colony. In an age of Leiters, Hooleys, and Rhode's, this incident is, perhaps, not to be wondered at. But if anyone doubts that the political vendors—the Ministry and Legislature of Newfoundland—have betrayed their trust to the Colony in conveying it to Mr. Reid, they should peruse the Parliamentary paper recently issued in reference to the "contract." Mr. Chamberlain is the very last man to interfere in, or pass a hasty judgment on, the management of a self-governing Colony, but no one who cares for the welfare and honour of the Empire, and has also followed the "negotiations" with Mr. Reid, can deny that the Secretary of State's observations are strictly constitutional and thoroughly deserved. In a despatch of 23rd March, 1898, from Mr. Chamberlain to Sir H. H. Murray, the Governor of the Colony, it is pointed out that the Imperial Government cannot veto the contract, as it is essentially a question of local finance, which does not interfere with Imperial interests:—"On these constitutional grounds he was unable to advise the Governor to withhold his assent to the Bill confirming the contract, but he could not refrain from expressing his views as to the 'serious consequences which may result from this extraordinary measure.' Under the contract 'practically all the Crown lands of any value became, with full rights to all minerals, the freehold property of a single individual, the whole of the railways were transferred to him, the telegraphs, the postal service, and the local sea-communications, as well as the property in the dock at St. John's. Such an abdication by a Government of some of its most important functions is without parallel. The Colony is divested for ever of any control over, or power of influencing, its own development, and of any direct interest in, or direct benefit from, that development. It will not even have the guarantee for efficiency and improvement afforded

by competition, which would tend to minimize the danger of leaving such services in the hands of private individuals." The Committee of Council in the Colony, in a long Minute, replied to the objections raised by the Secretary of State, and on June 3rd Mr. Chamberlain wrote to the Governor that he had not found in the reply any reason to alter his general opinion of the contract made with Mr. Reid, and that he did not consider any useful purpose would be served by arguing the matter in detail. If the contract should result in the benefits to the Colony which its Ministers anticipated, such a result would, he added, "be most welcome to Her Majesty's Government." So would they be welcome to every Englishman, but what "benefits" can possibly arise to compensate for the inevitable demoralization of becoming a one-man community? A Czar-contractor of the very best type is probably the worst form of Government any country could choose. We are sincerely sorry for the people of Newfoundland, the mass of whom have committed no greater crime than to elect a lax Legislature.

CORRESPONDENCE.

The Irish Land Acts at Work.

To the Editor of "The National Review."

Sir

In a recent article in The National Review (March, 1898) I dealt with the Report of the Royal Commission in relation to the fixing of "Fair Rents" and "True Value." I propose now to summarize the report on the subject of Land Purchase, and to make a few new suggestions. If, as I have shown, the landlords suffer in the administration of the Land Acts, so far as they relate to fair rents and true value, I think it was incontestably proved before the Royal Commission that the administration of the Purchase Acts is in such a state of anarchy as practically to destroy the capital value of estates for purposes of sale. The prediction of the author of the Land Act of 1881, that when rents were once fixed by the State they would become so secure that the *capital value* would be unaffected, or, if changed, would be increased; and the more recent predictions of the authors of the Act of 1896, that it would make no difference whatever to the landlords, have been amply falsified by the facts.

There are, moreover, serious hindrances in the way of Land Purchase, arising from the mode of administration of the Purchase Acts, in three respects:—

(*a*) In delays caused by too much red tape.

(*b*) In the inadequacy of the sums advanced by the Land Purchase Commissioners.

(*c*) In the loss of rent in the interval pending the completion of the arrangements for purchase.

The following extracts from the report deal with each of these matters.

(*a*) "There seems to be a concensus of opinion in Ireland, in which we concur, that beneficial results have followed from the sales already effected, and that it is very desirable to encourage landlords and tenants to avail themselves of the benefits of the Land Purchase Acts in the future more generally than they have done in the past.

"Unfortunately the efficiency of the Land Commission as a body for carrying out sales with dispatch has diminished instead of increasing.

The staff has been fully maintained, but the amount distributed has fallen away. The sum of £515,252, paid out in the year 1896 is less than in any similar period since the year immediately following the passing of the Ashbourne Act of 1885, and is less than one-third of the sum which was distributed in 1887, viz., £1,599,271.

"The Purchase Acts from 1885 to 1896 do not disclose any reason why the proceedings of the Land Commission in sales should have become more complex or more dilatory. On the contrary, by removing certain legal difficulties which formerly impeded the progress of sales, these Acts have tended to simplify procedure and facilitate the rapid completion of sales. The conclusion is almost irresistible that the increasing delays must be, in part at least, due to the rules and methods of procedure followed by the Land Commission. 'I am quite sure,' said Mr. Commissioner Wrench, 'that the delays in dealing with purchase now stop purchase . . . if we can only make the sales go through quickly and avoid "red tape," purchase will increase very much.'

(*b*) "It is thought by many witnesses that unreasonable strictness is exercised with regard to the amounts advanced, and that many proposals for loans which ought to have been accepted have been refused; the evidence of Mr. Commissioner Wrench strongly confirms this view. As the property pledged as security consists of the interests of both landlord and tenant (united in the tenant by his purchase), and as the money required is only that representing the landlord's interest, and as furthermore a part or even the whole of the purchase-money may be retained by way of guarantee deposit, it would have seemed probable that there would rarely be any difficulty in advancing the whole of the sum required.

"But such advances are frequently refused. The Commissioners acting in the Purchase Department decline to take into account the value of the buildings, on the ground of difficulties connected with the insurance of them. Considerable attention is also paid to the personal condition of the tenant and the stock on the holding, and from these circumstances, advances appear to be sometimes refused which might have been reasonably granted.

"We have evidence before us of one case in which the landlord had agreed to sell to his tenants at what has been described to us by a most experienced surveyor as a very moderate figure. On an application to the Purchase Department the Commission first *reduced the price of a particular holding* and then, even *when the whole* purchase money was offered as a guarantee deposit, *refused to advance* the money. This is not the only case which has come before us where *the landlord offered to leave the whole purchase money on particular holdings as a guarantee deposit and yet the advance has been refused.* In these cases it is obvious that it was *impossible for the Treasury to lose*, however deficient may have been the security of the land taken by itself. In our opinion the *practice of the Department has been over strict in the matter of security*, and applications to the Department have been thereby discouraged.

"We think that in every case in which the landlord and tenant have agreed upon a price, and the landlord is willing that the whole amount

should remain as a guarantee fund, the advance should be made as *a matter of course;* and that where the landlord gives a consent to this effect before the inspection of the land, the advance should be made without the expense and delay of the inspection, except so far as may be necessary to ascertain that the purchasers are the actual occupants of the holdings.

We are further of opinion that, where the purchase is made within a fixed period, *say five years from the fixing of a fair rent*, and the purchase-money does not exceed, *say eighteen years' purchase* of the fair rent, *that price ought to be accepted by the* Purchase Department as the sum to be advanced by the State, *without inspection*, except to the extent of ascertaining that the purchasers are the actual occupants.

(*c*) "The legal effect of an agreement for sale from landlord to tenant having been entered into, is to discharge the tenant from all rent and arrears, not up to the gale day preceding the signing of the agreement, but up to the date of such signing; thus leaving an intervening period, in reference to which either the landlord must forego his rent, or the tenant must, prior to the signing of the agreement, pay such rent. It has been pointed out to us that this system causes inconvenience, and acts as a deterrent to sales. The vendor, especially if he be a trustee, is unwilling to forego the rent; the purchaser often finds it very inconvenient, and regards it as a grievance to be called upon to pay up the rent at a time unusual to him.

"In our opinion, it would be conducive to sales to make the agreement operate as discharging the purchaser from liability up to the preceding gale-day, leaving him liable to pay, not rent, but interest on the purchase money, from such gale-day up to the completion of the purchase."

But the destruction of the Capital Value of Estates is much more serious than either the great reduction of rents or these hindrances to purchase, and if voluntary sales of estates from landlords to their tenants are to be encouraged, some drastic remedy must be immediately applied to the present administration of the law. Here is what occurs:—A landlord and his tenants agree upon a sale at a certain number of years purchase (say 18 or 20) of the rent, and the Land Purchase Commissioners are then approached. Their first proceeding is to send down an Inspector to report upon the security of each holding for the corresponding advance by the State. This Inspector takes a most unnecessary step; he proceeds in the most public manner to revise the judicial rents which have been fixed by another State Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction. He never reports the rents to be too low, but in a number of selected cases he declares them to be too high, and lets the tenants know what he considers the fair rents for purchase to be.

When the Purchase Commissioner in charge of the case comes to consider the report of the Inspector, he not only adopts the doubly reduced rent as his basis for sale, but he alters, in individual cases, the number of years' purchase which has been agreed upon by the landlord and his tenants. This mode of practice has two serious consequences: (1) If the landlord, finding that the total purchase money has been considerably

reduced, declines to proceed with the sale of his estate, the tenants naturally become dissatisfied, for they have been informed by a State official that their judicial rents are too high ; they consider the landlord guilty of a breach of faith in discontinuing the proceedings, and expect at least to get from him a further reduction of rent, and consequently in some cases refuse to pay any rent whatever. (2) If, on the other hand, the landlord, notwithstanding this great discouragement, elects to proceed with the sale, those tenants whose agreements with him have been carried out on the terms of the full purchase money being advanced to them, feel aggrieved when they find that some of their neighbours are offered greatly reduced terms for the advance of their purchase money. In all these cases those tenants who have kept their farms in the best order come off worst, while the thriftless or dishonest tenant who has allowed his farm to become deteriorated, either by negligence or of purpose, is given a bonus for his indifferent conduct by the State. Abundant evidence was laid before us to show that many of the tenants, expecting to purchase, deteriorated the fences on their farms and removed their stock, when preparing for the visit of the Inspector, and that they have thus been allowed to benefit by their own wrong. In my opinion, no revision of rent for the purposes of sale is necessary, and it should be discontinued. The verdict of one State Department upon this matter should be sufficient. I am further satisfied that the same number of years' purchase should be applied to every holding on the estate. If it should happen that the judicial rents have been fixed at different times and under differing scales of prices on the various holdings, so that a subsequent fall in prices may affect them differently, or if in some cases the near approach of a second judicial term might seem to indicate a change of rent, it might be well that a suggestion should be made to the landlord to make beforehand such a revision of the rents as would practically put all the tenants on a par, so that their rents might be considered to be judicial rents fixed at the same date. But such suggestion need not be carried too far, when it is remembered what a very substantial reduction the tenant obtains by the payment of instalments after purchase, compared with *any* judicial rent he may have been previously liable for. The chief reason assigned for these anomalous proceedings is, that the purchase Commissioners are bound in duty towards the State to see that there is ample security on each holding for the purchase money to be advanced thereon, and that in case of default of the payment of future instalments by the purchaser it might be impossible to effect a sale of the holding, as such sale might be boycotted by the adjoining tenants and purchasers. They also contend that there is less security for the payment of the instalments on the small than on the large holdings.

In regard to this latter statement, I may say that all the evidence on the subject of tenant-right values given before the Royal Commission goes to show that the sums paid for tenants' interests in small holdings is, proportionally, much larger than those given for large holdings.

With respect to the supposed difficulty of finding purchasers of defaulting farms, it should be made the direct interest of all the purchasers of

adjoining holdings to see that the market for such farms is protected. The following simple remedy would, in my opinion, amply meet the requirements of the case, in which the difficulties suggested are more imaginary than real. Let the liability to the State of each tenant on the estate (or on the townland if it be preferred) be increased at the time of sale by an insurance premium of 5 per cent. on the amount of the annual instalments, as a joint security from them all for the payment of instalments by each, and let those insurance premiums, to a sufficient amount, be confiscated to the Treasury in case of default of the sale of a holding in arrear, or returned to the tenants at the end of the time or when the balance of the purchase money has become secure, so far as this insurance premium has not been called upon to meet the default. The mild pressure of such a scheme will secure an ample number of bidders for any farm which has to be sold to meet arrears of instalments. There cannot be the least doubt that the security for the purchase money of the landlord's interest is most ample, when it is remembered that his interest is combined with the value of the tenant-right in the person of the tenant purchaser. There should therefore be a discontinuance of that cheese-paring policy in the matter of State loans from which the landlord alone suffers, and which is quite unnecessary for the security of the State.

It is quite impossible to expect land purchase to be generally accepted by the landlords, unless not only these administrative difficulties are removed in those cases where sales become inevitable sooner or later, owing to encumbrances, but also direct encouragement to sell is given to encumbered or unwilling landlords. This can only be done by re-establishing the market value of estates as far as possible, and for this purpose it would be well worth while for the State, in readjusting the "financial relations" between Great Britain and Ireland, to provide that after the ordinary terms of advance of purchase money to the tenants shall have been settled, the landlord who agrees to sell shall receive from the State a bonus of three years' purchase, provided that such bonus does not make the whole money paid by the State amount to more than 21 years' purchase of the rental in any individual case.

If moreover it be generally allowed to be advisable, in the interests of the State and of public order, that the so-called dual ownership created by Parliament should be done away with by every possible means, then equal facilities should, in all fairness, be given to the landlords to buy out their tenants as are given to tenants to purchase out the interests of the landlords, especially as the landlords can give much greater security to the State for such advances than the tenants can in similar cases, viz., the security of the rest of their properties.

If some such plans as I have indicated here, combined with liberal advances for the fining down of rents into perpetuities, which I have so often advocated elsewhere, be adopted, a period would be put to that unrest, of which the Report of the Royal Commission so strongly complains.

ANTHONY TRAILL.

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THE NATIONAL REVIEW.

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EPISODES OF THE MONTH.

THE NAVAL PROGRAMME.

Members of the House of Commons, though proud of belonging to the Imperial Parliament, do not, as a general rule, take a very intelligent interest in either Foreign or Imperial affairs. They prefer to circulate round the parish pump, and are only stirred to their spinal marrow by such colossal problems as the vaccination of children, or the muzzling of dogs, and on the former, at any rate, are prepared to eject their Party from power even against their own convictions. However, we live in an age of small mercies, and we must be thankful for what is vouchsafed us. The House of Commons begins to realize that the British Navy, though not a suitable subject for a full dress debate, in which the great, wise, and eminent occupants of Front Benches pulverize one another, is a question of primary importance. The First Lord of the Admiralty is no longer regarded as a dinner-bell, and can count upon expounding the Naval Estimates, not to a handful of "naval bores," but to a fairly large and closely-attentive audience, with a wholesome distrust of official optimism. Mr. Goschen (the present First Lord) is always on his metal on these occasions, and in introducing the Supplementary Estimate, on July 22nd, he made a speech of great ability and some significance. He explained that the original programme laid down this year, together with the previous programmes since the Naval Defence Act of ten years ago, ensure

a total of "forty-one first-class battleships built and provided for." He affirmed that "our numbers are equal to those of any two Powers in first-class battleships, taking ships built and building, and I am prepared to maintain that the forty-one ships which I have mentioned cannot be matched in power, speed, and efficiency generally by the fleets of any two Powers." The original programme for this year consisted of three battleships (included in the forty-one), four cruisers, four armoured cruisers, and four sloops. "We considered that this programme was sufficient with the knowledge that we had at the time that the estimates of the year were submitted. It was based on what I may call the two-Power policy—the two-Power system—the principle that we must be superior in power and equal in numbers to the fleets of any two countries. I think that history has shown over and over again that two allies have never been considered equal to the one fleet of a single Power. Although I make that remark I stand by the principle—which we have followed and intend to follow—that we must be equal in number to the fleet of any two Powers, and now, in consequence of the action of another Power, the same principle compels us to take further action by a supplementary programme."

THE RUSSIAN CHALLENGE.

Mr. Goschen very wisely refrained from making any mystery as to the identity of the Power whose action is responsible for the introduction of the Supplementary Estimate. To have done so would have been farcical, considering the ostentatious manner in which this foreign nation has "boomed" her programme. The First Lord of the Admiralty couched his reference to the opponent in strictly proper and studiously unprovocative language:—"I regret that it should be my misfortune to have to introduce the name of any foreign Power, but it is impossible to conceal the fact that it is the action of Russia and the programme on which she has entered which is the cause of our strengthening our fleet and taking parallel action with her. Now, let it be distinctly understood that what we propose is not aggressive in the slightest degree. Let Europe note that we intend to increase our power because we believe that it is absolutely essential to maintain the principle that we have laid down, and I will say more—I do not assume—I will not assume, and I am not entitled to assume, that the action of Russia is simply taken as a menace to this country or is directed against us. Russia has possessions bordering on other Powers who are increasing their navies very rapidly, and Russia has a perfect right to look to her own interests and to build such a fleet as she thinks that her position in the world requires. But, deeply as I regret that we should be forced into that position, we must take parallel action ourselves with what other Powers do—parallel action with

the action taken by other Powers. . . . . We know of six Russian battleships to be laid down this year, including one already commenced. We have now verified where those six ships are being built. Of those I took two into account in my original estimate. From the last information, the new Russian programme provides for four cruisers—that is to say, four cruisers in addition to those provided for already. My supplemental programme also includes twelve torpedo-boat destroyers. This, then, is my proposal—four battleships, four cruisers, and twelve torpedo-boat destroyers." The reader will have gathered that the British ship-building programmes for 1898 jointly provide for seven battleships, eight cruisers, four armoured cruisers, four sloops, and twelve torpedo-boat destroyers, at a total outlay of £15,000,000, spread, say, over the next three or four years. Mr. Goschen indicated an important distinction between the battleships of these two programmes. The first three belong to the *Formidable* class, the final four "will have rather more speed, rather less draught of water, will be more calculated to pass through the Suez Canal without lightening, and will have slightly less armour. They will be designed to meet those ships which they are likely to encounter in the waters to which they are sent (an honourable member, "What waters"). "I should have thought honourable members would read between the lines." The Admiralty ask for a free hand as to the designs of the new ships, which will depend on what is done abroad. We read the speech as an intimation to those whom it may concern that Great Britain will not relinquish the command of the sea to any alliance that may be formed. When either of the partners puts down a ship we shall put down a superior ship, and build it faster.

POLITICAL VANITY.

Mr. Goschen's otherwise excellent speech was marred by one unworthy and, indeed, absurd observation:—"I may here say that we have not had a single ship or a single man added to the navy in consequence of outside pressure from whatever quarter. We have followed our own system, and I strongly hope that that may continue to be the policy of successive Boards of Admiralty, and that they will be sustained by the authority of the House of Commons." This and other interlocutory remarks made in the course of the debate by Mr. Goschen suggest that we owe our magnificent fleet to the foresight, vigilance, and zeal of successive First Lords of the Admiralty, who have refused to surrender their superior judgment to the ignorant clamour of irresponsible "agitators." In the main this statement is a travesty of the truth. The existing British Navy is the child of "agitation," which has fortunately

been neither ignorant nor irresponsible. The agitators originally consisted of a handful of men—and, we believe, one woman—who realized in the first place that the maintenance of British Sea Power was the basis of the British Empire, and, in the second, that the politicians were allowing this precious Sea Power to run to seed. They therefore set to work to stimulate their countrymen. By a happy accident their efforts coincided with the publication of a profound treatise by an American writer, which was an education in itself, on the influence of Sea Power. These volumes ensured the victory of the agitators and the defeat of the politicians who had fought inch by inch against any serious addition to our navy. Both parties were equally to blame, and the "responsible" politicians, Conservative or Radical, repeatedly sought to kill the agitation by the crushing announcement that if more ships were built the Admiralty would not know what to do with them. But the agitation was invariably successful, because it was conducted by skilful and determined people who had completely mastered their subject, and the Departmental declaration was no sooner made than it was killed by a murderous array of facts. There was no kudos to be gained in resisting this "outside pressure," so eventually the statesman capitulated and graciously consented to give his name to a Naval Programme of which he subsequently convinced himself that he had been the real author, whereas, in reality, he had fought it as long as he dared. No one grudges him his titular honour; as long as we have the thing the name does not matter; but when the present First Lord of the Admiralty seeks to pooh-pooh the "pressure" to which he and all his kind have capitulated, he gratuitously "gives himself away."

LORD CHARLES BERESFORD.

Mr. Goschen's petulance was naturally resented by Lord Charles Beresford, who has done more for the British Navy than both Front Benches combined. His utterances have a peculiar importance because they are the fruit of unremitting industry and accurate information. Whenever he has declared an increase to be due, no long interval has ensued before the increase has been officially announced. He thought "the proposals that had been made by the right hon. gentleman in regard to battleships and cruisers were most satisfactory." In reply to an indignant interruption by Mr. Goschen, the speaker modestly disclaimed the authorship of the last Naval Defence Act.

"All that he had ever asked was that somebody should do something. He wished to be more chivalrous and more generous than the right hon. gentleman, and to say that the Government could not go to the country and ask for large sums of money without having public opinion with them. Those of them who had taken up this question had done so from motives of pure patriotism and with the idea of awak-

ing their fellow-countrymen to the state of the case. And some of them had suffered a good deal for it. He personally had suffered very much. He was treated with ignominy over his A.D.C.-ship to Her Majesty, and his time was stopped in the Sudan when no other officer had it stopped who was engaged in that war service. If the right hon. gentleman chose to bring up these things he could say just as nasty things. But it was not in his line."

Lord Charles Beresford regretted the postponement of this important vote till the end of the Session, when there was no time for fair criticism, the delay being all the more inexcusable

"Considering the panic into which the country was thrown by the speeches of Ministers—the First Lord of the Admiralty himself delivering two or three of them—declaring that the country would get into mischief owing to the action of foreign Powers. His right hon. friend snubbed him most violently when he asked him a question as to whether the naval lords were satisfied with the shipbuilding vote. His right hon. friend must have known long ago what Russia was doing. The Chancellor of the Exchequer must have known it when he presented the country with £1,500,000 in the reduction on tobacco. (The Chancellor of the Exchequer: "No, I did not.") Well, I knew something about it, and surely I ought not to know more than the Government. I asked the First Lord of the Admiralty a question about the Russian programme as far back as last March, and my right hon. friend first told me there were two ships building; then three; then four; and now he comes down and tells us there are six, which is the number I gave."

Lord Charles has scored heavily over this "Russian programme," and we may hope that in the future the House of Commons will be less ready to accept official "assurances" as to the proposals of other nations than hitherto, and less ready to remit taxation on the initiative of men who subsequently have to confess that they "did not" know those proposals. It is satisfactory to have the speaker's assurance that "If we went to war just now he believed that we could hold our own, certainly against two other Powers, if not against three." But he significantly added, "it was the future he feared." Mr. Goschen's programme was agreed to without a division, Mr. Labouchere alone opposing it: Sir William Harcourt reluctantly confined himself to an acrid attack upon its finance.

MURAVIEFF *v.* DE WITTE.

Our new Naval Programme had been talked about some time before it was propounded, and, judging from the Moscow correspondent of *The Standard*, it would appear as though Russia had got wind of it. In the same issue that contained Mr. Goschen's speech this correspondent declared:—

"For some reason or other, the spending of ninety millions of roubles, which was recently announced with a flourish of trumpets as about to be devoted to the adding of ships to the Russian Navy, has been suddenly checked. It was much doubted at the time whether Russia could afford, except on paper, such a large sum of extraordinary expenditure in addition to the already increased Ordinary Vote for the navy. On the other hand, military projects have always had the primary claim on the finances of the Empire, so that the money would probably have been found. I believe that this Extraordinary Vote is yet hardly touched, as the ships

building abroad for Russia were ordered before the ukase authorizing the expenditure of ninety millions was signed. The decision to abandon, at least for the present, further expenditure upon naval construction was arrived at with unexpected suddenness. It is hardly creditable to British diplomacy to suppose that a large Extraordinary Vote was merely a piece of bluff, which was dropped after having served its purpose. It is preferable to hope that the views of the Party which holds that England is a more profitable friend for Russia than Germany is now gaining strength."

If this news is substantiated it marks a significant stage in the struggle which surges round the Czar between Count Muravieff, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who represents the aggressive military and bureaucratic element which wants to force the pace, and the more circumspect Minister of Finance, M. de Witte, who has told his Imperial master that six years of unbroken peace are vital to Russian interests. Her railways, her finances, and her army cannot stand any strain in the interval. She may plan, plot, squeeze, and contrive during this period, but until its close she must not exasperate any first-class Power beyond endurance. That is M. de Witte's urgent and sound advice. As a distinguished diplomatist recently said to a friend, "The German Emperor seems to be the only man in Europe who cares to make hay while the sun shines. He snatched Kiao Chau from under Russia's nose." Since this remark was made the Kaiser has decided to appropriate what he can in Asia Minor! Now the Czar is a wobbler. He inclines first to the Muravieff and then to the de Witte Party, and back again. The Foreign Minister was laid up with smallpox in the winter, during which time his rival had a good innings and Russia remained as quiet as a dove. But the premature developments of the Far Eastern Question gave the convalescent Count abundant opportunities of reasserting himself, which he did not neglect, and M. de Witte was in his turn in abeyance. Count Muravieff, however, as shown in his despatches, belongs to the category of those who are "too clever by half." They ultimately overreach themselves. This has happened in his case, and he is now a little "off colour." M. de Witte has succeeded in temporarily impressing the Czar with the fact that Russia the Unready has exasperated the English people beyond the safety point. The Supplementary Estimate has come in the nick of time to clinch the argument.

A Neglected Opportunity.

One sentence in the First Lord of the Admiralty's speech has attracted more attention outside the House of Commons than during the debate. Mr. Goschen said:—"The battleships will not be of the *Formidable* class, but will have rather more speed, less draught of water, be better adapted for passing through the Suez Canal, slightly less armoured, and designed to meet such ships as they are likely

to encounter in the waters to which they are sent." In reply to an interjection he invited his audience to "read between the lines." We have read between the lines, and we gather that a part of the new fleet is to be consecrated to the maintenance of British interests in the Far East, but we are not told what those interests are. In other words, the community are to be asked to undertake fresh burdens in pursuance of a policy which is shrouded in mystery. Unionists are, we trust, sufficiently democratic to resent this usage, especially as almost everyone connected with China seems to be convinced that the Government has no presentable Chinese policy. One observes, in the first place, that the Cabinet decline to allow the question to be discussed in the House of Commons, and, in the second, that Mr. Curzon is permitted to treat any member who interrogates him thereon as a public enemy. It is, therefore, ten thousand pities that when Mr. Goschen invited the Commons to authorize the construction of special ships "for passing through the Suez Canal" he was not challenged to break this conspiracy of silence as to our policy in regions beyond the Canal. A few months ago "crazy Jingoes" declared that Great Britain should decline to allow Russia to appropriate Port Arthur, from which she had ejected Japan on the specific ground that its occupation by another Power was incompatible with the independence of China. We can all recall the derisive indignation of Ministers. "Fight Russia," they ejaculated, "for the sake of Port Arthur, which is practically connected with St. Petersburg! You will merely drive her into Herat. She is invulnerable, and you must be mad!" Russia will be far more invulnerable in the Far East by the time these new ships are built than when she "jumped" Port Arthur. If the Jingoes were mad, this policy is madder. On the other hand, if the ships have another objective than Russia, why needlessly provoke Russia?

THE OLD POLICY.

We shrewdly expect that these improved *Formidables* are not designed to support British policy in China, but as a substitute for it. Bear in mind that the January policy of "open door" and "equality of opportunity" has gone beyond recall, and has not yet been replaced by any alternative policy. There was no mystery at the opening of the year. Cabinet Ministers spread themselves over the country and talked China from every platform. Having proclaimed their policy, they became as happy as hens that have laid an egg. To-day all is silence, and Sir Michael Hicks-Beach enforces the unimpeachable proposition that Lord Salisbury is the only member of the Government competent to speak on foreign affairs. Six months ago it was otherwise; in fact, the most striking utterance on the

Far Eastern Question came from the Chancellor of the Exchequer himself. It was universally applauded at the time, because it convinced the country that, at any rate, one member of the Cabinet knew his own mind and was not afraid to speak it. Moreover, he laid down a definite and intelligible policy, which all who ran could read, and which all who read approved. These were his words at Bristol on 17th January, 1898:—"What we wanted in China was not territorial acquisition. We thought of that country with no selfish interest. We desired to open it, and its hundreds of millions of toiling, patient, and hard-working people, to the benefit of the trade of the world. We desired that our civilization, through trade, should be brought into closer touch than had yet been possible with their civilization, which, it must be remembered, existed centuries before ours was born. We did not regard China as a place for conquest or acquisition by any Euporean or other Power. We looked upon it as the most hopeful place of the future for the commerce of our country and the commerce of the world at large, and the Government were absolutely determined, at whatever cost, even,—and he wished to speak plainly—if necessary, at the cost of war, that that door should not be shut." That was a policy of common-sense, *provided it could be carried out*, expressed in courageous, *if sincere*, language. It was interpreted as signifying that Great Britain would not permit China to be treated like Africa and partitioned into spheres of influence in which different European nations would occupy privileged positions to the detriment of the outsider.

THE NEW POLICY?

Unfortunately this excellent and animating pronouncement against spheres of influence did not commend itself to other nations, who forthwith proceeded to select their various spheres. Russia in the north of China, Germany in the Shantung province, and France in the south. No serious steps were taken by this country to enforce its declared policy. It was in fact seen to be a counsel of perfection which looked well and sounded well, but it was altogether above the head of this unregenerate world. No other nation would hear of it except the United States, and she refused to support it. Japan probably approved, but had been put *hors de combat* for the time by a foolish financial policy. By a vicious irony of fate the only country whose interests are menaced by our benevolent championship of "equality of opportunity" for all nations throughout the Chinese Empire, is Great Britain. Having been unable to prevent the establishment of vast foreign spheres of influence in which the nationals of other Powers will ultimately get all the concessions, contracts, and trade, she apparently finds her-

self debarred from declaring a British sphere of influence in which British interests will be strengthened. For example, Englishmen may not build, own, and operate a railway north of Peking owing to Russia's remonstrances, but Frenchmen and Russians may construct and control a strategic railway right across the Yang-tsze Valley which would be our sphere of influence if we had not committed ourselves to an illusory policy of which nothing remains but "the baseless fabric of a vision." Fortunately it is not too late to retrieve something. Let us cordially abandon that figment embodied in a House of Commons resolution, "the independence and integrity" of China, and leave off talking about "equality of opportunity" in Shantung, or the "open door" into Manchuria. Let us concentrate our energies upon the central provinces, whither the Chinese Monarchy will eventually gravitate. Let us delimit our sphere of influence, officer a Chinese army, and organize a Chinese navy. Some such scheme would enable the Government to answer the question which the House of Commons should insist on having answered before the present Session closes:—"What is the policy to which the new battleships are to give a moral support?"

THE WAR. At the time of writing there is a lull in the Spanish-American War, which is due to the staggering blows received by the weaker nation. Her last serious fleet, under Admiral Cervera, though fast, modern, and bravely manned, has been as completely pulverized off Santiago by Admiral Sampson's squadron, under Commodore Schley, as were her old wooden ships in Manila Bay by Admiral Dewey. This remarkable action is fully discussed elsewhere, so we can pass it over in these pages, as also the capitulation of a large Spanish garrison at Santiago (presumably without ammunition) to a numerically inferior American force, known to be in difficulties. These great events have had one wholly unforeseen consequence, which will furnish future moralists with a prolific theme, and may modify their strictures on the horrors of war. For the American triumphs have not only diminished the hostility of the victors for the vanquished, which is natural in a generous-minded nation, but they have positively diminished the hostility of the vanquished for the victors. This improved feeling is due to the splendid personal qualities exhibited by both combatants; the valour, the self-devotion, the terrible sufferings during the sea and land battles, and the consideration, as wise as it was chivalrous, shown by the American army and navy to the Spanish army and navy. There can be no lasting rancour between such foes, *e.g.*, as Captain Evans of the *Iowa* and Captain Eulate of the *Viscaya*. They

fought one another yesterday, and they may fight one another to-morrow, but in the interval they fraternize. Again the world has witnessed the singular and gratifying spectacle of the successful general in the field standing out for honourable terms for the defeated enemy while the distant politician in the safe seclusion of Washington pressed for humiliation. Happily General Shafter carried the day. Spaniards are profoundly sensitive on points of punctilio, and the considerateness of the American arrangements enabled General Toral to salute the Stars and Stripes as the emblem of a courteous and gallant opponent, while the victorious American army is said to have been played into Santiago to the tune of "The Star-Spangled Banner" by a Spanish band. This we imagine, if true, to be a unique episode in the history of warfare. Side by side with the amenities between the opposing forces has been observable a distinct cooling—to use the mildest term—between the allies (Americans and Cubans), which may lead to startling developments. War evidently scatters illusions as well as prejudices. We much regret that owing to a failure of mail we are unable to present our readers with Mr. Maurice Low's admirable account of current events in America.

PEACE? The Spanish Government is said to have taken advantage of the suspended animation of the war to indulge in "diplomatic exploration" as to the possibilities of peace. The preparation of Commodore Watson's squadron which was about to visit the Spanish coasts is apparently suspended, and it almost looks as though some indirect negotiation might be afoot. It certainly would be afoot if the Spanish Government possessed common-sense, nerve, or patriotism, but the whole course of the war shows that the Sagasta Cabinet is entirely devoid of any of these qualities. All through the piece the Madrid politicians have counted on assistance from accidents, and at this moment they probably set some store by American "difficulties" in the Philippines and in Cuba, and imagine the enemy may be induced thereby to consent to easier terms, if not to withdraw their forces altogether from these disappointing islands. They do not appreciate American grit which ensures the successful accomplishment of the various jobs the United States has in hand. It is certain that no Spanish proposals for peace would be entertained in Washington which did not recognize the termination of Spanish rule in Cuba and Puerto Rico. The desire to liberate the former island was the mainspring of the war, and the acquisition of the latter is a reasonable prize. Since we last wrote, the Senate has become a convert to the annexation of Hawaii,

which shows that the Imperial idea is growing in America, and the demand to retain the Philippines may become irresistible. If Spain has chastized Cuba with whips, she has chastized the Philippines with scorpions, and the American people will not be easily convinced of the equity of surrendering this group of islands to their cruel step-mother. If Spain is prepared to part with Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, peace could be made to-morrow, which is not the same thing as saying that it will be made.

A Possible Development.

There is no doubt a lingering hope in Madrid that at the eleventh hour some international complication may supervene which will break the fall of Spain, or at all events cover her collapse. The continued presence of the German squadron at Manila, to the manifest annoyance of the Americans, feeds this hope, which is also nourished by the frequent allusions in the Continental Press to the Treaty of Shimonoseki, when a European combination, consisting of Russia, France, and Germany, intervened to rob triumphant Japan of the legitimate fruits of her defeat of China, the inference being that the same Concert, reinforced by Austria, will, at the psychological moment, declare that the future of the Philippines is a European, and not an American question. Although some such diplomatic movement may be stirring, we refuse to believe it can be more than an attempt to bluff President McKinley, who, rightly or wrongly, is regarded on the Continent as a weak man. These Powers cannot be such fools as to seriously meditate treating the United States as they treated Japan. We can dismiss the Philippine Concert. If there is to be a "development" it will take another direction. The recent announcement that Commodore Watson had been commissioned to take a squadron into the Mediterranean greatly fluttered the dovecotes of Europe, although the United States have a perfect right to extend their naval or military operations wherever they are most likely to fulfil their proper function, which is to terminate the war. Why, then, should Europe excite herself over a natural and legitimate manœuvre? Simply because the Mediterranean bristles with "questions" which may be precipitated into "crises" by the rude touch of a third party. There is, *e.g.*, the "question" of Morocco, a country which Italy and Great Britain are pledged to defend against external aggression, while France is prepared to pounce upon it at the first opportune moment, for which purpose she keeps 80,000 troops in Algiers. However, they could only reach their objective by sea. Then, again, there is the "question" of Ceuta, which Spain might, in her present straits, seek to lease or mortgage to some strong Sea

Power to the intolerable detriment of British interests as represented by Gibraltar. There is ample scope for trouble at the western end of the Mediterranean, and it is high time that our battleships ceased to circulate round the interesting island of Crete.

MR. WHITE'S REBUKE.

It is not often that a nation lays itself open to such a crushing rebuke as that administered to Germany on 4th July by the United States Ambassador, or that diplomatists are able to wield a flail with the delicacy and deadliness of Mr. Andrew White. The occasion was the annual gathering at Leipsich of Americans resident in Germany to celebrate Independence Day. The cause of the castigation was the contemptible attitude assumed by public opinion in Germany during the last few months towards the United States, which may be summed up in Pope's line—

"Willing to wound and yet afraid to strike."

Mr. White commenced by referring to the "very widespread, very deep, feeling of regret, and even of resentment, among Americans who have within the last few years passed most of their time in Germany, at what they believe to be the injustice of German popular feeling towards our country." The Ambassador proceeded to express this "resentment" in cogent and scathing terms which delighted his audience:—

"It is said by them that there is throughout Germany a widespread, unreasoning dislike, frequently amounting to hatred, of America and Americans; that for some years there has been a determined effort throughout Germany to misrepresent and cry down not only everything done within our borders, but every product of our country; that every sort of petty occurrence or utterance on American soil has been magnified and represented as typical of American wickedness; that the genius of letter-writers has been constantly exercised not only in distorting events which have occurred, but in inventing events which have not occurred; that American statesmen of proven integrity have been represented as corrupt or animated by the lowest and most contemptible motives; that every sort of malignant prophecy has been indulged in as regards the future of the country; that especially since the beginning of difficulties between the United States and her present antagonists the feeling, aims, intentions, and actions of our Government and people have been grossly misrepresented; that scattering utterances of scatter-brained Americans exercising neither authority nor influence in our country have been dwelt upon throughout Germany as showing the feeling of the American nation; that sensation articles of uninfluential journals have been paraded as the deliberate judgments of our people, while utterances by the respectable and influential Press of the country, showing the best of feeling to Germany, have been passed over in silence; that in spite of the fact that Germans in America are welcomed and respected, deliberate attempts have been made to induce the German people to believe that there is throughout the United States a *Deutschenhetze*, a dislike of Germans and a desire to exclude them from our country, or to injure them; that every item of news unfavourable to us has been received in Germany with widespread delight, and every item of news favourable to us has been received with evident regret; that as a rule even the poor courtesy

of giving us our proper name has been denied us, and that we have been constantly and contemptuously alluded to as 'Yankees'; in short, that accusations against us are constantly made which would be ludicrous, were it not that they are provoking for generations to come an era of bitter ill-feeling between the two nations."

The speaker declined to discuss these views, but dismissed them in the words of an eminent composer when told that certain people did not like his music "*Qu' importe au pommier ceux qui n'aiment pas les pommes?*" He appealed rather "from the Germany which so many of our countrymen have pictured to themselves and are beginning to regard with aversion and hatred" to the Germany he had known for forty years, and vouched that "whatever prejudices may affect any of the German people for a time we may confidently count upon the final supremacy among them of right reason and justice."

GERMAN NEUTRALITY.

Having liberated his mind as a man, Mr. White resumed the Minister, and very properly rendered homage to the action of the German Government, which had observed "full and strict neutrality, and this neutrality has been neither cold nor grudging." He also asserted that "whoever else in Germany may or may not understand the real import of the present struggle, and the questions bound up in it, the German Government understands those questions, and does justice to the motives of our Government." Mr. White has been criticized by some of his own countrymen for indulging in what seems to them as an extravagant assertion. We cannot agree with this view. An Ambassador is bound, by the necessities of his position, to accept the statements formally made to him by the foreign Government to which he is accredited. Germany has overflowed, officially, with friendly assurances to both belligerents throughout the present "unpleasantness." Mr. White is strictly correct in taking them seriously, otherwise international business would become impossible. At the same time, the German Emperor has made a point of expressing his indignation at American policy to all and sundry who have come across him, nor has he minced his language. Having recently appropriated the distant harbour of Kiao-Chau and the adjoining Chinese province as "compensation" for the murder of two missionaries, his Imperial Majesty was furious when the United States, having witnessed a loss of life in Cuba amounting to at least 200,000, decided to suppress an impossible scandal off her own coast; he treated their humanitarianism as so much humbug, and declared they had no more right to interfere with Spanish rule in the West Indies than he to interfere with Swiss rule in Switzerland—an intervention, by the way, that would at once occur if it suited

German interests. The Emperor would like to organize a League to restrain a bumptious Republic from starting on a career of aggrandizement to the detriment of old-established monarchies, but the materials for such a league were not forthcoming. Thus he has had to content himself with a minor operation. A squadron of seven ships was despatched to the Philippines, where there are no appreciable German interests. As German admirals never act without instructions we may assume, from subsequent events, that Admiral Dietrichs went to Manila Bay with a distinct hint to make himself "nasty" to the Americans. He seems to have loyally carried out this mandate, and has been a thorn in Admiral Dewey's side for the last two months; so much so, that the Washington Government has been compelled to suppress or bowdlerize the latter's despatches, for fear of over-exciting popular resentment in the States. The strained relations between the two Admirals culminated in the *Irene* incident, on which the following extract from Admiral Dewey's despatch was published:—"Aquinaldo informed me that his troops had taken all Subig Bay except Isla Grande, which they were prevented from taking by the German man-of-war *Irene*. On July 7th, I sent the *Raleigh* and *Concord* there. They took the island, and about 1,300 men with arms and ammunition. No resistance was offered; the *Irene* retired from the bay on their arrival." The Admiral must surely have reported that it required a shot from one of the American ships to induce the withdrawal of the *Irene!*

HER PHILIPPINE POLICY.

Germany, like other nations, acts with a single eye to her own interests, and her policy is usually far-seeing and firm. It is frequently an example to imitate, and always a pleasure to watch. But with regard to the Philippine Islands one asks oneself *que diable allait elle faire dans cette galère*, and no satisfactory answer has yet been given to the conundrum. She is supposed to have had two strings to her bow. In the first place there was the calculation that Spain would be far more successful than she has been, and that Admiral Dewey would ultimately find his position untenable, in which case the Americans would abstain from making a military conquest on the far side of the Pacific Ocean. The Philippines would consequently remain in Spanish possession, and the various disinterested little services Germany might have been able to render, in addition to the moral support of her fleet, would be rewarded by, at least, one coaling-station. Spain's financial straits at the end of the war might even lead to some more substantial transaction. This expectation, which was founded on a complete miscalculation of the relative capacity of the combatants, has been disappointed, for

the Philippines seem to be passing out of Spain's possession. Germany, therefore, falls back upon her second policy, which is to encourage the rebels, under their leader, Aquinaldo, to resist all "American pretensions" to the islands, and to constitute and proclaim an absolutely independent Philippine Republic, with which the Imperial Government hopes to do at least as satisfactory business as might have been done with Spain. Apparently Aquinaldo is acting in this sense, and has formed a Government comprising himself as President, his brother as Minister of War, and General Trias as Minister of Foreign Affairs, which claims sovereignty over the whole Philippine group, and is "becoming restive under American restraint." Germany is determined by hook or by crook to have a finger in the Philippine pie, and she usually accomplishes her object. Outsiders must remember that owing to the great strength of the German vote in the States, which is a valuable and Conservative element, the politicians will leave no stone unturned to avoid friction with Germany. She has temporarily annoyed the American people, but she may eventually secure some pickings.

THE NILE EXPEDITION.

Before our next number appears the advance towards Khartoum of the combined British and Egyptian forces will have commenced from summer quarters in the Dongola and Berber Provinces, and we shall doubtless have many columns of descriptive writing by daily newspaper correspondents. Before, however, public attention is wholly centred in the sensational incidents of the campaign and in the sentiment founded on the recollection of Gordon's martyrdom, we desire to impress on our readers that the defeat of the Dervishes and the downfall of Beggara misrule marks the commencement, not the last stroke, of Great Britain's enterprise on the Upper Nile. The fighting of massed batteries and battalions will be over, most, if not all the British troops will be withdrawn to a more suitable climate, but the work of the British officers who serve the Khedive, and of his army, will be arduous for many a long month. That work is to reoccupy all the lost provinces which a combination of Mahdism and of a certain British Government compelled Egypt to relinquish in the eighties.

ABOVE KHARTOUM.

The first step after the recovery of Khartoum obviously is to send gunboats—of which there are thirteen now available—up the Blue and White Niles with orders to their commanders to go as far as they can up these two rivers before they fall too low for navigation. Their retirement when the river beds dry up will not be misunderstood by

the natives, who, from childhood, have seen that sailing boats can only reach the remoter towns during the flood months of each year. The commanders of these reconnoitring expeditions must be given a free hand as to all their arrangements and must be followed by sailing boats—the huge gyassa or nuggar of the Lower Nile—carrying troops and food supplies from Khartoum. All that they need tell the inhabitants of the upper waters is that they will return again next year on the flood, and that meanwhile the people should resume the cultivation of their lands, as Dervish raids need no longer be feared, and every man, wife, and crop will in future be safe. When Abyssinian raids are anticipated the inhabitants should be armed for their defence and preying parties will soon cease to trouble them. It is highly improbable that an Abyssinian Army will be encountered on the Nile or on any of its tributaries, for the Abyssinian, whose dwelling Nature has fixed on a plateau 8,000 feet above sea-level, sickens in the Nile Valley. The Abyssinian bugbear may be at present dismissed from the minds of any Cabinet Minister who becomes uneasy when he contemplates a map of Africa and observes a contiguity of colour.

GUNBOAT SUZERAINTY.

The gunboat advance, backed by sailing craft, of which we shall seize a large number at Khartoum, *should be immediate*, and boldly conceived. Those who have not seen three or four of our modern gunboats steaming in line ahead on an African river can have but a small conception of the sense of power which they impose on the wondering native. They symbolize to him all that he hopes and fears from his God and his Devil. It is useful to impress the African mind on first acquaintance. When experience afterwards teaches that these gunboats are for the protection of the loyal native, his loyalty will be secured and he will be easy to govern. The White Nile detachment will find no physical difficulty in getting up the open water which extends 400 miles above Khartoum as far as Fashoda and beyond. We hope that no imaginary difficulties will be created by closet politicians. The gunboat's business after Fashoda will be to cut through the *sudd* and reach Beden as soon as possible. Beden is seventy miles below Duffilé, which is a British post held by detachments from Uganda, and thus for the first time in its marvellous history will the 3,300 miles of the Nile's full length be patrolled or administered by officials whose ambition will be to promote the welfare of its millions of inhabitants. That these will be slow in grasping the fact that difficulties may arise, and some conflict, who can doubt? But British patience and tenacity of purpose will ultimately prevail. The natives who, for so many centuries, have made such industrious slaves and hard-fighting

mercenaries will, by the force of example and proper direction, learn to make the Nile into a commercial highway such as the Ganges has become under our authority. The first art the natives of the Upper Nile have to learn is that of boat-building. At present there is not a single native boat on Lake Albert Edward Nyanza, or on the open water between it and Duffilé. Property in boats has been too precarious hitherto to encourage the art of boat-building.

THE PRINCE OF WALES.

The Prince of Wales has met with a most painful and, many fear, a really serious if not a disabling accident. It occurred on Monday, 18th July, at one of the Rothschild houses in Buckinghamshire, Waddesdon, where His Royal Highness had been staying for the Sunday. In coming down the slippery spiral staircase his foot slid, and in trying to recover himself he injured his left knee. The Prince hates being fussed, so he cheerfully persisted in returning to London, being carried to the train at Aylesbury Station in an ill-constructed chair, which partially collapsed, causing a further jar to the damaged joint. He reached Marlborough House with a greatly swollen knee, and there ensued anxious consultations among doctors and surgeons—the Röntgen rays being enlisted. The knee-cap was pronounced to be fractured. The usual reassuring bulletins have been issued, but they have not allayed public anxiety as to the Heir-apparent's condition. The Prince is evidently in for a prolonged restraint, which is in itself a severe strain upon a man of boundless activity. The possible effect upon his general health, even if there are no complications, is necessarily a matter of concern. Moreover, everyone is aware that the knee is a very sensitive joint, and that a fracture of the cap is liable to exceedingly disagreeable developments. So long as the swelling remains it is impossible to exactly locate the fragments or to reunite them, and there must be some risk of fever. Then, again, the necessary operation is, in itself, serious, and, although the royal patient knows no fear, the surgeons do not care to attempt it without administering chloroform, which the physicians seem inclined to disallow. Unless the operation is performed it is believed that the Prince of Wales is threatened with permanent lameness. That is why the nation is apprehensive in spite of the daily bulletins announcing that "His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales has passed a good night and is making satisfactory progress." The only redeeming feature of this deplorable accident is that it has again manifested the royal sufferer's immense popularity among all classes of the community, who earnestly hope that he will be speedily restored to complete health and unimpaired activity.

THE DEFECTION OF MR. DOUGHTY.

Mr. Doughty, the Member for Grimsby, who was one of the handful of Radicals to gain seats at the General Election of 1895, has created a considerable sensation by renouncing his allegiance to his Party. In the middle of July he communicated this desire to his constituents in a letter which is believed to reflect the private opinions of no small section of the Opposition. He had received "strong complaints" for "not voting with Sir William Harcourt" on the Redmond resolution "declaring that Ireland had new financial grievances, and implying that she paid three millions per year in taxation more than she should pay, and that redress to that extent was desirable, with the inevitable result of imposing further taxation on this country amounting to three millions per year." Having made "a careful study of this subject" he is "convinced that, instead of paying more than her share, she is most generously treated by the British Exchequer." He argues thus:—"It is a well-known fact that Ireland is a poor country. It is also a fact that some counties in England are equally poor. Our taxation, however, is not levied on geographical areas, but on individuals. The simple question therefore to decide is: Do Irishmen as individuals in Ireland pay more taxation of any kind than individual British subjects living in any other part of the United Kingdom? The law in this respect is absolutely equal both in England, Ireland, and Scotland. Individuals are taxed exactly on the same principles, both for direct and indirect taxation." He lays the following figures before the people of Grimsby:—

"The Chancellor of the Exchequer's estimate shows that the taxes of Ireland for this year will produce £8,115,000. Of that amount £6,750,000 is spent in local services in that country, and only £1,350,000, or $\frac{1}{5}$nd part of the common expenditure of the United Kingdom will be borne by Ireland, whereas it is estimated that her fair proportion would be one-twentieth of the common expenditure. Further, a much larger share of the cost of local rates and charges in Ireland is borne by the Exchequer than local authorities receive in Great Britain, and the result has been that Irish ratepayers have been far more relieved of the increased cost of local charges than the ratepayers of Great Britain. Out of every pound expended on local services in this country the ratepayers pay 10s. 6d. and the British Exchequer contributes 9s. 6d., whereas in Ireland for similar purposes the Exchequer bears 13s. 6d. and the rates 6s. 6d. These figures do not include the large sums given to Ireland at various times for the construction of light railways and harbours and other Irish necessities, nor the £615,000 per year she is to receive under the new Local Government Bill. Under these circumstances I respectfully ask my constituents how I could do other than support the Government in resisting this demand? The fact is, there is no financial grievance in Ireland that is not shared by the other parts of the United Kingdom."

Mr. Doughty is "most conclusively convinced," by "the manufacture of the new Irish grievance," of the "impossibility of any English Party ever satisfying Irish Nationalist and Parnellite demands," and "to one who thinks that the time has quite arrived

when the social needs of the rest of the United Kingdom should receive the attention of Parliament it is intensely discouraging to find some Liberal leaders attempting to maintain the alliance by pledging the Party to another Home Rule crusade."

A STEPPING-STONE TO SEPARATION.

The Radical Member for Grimsby proceeds to point out that

"The Government have given, in fulfilment of their pledge, the major part of this Session to Irish affairs. They have passed through its principal stages the largest and most comprehensive Local Government Bill ever introduced into the House of Commons, placing the Irish electorate on the same popular basis as the English electorate. They have given the boroughs practically the same powers of control that English municipal authorities enjoy. They have removed every disability and given popular control in county government and in the Poor Law, and all other public bodies in Ireland will now enjoy the same advantages which English county authorities possess. In order to accomplish this peaceably, and in justice to every interest, they are giving £700,000 a year in relief of the local rates. Surely, therefore, if Home Rule means equal laws in local government for both countries and the management of Irish affairs by Irishmen, Ireland should now be satisfied. If it were the object of the Irish Members to obtain for their country local self-government, following all the rules of past experience they should be willing to give this Act a fair trial, and work contentedly and in harmony with the rest of the United Kingdom. They, however, boldly assert that this great measure does not in any sense satisfy their demands."

The scales have fallen from Mr. Doughty's eyes and he is able to furnish his constituents with a remarkable appreciation of the true inwardness of the Nationalist movement :—

"But is it Home Rule that Irish Members desire, or is the ultimate object aimed at separation and alienation from this country? From my observation and experience in the House of Commons I regret to say that I am driven to the latter conclusion. On February 10th last Mr. John Redmond moved an amendment to the Address declaring that the demand of Ireland was for an 'independent Parliament, and an executive responsible thereto.' Sir William Harcourt remarked that such a proposal meant separation from this country, while the Members sitting on the Irish Benches supported this demand and many do not disguise their aim and intention to be absolutely separate. On every occasion that foreign complications have arisen, whether in America, Africa, or China, Irish Members have expressed their delight, and only a few days ago one of their most prominent leaders declared in the House of Commons that if the Irish could prevent it there should be no good understanding tantamount to an alliance of interest between Great Britain and America. In view of these facts, I cannot conceive how any English Party desiring to maintain the unity and prosperity of the Empire can commit themselves to another Home Rule Bill. If this impossible policy is to be pursued, it cannot be surprising that men desirous of doing some useful public work should turn their attention to strengthening the Liberal Unionist Party, hoping thereby to further some of the measures in which they are interested."

We make no apology for giving one more extract from this highly significant missive :—

"For my part I feel bound to inform my constituents, that I am not prepared to waste years of my life in ploughing the sand and beating the air in the hope some

time of putting in power a Party to introduce a Home Rule Bill and to hold office during the pleasure of Irish Members, who amongst themselves are in hopeless division. I respectfully ask those who are interested in the continued prosperity of our trade, in the maintenance of the unity of the British Empire, in the happiness and improvement of our people, to weigh carefully the question whether it is not wiser to aim at such useful reform as can be accomplished by those who have the power, rather then enter into years of fruitless struggle in order to establish a Government the main plank in whose platform will be to assist Irish Members one step farther towards separation from this country. In the present condition and future prospects of foreign affairs, it is most essential that whichever Party is in power should be in an independent position, and should possess the confidence of the people of Great Britain. A Party occupying office merely by the will of the Irish Members would, in my opinion, be a source of serious weakness to this country. It is well known that I am not a 'little Englander,' and am deeply attached to maintaining and developing the British Empire abroad, for, assuredly, upon it depends the expansion of our trade in the future, and the employment and improvement of our people, and I can support no policy that would weaken that position."

Mr. Doughty concluded by leaving his future position "to the judgment of those concerned."

RELUCTANT RADICALS.

One would have expected Mr. Doughty's challenge to be taken up with alacrity by a Party which professes to be growing stronger from day to day, when given a brilliant opportunity of vindicating the faith that is alleged to be in them. As a matter of fact, they were far from eager, and an influential section of the local Radicals were anxious that the rebel should continue to sit in spite of his abandonment of Home Rule. Mr. Doughty, however, followed up his letter by applying for the Stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds, the formula for resigning a seat, and subsequently met his constituents at the Grimsby Town Hall. Here the anxiety of the Party to avoid a contest was painfully manifest, and a leading Radical Alderman significantly enquired whether Mr. Doughty, "if given a free hand in regard to Home Rule," would support the "current measures of reform advanced by the Liberal Party." The Member shrewdly replied that, "until the Liberal Party dropped Home Rule out of their programme he had done with the Liberal Party." With regard to Home Rule he expressed himself with perfect candour. "He was willing to admit that when elected to Parliament (1895) he promised to vote for a measure of Home Rule. He was there to-night to tell his constituents that he had altered his mind, and was not ashamed of his convictions. Ireland was put on the same level as the remainder of the United Kingdom by the Local Government Act. The object of the Irish Members was to effect a separation from Great Britain." The reluctant Radicals of Grimsby find themselves forced into a fight for which they have no stomach, while the political world is provided with

the most interesting by-election of the last three years. Mr. Doughty, of course, champions his own cause, and will presumably be supported by the Unionists; while his opponent is said to be a strong local Radical. As good partisans we should naturally enjoy seeing our opponents put into a hole, were they not in so many holes already. The so-called Liberal Party is, in fact, so utterly disorganized and demoralized that its worst enemies cannot wish to see it in a worse plight. Moreover, the ineptitude of Her Majesty's Opposition has a detrimental effect upon the policy of Her Majesty's Government. If the former could only pull itself together, it would brace up the latter to the general good of the nation. But Sir William Harcourt does not provide his followers with serious leadership or settled convictions, so we may expect to see continued manifestations of Doughtyism, and a general decadence on both sides of the House. Political dry-rot is a contagious disease.

THE RUSSIAN BOGEY.

If the future of Russia be readable by the light of her past history, there is ample assurance that her almost invariable diplomatic successes will continue to present a sharp contrast to the miscarriage of her adventures in war by land and sea. In view of recent events it is needless to recapitulate the run of good fortune attained by Russian diplomacy during the present century. Europe rings with its fame. The astuteness and brilliancy of Russian diplomacy fills the air. To hear unfavourable criticisms of the effectiveness of Russian foreign policy one must go to Russia—and then one hears but a whisper.

On the field of action, however; where the exertion of organized force is the dominant factor, the history of Russia records an almost unbroken series of defeats. In the war with Sweden, Peter was totally defeated by Charles XII. at Narva. It is true that the tables were turned nine years later at Pultowa; but Pultowa is almost the solitary victory carrying with it political consequences and territorial aggrandizement that can be credited to the Russian Army during two centuries. In 1711 Peter the Great and his army crossed the Pruth, were surrounded by the Turks, and only escaped by the energy of the Empress Catherine. In 1774 the Cossacks rebelled unsuccessfully, but the causes that led to the outbreak are by no means extinct, although their operation takes effect in other portions of the empire and among a different people. In 1796 Russia was unsuccessful in her war with Persia. As an ally in the coalition against France, Russia was defeated at Austerlitz. She was beaten by the Turks near Cilicia in 1809; vanquished at Smolensko and at Borodino in August and September, 1812, by the French; in October, 1812, the approach of winter prevented Napoleon from following up his previous achievements, but he was within an ace of success, and if he had undertaken the invasion of Russia earlier in his career, when in the prime of his strength and activity, there is little doubt that he would have succeeded in dictating terms of peace in the Kremlin, a spot which has since rung with the strains of the *Marseillaise*. If Alexander I. entered Paris victoriously in 1813 it was not as the

result of any feat of Russian arms. In 1840 an expedition against Khiva failed to achieve success. In the Hungarian War Russian assistance was given to Austrian rule, and the Hungarians were defeated by the Austro-Russian troops in June and July, 1849; but here Russia had an ally and obtained nothing as the result of her interference. The English and the French defeated Russia in 1855; but she regained, by a diplomatic stroke in 1871, everything lost by war in 1854-55. Enthusiasm for Bulgaria led to the declaration of war in April, 1877, which ended in the declaration of peace at St. Stefano in 1878. By the time the Russians had lost 80,435 men, had successfully crossed the Balkans, and spent £120,000,000 sterling, there were not ten thousand trained men left as reserve had it been decided to occupy Constantinople in the teeth of the English Fleet. The last Russo-Turkish War is perhaps the most conspicuous example in the whole of Russian history of the inadequacy of the results obtained when she exerts her physical strength. The absorption of the Khanates may be adduced as telling against the accuracy of the statement that Russia is unlucky or unskilled in war. A moment's examination, however, disposes of this objection. Samarcand was taken by Kaufmann in 1868, but an expedition against Khiva failed in 1840, while the fusion of Bokhara, Turkestan, Khiva, and Khokan with the rest of her Central Asian provinces, although there had been heavy fighting in the first instance, was rather due to the affinity of Orientals for a race itself half Oriental than to the effect of military prowess. The suppression of the Polish rising in 1863, and the rebellion in the Caucasus in the succeeding year, can scarcely be counted as among the more glorious traditions clustering round the Russian standard. The storming of the Turkoman stronghold of Geok Tepe in January, 1881, has attracted more attention than it deserves because of the matchless courage and picturesque personality of Michael Dmitrievitch Scobeleff, who, in addition to being a great soldier, was one of the recognized leaders of the aggressive and militant wing of the Panslavist agitation.

With such a record in war, Russia seriously aspires to dominion in Asia, to the mastery of Europe, and to become suzerain of the world. For a hundred years supremacy in Asia has been wielded by England. Russia now proposes to supplant her. I have listened to a company of Russian generals gravely discussing the future Russian name of Calcutta. One group considered that Nicolaieff would be the appropriate name when the Eagles of Russia float over the Hooghly. Others, mindful of Scobeleff's services to the Panslavist cause, considered that a memorial of the victor of Geok Tepe and the conqueror of Osman Pasha should be created by substituting the name of Scobeleff for that of Calcutta.

If the maintenance of the British position in Asia were to be settled by diplomacy or by the effusion of ink the prospect for this country is gloomy. It is, however, in the last degree unlikely that the question of who is to be master in Asia will be determined by despatches, protocols, or parchment. When the inevitable collision between the Slav and the Anglo-Saxon takes place, and the great issue of constitutional government and freedom of trade against military despotism and aggravated protection is fought out to a finish, the shock to the Russian civil and military system will be greater than any she has yet had to endure. If we credit the current impression, Russia is invulnerable. One Cabinet Minister has recently said as much. Her homogeneity, the blind faith and docility of the mass of her people, and the advanced state of her military preparations are held to be such that no European Power can successfully cope with Russia. The arrogant tone of Russian newspapers, inspired by the officials of Monsieur Goremykine's department and by the heads of the Asiatic department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is growing every month. Even English Ministers appear to accept the Russians at their own exaggerated valuation. The Slavs are no less boastful than the Latins. Pressmen in St. Petersburg are as addicted to yellow journalism as Mr. Hearst or Mr. Pulitzer of New York. Intoxicated by their diplomatic successes, Russians forget their failures in war.

Before the struggle with Turkey in 1877 it was generally foretold in Russia that the campaign was to be a picnic. It lasted a year, depreciated the rouble by more than a third, and ruined Russian finance until the French consented to submit to an operation for the transfusion of her life-blood—for the sake of an alliance where one loved and the other permitted affection. In the course of several visits to Russia, where I have had opportunities of seeing below the surface, I have come to the conclusion, with all deference to those who now regard Russia as Englishmen regarded France in 1804, that the Russian terror is a bogey. In the first place, the Slavonians have no leader—certainly no Napoleon. The young Tsar has not shown himself to be a king of men. He began to take interest in foreign affairs when Lord Salisbury met his Majesty at Balmoral to the disquiet of the great Tchinovniks. Since then steps have been taken to divert Imperial attention and devote it to lesser things than Anglo-Russian relations. He is continually surrounded by a zereba of detail and enticed from affairs of State by organized diversions. Government in Russia does not really rest in Imperial hands. The young Emperor is the instrument of stronger minds; no matter if they quarrel among themselves. Moreover, his lineage on the Romanoff side would not conduce to healthy judgment or to sober

and statesman-like conduct even if he enjoyed real power. The ancestry of this Russian Emperor is a sinister story of accumulated horrors. His father died in the arms of a thaumaturgist—Father John of Cronstadt. His grandfather was assassinated in the public streets. His great-grandfather, overwhelmed with Crimean disasters, is generally believed to have ended his own life. The Emperor Paul was murdered in 1801, while Catherine II., his mother, who was a great sovereign and extended Russian territories on all sides, was not a personage likely to transmit to her posterity the qualities that make either for orderly life or world-wide sway. Her husband, Peter III., was supposed to have been murdered. Ivan VI. was immured in a dungeon for eighteen years and murdered, while Peter II., the Tsar of 1727, and the successor of Catherine I., whose first husband was killed on the day of her marriage with Peter the Great, was deposed. Such is the family history of the reigning Romanoff.

There is no Napoleon on the Russian throne. General Kuropatkine, War Minister, however enlightened and resolute, has enormous difficulties to contend with, and little is known of him outside the seat of his late Government in Siberia. Russia, to use the Yankee phrase, has bitten off more than she can chew for a long time to come. She has no middle-class from which to draw honest and capable administrators, while the human material with the higher brain qualities necessary for the administration of vast territories in times of peace, still more for the organization of the operations of war on the largest scale ever yet seen on earth, is almost wholly wanting. The ablest Russian subjects are admittedly the Jews; but Jews of the Pale are persecuted by Holy Russia, nominally in revenge for Jewish participation in the greatest tragedy of all history, but really because the Tchinovniks are wide awake to the fact that if the Jews were educated and were allowed the right of entry to all parts of the Empire and to every department of the civil and military services, eight years would not elapse before an assiduous, temperate, patient, intellectual, and resolute Jew would occupy every place worth having in the civil and administrative services of the Empire.

Since there is no educated middle-class whose sons can be trusted to govern honestly half a province on a pittance, as eleven hundred white men rule nearly three hundred millions of people in India, it follows that the real interests of Russia palpably lie in the direction of peace, not of war. So far as my observations, reading, and conversations enable me to judge, there is no nation in Europe with a more vital interest in the preservation of peace during the next twenty years than Russia herself. Peace during the next five years is not only essential to her welfare, but if Russia were to risk

a conflict with any European nation, especially with England, the strain upon her administrative services would quickly reveal to an astonished Europe the feet of clay now obscured by the sparkle and coruscations of a brilliant diplomacy. In the Far East, that is in Amour and Primorskaya, the area on which any war with Britain or Japan would be partially fought out, there dwells a population of a quarter of a million of Russian subjects. Provisions for these people and for the convict island of Saghalien are sent all the way from Odessa through the Suez Canal. The expense of equipping an army with its commissariat and transport and sending it by sea to the Far East is a task to which the vaunted Russian power would be unequal. Even if transport were forthcoming, and the troops or their stores ever got through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, nothing could save them, for the British Fleet is stronger in fact than it is on paper. All the military stores, commissariat, and army for the Far East are drawn from Moscow, Kieff, Petersburg, Odessa, and Nicolaieff. Until the Trans-Siberian Railway is finished every ounce of these reinforcements must travel by sea. If the Suez Canal were blocked the Russian armies for the Far East must pass round the Cape of Good Hope, or march 1,950 miles in East Siberia.

The Russian Government has no financial credit for such an enterprise as this. Nothing but the ignorance of the population, which the Government does its utmost to maintain, prevents the formation and expression of a public opinion on the subject, the influence of which Russian Ministers are themselves the last to deny.

The cost of the Siberian Railway proper up to the end of the last year has been nearly £33,000,000 sterling, the mileage completed being 2,540. This gives an average of £12,800 a mile, and the most difficult sections of the work are not yet begun. The cost of the completed line will scarcely be less than £14,000 a mile, without including the Manchurian line and the other railway schemes in China, which are likely to remain on paper much longer than is anticipated by English alarmists. Mr. A. R. Colquhoun tells us that the Trans-Siberian Railway was opened to Kansk last October, a distance of 4,323 versts, and a further section of some 350 miles will be opened to Irkutsk this autumn. Thence to Vladivostok, or some other point on the Pacific, will be about 1,600 miles. The rate of building has been recently about 450 miles yearly. The chief physical difficulties will be encountered east of Irkutsk. The works can be pushed on from both ends, and the main line to the Pacific will, it is expected, be completed within four years' time. The Southern Manchurian line (to Port Arthur) could be completed within six years' time.

The scarcity of capable, experienced, and trustworthy adminis-

trators is not only due to popular ignorance stimulated and encouraged by the Russian Government, but also to the active measures adopted by the Tsar's Ministers towards the ablest, most prolific, and adaptable race in Russia. There is only one Government in the world which takes into its own hands the persecution of the Jews. Outside Russia, Jew hatred is a matter with which Governments have no direct concern. In the Empire of the Tsar it is otherwise. Jew-baiting is a matter of high State policy, and the Russian Government justify themselves by the plea of necessity. The canker in the Russian body politic, caused by the exclusion of the Jewish element from the public services, except in the lowest ranks, is sufficiently important to affect the future of Russia. Taken as a whole, the Russian Jews are more intellectual, temperate, industrious, and supple than the Slavonians. Jews are now forbidden to settle in Siberia, and while the transportation of political criminals to the Asiatic dominions of the Tsar is about to cease, the whole brunt of the responsibility of Administration is thrown upon Russian officers who, man for man, are less efficient and less trustworthy than Englishmen holding similar posts in India or Egypt. The antidotes of education and equality prescribed by Western writers have nothing to recommend them to Russian Ministers. Instinct for self-preservation, not stupid barbarity, dictates the policy by which the Jews are treated as outlaws, condemned to illiteracy, and are regarded as potential insurgents. This traditional policy of Russia in refusing to accord equality or permit education among the Jews carries with it inherent disadvantages. In the first place, the Jew is increasing far more rapidly than the Slav.

The first complete census of the Russian Empire was taken in February, 1897. The figures are not yet complete, but the Central Statistical Commission of the Minister of the Interior annually publish figures of the rate of increase of the Russian population which demonstrate the overwhelming importance of the Jewish question to the ruler and people of Russia.

In most of the text books published on the subject of the Jewish population in the world the number of Jews in Russia is greatly underrated. The late Sir Robert Morier, G.C.B., as British Ambassador for many years at St. Petersburg, gave much attention to the subject. In 1891 he expressed his opinion to me that the Jewish population in Russia was about five and a quarter millions, the figures being arrived at by the triple statistics of birth-rate, death-rate, and conscription. The totals of the deaths, births, and marriages of the various religions in European Russia now supply the absolute data. These figures have been elaborated by Mr. E. J. Dillon.* The figures of the birth and death-rates, when compared,

* *Fortnightly Review*, January, 1898.

establish the ratio between the two. For every 100 Russian Jews who died during the decade ending 1892 the number born was 171·42. The number of orthodox Christians per cent. born in Russia during the same period was only 138·14 per cent. This superior fecundity of the Jewish race is attributable to the universal practice of marriage and of the phenomenally low death-rate. Four hundred and seven orthodox Russian infants died out of every 1,000. Only 232 Jewish children died out of the same number. But these figures do not really indicate the rapidity with which the Jewish population is growing. Military service is immensely unpopular among the Jews, and they resort to many devices in order to free their sons from liability to serve. One method is the concealment of the birth of their children, and the number of Jews is therefore greater, and the actual death-rate lower, than the official statistics show.

Both in Russia and Roumania the Jewish element is better fitted for the struggle for existence than any of the Christian sects. The devotion bestowed by Jewish parents on their children, the respect and tenderness paid to women during the critical events of their family life, enable the Jewish element in Poland to increase twice as rapidly as the Christian sects. One-third of the population of Warsaw is Jewish, but the Hebrew increase is equal to that of the Christians who form two-thirds of the population. The more Jews there are in a city the smaller the death-rate among children. In Warsaw the Jews are one-third of the population, and the death-rate of a thousand children during the first year of their lives is only 187. In Moscow, where the Jews are only 2 per cent., the death-rate of infants is 391.*

The Russian people, with the exception of the Jews, have the highest birth-rate and the highest death-rate of all the peoples of Europe. Of all the races and religious faiths professed in Russia, the Jewish element is the most fruitful. In the cities and towns of the sixteen provinces which constitute the Jewish Pale the Israelitish increase is four times more rapid than that of their Christian fellow-subjects. Their net annual increase amounts to 71·4 as compared with that of all the Christian denominations, which is only 17 souls. Their annual increase appears to amount to 80,000 a year, a rate which will continue to increase in the absence of pestilence, famine, or extermination.

The Russians are a kindly people, and there is no desire to treat the Jews more hardly than circumstances require. On two things,

* Reclus states that the Jewish element in Hungary has increased by eight times its number during the past hundred years. During the years 1868-1870 the death-rate of the various religions in Budapest was:—Among Catholics, 48·0; Calvinists, 33·7; Lutherans, 46·6; and Jews only 18·2 per thousand souls.

however, the Government are resolved. So far as the operation of law and the exertion of force enable them to do so, the Jews, as a mass, will be kept apart from the bulk of the Russian people; and, secondly, the Russian Tchinovniks from top to bottom will not sign the death-warrant of their own supremacy by enabling the Jews to train their intellects. Since, however, as I have shown, the Jewish element in Russia is better equipped for the struggle for life than any of the Christian sects, and since the Jewish increase is four times more rapid than that of their Christian fellow-subjects, it follows as a necessary consequence that the Jewish trouble now brewing in the Pale already menaces the future of Russia. The present Minister of the Interior informed me last year that the Jewish problem was insoluble. Problems insoluble to officials, when they relate to bread-and-butter, have a way of solving themselves.

It is only fair to say that in the highest quarters a better standard of public virtue exists to-day compared with that of five-and-twenty years ago. In those days the bribery of a Russian Minister was not uncommon. To-day the standard, if not so high as that of an English Cabinet or German Ministry, is at least as good as that attained by the elected rulers of France and Spain. There was a time not so very long ago when a Russian Minister would expect, and even occasionally ask for, a commission or present in connection with any contract or license granted by his department. Nothing of the kind is done now, but officials below the rank of Minister, as a class, cannot yet be said to comply with Burke's estimate of the chastity of honour or to feel a stain like a wound. The way in which bribery is accomplished is not by vulgar methods. The intermediaries, who are generally Jews, have carried the practice of influencing authority to the limits of a high art. Some of the companies recently formed with English capital to work Russian products could if they choose tell queer stories as to their experiences in getting a footing in the country and as to the methods of working their concessions when they have obtained them. Many of the officials are too high-minded to take a vulgar bribe, but they do not find that their honour is compromised if at a game of *wint* or *bridge* with the agent of a would-be concessionaire the score chalked on the green baize of the card-table at the close of play should show them to be heavy and invariable winners. Another type of Russian Tchinovnik, often a man in high position, is insensible to pecuniary temptations so far as he himself is concerned, but he is not unwilling to permit a wife or a daughter to receive a tribute of admiration and respect in the shape of an annual gift of a valuable piece of jewelry. A third class, who would scorn the idea of touching a direct cash subsidy, will pointedly admire a valuable pair of horses or a handsome

drosky in such a way that the gift of an equipage complete in all particulars is a natural consequence of a desire on both sides to maintain good relations, while saving the face of the official implicated. Passing to a lower class of officials, bribery is nearly universal, because the miserable stipends paid by the Administration leave, to married men at all events, a choice between starvation and corruption. The example set to the subaltern officials by those in high places is faithfully reproduced. The half Oriental nature of the Russian is partly displayed by the variety of the devices by which the incomes of the official class are enhanced by the contributions of the governed. The effect of the general official corruption is not visible on the surface. Even the grossest abuse of public trust rarely reaches the newspapers. A recent case of fraud by an Admiral in the South of Russia in connection with the coal supply of the Black Sea Fleet was allowed to leak out. Publicity is such cases is the exception. The consequence, however, of the corruption so prevalent in the Russian service is a deterioration in the executive strength of the Administration, especially in distant parts of the Empire, and it is probable that the comparative failure of Russia in warlike operations during the last two hundred years—which is certainly due to no want of courage or of brain-power—may be partly attributable to the looseness in financial matters traditional in the Russian services. If this be so in the past, the future antagonist of Russia may fairly reckon on a potent ally in the lapse of Russian officials from the paths of virtue. Hundreds of cases will assuredly occur on the outbreak of war and the mobilization of the army and navy, in which the Administration will break down solely in consequence of the past dishonesty of the officials. It is not necessary in recognizing the prevalence of Russian corruption that Englishmen should pharisaically thank God that they are better than those other men. Pepys' Diary shows that the state of morals of public servants in Russia to-day is identical with that of English officials of the Stuart era. Mr. Pepys himself records the fact that he studies arithmetic for the simple purpose of making a bit on his own account out of the wood he buys for the Government. The moral fibre of Admiralty officials in the time of James II. and William and Mary was not improved until a much later date. With education and the spread of ideas Russians may become more honest, but the break down of the great Russian spending departments in the next great war in which she is engaged, as the direct consequence of the laxity of her public servants, is as certain as anything can be that has not actually happened. The Minister of the Interior himself told me last year that the payment of the wages of the labourers employed on the Siberian Railway was a matter that anxiously engaged his

attention. Continual complaints reached him that the money set aside for the payment of a contract never reached the labourers. It is true that the blame for this was attributed to the Jewish contractors, but there is no reason to believe that the vice of dishonesty in the Russian Empire is monopolized by the descendants of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.

Another disintegrating influence in Russia, fraught with ominous consequences in the future, is the growing poverty of the ignorant Russian peasantry. The denudation of forest in the Volga Valley, and, in fact, throughout the whole of the centre and South, has had for its effect the diminution of the rainfall and the impoverishment of the soil. Scarcity is almost continuous even in the black soil districts; famine is always on the horizon, and every few years the spectre of want enters the doorway of millions of Russian homes. Much of the soil in European Russia, vast as it is, is rapidly becoming exhausted. When death comes the peasant accepts it with Oriental patience. His faith is sublime. Call it superstition or belief, the qualities of endurance and patience under suffering are, in the Moujik, pathetic in the extreme. The minor key, the note of sadness which oppresses the Western observer from the moment he enters Russia, is maintained by the constant suffering of the ignorant peasantry. Their ignorance is the bed-rock upon which the executive power of the Empire is built. "Ignorance and Empire" is the Russian equivalent of "Imperium et Libertas." This ignorance is beginning to be invaded. Even twenty years ago large masses of the peasantry believed that all foreigners were of the same race. After the last Turkish War, when numbers of prisoners were sent into the interior of Russia, everybody not a Russian was supposed to be a Turk. I myself have been taken for a Turk in a small Russian village. This ignorance is disappearing, however, slowly. Every verst of telephone or telegraph wire erected, of railway laid down, and every manufactory established, produces its educational effect. Industrialism, long feared, has begun, and assists the process. Even the army is leavened with new ideas. The soldiery have now heard of France and of the French Army. Liberal and revolutionary ideas connected with France filter through the by-ways of Russian thought and reach the peasantry through the time-expired soldiers. Unknown to their rulers, the peasantry are being slowly and surely leavened with the yeast of Western thought. Not rapidly, it is true; but as the Romans perished after enervating contact with the vices and charms of Greece, so the life-blood of Russia as it flows in her veins is silently infected with the microbe of unrest inseparable from the French character. It is true that all Europe lies between France and Russia, but nothing can prevent the gradual absorption of French ideas. Tens of thousands of the Russian

peasantry begin to long for light. Strange religions, eccentric and fanatical sects, many of them secret societies, are the results of this unrest. The ignorance of the peasantry is not a foundation upon which the Russian Empire can build for ever. It is not probable that in the long run a people ignorant as horses will succeed in holding down the educated nations of the earth by a combination of brute strength and imported brains. A gradual process of mental enlightment is involved in the vast schemes now favoured by the present "advisers" of the obliterated Tsar. These projects require for their fulfilment the services of an educated as well as an ambitious, prolific, and a faithful people. Russia is, therefore, in this dilemma. If she consents to educate the peasantry the despotic system is doomed. If she refuses and maintains the present system of organized ignorance, the light will enter through illicit windows and the necessary consequence will still ensue. The Jews may play a great part in this act of the drama when the partition of Poland is avenged.

Recent Russian legislation on the subject of the liquor traffic indicates an uneasiness in the administrative sphere which is only too well founded on facts. Possibly the England of a hundred years ago had little to teach the Russia of to-day on the subject of sobriety. Even at the beginning of the present century in England the host claimed it as his due that guests should drink until they could drink no longer. It was a common practice at English dinner parties for a servant to loosen the neck-cloths of plethoric diners that they might drink more copiously and with less danger than if their throats were apoplectically swathed. The state of drunkenness in England in the last century finds a parallel in Russia to-day, the only difference being that the habit of inebriety, which steadily diminishes with the spread of education and the consequent softening of manners, shows little sign of diminution in Russia. The village assemblies have become worse than they were in the days of serfage. Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace declares that almost any communal decision may be obtained by "treating the Mir," that is to say, by supplying a certain amount of vôdka. Alcoholism is prevalent in Russia to an extent unparalleled in other countries. High and low, rich and poor, drink to excess. Liver and kidney troubles are common among all classes. Nor is there the sense of shame in being overcome with strong drink which obtains in Western countries. I have heard a young guardsman apologize to a lady at an Embassy reception, in the hearing of a dozen guests, by saying that the reason why he had not kept an appointment with her to which he was pledged was that he was drunk the night before. The drunkenness in the army, navy, and administrative services is prodigious,

and although the average Russian can undoubtedly consume more raw spirit than any other white man, the effect of the drinking habits of the Russians, in the event of collision with a first-class Power, will be shown here and there in the engine-rooms of battleships and in the conning towers of cruisers, in the incapacity of squadron commanders and engineers in the field, and in the absence of smart co-operation between the various departments concerned in the mobilization of the Russian army, navy, transport and commissariat services. I cannot close this part of the subject without referring to the practice of drinking matches which still prevail, not only in private society, but in the army and navy. If the real strength of a nation is intimately connected with its moral fibre, the drawback of general inebriety may fairly be counted as one of the disintegrating influences that will tell against Holy Russia the next time she is engaged in a conflict with a sober first-class Power. When Rudyard Kipling's Dirkovitch, in his cups, told his "fellow-soldiers glorious—true friends and hospitables," of the White Hussars, that the seventy million Slavs have done nothing, not one thing, he added: "Here, you old peoples, we have done nothing in the world—out here. All our work is to do, and it shall be done, old peoples, get a—way." With admirable point Mr. Rudyard Kipling makes Dirkovitch fall asleep when he had thus spoken.

To recapitulate. The future of Russia, so long as she keeps the peace and limits her disputes with other nations to the field of diplomacy, may possibly be prosperous and bright, but if her unwieldly Empire should be plunged into the hazard of war, the ignorance and superstition of her people, the corruption and inebriety of her Administrators, the absence of a master-mind in the Tsar, or of an educated middle class, her alienation of the Jews, and her slipshod unreadiness for vast combinations at a distance, are more likely to result in a humiliating and perhaps ridiculous collapse than in the establishment of universal dominion over the civilized world.

ARNOLD WHITE.

M. CAVAIGNAC'S VINDICATION OF CAPTAIN DREYFUS.

A few days after the condemnation of Captain Dreyfus, in December, 1894, the Governor of the prison (Commandant Forzinetti) in which the accused was imprisoned stated: "The Captain is certainly innocent, and he was deemed guilty simply because he was a Jew."

I SHALL attempt no apology for recurring to the Dreyfus question, although it has already been discussed in two successive numbers of this Review,* and was pronounced to have been "buried" by the emphatic asseverations of the French Minister of War, M. Cavaignac, when expounding the policy of the incoming Brisson Cabinet to the Chamber of Deputies on July 7th. As a speaker, M. Cavaignac unquestionably achieved a signal Parliamentary triumph. His sentences were punctuated with frantic cheers, his opponents were reduced to ignominious silence, and the least harmonious assembly in the world forthwith decided by the overwhelming majority of 572 votes to 2, to distinguish the orator by placarding the oration throughout the *communes* of France. The War Office had effected a grand *coup de théâtre*, and a pestilential agitation received its *quietus*. The country prepared to recover her equanimity. It was noted at the moment—and the episode gathers some significance from subsequent events—that the Premier, M. Henri Brisson, did not partake of the general jubilation, but seemed rather inclined to pour cold water on the excited Chamber. He dared to deprecate the proposal to placard the victorious utterance of his brilliant colleague, and suggested that the motion to that effect should be withdrawn, on the curious ground that, even if "unanimously carried," it argued a want of "reciprocal confidence." Whether he felt the speech sounded better than it would read, or was inspired by a tender solicitude for the "Dreyfusards"—towards whom he is suspected of "leanings"—did not transpire. His objection was summarily dismissed and M. Cavaignac's statement must be accepted as the practically unanimous pronouncement of the French House of Commons.

* See in particular "The Truth about the Dreyfus Case," by "Huguenot," in the June NATIONAL REVIEW.

The reader may be inclined to suggest that the incident should be regarded as closed by such a verdict from such a body, and that no foreigner can, with any decency, rush in where the Deputy has feared to tread. M. Cavaignac evidently holds the view that he is dealing with a national and not an international question. Whereas his predecessors had endeavoured to muzzle domestic criticism by the threat of foreign complications, he is morbidly anxious to warn off the outsider. "I ask the Chamber, first of all, to assume no connection between the facts which I am about to present and what has been said abroad. We have a right to manage our own affairs as we please. If we have to respect international proprieties towards others, others are also bound to respect them towards us." In the light of the last hundred years of European history, during which France has claimed the *rôle* of pioneer to the civilized world, this assumption of moral "isolation" sounds strangely on the lips of a French statesman, and possibly indicates some mental uneasiness. It happens to conflict with a dictum of the late Premier, M. Méline, who affirmed so recently as 29th January, in reference to this very subject, "We are engaged in defending the good name of France abroad." Apart, however, from M. Méline's earnest appeal for foreign approval of French policy on the Dreyfus question, it is impossible for Englishmen to shut their eyes to the amazing chapter of French history which lies open before them, however anxious they may be to avoid wounding the susceptibilities of a sensitive and gallant nation. France after all is our nearest neighbour, our mutual relations are continuous, and our contact is world-wide. We cannot escape from one another anywhere. We have an immense stake in her strength and prosperity, and are vitally concerned in the stability and well-being of her Government and people. We should be the very first to feel the effects of a political catastrophe to her. I will say nothing of the friendly feeling in England towards the French nation, the mass of whom seem, in their present ominous mood, to be hardening themselves to hate and despise all foreigners simply because they are foreigners. On selfish grounds we are entitled to record current events in France, where a handful of military desperadoes seem to be in a fair way to capturing the Republic—a Boulanger alone being wanted to ensure their victory.

The occasion of the War Minister's sensational success was an interpellation by M. Castelin—a ferocious Jew-baiter—who called upon the new Cabinet to produce the "decisive documents" which M. Cavaignac had, prior to his appointment, declared to exist in the War Office, so that the desire of the country to extinguish the Dreyfusards might be gratified. M. Castelin also demanded that all persons should be prosecuted who "persisted in trying to im-

pair discipline among the soldiers," and concluded with an expression of pleasure at the presence of M. Cavaignac in the Brisson Cabinet—whither he had been summoned by the Anti-Semitic Press, which made his appointment a condition of their support. The Drumont-*cum*-Rochefort combination regarded him as a man who could be relied upon to resist a revision of the Dreyfus case at all costs, in despite of such colleagues as M. Brisson, M. Bourgeois, and M. Sarrien, who have, or had, not yet "found salvation." M. Cavaignac is an able, energetic, determined man, and a master of Parliamentary strategy. He can present as good a case as any member of the Chamber, and being notoriously desirous to destroy the Dreyfusards we may regard his speech as the most effective brief against revision that skill and zeal can frame. It was unhesitatingly accepted as such by the anti-Dreyfus party. I do not, however, hesitate to say that no person not blinded by passion can read M. Cavaignac's philippic as it stands without being absolutely convinced that Captain Dreyfus was illegally convicted, and, by following up the chief clues to be found in the speech, I hope to show the reader that this crushing indictment is in reality a striking vindication of the accused. In other words, Dreyfus is a martyr. He is not a guilty man illegally tried, but an innocent man unjustly convicted. The Ministerial declaration makes this as clear as it can be made outside a law-court.

M. Cavaignac commenced by a reference to that impregnable rock the *chose jugée*, behind which the Méline Cabinet had resolutely intrenched themselves, and whence they refused to be drawn into the open. He declined, however, to follow their example, on the ground that "we are bound to offer the Chamber and the country all the truth that we can," for "we hold that the most ample recognition of the *chose jugée* cannot prevent us from bringing before you the facts that have come to confirm it. . . . When those facts have come to confirm in signal fashion the *chose jugée* the Government has not been permitted to produce them. But there are reasons which override even reasons of law, and the contingent necessities of politics." He added: "This declaration I make now because I have the absolute certainty of the guilt of Dreyfus. Rest assured that if I had not such conviction, no consideration of public safety would draw from me the declaration which I have just made, or would induce me to keep an innocent man at the galleys. (M. Méline.—'General Billot has said the same thing.') And when I assume such a responsibility, all the weight and extent of which I feel, the Chamber will allow me, if I cannot give all the grounds of my conviction, to give at least all those which I am able to give."

In pursuance of the Cavaignac policy of "confirming the *chose*

jugée," we are told that the Intelligence Department of the War Office has collected during the last six years 1,000 documents and letters relating to espionage, of the authorship of which there is no reasonable doubt. They vary in quality, some being trivial, while others are important. "I will not dwell on the former. I will call the attention of the Chamber to only three documents. The first two were exchanged between certain persons who have been mentioned (Colonel Schwarzkoppen, late German military attaché in Paris, and Colonel Panizzardi, the present Italian military attaché in Paris), and refer to a person designated by his initial D. Here is the first letter. It received the date of March, 1894, when it reached the Intelligence Department of the War Office:—

(*A.*) "'Last evening I finally decided to send for a doctor, who forbade me to go out. Being unable to go and see you to-morrow, I beg you to come to me in the morning, for D. has brought me a number of very interesting things, and we must divide up the work as we have only 10 days' time.'"

The second, dated April 16th, 1894, runs as follows:—

(*B.*) "'I exceedingly regret not having seen you before my departure. However, I shall be back in a week. I enclose 12 plans of——' here he gives the name of one of our fortresses which I omit—'which that *canaille de* D. gave me for you. I told him you had no intention of resuming relations. He alleges that there has been a misunderstanding and that he will do all in his power to satisfy you. He says he was obstinate and that you will not bear a grudge against him. I replied that he was mad and that I did not believe you cared to resume relations. Do as you like.'"

While "certain" that the above refers to Dreyfus "owing to the confirmation afforded by a comparison of the less important documents which I have mentioned," M. Cavaignac consented to read a third document "which contains the full name of Dreyfus," which he particularizes thus:—

"When in October or November, 1896, M. Castelin put in his first request to interpellate the Government, the two correspondents of whom I am going to speak became anxious as to what was going to take place, and one of them wrote to the other:—

(*C.*) "'I have read that a Deputy is going to make an interpellation on Dreyfus. If'—(here is a portion of a phrase which I am unable to read)—'I shall say that never have I had any relations with this Jew. That is understood. If you are asked, say the same, for nobody must ever know what has occurred with him.' (M. Humbert, 'That is clear enough.')"

One cannot trust oneself to epitomize or paraphrase the sentences in which the War Minister interprets this document. He must be allowed to speak for himself:—

"The material authenticity of this document is evident, not merely from the circumstances which I have related, but from the striking similarity between it and a document written on the same paper and with the same blue pencil, dated 1894, which has not since been out of the War Office archives. The moral authenticity is established by the correspondence exchanged between the same persons in 1896. The first writes to the other, who replies in terms

which leave no obscurity on the cause of their common uneasiness. Thus the guilt of Dreyfus is clearly proved by a document of 1896, which perfectly fits in with a previous correspondence, and which proves that guilt in an irrefutable fashion."

It is almost enough to give this third document in the original French:—"*J'ai lu qu'un député va interpeller sur Dreyfus. Si*"—(here some words which M. Cavaignac could not read)—"je dirai que *jamais j'avais* des relations avec ce juif. C'est entendu. *Si on* vous demande, dites *comme ça*, car *il faut pas que on* sache *jamais personne* ce qui est arrivé *avec lui.*" Here elementary errors in French composition are in italics. Surely this is the sort of French that a negro in Hayti would write, and not Colonel Schwarzkoppen or Panizzardi, for they are almost Parisians in their command of the French tongue. It is clearly the forgery of some Frenchman who set himself to imagine what sort of French a foreign attaché would write. Moreover the documents (A) and (B) are genuine, and are in Colonel Panizzardi's handwriting, whereas (C) was meant by its author to appear to be from the pen of Colonel Schwarzkoppen. So easy is it to gull a French Minister of War.

This third document is an old friend, for it was adduced by General le Pellieux at the Zola trial. He laid before the Court a summary of its contents, and also in his evidence stated (i.) that it was signed, but not with any known name; (ii.) that it was supported (appuyée) by a carte-de-visite; (iii.) that on the back of this carte-de-visite was specified an unimportant rendezvous (un rendez-vouz insignifiant), identical with that given in the document itself; (iv.) that the carte-de-visite bore the name of the person (? Schwarzkoppen). "On a eu," said Gen. le Pellieux of this document, "au ministère de la guerre la preuve absolue de la culpabilité de Dreyfus, absolue, et cette preuve je l'ai vue." In his pleadings (Le Procès Zola, ii., p. 312 foll.) M. Labori dissected this piece of evidence, emphasizing several facts about it, viz.:—

1. He had not been allowed to cross-question the witness about it. For the President of the Court allowed military witnesses to bring forward such evidence, but forbade Zola's counsel to examine it, on the ground that it related to the *chose jugée.*

2. By consequence nothing was known of the origin of this document; nor whether its presumptive author or authors acknowledged it; nor whether, in default of their doing so, it had been submitted to experts.

3. Anyone could procure one of Schwarzkoppen's visiting-cards, for that attaché left them everywhere in Paris. How did the fact of one of them being tied to an anonymous document prove its authenticity?

4. Why should two foreign attachés pledge one another to silence in this way? Who was going to interrogate them about a

matter settled by their Governments so far as regarded them two years before in 1894?

It is evident that this third document, which to M. Cavaignac's intelligence demonstrates the authenticity of the two others, is a forgery fabricated within the precincts of the War Office, probably by the same person who, in November and December, 1896, opened in that office private letters addressed to Col. Picquart, and communicated their contents to Esterhazy, so enabling the latter to send the false telegrams signed *Speranza* to the Colonel in Tunisia. This accomplice of Esterhazy was in league with Drumont, and was almost to a certainty du Paty de Clam. He, then, is the forger of this third document, the only one in which Dreyfus is mentioned by name. He is one of the very few who could have seen documents (A) and (B); and under the mistaken idea that they were Schwarzkoppen's, whereas they are really Panizzardi's writing, he imitated them in his forgery, so far as using a blue pencil and a similar quality of paper can be called imitation. If le Pellieux had read the document out *verbatim* at the Zola trial, and so acquainted the Court with its phraseology, he would have been even more laughed at for his simplicity than he was.

Having established the "irrefutable" guilt of Dreyfus by the three foregoing documents, M. Cavaignac proceeds to pile on the agony:—

"This is not all. There is still another class of facts, and I declare that for me they would suffice to make my conviction absolute. I mean Dreyfus' confessions. On the morning of his degradation Dreyfus remained for several hours with two officers, who took down from his lips the confession of his crime. They spoke of it at the time, as is stated in the following note, which appeared in the *Temps* of January 5th:—

"We have been able to secure his words. They are almost textually as follows:—'I am innocent. If I handed over documents to the foreigner, it was as a bait and in order to get more important ones. In three years the truth will be known, and the Minister himself will take up my case.'" The speaker stated that the two officers to whom Captain Dreyfus had confessed his crime were Captain d'Attel and Captain Lebrun-Renaud. "Captain d'Attel is dead, but there remain officers who received his confidences. Here is a War Office memorandum (without date) thereon:—

"Captain Anthoine has the honour of reporting that on the day of Dreyfus degradation he met at the door of the room where Dreyfus had been shut up Captain d'Attel, his friend, with whom he was on duty as belonging to the General Staff. Captain d'Attel told Captain Anthoine that Dreyfus had just said before him—'As for what I have handed over, it was worth nothing. If I had been let alone I should have had more in exchange.' Captain Anthoine immediately repeated this talk to Major de Mitry."

The other recipient of Dreyfus' confession, Captain Lebrun-Renaud, recorded their conversation on January 6th (1895?) "on a leaf torn from his note-book, which has always remained in his possession."* This note was embodied in a letter written by General Gonse to General Boisdeffre, which contained the following passage:—

"In a general way Captain Lebrun-Renaud's conversation with Dreyfus was a monologue on the part of the latter, broken off and constantly resumed. The gist of it was that it was not original documents, but copies that were handed over. For an individual who always affirms that he knows nothing this phrase was at least singular. Then, while protesting his innocence, he ended thus:—'The Minister knows I am innocent. He directed Major du Paty de Clam to tell me so in prison three or four days ago, and he knows that, if I handed over documents, they were documents without importance, and that I did so in order to obtain serious ones.' The Captain concluded by expressing the opinion that Dreyfus made half confessions, mingled with reticences and lies."

M. Cavaignac thus closed his impeachment of Dreyfus:—"Either human testimony has no longer any value, or it results from this decisive concordant testimony anterior to all the impressions since produced that Dreyfus uttered these words—'If I gave up documents——.' This confession has been denied. It will, perhaps, be said to-morrow that it was obtained by menaces or promises. Never will I admit that a man would have uttered these words if he had not given up documents."

I have given the reader all the material portions of this remarkable utterance, of which an admirable translation appeared in *The Times* of July 8th. It is the only attempt at a serious defence of their Dreyfus policy which the French Government has yet vouchsafed, and M. Cavaignac may be relied upon to have made the utmost of his materials. Those who have been clamouring for a revision—the Dreyfusards—are now aware of the worst that can be said against their client. To the average foreign observer who had become impressed with the notion that there might be something serious behind the *chose jugée* which could not be revealed without the risk of a war with Germany or a rupture with Russia, M. Cavaignac's statement is simply stupefying. His "irrefutable" evidence is far flimsier than one had conceived possible. He demonstrates beyond "all possible probable shadow of doubt" that the trial of Captain Dreyfus was steeped in illegality. That the War Office has collected more than a thousand documents bearing on espionage during the last six years is only too probable; but it is not even alleged that a single one of them was written by Dreyfus. Does not the absence of such allegation completely clear him of their authorship? Considering the energy with which

* M. Cavaignac added: "He (Lebrun-Renaud) has since confirmed these declarations by a written and signed statement, which I will not read because it is of a later date, and I prefer those which are contemporaneous."

M. Cavaignac made all possible points against Dreyfus, would he not inevitably have produced any document that could, with any show of reason, have been fathered upon that officer? What is the irresistible inference? That the new War Minister, though as eager as any of his predecessors to convict Dreyfus of treason, is compelled to recognize that he was not the author of the fatal *bordereau*. *M. Cavaignac made no mention of the bordereau.* That is to say, the charge upon which Dreyfus was tried by court-martial four years ago is tacitly withdrawn. Should not the release of the prisoner follow as a necessary consequence of an admitted miscarriage?

If, on the other hand, we assume what is now no longer denied, viz., that Dreyfus was convicted on documents other than the *bordereau*, the case for revision becomes irresistible, as those documents were never brought either to his notice or to that of his counsel. There is no uncertainty in the military code on this point, while the evidence that it was violated is equally clear. Against the injustice of convicting an accused on secret documents Article 101 makes this special provision:—"The prosecutor (*rapporteur*) shall proceed to the cross-examination of the accused. He shall ask him his name, Christian names, age, place of birth, profession, domicile, and the circumstances attending the crime. *He* shall lay before him all the evidential documents which may lead to his conviction, and shall question him in order that he may be able to declare whether he recognizes them."*

Nor is the above the only clause of the Military Code which aims at preventing such an infringement of equity; for its Article 82 specially lays down the following:—

"The provisions made in Articles 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, and 542, Paragraph 1 of the Code of Criminal Instruction, are applicable to the judgments of military tribunals."

But Article 441 of the *Code d'Instruction Criminelle*, which is here declared binding on court-martials, runs as follows in the French:—

"Lorsque, sur l'exhibition d'un ordre formel à lui donné par le ministre de la justice, le procureur général près la cour de cassation dénoncera à la section criminelle des actes judiciaires, arrêts ou jugements contraires à la loi, les actes, arrêts ou jugements pourront être annulés et les juges poursuivis s'il y a lieu, de la manière exprimée au chapitre II. du titre IV. du présent titre."

In other words, if any tribunal, civil or military, has in its procedure violated the law, the French Minister of Justice (who

* This last clause, which is so important, stands in the French as follows:—"Il lui fait représenter toutes les pièces pouvant servir a conviction. Et il l'interpelle pour qu'il ait à déclarer s'il les reconnait."

answers to an English Home Secretary) shall give a formal order to the *Procureur Général* (our Attorney-General); and the latter shall denounce the illegality of the lower tribunal before the *Cour de Cassation* or Court of Appeal, which, being thus seized of the facts of the case, must annul the sentence illegally obtained, and, if necessary, prosecute the judges who thus contravened the law.

It follows then that Captain Dreyfus' conviction being obtained by the exhibition to the officers who formed his court-martial of evidence concealed from the accused and his counsel, Maître Demange, the sentence then passed on him should be quashed. And this no matter whether the secret evidence so adduced was of a nature to inculpate him or whether it was not. Was such secret evidence employed?

It will prepare the way to an answer to state what the overt evidence was which was alleged against Dreyfus. This overt evidence consisted of the *bordereau*, now abandoned by the War Office, and of nothing more. Here are the proofs that the *bordereau* was the only overt, that is to say legal, evidence laid before the Court.

Firstly, we have the official *Acte d'accusation* or formal indictment submitted to the court-martial, December 19th, 1894, and drawn up by an officer named d'Ormescheville. At the beginning of this document we have the following:—

"La base de l'accusation portée contre le capitaine Dreyfus est une lettre-missive écrite sur du papier pelure, non signée et non datée, qui se trouve au dossier, établissant que des documents militaires confidentiels ont été livrés à un agent d'une puissance étrangère."

The consideration of the *bordereau* occupies six pages of M. d'Ormescheville's *Acte d'accusation*. In the remaining six no other incriminating documents are alluded to, but we have the tittle-tattle of certain French officers who disliked Dreyfus for being a Jew and an industrious man. Their main allegations were, that he worked overtime in the War Office when he need not have done so, and that he spoke German, *qu'il parle plusieurs langues, notamment l'allemand qu'il sait à fond.* It is evidently a crime in a French officer to talk German, and the leading men in the *État Majeur*, in particular General Boisdeffre who presides over it, and Colonel Henry, the present head of its Intelligence Department, are above reproach in this respect. It has been supposed in England that French officers had, since the war of 1870, realized the utility of a knowledge of German. It is not so. An infantry officer of Alsatian origin recently declared that of a total of forty officers attached to his regiment he is the only one who can express himself in German at all.

Secondly, we have the evidence of Maître Demange who was

Dreyfus' counsel, one of the foremost barristers in Paris, and a man whose integrity no one has ventured to call in doubt. In the Zola trial, M. Demange gave evidence (Procès Verbal, I. p. 381-383) to the effect that he could not regard the sentence on Dreyfus as one *legally* given, because, whereas he knew from members of the court-martial that other documents incriminating Dreyfus were used in order to secure conviction, the *bordereau* was, nevertheless, the only one shown to himself and to his client. "Je n'ai jamais vu que le bordereau" was his answer at the Zola trial, and before the *huit clos* or *in camera* rule was imposed at the court-martial of December, 1894, M. Demange had already declared that the *bordereau* was *l'unique pièce.*

Therefore, by finally discarding the *bordereau,* M. Cavaignac makes such an unanswerable case for the revision which he refuses to grant, that the question might well be left there. The remainder of his address consisted of mere prejudice imported to mislead and inflame his audience and in no way strengthening the Ministerial position. It happens, however, to be easy to turn the tables upon him, and the reader may be interested in the process. While not daring to describe the trial of Dreyfus as *legal,* M. Cavaignac affirmed its *justice,* which he sought to substantiate by reading the three letters printed on a preceding page and respectively marked A, B, and C. The suggestion is that they were written by the German military attaché in Paris, Colonel Schwarzkoppen, to the Italian military attaché, Colonel Panizzardi, and, being intercepted by the French War Office, established the treasonable relations existing between those officers and Captain Dreyfus. Two of the three (A and B) belong to the year 1894, and though they satisfy the dark suspicions of M. Cavaignac, there are cogent reasons for believing they have no connection with Dreyfus. They undoubtedly played no legal part in procuring his conviction, as is shown by M. Demange (Dreyfus' counsel), who within a few days of their production in the Chamber addressed a letter (July 10th, 1898), to the Public Prosecutor (Garde des Sceaux), saying, "It is my duty to inform you that the documents dated March and April, 1894, which were read in the Tribune of the Chamber of Deputies by the Minister of War—as having contributed to convince him—were not made known either to M. Dreyfus or to his counsel. I affirm that I was only aware of, and the court-martial can only have been *legally* aware of, the letter known as the *bordereau,* which was the sole basis of the accusation, and of which the Minister made no mention in his speech." Moreover, Colonel Picquart, the late head of the French Intelligence Department—a man whose military distinction is only surpassed by his splendid civil courage, which has led him to sacrifice a brilliant career in his desire to right a great wrong,—

who has all the facts of this case at his fingers' ends, and who is wholly incapable of deviating from accuracy, has disposed of these letters. Two days after M. Cavaignac's speech he wrote (July 9th, 1898) thus to the Premier, M. Brisson, "I consider it my duty to inform you that I am in a position to prove before any competent tribunal that the two documents dated 1894 have no relation to Dreyfus, and that the one dated 1896 bears all the marks of a forgery." Colonel Picquart's affirmation is partially corroborated from a most unexpected quarter. Colonel Henry (the present head of the Intelligence Department, who sat on the court-martial which convicted Dreyfus, and is a rabid enemy of revision) repeatedly asserted in the Zola trial that the document B, containing the words "Canaille de D," has "no relation to the Dreyfus affair" (*n'a aucun rapport avec l'affaire Dreyfus*). And this is one of M. Cavaignac's "irrefutable" proofs!

On closer inspection M. Cavaignac's Parliamentary triumph degenerates into a ghastly fiasco. Must he not ultimately become the laughing-stock of the hamlets adorned by the placards? In order that a Departmental victim may perish in the Devil's Island the Minister—being obliged to abandon the basis of the prosecution—produces three letters, of which neither the accused nor his counsel ever had cognizance at the trial. Two were written in 1894 and one in 1896—*i.e.*, two years after the trial. The present Chief of the Intelligence Department had already sworn that one of the 1894 letters does not refer to Dreyfus, while the late Chief of the Intelligence Department is prepared to prove that neither of the 1894 letters have any connection with the Dreyfus case, and he confidently avers that the third letter—of 1896—is a forgery. The reader will probably share this opinion if he re-reads this precious document (C) realizing that one military attaché is actually supposed—by M. Cavaignac—to have employed such childish terms in writing to another about their common spy. It is in truth a clumsy, palpable, and grotesque forgery. It recalls the evidence against the Knave of Hearts in *Alice in Wonderland*.

The pitiful, intellectual, and moral plight to which M. Cavaignac has been reduced by constituting himself the mouthpiece of the blunderers at the head of the French War Office is, perhaps, most clearly shown by his closing statements as to Dreyfus' "confession." On this point he was even more emphatic without being more convincing than on others, and while declaring that "human testimony has no longer any value" unless this "confession" is credited, he seemed conscious that it could not be allowed to pass. "This confession has been denied. It will, perhaps, be said to-morrow that it was obtained by menaces or promises." It has been promptly denied, not on the grounds suggested by the speaker, but simply

because the evidence substantiating the "confession" is smothered by contrary evidence. Of the two officers to whom Captain Dreyfus is alleged to have confessed that he had handed over documents to a Foreign Power, one, Captain d'Attel, is dead. He left no written record of the prisoner's statement, which is remarkable, considering its sensational character. For Dreyfus, be it remembered, had continuously and notoriously protested his innocence, and one would have expected the fortunate officer to whom the culprit had finally avowed his guilt to have drawn up a memorandum, or at least to have written a letter to his superiors, containing the joyful news. During his life Captain d'Attel made no sign, but now that he is dead we are told that Dreyfus' guilt is demonstrated by the following slender thread of "human testimony" : the late Captain d'Attel is alleged to have repeated the accused's confession to Captain Anthoine, who subsequently passed it on to Major de Mitry, who transmitted this third-hand conversation to a nameless superior, and it was finally embodied in a memorandum which M. Cavaignac read in the Tribune, to the delirious delight of nearly six hundred legislators. By reverting to the extract I have given from the Minister's speech, the reader will see that I have not unduly depreciated this piece of "evidence." Would one care to suspect a spider on such testimony?

By a process of exhaustion we are left with the remainder biscuit of the voyage, *i.e.*, the alleged confession to Captain Lebrun-Renaud, who escorted the prisoner Dreyfus on the day of his degradation (January 5th, 1895). According to M. Cavaignac, Captain Lebrun-Renaud entered Captain Dreyfus' statement "on a leaf torn from his note-book." As the degradation occurred three and a half years ago, and the "Lebrun-Renaud confession" only became a part of the indictment of Dreyfus half a year ago, one would like to know at what date the entry in the note-book was made. If Captain Lebrun-Renaud only recorded the "confession" from memory three years after it had occurred, and at a moment when his superiors were gravelled for matter against Dreyfus, it would have no great value.

In passing one may note that M. Casimir Perier—late President of the French Republic—is credibly reported to have assured several friends, including Senators, that he summoned Captain Lebrun-Renaud to the Elysée, and that the latter there stated that he had never received any confession from Captain Dreyfus on the day of his degradation, or anything approaching a confession. I respectfully assert that M. Casimir Perier will not repudiate this statement, and one cannot help hoping that he will have the courage to come forward and substantiate it. The Prime Minister of that time (1894-5) was M. Charles Dupuy, and according to

M. Jaurès, the brilliant Socialist ex-Deputy, M. Dupuy said in his (Jaurès') presence, during the Zola trial this year, "When I heard a few days after the degradation of Dreyfus that Captain Lebrun-Renaud spoke of confessions which the convict had made to him, I sent for him; he protested in my presence, and subsequently in the presence of General Mercier, to whom I took him, that Dreyfus had made no confession. And I know that it was only in October, 1897, three years after the condemnation, that Captain Lebrun-Renaud signed the *Procès Verbal* containing the confession."

Curiously enough, the *Figaro* of the 6th January, 1895, contains a very detailed recital of the degradation of the previous day, given by Captain Lebrun-Renaud (whose memory was then fresh) in the presence of M. Olivier Clisson and others. This account contains no mention of any "confession," though it would have been the sensational feature of the day. There is further the very categorical statement of Commandant Forzinetti, the Governor of the prison (Cherche-Midi) in which Dreyfus was incarcerated from the time of his arrest to the day of his degradation. M. Forzinetti relates—he has reiterated his statement during the last few days—that he met Captain Lebrun-Renaud in the spring of 1897 for the first time since the day of degradation, and that Lebrun-Renaud then stated that "*Dreyfus had never made any confession to him.*" He also told Commandant Forzinetti that he (Lebrun-Renaud) had been annoyed by newspaper gossip about an alleged confession, in consequence of which "he had been summoned to the War Office, and subsequently to the Presidency of the Republic, and that *he had there declared that he had never received any confession.*" When M. Forzinetti subsequently learnt that Captain Lebrun-Renaud was cooking up a confession for the Zola trial, he (Forzinetti) met him in the corridor, and told him to his face that if he repudiated their previous conversation he was "an infamous liar," and as a matter of fact the gallant captain has never attempted to repudiate it. M. Forzinetti, as Dreyfus' gaoler, is able to affirm that throughout the whole period of his imprisonment "he never made any avowal of guilt"; but, on the contrary, "stoutly protested his innocence to everyone he saw up to and on the day of his degradation," and his whole bearing was so instinct with innocence as to convince the Governor of the prison that he was innocent. M. Forzinetti concluded his statement, which may [illegible] in the *Siècle* of 7th July, 1898, by the following significant details, showing that Captain Lebrun-Renaud had scant opportunity of receiving a confession from Dreyfus:—

"Captain Lebrun-Renaud's sole business was to escort the carriage (containing

Dreyfus). He saw the prisoner get into it with two gendarmes and the door shut. He (Lebrun-Renaud) disposed his troops as he judged best to prevent any escape or rescue, and he escorted the carriage according to his instructions. That is all he did. Believe me, M. Lebrun-Renaud could not have gathered any confession from Dreyfus."

Be it remembered that on 31st December, 1894,—four days before the degradation and the alleged confession—Dreyfus addressed the following letter to the Minister of War :—

"M. LE MINISTRE,—

"I received by your orders the visit of Commandant Paty de Clam,* to whom I again declared that I was innocent, and that I had never committed even the least imprudence. I am condemned, I have no favour to ask, but in the name of my honour,

* Dreyfus also wrote an account of this visit to his counsel, M. Demange, on 31st December, 1894. M. Demange forwarded it to the Garde des Sceaux on 9th July, 1898, by way of reply to M. Cavaignac. I extract a passage or two which seem to dispose of the "Russian" theory :—"Commandant du Paty came to-day, Monday, 31st December, 1894, at 5.30 p.m., to ask on behalf of the Minister if I had not been the victim of my imprudence, and I had not sought to bait —— (name withheld by M. Demange), and finally become involved in wheels within wheels (*un engrenage fatal*). I told him that I had never had any relations whatsoever with any agent or attaché . . . and that I had never set any bait, and that I was innocent. He told me that his own personal conviction of my guilt was originally based on an examination of the handwriting of *la pièce accusatrice* (the *bordereau*) and on the character of the documents which it enumerates, then on information showing that the disappearance of documents corresponded with my sojourn at the *Etat Majeur*, that finally a secret agent had said that a Dreyfus was a spy . . . without positively affirming that this Dreyfus was an officer. I asked Commandant du Paty to be confronted with this agent : he answered that it was impossible. Commandant du Paty admitted that I had never been suspected before the receipt of the *pièce accusatrice* (the *bordereau* now abandoned by the Minister of War). I then asked him why no *surveillance* was exercised over the staff from the month of February (1894), seeing that Commandant Henry assured the court-martial that he was aware at that date that there was a traitor among the officers. The Commandant (du Paty) answered that he did not know, that it was not his business but that of Commandant Henry, that it was difficult to follow all the staff officers, &c. . . . then feeling he had said too much, he added : 'We speak within four walls, if I am interrogated on all this I shall deny it all.' I preserved my calmness, wishing to know all his thoughts. '*En resumé*,' he said, 'you were condemned because there was a thread indicating that the culprit was an officer, and the letter seized (*bordereau*) put a point on this thread. You were the culprit.' . . . He subsequently spoke to me of the remarkable report of M. Bertillon (the expert) according to which I had traced an outline of my own handwriting and that of my brother so that in case of arrest as author of the letter I might maintain that there was a plot against me!!! (*sic*). He permitted me to hear that my wife and family were my accomplices—in fact the whole Bertillon theory. By that time, knowing all I wished to, and not wishing to allow him to insult my family I stopped him, saying, 'That's enough, I have but one word to say, which is that I am innocent and that it is your duty to pursue your researches.' He replied, 'If you are truly innocent you suffer the most appalling martyrdom of all the centuries.' 'I am that martyr,' I answered, 'and I hope the future will convince you.'"

which will, I hope, be restored to me one day, I must pray you to continue your researches. When I am gone let constant search be made—that is the only favour I ask."

Again, a few hours after the horrible degradation and reputed "confession" of the 5th January, 1895, Dreyfus addressed the following lines to his counsel, M. Demange:—

Prison de Santée, samedi.

"CHER MAITRE,—

"I kept the promise I made you. Though innocent, I faced the most appalling martyrdom that can be inflicted on a soldier; I felt around me the contempt of the crowd; I suffered the worst tortures one can imagine. How much happier I should have been in a grave. All would be over, I should hear nothing more, there would be peace and oblivion of all my sufferings. Alas! you have convinced me that duty will not permit this. I am obliged to live, I am obliged to suffer further martyrdom during long weeks in order that the truth may be discovered and my good name restored.

"Let light be thrown on this dark business and let my honour be returned to me.

"For God's sake, dear master, let my undeserved punishment be shortened.

"During that period you will seek, and I have faith and conviction you will find.

"Believe me, always your devoted and unhappy,

"A. DREYFUS."

It is unnecessary to continue flogging a dead horse. All that need be said with regard to Dreyfus' alleged acknowledgment of his guilt is that neither at the court-martial nor for three years afterwards was it ever seriously suggested that he had made any such acknowledgment. That he had consistently protested his innocence was common ground, as is shown, *e.g.*, by the famous semi-official article which stated the case for the War Office in the *Eclair* of 14th September, 1896. It recognized that "Dreyfus had always persisted in protesting his innocence," probably because he was not aware of the evidence against him in the hands of the War Office, &c., &c.

I desire, in conclusion, to adduce some information which, though not legally speaking "evidence," can easily be verified by the French Government. Even as it stands it is infinitely more convincing than the flimsy legends wherewith the Minister of War hypnotized the Chamber of Deputies. Let it be premised that in pursuing his enquiries M. Cavaignac need have no fear of provoking those "international complications" with which the opponents of re-

vision habitually seek to cow its partisans. The path of safety is surely indicated by the following extract from the semi-official *National Zeitung* (Berlin), which appeared on the day following the French Ministerial pronouncement (July 8th, 1898):—"It is true that M. Cavaignac did not speak of Germany or Italy. . . . But although he did not mention any names, we know to what countries he was alluding. Germany has already declared that no diplomatic or other difficulty would result from the clearing up of the Dreyfus affair. We think we may add that if the German Government were confidentially interrogated, it would not decline to divulge the whole truth." If France is sage enough to accept this friendly invitation she will be able to solve the problem that paralyzes her and haunts the conscience of the civilized world.

When the suspicions against Dreyfus were first mooted, in 1894, the German Emperor directed that a Court of Enquiry should be held in Berlin, which reported that no German agent had ever had any relations whatsoever with the accused. Consequently, Count Münster, the German Ambassador in Paris, acting on Imperial instructions, informed the French President, M. Casimir Perier, and the French Premier, M. Charles Dupuy, that Germany had had no dealings, either direct or indirect, with Dreyfus. This occurred in the autumn of 1894, and although M. Hanotaux, Minister for Foreign Affairs, was absent from Paris at the moment, he must have been privy to the episode and to the subsequent declaration of Major Schwarzkoppen, the German military attaché in Paris, on 12th November, 1894, that he had had no relations of any kind with Dreyfus. On the 13th November the Italian Ambassador made a not less categorical denial, and Austria followed suit on the following day. On the 24th January of this year (1898) Herr von Bülow, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, spoke thus before the Budget Commission of the Reichstag:—"I will therefore limit myself to declaring in the most formal and categorical manner that there has never existed any relations whatsoever between any German agent and the ex-Captain Dreyfus. . . . I desire to state with satisfaction that the Dreyfus affair has to my knowledge never disturbed the tranquil relations existing between Germany and France." A few days later Count Bonin Longare, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Italy, made the following declaration in the Italian Chamber of Deputies:—"I can affirm in the most explicit manner that neither our military attaché nor any agent or representative of the Italian Government has ever had any kind of relations with Dreyfus."

These categorical statements are, I venture to think, irresistibly fortified by the circumstantial deposition of Count Casella, no sentence of which has ever been repudiated by either of the

distinguished soldiers whom it implicates in very grave transactions. One of them, in fact, as will be seen, pledges himself to come forward and confirm the narrative, provided the other is agreeable. M. Casella was summoned as a witness at the first Zola trial, but he was not put in the box owing to the refusal of the President of the Court (M. Delegorgue) to entertain any evidence favourable to Zola or Dreyfus. Thereupon M. Casella recorded his testimony in two sworn statements which have had a European circulation, without apparently having reached M. Cavaignac. The first appeared in *Le Siècle* on April 8th of this year. The deponent relates that in the middle of December, 1897, being a friend of Colonel Panizzardi (Italian military attaché in Paris), and having heard that the Colonel was suspected of possessing documents exculpating Dreyfus and inculpating Esterhazy, he (Casella) asked him whether there was any truth in these surmises. The attaché replied that he had never known either Dreyfus or Esterhazy personally—how then could he have procured documents from them? M. Casella referred specifically to the letter containing the phrase "Cette canaille de D. devient par trop exigeante,"* which was alleged to indicate Colonel Panizzardi's intimacy both with Dreyfus and Colonel Schwarzkoppen (the German military attaché). Colonel Panizzardi replied, "I have denied that letter; it was not mine nor did it ever reach me. I authorize you to repeat that. I give you my word of honour as a military attaché and as a gentleman." They had some further talk that day, M. Casella begging his friend to reveal all he knew about any documents that might clear up the case. Panizzardi maintained that he "could not compromise a friend like Schwarzkoppen," and that one could hardly expect the German Embassy to supplement "its categorical statement that it had had no dealings with Dreyfus" by "denouncing the real culprit." He thought he might, however, make one confidence "as conclusive as the documents which people insist on believing I keep in my strong box," and he promised to consult his chief (the Italian Ambassador, Count Tornielli). He begged M. Casella to return the following day.

At their next interview Colonel Panizzardi seemed "nervous and irresolute," and said he had "no declaration to make. Why should he? Why should he concern himself in what did not concern him?" &c. "This Dreyfus case has been no small anxiety to me. All my hair was black. It has grown grey in a few months." They discussed the matter, and M. Casella hazarded the remark, "One man

* This is the document secretly submitted, or rather read, to the Dreyfus court-martial by the Minister of War without the knowledge of the accused or his counsel, the "D" being expanded into "Dreyfus" to secure conviction.

only possesses the truth—Colonel Schwarzkoppen. All efforts should have been concentrated on the German Embassy, when the affair originated, and I am amazed that the interested parties have not employed all means to have an exact explanation with the German military attaché." Colonel Panizzardi replied, "You speak like my friend Schwarzkoppen," who "has often said that he was much surprised and puzzled that the Dreyfus family had never taken any steps to talk with him."

Acting on this hint, M. Casella went to Berlin on 23rd December, 1897, with a letter of introduction to Colonel Schwarzkoppen, who was leaving for the country. So the meeting was postponed until 1st January, 1898, and then came off at the Kaiserhof Hotel, where M. Casella was staying. Colonel Schwarzkoppen was the first to introduce the Dreyfus case, in which he said people were determined to involve him at all costs, to which M. Casella answered: "Everyone is persuaded that you alone can speak the real truth on this obscure question." Colonel Schwarzkoppen replied, "Good heavens! I can only refer to the very explicit declaration of the German Embassy that we had nothing to do with the ex-Captain Dreyfus." This led to the following conversation:—

M. Casella: Then, Colonel, I seem to understand that you are persuaded that the ex-Captain Dreyfus is not the author of the incriminating *bordereau?*

Colonel Schwarzkoppen: No, the *bordereau* is not by him.

Casella: Personally, you are persuaded that Dreyfus is not guilty?

Schwarzkoppen: Yes; I know that he is not guilty.

Casella: Nevertheless, documents were produced before the court-martial which enlightened the judges, and decided them to condemn Dreyfus! What do you say to that?

Schwarzkoppen: My opinion is that the judges acted in good faith; but if their conviction was formed by documents establishing relations between Dreyfus and the German Government, *eh bien!* their good faith was imposed on. Those documents could only be forgeries.

Casella: Who is the culprit? Have you known Commandant Esterhazy? He has acknowledged relations with you. Would it be indiscreet to ask your private opinion of him?

Schwarzkoppen: I think him capable of anything.

M. Casella and Colonel Schwarzkoppen saw a good deal more of one another during the next few days, and the latter constantly talked with great frankness on the Dreyfus question, which he avowed had greatly weighed upon him. He explained the delicate position of his Government. "We cannot accuse, and the French Government cannot diplo-

matically ask us, if Esterhazy is guilty or not. We can only do what we have already done spontaneously, *i.e.*, declare the truth, viz., that we have never had any relations with ex-Captain Dreyfus. But if the French insist at all costs that Dreyfus is the traitor, we can do nothing, it is not our business." Subsequently Colonel Schwarzkoppen exclaimed, "This affair, you may be sure, will crop up again, and in a more threatening form. The second court-martial (that which whitewashed Esterhazy) will settle nothing. It is a miserable and melancholy business. . . . Who knows if later on something may not be feasible."

Count Casella returned to Paris charged by Colonel Schwarzkoppen to deliver a letter to Colonel Panizzardi, which the latter read aloud on the 7th January, 1898, in the presence of the bearer. The writer urged Panizzardi to "tell Casella not to talk too much," and enquired "How will that scoundrel, Esterhazy, get out of this business. How can he continue to live in France even if acquitted?" A few days later (13th January, 1898), Count Casella again saw the Italian military attaché, who was sitting at his desk reading a letter, when the following dialogue occurred:—

Panizzardi: You will excuse me, but I am obliged to go out. The German Ambassador returns to Berlin to-night, and I want to give him this letter for Schwarzkoppen. I am somewhat excited, but not without cause. Have you read Emilé Zola's article this morning?

Casella: Yes; I have read it.

Panizzardi: Good God! Good God! What victims! What can be done? In this letter (to Schwarzkoppen) I give my friend some advice. I tell him he must decide to speak one of these fine days, or finally I shall speak. Yes; but when? A year or two hence, perhaps,—and, in the meantime, what victims! Yesterday Dreyfus, to-day Picquart, to-morrow Zola. How horrible! Good God!

Casella: Then, according to you, does Zola speak the truth?

Panizzardi: Yes; Zola speaks the truth.

Such are some of the chief points in M. Casella's first deposition which appeared in *Le Siècle* on the 8th April, 1898. Its publication naturally caused a great sensation both at home and abroad. A few days later one of the most impudent organs of the War Office, *Le Jour*, published a bogus interview with Colonel Panizzardi, in which the latter was made to repudiate his statements to Count Casella, whereupon the Italian military attaché declared that an editor of the *Jour* had called upon him at his house, but "he had refused all intercourse with him on the conversations he had had with M. Casella."

M. Casella sent his second deposition on the 18th May, 1898, to

La Réforme de Bruxelles, where it duly appeared. I unfortunately have only space for one short extract from this remarkable document,* which records a conversation between Count Casella and Colonel Panizzardi at the house of the former (3, Rue Berryer, Paris), on the 17th February, 1898.

M. Casella: Permit me to tell you squarely, Colonel, that Dreyfus is not the victim of militarism but of diplomacy. You cannot persuade me that if, in 1894, Colonel Schwarzkoppen had called on General Mercier and quietly told him "General you are on a false track. I shall be obliged to name the real culprit in order to save an innocent, if you don't abandon it."

Colonel Panizzardi (interrupting): No, Schwarzkoppen could say nothing in 1894. I will explain that. His real blunder commenced in 1896, when the facsimile of the *bordereau* was published. When, in 1894, the first rumour appeared, announcing that a French officer was suspected of having betrayed his country, my friend, Schwarzkoppen, was struck all of a heap. He came to me and said, "I am in agony; I believe that my man has been caught." Some days later the papers asserted that the traitor was a Jewish officer of artillery. Schwarzkoppen called on me and said, "It was a false alarm, it must be another affair, it is not my man." And as a fact the German military attaché, *even after the condemnation of Dreyfus, continued to receive notes and documents from the same source and written in the same handwriting.* When, in 1896, *Le Matin* published the facsimile (of the *bordereau*), Schwarzkoppen came flying to me exclaiming, "My dear Panizzardi, this time there is no doubt. My man has been caught, it is certainly his handwriting."†

Casella: There you are again talking about secrets and confidences. You are in my house, where you recite very grave facts, and then you would close my mouth. I think, on the contrary, that it is your duty to speak out. How can you tolerate such infamies? No, you must speak all the more as you have made similar confidences to others. You have told a friend of mine that you possess several letters from Schwarzkoppen giving the full name of the person alluded to in the famous phrase, "*Cette canaille de D. devient par trop exigeante.*" Well, why did you not go before the court-martial, and at any rate clear that up.

Panizzardi: That is true, but in Schwarzkoppen's last letter to me he affirms that he never wrote that which has created such a stir. He says it is a forgery. . . .

Casella: When did you learn the name of the real culprit?

Panizzardi: Schwarzkoppen wished to impart it to me some time ago, but I always diverted the conversation as it did not concern me personally. But before going to Berlin, after the famous revolver scene (when Esterhazy vainly threatened to shoot Schwarzkoppen unless he would tell the Dreyfus family that he had had relations with Captain Dreyfus) Schwarzkoppen told me "The bomb will shortly burst; I give you the first-fruits (*unc primeur*). My man is Commandant Esterhazy."

Casella: All that is horrible! Colonel Schwarzkoppen is not an honest man

* The reader should read a copy of the original in full, which appears in a pamphlet by M. Jean Testis, entitled *La Trahison* which may be obtained for 5d., from the office of *Le Siècle* (12, Rue Grange-Batelière, Paris). The reader should likewise obtain from the same address M. Yves Guyot's very able pamphlet, *Dreyfus et Esterhazy*, price 2½d.

† That is the moment when my friend should have revealed all. If I had been caught like that, I should have bravely gone to my king, and asked his permission to tell all. All the officers of the Italian army would have approved. With my nerves I could not have slept twenty-four hours in such a position. But all this is confidential.

If he remains silent. He will be nailed to the pillory by the civilized world! Can't you say something?

Panizzardi: What can I do? I have formal orders from my Government owing to my not being directly implicated in this unhappy business. *Schwarzkoppen should begin, or if he will only give me a sign I give you my word of honour as a soldier that I will confirm all I have told you before a court of enquiry.* But put yourself in my place, I can't take the initiative in making confessions. *

I have already taxed the reader's patience beyond endurance, and will only say one last word. If, in the light of the statements of the German and Italian military attachés, M. Cavaignac's speech represents the final decision of the Brisson Cabinet on the Dreyfus question, they combine with a barbarous contempt for law a bitter hatred of justice. But Englishmen will continue to hope against hope that, as the French nation miraculously recovered after the fearful *débâcle* of 1870, to the fury of their enemies and the delight of their friends, so the French Government will confound their critics by an equally marvellous escape from their present Slough of Despond. Let us still refuse to sing :—

Ce bon mot de "Chose Jugée"
Devait être perpétué.
Chantons alors en "Chose Jugée,"
Jésus bien crucifié.
Socrate bien empoisonné,
Et La Pucelle bien brûlée,
Chantons alors !

* The real authorship of the *bordereau* was clearly demonstrated by "Huguenot" in his article in the June NATIONAL REVIEW, which contained the following passage :—

"Before long, however, the true authorship of the *bordereau* was to be revealed, independently of Colonel Picquart, by the very man in the streets. Esterhazy gambles on the French Bourse, and had used a broker, De Castro, to buy and sell for him. The latter was so well acquainted with his writing that he knew which were his letters before opening them. In October, 1897, De Castro was sitting in a café on the Boulevards, when a hawker came up selling facsimiles of the *bordereau* which he had not hitherto seen, though General Mercier had published it in the *Matin* a year before. The facsimile caught the eye of De Castro, the rest of whose story we will relate in his own words:—'I was struck aghast when I saw that writing, for I seemed to see in it a letter of the Commandant Esterhazy. I went home in a state of perturbation. Next morning I went with my brother-in-law and looked up the letters of Esterhazy which we had on our files. I even made some comparison of the handwriting, with the result that I found a perfect resemblance, I may say, a striking identity.' By the advice of Dreyfus' brother, De Castro took his discovery to M. Scheurer-Kestner, who in turn advised Matthieu Dreyfus to formally denounce Esterhazy to General Billot, the Minister of War, as the real author of the *bordereau*. This he did, November 15th, 1897."

L. J. MAXSE.

SECOND IMPRESSIONS OF THE WAR.

In considering second impressions of the war, I naturally turn to my first, published in the June number of this Review, in order to see how many of them have to be withdrawn or modified. The *Maine* is now almost forgotten, and no one cares very much whether her magazines exploded accidentally from internal causes or were exploded designedly by a torpedo applied outside the ship. Thought on the question is no longer entertained in the United States, and the passions naturally engendered by belief in such abominable treachery as was credited to the Spaniards are allayed. Graceful acts and graceful words between the combatants have taken the place of the popular howls which preceded the outbreak of war, and a mutual apprehension of "the pity of it" has tinged the feelings of both sides. War is not without its elevating lessons, and nations engaged in it soon find that there is greater honour in the enemy than mere passion at first allowed him. The United States' officers lost no time in officially refuting the popular charge brought against the Spanish troops of mutilation of the dead Americans on the shores of Guantanamo harbour. But as to the *Maine* herself, nothing has occurred to change my first views; and other writers in England have thoroughly confirmed them.

Writing in May, my belief was that the task before the United States, in wresting the Island of Cuba from the hands of the Spanish Government, was greater, and would take longer to fulfil than was at all allowed in that country. The air was then full of an immediate attack on Puerto Rico. I concluded that no such attack could be made so long as Admiral Cervera's fleet was "in being," and that, in any case, there were not sufficient troops immediately available for such an undertaking. What has happened in every way confirms the correctness of that first impression.

As a matter of first impression, founded absolutely on the experience of naval war, I did not in the least believe in the "bombardment" of towns by the United States' ships; and when morning after morning the newspapers were filled with reports of

such bombardments, I did not believe one of them. As is perhaps generally understood now, not a single Cuban or Puerto Rican town was bombarded, or even fired on, by the United States' ships until the 10th of July. Then Commodore Schley, being very much pressed by those who have but a small understanding of these matters, opened a fire on the town of Santiago in order to assist the army of General Shafter which was partially investing it. This is a perfectly legitimate operation of naval war. Bombarding a place to clear, as it were, the front of an army has always been undertaken by the navy when it is feasible. It may be a main element in securing the surrender of the place; but the cause of it is the presence of the army, and when that cause is absent there is little sense in bombardment.

In this case the town is situated four miles—that is 8,000 yards—from the nearest point of the shore about Aguadores, and there is high land between the sea and the town; this high land would probably compel the ships to lie some distance from the shore in order to avoid elevating the guns beyond what was due to the intended range. There are no dangers in the way, as the water is deep close up to the land. It is said that the three ships first employed in the bombardment, the *Brooklyn*, *Texas*, and *Indiana*, the two former armoured cruisers, and the latter a battleship, carrying between them four 13-inch, two 12-inch, and sixteen 8-inch guns, placed themselves within 500 yards of the shore; but then, after Schley had fired thirty-five shell from the 8-inch guns of the *Brooklyn*, he became convinced that his shell were falling short, and stopped the firing of all but the larger guns. Evidently his belief in the value of the operation was not great. He declared that he did not understand the purpose of the bombardment, and was greatly in fear that, as the direction of the city could only be assumed by compass bearings, some of his shell might fall into the American lines. Should anything come of it, this bombardment will be held to weaken the position of many arsenals that have hitherto been considered safe.

Regarding the reported "bombardments" by the ships generally, it has now become clear that in every case they have been no more than an exchange of distant shots with certain shore-placed batteries, where the damage done on either side was at a minimum. The United States service papers are beginning to grumble at what may be supposed to be a useless waste of ammunition; but I think it is probable that in most cases these so-called "bombardments" were put in hand to relieve the monotony—for there must be a terrible amount of monotony on board the American ships—and in part as target practice. There must be practice, and what better targets than the enemy's batteries? The chief puzzle was the firing

on the batteries of San Juan in Puerto Rico. There is at least some reason to suppose it was political; ordered from Washington to keep the populace in heart.

I have nothing to alter as to my first impressions of Dewey's victory at Manila, or rather at Cavite. The puzzle of why the Spanish batteries had so little effect on the United States' ships, while the latter had so great an effect on the Spanish ships, and, generally, why the United States' ships suffered so little, remains.

The general historical explanation is clear enough; but then that in itself is inexplicable. It was quite an ordinary occurrence in former naval wars that the victor in a duel at sea should come off without the loss of a man, when she left the defeated ship a mere wreck and slaughter-house. There is apparently some sudden and subtle moment at which the moral force of one combatant disappears, and, if that comes very early in the fight, every man throws away the shot he fires; and the moral force that the failing combatant loses passes wholly to the winning side, and the firing grows cooler and more accurate, until the destruction or surrender of the enemy is complete.

Dewey's powerless position after his victory which impressed itself strongly on me at first, was confirmed as the weeks went on. Once more the navy had shown its powerlessness to attack anything but its legitimate object. Once more was it impressed on all minds willing to receive it that the army is the attacking force, and that a naval victory cannot be followed up if there be not an army immediately ready to do it. But now that troops, reinforcements, and supplies have reached the Phillipines, one turns to the future. What will they do with them? is the thought. And these insurgents? If in a serious article one may occasionally descend to slang, I think that in the Phillipines, as in Cuba, the insurgents will "sell" the Americans at all points. I do not believe in insurgents generally. When they get leaders of any position they are usually men of excessive vanity and self-importance, with no sense of the reality of things, and therefore of no capacity to deal with them. But neither in the Phillipines nor in Cuba have we heard of any that are more than nominal leaders—men of words possibly, but not of acts. Not one of them is the sort of man that would willingly give up his prospects of power, adulation, and prosperity, for the good of his country. If, in the end, the American admiral and generals in the Phillipines find it easy to deal with the legal Government of the islands, their troubles will but begin when the illegal Government comes into play.

Returning to Cuba, I first thought that there would be landings here and there on a small scale, and for definite pur-

poses, to the support and supply of the insurgents, and so on, but no great landing for the conquest of the country until after the end of October. And though there has landed for the attack of Santiago a considerable military force, my original idea remains. This landing was made in order to effect the capture or destruction of Cervera's squadron, and that being now [illegible] the army—if strict strategical reason ruled—ought to embark again. But policy must be now considered to over-rule strategy in such a case. There is a natural, and, perhaps, not ill-founded idea, that the destruction of Cervera's ships, followed by the fall of Santiago, may bring Spain to ask such terms of peace as the United States will grant.

But the whole interest of the war centred, when I closed my first impressions, on Cervera's squadron, which, having dropped one destroyer in a disabled state at Martinique, was somewhere between Curacoa and Cuba, and consisted of four cruisers and two destroyers. It had seemed to me that, supposing such a squadron, complete with coal and in such high order as British ships are found in as a matter of course, at all times and in all places, to have sailed from St. Vincent on the 29th of April, it could have struck one, if not two or three, very severe blows upon the United States' Navy off Cienfuegos, Havana, and Key West about the 14th to the 16th of May. The first breach in that impression was the disclosure of the squadron's position off Martinique, but only as late as the 13th of May. It had not crossed the Atlantic at the speed it should have done to be successful, and at which a similar English squadron would almost assuredly have crossed it; and it had disclosed its whereabouts at a late date, and put its enemy everywhere on the *qui vive*. It drove another nail into its coffin by putting in an appearance at Curacoa. But when I wrote on the 19th of May, I remained under the impression that "the field of strategy assumed was still open." Sampson was somewhere to the east of Cuba, apparently in a dilemma, as being 500 miles from Havana and Key West, and doubtful about falling back; while Cervera might have been much nearer. I was not able at first to comprehend why Admiral Sampson ever quitted the vicinity of Havana and Key West. Now I am under the belief that men who assumed to know more of naval strategy than the admirals—most people do—had ordered Sampson into such a position as did leave it open, which it would not otherwise have been, to Cervera to strike a blow.

My second impression is that Sampson withdrew the ships from Cienfuegos, and that those were the ships that exchanged fire with the Spanish batteries at Santiago and Guantanamo just before

Cervera's arrival at the former place, as they were passing east to join Sampson. Cervera's opportunity was still this: namely, to steer for Santiago, but to have stopped fifty miles short of it, and to have sent a destroyer in during the darkness for intelligence. It was only a matter of five or six hours' delay to have obtained it, and to have known exactly what the situation of the American fleet was. Not impossibly, Cervera might in this way have got hold of the detached ships that had fired upon Morro Castle and the works at Guantanamo, but in any case he would have found that the game off Havana and Key West was open to him. Yet, even as I wrote, the conduct of the Spanish squadron had, up to date, been so hopelessly futile that I could not believe it was in it to achieve anything but the common-place. I was able to confirm my first impression in a postscript, for the arrival of Cervera's squadron in the port of Santiago was to the onlooking student of naval war an end to it.

Cervera is alleged to have said since that he was obliged to go to Santiago for coal, and that he expected to have got it and to have put to sea again within twenty-four hours. The story is only explicable when we placed it side by side with the apparently confirmed statement that the *Christobal Colon* had none of her heavy guns on board when she left St. Vincent! It is not possible for an English naval officer to conceive such administrative neglect or corruption as could permit of a thing like this; but if it is true, and we can conceive it as true, then—but only then—can we conceive of Cervera's ships leaving St. Vincent for the West Indies short of coal. Granting the short supply of coal, and what Cervera is stated to have said in regard to the time it took to coal his ships in Santiago, and we may exonerate him from blame in allowing himself to be "bottled up" in port and deprived of all power of striking a blow. No naval officer in his place would have left St. Vincent short of coal if he could have helped it; but if he was ordered from St. Vincent in that condition, he must have known that he was going to throw the squadron away. There is, in fact, an air in the conduct of this war which is not wholly confined to the Spanish side, as if many men "who know better" than the naval officers, have had fingers in the pie. A second impression, continually growing in strength, is, that naval commonplaces are, and must ever remain, more or less Greek to the lay statesman, and that he can best show his wisdom by abstaining altogether from interfering with the conduct of naval war.

As long as Cervera was supposed to be free to act, there was not one reporter who did not know, and for himself intimately feel, that nothing whatever could be done in Cuba by the American Navy. It was nothing to say that the squadron was altogether in-

ferior to the United States fleet in Cuban waters, and that any landing or other determinate operation could be fully guarded by a mere section of the American force. The fact was, and everybody felt it, that the freedom of Cervera's squadron was "an absolute bar" to attacks upon the Cuban soil. Those who are now stigmatized as "the extreme naval school" never said more, or perhaps as much, as the reporters, taking their tone from American naval officers on the spot, said about the tremendous preventive force of "a fleet in being." Those who are convinced of the lack of defensive power which they think is inherent in navies, and use all their literary force to assert it, will, I suppose, remain in the same mental condition which they had reached before this war broke out. It seems to them to be a national object to disprove the defensive power with which naval men credit navies, and they will not allow what passes under their ken to interfere with their conceptions. They have never, I think, quite apprehended the position of "the extreme naval school" on this question of the "fleet in being"; and they have even got to accusing Mahan—for it is nothing less than an accusation—of agreeing with them. When all is said and done, "the extreme naval school" allege no more than that admirals are made of such stuff that if they are asked to carry out some undertaking with which the enemy's fleet can interfere, they simply will not, until that fleet is in some way prevented from interfering. To such as are not in the way of thinking like admirals, the thing seems absurd. Yet it is the thought of admirals and not the thought of their critics, that will rule, and naval force retains its power of defence because the thought of admirals, when they come into face of the conditions, will not vary.

And surely there never was so complete an exposition—never so extended an exposition—of the whole matter, as the United States' action has afforded. A "fleet in being,"—a mere squadron or detachment, which it is proved afterwards—can be utterly destroyed in a few hours, and without loss to the American fleet, puts into a Cuban port, and hey! presto! the whole war changes. To the United States of America there is only one thing in the world, and that is the Spanish detachment in Santiago. Its whole fleet assembles there. It is not ready to send an army to Cuba, but one must be sent without a moment's delay, because four cruisers and two destroyers are there. The harbour of Guantanamo must be seized as a preliminary only because Cervera is in the next port. The American Army must move on to the attack before it is strong enough or ready enough, and it must suffer a reverse and fall back, all because Cervera is in Santiago. And yet the "fleet in being" is a mere fad of Lord Torrington's and one or

two of "the extreme naval school"; a thing to be neglected in war when the real operation of invasion is in prospect. But open minds will probably comprehend the tremendous power of a "fleet in being" when they recall the great exertions of the United States to put it "out of being."

I am constantly asked for my views on Cervera's conduct in attempting to escape from Santiago in broad daylight; and I am obliged generally to reply that I have none. The question is why he did not make his escape by night, instead of in the daytime? Which is another way of asserting that the dangers of navigation by night were less than the dangers of the enemy's fire by day, and that Cervera should have understood it. But for myself, not being on the spot, I do not know which danger would have appeared to me greatest if I had had to make a choice. The entrance to Santiago is somewhat winding and remarkably narrow. At the point near which the *Merrimac* was sunk it is only 130 yards wide; that is, not much wider than Cervera's flag-ship was long. By how much the width was decreased in consequence of the sinking of the *Merrimac* we do not know, but we may be sure that she greatly increased the difficulties of navigation. The ease and quickness with which the Spanish ships were destroyed has made us fully acquainted with the dangers of the United States' gun-fire; we do not really know anything of the dangers of navigation as they appeared to the Spanish officers. But we do know that British naval officers make much lighter of the dangers of navigation, especially in darkness, than those of most foreign navies, and quite possibly an English admiral would have risked the dangers of navigation rather than the dangers of gun-fire, especially if the condition of the *Cristobal Colon* in regard to her guns was an index of the state of the rest of the ships. Concerning the policy of attempting to escape at all, opinions may differ. The presence of the ships in the port may have been a considerable element in the defence; and even if the ships had succeeded in passing through the American fleet, they could not have hoped to be left sufficiently uninjured to have done much before passing into another port; and then passing into another port would have been of no particular use.

When it was seen that the Americans would attack Santiago by land, it seemed to me clear that, as in Vernon's time, Guantanamo, fifty miles by road to Santiago, would be made the military as well as the naval base. I knew of the iron pier at Daiquiri, and that it was somewhat sheltered from the prevailing easterly winds, but I understood it to be a light structure, and I did not conceive it of much importance, or that it made Daiquiri a suitable place to land a considerable army at, nor did I connect it with any road. I

expected the landing to be made, as in Vernon's time, at Guantanamo, especially as the water off Daiquiri is deep for the anchorage of any considerable number of ships. The occupation of Guantanamo, and the landing of the marines, was therefore entirely anticipated by me, and, though we have heard little or nothing of Guantanamo since the landing party made good its position there, I suppose it was Sampson's naval base. Else, where does he get his coal and supplies from? But oh! those reporters! who use so many words in telling us what has not happened, what is of no real interest, what does not concern the question, and in omitting the keystones of their bridges! How was the landing really effected at Daiquiri? What forces have been actually landed, and at what rate were the 15,000 men that Shafter is said to have taken with him at first, put on shore? Did the pier materially assist, or was there a beach or rocks to land on? Did the transports anchor, or did they keep under way? Above all, how and from whence are Sampson's ships supplied, and what use is made of Guantanamo? These things, which are of immediate interest and of future importance, we are left in the dark about; while we are carefully told how many shell one of the ships threw into the apparently empty bush before the landing began. I doubt if we could be much more ignorant than we are, if the reporters' columns in the papers were left blank. I sometimes wish that all the reporters had but one pen, in order that I might cut the nib off.

There seems some doubt as to whether all the ships of Cervera's squadron were disabled before they ran on shore. It is stated that an American Board of Survey has examined the hulls of the ships and finds those of the *Maria Teresa* and *Cristobal Colon* recoverable. In this case they probably were run ashore to prevent them falling into the enemy's hands. The magazines of the *Almirante Oquendo* and of the *Vizcaya* exploded, but it is not clear in regard to the former whether the explosion was the effect of United States' shell, or was designedly effected by the Spaniards after the ship had grounded. If it is true, as reported, that the *Vizcaya* was blown up by her own torpedoes, and that the Board of Survey has recommended that fighting ships—that is, gun-ships—should no longer be supplied, as at present universally, with torpedoes, then no more momentous conclusion has been reached by this gigantic war experiment. The place of the torpedo in our battleships and cruisers has in past years been continually aggrandized, and our conceptions of naval tactics will be not so much modified as reversed, if the American suggestion should be adopted. It is plain, however, that, as at Yalu and as at Cavite, fire, excited by the lodgement and explosion of American shells in Spanish hulls has been the chief destructive agent off Santiago. The

astonishing point about this is that, in the mid-sixties, abundant experiment had seemed to show that even in wooden hulls the danger from conflagration set up by shells was of the slightest. And now, when time after time the destruction of the warships by fire has taken the place of the old surrender, the hulls are of steel, and inflammable substances are reduced to a minimum.

Off Santiago, as off Cavite, the Spanish fire proved quite ineffective, and the impression is that the Spanish nation are hopeless gunners.

There is a statement quoted, or more probably misquoted, from the Report of the American Board of Survey to the effect that "rapid-fire batteries on battleships are of supreme importance, and the fire of the main-battery should be below the protective deck." This reads almost as if opinion was turning against the very essence of the modern battleship, her heavy guns in barbettes or turrets. There has been from the very first a strong party, if a small one, in the navy, which has held that a numerous battery of medium guns is much more powerful than one made up of very few very heavy guns, and—because of the great weight absorbed by this battery—comparatively few much lighter guns. It is impossible to say whether this is at all in the words of the Report. At first, as the result of some very odd process of reasoning, the very heavy battery of the battleship was enormously protected by armour, and the lighter battery not at all. Of late the tendency has been, as it were, to even the armour protection over both batteries. The probably misquoted expression in the American Report appears to press this matter still further. My belief certainly is that the issue of this Report is like to prove the most important and far-reaching event of the whole of the naval part of the war.

For it is unquestioned that, apart from what may come of this Report, the naval war has taught on-looking navies just nothing at all. It was generally agreed by those naval officers who had given special study to what has been termed the philosophy of naval war, that steam had only in a general way accentuated those lessons which can be derived from a study of the experiences of sailing wars. The position was hotly contested by considerable numbers of very able men outside the naval ranks, who have insisted that steam had changed everything. As a fact, however, the student of the past and the believer in its lessons has been able to discount every morning's reports, and to set aside from them as untrue all that was not justified by experience. And invariably, after a day or two, it was found that experience was right. A strong instance was noticed in the detailed accounts which arrived on the Monday, as to Sampson's breaking into Santiago harbour and destroying Cervera there. It was incredible to the student, and he was clear

that Cervera must have broken out. So with that general cutting of cables, which the repudiation of the past experience has long insisted would be the herald of war. The student said, No; cables will be cut and used on occasion. But it is not congruous with experience to suppose a reckless cutting of cables without reference to the convenience of neutrals; and so Cuba has never been cut off from the outer world. Again, the absurdity of the alarmist's idea of war without notice cannot reasonably sustain itself against this war's experience. But disappointment must be everywhere felt that we should stand just where we were—except in the very serious matter already mentioned—as to the meaning of torpedo-warfare. According to my view, Spain's original policy should have been to send out to Cuba every torpedo-boat and vessel she could lay her hands on. The whole strength of the idea of the torpedo-boat is its defensive power; and it is a distinct loss to all nations that when this war closes the value of the torpedo-boat and vessel must remain theoretical.

But the strongest impression of all that I am left with is the mistake that a country like Spain can make in expending her money on the naval forces of attack, when it is the forces of defence that she is almost always sure to require. In this respect a very old impression is confirmed. A shipbuilding programme without a strategical bottom to it will certainly, when it comes to be tried, result in a waste of money, if it does not court a quick and easy ruin.

P. H. Colomb.

JOURNALISM AS A PROFESSION.

Among other social changes that mark our time is the evolution of journalism into a recognized profession. It is no longer a mere limbo for educated waifs and strays or a stepping-stone to higher things, but a regular career which men of character and ability deliberately enter upon with the intention of devoting themselves wholly to it. This has come about partly through the increasing pressure in other professions and partly through the great expansion of newspaper enterprise which has multiplied opportunities of decent employment on a great scale. As more men of good stamp have been attracted to the Press, they have themselves raised its *status* and rendered it more attractive again; for the estimation in which any career is held depends chiefly on the men who follow it. Politics, for instance, have gone down as distinctly as trade, manufacture, and the arts have gone up, because of a change in the type of men engaged in them respectively. Of course, I am only speaking in general terms. The great politician stands as high as he ever did, and the great trader or the great artist stands no higher than his predecessor in former days; but with the rank and file it is very different. The name no longer commands any respect in the one case or invites any contempt in the others. And that is clearly due to a personal change; for other professions which are recruited from the same classes as formerly—the Services and the Bar, for instance—stand very much where they did. Journalism has gone up with the arts to which it is allied. Like them, it is a career for gentlemen, and those who follow it can afford to smile at the cheap abuse of silly or superior persons. Sensible men know that they depend on the Press for the current information which is indispensable, if not for carrying on their business, at least for playing an intelligent part as members of the community; and they respect it accordingly.

And yet journalism is still a very amorphous profession and too much of an *omnium gatherum*. It contains so many different grades and tails off into such a ragged fringe that it is difficult to speak of it in general terms. One cannot even define a journalist.

Attempts have been made, but without any success. Someone once proposed to confine the term to "persons engaged in the daily production of a newspaper"; but that is at once too wide and too narrow, it would include compositors and office boys, and would exclude a whole army of leader-writers, special correspondents, and critics, who live entirely by writing for the Press, but are not at all engaged in the daily production of a newspaper. If, on the other hand, you define journalists as those who earn their livelihood by writing for the Press, then you exclude the very large and important class of sub-editors who are mainly engaged in selecting and arranging news, while you would include a number of highly doubtful hangers-on who live by supplying still more doubtful paragraphs to the news-agencies. For my part, I give it up. I known what a journalist is not—he is not an amateur or a mechanic; but I cannot say what he is. Perhaps some day the profession will close up its ranks and establish a definite criterion of membership. Such a step would conduce much to its dignity, and is greatly to be desired in the interests both of the public and of honest journalism. If there were some central organization with power to bring to account persons guilty of unprofessional conduct and to exclude the unfit, it would materially assist the Press as a whole by elevating its character and increasing public confidence. For instance, it not unfrequently happens to a journalist making a serious enquiry into some question of public interest that he is refused all information, simply because an unscrupulous colleague has betrayed the confidence of his informants, and has published matter entrusted to him on condition of secrecy. The fabrication of false news is even more common, and does harm on a larger scale. These things, to which I shall return later on, recoil upon the whole Press and do it serious injury. They can only be prevented by a self-governing organization such as other professions have been obliged to establish for their own protection. It seems to me high time that steps were taken in this direction.

When that is done we shall, perhaps, know better what a journalist is. Meanwhile, the want of solidarity makes it very difficult to discuss the profession as a whole. I can only speak according to my lights and under correction, being well aware that there are many journalists far better qualified by experience to do so than myself. The points that occur to me as likely to be of most interest are the manner of entering the profession, the prospects it holds out, and the nature of the work. In discussing them, my remarks must be understood to apply only to the English, and more particularly the London Press.

With regard to entry, I suppose journalism stands entirely alone

in this: that it may be entered from the bottom or the top. It has been entered, I believe, from the top absolutely; but that, of course, cannot very often happen. It is, however, frequently entered pretty near the top, and I should say that in London, at any rate, a large and increasing proportion of the working journalists of the day have entered more than half-way up. This virtually amounts to saying that there are two separate ranks in journalism, and that the upper can be entered direct without going through the lower. Broadly speaking, that is true; but, on the other hand, men, and possibly boys, have begun at the very bottom and have worked up to the position of editor-manager of a great morning paper. There is, therefore, no hard and fast line. Still, there is a line, and with the evolution of the newspaper it tends to become more definitely drawn. As the supply of highly educated men increases they will more and more monopolize the skilled and better paid work, and the chances of rising from the bottom will become less. Those who aim at the higher ranks will be more likely to succeed by preparing themselves thoroughly and going in straight for the higher work than by entering young and beginning on the lower rungs.* The wider the education, the more complete the intellectual equipment, the better I believe there are "schools of journalism," and, for all I know, they may be excellent; but I should say, judging both *a priori* and *a posteriori*, that the best schools of journalism are the University of Oxford and extensive foreign travel. Oxford dominates the London Press to an extraordinary extent already, and its hold continually increases. The explanation lies, without doubt, in the wide culture, the *savoir faire*, and the intelligent interest in affairs imparted by the Oxford course. There is no better general training for the best kind of journalism. Of special studies the most useful is modern history, and next to that literature. But all special knowledge is valuable, and increasingly so. Specialization is the law of advancing knowledge, and important newspapers are obliged to obey it. They must notice current events, and they live in such a glare of publicity that they cannot afford to make mistakes. What they print on any subject will be read by experts and therefore it should, if possible, be written by experts. Everything comes in sooner or later. For instance, a great fire occurred in London some months ago; it was the topic of the week, and every paper must talk about it. Of course the great journals command skilled and versatile pens which can say something on such a subject without blundering, but how much more satisfactory to the

* I see that Mr. Smalley, whose experience is far greater than my own, has recently expressed the same opinion in an article on Journalism in *Harper's Magazine*.

editor if one of them happens to possess an expert knowledge of fires and fire-brigade work, how much more pointed and interesting his remarks will be than the obvious commonplaces of the cleverest man without that knowledge! Another time it may be a scientific discovery, a war, an earthquake, a railway collision, an epidemic, or what not. The great standing subject is politics, but expert knowledge on a thousand others is continually wanted. The aspiring journalist, therefore, who would put money in his purse, should put knowledge in his head.

How to find the market for it. That is really not difficult for the well-equipped man. It is a very open market. Some fortunate individuals may be offered work right off on a personal recommendation; but that is not the rule, nor is it advisable to wait for such assistance. Most journalists of the class of which I have been speaking have "drifted" into journalism, which merely means that after trying some other vocations they have found the one for which nature intended them. The Bar probably furnishes more of them than any other profession, because it attracts more clever men and gives them less to do than any other; but they hail from all quarters as a rule. It will be found on examination that they know a good deal in general, or something very well in particular, or both, and that they have begun by offering contributions which have commended themselves to the editorial mind by virtue of the skill or knowledge displayed. More work has followed, and, sooner or later, according to chance and capacity, a certain position has been achieved. This is called "drifting" into journalism; but, after all, the process is not essentially different from that by which the average barrister or physician who offers himself in the open market gets into his work, except that the journalist has the advantage of being able to take the initiative. In the case of all three one job leads to another if the man gives satisfaction and inspires confidence; and for the great majority there is no other way of getting on. I do not see that much change in this respect is either likely or necessary. There will never be a "school of journalism" that will furnish ready-made editors, leader-writers, special correspondents, and critics, whatever may be done with reporters and sub-editors. Men will continue to "drift" into the business, led thereto by inclination and fitness. And why not? The process of drifting is the best proof that the work suits the man and he it. And what more can a man desire than to do the work that suits him? How can work be better done? A sporting journalist, who has recently published his autobiography—and a very good autobiography it is—affords a capital example of the drifting process. First he was a soldier, then he tried his hand at various things,

until at last he found his billet in sporting journalism. The moralists shake their heads over the career of "Nathaniel Gubbins," and call it a warning to young men. Heaven had given him sufficient brains, a good education, and a start in life; instead of which he went about the country flinging away his prospects and, metaphorically, stealing ducks. "What a pity to give up a promising career and come down to this!" Stuff and nonsense! There is not the slightest proof that he would ever have done any good by soldiering, but every reason to suppose the contrary, while it is as plain as a pike-staff that he was born to be a sporting journalist. From childhood upwards he took far more interest in the turf than in anything else, and possessed a prodigious knowledge of it. The only pity is that he did not drift somewhat sooner into the congenial occupation on which he has lived contentedly for twenty years to his own and his readers' satisfaction. It may not be a very lofty one compared with the Army, but it suits him; and far better be a good sporting journalist than a bad soldier, which he most certainly was. He is not ashamed of his business, nor has he any reason to be on a large view of human affairs. The best work for a man is that which he does best. Many another, who has started out to be Lord Chancellor or to play some other imposing part in the world, has found his real account in plying an obscure and industrious pen, and has been all the happier for it.

Granted that a man has the aptitude for journalism, what prospects does it hold out for him? Nothing very grand, it must be confessed, from the vulgar point of view. If he be ambitious of wealth or fame he had better turn to something else—in this country at any rate. In the United States, in France, and in our own Colonies, it may lead to anything. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, for instance, is a journalist. But here it is different. Men who have been on the Press occasionally rise to prominent positions—Mr. John Morley and Sir Alfred Milner, for instance—but it is not by virtue of their journalism, and in any case they form no precedent. In France, the best working journalists enjoy a personal fame and influence—with a corresponding emolument—from which their English colleagues are debarred by the practice of anonymous writing. This raises the whole question of anonymity. A friend of mine, who writes with equal brilliancy in at least four languages and knows the European Press down to the ground, is never tired of inveighing against the anonymous system and its unfairness to the writers. Undoubtedly it is unfair to them in the sense that they do not get the credit for their own work. Neither, it may be added, do they get the discredit. A good many attempts to abandon anonymity are visible in various directions, and the

movement seems to be growing, not at all for the sake of the writers, but because signed articles are thought to be more piquant. It does not strike me as particularly successful up to now or likely to be followed by the great papers. Nor, in my humble opinion, is it desirable. Angry people sometimes make a great outcry about the "irresponsibility" of the anonymous Press. They fail to see that it is much more responsible than any other, because the paper, being itself answerable for everything, must be conducted in the most circumspect and honourable manner if it is to maintain a high position. The exceptionally high tone of the English Press, which is a just source of national pride, seems to me largely due to the anonymous system. Its abandonment leads to all sorts of abuses. Nor do I believe that the best journalists have any desire to abandon it themselves. As I have said before, they are for the most part modest and reticent men, who prefer to work quietly and need no stimulus to do their best.

They are also content—so far as any man is ever content—with a modest wage, which is lucky for their employers. It certainly is modest enough and, in the case of the great daily papers, in startling contrast to the colossal gains of the proprietors. For in journalism, it is to be observed, the employed supply the brains as well as the labour. In return they receive far less than men of the same calibre and corresponding position at the Bar or in Medicine. With the exception of a very few exceptional posts, which may run up to £3,000 a year, I suppose the ablest journalist cannot expect to make more than £1,500, and he is much more likely to have to be contented with from £500 to £1,000. A vast number range from, perhaps, £150 to £500. This is not precisely wealth, but it would probably average out quite as high as the Army, the Navy, the Civil Service, Medicine, School or University teaching, and much higher than the Church. There is, therefore, nothing to complain of, and in respect to the pecuniary inferiority of successful journalism to the higher walks of medicine or surgery and to successful Bar work it is to be noted that all these entail years of waiting. The journalist can make a living right off. A man who has the ability and education requisite for the Bar or for consulting practice, instead of earning nothing for five or ten years, could make from £200 to £500 a year as a journalist from the outset. The Press has that great advantage for young men. Success may be very rapidly attained. It is at the other end that its defects appear. Instead of becoming easier with use, much of the work tends to grow more irksome as the elasticity and initiative of youth depart, and instead of increasing without trouble like a snowball, the income tends rather to diminish. That is not always or necessarily the case, but it often is. A once

successful journalist may die in poverty through no fault of his own, which never happens to the successful professional man. In this journalism shows its kinship to the arts.

As to the nature of the work, it is exceedingly varied—so varied, indeed, that one man can hardly have much experience of all its branches. To the general public, I imagine, a journalist means either a reporter or a war correspondent. They see the one at public meetings, and the other announces himself with a fanfare of trumpets, doubtless unconsciously adopted from long habit on the battle-field. Both are so familiar that I shall only make one or two remarks about them. Reporters form a very large, important, and unpretending class. They may be called the backbone of serious domestic journalism, and, as such, are none too well paid. But then their work is rather mechanical. It is for the most part easy and dull. Shorthand reporters can never be dispensed with, but there seems a tendency to cut them down what with increasing love of snippets and increasing avalanches of news from everywhere. There is also a tendency to put the work more and more in the hands of news-agencies, which means a diminished demand for individuals, as one report serves many papers. As to the war correspondent, his work—when he gets to it—must be far the most exciting that falls to the lot of the journalist; but I fancy that he will never again enjoy the great times of the past. He has spoilt his own market by being too numerous and too indiscreet. With a mob of correspondents on the ground nothing is allowed to come through, or nothing but lies. So it was, at any rate on one side, in the Greco-Turkish War. The amount of matter produced bore a ludicrous proportion to the army of workmen engaged. It was still more so in the Spanish-American War, in which there were for weeks more correspondents than combatants, yet with so little to say that they were driven to inventing the most transparent rubbish. To be a war correspondent and to have nothing to say, or to write elaborate despatches and have them returned or garbled, must be purgatory.

There remain editing, leader-writing, special correspondence, foreign correspondence, criticism, "interviewing," and a host of other things. To go over them all would require a treatise. I can only give a few impressions of my own for what they are worth. Broadly, I should divide journalistic work into the regular and the irregular. The former has the advantage of certainty and the disadvantages of monotony and drudgery. It is the best for an elderly man, or one with wife and children. The irregular work has the advantages of variety, interest, and freedom; it has the grave disadvantage of uncertainty. Some will prefer the one, and

some the other, according to their temperament and circumstances. But in one sense the man with a fixed salary and regular office work is exposed to greater uncertainty than the free lance. He may quarrel with his employer, or the paper may change hands, and he may find himself out of work altogether. That happens conspicuously with editors, who are the type of the regular journalist, and though a competent man can always find a billet, he cannot always find an editorial one, and it is difficult for those who have once wielded authority to take a subordinate place. There are enough ex-editors in London to run a first-class paper all by themselves. The same thing may happen to any member of the permanent staff, whereas the man who writes for two or three or more papers—and there are many such—can never be left stranded in the same way.

To go a little more into detail. Every branch of journalism has its merits and defects. Editorial work is the best paid, as it deserves to be, and it has many privileges; but it entails much drudgery, a wearing responsibility, and not a few annoyances. The editor's chair, though very attractive to a strong man, is not altogether a post to be envied. And, speaking of editors, I may perhaps correct one or two common misapprehensions. There is a foolish way of talking as if a paper had several editors, a City editor, a sporting editor, and what not. It may be so with *The Field* and similar journals, but I believe I am right in saying that a daily paper has only one editor. The mistake comes from France, where every man on the staff is a *rédacteur*, while the editor is the *rédacteur en chef*. Here the head is the editor simply. He has assistants, who are not to be confounded with the sub-editors—a wholly different and subordinate class. I remember a fond mother once telling me that her hopeful son—a junior reporter on a great journal—had been temporarily made sub-editor. She believed, or wished me to believe, that he was in charge of the paper. Next in dignity to the editor and assistant editors are the leader-writers. Their work is well paid, agreeable, and less difficult than might be supposed, but it demands qualities which are not too common. A man ought to be perfect master of his subject and of good English; he must know how to seize two or three points and elucidate them clearly, concisely, and forcibly without wandering beyond them; he must wield an adroit pen that can turn phrases of nicely shaded meaning from the most forcible utterance down to ambiguous suggestion; and he must be able to do all this against time if necessary. If he possesses wit and irony so much the better, but above all things he must be clear and avoid mistakes. Considering the pressure under which the work is generally done, much of it is astonishingly good. A first-rate leading article is quite equal as an

intellectual feat to the most brilliant display of advocacy or parliamentary debating. The drawbacks are that, in writing against time, a man is liable to be dissatisfied with his work, which he feels might have been done better, and going over the same ground perpetually is apt to become monotonous. Commenting on party politics, for instance, is for the most part terribly hack work. There is a marked tendency at the present time to shorten, if not to abolish, editorial comment in the daily Press; but it must always be a leading feature of serious journalism. A paper that has no mind of its own has no influence, however large its circulation.

The special correspondent's business is delightfully free from monotony, and, if there were only enough of it, would be the pleasantest of all branches of journalism. It provides interest, variety, change of subject and of scene; it gives a man new knowledge and new friends, and affords opportunities for no little intellectual satisfaction. There is considerable attraction to an alert mind in mastering the facts on some actual question in which the world is interested at the moment, or in watching events on the spot and then telling the story to an eager public. Moreover, the special correspondent usually has a free hand and can say what he believes to be the truth on his own responsibility. Unfortunately, the opportunities are so irregular that no man can live for very long on special correspondence alone. The regular foreign correspondent, on the contrary, has a solid position, but according to my experience he is the most discontented of all journalists, unless he is stationed in Paris. He is an inveterate grumbler, though his salary is good and his work by no means crushing. He feels an exile, he is haunted by the fear of being beaten by his rivals, he does not know what is going on at home and whether his news will be stale or not. The best are extremely able, well-informed, and careful men, but it is a pity that so many of them devote their time chiefly to picking out all the nastiest things said about us in foreign newspapers. The foreign correspondents stationed in London are still worse in this respect, and the two between them manage to do a deal of mischief.

The least attractive branch of journalism, to my mind, is criticism, with the sole exception of "interviewing." Musical and dramatic criticism is mostly done under pressure, and very monotonous. It seems to me a desperately trivial business. Reviewing is better, but, if conscientiously done, it is laborious work and far from remunerative in proportion to the time spent upon it. I have frequently read a stiff book through twice, and parts of it many times over before feeling competent to deal fairly by it; but, perhaps, that is taking the business too seriously. With

"interviewing," in the modern sense, we reach the lowest stage. Of course interviews of a sort have always been, and always will be, essential to journalism, because when information is required it is necessary to go and obtain it from the person who possesses it. But the modern personal and domestic interview, the odious "chats" with actresses and other important persons, the revelations of private life, the silly gush about nothing at all, the inevitable, empty compliments, the inane pleasantries, the drivelling, forced conversation—surely a sorry affair. The only thing to be said is that it must be much worse for the interviewer than for the interviewed. It will be a relief to everybody when the public taste for this stuff declines, of which some signs are happily visible.

Multifarious as are the departments of Press work—and I have left many unmentioned—they are but parts of a complicated machine designed to effect a single purpose. Tall things have often been said about the "mission" of the Press; it is to govern the nations upon earth, to right the wrong, feed the hungry, put down the mighty from their seat, and generally play the part of Providence. When the time is out of joint—which is always—the modern Hamlet cheerfully undertakes to put it right. "I, said the wren, with my little pen, I'll put it right." I venture to think that the real mission with which the Press has directly to concern itself is something much less ambitious but by no means less honourable. It is simply to tell the truth about current events. If the missioners would hold fast to that modest ideal they would come a great deal nearer to realizing their lofty aims and at the same time reflect a great deal more honour upon their profession than they do at present. The business of the Press is to inform and instruct the public upon the affairs of the moment, first by news and secondly by comment. But it is essential that the news shall be true and the comment honest. When those conditions are fulfilled the Press is a great power for good and the journalist may take a legitimate pride in his calling; it belongs to the very best of services, the service of Truth. When they are not fulfilled it is a mischievous abomination of which he has every reason to be ashamed. The dissemination of lies by false news and dishonest comment strikes at the profession in the very citadel of its honour. I do not speak of mistakes in fact and honest differences of opinion, nor even of the publication of rumours; but of news deliberately fabricated and of comment deliberately intended to deceive. We have far too much of both, and they are a just reproach to the Press which might do much to purify its own ranks. False news most frequently—though by no means always—emanates from inferior news-agencies which supply short paragraphs on current topics of interest, and when they have nothing to say, invent. A great many

newspapers might be more careful than they are in accepting such news. A few take great pains to avoid publishing false intelligence, and refuse to accept items from doubtful sources. The rest appear to be only restrained by the law of libel; they use anything that is sufficiently piquant or—worse still—that suits their political ends. Let me give a recent instance. At the time of the Cripplegate fire, when all London was excited over the disaster, a prominent paper published the statement that the water-supply failed the fire brigade—not only published it but printed it in capital letters in a leading article with appropriate comment. It was an absolute fabrication without any foundation whatever; but it suited the views of the paper and was used accordingly, though the slightest trouble would have proved its falseness. Such conduct is unprofessional because it damages the whole profession in the eyes of honest men. I could give any number of instances of the same thing. There are some polemical journals, indeed, which nobody takes the trouble to contradict, because they notoriously live by lies. The dissemination of false news merely for its own sake, without any ulterior object, stands on a different footing. We have lately witnessed a regular orgy of this particular journalistic vice. For several weeks after the war broke out between Spain and America the newspapers made themselves a public laughing-stock by daily furnishing columns of intelligence all duly contradicted in the next issue. This evil, perhaps, cures itself, and needs no other remedy; but to deceive the public with falsehood for a definite purpose is a not less heinous and treasonable offence than betrayal of professional trust by a lawyer or a doctor. Nor is it in any wise mitigated by being done, as it usually is, in a "good cause." The end does not justify the means, and no cause is higher than the truth. One which is served by lies is either bad or badly served. To this offence may be added the publication of information imparted in confidence. For its own sake the journalistic profession should have some means of bringing offenders to book, analogous to the Incorporated Law Society and the General Medical Council. A still worse offence, of course, is dishonest journalism for sordid personal ends, in the form of blackmail and bribery; but I am confident that these are exceedingly rare in this country in spite of recent alleged scandals. If they occur at all, it is only within the corrupting influence of the financial world. To judge from my own experience, journalists are generally considered as far above anything of the kind as any other honourable gentlemen, and are equally exempt from attempts to influence their judgment by corrupt or personal motives.

ARTHUR SHADWELL.

A REMINISCENCE OF MANILA.

Recent historical events, both on the mainland of China and in the East Indian Archipelago, have at least done good service in one direction, that of quickening the geographical sense of our countrymen, which is strangely wanting in acuteness for so nomad a people. The crowded waters of the "China Sea," as navigators loosely term the vast area of island-studded ocean east of Java as far as the 130th meridian, contain without doubt some of the most interesting and lavishly endowed portions of the whole world. Their intricate passages, unresting volcanic agencies, sombre reefs, and unutterably baffling currents have for many generations engaged the most earnest attention of nautical surveyors, whose duty it is to prepare accurate charts of marine highways for the benefit of mariners generally. Yet in spite of their unceasing labours an enormous extent of coast-line still remains almost unknown, and certainly unvisited except by native craft of doubtful reputation on mysterious errands savouring strongly of piracy or head-hunting. Over one of the largest of these great island groups Spain has for three centuries enjoyed a nominal sovereignty, sufficient to prevent any other Power from claiming jurisdiction without undesirable trouble, but utterly inadequate for the practical and beneficent work of civilization, and of utilizing their wonderful resources for the benefit of the mother country. In many of the islands the power of Spain has always been an indefinite thing, unrealizable by the natives, who have lived and died for generations in their own primitive fashion, unaware of the ferment going on in the outer world. At long intervals the aboriginal inhabitants of some Eastern sleepy hollow on the unnavigable coast of Palawan or Mindanao have been rudely awakened to the fact that they were subject to the rule of white men not at all inclined to be particular as to their methods of showing their authority, and apt to kill, burn, and destroy at large with little provocation or even none at all. But, generally speaking, it has only been in the larger islands of Luzon and Panay that any attempt at resolute government has been made by the Spaniards, whose ideas of ruling a subject race may be described as ignorant incapacity tempered by cruelty. In these

islands an energetic and fair-dealing people would have had a comparatively easy task with the aborigines, who may be roughly divided into three: the Tagals of the north, the Bissayans of the south, and the Negritos of the mountainous interior. Of these, the first two are probably of Malay derivation, but with the fierce treachery of the parent people greatly modified; in fact, they may be justly credited with being docile, teachable, and fairly good workers for such a climate. The Negritos, on the other hand, are a diminutive black race with woolly hair, and undoubtedly of Papuan origin. In their native wilds they have hitherto defied the invader, and still manage to remain free and untamable as ever they were. There is yet another small section of the inhabitants of this Archipelago, who were once the terror of the surrounding seas, born pirates, ravaging those intricate waterways like questing wolves through the mazes of a forest, and just as ruthless to their prey. These have long been known as "Illanons." They are almost pure Malay, and possess all the more undesirable attributes of that polished Eastern race with scarcely any of their virtues. The devastating typhoon or hurricane, that in the autumn occasionally cuts a wide swath of destruction across those seas, has been credited with the loss of many a noble vessel and all her brave crew, whose end has been far more awful than the swift oblivion granted by the elements. But the sailor is thankful, in no small degree, that, owing to the arduous labours of our gunboats in those dangerous waters, piracy is almost a thing of the past, and that the great highways of the China Seas and Eastern passages are now, as far as wholesale robbery and murder are concerned, as safe as the Straits of Dover.

It is, however, when we consider the enormous wealth of the Philippine Islands, both in mineral and vegetable resources, that we are astounded at the strange fact that instead of their possession being a prop and stay to the mother country, they have long, like Cuba, been an open ulcer in the great body of the State draining it of blood and treasure in terrible quantities and yielding nothing in return. When we look at the marvellous young giants that have sprung from our country, and within the last century have risen to such power that they make no uncertain claim to be heard in the councils of the world, we find it difficult indeed to understand how so fair a heritage as the Philippines can have been in the possession of Spain for three centuries and now possess but a tithe of the trade controlled by one tiny outpost of our Empire, Hong Kong. My first visit to Manila was in a sailing ship of a thousand tons register from Hong Kong. It was also my first visit to the place of "fragrant streams," and all accustomed as I have been to the manifestations of Britain's great

ness throughout the world, Hong Kong seemed the most wonderful of them all. Just a clearing-house as it were, a depôt for China, a tiny dot upon the ocean, a cluster of dwellings and warehouses around the sloping shoulders of a mountain, without other "Hinterland" than that mobile one we fondly call "Britannia's realm," yet how mighty, how wealthy, how full of overflowing vigour. The harbour of Hong Kong is fairly spacious, but by no means secure, as the dismal records of ravages by typhoons abundantly attest. Yet upon its crowded bosom float the argosies of all nations, swift to take advantage of the wise and generous maritime laws of Britain, even though they are too blinded by jealousy and narrowness to reciprocate, or even make an experiment in the same wise direction.

Our antiquated craft could not hope to obtain a cargo where so many swift steamships were clamouring for freight, and so it came about that we were chartered to proceed in ballast for Manila, and there receive a lading of hemp, the leisurely delivery of which would not affect us much, while it often prevents expensive steamers from using the port in competition with the highly favoured Spanish lines, which, of course, take precedence of all others in everything. We were unfortunate enough to make the passage during the south-west monsoon, the weather being stormy, wet, and gloomy, while the staunch old ship, light as a bladder upon the water from being in ballast, had much ado to hold her own against the fierce beam wind. One incident I remember made a vivid impression upon me while on that passage. It was just after sunset on a very gloomy evening, with half a gale of wind blowing, and the old *Dartmouth* laying over till her lee rail dipped occasionally. I was at the wheel and saw, to my surprise, a stork come labouring on heavy wing up from to leeward, apparently bent upon taking shelter on board. Several times he fetched up under the lee of the spanker, catching the down-draught of the great sail and being whirled away again, only just able to avoid the curling crests of the cross sea. Once or twice he reached astern and came cautiously to windward, but he was evidently afraid of being driven on board against his will, and resumed his fruitless struggle up under our lee. My sympathies were so strongly excited that I could hardly breathe when he managed to get within a few feet of the lee rail, and it was with a real pang of sorrow that I saw the gallant bird grow weaker and weaker until, making one more attempt to get up under the lee of the spanker, he lost his steerage way, the eddy caught him and whirled him, a ragged bundle of feathers, into the yeasty smother beneath, where he instantly disappeared.

We sighted the high land of Luzon on the eighth day after

leaving Hong Kong, but it was not until two days later that we managed to beat up to a weatherly position off the magnificent bay of Manila. Among the great ports of the world this splendid bay takes high rank for all those qualities that make a harbour really great. But these islands are all marvellously endowed by Nature with easy access to the sea, for, except in the case of Luzon, every island is so penetrated by gulfs, bays, and inlets that no part is very far from the universal highway of nations. None, however, of these harbours can compare with Manila Bay for ease of access, freedom from dangers, and gradual shallowing of the sea-bed as the shores are approached, rendering navigation one of the easiest of tasks. We blessed our lucky stars that such was the case, for we met with a fairly strong head wind blowing right out of the bay, and as we made our first board into the fast-darkening harbour, the light on Corregidor Island sent a long warning finger of light from its towering height right across our path. Our captain had determined upon entering by the southern channel, the entrance, though ten miles across, being divided unequally into two wide passages by the two small islands of Corregidor and Caballo, which are about a mile apart, and from each of which lights are shown. Now, the channel south of Caballo Island is much wider and therefore more suitable for a ship working to windward, and our captain naturally made for it. But a long, low galley shot out of the shadows, and a stern voice bade us "heave-to." Our main-yard was instantly hauled aback and the visitors came alongside, where they remained while, through an interpreter whose English was fragmentary and guttural to an almost unintelligible degree, we were catechized as to our intentions, &c. Satisfactory answers having been returned, we received a curt warning that we must not enter by the south channel on peril of being fired at from Corregidor, but no reason was given. Then, with a grand bow, the officer in charge of the boat said, "*Señor Capitan, buena noche, Vaya Vd. con Dios*," and, with a wave of his hand, the boat darted away into the darkness again. It was well for us that there was nothing in our way. The night became quite black; a clear darkness caused by a thick pall of cloud low down overhead. And then, to add to our difficulty of seeing whither we went, that beautiful, inexplicable phenomenon of the "milk sea" suddenly appeared! I have seen it both before and since in those same latitudes, but always in the open ocean, and never so brilliant. The water became like a lake of lambent flame, and every wave-crest as it broke shot up into the darkness above a coruscating shower of diamonds glittering with an unearthly brilliance that broke against the ship's hull and lit up every spar and web of cordage far more powerfully than any electric search-light. As we worked farther and farther into the harbour the wind grew

lighter and the sea smoother, until the scene was beautified beyond the power of words to describe. Looking over the side, one could see to read the smallest print, and could *feel* the waves of light rising from the water like some miraculous radiance emanating from no known source in such infinite abundance as to baffle all comparison. Many fish of various sizes disported themselves in the glowing waters, their tracks being even brighter than the shining sea through which they sped. Altogether a sight never to be forgotten.

With the full day came the health officer and his utterly ridiculous routine of long exploded customs that so sorely harass business-like people and make them expend so much fruitless energy in denouncing these inanities. Fortunately, there was not the slightest pretext for worrying us beyond the answering of a long string of aimless questions, and we were forthwith admitted to full pratique—certified to be free from all suspicion of our ability to spread contagious disease throughout the smiling healthful territory before us. Then came the customs officials, an armed band led by a stately figure who only needed a suit of mail to look as if he had just stepped out of a picture by Velasquez. He was tall and dark, his oval face bearing a huge pointed black beard and moustache, and his brilliant black eyes overhung by a pair of black eyebrows as thick as his moustache. Of course, he spoke no word of English, but a cringing little fellow of doubtful nationality, who appeared to be a clerk of some sort, went with him into the cabin and translated the ship's manifest for his benefit. Now, the vessel being in ballast and coming from a port like Hong Kong, there was apparently no reason why we should be suspected of any design to cheat the customs authorities, yet a general "rummage" was ordered, much to the captain's disgust and in spite of his energetic protests, to which indeed the grand "Caballero" paid no heed, except by a slight languid inclination of the head. The search was thorough, but the seekers drew blank until they came to the forecastle. There they overhauled each man's chest and bunk, pouncing upon every bit of soap we possessed and also upon all the harmless curios which, sailor-like, we had bought in China. These things in the aggregate made quite an imposing pile when they were all heaped together outside the forecastle door on deck. Up till then we had simply stared in blank amazement at these high-handed proceedings, but made no protest. When, however, it become evident that our goods were to be confiscated, a general chorus of indignant remonstrance arose, and, as the only individual on board speaking Spanish, I was deputed to address the officer, who had remained aft, nonchalantly leaning against the cabin door. To my respectful statements he only vouchsafed the

dignified reply that as these goods did not come under the head of wearing apparel, and did not appear upon the manifest, it was his duty to take them from us. The ultimate disposal of them would rest with the officials on shore, who would inform the captain of the amount of fine payable when he appeared before them to clear the ship inward. So we were compelled to witness the transference of our property to the boat alongside, and with a chorus of execrations upon the marauders, which perhaps it was as well they did not understand, we saw our curios and soap disappear shorewards.

One of the soldiers was left behind, ostensibly to guard the ship, but really I should think to save his keep. He was evidently a half-breed, with a vacant look upon his simple face, and clothed in a dilapidated tunic and trousers of no pronounced colour, but studded with tarnished brass buttons. He was barefooted, but wore a straw sombrero fastened under his chin by a strip of raw hide. His rifle was an ancient muzzle-loader which would have been despised by an African chief, and, taking a peep down the barrel one day, I saw it was thickly encrusted with rust. That mattered little, as he had no ammunition. No directions were given as to his maintenance, he was just left on board without a word of explanation. I do not believe they cared what became of him, except as a means of screwing some penalty out of the ship in case anything happened to him. Incidentally his presence on board became one of the most interesting events to me personally. We had been nearly a week at anchor, and, as far as I know, no one had addressed a word to him or he to anyone. But one night, as I was fishing from the waist of the ship, I became aware of him leaning silently over the rail near me and stealing a shy glance in my direction now and then. A feeling of pity rose within me for the lonely man thus shut out from human companionship, and I looked up and smilingly made some trivial remark to him in Spanish. It was like a cup of cold water in the desert to the poor fellow, and in about five minutes I had quite forgotten my favourite sport and was deeply engrossed in one of the most enthralling conversations I have ever held.

I must here state that some years before I had spent a considerable time upon the lawless coast of Mexico, going from port to port at the western end of the Gulf, where I got my first acquaintance with the Spanish language. Afterwards, through the accident of a shipwreck upon one of the "cays" in the Bay of Campechè, I visited Havana and remained there for six months, during which time I got a very fair insight into Spanish colonial customs. Personally, I must say that I met with very great kindness from individual Spaniards, so that my stay in the capital of Cuba is one of the pleasantest recollections of my life, but that could not blind me to

the evident facts of utter callousness, maladministration, and general futility on the part of those responsible for the government of the island. No such insight, however, as I was now favoured with had ever been granted me before. My new acquaintance at first confined himself to trivialities, telling me, among other things, that the spoiling of our goods was entirely the captain's fault. He had omitted to make the usual "cumshaw" (present) to the officer in charge of the searching party, which would have effectually blinded him to any irregularity, however gross, provided the gift was proportionate in amount. After a while my friend grew confidential about the difficulties of his life ashore, until I interposed the innocent remark, "You don't seem to love the Spaniards over much." Then a change came over the man dreadful to see. From a meek, spiritless creature he became to all appearance a bloodthirsty demon, with distorted features that would have served as a model for a statue of hatred. With a string of those unutterably horrible blasphemies in which Spanish-speaking people are so proficient, he assured me that no death could be sufficiently dreadful, no torture that could be devised painful enough for the punishment of that thrice accursed race in his opinion. His vehemence was painful to witness, the epithets hissing through his clenched teeth, and his eyes glaring like those of a maniac. Presently he calmed down somewhat, and, taking my arm, he pointed along the coast to a low point where I could just distinguish a few twinkling lights. "There," he said, "lies the little village where I was born thirty years ago. My father was a Spaniard, who boasted that his race was too noble for anything so degrading as work, but who thought it quite fit and proper that my mother, a native of Luzon, should labour both for him and his miserable offspring. I was the youngest of five, four boys and a girl, each of whom, as soon as they grew old enough to walk, let alone work, were taken away from my mother's side. She never saw them again. Fortunately for me, my father was killed before I was old enough to know what his crimes were. I rejoice at the thought that he received his deserts at the hands of one of my mother's people, who waylaid him and hacked him to pieces one night after he had brutally flogged my poor mother, and left her bleeding and insensible on the floor of our hut. After this act of righteous justice we were left in peace for many years. I grew up into a strong, healthy lad, as passionately fond of my mother as she was of me, and able to help her, so that her hard life was no longer so bitterly severe as it had been. She was a cripple, having had her leg broken by my father before I was born, and been left to die or recover, as it might happen, just like a wild animal. The one fear that never left us both was that I should be torn away from her, as we had seen so

many others hurried to Manila by the soldiers, for what purpose we never knew, but they never came back again. But by some strange oversight, which I do not even now understand, I was overlooked until I was twenty years of age. The ever present terror was no less than it had been, but somehow I felt a proud confidence (quite groundless) in my ability to defend my liberty or escape if ever I should be seized, and I vowed to our ancient gods that nothing should keep me from my mother's side. Another tie came also to bind me to my little home still closer, if that had been possible. The daughter of one of my mother's oldest friends was left an orphan, and to save her from the fate that in such a village as ours, so near Manila, always overtakes our young women, mother contrived to give her a shelter with us. I fell in love with her, and we were married, although I was sorely put to it to pay the priest's fee, which I was bound to do to have even the shadow of right to my own wife. Our marriage made no difference to our mode of living, as we still occupied the same little hut and all toiled hard to get a bit of food. She was almost as fond of my mother as I, and, although we had a hard struggle for a bare existence, we were free and very happy. Our people want so little besides liberty. Then—then; how can I tell you?" and he suddenly burst into a passionate fit of weeping, which seemed as if it would tear him to pieces. I was distressed myself to see his agony, but could offer no comfort. At last he calmed down and proceeded: "In spite of the gloomy prospect of difficulties in finding food for another mouth, I was overjoyed when Leequa whispered to me her hopes, and went about my work feeling bigger and stronger, and swelling with importance. But it was only the next day after I had heard the news that, as I was returning home for the *siesta*, Leequa sprang out from a bush near the hut looking mad with fright. 'Hide, hide,' she said, 'the soldiers are in the village, I'm sure they'll take you away from me.' I was stunned for a moment, and unable to think. Before I had recovered myself sufficiently to form any idea of where to go or what to do, those infernal wretches had surrounded us. Then, too late, I made a dash for liberty, fighting like a tiger; but what could I do? In a minute I was overpowered, tied hand and foot, and thrown in a stupefied heap upon the ground. They ill-used my poor girl, my Leequita, before my eyes, and at the sight I went mad. I remember no more until I found myself in a filthy den in Cavitè, my head shaven, and my whole body aching and smarting with bruises and cuts. They had been flogging me to hasten the recovery of my reason. All my spirit was gone. I was no longer a man but a thing, and the happy past was only a foolish dream, impossible ever to have been real. Well, with hundreds of other unfortunates

like myself, all wolfish with hunger, beaten, spit at, and trampled upon continually, I was drilled and made into a soldier. We were driven like cattle to fight, to shoot down our own countrymen wherever they, goaded to desperation, had risen against their hellish masters. You may perhaps wonder why we did not sooner die than consent to march against those who were fighting for our rights, who were brave enough to stand against their oppressors. I can't answer you except by saying that we were no longer human beings; we even spied upon and betrayed one another, in the hope of being favoured with a little more consideration, a full meal or so now and then. Pay we had none, or any hope of release except by death. And I believe that quite as many of us were killed by our own officers, and by the Spanish soldiers that always went with us, as ever we had the misfortune to slay of our unfortunate compatriots. Were I to tell you what I have seen during this last ten years, reproduce for you the scenes as they have occurred, I believe you would die with horror; for I have often heard that in your country you are really free, and choose your own rulers who govern with justice and truth, and that you may really enjoy your lives without fear of being robbed or beaten. But not even Satan himself could surpass the unutterable cruelty and rapacity of the Spaniards in these islands. Even their own countrymen fare little better at their hands than the natives. They seem to have no humanity left except that which is vile, full of lust, greed, and cruelty. I have heard that in their own country there are great and good men, Englishmen and Americans have told me so; how is it that none of them ever come here? We were a gentle kindly race, simple in our wants, peaceful and happy in our lives, and they have made of our islands a very inferno for hundreds of years. I pretend to worship their God, but in my heart I hate Him; for if He were not as they are, why does He let them continue to blight us?

"I never heard of my mother or my wife again. Years ago I lost the last faint hope that ever I should, and I no longer think of the possibility of such a thing. I am now better off than thousands of my fellows, for I often get long spells like this on board English and American ships, where I am well fed and kindly treated because you are men with hearts. And the long silences do not hurt me, for I do not think, I just bask like a well-fed animal. But it makes the starvation ashore very hard to bear when I have to go back to it again."

Of course, it is impossible for me to endorse this poor wretch's sad story, nor could I venture to reproduce it in his own words, bristling with blasphemies and cursings. If it sounds harsh or exaggerated, it may be remembered that my version is as milk-and-

water to vitriol, compared with the corrosive virulence of his words. As far as I am concerned, my previous experience in Cuba had prepared me for some such testimony about Spanish rule, although I never heard before so much harrowing detail. It has often seemed to me that the Spaniard is incapable of even thinking that a subject race might possibly have some claim to consideration, some few rights to be remembered. Cruelties, therefore, such as make our nerves twitch to hear of, are perpetrated not only in the suppression of revolt, but in the ordinary course of keeping the people down. Not, perhaps, so much from any lust of cruelty *per se*, as from inability to sympathize with the sufferers, a stubborn mediæval spirit refusing to respond to the growing light of human fellowship which slowly but surely is suffusing the whole world.

What, however, cannot fail to make an Anglo-Saxon indignant on the business side of his practical nature, is the way in which the progress of the world at large is hindered by such hopeless ineptitude as is manifested in the Philippines. Here is a magnificent territory splendidly favoured with every form of wealth, and capable of supporting with the greatest ease fifteen times its present population. It is provided with such a magnificent series of harbours, running far inland and fed by navigable rivers, that no part of the country is at any serious distance from an easy means of communicating with the world's markets. And its climate, except in the low-lying valleys, is almost perfect. Yet its history is a melancholy record of warfare and needless bloodshed, commerce choked and enterprise hindered, a gang of needy adventurers draining the life-blood of the people, and by some mysterious means benefiting no one, not even their avaricious selves.

While ashore I was struck with the absence of all energy apparent except where the English, American, and German merchants are to be found, and they avoid the old city of Manila with the utmost carefulness, leaving it to moulder away under the eyes of its indolent and haughty rulers, who would not, could not, see the handwriting upon the wall which told them that their days were indeed numbered. The most industrious people in the place are the Chinese who, in spite of repeated massacres, still flock over to these fruitful isles from their own teeming land, and manage with that wonderful adaptability of theirs to live and thrive in spite of all drawbacks. The water-carriers of the city are a race of giants from Northern Manchuria, such huge men as would justify the fables told of the Patagonians by the first voyagers thither. To see them strolling along with hardly an effort carrying two barrels of water slung on either end of a bamboo balanced on their naked shoulders, the total weight being little short of a quarter of a ton, would surprise most people. But

the native population seem to have no energy, no desire for anything but to loll in the sun during the day and carry on cock-fighting for their amusement. This latter trait is common to nearly all Malays. The little river which divides the suburb of Binondo from Manila proper is only navigable for small craft, at least vessels drawing not more than ten or twelve feet. Below the bridge it is locally known as the "Canash" (Carènage), the name Pasig being hardly ever used. Near its mouth the embankments are in good order and built solidly enough of masonry, but as you ascend you find wharves and "go-downs" in every stage of dilapidation, unless they belong to any of those really energetic classes of merchants before mentioned. The general exports of the country mostly go to Spain in Spanish steamers, but the staple, now that sugar is a drug in the market and over-taxation is killing the tobacco industry, is hemp. This beautiful fibre is eagerly sought after by the Americans, who hold an undisputed pre-eminence in its manufacture. American Manila cordage is a marvellous production, so light, so silky, yet withal so strong that it excites the envy of all other countries who cannot begin to compete with the Yankees in this industry. Moreover, we are eliminating rope wherever we can use flexible steel wire, but the Americans cling to their splendid cordage tenaciously, and for that reason have been and are still likely to be the best customers that the Philippines can have for this fibre (Abaca), which is obtained from a sort of banana tree growing here in amazing profusion.

It is hardly to be wondered at that all such business as must necessarily be conducted through the agency of half-breeds—Banians or Chinese—involves an amount of cheating and rascality generally that coping with these people becomes a fine art, only attainable at the cost of much anxiety and expenditure of energy in bad language. Shipmasters are robbed right and left, until the balancing of their accounts at leaving is a task of tremendous difficulty. One very amusing thing (not confined to Manila though) is the solemn tendering of testimonials by the parti-coloured tailors, *compradores*, and bumboatmen soliciting the esteemed favour of your never-to-be-sufficiently-valued custom. One of the most usual forms which these certificates take is as follows :—

Ship *Northern Light*,
Manila, May, 1890.

I certify that the bearer, Domingo Sabanera, is, in my opinion, the most infernal thief and accomplished villain I have ever had the misfortune to be swindled by ; but the character is so universal in this nest of liars and scoundrels that whoever reads this will

probably employ another just as deep-dyed, and I can only advise him to keep a sharp eye upon everybody and pay them not more than half of their demands. Wishing him well out of their knavish clutches, I am, &c.,

THOMAS BROWN, Master.

Some of these documents are couched in such vigorous terms as to be quite unprintable, and when a smiling olive-complexioned gentleman in snowy-white raiment presents such a letter, supposing it to be a compendious list of his virtues, the strain upon one's gravity is very hard to bear.

In summing up this necessarily slight sketch of the fair Eastern heritage now falling from the nerveless hold of Spain one conclusion cannot be avoided, even though it is bound to meet with the usual Continental sneers at "the insular arrogance of these hypocritical tradesmen." It is that whatever the ultimate fate of the Philippines may be, there are only three nations capable of doing justice to their possibilities of prosperity. The first is Japan, who would probably succeed better than any Power, for many reasons into which there is not space now to enter. The second is Great Britain, but in view of our already gigantic burden no true lover of his country would wish to see such a responsibility added thereunto. Lastly, the United States, many of whose citizens have long held commanding interests in Manila, and who is certainly the best customer for Philippine products at present.

Now, much as we may admire the plucky little Island Nation, we cannot possibly forget how superficial is the veneer of civilization, nor how little the humane instincts of any Asiatic peoples are to be relied on. The tragedy of Formosa remains an ineradicable object-lesson on this head. Emphatically, *we* are not to be ounted in. Not from any craven fear of being great—one does not ask a man whether he is afraid to attend to his daily duties—but because we really do not now need the burden of redressing such centuries of wrong as the Philippines have endured.

The great Western Nation has put her hand to the plough, and we do firmly believe in her ability and intention to see this thing through in our own sterling fashion. All our hopes, all our wishes, are with her in this tremendous task upon which she has entered. If ever she had any doubts as to our sympathies, she will soon find them dispelled. Not that she needs the spur to noble deeds. Her record tells its own bright story. That the future shall be even as the past, and yet more abundantly fruitful in the direction of the elevation of mankind, we cannot choose but believe.

FRANK T. BULLEN.

THE REPORT ON OLD-AGE PENSIONS.

THE Report of the Committee on Old-Age Pensions, which was appointed in July, 1896, has at length been issued. The circumstances which led up to the appointment of this Committee may be sufficiently indicated in a few sentences.

For some years there has prevailed a "wide-spread expectation, in and out of Parliament, that some provision other than that made by the Poor-Law should be devised for the assistance in old age of those among the poor who have led respectable and industrious lives"; and in the year 1893 a Royal Commission was entrusted with the duty of ascertaining whether any alterations were desirable in the methods of Poor-Law relief to meet the case of the aged poor, or whether assistance could be otherwise afforded to them. The deliberations of that Commission, in so far as they relate to suggestions for a system of Old-Age Pensions, were negative in result. The Commissioners had before them, among other proposals of less defined provisions, the scheme of the informal Parliamentary Committee associated with the name of Mr. Chamberlain, and that of Mr. Charles Booth; they reported their inability to recommend the adoption of any of the schemes submitted to them, but expressed a desire that their enquiry should not preclude the future consideration of plans which might be thereafter proposed. A Minority Report was also presented. This Minority of the Commissioners, including among them two members of the present Cabinet, Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Ritchie, advocated more definite action: the appointment of a small Committee whose functions should not be limited to an "examination of all the schemes" which might be laid before it, "but should extend to the construction, if possible, of a practical scheme, either based upon or altogether independent of any of those submitted. . . . It should," they were of opinion, "lay down the principles to which any scheme should conform," especially in relation to its financial aspect and its influence on habits of thrift and self-reliance.

The Royal Commission on the Aged Poor presented their report

in February, 1895. Between that date and the date of the General Election, the spring-time for projects of social reform, the movement in favour of State or State-aided Pensions developed rapidly. The leaders of the Opposition sanctioned the demand for State assistance to the industrious poor in old age, and when the defeat of the Radical Government occurred and the present Ministry came into office, the new Ministers accepted, as responsible advisers to the Crown, "Old-Age Pensions" as an integral part of the legislative programme upon which they appealed to the country for support. They therefore took a step in advance of the position assumed even by the Minority section of the Old-Age Commissioners. By including Old-Age Pensions among the subjects upon which, if the electors confirmed them in power, the Government intended to legislate, the present Ministry crystallized "the wide-spread expectation" into anticipations which could be reasonably entertained, and gave the electorate to understand that they viewed the suggested departure, not only as just and expedient in principle, but as practicable in application.

Among the projected social reforms commonly accepted by the Party now in power, and endorsed by its leaders, to none was given greater prominence at the last General Election than to the "amelioration of the lot of the aged poor" by some system of pensions. In the purely agricultural districts of the eastern counties, in the manufacturing cities of the midlands, in London and in Glasgow, from the South of England to the North of Scotland, by the recognized chiefs of the Party and by its rank and file, scarcely an address was published, scarcely a speech delivered, without some reference, more or less definite in its character, but invariably favourable, to the promotion of legislation with a view to improving the position and safeguarding the independence of industrious people in their old age.

It is, then, reasonable to affirm that the application of some scheme of Old-Age Pensions to meet the problem of old-age pauperism is an essential part of this Government's programme of legislation. Not only was the necessity of a departure in this direction publicly favoured by the foremost men in the Unionist forces, but they persevered in their advocacy subsequently to the publication of the Report of the Commission on the Aged Poor, and undeterred by its nugatory character. That report was issued, and its conclusions, or paucity of conclusions, widely canvassed in the spring of 1895, giving ample space for any reconsideration of policy before deciding upon the character of the appeal to be made to the constituencies. But no alteration of policy was announced; the members of the Government and the rank and file of their

followers continued to maintain the question of pensions for the aged poor in a prominent position in their electoral programme.

It is not necessary to impugn the good faith of the Government, to doubt the wisdom hitherto of their policy in regard to this question. Having accepted the principle of State aid for the industrious poor in old age, this Government had to decide upon the most practicable and beneficial application of that principle. They apparently acquiesced in the recommendation of the Minority Report of the 1893 Commission, that a further investigation by a small committee, with a view to formulating a scheme of its own or endorsing some scheme submitted to it, would be serviceable, and might indicate the lines which Parliament could advantageously pursue. But their acquiescence was only apparent. They appointed a small committee; but neither in the scope of the reference to it nor in respect to its composition did they fulfil the recommendations of the Minority Report.

If the Government were actuated only by anxiety for further informed advice to enable them the better to apply a principle entertained in all sincerity, the procedure most likely to be of service to them seemed fairly plain: to appoint a small committee—a Departmental Committee with some expert members, or a Select Committee, which to my mind would have been a preferable body for the purpose, and would have equally been able to avail itself of expert opinion, but in either case composed of gentlemen who might be supposed to favour, or at any rate not to be adverse to, the principle which it was the purpose of the Government to establish; to arrange that this committee should act under a reference wide enough to enable it to test every proposal submitted to it which might promise to repay examination, and with a specific direction to endeavour to construct a practical scheme or schemes for the consideration of the Cabinet and Parliament, and to indicate the principles to which any such scheme should conform.

Unfortunately, the more obvious course was not the course adopted by the Government.

The Departmental Committee, which was constituted under a Treasury Minute of July, 1896, was somewhat unsuitable in its composition for the object for which it was avowedly established. An acceptable chairman was nominated in Lord Rothschild; but of the eight other members of the committee, four were permanent officials representing respectively the Treasury, Board of Trade, Post Office, and National Debt Office—representatives of a section of the community justly held in high esteem, but not popularly supposed to be partial to legislative departures involving any additional levy upon the National Exchequer. Of the other four

members, consisting of Mr. Brabrook, the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies, whose experience and advice were essential to any body charged with an investigation of this character, the actuaries of the Atlas Insurance Company and the Manchester Unity of Oddfellows, and the Parliamentary agent of the Ancient Order of Foresters, one at least of them had publicly given expression to his dislike to any system of subsidized or State pensions, and, on the other hand, there was no reason to gather that any one of them was already favourably disposed to the movement. The Minority Commissioners of the Royal Commission on the Aged Poor had it "brought home" to them "only too plainly" during the course of their enquiry that the composition of that Commission, however admirable for the purposes of criticism, was "far from favourable to the work of construction." This opinion, passed by Mr. Chamberlain, Mr. Ritchie, and their co-signatories upon the composition of the Commission of 1893 upon which they served, applies with equal force to the committee appointed in 1896 by the Ministry to which Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Ritchie belong. The work of construction must be consigned to men who have not only the ability but the desire to construct. When this Government decided that voluntary schools were deserving and in need of pecuniary support, they did not hand the matter over to a council of Liberationists to advise whether they could recommend any proposals to that end. Army reformers would scarcely care to depute the strengthening our forces and remodelling our army system to a committee composed of officials of the War Department with a couple or so of the Little England Party to assist them in their deliberations. No satisfactory scheme of Old-Age Pensions will ever be formulated until the duty of devising such a scheme is confided to men who unreservedly accept the principle which is involved.

But if the choice of the *personnel* of the committee was unfortunate and not conducive to productive result, the reference under which it was required to act was conceived even less happily; ill-conceived at once in what it permitted and refused to permit. The investigation of the committee was not focussed by any clearly specific direction upon the endeavour, after examining "all the schemes" laid before it, to construct a practical scheme or schemes for the guidance of Parliament, and "to lay down the principles to which any scheme should conform." From the terms of the reference, it could not be inferred that the demand for Old-Age Pensions had been already acquiesced in by the Government, and that the business of the committee was to advise upon the best method by which effect could be given to a settled principle.

But it is the limitations which were inserted in the reference

even more than those which were omitted, which have effectually operated to deprive the report of this committee on Old-Age Pensions of any material weight, and of any degree of finality; nor can the Government plead that these restrictions were imposed through mere careless oversight or ignorance on their part. They had warning of their destructive tendency; but preferred to invite an impotent conclusion, and they have secured it.

"We have found that of the numerous schemes submitted to us, the greater number are excluded from consideration *under the terms of our reference.* . . ." "*Within the limits marked out by our reference* we have not received and we are unable to construct any scheme," &c. "Any pension scheme *coming within the terms of our reference* would be limited," &c. . . .

Such is the refrain of the report; paragraphs perforated with this depressing moral are to be found scattered through its columns. They supply the password which the reader has to master before he can thread its barren pages. "The terms of our reference" are to the Committee what King Charles's head was to Mr. Dick.

Upon Her Majesty's Government must rest the responsibility alike for the composition of the Committee and the limitations imposed upon its deliberations. But the members of the Committee have observed these limitations with a ready and loyal acquiescence, with a faithfulness deserving of more recognition than Ministers on mature consideration are likely to extend. They might have petitioned the Treasury, had they so desired, to widen the terms of their reference; but they preferred, on the contrary, to interpret the limiting words with a refinement and precision which go far to justify their designation as an "expert" Committee, and with an appreciation of exact verbal values which will rejoice the soul of Professor Raleigh.

The Committee was instructed to consider schemes "for encouraging the industrial population, by State aid or otherwise, to make provision for old age; and to report whether they can recommend the adoption of any proposals of the kind."

"Encouraging" differs in degree from "compelling"; any scheme containing an element of compulsion is ruled out of court.

"Encouraging the industrial population."—"The industrial population" is not to be confounded with "a part of the industrial population," or "a section of the industrial population." The greater includes the less, but the less is not the greater. The members of Friendly Societies, Trades Unions, and cognate associations form a portion only of the industrial population; proposals therefore suggesting preferential treatment for members of these societies cannot be entertained.

"Encouraging the industrial population to make provision" is not coterminous with "to make provision." All methods which do not involve a direct contribution from the beneficiary are discarded.

"Encouraging the industrial population to make provision for old age" cannot strictly be construed to include provision against sickness or any other contingency of life except old age proper. Thus the contribution of the beneficiary must be a contribution specifically applied towards his own maintenance in age, and no other test of thrift is acceptable. It might be argued, indeed, by the unsophisticated materialist, that old age is a relative circumstance dependent on the health of the individual and his capacity to follow with ordinary vigour his accustomed employment, that whilst some men may justly be termed old at 60 years of age, some could not be correctly so described at 65; and that a man who has provided for himself from the time when his health and energy have become impaired by advancing years has, in fact, been providing for himself in old age, although his 65th birthday, the moment the Committee reckons old age as existent, has not been passed. So nice is the discrimination of the Committee, that it can differentiate between the case of a man who provides 5s. a week from 65 to 70 years of age for himself, and is rewarded from 70 years onwards, to 75 years of age—supposing him to live so long—by a weekly pension of 5s. wholly sustained by the State, and that of a man who provides 2s. 6d. per week for himself from 65 to 75, and receives from the State the other 2s. 6d. during these years. Although the respective contributions towards this old-age provision of the individual and the State would be identical in either instance, the latter case the Committee is at liberty to examine, the former it is precluded from entertaining.

And so the process of elimination is brought to a triumphant conclusion. Four only out of the hundred and more schemes submitted—including the proposals of the informal Parliamentary Committee and of Sir Henry Burdett—pass this rigorous preliminary test. This result is not surprising; but it is surprising that, having once narrowed down their enquiry within these dimensions, the Committee contrived to spend two years on an investigation which one might have supposed could have been adequately accomplished in two months.

Discussion in any detail of the Conclusions at which the Committee has arrived must have about it an element of unreality. The limitations attached to its reference have deprived the Committee's Conclusions of the value which under happier conditions they might have possessed; as it is, they have no title whatever to finality except in so far as they confirm the objections taken by

the Royal Commissioners in their report of 1895 to proposals based on the contributions of pensioners, the one class of schemes this Committee has held to be within the scope of its enquiry. Although for the purposes of destructive criticism the members of the Committee relax the superstitious homage they otherwise pay to the "terms of our reference," only within the accepted limits of their reference can weight be given to their criticisms.

In paragraphs 52 to 57 the Committee endeavours to depreciate the need of any system of Old-Age Pensions by a somewhat elaborate train of argument. The evidence "appears" to it "to suggest" that men whose average weekly wages do not fall below 20s. can, with no serious difficulty, contribute 2d. a week from early manhood, or, if earning a slightly higher rate of wage, 4d. a week, to secure pensions of 2s. 6d. or 5s. a week at the age of 65 years. "These considerations," the Committee admits, "must not be pressed too far." From these considerations it derives, however, several somewhat crude deductions. Because, in its estimation, it is possible for a workman with an average wage slightly above 20s. a week to insure by his own efforts for a deferred annuity of thirteen pounds to begin at 65 years of age, the Committee infers that the only persons who may require State assistance in old age are those whose average weekly wage falls below 20s.; that these persons form but a small proportion of the industrial population; and that, even of them, but a small proportion above 65 years of age who are inmates of the workhouse—the bedridden, for instance, and "those who are no longer capable of the economical application of a small pension"—would under any system be able to support themselves independently.

It may be noticed that the initial consideration upon which the members of the Committee base these deductions is in itself not in complete harmony with a stricture they pass upon Sir Henry Burdett's proposals, in which they question the probability of men whose average earnings are from 15s. to 20s. a week being able for any continuous period to spare 9d. a week out of their wages for the purchase of the provision against sickness and old age combined contemplated by Sir Henry Burdett. The weekly sum required from the age of 25 onwards to secure a deferred annuity of thirteen pounds at the age of 65, together with ordinary Friendly Society assurance against sickness, is from 8½d. to 9½d. It is impossible to suppose that the Committee deem it desirable that any working-men should cease to make provision against the more certain and imminent contingencies of life, such as the drain upon their resources caused by sickness and funeral expenses, which they now are customarily enabled to meet through the agency of Friendly Societies. If, then, it is improbable that a man

whose earnings are slightly below 20s. a week can spare 9d. a week out of them for any continuous length of time, can it be asserted with any confidence that the individual whose weekly wage is only slightly in excess of 20s. is able without difficulty to devote 8½d. or 9½d. a week for forty years of his life to insurance against sickness and old age? Yet it is upon this precarious assumption that the Committee constructs the argument by which it aims at minimizing the need of any system of Old-Age Pensions.

But even if we accept without reservation the inference of the Committee, that a working-man whose earnings exceed an average of 20s. can by his own efforts subscribe for a pension of 5s. a week from the age of 65 onwards, to acquiesce in a premiss does not necessarily imply acquiescence in a *non sequitur*. The Conclusions which the Committee arrives at from this proposition can only be made acceptable by ignoring and misconceiving some of the essential conditions of existence among the poorer part of our industrial population.

We must ignore the weighty objections to deferred annuities as a form of thrift which were expressed in evidence before the Royal Commission on the Aged Poor and in principle endorsed by the Commissioners. That deferred annuities are unpopular as a form of investment, and demand a greater degree of foresight than can be reasonably looked for among young people, is certain. That they constitute a prudent or valuable mode of thrift has been seriously disputed; and the fear has been expressed that to put a premium upon this form of saving might well be productive of economic harm by injuriously affecting other and more beneficial methods. Do the members of the committee hold a different opinion, and regard deferred annuities as a method of saving valuable in itself, preferable to other methods, and likely to be generally used? If so, they can scarcely anticipate any general concurrence with their view, when they vouchsafe no reasons for rejecting the considered Conclusions of the Commission on the Aged Poor. If, however, no such inference as to the opinion of the Committee is to be gathered from its suggestion as to a certain proportion of the industrial classes being in a position to purchase deferred annuities, what possible end is furthered by the statement of an irrelevant fact, and how can the statement be applied as an argument to depreciate the need of pensions?

The reasoning of the Committee in these paragraphs is also vitiated by excluding any consideration of the claims of the female portion of the community, even of the widow who has assisted her husband in his efforts of thrift, foregoing during his life the present use of the savings which he was devoting in weekly con-

tributions towards an Old-Age Pension, savings entirely lost to her on his death. Women in their old age are at least as much in need of assistance as men; few women among the industrial classes secure the average wage which the Committee regards as sufficient to enable the wage-earner to purchase a deferred annuity;—and the Conclusion of the Committee, that "the people thus in a position to require assistance must, in any case, form but a small proportion of the industrial population," can only be justified by reading a further limitation into its reference and interpreting "the industrial population" to mean the male industrial population only.

But the deductions which the members of the Committee come to by a process of abstract reasoning, based upon "evidence" which "appears to suggest," are so manifestly at variance with ascertained facts that it is astonishing that they do not suspect the presence of some flaw in their syllogism. How can their pronouncement be squared with the existing conditions—"that nearly 20 per cent. of the total population (rich as well as poor) above the age of 65 receive relief in one day, and nearly 30 per cent. in the course of one year"; that while the proportion of paupers under the age of 65 to the population is only 8 per cent., it amounts to 25 per cent. in the years which follow 65; that although, for the most part, the members of the working-classes are "fairly provident, fairly thrifty, fairly industrious, and fairly temperate," four out of every nine of them over the age of 65 years are numbered among the army of paupers? No shower of acute syllogisms can sponge this record from the slate, nor pages of faulty deductions from doubtful premises.

The argument of the Committee receives no accession of strength from the rider, that "only a small proportion of those above 65 years of age who now appear as inmates of the workhouse or infirmary would, under any system of State-aided pensions, be able to support themselves independently." It is merely misleading. Returns for the years 1890 and 1892 show that more than two-thirds of the whole community of paupers over 65 years of age receive *outdoor*, not indoor relief; and figures of a striking character will be found in an appendix accompanying the report, which disclose an ominous growth in the tendency to give outdoor in preference to indoor maintenance since the electoral changes of 1894. Even although it were the case, as the Committee infers, that the bedridden and "those who are no longer capable of the economical application of a small pension" would not, if possessed of a small annuity, be frequently able to find in the cottage of a relation or friend a more acceptable home than the workhouse, at any rate the remaining two-thirds of the industrial population

over 65 years of age, who now in a greater or less degree receive assistance under the Poor-Law, but receive it outside the workhouse, might be enabled by State-aided pensions to support themselves in independence.

The members of this Committee have failed to realize the motive which animates the demand for State aid to the aged poor. State pensions are not only sought for those people who under existing conditions are reduced in old age to actual pauperism, but, at least as imperatively, for those also who are kept off the rates by the assistance of friends or by private charity, or by their own painful and penurious struggles. "Such persons," the Commissioners of 1893 pointed out, "must sometimes endure great privation in their effort to avoid application for official relief, and they form a class quite as deserving of consideration as others who are actually numbered in the return as paupers." Does it in any degree satisfy this requirement to prove that a section of the male working-class can by continuous effort, even granting such effort to be wise, secure for themselves a deferred annuity of thirteen pounds after 65 years of age? A sum of 5s. a week may in many instances enable an old person to obtain an honourable asylum with relations or friends; as a State endowment it will supplement any savings an individual has been able to lay by, it will relieve him of the apprehension that a few years or months of enforced want of employment will dissipate any little capital he has collected, and that in his age he will be left naked to the Poor-Law authorities. But, dissociated from any other resources, an income of 5s. a week is not sufficient to supply bare means of subsistence.

The reasoning pursued by the members of the Committee has no appropriateness to their Conclusion, unless it is their thesis that a man who is in receipt of an annuity of £13 in old age, as a result of his personal efforts through life, has no actual need of, nor ethical title to, any assistance from the State. Although this view may harmonize with the destitution test of our Poor-Law procedure, the advocacy of State or State-aided Old-Age Pensions is grounded by the majority of those who favour their creation upon a principle which is almost the converse of that which the Committee approves. Thrift and the possession of small hard-earned savings is not to be the disabling but the enabling test for the enjoyment of the bounty of the State. Instead of the command of a small self-secured annuity destroying a man's claim to consideration, it goes far to establish it.

The Committee in making these criticisms wanders beyond the limitations with which it consented to hedge round its investigation; but its theorizing is instructive, because it indicates at once

the disposition with which the majority of its members approached their task, and the insufficiency of the reasoning upon which they are content to dispute the need of any system of pensions.

In a fine optimistic vein of prophecy they ultimately pass judgment, that improved conditions of labour will deprive the whole problem of Old-Age Pensions of importance. They are careless of the warning that prophecy should be grounded upon experience. From year to year the actuality of the demand has not waned but waxed, until it has but now won formal notice and approval from a responsible Government. This phenomenon may be attributed in part, no doubt, to the increased potency of popular expression and to the increased tenderness of the public conscience and sentiment, rather than to any aggravation in the necessities of the poor in old age. But is it not also the case that the tendency of modern industry is to favour the young; that its methods demand a higher rate of speed than formerly, as well as of excellence, and, therefore, a more rapid expenditure of energy; that the reserve of vital force in the worker is more quickly used up? And while every year it is becoming more difficult for the poor to obtain employment in old age, for good or for evil the personal relationship of employer to employed tends to be less intimate, and an artisan must be content to shift for himself when the fulness of years impairs his productive powers.

Three other of the Conclusions which have been approved by the Committee may repay brief examination.

Accepting the view that State aid should be afforded only to a person who has exercised some degree of thrift, and that it is inexpedient to ascertain whether this condition has been conformed to by an investigation into the applicant's history or earnings, the Committee proceeds to enunciate the doctrine that "the only test that can be applied is the possession at the pension age of an income within the limits laid down as qualifying for the aid." A test of income as a standard of thrift is something of a novelty. The gambler who had reduced an income of thousands to one of "not less than 2s. 6d. and not more than 5s. a week" by the time he reached the age fixed for the pension to commence, or a burglar who successfully engineered a lucky haul a few hours before his sixty-fifth birthday, would, under this test, be acknowledged as paragons of frugality, and as having proved by careful economy their title to State maintenance outside the walls of a gaol. Of course, every possible test of thrift that can be suggested must fall short in some degree of exactness and comprehension. But that one relied upon by the Committee, as the "only test" applicable, is manifestly illusory. A pension test should accept some habit of saving and frugal investment which is customary among the poor,

and which can be not unreasonably demanded from a man in receipt of low wages, and who out of them may have to support a family. For a working-man earning a moderate wage to secure himself against the eventualities of illness and death, medical attendance and funeral expenses, and to maintain his independence of parish relief during the more active years of his life, affords a fair presumption of thrift and credit. Long-continued insurance against sickness, whether through a Friendly Society or other organizations, may not improbably be considered the most convenient and satisfactory evidence of an enabling standard of thrift. The Committee, however, did not deem itself authorized to entertain any scheme framed in accordance with this view.

The Committee inclines to the opinion that a State-aided pension will diminish the wage-rate; that the rate is fixed subject to the requirements of a wage-earner in old age, and "the wage payment will tend to fall by a percentage approximating to that contributed by the State to the pension fund." Every attempt to dogmatize upon the considerations which influence the rate of wages has hitherto conspicuously been brought to naught. Professor Marshall does not anticipate that pensions to the old would affect its natural rise or fall; and the Committee apparently ignores the actual condition, that nearly half of the working-classes over 65 years of age are now either wholly or partially supported by the State through the Poor-Law. Experience has shown that any general grant of doles to able-bodied men will militate against high earnings; but if the State aid is restricted to aged persons, it is improbable that it could do more than possibly influence in some degree such wages as old persons may at present receive. Under an organized system of industry such as now obtains, the endowment of certain old people with pensions will open no new cheap labour market to the employer. It is the efficient labour which settles the remuneration of labour throughout a trade, nor, in most commercial undertakings, would it be worth the while of an employer to engage men of an inferior capacity or activity, even at a reduced cost. The suggestion that recipients of State-aided pensions should be debarred from engaging in remunerative work is, at the same time, brusquely dismissed by the Committee, as an attempt which "must assuredly fail." A provision that pensions should begin only with cessation from regular work might be inexpedient, and could not be enforced with uniform certainty; but it is the custom of Trade-Union Societies to confine their superannuation allowances to members incapable of earning the ordinary rate of wages, and the evidence of witnesses before the Royal Commission of 1893 intimates that no material difficulty would be found in seeing that such a condition was generally observed. This

abrupt dogmatism of the Committee needs more examination and authoritative support before it can be accepted as a dogma by those who have faith in the policy of Old-Age Pensions.

The Committee approves a Conclusion that only under a system of pensions which are at once identical and universal can a State or State-aided allowance be exempt from the taint which attaches to allowances made under the Poor-Law. "Any discredit must depend," it is of opinion, "not on the form in which the relief is received, but on the causes which have led to it." This opinion, again, although it contains a considerable element of truth, appears to have been pronounced without mature deliberation. It is easily conceivable that the causes which have reduced a man to destitution may reflect no discredit upon him; he may, for instance, have been forced by ill-health to resign his affairs or business for a time to the hands of a friend or partner in whom he had every reason to rely, but who betrays his trust. If from such a cause he is brought low, and is reduced to soliciting assistance from the Poor-Law Guardians, is no pauper taint, either in his own estimation or in that of others, attached to the relief he receives? When in the workhouse, is he less a pauper than his companions because the cause of his entering it is devoid of shame? The converse to the proposition of the Committee, though also not completely satisfactory, contains not less of truth than the proposition itself: that the pauper taint depends not on the causes which have led to the relief, but on the manner in which it is received. The pauper stigma is involved by the element of personal selection and discrimination, the enquiries as to character and opportunities which precede the dole of relief; the applicant has to submit to an examination upon his means of subsistence, he makes his application *in formâ pauperis*, as a poor man craving for the most the Guardians will bestow. But this stigma is lightened if the tenure of the pensioner is of legal right, not of grace; and the shame of dependence is eliminated. Accepting, for instance, the general test I have suggested in a former paragraph, insurance over a period of years in some society or organization against sickness and funeral expenses—such a test would seem to escape the definition of pauper taint which the Committee relies upon. To have been a member of a Friendly Society for some length of time, to have guarded against the eventuality of ill-health, is not a cause to which any discredit can attach. On the other hand, it avoids an investigation into character or means of subsistence, any personal selection, any discrimination between classes of individuals. Should the State decide to pay an identical pension at a certain age to persons so situated, to qualify by thrift for the bounty of the State will rather be meritorious than discreditable.

Although the members of the Committeee held themselves debarred by their reference from entertaining any proposal based on such a test, they nevertheless hazard a conjecture which, should it be realized, certainly points to an undesirable resultant of any measure making insurance against sickness, in a Friendly Society or otherwise, a condition precedent to the receipt of a pension.

On the one hand, it is contended that sickness is one of the most imminent and serious contingencies of a wage-earner's life, and probably the most fruitful source of pauperism; that insurance against sickness is the most customary form of thrift exercised by the working-classes, and, if exercised continuously over a number of years, affords a sound presumption of the credit of the individual. It is suggested that a State pension might be paid to every person arriving at the pension age who could show that he had during his manhood established his independence of Poor-Law relief by securing for himself an adequate sick-allowance by some approved and easily ascertainable method, as by insurance in a registered Friendly Society.

On the other hand, the members of the Committee are of opinion that this plan would imply a contract with every member insured in a registered society that even should it become insolvent and unable to meet its obligations the State would nevertheless grant him a pension. In effect the State would be guaranteeing the solvency of each registered society; and would certainly be considered to do so if the present registration were rendered more effectual, and registration made contingent upon the solvency of a society.

It will be observed that their reply contains, in fact, two distinct criticisms. The Committee is of opinion, as I understand its comments, that to offer a State pension under certain conditions to members of registered Friendly Societies is to guarantee the stability of those societies; it is also of opinion that to institute a more stringent system of registration will have the same result. Pensions can be accorded to members of registered Friendly Societies without any alteration in the requirements of registration; or the registration requirements can be altered apart from the institution of any pension scheme. In either instance I gather the Committee to suggest that a State guarantee of solvency is implied. It seems, indeed, in its argument rather to confound the two issues; but they are manifestly distinct.

To insist upon the latter objection, the members of the Committee must be prepared to reject the emphatically expressed opinions of the Select Committee on National Provident Insurance of 1887, and of the Select Committee of 1889 on the Friendly

Societies Act. Both these Committees commented upon the imperfections of the present system and made various recommendations towards enabling the Registrar to refuse to register societies unless substantially sound, and to suspend any which might have become unable to fulfil their obligations unless prepared to remedy their position. It must also be remembered that the very course which the Committee deprecates was last year adopted without dissent by Parliament in regard to societies connected with industrial undertakings. The Registrar is called upon under the Workmen's Compensation for Accidents Act of 1897 to satisfy himself as to the solvency of these societies before granting them a certificate. Is the State, then, to be held to have guaranteed their solvency, and to be responsible to their members in the event of their default?

But whether some degree of efficiency is to be imparted to the formality of registration or not, can it be assumed that by offering pensions in their old age to members of registered societies, any State guarantee of the solvency of these societies is necessarily involved? This objection was advanced by the Royal Commissioners of 1893 to contributory schemes which it was proposed to work in connection with Friendly Societies; but the members of the Old-Age Pensions Committee misapply it if they mean to extend the objection to non-contributory schemes. If Parliament demands that an individual aiming at a State-aided pension must pay over a sum, however trivial, to the Government, the State enters into a contract with the individual, and is responsible for its complete fulfilment. But if no deposit and no payment is required, if the pension is in the nature of a free gift and endowment, such liability is not created. The contributions of a member to his society are to cover the ordinary risks which the society accepts, and no more. If it fails, however grievously its failure may press upon the individual, he has not paid for a pension, and if he does not receive it through lack of qualification, he cannot complain of any breach of faith on the part of the State. The State merely offers a gratuity in the form of a pension to those who can show that for a certain number of years they have not come upon the parish for relief, and have been insured against sickness and funeral expenses.

The report runs to some seventy paragraphs; but beyond the findings and arguments which I have essayed to discuss, there is, I believe, no judgment of material importance, and no criticism of any novelty to be met with in its pages. Nor could anyone fully apprised of the limited terms of the reference to the Committee on Old-Age Pensions, and of the literal construction of the reference which commended itself to the members of the Committee,

anticipate any other outcome from their deliberations than the impotent one which has in fact ensued. The Committee confined itself to the consideration of proposals which insist upon a pensioner making direct contributions towards his pension, and any wider criticisms it may have ventured upon are mere *obiter dicta*, irresponsible comments on matters admittedly excluded from its cognizance.

From whatever standpoint this result is regarded, there will be a consensus of opinion that it is eminently unfortunate. Even those most disinclined to favour any distinct system of State aid for the aged poor will acknowledge that their contentions receive no additional force from the substance of this report, that it fails to advance the understanding of the question beyond the point reached by the Commissioners of 1893;—and they were agreed upon the expediency of a further enquiry being undertaken to meet the widespread expectation as to the desirability of affording by legislative action some independent provision to the deserving among the poor in old age. Those whose minds are yet clouded with a doubt, who contemplate with approval altered conditions for old people, but distrust the feasibility of any attempt to establish them, and fear that the expense to the State would be more than it can properly encounter, can gather no instruction from a report which is avowedly inconclusive and incomplete. In regard to two points only will they meet with substantial directions: the Committee endorses the objections taken by the Commission on the Aged Poor to all contributory schemes, and expresses its conviction that the problem of cost is not the most serious, that it does "not question that the State could bear the necessary additional burthen if the welfare of the community really demanded it." The presence upon the Committee of Sir Francis Mowatt, the permanent secretary to the Treasury, lends to this expression of opinion an unusual degree of authority.

But if the publication of this Blue Book can give no satisfaction to those who are averse to any measure of State pensions, or to those whose views are still undecided, with what tolerance is it likely to be regarded by advocates of the movement, by the Members of Parliament who, with the sanction of the Unionist leaders, declared themselves favourably towards it, and by the electors who gave credence to the declarations of Unionist Ministers and Tory candidates? Already the cry of bad faith has been raised against the Government. It is alleged that their electoral pronouncements of policy were mere gipsy predictions; that this Committee was a sort of feather-bed device to break the fall of their "Old-Age Pensions" pledge, and enable the Ministry to escape from it, if not without dishonour, without immediate risk. But even if we could

credit the charge of bad faith which this theory imputes to the Government, it also infers on their part a degree of stupidity of which it is difficult to believe them capable. Had the Government aimed at escaping their assurance of legislation by the appointment of a Committee of Enquiry, they would at least have authorized the Committee to undertake a complete survey of the question. By a judicious selection of its *personnel* they might in any event have ensured a finding adverse to any system of State pensions, but, had they acted with malice prepense, they would have taken care to impart to the investigation an appearance of thoroughness. An unfavourable report might then have afforded a colourable pretext for diffidence and delay, which the result of no truncated enquiry can possibly engender.

Ministers are fortunate in still enjoying the opportunity to disprove the suspicion of indifference provoked by their ill-judged methods of approaching the problem hitherto. Prior to the appointment of this Committee the present Government had publicly tendered their adherence to the principle of Old-Age Pensions, and their will to incorporate that principle in legislation. Unless it was their fixed determination to initiate a system of contributory pensions, in defiance of the disapproval expressed by the Royal Commission on the Aged Poor to any such plan, nothing has occurred to justify any change of attitude; and that they had no such fixed determination the appointment of this Committee is sufficient evidence. The direction, then, of this Committee to the Cabinet is merely one of "As you were." The obligations of the Unionist Government and of Tory Members are unaffected by its abortive deliberations.

Two years, however, which should have been spent in fruitful investigation and construction have been wasted, and Ministers cannot reasonably complain if their future action is followed with jealous anxiety. Mere lapse of time is the only altered feature in the situation since the General Election, but it is a factor which is shadowed by grave consequences. A deliberate policy which might have been defended as prudent two years since would now be justly held to be a symptom of timidity and insincerity. By the appointment of the Committee on Old-Age Pensions the Government gave the country to understand that, while anxious to improve by legislation the condition of the aged poor, they were not prepared finally to commit themselves to a scheme of their own manufacture without a preliminary enquiry, which would enable the merits of various alternative ideas to be sifted, and the structural lines brought into prominence in accordance with which a measure might most advantageously be framed. The actual enquiry which has been undertaken has conspicuously failed to supply them with this

assistance; its total effect has been to reduce the time at their disposal to make good their profession. To refer the subject now to a Select Committee, however direct its instructions and however admirable in constitution, would spell further delay. A Select Committee could not terminate its work during the present Session, would be dissolved at the close of the Session, and be able to gather little material to form the basis of legislation in the coming year. Two courses remain: either for the Government to give notice of their purpose to tackle the problem next year upon their own initiative, upon such information as is now at their disposal or can be acquired through the channels open to them; or that they should appoint a small Commission specifically directed to submit some scheme or schemes for their consideration, with such criticisms as commend themselves, and upon the distinct understanding that it should complete its deliberations during the recess, so as to allow members of the Cabinet to avail themselves of its report and the evidence taken before it in formulating legislation for submission to Parliament next Session.

At any rate the time has gone by for trifling with this demand that independent provision should be made for the poor in old age. Electors are capable of distinguishing between those who regard a project as an agreeable plaything and those who are sincere in their attempt to realize it. If another General Election overtakes us while a Unionist Government is still extending to this problem their best consideration, or when they have enlarged the Statute Book by one of those measures, dear to Ministers, which vary the letter of the law without disturbing its practical operation, no protestations of good faith will have much weight with the constituencies. If members of the Cabinet have repented their former assurances, however illogical their change of attitude, they would be wise to screw up their courage to the confessing point. Their candour will alienate the sympathy of electors who put confidence in their undertaking to ameliorate the lot of the aged poor, but that sympathy cannot be retained by any mere expressions of continued goodwill towards the movement, nor by any mere tinkering and inoerative measures; and they will at least regain the esteem of the comparatively small but influential section of the community who view with alarm all suggestions for Old-Age Pensions.

LIONEL HOLLAND.

THE GERMAN ELECTIONS.

The German Imperial elections have not produced any very startling surprises, nor have they very materially affected the balance of Party power in the Reichstag. Nevertheless, they have brought into relief several facts of considerable significance, which may prove to have an important bearing on the future of German politics. To judge the results of the elections simply by the seats which the contesting parties have won or lost, or even by the votes which their candidates have polled, would be to take a narrow view of a wide question. For when you speak of the relationship of parties in Germany, what do you exactly mean? It is true that there are there, as here, two broad currents of political feeling which may be conveniently classed as Conservative and Liberal. But German Conservatism is not synonymous with English Conservatism, and still less are the working principles of Liberalism identical in the two countries.

At the time of writing there are no fewer than fifteen well-defined fractions in German political life; farther than the flying moment no scrupulous critic will venture to commit himself when dealing with so variable a theme. Of Conservatives pure and simple there are two species—the "German" and only orthodox Conservatives, and the Imperialists or Free Conservatives. Moderate Liberalism is represented by the "National" type. Of Democratic parties there are three—the Radical Union and the Radical Peoples' Party (into which the old German Radical Party was divided owing to internal discord in 1893), with the South German Democratic Party. The centre party stands formally for Ultramontanism, though it can count on many votes from other benches when Roman Catholic interests are at stake. There are also the Social Democrats, the Poles, the Guelphs or Hanoverians, the Alsace-Lorrainers, the Anti-Semites, the Agrarian Leaguers, and the Bavarian Peasants' Alliance, while one member has ever since 1871 consistently sat in the Reichstag as a protest against the annexation of Schlewig-Holstein; and finally there are always from six to a dozen faddists who class themselves as "Independents," yet each of whom at heart indulges the secret conviction that he stands for the one all-comprehensive national party of the good time coming.

Confronted by such a bewildering array of parties, sub-parties, and coteries, it is difficult to draw any illuminating electoral moral, yet a few figures will not be without interest. In order to form a fair estimate of the relative Party strength, it is necessary to take the results of the first or principal polls. It will be remembered that the basis of the Imperial electoral law is the two-ballot system. The franchise is universal, equal, secret, and direct—unlike the franchise by which the Prussian Diet is elected,—but a candidate only secures victory when he obtains an absolute majority of all the votes cast in the contest in which he takes part. Where, therefore, there are three candidates or more in the field, and the highest on the poll fails to obtain this absolute majority, a second ballot takes place between the first two candidates, and between these two a simple majority of votes decides the day. Where the votes are equal decision is by casting lots. Thus as an index to the true strength and relationship of parties the first ballots have obviously far greater significance than the second; for in the first ballots the parties must in the main rely upon their own unsupplemented strength; then they stand forth just as they are. In the second elections, however, there are all sorts of combinations—and never were there so many as on the present occasion,—and the almost general prevalence of cross-voting obscures the actual strength of the nominally contesting parties.

But, accepting the available data for what they are worth, it is not uninstructive to compare the first elections of the present year with those of June, 1893. Comparison shows that the Conservatives and Moderate Conservative fractions have decidedly lost ground. Five years ago there were elected in the first ballots 50 Conservatives and 12 Imperialists, a total of 62. The first ballots this year only returned 38 Conservatives and 10 Imperialists, a total of 48. A comparison of the number of chances secured in the second ballots redeems these figures somewhat; for the two parties had 73 both five years ago and now, though the number which fell to the Conservative Party proper fell from 56 to 48, the ultimate result of the election was the reduction of these parties from 82 at the dissolution to 74. On the other hand, while the two Radical parties secured but two successes in the first ballots this year, against three in 1893, they had 49 places in the second, against 48 before; and, on the whole, won 43 seats against 41 held before the dissolution. The Ultramontanes carried 85 seats in the first elections this year against 82 in 1893, and they had 40 places in the second elections against 32 in 1893; while the final result gave them 103 seats against 101 at the dissolution. Coming to the Socialists, they won 32 seats in the first elections this year against 24 in 1893; and while they had 82 chances in the

second elections in 1893 they had this year 101, and their advance in numbers was from 48 to 56.

Slight as has been the derangement of Party strength, the transference of votes from the Ministerial to the Opposition and Opportunist camps denotes a far greater change in public sentiment than might appear on the surface, and it is no exaggeration to say that by all parties alike the issue of the election has been regarded as symptomatic of dissatisfaction with the direction which it was feared domestic legislation was about to take, and to that extent must be received as a direct warning to the Government.

It cannot be said that the election was fought upon any very novel issue. The late Reichstag did not, like some of its predecessors, end its days amid acute Party tension and political crises. On the whole, its career was a somewhat unromantic one. It witnessed the passing of a few laws of far-reaching importance; but, save the Navy Act, under which the Government secured a naval grant of over eight million pounds a year for six years, not one stirred to any depth the essentially sluggish political mind of Germany. The measure which achieved this result to the greatest degree was not passed at all—the Anti-Revolution Bill (*Umsturzvorlage*) of the Session of 1894-95. It might have seemed, indeed, as though events had conspired to favour the Government in the contest. Apart from the rise in the price of corn in late spring, the country was in the enjoyment of unwonted prosperity. Industry was thriving, employment was abundant, the earnings of the working-classes were comparatively good. Moreover, the bold and successful move which the Emperor had made in China had drawn the nation together, and something of the contagious enthusiasm for foreign acquisitions, which belonged to the early Colonial days, had been created. Kiao-Chau had become a word to conjure with. It represented the planting of the Imperial Eagle in a part of the world hitherto closed to Germany; and so well had diplomacy played a game which, strictly speaking, was that of commerce, that this new footing on foreign soil had been obtained (to use the words spoken by the Emperor at the dissolution of the Diet) "by a friendly agreement with China and without disturbing the relationship of Germany with other States." Kiao-Chau may prove the lucky investment which it is to-day regarded; but, at any rate, it secured for the Emperor the bigger fleet which he desired.

The chorus of jubilation with which the conclusion of the Chinese treaty was greeted had not subsided when the Reichstag was dissolved, and the members went to their homes bearing the Imperial benediction. Probably it was the prevalence in Parliamentary circles of a general spirit of good-humour, and in the public mind one of satisfied quiescence, that induced the Govern-

ment to refrain at first from doing or saying anything to influence the course of the elections. The contest had no sooner begun then the Imperial Chancellor withdrew into the background, and saving that he penned an unofficial letter wishing well to the candidature of Prince Schönaich-Carolath, a friend of his son, he has not publicly alluded to politics from that day to this.

But, in truth, the era of Government electioneering on the grand scale is over in Germany. It began and was contemporary with the *régime* of Prince Bismark, and it ended with that great statesman's withdrawal from the Parliamentary scene. Prince Bismark knew as no "Parliamentary hand" before or since his day how to play upon the patriotic sentiment and the national prejudices of his fellow-countrymen. It seldom happened that he dissolved a Reichstag without first adopting such precautions as might ensure the election of a successor equally, if not more, tractable. But great measures and great crises presuppose great men, and in German politics there are no longer giants in these days. Furthermore, during the latter years of his control of affairs Prince Bismark had an astute electioneering agent in the person of Minister von Puttkamer, who may be said to have reduced the management of elections to a scientific system. There was not much visible machinery on the surface, but it was there, and it always worked with a regularity and an efficiency which were as ingenious as they were detestable. It was the merit of the Emperor Frederick to have put an end to the graver and grosser species of undue influence which had grown up under the fostering genius of Herr von Puttkamer. The Conservative friends of the ex-Minister will have it still that Puttkamer was a marked man from the moment that the late Emperor ascended the throne, but, if so, he had no one to blame but himself that he should have fallen under the disfavour of a sovereign to whom paltry personal bias is surely the last failing that can be imputed. Since then, influence "from above" has been but little exerted, though amongst the provincial and district officers there are always solicitous busybodies, who, at election time call to mind the convenience to the Government which would result from the strengthening of the more docile elements in the Reichstag, and use their powers of suasion accordingly. Nor, with a bureaucracy so extensive and so powerful as that of Germany, can it be hoped that this practice will ever be quite discredited.

Minister von Miquel had, indeed, some time before urged the parties uniformly favourable to the Government—the German Conservatives, the Imperialists, and his old friends the National Liberals—to pursue a policy of "concentration." His idea was a greater *Kartell*, placed upon a broad and permanent basis—a union of compatible classes such as the Government might find itself able

to work with in the revision and settlement of open economic questions, and especially that of customs duties and commercial treaties, as well as in repelling the advance of Social Democracy. When, just a year ago, he expounded this policy, Dr. von Miquel added that to such a reconciliation of parties and interests there would first be requisite a clear statement by the Government of the measures to which it would be willing to pledge itself in pursuance of this "middle line" of policy. As yet, however, the Government has failed to fulfil the condition thus laid down. Other questions have supervened, and chiefly those foreign questions which have for so long a time diverted the attention of Continental Governments generally from the less absorbing and less heroic incidents of humdrum domestic politics. Doubtless, too, the difficulty of bringing into line the Federal Governments, with their different tempers, traditions, and interests, has contributed to the delay in producing the promised programme. Thus while Dr. von Miquel gave to the election a catchword, he gave to no party either light or leading, and certainly he inspired no confidence in his own specific for the cure of Germany's party discords. Nor is he, perhaps, the man to do it. Dr. von Miquel is one of the ablest of German publicists, he is a shrewd Parliamentarian, and above all he is a born financier, but he is still Dr. von Miquel—socially, a highly respectable representative of the middle class; and politically, an ultra-democrat by only two removes. First a Communist, then a Radical, then a National Liberal, he is a statesman whom the aristocratic parties must instinctively mistrust, even were it not the fact that the Senate has more than one Brutus, as the forum has more than one Casca, who say that he is ambitious.

Where thus the Imperial Chancellor did not care to tread, and where Dr. von Miquel interposed without effect, there rushed in, very unexpectedly and altogether unfortunately, Count Posadowsky, the Secretary of State for the Interior. Then it was that the Government's chance of receiving a favourable verdict from the electors disappeared. A fortnight before the day fixed for the first ballots there appeared a long letter, which had been addressed by Count Posadowsky to a "well-known politician," who, being troubled with a conscience, asked advice as to how he and others similarly situated should vote.

"In my opinion," the letter began, "the burgher parties can be in no doubt as to their attitude in the elections. The Social Democratic Party has not only publicly acknowledged itself as a revolutionary Party but it is so, in fact, since its avowed aims consist of the abolition of the existing political order and of private property, while its methods often include a terrorizing restriction of the personal liberty of the working-class. That this fact should be in

many quarters unrecognized, or intentionally obscured, can only be due to theoretical misconception, to political shortsightedness, or to lack of courage. The burgher parties, which are undoubtedly desirous of maintaining the present political order intact, are bound in duty to the German Empire, as also from motives of self-preservation, to make common cause with a view to preventing the return of Social Democratic representatives. Electors who, from Party considerations, set up impossible candidates, and thus imperil or prevent the election of candidates of the burgher parties, run the risk of directly supporting the Social Democratic Movement. He who will protect the Fatherland against disastrous internal disorders will therefore be willing to subordinate his political preferences and prejudices to the supreme political duty of presenting a united front against revolutionary Socialism."

Had Count Posadowsky stopped here, his letter would have done no harm, even if it had achieved no absolute good. In an appeal to common antagonism against a Party which is the enemy of all, and in its turn the friend of none, he would have carried all the forces of civil order with him. So far, he was but giving point to a warning which he had uttered from his Ministerial place in the closing days of the Reichstag. But the part of Count Posadowsky's letter that attracted most attention, and the part by which the whole letter was judged, was that in which he suggested the future course of economic legislation.

"For the welfare of all classes of the population," he continued, "the next Reichstag must be provided with a stable majority, prepared to promote the great and common interests of our productive classes (*Erwerbs stände*) by positive measures. To this end it must offer the Government a firm support in the consideration and determination of the difficult questions of international competition and be resolved to subject the condition of home production, and, in particular, of those productive classes most threatened by modern economic development, viz., agriculture and the middle classes, to an unprejudiced investigation, uninfluenced by doctrinaire ideas and political considerations."

Whether so intended or not, the latter sentences were universally regarded as a virtual endorsement of the Agrarian Movement, and as inviting the electors to make choice of candidates in sympathy with its aims.

The genesis of this movement calls for a word in passing. It dates from the conclusion of the most-favoured nation treaties which were incidental to the economic era inaugurated by Chancellor von Caprivi. These treaties admittedly put an end to the privileged position which the landed interest had enjoyed since Protection was introduced into Germany, yet, on the other hand,

they were obviously necessary to the country's industrial and mercantile development, and were indeed a recognition of her entrance as a serious competitor in the markets of the world. What has been for the benefit of industry and commerce has, however, proved the bane of agriculture, and the endeavours of the Agrarians to reverse the Caprivi policy, and so turn the balance of advantage in their own favour, have of late years led to much heated debate both in the Reichstag and the Prussian Diet.

What the average Agrarian actually wants, he would himself have difficulty in defining. Vaguely he calls for legislation in the interest of agriculture and of the classes which depend directly upon the land for subsistence. Less obscure, though far too impracticable for serious politicians, is the programme put forward by the Agrarian League, an organization which was founded five years ago in a fit of displeasure with the Government. The objects principally urged by the League are the increase of existing duties upon agricultural imports of all kinds and the introduction of new ones (as upon wool), including the denunciation of the most-favoured nation treaties now in force; bimetallism; changes in the incidence of local taxation in favour of agriculture; the nationalization of the spirit industry; the nationalization of the Imperial Bank (now on a semi-private and commercial basis), avowedly with a view to its profits being applied to State purposes, though actually in the hope that it may under new auspices be utilized as an easy land credit institute; and the restriction of the right of migration with the object of preventing a dearth of agricultural labour. That the Alliance is a great power is proved by the fact that in some 240 constituences candidates were nominated who either adopted its entire programme or gave satisfactory assurances as to their attitude towards questions affecting the land. The great majority of these candidates were Conservatives, but Imperialists, Anti-Semites, Clericals, and even National Liberals were also among the number.

That Count Posadowsky deliberately intended to give his *imprimateur* to this movement may reasonably be disputed. On the other hand, it was recalled that he had in the Reichstag repeatedly avowed the opinion that Germany's recent policy of commercial treaties was a fallacious policy, and one menacing to the permanent interests of agriculture; while the influences which had for a long time been unwearyingly brought to bear upon the Government from every conceivable quarter by the Agrarian Party are notorious. The Conservatives, without exception, held that the letter meant the Government's acceptance of the Agrarian Programme; and so, too, did the leaders of the Agrarian League, whose journalistic organ flatly asserted that "the Imperial Government

has adopted the economic views of the Alliance, and has indirectly made the confession that it desires a policy of concentration in our sense."

But if the Agrarians and their newspapers were delighted, every other section of the community and the Press was alarmed, and even so consistent an organ of the Conservatives as the *Cologne Gazette*, in deploring the tone of the letter, called upon the electors to return such a Reichstag as would "protect the economic life of the nation against the adventurous designs of the greedy Junkers."

It was clear then, and it is still clearer now, that from every standpoint the letter was a tactical error. As a programme it was vague and unsubstantial—a mere piece of phraseology, a theoretical setting of indefinite aims; while its immediate effect was to unite against the Government, forces, which under normal circumstances would have been employed in its favour, to stimulate the Liberal parties to redoubled efforts, to create on the part of the entire mercantile section of a growing mercantile nation a deep feeling of suspicion and unrest, and finally to nerve the Social Democrats for what they were bidden to regard as a life and death struggle.

The country has given its answer to Count Posadowsky's letter, and it is not difficult to divine what the answer is. In the first place, the Agrarian Movement has been rebuked, and the mercantile interests and activities of the country have obtained peace for at least five years. There can be no doubt that a large section of the population, not unfriendly to the Government nor indisposed to Moderate Conservatism, has been thoroughly alarmed by the inconsiderate and tactless manner in which the Agrarians have ignored every interest save their own, and even shown a disposition to set aside for the moment the political principles which have hitherto been an unfailing bond between all "Government men" (*Regierungsmänner*) in their determination to fight for their own hand. It is safe to assume, however, that there will be no revision of the Protection system prejudicial to the industrial and trading community until the electors have had another opportunity of going to the urns. Were the Government in favour of such a step—and Prince Hohenlohe is a careful man—it would first be necessary to purchase the requisite Parliamentary majority. And this majority would have to be purchased in an expensive market, for the Ultramontanes can alone give the votes that would be needful, and they do not hold themselves cheap. So far the clerical leader has warily suspended judgment upon the subject, probably in consideration of the fact that his Party has to rely for its strength upon not a few industrial towns to which dearer corn would mean disaster.

Nor need fear be entertained for the safety of the present franchise.

Much was made by the Liberal parties during the election of the Government's alleged desire to abolish manhood suffrage in view of the steady progress of Social Democracy. Such a design has not only never been admitted, but it has been disavowed, and to attribute it to the Government was quite gratuitous. Nevertheless, "No tampering with the suffrage!" made a capital Party cry, and it was used with good effect in the towns.

That the Government would only be too glad to revise the electoral law can well be understood. It knows—as every thoughtful observer knows—that the universal suffrage is the effective instrument by means of which the Social Democratic Party has achieved its present powerful position, and hopes with every reason to become before long a determining factor in the Reichstag. In the Prussian Landtag, thanks to the narrow franchise on which it is elected, the Socialists have never been able to obtain a strong voice, and it is only recently that they have obtained seats at all. In the Reichstag, however, they have, during the last twenty years, ominously increased their strength at every election, with one single exception. Given a continuation of the present electoral conditions, and it is not unlikely that the time will soon come when the Socialists will become the most powerful of the fractions. Already they are the first party by number of votes, and second by number of seats. Directly their representation became at all proportionate to their voting strength, the balance of power would pass from the constitutional parties to a party which has never hesitated to avow as its first aim, because the necessary condition of its economic experiments, the abolition of the present political order. Assuming that an alteration of the electoral law would be justifiable as a means for staving off this contingency—a point which must here be left untouched—it is evident that there is not much time to lose. For, once let the Social Democratic Party acquire the predominance at which it aims, and nothing short of an open *coup d'état* on the part of the Federal Government, either supported or not by a portion of the Reichstag, would accomplish the constitutional revision which many deem to be desirable and not a few to be indispensable.

The recent elections have, however, shown another way of meeting the onslaught of Social Democracy, and this is one of the most remarkable features of the contest. It is the way of combination. Never before did the "parties of civil order" manifest so serious or so general a determination to prevent the tide of Socialism from spreading across the floor of Parliament. In the first ballots the watchword was, of course, *sauve qui peut*, and as most of the fractions which confronted each other did so with a genuine hope of success, it was only here and there that agree-

ment was come to, outside the groups closely allied in principle and aim, to fuse forces with a view to routing the common enemy. But no sooner were the first elections decided than from the head-quarters of every party the injunction was issued that wherever Social Democratic candidates were in the field, no effort should be spared to inflict upon them crushing defeat; and now, at any rate, Count Posadowsky's advice was loyally followed. Even parties so self-centred as the German Conservatives and the Ultramontanes did not hesitate to combine with their antagonists in pursuance of this end. In Berlin the Council of the former party, issued a formal appeal to the rank and file to forget their Conservatism for the moment, and to vote solidly for the Radical candidates. The appeal was heeded, for in two of the metropolitan districts in which they were successful the Radicals would have been overwhelmingly defeated had not their traditional enemies come to the rescue. More noteworthy still, in his constituency of Hagen, the arch-Radical Herr Eugen Richter received over 7,000 National, Liberal, and Ultramontane votes in the second ballots. Similarly Herr Rickert, the leader of the Moderate Radicals was helped into his seat at Danzig by Conservative votes; while, conversely, in not a few Rhenish and other Catholic districts Ultramontane candidates were supported both by Radicals and National Liberals, where Social Democratic success was the only alternative. Alone amongst Germany's many parties, the Socialists have fought the election by their own unaided strength.

The policy which has thus been pursued is not without encouragement for those who have hitherto viewed the Parliamentary progress of Socialism with growing concern. Present party relationships, may be obsolete in Germany; yet so long as the parties most antagonistic to each other can be found ready in emergency to make fractional interests secondary to the prevention of Socialist supremacy in the Reichstag, the visions of the apprehended "Red Terror," which needlessly alarm the more nervous sections of the community, will lose in vividness and colour, while political life throughout will gain in vigour, unity of aim, and general wholesomeness.

W. H. Dawson.

MARRIED WOMEN IN AMERICAN SOCIETY.

It has long been the fashion to regard the position of all women in America as immeasurably superior to that of women in any other quarter of the globe. From a legal point of view this is perhaps true, and even in social matters it might well be admitted with regard to the unmarried girl; but on behalf of married women I venture to make an Englishwoman's emphatic protest to the contrary. This is probably a proceeding of extreme audacity, and, in order as far as possible to disarm criticism, I wish to say that the following remarks are not intended to apply to the United States at large, of which I know little, but only to the Southern town where I spent two or three years. Furthermore, they are proffered not as universal truths, but as resulting from the observation and experience of one individual. They may (and probably do) apply in large measure to all American society, but their truth is vouched for as regards one town only. To disprove the universal affirmative alluded to in my first sentence it is by every law of logic sufficient to prove one particular negative, and this is the aim of the present article.

"No man," said an inhabitant of this town of L—— to me, "cares to play tennis with a woman except for purposes of flirtation." For the special game mentioned he might have substituted the game of conversation or of social relations as a whole, and his axiom would have been broadly true. No man in L—— cares for a woman's society unless he is actually or potentially in love with her. It may even be allowable for a married man to "pay attention" to a girl, because this also is a semi-flirtation, with limits clearly understood beforehand; but let a man of any kind try to make friends with a married woman, and he will soon find himself and her in the unenviable position of the heathen man and the publican. Friendship between the sexes after marriage is a thing simply not understood; among Americans it falls under one of two heads, formality or flirtation.

Of course, it is, and always will be, a moot question whether friendship between the sexes is ever more than a temporary illusion, and whether, as the old song says, one at least of the parties does not invariably "come but for friendship and take away love."

But to the English mind it would seem almost a self-evident proposition that such a friendship is more within the bounds of possibility when one or both of the parties is deterred from going farther, not only by honour but by the sense of previous acquisition, a repletion of soul, so to speak, that might presumably quench the thirst for conquest. That this is not the opinion of Americans is clearly indicated by the following points of their practice: —

A girl in L—— may ride, drive, or bicycle with a man to an unlimited extent; she may see him *tête-à-tête* in her own house at any time; she may write to him freely; she may, and even expects to, receive from him flowers and candy with a frequency appalling to a frugal English mind. And yet with all this she neither marries him nor has any intention of so doing; indeed, unless polyandry were permitted, she could not. But once she is married all this abruptly ceases. For a man to indulge in any real intimacy with a married woman, whether it take the form of rides, correspondence, or even frequent five o'clock teas at her own home, is to expose himself and her first to surprised comment and then to ill-natured gossip. The average American man, indeed, takes this so much for granted that he cannot understand why his wife should *want* anything more. Feminine society she may have all day long if she likes—ladies' luncheons and ladies' teas seem to him part of the natural order of the universe; but as far as male companionship goes, he, in his own eyes, and presumably in hers, is all-sufficing. Her neighbours at dinners (a form of entertainment by-the-bye much rarer than in England), the few men her husband may bring to the house to dine, the still fewer "tame cats" whom she may meet at teas, and, fewest of all, the men who at a ball will spare to a married woman some moments ordinarily consecrated to a succession of immature *debutantes*—this is all she is allowed to see of the superior sex. And the most remarkable feature of the whole is the fact that not only is she unable to make new men friends, but she loses all her old ones. The very same woman who has been a "tearing belle" one year is absolutely shelved the next by the mere fact of marriage. American men have been heard pathetically to complain that from the moment of their engagement girls looked coldly on them. Much more is this true of women, who in becoming everything to one man becomes less than nothing to all the rest, even to the "beaux" or potential "beaux" of a few weeks before.

It might perhaps be inferred from this that the American wife enjoyed an unusual portion of her husband's society, and that other men were excluded simply on the principle of "two's company." If it were so, she would doubtless be a fit object of envy,

or at least would have no right to complain; but, as a matter of fact, the women of L—— see far less of their husbands than the average Englishwoman. Business hours are longer, and on the remaining hours the clubs are far more apt to encroach; men's dinners are more common; and finally, in the summer almost every couple is forcibly separated by the heat for three or four months. Companionship in outdoor amusements is rare, though latterly on the increase. Hitherto it has been considered almost a point of etiquette for a woman when she marries to retire from the world of "sport," and one hears women say with conscious virtue: "I have never danced" (or "ridden" or "played tennis," as the case may be) "since I married." The consequence naturally is that even the man's hours of exercise are passed away from his wife, and he is more likely to spend his summer holiday fishing with a male friend than rocking beside his wife on a hotel piazza.

This, indeed, is one principal cause of the social phenomenon here treated of. The American woman is not only less robust than her English sister, but also less active, and after marriage this difference is intensified. She has always played but a feeble game of golf or tennis, and whereas before marriage there were plenty of men ready to play with her "for purposes of flirtation," after marriage that incentive is gone, and she is accepted, or rather refused, solely on her merits as a player. And so she stops playing, or, indeed, using her muscles at all, so that if her husband wishes to take any form of exercise he has to do so without her, and so *a fortiori* do her old men friends, who are presumably less tolerant because less interested. It is, however, fair to say that every year the American woman seems to realize more clearly the value of exercise, so that this cause is probably transitory.

Another cause of separation between the men and women in L—— may indisputably be traced to that old and hackneyed source, the "servant problem." The unmarried girl is (fortunately for her) not responsible for the vagaries of the cook or the housemaid, but when she marries she has in America, thanks to the inferiority of the servants, to devote to household duties an amount of time and care unheard of in England. Especially is this true where there are children, for obviously when it is necessary for a woman, or she at least thinks so, to wash and dress her own baby, prepare its food, and generally perform the offices first of a nurse and then of a governess, she cannot have time for much besides. Sport, work, and even companionship, whether with her own husband or with other men, have all to go to the wall. Let us hope that the course of years and changed social conditions will do away with this cause also.

But there are weightier reasons than servants or habits of

exercise for the total difference in mental attitude on this subject between the English and the Americans. It is not merely that marriage by tradition or necessity diverts a woman from her old interests to a greater degree in L—— than in London; there is far more than this. Marriage for a woman is regarded in England as the hall-mark of merit; in L—— it has, so far as the opposite sex is concerned, almost the painful consequences of the mark of Cain. And here we touch on a curious double inconsistency. Men in England do not, as a rule, want to marry; in fact, a recent writer has told us that they view the coming on of love with horror; yet a married woman is *ipso facto* more desirable as a companion in their eyes, and it has become a commonplace of modern English literature that "girls are no good," or that "nobody cares to talk to girls." Men in America regard marriage as a goal, and prolonged bachelorhood as a disgrace; yet their friend's wife seems to them either a nuisance or a negligible quantity. Possibly this is not really an inconsistency, but points to the fact that to every man an unmarried girl is a possibility, to the American delightful, to the Englishman terrifying. So to the Englishman a married woman is a haven of refuge; to the American she is as salt that has lost its savour.

The greatness of this difference in attitude no one will deny. The comments on it will be various according to the race or personal idiosyncrasies of the thinker. To the English mind it may appear ridiculous, to say the least of it, for a man to see in every woman a potential wife, and to take no interest in those outside this category. The American, on the other hand, regards the Englishman's dread of marriage and preference for a friendship where this is manifestly impossible, as something selfish and unnatural, and he claims for himself the championship of the married state. To this there is the English rejoinder: No wonder that men desire the married state, when bachelor lodgings are as bad and bachelor comforts as few as in most parts of the United States, so that a wife is the cheapest and best form of housekeeper; but where is your boasted admiration for marriage in the abstract, when you discard your girl friends immediately on their attaining that state? Being an Englishwoman, I will not attempt to frame an American reply, but will content myself with mentioning a few more points which have come under my own observation.

A good deal of what we have been considering may I think be accounted for by three *lacunæ* in American society: the want of common topics of conversation, the absence of what has been called "country-house life," and the practical elimination of the chaperon. The women in L—— are, as a rule, better educated than the men, who have little time or inclination for anything

besides the newspaper; books, therefore, are almost an impossible subject. Politics, that great bond in England between all ages and classes, as a recent critic has pointed out, are in America, broadly speaking, neither a gentleman's profession nor a suitable society topic. On the interests of the men themselves few women are competent to talk, for the "society men" of L—— consist entirely, so far as my experience goes, of business men, lawyers, and doctors. Conversation on business cannot be expected, and should indeed not be encouraged in social intercourse, and the wearisome discussions on stocks and "real estate" may advantageously be confined to the smoking room; while for men to discourse on law or medicine to the lay woman simply ends in an egotistical monologue on the one side, and polite inattention on the other. And so talk in L—— becomes at home an intermittent exchange of domestic items, and in society a mere fire of banter, "chaffing" compliments from the man, and "bright" repartees from the woman, all of which is obviously easier and more amusing between the unmarried, who consider themselves privileged to go to all or almost all conversational lengths. To an Englishwoman accustomed to have her "want of sense of humour" daily and hourly impressed upon her, the marvel is that Americans should make so little humour of their own go such a long and weary way. But this is no doubt mere jealousy on our part, the jealousy which a foxhound must feel on watching the surprising antics of a French poodle. At any rate, just as the course of years makes the poodle old and stiff, so do age and matrimony dry up the fount of American conversation, and the married woman is emphatically "not in it."

So much for town society. When we come to country life with its Saturday-to-Monday parties, its shooting weeks and so forth, we find that all this is in America as the snakes in Iceland. If any Englishman will call to mind his many pleasant talks to women, married or single (preferably the former), whether in a punt or on horseback, or merely in the course of a Sunday afternoon walk, all owed to the hospitality of friends on the river or elsewhere, he will forcibly realize what a large avenue of pleasure for the man and of social importance for the woman is closed by the non-existence of "country-house life" in America. The American married woman spends at least nine months of the year by her own fireside, the remaining three probably at a summer hotel with her children. In neither circumstances has she the freedom from domestic responsibility and the opportunity for casual unsought acquaintanceship that form a part of the ordinary existence of an English wife, accustomed from her earliest girlhood to "pay visits," first with her parents and afterwards with her husband.

Again, chaperonage, whether in town or country, plays a far smaller part in the society of L—— than it does with us, and the married woman is still further shorn of importance. When men and girls can freely ride, drive, bicycle, and sail together, what need is there for the young and fascinating chaperon, in England herself often half the attraction? She has no place in the young American's scheme of creation, and, therefore, in spite of all her charms he leaves her to languish where in his opinion is her proper sphere, at home.

This question admits of infinite discussion leading to no particular issue. But enough has, I hope, been said to establish the proposition: That however transcendent may be the privileges of the American *girl*, the American *wife* has in comparison with the English wife a less free position, a less full social life, in short, as she herself would say, far less of a "lovely time." We are perhaps rather tired of that same American girl, of hearing and even echoing her praises and observing with wonder or envy her perfect liberty. It is therefore only right to note that the natural outcome of her pre-matrimonial freedom seems in the land of her birth to be an almost Turkish seclusion after marriage. If the English girl wishes to copy her Transatlantic sister, a wish which of late years she has steadily been carrying into effect, she ought in fairness to make her imitation thorough. She must not expect, in nursery parlance, to eat her cake and have it too, but must be content to sink gracefully into the background as soon as the Wedding March is over. She can have fun and plenty of it before marriage; afterwards the "way to glory," by a reversal of English processes, will be found to have turned suddenly and uncompromisingly into the "path of duty." Whether the consciousness of glorious triumphs in the past and unbounded domestic usefulness in the present will fully compensate her, I for my part cannot pretend to say.

MARYLAND.

THE RECENT INSURRECTIONS IN ITALY

I.—Subversive Propaganda and the Supposed Conspiracy.

The agitations of the peasants of Southern Italy, caused by the high price of bread and the lack of work, have had an unlooked-for epilogue in the Insurrection of Milan. The distinctly political character of this latter event has upset prevailing explanations of the earlier risings in the south, and none of the formulæ made to account for them fits this sudden and violent revolutionary movement.

According to current phrases, the peasantry of Sicily and of the Puglie were moved by hunger, the disturbances were merely a passing phenomenon, the new harvest would set everything right; meanwhile the remedy would be found in the temporary abolition of the duty on cereals, in "Cucine Economiche" (soup-kitchens supported by charity), and the distribution of wheat at cost price. But the political insurrection at Milan nonplussed the political quacks by presenting to them an entirely new problem.

In the case of the revolt at Milan starvation was not the cause, so the explanation which is suggested and generally accepted is that a propaganda was made by subversive political parties, either Socialists, Clericals, Republicans, or Anarchists. From the bugbear of revolutionary propaganda it was but a step to the supposition of revolutionary measures; favoured by the circumstance of general economic uneasiness. The existence of this plot, however, was from the first improbable, and the court-martial of Milan was obliged to recognize its non-existence. But even had there been a plot it could not have been looked upon as the cause of the insurrection. Conspiracies and sects are the effects of revolutions, but not their causes.

Organizations of political forces there have certainly been, but this is lawful according to the Italian Constitution. For years propagandas have been carried on by Socialists, by Republicans, by Clericals, and also by the Liberals. I am willing to grant that the propaganda of the Socialists and Clericals, falling upon untilled soil in the persons of our peasantry may have been a subsidiary

cause of the explosion which took place. But this is a point of secondary importance, since it is undeniable that behind the ignorance and violence of the people exist conditions of material distress calculated to form a very hotbed of revolt, and these conditions must be remedied by other means than repression, if we have real reforms at heart.

II.—The Bogey of Socialism.

The Fallacy of Public Works.

If propaganda and plots are not the causes of the insurrection, it is no less a mistake to magnify the part played in it by Socialism.

Political unity once established, the dangers of Clericalism disappeared; Republicanism being out of fashion, and Liberalism banished from Parliament, Socialism was for a time the only rallying point of discontent. Its progress has been formidable, because its propaganda was purposely kept within the limits of the Constitution, and aimed at reforms. Now Socialism, neglecting the political form, has fought the present economic system, and this is the real origin of the exaggerated hatred and terror in which the Socialist propaganda is held by the bourgeoisie.

The working men's "Leagues of Resistance" were originally founded by the Italian Socialists in imitation of similar associations abroad, for the purpose of organizing an *economic* struggle. This economic struggle of wages against capital, degenerated little by little into a *political* struggle against the State. The causes which have wrought this change constitute an important political symptom. The struggle would not have passed beyond the limits of a problem to be solved by better education and mutual forbearance, or at most by a better organization of the Police, had not the rapid growth of State Socialism hastened the degeneration of the *economic* struggle between workmen and employers into a *political* struggle between the workmen and the State. The State has intervened more and more in all manner of private industries, causing the construction of useless railways, and encouraging the building mania. It has forced the Banks of Issue into subsidizing public and private contractors by the reckless issue of paper money in excess of the Bank reserve, alleging in justification of this bare-faced Socialistic measure the necessity of creating work for the unemployed.

On this plea, the State has substituted its own judgment for that of the citizen as to the useful investment of capital, taking private income in the form of taxes and expending it on unproductive public works. Thus the State has withdrawn capital from agriculture, and given artificial stimulus to the manufacture of

steel rails, armour-plates, cannon, dry-docks for the building of warships, &c.; so deflecting the current of wealth from its more remunerative channels. The employer has been transformed into an irresponsible intermediary between the labourer and the State and the State which has assumed the whole charge of the national production cannot now escape the fatal consequences of this policy. Already it is generally predicted that the Ministry will apply to Parliament for new appropriations for public works. In so doing, it will be acting in accord with the platform of the Socialist Deputies, who have always demanded this measure, and who still demand it.*

If the State builds monuments and other unproductive public works the capital thus sunk will neither yield an income nor be reintegrated, so that no further demands of labour can be expected from it in the future. If, instead, the same capital be employed by the individual citizen in industries, or in agriculture, it will yield a revenue, and this revenue, whether derived from landed property or from industries, will grow, and with it the future demand for labour.† The policy which has recourse to public works in order to give employment, to quiet the hunger-stricken and turbulent mass of labourers, only fosters the chief cause of the economic distress.

Even from the political point of view, once launched in this direction it will no longer be possible to turn back without provoking a political reaction in the groups of labourers who have been living as hangers-on of the bureaucracy, and who have learned to look upon the National Budget as their legitimate "Wages Fund!"

* In the Manifesto of the Socialist Deputies, recently issued (*vide Avanti*, May 14th, 1898), occurs the following passage: "Before the rise in the price of bread had as yet occasioned any popular agitations, the Parliamentary group of Socialists proposed that the duty on wheat be immediately abolished, and that public works be immediately begun." Thus far, the Ministry has found nothing better to propose than the tardy adoption of these measures, recommended by the Socialists in anticipation of the Bread Riots. The repeal of the "Corn Laws" is properly a Liberal measure, not accepted by the Government, although now, compelled by *force majeure*, it has grudgingly adopted it—*for a month!* The demand for public works is, *per contra*, an integral part of the Socialist platform, and this measure the Government is bound to adopt.

† A landed proprietor writes from a small town in the province of Lecce: "For the past four months I have employed a number of labourers from U—— and C——" (neighbouring villages), "paying them fifteen sous!" (about sevenpence halfpenny) "while the current wages are from nine to fifteen sous. I am carrying on work which I should not otherwise have undertaken at this juncture, in order to give work to as many men as possible. At least, unlike the Government, we are doing work which is in a manner productive—work which in the future will give more work—and better, which is of use to the people. Guess what the municipality of M—— has invented in order to give employment. A public garden!" This is a typical case. A proprietor plants a vineyard, which produces wine, and the wine will become a demand for fresh work. A village makes a public garden—"and there's an end on't!"

Crescit eundo! Behold the Socialist avalanche!—which is not, however, the work of the Socialists!

III.—The Republican and Clerical Movements.

The Reform of Local Self-Government.

By the side of the economic movement of the Social Democracy there has sprung into sudden vigour a Republican movement whose origin dates back to previous agitations against taxation, military and colonial expansion, and bureaucratic centralization. These issues are more complex and more concrete than those raised by Socialists, and affect all classes of the population, enveloping the whole policy of the State. In Milan we have an industrial community of the most advanced type, with the distinctive characteristics of hatred of militarism and bureaucracy. Such a population, successfully engaged in production and the accumulation of capital, is eminently fitted to appreciate the higher productivity of private as compared with public enterprise. To such a community a workman is worth more than a soldier, a factory more than a fortress, a harbour more than a strategical railway. Hence Milan has been for years the centre of resistance to exorbitant military expenditure, to sterile colonial conquest, to centralization, and to the consequent growth of crushing taxation. This spirit pervades all social and political parties; the industrial middle class no less than the Social Democracy.

It has become the general conviction that militarism in Italy radiates from the Crown, deriving thence a power which disturbs the equilibrium of the other Parliamentary forces; that, contrary to modern, Liberal tendencies, the monarchy is becoming more and more a military institution. There is a feeling that the Italian monarchy must grow into a civil monarchy on the English model, or lose its historic mission. A civil monarchy would be in harmony with the interests of the great mass of taxpayers, and would strike its roots deep in the sentiment of the people, which is at heart monarchical; whereas a military monarchy is in opposition to the real interests of the nation. Thus, little by little, the anti-military spirit has become anti-monarchical.

The Clerical Party betrays a similar tendency. It believes that the day which should see the hereditary monarchy replaced by the shifting Presidency of a Republic would see the Papacy established as the only kingly power, the conservative depository of Italian traditions, capable of dominating—at least by indirect influence—the civil Government. Thus seemingly contradictory interests conspire to the same end. The movement is not religious, but political, and, therefore, vigorous in the north, and almost null in the south.

There is also a Separatist movement. The general, but erroneous opinion in Lombardy is that the central Government squanders in the south the money raised by taxes in the north. There is also a widespread and more correct view, that Southern Italy is too much in favour of bureaucratic centralization, of public works, of colonial expansions, and of a grandiose policy. These views stir political opinion in Milan, and more and more strengthen the tendency to autonomy.

There seems good ground for thinking that the remedy for these just grievances might be found in local self-government.

The urgent need for this measure has long been felt, but it is met by promises which are, unfortunately, never kept. Local self-government would certainly cement political unity, while bureaucracy, centralization, and militarism, under the appearance of personal uniformity, foster the germs of political separation.

IV.—Causes of the Distress in the South.

The causes of the misery of the population of Southern Italy are more complex. The south pays more taxes than the north in proportion to its relative wealth.

The subjoined tables, showing the distribution of wealth and the burden of taxation, were compiled by Professor Pantaleoni and published by him in the *Giornale degli Economisti*, January, 1891*:—

Distribution of National Wealth by Zones (excluding Sardinia).

Zone.	Wealth from 1884-9.	Burden of Taxation.
Northern Italy	55,871,400,000	352 millions.
Central Italy	13,505,400,000	253 millions.
Southern Italy	14,617,800,000	288 millions.

That is, Northern Italy owns 48 per cent. of the total wealth, and pays less than 40 per cent. of the total taxation; Central Italy owns 25 per cent., and pays 28 per cent.; Southern Italy owns 27 per cent., and pays 32 per cent.

Were the relative burden of taxation compared with the relative amount of public works, a still more marked disparity would be evident; but, setting aside the distribution of public works, this result is further strengthened by the well-known fact that public works (canals, railroads, and the draining of marshes, &c.) have been more needed in the north.

It is generally asserted that since the establishment of Italian unity the southern provinces have cost the north far too much in

* "Delle Regioni d'Italia in ordine alla loro richezza, e al loro caricotributario." *Giornale degli Economisti*, January, 1891.

roads, schools, and harbours; just as though these public works, executed in the south since 1860, had not been *more than paid for* by taxes levied in the south! The fact is, that the south, which was poorer than the north, had relatively less need of railways, harbours, and schools, &c. The south, like the north, has paid for its own railways, but while the northern railways have been comparatively productive the southern railways have been correspondingly unproductive, so that the investment of capital in this direction has been relatively less disastrous in the north than in the south.

The financial policy of the Central Government has been imitated by the Communes. All over Italy there is a mushroom growth of public improvements, buildings, and, as a necessary consequence enormous local taxes.

Closely connected with the question of the rate of taxation is that of its distribution, which has been based upon the following mistaken principles:—

1. That indirect taxation upon consumption must be made to yield a larger revenue than direct taxation.

2. That indirect taxation must be made to fall more heavily upon articles of popular consumption than upon luxuries.

3. That the large landed proprietors are to be compensated for the high land-tax by a high protective duty on cereals.

It is true that landed property is devastated by taxation. This is amply proved by a comparison with France. Heavy taxation is, however, the inevitable consequence of the grandiose military policy approved of by the southern landowners; and they have succeeded in evading the burden by placing a duty on cereals, which lays the whole weight of the taxation on the peasants who buy the wheat. The system of "métayage" is not used in Southern Italy. There are large and small proprietors and day-labourers. Setting aside the small proprietors, the average of whom probably neither makes nor loses by the duty on wheat, there remain the small class of landed proprietors who sell wheat and the large labouring population who buy it. Probably, if the higher price of wheat only partially compensated the landowner for the excessive taxes he pays on his land, he would make a political stand against the causes of the high taxes; but the fact is that he is more than compensated, and pockets a surplus.*

* It would be easy for any Italian landholder to verify this by the following simple calculation. Compute the number of hectolitres of wheat per hectare raised on his land, multiply the result by the Customs duty (7·50 to 8 lire) and compare the product with the land tax per hectare. The results vary from place to place, and from one estate to another. This calculation made on some property of my own gives the following result:—For every 14 lire of land tax the duty on wheat gives, on the average, 32 to 35 lire. Of course, the truth of this inference depends on the assumption that wheat is cultivated.

It must also be remembered that the duty on wheat, which is now spoken of as the compensation for the land tax, was the price paid to the south by the north for industrial protection. The bargain has been profitable to but few even among the larger landowners, for in the southern provinces, taken as a whole, the production of cereals falls below the local consumption. The higher price of wheat has not, therefore, increased the buying capacity of the south in proportion to the higher price of the manufactured goods imported from the north; so that the increase in the cost caused by industrial protection is paid by the southern consumers to the northern producers at a sheer loss. The effect of our "Corn Laws" has been that they have made life harder for the labourer and have strained his relations with the landowner. Indeed, they have made life harder to *all* classes in the agricultural south which pays tribute to the industrial manufacturers of the north.

The south has been simply ravaged by this policy. After the unification of Italy the south embarked upon agricultural improvements on an enormous scale. But the sudden introduction of industrial protection completely changed the relative market value of agricultural products and manufactured goods, lowering agricultural prices and raising those of manufactured goods; and the south, which had embarked upon a gigantic process of agricultural development on credit, found itself suddenly bankrupt. The value of landed property was suddenly depreciated, the great estates passing into the hands of the banks to which they were mortgaged; the demand for labour was diminished, and the standard of living of the whole population was lowered. This blow, one of the most audacious ever dealt by Protection, could not have been inflicted but for the gross ignorance of the peasantry and of the lower middle-class; it has worked its inevitable result. Protection, by lowering the revenue, has practically increased the pressure of taxation. The budget of all classes has suffered, till that of the labourer has no longer the slightest margin; a hard winter, prolonged rains, or a bad harvest is enough to place him at the cross roads of starvation and revolt.

The revolts, when they occur, are directed neither against the army, nor against the Colonial policy, nor against Protection, nor against the duty on wheat! for the connection between these causes and the universal misery is not grasped by the masses. The recent cry of the peasantry at Bari, Foggia, and Minervino was for "Bread and work!" They do not know why bread is dear and work is scarce. Nor do they know that the duty on wheat has aggravated the famine, nor that Protection has alike reduced the revenues from the land and the labourer's wages; for questions of State policy escape their comprehension, being beyond their

political experience. Their widest horizon is that of the Commune. According to the ideas of the south, the deputy's whole duty is to help them in obtaining what they want from the Central Government. His mission is to obtain, or prevent, administrative victories and outside this, he is free to vote as he likes.

In this rudimentary political environment it is easy to understand that when hunger rages the revolt of the mob is directed against the mayor, the common council, and against the taxes and abuses of the *Municipal* Government, just as at Milan it broke out in the sphere of national politics and was directed against the taxes and abuses of the *Central* Government. The difference is in the range of vision, and is due to the different degrees of political education. To the south the Commune is the State; but the essence, the fundamental reasons for the discontent are the same in the north and south.

V.—Liberal Character of the Movement.

Reforms of the Police and the Judiciary.

If I have succeeded in giving a clear, though, I fear, not exhaustive explanation of the recent tumults, it will be evident that what Italy needs is more liberty. By liberty I mean the liberty advocated by Cavour, who based his policy on the simple but complete principle "that the more heavily the citizen is taxed the greater the economic freedom which must be given him." The application of this principle gave to the Government after 1860 a period of economic prosperity. Released from the pressure of Absolutism the productive forces had free play, and although heavy taxes were levied the country was easily governed.

Nowadays, a slight increase in taxation produces a menace of revolution. . . . A really Liberal Government should make the smallest possible demand upon the citizen's income, and should devote the taxes to such public services and public works as are of primary importance to the people at large.

Our present system of taxation, therefore, is not Liberal. Parliament has become a sectarian power, which interferes in every branch of public administration, invades, oppresses, and carries corruption everywhere.

The reaction against this state of things arises from the pressing need of liberty. The real struggle to be made at this moment is the struggle for liberty. Far-off ideals are not to be thought of until those obstacles have been removed which at present hamper the free movement of the individual.

The Extreme Parties, Socialists, Clericals, &c., all recognize this and are, for the time being, engaged in a propaganda against

"Domicilio Coatto," against the Corn Laws, and in favour of the freedom of instruction, of the independence of the Judiciary, the reduction of taxation, and other Liberal reforms which are at the heart of the people. The masses in revolt do not ask for "Collectivism" nor for the municipalization of the commerce in wheat. They do not want to be further pestered by the *political* persecution of the police nor by the *political* intolerance of the judges. All they ask is the right to live, to dispose freely of their property and the fruits of their toil, and, finally, to have justice meted out to them by their rulers. Old-fashioned Conservatives urge that "the cause of liberty is not advanced by barricades and incendiary fires; that the people has shewn itself incapable of using its political rights, and, therefore, that the Government should adopt a retrograde policy and restrict the suffrage, the right of public meetings, and the freedom of the Press." But the thing would not be as simple as it seems. If the people has shewn itself incapable of defending its rights by legal means, it has shewn its capacity for rebellion! This concerns also the ruling classes, who in their own interest cannot but wish to avoid periodic revolutions.

The inability of the people to defend their own interests does not give the ruling classes the right to trample on those interests nor, because the desire to throw off the yoke is manifested by violence, does it follow that the desire is not legitimate. The masses are in revolt against misgovernment; admitted that they do ill to *revolt*, the question remains, does misgovernment exist or not?

It is notorious that in the struggle between the people and its rulers the Italian Parliament has not taken the part of the people. Instead of defending the interests of the taxpayers against encroachment, it has entered into an understanding with the class in power and claimed its share of the spoils.

Hence it is inevitable that, in the struggle for the defence of their property, the mass of taxpayers should act without regard to Parliament, and should place themselves beyond the pale of the Constitution.

Even had Parliament represented the average or general interest of the taxpayers as, according to the spirit of the Constitution, it should have done, it is by no means certain that the struggle would have been avoided. We find in English History that the Parliament struggled against the Crown (that is, against an Absolutism based on the army, the bureaucracy, and the servility of the Judiciary). "The servile Parliament of Henry VIII. grew into the murmuring Parliament of Elizabeth, the mutinous Parliament of James I., and the rebellious Parliament of Charles I." The history of the English Revolution is well known.

In order to avoid the struggle it would be necessary that the contending parties should, in their mutual interest, seek a common ground of agreement, and should arrive at a compromise through Parliament. It was to this end that the Parliamentary system was introduced into Italy. At first it served its purpose, but it does so no longer, and to its failure is due the fact that our political struggles still take the classic form of street riots.

Things will be made not better but worse by the adoption of measures inimical to liberty and to the exercise of political rights. The restriction of the suffrage will strengthen the "machine-politicians." The electoral machine will remain unchanged, for the ties between the Central Government and the Communes will be the same. The one logical reform lies in the direction of cutting the ties between Central Government and Local Administrations.

Thus a new series of considerations points afresh to the same imperatively needed reform, local self-government.

As to the rights of public meetings and the freedom of the Press, historical precedent warns us that if these rights were tampered with the people would be driven into joining secret societies and sects. The perusal of the suppressed newspaper would be replaced by that of seditious writings, to which the persecutions of the Government would lend the lustre of an evangel.

Even those who ask for severe laws against offences of the Press recognize that the already existing laws are not applied. It is dangerous to enter upon the path of repression which means a return to the fatal methods of the Bourbon Police. Such methods did not succeed then when it was only a question of fighting a Liberal nucleus, which was the merest fraction of the population working without the Press, without railroads or telegraph. How can they succeed now against the majority of the people fighting under far more favourable conditions?

Local self-government and respect of the political liberties should go hand in hand with the reform of the magistrature and the reorganization of the police. These reforms have long been wanted, but recent events emphasize anew their extreme urgency. Courts-martial and the employment of the army for violent and systematic repression at home sow germs of hatred and revolt which must bear bitter fruit. The Crispian Tribunals silenced compulsorily by death or imprisonment the opinions of its various victims, but it aroused on every side indignation and hatred. The repression in Sicily produced its effects in Milan. Those condemned by court-martial in Sicily became political candidates in Romagna, in Rome, Milan, Leghorn, and other places, though not being eligible for office, their nomination was merely a protest against injustice. The first victories of the Socialists and Clericals

in the local administrative elections date from this period.* The same methods used to-day will produce the same results. Only the reorganization of the police and of the Judiciary can give the legitimate means of restoring order without having recourse to the army and court-martial.

VI.—Economic and Financial Reforms.

Most important of all, there remains to be considered the financial and economic reforms, and here lies the great difficulty, for these reforms clash with various interests which make up the political environment and which limit the action of the Government.

The problem has two sides, one relating to the excessive burden of taxation, the other to the unequal distribution of taxation. The excess in the burden of taxation relative to the national wealth results in a disproportion between public and private expenditure, too much of our revenue going to the State for its provision for so-called public needs, leaving too little to the citizens to provide for their own private needs. The balance must be restored by the reduction of public expenses so as to allow a corresponding increase in private expenditure. The sooner this equilibrium is established the sooner we shall emerge from the present state of depression.

A step in the right direction has been taken in the last few years in cutting down public works, but reform must be carried further. The bureaucracy and the army cannot retain their present dimensions. If the question to-day is between ten or twelve *corps d'armée*, to-morrow it will be between eight and twelve. These reforms do not imply a revolution, but merely a change in the direction of public finance.

Besides the question of the absolute burden of taxation there is the question of its distribution. Everyone in Italy feels intuitively that the working-classes pay taxes out of all proportion to their wages. This is true, not only by reason of the uncivilized system of Excise duties which fall on all necessaries and commodities, but also because of the Protective duties, which are so many taxes in disguise, and fall also upon articles of popular consumption. The duty upon cereals and the duties upon manufactured articles transfer to the consumer the taxes upon land and upon personal property. The professional middle-class finds its compensation by pouring into the military and bureaucratic careers, and thus secures an assured existence from the State Budget. So the ruling class finds it possible to vote the expenses demanded by a grandiose policy, and to lay upon the peasants, who are politically helpless the onus of payment.

The two sides of the financial problem then are interdependent, so that no detail can be touched without affecting the whole system

* *Vide* "The Political Situation in Italy," *Nineteenth Century* for October 1895.

of large and small interests. The shock of an outside force is required to break this close and solid political organization. As the movement headed by Cobden was the outside force which routed Protection in England, so it may be that, in spite of their fitful and violent character, the periodic agitations of peasants and labourers may demolish the system of Protection in Italy.

In all these agitations, beginning with that in Sicily, the Excise and the duty on cereals have been the principal factors.

The most obvious reform for the moment is to correct the inequality in the distribution of taxation. This reform will be severely felt by the Budgets of the State and of the Commune, and will fall still more severely on the incomes of interested private individuals. The landed proprietors will raise an outcry, and the industrial and professional classes will find themselves menaced with additional burdens to make up the deficit in the National Budget. But this is exactly what is necessary in order to bring about a reform of the tributary system under Parliamentary government.

This may come to pass slowly and without perceptible disturbance, for, for every private interest impaired, new productive forces would be liberated, and would prepare compensation for the individual loss. We may be sure that the abolition of the duty on cereals, for instance, or of the premiums to the mercantile navy would not produce such a disturbance of interests as that which followed the rupture of the Treaty of Commerce with France, or the Protective Tariff of 1887, or the fifty millions of paper money, unprotected by Bank reserve, issued to succour the creditors of the "Banca Tiberina."

In conclusion, the recent troubles, a repetition of former troubles, are to be ascribed to political discontent and economic distress; the discontent and the distress have their remote causes, and in these causes are to be found motives for reforms which should not end with the repression of the symptoms.

There is a vague presentiment that the moment through which we are passing will prove to be an epoch-making moment in our history. The present political conditions of Italy have been likened to those of Spain and Greece. The comparison has been indignantly repudiated; yet many amongst us have, with a sense of dismay, recognized that the same system of government is doing the same fatal work here as there. There the process is more advanced, here it is at an earlier stage; but the retrograde tendency is the same.

On the other hand, our conditions bear a singular resemblance to those of England in the first half of the century, and there the conditions were radically changed by the vigorous Liberal reforms.

Two alternatives lie before us; two roads are open to us; two policies are possible!

De Viti de Marco

A COLONIAL CHRONICLE.

THE JOINT COMMISSION.

The chief Canadian event of the past month was the appointment of a Joint American-Canadian-British Commission, to settle the principle questions outstanding between Canada and the United States. Copies of the protocol containing the reference have been published, and the specific questions submitted to the Commission, which meets at Quebec in August, are the Behring Sea Sealing Question; Reciprocal Mining Regulations; the Alaskan Boundary; Restrictive Regulations for the Preservation of the Fisheries of the Great Lakes; the North Atlantic Fishery Question and the Boundary Question; the Alien Labour Law; Reciprocity of Trade. From the Canadian-British side the following Commissioners have been selected: Lord Herschell, (ex-Lord Chancellor), Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Sir Richard Cartwright, Sir Louis Davies (Members of the Canadian Cabinet), and Mr. Charlton, a considerable authority on commercial questions. After their nomination had been published, it was announced from Washington that the Senate had struck out from the General Deficiency Bill the credit of 50,000 dols., which was to defray the expense of the Conference. This caused some surprise, and was interpreted as a wish on the part of the Senate to be "nasty" to Canada and Great Britain. It was more probably an incident in the unceasing war between the Senate and President over Executive questions, in which the latter desires to have a free hand, which the former refuses to recognize. Subsequently the credit was reinserted and the American delegation was forthwith constituted as follows:—Senators George Gray, of Delaware, and Charles W. Fairbanks, of Indiana, Mr. Nelson Dingley, of Tariff fame, Mr. John A. Kasson, of Iowa (ex-Minister in Berlin and Vienna), and Mr. John W. Foster, the author of the famous Sherman despatch. *The Times* correspondent in New York—not the wisest of mankind—declares that the American list of names "as a whole is disappointing," which is exactly what it is not. The general calibre of the Commissioners inspires confidence. In one respect only it is "disappointing." Mr. Foster is a crank, whose principal object in life seems to be to inflame the relations between

the Dominion and Republic. He will be an element of disturbance at deliberations which otherwise open auspiciously.

A Postal Reform.

An important inter-Imperial Postal Conference has been sitting at the Westminster Palace Hotel, London, attended by delegates from all the principal colonies, and presided over by the British Postmaster-General—the Duke of Norfolk. After a few sittings a *communiqué* was sent to the Press stating: "It has been agreed, on the proposal of the representative of the Dominion of Canada, that letter postage of one penny per half-ounce should be established between the United Kingdom, Canada, Newfoundland, the Cape Colony, Natal, and such of the Crown colonies as may, after communication with and approval of Her Majesty's Government, be willing to adopt it. The question of a uniform reduced rate for the whole Empire was carefully considered; but it was not found possible to fix upon a rate acceptable to all the Governments concerned. A resolution was therefore adopted leaving it to those parts of the Empire which were prepared for penny-postage to make the necessary arrangements among themselves. Although India is not mentioned in the Postmaster-General's announcement, it may be assumed, from the attitude of the Postmaster-General of Bengal, who represented our great Asiatic dependency at the gathering, that the Viceregal Council will heartily endorse the Canadian proposal. For the present, the Australian colonies decline to be parties to the agreement, but there is reason to believe that, ere long, different counsels will prevail." According to Mr. Henniker Heaton, who has made a speciality of postal reform which he has, perhaps, advocated with more zeal than tact:—"This glorious message of England to her Colonies will send a thrill of joy throughout the British Empire. This one action is, I believe, the greatest yet achieved by the Government. It is a great and splendid step in the direction of Imperial union and the solidarity of the Empire. There is scarcely a family in England but has a relative in some part of the world, and I undertake to say that the first ship that carries the penny-postage letters will contain tens of thousands of messages from the old folks at home. The 2½d. rate was never popular. I am bound to say that we should never have got the penny rate if it had not been for Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, and the able Postmaster-General of Canada." We are grateful to Canada for the activity with which she agitates Imperial questions, and for the constructive capacity of her statesmen. At the same time we must add, without any desire to quench smoking flax, that we are unable to entertain the extravagant expectations expressed by Mr. Heaton of the consequence of

effecting a useful reduction of postage. However, if others consider we have entered the millenium—so be it.

THE CABLE SCANDAL.

No explanation is as yet forthcoming to explain the scandalous delay in laying a Pacific cable which has become one of the crying needs of the British Empire. We understand that the only serious obstacles to this Imperial undertaking are certain vested interests, some of which desire to maintain the existing monopoly, while others stipulate that if Australia cannot be prevented from having a second cable she shall be compelled to connect with South Africa, and so bring grist to their mill. The Canadians and Australians are capable of penetrating these transparent tactics, and are resolved, we believe, to overcome them. It is most gratifying to learn that during his visit Mr. Mulock, the able Postmaster-General for the Dominion, has conferred with the Agents-General for Australia and New Zealand as to the best means of supplying this long obstructed project. While we continue to slumber in order that certain dividends may be swollen, other countries are alive to the importance of cable communication under the Pacific. Within a very few days of the annexation of Hawaii to the United States it was announced that the Pacific Cable Company of New York had acquired the exclusive right to lay a cable connecting Hawaii with the United States. The company is stated to be "entirely American, has a capital of 10,000,000 dollars, and hopes eventually to extend its cables to the Ladrones, the Philippines, Australia, and Japan." We trust it will carry out these projects, and lighten the outer darkness that at present besets our Australian fellow-subjects. Even the French have a cable to New Caledonia. Cannot the British Empire be shamed into kindred activity?

SAGACITY OF VICTORIA.

Justice has not yet been done to the sound political instinct of the people of Victoria, as shown in their remarkable rally to the cause of Australian Federation in the recent referendum on the Commonwealth Bill. South Australia did well, and the exiguous electorate of Tasmania did splendidly in swamping the "Little Australians," but the palm must be awarded to Victoria because in a populous colony a fairly strong case against that measure could be made to a small-minded people. The Victorian community, however, looked at the question from a broad and patriotic point of view. They are intelligent enough to realize that their own well-being is bound up with a united Australia, and they dismiss those petty provincial considerations which have, unfortunately, carried the day elsewhere.

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Having put a hand to the plough in so determined a fashion, the Victorians will probably keep it there, which augurs well for the future of Federation. When the last mail left Melbourne in the first week of June the official returns were as follows: For the Bill, 94,937; against, 20,678 (these numbers have been since raised by cable to 100,500 and 22,099 respectively). Some of the figures to hand are worth recording. We know of no similar series of majorities in parliamentary history. The voting in the metropolitan area was as follows: Albert Park, Yes, 1,159; No, 236. Brighton, Yes, 1,469; No, 96. Carlton, Yes, 1,139; No, 556. Carlton South, Yes, 690; No, 280. Collingwood, 2,978—1,188; Eastern Suburbs, 1,845—189; Emerald Hill, 818—435; Fitzroy, 1,927—677; Footscray, 1,221—591; Hawthorn, 2,047—227; Jolimont, West Richmond, 1,034—219; Melbourne, 1,432—216; Melbourne East, 1,769—281; Melbourne North, 1,012—513; Melbourne South, 823—337; Melbourne West, 664—281; Port Melbourne, 897—460; Prahran, 1,459—205; Richmond, 1,965—769; South Yarra, 1,227—2,401; St. Kilda, 1,854—158; Toorak, 1,920—184; Williamstown, 1,209—507; Essendon and Flemington, 2,341—5,301. The following was the voting in some country constituencies: Ballarat West, Yes, 3,350; No, 116; Ballarat East, 1,761—129: Sandhurst, 2,849—199; Castlemaine, 1,540—687; Sandhurst South, 1,283—124; Gippsland North, 830—674; Gippsland Central, 888—365; Geelong, 2,278—494; Maryborough, 877—170. An analysis of the returns shows, says the Melbourne *Argus* of June 4th, that in this Colony the Federalists scored a victory right along the line. The total vote is over four to one for the Commonwealth Bill, and in no single electorate was there a majority against it. Not one of the Anti-Federal leaders was able to induce even his own constituents to follow him. Mr. Higgins's friends at Geelong mustered only 494 votes against the Bill, while there were 2,308 for it. At Footscray Mr. Hancock had 591 with him, and 1,225 for the Bill. Mr. Graham had the satisfaction of knowing that his was the only electorate—that of Numurkah—in which there was a majority against the Bill at any of the polling places, but these were only two or three small returns, and the totals for the district showed a large Federal majority. Mr. M'Lean's experience was very disheartening. Even at Maffra, his great stronghold, and among his own familiar friends, there was a majority of one for the Bill, and the total figures for the North Gippsland electorate, which Mr. M'Lean represents, were—Yes, 915; No, 271. In other electorates the disparity in the votes recorded for and against the Bill was enormous. In the two Ballarats 5,118 votes were cast for the Bill, and only 245 against. At Bendigo the numbers were almost as striking—3,749 for, and 279 against. In

St. Kilda, Toorak, Hawthorn, and Brighton the majority for the Bill was 10 to 1 and upwards. The strongholds of the Opposition Party in the metropolis were Collingwood, East Bourke Boroughs, Fitzroy, and Richmond; but only in Collingwood did they get anywhere near the Federal vote, and there they fell 243 short of it.

AUSTRALIAN NATIVES' ASSOCIATION.

We called attention some time ago to the valuable work being done in Victoria by the Australian Natives' Association in the cause of a Big Australia. The leaders of the Federal movement in the Colony abundantly recognize what is due to this admirable organization, and affirm that to its non-existence in the Mother Colony of New South Wales must be ascribed the loss of the Bill. Whatever the cause may be, the people of Victoria have every right to be proud of their record. This feeling finds expression in an interview with Sir George Turner, the Premier, who, within a few hours after the poll, said:—"At the outset I desire to say that I am highly gratified with the result of the vote in Victoria. I did not expect that there would be such a large vote. The result of the vote shows unmistakably how sincere the people of Victoria are in the matter of Federation. I deeply regret that the requisite number of affirmations was not secured in New South Wales. This is to be deplored, because it means delay and possible uncertainty as to the future. It is satisfactory to know that notwithstanding the efforts of the Opposition more people in New South Wales are in favour of than against Federation. I believe that if New South Wales polled again the necessary 80,000 affirmative votes would be secured. It is not likely that the minority there will long continue to oppose the wishes of the people for Australian union. I shall wait a few days to see what Mr. Reid proposes. The poll in New South Wales was so heavy that the matter cannot be lightly set aside by any Government. Mr. Reid and his colleagues will no doubt give cordial consideration to the matter, and make an announcement on the subject. I don't suppose the smaller Colonies would join in another Convention. I think the temper of the people of Victoria is such that they will not consent to another Convention just to give New South Wales all she wants. The other Colonies had to give way to her on several important points, and she ought not, in fairness to the others, to expect a compromise all on one side. If Western Australia will come in, then I will favourably consider a proposal for Federation without New South Wales, which would be almost bound to come in afterwards. All, however, would desire to get the Mother Colony to enter the Federation at the beginning. Personally, I feel inclined to gratify the wish of the people of the other Colonies, irrespective

of the attitude of New South Wales, but we can afford to wait a few weeks." Three weeks after the declaration of the poll the Victorian Parliament was opened in a speech which contained a somewhat vague reference to the Federal question :—"The Federal Constitution had received the approval of a majority in every Colony. Although its adoption had been temporarily delayed, he confidently anticipated that so deliberate, direct, and pronounced an expression of the people's desire must result in an early union of the Colonies." One may venture to express the hope that the people will not allow their politicians to shelve a question on which the country has pronounced itself with such emphasis. The "pea-nut" politician, to use an expressive Americanism, is the real enemy of a Federal Constitution—when he dare be. However, the strong popular sentiment exhibited throughout the Colony should be able to keep him under proper control.

MR. REID'S FEDERAL BILL.

Mr. Reid, the Premier of New South Wales, who consistently maintains that he is a friend of Federation, and is as consistently regarded by its undoubted friends as an enemy, remains unchanged in his attitude, whichever it may be. On the opening of the new Session at Sydney at the end of June the Governor, in his customary speech, said that under the Acts providing for the submission of the Federal Convention Bill to the electors, the result of the poll had been equivalent to the rejection of the measure, but the Government were not prepared to abandon their efforts to arrive at the satisfactory removal of those features of the Bill which prevented the people from voting more largely in its favour and had caused many thousands to vote against it. The Government were, therefore, preparing proposals to modify the Bill in the following respects, and these would shortly be submitted to the electors :—

1. That a bare majority instead of three-fifths be effective at joint sittings of the Houses, or that provision be made for a national Referendum to solve deadlocks.

2. That some of the financial provisions be recast and the Braddon clause omitted.

3. That the Senate should not amend money Bills.

4. That there should be the same protection for the territorial rights of each State as there is for the representation of each State in the Federal Parliament, including more definite provisions regarding inland waters.

5. That regarding the seat of government, the Canadian plan, slightly modified, be adopted.

6. That appellate jurisdiction be remodelled.

Two Bills now hold the field : the first is approved by very large

majorities in three Colonies, and by a small majority in the fourth (New South Wales, where, it must be remembered, there was a majority of ayes, but an insufficient number of them); the second springs from the brain of Mr. Reid, and contains certain features which cannot be accepted by the Federalists. That these are not fanatical, and are anxious to make all possible concessions, is shown by the recent declaration of Mr. Barton, their leader in New South Wales, that he will agree to amendments of the clauses in the Commonwealth Bill relative to finance and deadlocks. He has gone so far as to suggest summoning a new Convention with these objects.

THE GENERAL ELECTION.

At the time of writing a General Election is being fought in New South Wales, which will be decided while these pages are going through the press, and the reader will be able to judge very much better than we can as to the prospects of Federation. The issues are exceedingly obscure, and the parties hopelessly mixed. A very competent—the only competent—appreciation of the position we have met with is in a recent *Westminster Gazette*:—

"The General Election in New South Wales, which takes place next week, is of unusual importance and of quite exceptional interest. Mr. Reid, the present Prime Minister, has signalized his Administration by the introduction of Free Trade, the Mother Colony being the only one of the Australian group which has faithfully carried out the principles of Mr. Cobden. Thus one of the issues involved in the forthcoming appeals to the electorate is distinctively economic. On the other hand, those interested in the working of a Second Chamber will closely observe the verdict of the polls on Mr. Reid's proposals for the reform of the Upper House, under which he would substitute for life membership a limited tenure with nominations to fill the vacancies by the Ministry of the day. Another point worth noting will be the fate of the Labour Party, by whose vote, although divided on the question of Protection, Mr. Reid's Administration has been kept in office. All these issues, however, are completely overshadowed by the importance of the Federal question, and the disappointment felt by the friends of the movement at the alleged treachery of Mr. Reid, who is taxed, and perhaps justly, with the failure of New South Wales to respond by a sufficiently large affirmative vote when the Referendum was held the other day. Mr. Reid in his manifesto boldly challenges public opinion on the action he has taken in throwing over the other Colonies represented at the late Federal Convention, and demanding what is practically a new Federal Constitution specially drawn in the interests of New South Wales. The result of this challenge is that Mr. Barton, the leader of the late Convention, has entered the lists and will contest Mr. Reid's present seat in the Assembly against the Prime Minister. Should Mr. Barton be returned the present titular leader of the Opposition—Mr. Lyne—will be practically superseded. It is almost too much to hope that the result of the elections will be a House of Assembly containing a majority of Federationists on the lines of the Constitution recently rejected, but should such be the case it is still possible that the Federal Constitution will be adopted. Much opposition has been aroused to Mr. Reid by the blunders, particularly in the enforcement of the land and income tax, of which his Administration has been guilty; but as the classes most affected by these include some notorious anti-Federalists it is probable that there will be a

good deal of cross voting under circumstances which preclude anything in the nature of an accurate forecast of the result. There are now in New South Wales Labour men who are Protectionists, and those who are Free Traders. There are Protectionists who are Federalists and those who are not. There are Federalists who are Free Traders and those who are not. Federation would certainly secure inter-Colonial Free Trade among the Federated States, and just as certainly necessitate a Customs tariff extra-Colonial for revenue purposes."

NEW ZEALAND.

Our attention has been called to a failure of which we are fully conscious, viz., the wholly inadequate treatment the affairs of New Zealand receive in these pages. Politically, New Zealand is the most interesting member of the British Empire. Her daring, and by no means unsuccessful, experiments in legislation have attracted world-wide notice; and she is becoming recognized as a great political laboratory. At the same time she is in very imperfect communication with the rest of the world, and does not contribute more than one cablegram a week, if as much, to the news gatherer. Her current events are consequently most difficult to chronicle; and, moreover, this Colony is unlike other Colonies, where the population is usually congested in some huge overgrown city, which inevitably dominates the whole community, and acts as its mouthpiece to the outside world. In New Zealand there is a healthier diffusion of population and interests. In the two islands there are four important towns which used to be the old provincial capitals. They have, to some extent, kept up their traditions as metropolis', an attribute that is necessarily reflected in the Press. For these and similar reasons it is far from easy to see the national life of the country in true perspective. The latest Governor's speech on the opening of Parliament at the end of June (mid-winter) helps, however, to focus public attention on the essentials. The Radical Party have had a very long reign, but the Seddon Ministry, as judged by their latest programme, show no symptoms of decay. As their mouthpiece for the occasion, the Governor (Lord Ranfurly) made the important announcement, "that the defensive forces and harbour defences of the Colony were being overhauled by a committee, and that the Cabinet hoped shortly to submit a scheme for the defence of the Colony to the Imperial Colonial Defence Committee." He added "that the disturbed condition of international relations throughout the world caused the Government to deem it expedient to increase the number of Volunteer Corps, and to supply them with small arms of modern type, munitions of war, and armaments." That is certainly no exaggerated diagnosis. Never has the world been so full of gunpowder as it is just now, and the long threatened explosion may burst at any moment. One may venture to hope that the public opinion

of New Zealand will support the policy of the Government on this vitally important question, and that the obligation will not be considered discharged by a paragraph in the Governor's speech.

"Socialism." The New Zealand Parliament is also to be invited to consider several important domestic projects. The Old-Age Pensions Bill, which was abandoned last Session, will be re-introduced. There will be a Bill for reforming the municipal franchise, presumably in a democratic direction, and another to reform the constitution of the Upper House (the Legislative Council), involving the abolition of life tenure. Speaking next of trade relations with Great Britain, the Governor made a very important announcement. He recalled the fact that at the conference last year between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Colonial Premiers, it was understood that the question of preferential duties for goods manufactured in the Mother Country would be brought by the respective Premiers before their colleagues. This had been done, and the Government were of opinion that an opportunity should be given Parliament to discuss the question, believing that, if the finances of the Colony permitted, an alteration of the Customs tariff might be made in that direction to the advantage both of the Mother Country and of the Colony. The reader can see that the new Session promises to be full and varied. We, necessarily, are no partisans in New Zealand politics. But it seems not inopportune to point out to those who carry on a desultory campaign in the London Press against the "Socialistic Legislation" of the present and recent New Zealand Ministries, that Lord Ranfurly's speech, though drawn up by a Radical Cabinet, contains several proposals in which a steady-going Tory may not only acquiesce but applaud. Has not this denunciation of Colonial Socialism been a little overdone?

The Struggle at the Cape. Such sustained and impudent efforts are made to hoodwink the British public as to the real issues in the General Election for the House of Assembly, which is now in full swing in Cape Colony, that any information with an impress of fairness almost takes one's breath away. Reuter's message of the 19th July seems to be of such a character. It consists of an epitome of three speeches made respectively by the chiefs of the various political parties engaged in the contest. Mr. Rose-Innes, Q.C., who is the great moderating influence in a community where moderation is a rare and therefore valuable quality, leads the Cross Bench Party. In addressing the electors of Claremont he contended "that British supremacy in Africa was quite safe. He deprecated the introduction of loyalty into the

elections, or the waging of the electoral campaign on the Rhodes question, or on any name however great. He was confident no Ministry would be returned antagonistic to the development of Rhodesia." Mr. Rose-Innes is a man of unimpeachable loyalty to the British connection, and one may hope that his sensible and timely declaration will kill some of the nonsense talked by those who invite us to believe that the fate of the British Empire depends on the triumph of the present Premier, Sir Gordon Sprigg. Those who regard the welfare of the Empire as of infinitely greater importance than the aggrandisement of any individual—and there are many so-called Imperialists who do *not* hold this view—are delighted to have Mr. Rose-Innes' assurance as to the Imperial sentiment of Cape Colony which confirms their own surmises. It is also encouraging to know that, whatever may happen at the elections, Rhodesia will be given every opportunity of proving itself a valuable country. That the Cape could be hostile to the development of Rhodesia has always appeared incredible to us, but it has been necessary on occasions to represent Mr. Rhodes as struggling with adversity, so we have had to submit to sensational accounts of opposition to his "Imperial ideas."

Sir Gordon Sprigg.

While Mr. Rose-Innes was enlightening the electors of Claremont, Sir J. Gordon Sprigg, the leader of the Rhodesian Party and the present Prime Minister of the Colony, was improving the occasion at Grahamstown. He made the startling asseveration that "war was the last thing the Government desired in Africa"—a disclaimer that gives one an unpleasant impression of the mischief caused by the vapourings of journalistic jingoes. That it should have imposed on any considerable section of the people of South Africa as, judging from the declaration of the Premier, it must have done, while affording a further tribute to the "power of the Press," is a distinct reflection upon the discretion of those who have swallowed this legend. What "Government" is accused of "wanting war" in Africa? Sir Gordon Sprigg's Cabinet has no authority to make war, while the Imperial Government is notoriously inspired by a dove-like devotion to peace in all parts of the world. Personally we do not believe in the perilous doctrine of peace at any price, but there is no place where peace is more precious than South Africa. There a war would present specially hideous features, and would leave a legacy of difficulties and bitterness which time could hardly efface. One would require to be an anarchist to "want war" in this particular part of the world. The only possible causes of a war, and the only rational ones, would be either some foreign interference in an already complex political system,

e.g., in reference to Delagoa Bay, or the repudiation of the London Convention by the Transvaal Government. But if Great Britain has made it plain, as our statesmen allege she has, that she will not submit to see Delagoa Bay pass into the control of any nation other than its present possessor, Portugal, *and if other nations believe we mean business*, no attempts on Delagoa Bay will be attempted. Again, the Transvaal Government, while denying that Great Britain has suzerain rights, whatever these may be, has given repeated assurances that it abides by the London Convention, and its defenders indignantly repudiate the suggestion that at their own time the Boers will denounce it. On these assumptions it is not easy to understand the anxiety which Sir Gordon Sprigg sought to allay, by declaring that "war was the last thing the Government desired in Africa." He made a cryptic remark on the Imperial question, suggesting that for electioneering purposes "British supremacy" was the private property of himself and party, and warning off all intruders. Now, from the British point of view it is infinitely preferable that the question of British supremacy should *not* be an issue in a Colonial General Election. Mr. Rose-Innes' position seems to us to be far sounder and more truly Imperial than that of Sir Gordon Sprigg. Supposing the latter is beaten in this election after having established a personal and party monopoly in "British supremacy," what would be the position of the British Empire in South Africa?" Surely it is better that British supremacy should be upheld by all three parties, one of which must win, than by one alone—which may lose.

A Chameleon.

Sir Gordon Sprigg stated that "he sympathized with Mr. Rhodes' enterprise in the north, but considered it would be better promoted by the support of a strong Government of which Mr. Rhodes was not the head." We confess to being entirely lost in this remark. When Sir Gordon Sprigg was in England at the time of the Jubilee, he wrote a letter to Mr. Chamberlain which excited great attention, and made a marked impression on public opinion. To lookers-on it had previously appeared that Mr. Rhodes' Transvaal policy must have caused deep resentment to the Dutch of Cape Colony, who, however much they may resent the mediæval Toryism of Pretoria, have a kindly feeling towards both the Dutch Republics. How could he remain a popular hero with the Dutch after the Raid, and, as the Dutch of the Colony are to the British in about the proportion of three to two, it seemed incredible that he could be reasonably regarded, at any rate for the time being, as the idol of the Colony. However, we were all silenced by the letter of Sir Gordon Sprigg, who, as Premier, "ought to know the

sentiment of Cape Colony much better than any outsider." This document was read to the House of Commons by the Colonial Secretary for the information of the country. Here is a typical passage: "With respect to Mr. Rhodes, it is my belief that he still retains to a large extent the popularity he has enjoyed in South Africa for some years. Speaking for the Cape Colony, I should say that a vast majority of the English population support him strongly, and I doubt whether more than half of even the Dutch population are really opposed to him. . . . Mr. Rhodes has rendered great services to the Empire in South Africa—services so extraordinary that they would be regarded as a set-off against the wrong he has committed. That will be the verdict of history, and that, I am convinced, would be the judgment of the majority of the people of the Cape Colony if a poll were taken on the question to-day." The Premier, therefore, warned the Imperial Government that any attempt to remove Mr. Rhodes from the Privy Council would be unfavourably viewed in Cape Colony. Constancy is evidently not the diapason of Sir Gordon Sprigg's statesmanship. Having been regarded as Mr. Rhodes' political champion here, and as the leader of the Rhodesian Party in the Colony, he now coolly comes forward on the verge of the elections and practically banishes Mr. Rhodes to the wilds of Rhodesia, on the ground that he is not a suitable Premier of the Cape! Either Sir Gordon Sprigg has grossly misled the British people by representing Mr. Rhodes as having the Colony behind him, or he is misleading the Colony by representing Mr. Rhodes as unfit for the Cape Premiership.

THE AFRIKANDER BOND MANIFESTO.

While the Premier was mystifying the electors of Grahamstown Mr. Schreiner, who leads the Opposition, was declaring himself at Malmesbury. According to Reuter, he "severely criticized Sir Gordon Sprigg for fighting the election on the question of British supremacy. He contended that Afrikanders were loyal to the backbone and wished to live under no other flag than the British. But, he added, the Afrikander wished the neighbouring republics to govern and dispose of their own internal questions without interference from outside." On another occasion, Mr. Schreiner elaborated his political views and issued what may be regarded as the programme of the Afrikander Party. It is worthy of attention, as not a few well-posted observers predict that Mr. Schreiner will supplant Sir Gordon Sprigg in the Premiership. We take this summary from *The Daily Mail* correspondent at Cape Town: "Mr. Schreiner, the Afrikander Bond leader, has issued a manifesto recognizing the critical nature of the situation, and appealing

for the return of men loyal to the Queen, but determined to end the misrepresentation of the people by the present Cabinet." He advocates :—

1. A substantial contribution to the Imperial Navy.
2. Protection for farmers and manufacturers.
3. A South African Customs Union.
4. "A firm and just policy towards the natives."
5. Education Reform.
6. The development of irrigation.
7. "Such a redistribution of seats as would lawfully provide that the healthy balance of power presently subsisting should not be unduly disturbed."
8. A "sympathetic" attitude towards Rhodesia.
9. Cordial relations with all neighbours.

Those who for their own purposes continue, in the face of a programme pledging the Afrikander Party to the policy of a contribution to the Royal Navy, to denounce the Afrikanders as "disloyal" are themselves disloyal to British interests. We are glad to note that this programme has had an excellent effect on British opinion, and has sensibly diminished the capital of the Rhodesian Press.

"DREADS." The Schreiner manifesto is reported as "dealing exhaustively with Mr. Rhodes," and expresses "dreads" as to his "regaining his former dual position as Premier and head of the Chartered Company, and contends that Mr. Rhodes has abundant opportunity and scope for the exercise of his organizing activities in developing the system of civilized government in Rhodesia." What is this mysterious "dread" of Mr. Rhodes of which we get so many hints in this election? They puzzle the average Englishman, who is wont to regard the "Colossus" as the *deus ex machina* of South Africa. Let us examine the question so that we may be in a position to appreciate the meaning of a Rhodesian defeat, or the significance of a Rhodesian victory. A recent number of *The Express* of Bloemfontein, the capital of the Orange Free State, contains a remarkable article, entitled "The Cape Colony on Trial," which undertakes to explain this "dread." It opens with some generalizations which indicate the standpoint of the writer. "We love to dwell upon the idea of a South African Family of States, each, whilst not neglectful of its own interests, seeking the welfare of its others, and all working unitedly for the mutual good of the whole. South Africans are really one people. The two sections composing its main white factors are closely related by blood, strikingly alike in mental characteristics (especially in 'that determination which one's friends call obstinacy'), and both are heirs to the proudest

traditions. Seldom has a nation fought such a fight for freedom as the Dutch, under William of Orange, fought against Spain and the Inquisition. . . . It is, indeed, a splendid tradition that the Dutch Afrikanders have. And, as for those South Africans of British descent—what need to speak of that tight little island in the north, the mother of nations, the apostle and champion of political and religious freedom! England has but to stand true to her high traditions, and she is peerless among the nations of the world. Here in South Africa are the descendants of these two nations, loving South Africa as they love no other country in the world; for is it not the land that gave them birth, and that is associated with every incident in their lives? They are no longer living merely side by side, the relationship is closer; they are being educated together, their interests are identical, they are rapidly intermarrying, they are becoming one South African people. If they are but left to work out their own destiny, if the embers of race feeling are not fanned into flame, but quietly allowed to smoulder out and die, soon there will be no white race problem. It is the self-seeking politician and the Jingo that are the menace to this country. The English *nation* is large, generous, and fair. If what the English *people* desire can be done in South Africa, a nation will arise here loving England, loyal to the noblest traditions, and united to her in the closest bonds of comradeship."

AN UNFAMILIAR VIEW.

The Express proceeds to present this wholly unfamiliar view of the struggle at the Cape:—

"Now, the situation is almost painfully simple, if one understands Mr. Rhodes. He is enormously wealthy, and supported by the wealthiest financial house in the world; he is aided by impecunious aristocrats, to whom he has cringed, as he once cringed to the Bond; he is able, resolute, thoroughly unscrupulous, and consumed with personal ambition—his sole end being his own personal aggrandizement, at whatever cost to the British Empire, and at whatever cost to purity of public life and constitutional government in South Africa, and especially in the Cape Colony. That is the man, and his problem is how to aggrandize himself. The one act which would leave him renown, unenviable though it would be unless obtained honourably, is to make the whole of South Africa British—as he puts it, 'to paint the map red.' Now, he is the one man who not only cannot do this, but who cannot even help towards it, unless he acts upon the wise advice of Mr. Innes and Mr. Schreiner, and retires from public life at the Cape. His acts have made a closer union or a federation absolutely impossible in South Africa while he remains an accredited politician at the Cape or in England. He knows this perfectly well: a man would be mentally blind who could not see it. Now, unless he can force a federation by a bloody war, he must inevitably become less and less. No more credit seems likely to be got from Rhodesia, and the Premiership of the Cape pure and simple—what is it when such a man as Sir Gordon Sprigg can fill it three times? Mr. Rhodes' idea of federation is: 'Be my brother or I kill you!' Not that he really cares about South Africa being federated or being British: all he cares is that *he* should bring it about; and if *he* cannot do it, he will take good care that the federation we all desire shall not come by the natural evolution of events.

Time was when, not only privately but publicly on the floor of the Cape House of Assembly, he advocated (the words are his own) 'the elimination of the Imperial factor'; time was when he literally hauled down the British flag in Bechuanaland and styled himself (again the words are his own) 'Oom Paul's young burgher!' At any rate, whatever his reasons are for wishing to 'federate' South Africa, *he* can only do it by getting England to attack the Transvaal. That is quite clear. It will be almost impossible for him to bring this about unless he becomes Premier of the Cape Colony—a contingency Mr. Chamberlain dwelt upon with pleasure in the British House of Commons. This is the inwardness of the political struggle now proceeding in the Cape Colony, and every leading man there knows it."

THE ORANGE FREE STATE TO THE CAPE.

This important Orange Free State organ concludes with an appeal to Cape Colony which will interest our readers whether they agree with it or not. The whole article affords food for very serious reflection:—"The Cape Colony is on its trial. Does it mean fair-play to the Republics or not? If it returns Mr. Rhodes as Premier (Sir Gordon Sprigg and the other members of the Ministry are but his marionettes), it throws down the gauntlet to the Republics, and it does it deliberately with its eyes open; it stabs in the face people (we refer especially to the inhabitants of this State) who desire to live in close comradeship with it, who desire to see a United South Africa, and who only look for the manifestation of that sense of honour and 'fair-play' so justly the proud boast of the right sort of Englishman, and of the English nation when it understands a situation and can make its voice heard. If, on the other hand, it is not swayed by an unworthy race feeling; if it rejects the man who has violated every tradition dear and honourable to Englishmen; if it refuses to put at the head of a Ministry a man who has proved himself utterly unworthy of such a high trust as an Englishman and as a man, and who has done such incalculable harm to South Africa; then we shall know it is being guided by a just sense of its honour, by a manly consideration for its neighbours, by a profound love for South Africa, that it is honouring its most honourable men, and striving to uphold the highest traditions of a great Empire."

THE TRANSVAAL'S BLUNDER.

Mr. Kotze, the late Chief Justice of the Transvaal, has behaved with considerable circumspection during his visit to Europe. Those who hoped to make a catspaw of him have been disappointed, and his abstinence from political demonstrations against the Government of the community he has served so well is prudent. He will probably take the opportunity to state his case to the British public before he returns to South Africa, but so far his utterances have been few and far between. On one occasion he addressed the Anglo-African Writers' Club in a short speech. He alluded to the "now some-

what historic case of 'Brown against the Transvaal Government'" and to the decision of the Court thereon, and afterwards remarked that, if the Judges were not allowed to test the acts of the Executive and the Legislature by reference to the ordinary law and Constitution, the Transvaal would cease to be a constitutionally-governed country, and would become subject to the wiles and whims of an oligarchy, for the moment the Transvaal Executive so wished they could dispose of the property and liberty of the subject in half an hour by a resolution passed by means of the casting vote of the Chairman of the Volksraad. That was not all. The existing Judges took office under existing laws and the Constitution, which guaranteed to them absolute independence in the exercise of their judicial functions, which also guaranteed to them their appointments for life; they could not be dismissed from office until after a charge had been lodged against them and that charge had been duly and properly investigated by a specially-constituted Court. He emphatically denied that the Judges of the Transvaal were in as independent a position as they were in a year or two ago, and he defended the position which he had taken up. Was the act for which he had suffered to go unchallenged, uncondemned, and unpunished? They would only be able to hope for better things when the old population came to look on the newcomers as their best friends—when the old burghers came to realize that, by moving with the times, they would strengthen themselves and develop their own country. The solution of all their difficulties in the future lay in the extension of the franchise to outsiders who went to the Transvaal. Mr. Kotze here puts his finger on the cardinal blunder made by President Kruger and his advisers. Wise statesmanship would have utilized the last two years to broaden the State by admitting to its privileges the stable elements among the Uitlanders. Until their reasonable claims are recognized the Government of the Transvaal will inspire no confidence, and the welfare of its people will not be assured. The British Government may have done unwise things and its members have certainly said unwise things, but such acts and utterances do not exonerate the reactionary policy of the Republic.

A CRISIS IN DOMINICA.

An acute political crisis has arisen in one of the smaller West Indian islands—Dominica, which enjoys a mixed form of Government, the Legislative Assembly being partially elected and partially nominated. The Secretary for the Colonies has offered Imperial aid to the Colony, on condition that the Constitution should be so modified as to give the Crown control of the finances which we infer would involve the reduction, but not the abolition, of the elected element.

The Legislative Assembly considered this proposal in the middle of June, and, after an exciting debate, it was rejected by eight votes to six. The Assembly was forthwith dissolved amid great popular excitement. The General Election extended over a fortnight. Of the seven newly elected members six are opposed to altering the Constitution and reverting to the status of a Crown Colony, and one is in favour of the scheme. This was believed to assure the passage of the Government Bill, as the solitary "Crown Colonist" was expected, when the last news came, to vote with the officials and nominees and thus secure a majority of ayes. We notice that the General Election weakened the opposition to the Bill, and it seems only reasonable that if the Imperial Government is to provide a subsidy, the Crown should be assured control of the finances on the principle that who pays the piper should call the tune. We say this without affecting to offer any apology for the general economic attitude of the Mother Country towards her stricken West Indian Colonies.

SIERRA LEONE.

The recent rising in Sierre Leone seems to have been driven below the surface, and as the whole matter is to be enquired into it is unnecessary for us to indict anybody. It has been generally assumed by those who know West Africa best, such as Miss Kingsley, that the trouble originated in the imposition of a hut tax which the natives regarded as an indication that the British were about to appropriate their homes. The other side is stated by a recent correspondent of *The Times*. He points out that the red patch on the map marked "Sierre Leone" consists of the colony proper which contains less than 1,000 square miles, and its hinterland of 40,000 square miles, which, since 1896, has been proclaimed a protectorate, having previously been "a sphere of influence" in which our influence was of a very shadowy character:—"Though nominally subject to our influence, prior to 1896 slavery was in full force and the slave trade a flourishing industry. Savage rites and cannibalism were constantly in vogue, and the terrible murders by the dreaded 'human leopards' added a new horror to tribal life." The defence continues:—

"When once, however, we had taken the country under our charge it naturally behoved the Government to put down slavery and make an end of cannibalism in any form, and it is to the British efforts in this direction that the recent rising is due. With increased responsibilities and duties in keeping the Queen's peace in the protectorate, it became necessary for the colony to cast about for increased revenue to meet the cost of the administration. At the present time with specific duties on the most important imports and a 10 per cent. *ad valorem* duty on other goods it is impracticable to make any addition to the customs dues, consequently recourse has been had to the hut tax, which is a source of revenue in every colony British or foreign, in Africa.

"During his tours the Governor had every opportunity of gauging the ability of the people to pay the tax, and its provisions were framed so as not to weigh oppressively on the community. The huts paid on are permanent, substantial dwellings, often of several rooms, with wattle and mud walls seven or eight feet high and a foot thick, and with lattice roofs thickly thatched and projecting so as to form a sort of piazza. Others again have an enclosed compound. Many of them have windows and doors of woodwork and European bedsteads and furniture, and most have tables and chairs. The huts are quite fit for European occupation, and the Governor during his tours invariably slept in them."

It is also stated that in the adjoining colony of Guinée Française a hut tax of 10 francs has replaced a poll tax of 2 francs per head and is paid without any trouble. The facts are alleged to show those who do *not* "judge superficially" and "jump to a conclusion" that the Sierra Leone rising "is primarily due to a general hatred of the British for having put down slavery and savage practices, and the hut tax is merely a pretext for the revolt. As regards the hut tax itself, it would be the height of folly to remit it, as natives cannot understand clemency of that kind. Far better would it be to impose it on the colony proper, as much of the resentment of the chiefs against the tax arises from the knowledge that the Sierra Leoneans pay no direct taxes and that the new railway will mainly benefit Freetown." Mr. Chamberlain is well advised in sending out a Special Commissioner (Sir David Chalmers) to report on the whole question.

UGANDA. After a silence of many weeks we get another glimpse of Uganda (*The Times*, July 18th), where affairs have long been in a hideous mess owing to causes which have not been officially explained, and ought to be enquired into. As it is under the Foreign Office, however, we may rest assured that every effort will be made to burke enquiry, and to conceal the mismanagement which has cost many valuable lives and tens of thousands of pounds. We suspect the *fons et origo mali* to be in Downing Street. It is indeed significant that while the Colonial Office is despatching a Special Commissioner with plenary powers to investigate the recent disturbances in Sierra Leone, the Foreign Office declines to grant an independent investigation into the far more serious occurrences in Eastern Africa. We need not recapitulate the well-known story of the collapse of the Macdonald expedition owing to the mutiny of the Sudanese troops, who, after many months' continuous campaigning on insufficient pay, which was not even paid, were unexpectedly ordered on a distant expedition to an unknown country under the command of an officer who did not understand them. The mutineers, several hundred strong, broke away and made for Lubwa's Fort on the Nile, which they reached on 18th October.

Here they remained besieged for three months by the motley forces collected by Major Macdonald. Frequent skirmishes occurred, the Sudanese fighting with their habitual dash, and in one engagement the Waganda troops were reported to have left 300 men on the field. Major Macdonald's army tended to augment by reinforcements from various parts of the world while the rebel ranks became steadily thinner, but the garrison could not be reduced. Finally, however, on the 9th January, the long investment closed by the escape of the Sudanese. Major Macdonald not having been able to establish an effective command of the sea, and the only "fleet in being" being a canoe which the Waganda refused to row, the besieged crossed the Nile in a dhow. They were subsequently followed on land by various contingents from India and elsewhere, and were ultimately overpowered by superior numbers. *The Times* correspondent in Uganda, writing on April 23rd, calls attention to the "deplorable" consequences of this revolt :—

"We thereby lose the services of an excellent body of troops—ideal troops for this country, as they will carry their own food and ammunition, and can be got ready to start half an hour after the order has been given. They are excellent fighters withal, many of them having been with General Gordon at Khartoum, and later with Emin Pasha and Sir Samuel Baker. It is true that they are hired troops, and have on two previous occasions shown a disposition to mutiny; but if their grievances had only been considered earlier, and less parsimony shown in our dealings with them, they would have constituted an offensive and defensive force to be unequalled in Africa, and one of the bulwarks of the Empire. The Indian insists on having the food he is accustomed to, and the transport of Indian rations to Uganda means that each sepoy costs the Government about four rupees a day to feed. An Indian regiment in Uganda on Indian rations thus costs the Government about £78,000 a year."

There should be a rigid and immediate enquiry into this scandalous affair; but there will be no enquiry. Mr. Curzon will make one of his disingenuous speeches in the House of Commons, and if there is any division the Ministerial flock of sheep will outnumber the Opposition flock, and that will be the end of it.

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